Republic of the Philippines

Department of Labor and Employment

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
Regional Arbitration Branch No. XIII
Butuan City

AMOR C. POWERS,
NLRC CASE NO. RAB-13-02Complainant,
00075-2015
FOR: Constructive Dismissal with
Claim
for
Wage
Backwages,
Leave Pay,
Holiday

Differentials,
Service Incentive
Rest Day Pay,
Pay, Overtime Pay,

Separation Pay, Damages, and

Attorneys Fees
-versusEGV GROCERY and/or
Eduardo G. Evangelista
In His Capacity as Proprietor,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------x

MEMORANDUM
(For the Respondent)
Respondent, EGV GROCERY and Eduardo G. Evangelista,
through the undersigned counsel and unto this Honorable Court,
most respectfully aver THUS:

I.

The Parties

1. Complainant, Amor C. Powers, is of legal age and currently

residing at Brgy. Ampayon, Butuan City, where she may be served
with legal processes and notices issued by this Honorable Court;

2. Respondent EGV GROCERY, represented by Eduardo G.

Evangelista, is situated in J.C. Aquino, Butuan City, where it may be
served with legal notices issued by this Honorable Court;
II.
Statement of the Case
The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes
neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. While the
Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the
protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every
labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor.
Management also has its own rights, which, as such, are entitled to
respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play.
This case involving Eduardo Evangelista is a classic example of
an erroneous imputation of an act prejudicial to labor. Mr. Evangelista
is wrongfully accused of constructive dismissal resulting in violation of
his own rights under the governing principles of labor and capital.

III.

Statement of the Facts

Amor C. Powers was an employee of EGV Grocery for nine (9)

years. She tendered her voluntary resignation on March 14, 2014,
stating, among others, that she needed more time to take care of her
little baby. She could not rely anymore on the nanny. Upon her
resignation, she was given an amount of Php 9,000.00 as pabaon.
Prior to her resignation, from February 3, 2012 to March 14,
2014, Amor was paid Php 233.00 per day with free lunch (which is
equivalent to Php 30.00). She worked from 8:00 AM to 7:00 PM with
one-hour lunch break without overtime pay. (Minimum wage was set
at Php 268.00 per day.)
The payroll showed that in one month, she only worked for 26
days.
She received 13th month pay, which was Php 800.00 lesser
than what she was supposed to receive.
She did not receive Service Incentive Leave Pay.
One year after her resignation, Amor Powers filed a Labor case
against Eduardo Evangelista, contending, among others, that she
was constructively dismissed. According to her, there have been
several times in the past when she pleaded for an increase in her

salary, but the same was refused by the Management. She tendered
her resignation because her continued employment with the store
was already unbearable, knowing that she was underpaid. She also
claimed that when she begged for an overtime pay, she was also
refused. Hence, the filing of the complaint proceeded.
Documentary Evidence submitted by Amor Powers: none.
On the part of the respondent:
The respondent contended that Amor Powers should not be
granted the monetary claims as prayed for in her complaint because
of the fact that she was not constructively dismissed. Her resignation
was voluntary. In fact, she was even given a sum of money to be
construed as pabaon.
Since she was given free lunch, which is valued at Php 30.00,
the management could not anymore grant an increase in her salary.
Besides, she was not underpaid because the lunch, which is valued
at Php 30.00, can compensate for the difference in the wage.
Respondent submitted the Payroll showing, among others, that
Amor Powers was given a salary of Php 233.00 per day.
The respondent also submitted the Resignation Letter given by
Amor Powers when she voluntarily tendered her resignation.
Respondent contended that Amor Powers is not entitled to
receive Backwages and Separation Pay because she was not
constructively dismissed. She was not also entitled to receive wage
differential because the Management provided lunch, which was
valued at Php 30.00.
III. Issues
1.

Whether or not there was constructive dismissal.

2.
Whether or not Amor Powers is entitled to receive the
monetary claims as prayed for in her complaint, e.g., Backwages,
Separation Pay, Wage Differential, Overtime Pay, Holiday Pay,
Service Incentive Leave Pay, 13th Month Pay Differential, and
Attorneys Fees.
3.
Whether or not an employee who voluntarily tendered her
resignation can still receive the above stated monetary claims.

IV.
1.

Argument/Discussion

There was no constructive dismissal.

Constructive dismissal has been defined by the Supreme Court

in the case of Aguilar vs Burger Machine Holdings Corporation, GR
No. 172062 as an involuntary resignation on the part of the employee due to
the harsh, hostile and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. In other words,
it is an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not. In fact,
the employee who is constructively dismissed may be allowed to keep on coming
to work. Constructive dismissal is therefore a dismissal in disguise. It is brought
about where there is clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer
and this becomes unbearable to the employee.

In the present controversy, it cannot be said that Amor Powers

involuntarily resigned due to any harsh, hostile, or unfavorable
conditions set by her employer EGV Grocery because the termination
of her employment was due to the fact that she tendered her
voluntary resignation on March 14, 2014, stating, among others, that
she needed more time to take care of her little baby because she
could no longer rely on the nanny.
Upon her resignation, she even accepted Php 9,000.00 from her
employer as pabaon, which clearly belies any allegation of
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain on the part of the employer.
Further, Art. 285(a) of the Labor Code provides that an employee
may terminate without just cause the employee-employer relationship by serving
a written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance.

In the case at bar, Amor Powers, by free and voluntary act,

tendered her resignation on March 14, 2014, stating, among others,
that she needed more time to take care of her little baby as she could
no longer rely on the nanny. The letter represented well her intention,
and true as it may appear, it stated her reasons for such intention.
There was nothing stated therefrom from which it can be inferred any
form of forced resignation, much less constructive dismissal, due to
any unlikely treatment committed by her employer against her.
The case of Phimco Industries vs. National Labor Relations
Commission and R. Carpio, G.R. No. 118041 (June 11, 1997) is
explicit that in cases of voluntary resignation, the law affords the employee the
right to resign regardless of whether the company has found an able and
competent replacement and whether the operation of the company would be

affected, provided he serves a written notice on the employer at least one (1)
month in advance. The rule requiring an employee to stay or complete the 30day period prior to the effectivity of his resignation becomes discretionary on the
part of management as an employee who intends to resign may be allowed a
shorter period before his resignation becomes effective.

EGV Grocery, the employer of Amor Powers, thereafter

rightfully granted such resignation as she was able to comply with the
necessary written notice, which she must tender before resigning. As
resignation is a right, Amor Powers can invoke such right anytime, as
long as she proceeds with the process accordingly.
In Alfaro vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 140812 (August 28,
2001), the Supreme Court defined voluntary resignation as the act of
an employee who finds himself in a situation in which he believes that personal
reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service; thus, he has
no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. The High

Court went on to say that illegal dismissal and voluntary resignation are
adversely opposed modes of terminating employment relations, in that the
presence of one precludes that of the other.

When Amor Powers tendered her resignation due to a personal

reason, which is because she needed more time to take care of her
baby as the nanny became unreliable, it is humbly submitted that
she, in effect, resigned voluntarily and was never dismissed
constructively.
Allegations pertaining to underpayment, denial of her request
for an increase in salary, and payment of overtime pay cannot be
appreciated because she failed to present to the court any evidence
that would prove her claim. She was unable to produce a copy of the
said letter of request or demand. In fact, she submitted no
documentary evidence at all to support her allegations. Hence, all her
claims are mere self-serving.
As the Court in the case of Abella vs. Court of Appeals, 257
SCRA 482 (June 20, 1996) held that oral testimony as to a certain fact,
depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written
or documentary evidence. I would sooner trust the smallest slip of paper for
truth, said Judge Limpkin of Georgia, than the strongest and most retentive
memory ever bestowed on mortal man.

On the other hand, EGV Grocery submitted documentary

evidence consisting of Payroll showing, among others, that Amor
Powers was given her salary of Php 233.00 per day, as well as the
Resignation Letter given by Amor Powers when she voluntarily

tendered her resignation.

As Section 3, Rule 130, of the Rules on Evidence on the Best
Evidence Rule provides, when the subject of an inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, x x x.

Although it is well settled that in labor cases, the employer has

the burden of proving that the employee was not dismissed, or if
dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal, the Court of Last Resort
made an equally significant ruling in Arc-Men Food Industries Inc. v.
NLRC, 338 Phil. 870, the Court ruled that the substantial evidence
proffered by the employer that it had not, in the first place, terminated the
employee, should not simply be ignored on the pretext that the employee would
not have filed the complaint for illegal dismissal if he had not really been
dismissed. This is clearly a non sequitur reasoning that can never validly take the
place of the evidence of both the employer and the employee.

The High Court held in De Jesus vs. Guerrero, GR No. 174191,

that In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding
of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the
complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in
his complaint. The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof.

In Madrigalejos vs Geminilou Trucking Service, GR No.

179174, the employee presented a lone piece of evidence to
substantiate his claim for constructive dismissal, which consisted of
an unsigned copy of the Kasunduan sa Pag-upa ng Serbisyo.
Petitioner averred that he refused to sign the kasunduan as it sought
to alter his status from a regular employee to a contractual worker.
Here, although the employee presented documentary evidence to
prove his allegation, the Supreme Court still ruled that it fell short of
the required quantum of proof, which is substantial evidence.
Considering that in the instant controversy, Amor Powers never
submitted any documentary evidence, it is only reasonable to hold
that her self-serving allegations must fail. Ultimately, based on the
above facts and jurisprudence, circumstances that would prove
presence of constructive dismissal are absent.

2.

BACKWAGES

Amor Powers is not entitled to backwages.

The term "backwages" has been defined in the case of St.
Theresa's School of Novaliches Foundation vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
122955 as "that for earnings lost by a worker due to his illegal dismissal.
Backwages are generally granted on grounds of equity. Payment thereof is a
form of relief that restores the income lost by reason of such unlawful dismissal.
It is not private compensation or damages, but is awarded in furtherance and
effectuation of the public objectives of the labor Code. Nor is it a redress of a
private right but, rather, in the nature of a command to the employer to make
public reparation for dismissing an employee, either due to the former's unlawful
act or bad faith."

Moreover, in the case of St. Joseph Academy of Valenzuela

Faculty Association-Fur Chapter vs. St. Joseph Academy of
Valenzuela, G.R. No. 182957, June 13, 2013, the Supreme Court
ruled that the Court of Appeals is correct in deleting the award of backwages.
Generally, the finding of illegal dismissal entitles an employee to the twin
remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages.

Also, Article 279 of the Labor Code states, in part, that an

employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time
of his actual reinstatement. These twin remedies reinstatement and payment of
backwages make the dismissed employee whole who can then look forward to
continued employment.

Based on these jurisprudence, we can infer that one must have

been illegally dismissed to be entitled to backwages as this is his/her
supposed earnings but were not collected because of the unjust
dismissal. In the case at hand, Amor Powers was not unjustly
dismissed. She voluntarily submitted her resignation letter to the
management for the reason that she needed more time to take care
of her baby as the nanny became unreliable. Hence, she cannot
claim any backwages.
SEPARATION PAY
Amor Powers is not entitled to receive Separation Pay.
The case of National Labor Union vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R.
No. 41459 (Dec. 18, 1987) provides that the previous termination pay law,

Republic Act 1052, as amended, has been consistently construed by the

Supreme Court as granting to the employer the right to terminate the
employment of an employee with or without just cause, the employer should
serve notice on the employee at least one (1) month in advance. It was the
failure to serve such notice that rendered the employer liable for separation pay
and not the fact that the employment was severed without just cause.

Based on the immediately preceding jurisprudence, it can be

inferred that the determining factor of the employers liability to pay its
employee a separation pay is its failure to comply with the one (1)
month notice rule, that is, it must serve notice on the employee at
least one (1) month in advance of its intention to terminate the latter.
With regards to the one (1) month notice that the employer must
serve before termination of an employee, the same is inapplicable in
the instant case because severance from the employment did not
originate from the employer but from Amor Powers herself. Amor
Powers, by voluntary and free act, tendered her resignation letter.
The intention to dissolve the employment or sever employment bonds
came from Amor Powers, her act of serving a resignation letter upon
her employer.
The question now to be resolved becomes: Whether an
employee who voluntarily resigned is entitled to separation pay.
The case of Travelaire and Tours Corp. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission and N. Medelyn, G.R. No. 131523 (August 20,
1998) prevails: The general rule is that an employee who voluntarily resigns
from employment is NOT entitled to separation pay, unless there is a stipulation
for payment of such in the employment contract or Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), or payment of the amount is sanctioned by established
employer practice or policy.

In the same vein, the Supreme Court held in J Marketing

Corporation vs. Taran, GR No. 163921, that separation pay may be
awarded only in cases when the termination of employment is due to (a)
installation of labor-saving devices, (b) redundancy, (c) retrenchment, (d) closing
or cessation of business operations, (e) disease of an employee and his
continued employment is prejudicial to himself or his co-employees, or (f) when
an employee is illegally dismissed but reinstatement is no longer feasible. In fact,
the rule is that an employee who voluntarily resigns from employment is not
entitled to separation pay, except when it is stipulated in the employment contract
or collective bargaining agreement (CBA), or it is sanctioned by established
employer practice or policy.

There was nothing in the complaint, as can be inferred from

the allegations therein, which would show that payment of separation

pay is accorded upon an employee who resigned. In fact, there was

no employment contract submitted as evidence by the complainant.
Nor was there a policy or practice by the establishment on the same.
In Lilia Pascua, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 123518 (March
13, 1998), the Supreme Court reiterated that the grant of separation pay,
however, is inconsistent with existing employment or voluntary resignation, for it
presupposes illegal dismissal.

Hence, Amors claim for separation pay must perforce fail.

OVERTIME PAY
Amor Powers is not entitled to overtime pay.
There was no substantial evidence to support the grant of
overtime pay. Noteworthy is the case of Pigcaulan vs. Security and
Credit Investigation, Inc., GR No. 173648, where the Supreme Court
rendered a decision to the effect that both the Labor Arbiter and
NLRC erred in relying heavily on the itemized computations
submitted by complainant, which he considered as representative
daily time records to substantiate the award of salary differentials.
Said the High Court, The handwritten itemized computations are selfserving, unreliable and unsubstantial evidence to sustain the grant of salary
differentials, particularly overtime pay. Unsigned and unauthenticated as they
are, there is no way of verifying the truth of the handwritten entries stated therein.
Written only in pieces of paper and solely prepared by Canoy and Pigcaulan,
these representative daily time records, as termed by the Labor Arbiter, can
hardly be considered as competent evidence to be used as basis to prove that
the two were underpaid of their salaries. We find nothing in the records which
could substantially support Pigcaulans contention that he had rendered service
beyond eight hours to entitle him to overtime pay and during Sundays to entitle
him to rest day pay. Hence, in the absence of any concrete proof that additional
service beyond the normal working hours and days had indeed been rendered,
we cannot affirm the grant of overtime pay to Pigcaulan.
In the case of Lagatic vs. NLRC, 285 SCRA 262, the Supreme Court
emphasized that entitlement to overtime pay must first be established by proof
that said overtime work was actually performed, before an employee may avail of
said benefit.

Applying the foregoing jurisprudence to the case at bar, it is

humbly submitted that the failure of Amor Powers to introduce even a
single documentary evidence is fatal to her monetary claim for
overtime pay.

HOLIDAY PAY
Amor Powers is not entitled to Holiday Pay.
Art. 94(a) of the Labor Code provides that EVERY worker shall be
paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, x x x

Section 3, Rule IV of the Implementing Rules of the Labor

Code, defines that the term holiday exclusively refers to: New Years Day,
Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April, the first of May, the twelfth of
June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and thirtieth of
December and the day designated by law for a general election or national
referendum or plebiscite.

Section 4 of the immediately preceding Rule states that any

employee who is permitted or suffered to work on any regular holiday, not
exceeding eight (8) hours, shall be paid at least two hundred percent (200%) of
his regular daily wage. If the holiday work falls on the scheduled rest day of the
employee, he shall be entitled to an additional premium pay of at least 30% of his
regular holiday rate of 200% based on his regular wage rate.

Further, Section 5 of the same Rule provides that for work

performed in excess of eight (8) hours on a regular holiday, an employee shall be
paid an additional compensation for the overtime work equivalent to his rate for
the first eight hours on such holiday work plus at least 30% thereof.

Azucena adds, in his 2013th Ed., Volume 1 of the Book: The

Labor Code with Comments and Cases, Holiday Pay is a one-day pay
given to an employee even if he does not work on a regular holiday. But this gift
of a days pay is limited to each of the twelve regular (also called legal) holidays
and is not demandable for any other kind of non working day.

Amor Powers was an employee of EGV Grocery for nine (9)

years and the fact of such employment alone qualified Amor for said
holiday pay. UNLESS she falls under any of the following exceptions
provided under Section 1 of the Implementing Rules of the Labor
Code:
(a) Employees of the government and any of the political subdivisions,
including government-owned and controlled corporation;
(b)
Employees of retail and service establishments regularly
employing less than (10) workers;
(c) Domestic helpers and persons in the personal service of another;
(d) Managerial employees as defined in the Labor Code;
(e) Field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is
unsupervised by the employer including those who are engaged on task or
contract basis, purely commission basis, or those who are paid a fixed amount

for performing work irrespective of the time consumed in the performance

thereof.

As can be gleaned from the facts of the case, Amor Powers has
been regularly working from 8:00 AM to 7:00 PM with one-hour lunch
break. With such schedule, it is safe to conclude that EGV Grocery is
manned by only a few employees--less than 10 workers.
Therefore, it is clear from the facts and circumstances in this
case that Amor does fall under (b) of the foregoing enumeration.
Amor Powers worked as an ORDINARY employee in a GROCERY
STORE with less than 10 employees. In which case, she falls under
one of the exceptions.
SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
Amor Powers is not entitled to Service Incentive Leave.
Article 95 of the Labor Code states the rule on the right of an
employee to service incentive leave, to wit:
(a) Every employee who has rendered at least one (1) year of service
shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five (5) days with pay.
(b) This provision shall not apply to those who are already enjoying the
benefit herein provided, those enjoying vacation leave with pay of at least five (5)
days, and those employed in establishments regularly employing less than
ten (10) employees, or in establishments exempted from granting this benefit by
the Secretary of Labor after considering the viability or financial condition of such
establishment.
(c) The grant of benefit in excess of that provided herein shall not be made
a subject of arbitration or any court of administrative action.

With the same rationalization as the invalidation of her claim for

Holiday Pay, Amor Powers is also not entitled to receive Service
Incentive Leave Pay on the ground that she falls under one of the
exceptions. That is, she is employed in an establishment regularly
employing less than 10 workers.

WAGE DIFFERENTIAL
Amor Powers is not entitled to Wage Differential.

Azucena explains, in his 2013 Ed., Volume 1 of the

Book: The Labor Code with Comments and Cases, the
th

acceptance by an employee of the wages paid him without objection

does not give rise to estoppel precluding him from suing for the
difference between the amount received and the amount he should
have received pursuant to a valid minimum wage law. A laborer who
accepts a lower wage than what the law sets as minimum wage for
laborers shall be entitled to receive the deficiency. In other words, the
law gives the employee the right to be paid at least the minimum
wage. Such legal right cannot be waived or given away even if he
does not complain at the time he receives a wage below the legal
minimum.

The Implementing Rules of R.A. No. 6727 known as the

Wage Rationalization Act, defines Statutory minimum wage as
the lowest wage rate fixed by law that an employer can pay his
workers. Hence, compensation which is LESS than such minimum rate
is considered an underpayment that violates the law.

R.A. No. 6727 known as the Wage Rationalization Act

(approved on June 9, 1989) provides for the statutory minimum
wage rate of all workers and employees in the private sector. But its
Section 4 exempts retail service establishments. It reads:
Retail/service establishments regularly employing not more than
ten (10) workers may be exempted from the applicability of this
Act upon application with and as determined by the appropriate
Regional Board in accordance with the applicable rules and
regulations issued by the Commission.

The exemption of retail/service establishments in R.A. No. 6727

is similar to the exceptions stated in Articles 94 on holiday pay and
Article 95 on service incentive leave (SIL). However, the exemptions
from holiday pay and from SIL are granted by the Labor Code itself and
may be availed of by the employer without need of a prior application
for exemption.

Admittedly, EGV Grocery failed to submit a documentary

evidence that shall serve as proof of such prior application and the
subsequent grant thereto.
However, let us not forget that Amor Powers received a pabaon
in the amount of P9,000.00, which cannot be considered a separation
pay since, as argued, she was not constructively dismissed. The

pabaon she received more than compensates for the wage

differential that she is now claiming. Hence, her claim thereto must
not prosper.
13TH MONTH PAY
Amor Powers is not entitled to receive 13th Month Pay.
The Courts decision is instructive in this case: Regarding
petitioner's claim for termination pay, 13th month pay and salary
differential, we agree that there is no substantial evidence supporting or
justifying his entitlement thereto. Petitioner utterly failed to prove that there
was a company policy or practice granting such termination pay nor could
it be said that the same was promised by respondent Ricafort or by any of
the private respondents for that matter. As to the 13th month pay and
salary differential, not only is there a dearth of evidence that petitioner
deserves the same but the propriety thereof is made even more dubious
by the fact that petitioner never demanded the same over the several
years of his employment. His belated claim surfaced only when he filed the
illegal dismissal case.|||(Dizon, Jr. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 69018, [January

29, 1990], 260 PHIL 501-510)

ATTORNEYS FEES
Her claim for Attorneys Fees will not prosper.
In the case of Lopez vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
Letran College-Manila, et al., G.R. No. 124548 (Oct. 8, 1998), the
Court held that in employment termination cases attorneys fees are NOT
recoverable where there is no sufficient showing of bad faith on the part of the
employer. Under Art. 2208(2) of the New Civil Code, the award thereof is
justified if the claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the party
against whom it is sought.

In the instant case, it has been resolved that there was no

constructive dismissal but voluntary resignation by Amor Powers.
There being absence of bad faith on the part of EGV Grocery as
regards her severance from the employment, there is no justification
for the employer to be liable to pay said claim for Attorneys Fees .

3. An employee who voluntarily tendered her resignation

cannot receive the above stated monetary claims.

In the cases of Fungo vs. Lourdes School of Mandaluyong, 528
SCRA 248 and Globe Telecom vs. Crisologo, 529 SCRA 811,
resignation is the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by personal
reasons to disassociates themselves from their employment - it must be done
with the intention of relinquishing an office accompanied by the act of
abandonment. Words of gratitude in a resignation letter can hardly came from an
employee forced to resign.
Having submitted a resignation letter, it is then incumbent upon the
employee to prove that the resignation was not voluntary but was actually a case
of constructive dismissal with clear, positive, and convincing evidence. (Vicente

vs. CA, 531 SCRA 240)

In this case, Amor Powers failed to present any documentary
evidence that would prove that she was illegally dismissed or that she
is entitled to any monetary claims. A complaint belatedly filed
supports the contention of the employer that it was a mere after
thought.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed of this Honorable Court that this case be dismissed for lack of
cause of action.
Other just and equitable relief under the foregoing are likewise
being prayed for.
Respectfully submitted.
August 8, 2015, Butuan City, Province of Agusan del Norte.

Stellar Law Firm

Counsel for Respondent
004 Everlasting Street Subdivision, Butuan City

By:
Atty. Sheila May C. Rojales
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Atty. Silhouette Adobas

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Atty. Delmer Riparip

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Copy Furnished:
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Counsel for Complainant
JC Aquino Avenue, Butuan City