Civil Law Reviewer Cases (Part 1)

Civil Law Review 1: Atty.
Legaspi
MARRIAGE
1.Classification of Marriages/ Relationships. Parties in Interest; NCC; FC; AM 02-11-10 SC
Title
Facts
Issues
1. Whether it was
Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to
1. Lucas v. Lucas
necessary to serve
Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with
summons on
Motion for the Submission of Parties to
respondent for the
DNA Testing). Respondent filed a
court to acquire
Special Appearance and Comment.
G.R. No. 190710,
jurisdiction over the
He
manifested
inter
alia
that:
(1)
he
did
June 6, 2011, 650
case of petition for
not receive the summons and a copy of
SCRA 667
establishing
the petition; (2) that DNA testing
illegitimate filiation.
cannot be had on the basis of a mere
allegation pointing to respondent as
Petition to
petitioners father.
establish
Jurisprudence is still unsettled on the
illegitimate
acceptability of DNA evidence.
filiation is an
RTC, acting on respondents motion for
action in rem.
reconsideration, issued an
Hence, failure to
Order dismissing the case.
serve summons Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for
will not deprive
reconsideration. This time, the RTC
the court of its
held that the ruling on the grounds
jurisdiction to try
relied upon by petitioner for filing the
and decide the
petition is premature considering that a
case.
full-blown trial has not yet taken place.
On appeal, the CA held that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of respondent, as no summons had
been served on him. The CA further
held that a DNA testing should not be
allowed when the petitioner has failed
to establish a prima facie case.
Ruling
1. The answer is in the negative
A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns
the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of
marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in
rem.1
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in
rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in
which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.
The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the
simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the
RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is
notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar
indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort to the
right sought to be established. Through publication, all interested parties are
deemed notified of the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for
the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the
due process requirements. Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive
the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack
of summons may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party
had, in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case.
2. The prima facie case for holding the test must be shown not upon the
1 An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as
defendant, but its object is to subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation
1
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

filing of the petition but during the trial.
A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations
in the initiatory pleading.
2.
Whether or not a
prima facie showing
upon filing of the
petition to establish
illegitimate filiation is
necessary before a
court can issue a DNA
testing order?
The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained

To warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show
cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or "good
cause" for the holding of the test. 36 In these states, a court order for blood
testing is considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions (as in ours),
must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence,
the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was
imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause.
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper
showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances
of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test.
Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures
which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that
a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally
order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that,
as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory
blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable
possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is
contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood
test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.
Figueroa vs.
Figueroa and Barranco were
Barranco, SBC
sweethearts since their teens.
Case # 519/July Their intimacy eventually resulted to a
31, 1997, 276
son born out of wedlock.
5CRA 445
Barranco promised Figueroa that he
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect

the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on
the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence
or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
1. Whether or not the 1. No. The facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent
act of the respondent
exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
in marrying another
premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests
woman constitute
a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute
gross immorality, thus
grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or
2
2.
a
would marry her when he passes the

bar examinations.
After four takes, he finally passed but did
not hold true to his promise of
marriage.
In 1971, their relationship ended. Years
later, he married another woman.
When Barranco was about to take his
oath to enter the legal profession,
Figueroa filed a complaint relaying to
the court what happened between her
and Barranco.
Until 1988, Barranco has filed three
motions to dismiss because Figueroa
still would not persecute and because
for the past years, he has become
elected in the Sangguniang Bayan, has
actively participated in various civic
organizations and has acquired a good
standing within his community while the
case was pending.
The court sought the opinion of the IBP
which recommended that Barranco be
allowed to take his oath.
Figueroa reappeared and intercepted the
scheduled oath-taking of Barranco
which led to its delay.
making him ineligible

to take the Lawyers
Oath.
disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of
the community.
Mere intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no
impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the
part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such
relationship a child was born out of wedlock.
FC Marriage Requirements; Civil Wedding v. Church Wedding; Certificate of Civil Registrar

Facts
Issues
Ruling
3

1. Tupal v. Rojo
AM # MTJ-14-1842,
Feb 24, 2014, 717
SCRA 236
Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the

Court Administrator a complaint against
Judge Remegio V. Rojo for violating the
Code of Judicial Conduct and for gross
ignorance of the law.
Judge Rojo allegedly violated Circular No.
1-90 which allows municipal trial court
judges to act as notaries public ex officio
and notarize documents only if connected
with their official functions and duties.
Tupal argues that affidavits of
cohabitation, which Judge Rojo notarized
are not connected with a judges official
functions and duties as solemnizing
officer.
He was also alleged to have violated the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
Whether Judge
Rojo is guilty of
violating the New
Code of Judicial
Conduct and of
gross ignorance of
the law.
YES.
Judge Rojo is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct and of gross
negligence of law.
Municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court judges may act as notaries
public. However, they may do so only in their ex officio capacities. They may
notarize documents, contracts, and other conveyances only in the exercise of
their official functions and duties. Circular No. 1-90 dated February 26, 1990
provides:
Municipal trial court (MTC) and municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judges are
empowered to perform the function of notaries public ex officio under Section
76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the Judiciary Act
of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative Code. But the Court
hereby lays down the following qualifications on the scope of this power:
MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex officio in the notarization
of documents connected only with the exercise of their official functions and
duties x xx. They may not, as notaries public ex officio, undertake the
preparation and acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other
acts of conveyances which bear no direct relation to the performance of their
functions as judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only enjoins
judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities in order to minimize the risk of
conflict with their judicial duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in the
private practice of law (Canon 5 and Rule 5.07).
Judge Rojo notarized affidavits of cohabitation, which were documents not
connected with the exercise of his official functions and duties as solemnizing
officer. He also notarized affidavits of cohabitation without certifying that
lawyers or notaries public were lacking in his courts territorial jurisdiction.
Thus, Judge Rojo violated Circular No. 1-90.
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally interview
the contracting parties and examine the requirements they submitted.25 The
parties must have complied with all the essential and formal requisites of
marriage. Among these formal requisites is a marriage license.26
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all
the qualifications and none of the legal disqualifications to contract marriage.27
Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally examine
the marriage license presented.28
4

If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five
years and have no legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the
marriage license requirement.29 Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of
cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths.30 The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the
affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and the absence of any legal impediment to marry
each other.31 The judge must also execute a sworn statement that he
personally ascertained the parties qualifications to marry and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.32 Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines
provides:
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without
any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state
the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he
ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the
Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting parties
affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties
marriage.
As a solemnizing officer, the judges only duty involving the affidavit of
cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for at
least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not
state that the judge can notarize the parties affidavit of cohabitation.
Judge Rojo also violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Rule IV, Section
2, paragraph (b) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice prohibits a notary
public from notarizing documents if the signatory is not personally known to
him. Otherwise, the notary public must require the signatory to present a
competent evidence of identity:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. xxxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory
to the instrument or document (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
5
2. Republic v.
Albios
GR 198780, Oct 16,
2013, 707 SCRA 584
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an

American citizen, and Albios were
married, as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios
filed with the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Fringer, alleging that immediately after
their marriage, they separated and never
lived as husband and wife because they
never really had any intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any
of their essential marital obligations.
Fringer did not file his answer. On
September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion
to set case for pre-trial and to admit her
pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only
Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor
appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the
schedule.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab
initio. The RTC opined that the parties
married each other for convenience only.
Albios stated that she contracted Fringer
to enter into a marriage to enable her to
acquire American citizenship and that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay
him the sum of $2,000.00. However, she
did not pay Fringer $2,000.00 because
the latter never processed her petition for
citizenship
Whether or not the

marriage contracted for
the sole purpose of
acquiring American
citizenship void ab
initio on the ground of
lack of consent?
A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person appearing before

the notary public is the signatory to the instrument or document to be
notarized. If the notary public does not personally know the signatory, he must
require the signatory to present a competent evidence of identity.
In all the nine affidavits of cohabitation Judge Rojo notarized, he only stated
that the parties subscribed and swore to their affidavits before him. Judge Rojo
did not state that the parties were personally known to him or that the parties
presented their competent pieces of evidence of identity. Thus, Judge Rojo
violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
The marriage between the parties is valid
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in
immigration cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if the bride and groom did
not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.This
standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead
demonstrate that the marriage was not ntered into for the purpose of evading
the immigration laws of the United States.The focus, thus, shifted from
determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws. It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not
purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared as valid a
marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States,
stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided erely because the marriage
was entered into for a limited purpose.The 1980 immigration case of Matter of
McKee, further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically
different from a nonsubsisting one.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely
given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A
reelygivenconsent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles
45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties
must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In
fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective
6

The OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling which
found that the essential requisite of
consent was lacking.
3. Go-Bangayan v.
Bangayan
GR 201061, July 3,
2013, 700 SCRA 702
4. OCA v. J.
Necessario et al
AM No. 7-1691, Apr
2, 2013, 694 SCRA
348
Solemnizing officer
is not duty-bound
to investigate
whether or not a
marriage license
has been duly and
regularly issued by
In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan,

Jr. married AzucenaAlegre. In 1982, while
Alegre was outside the Philippines,
Benjamin
developed
a
romantic
relationship with Sally Go. Sallys father
was against this. In order to appease her
father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign a
purported marriage contract in March
1982.
In 1994, the relationship between Sally
and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy
case against Benjamin. Benjamin on the
other hand filed an action to declare his
alleged marriage to Sally as non-existent.
To prove the existence of their marriage,
Sally presented a marriage license
allegedly issued to Benjamin.
Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial
Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu City and
headed the audit team created by OCA in
investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8 of
the MTCC in Cebu City. A female and
male lawyer of the audit team went
undercover as a couple looking to get
married.
The team reported that out of the 643
marriage certificates examined, 280
marriages were solemnized under Article
3412 of the Family Code. The logbooks of
Whether or not the

marriage between Sally
and Benjamin is
bigamous.
1. Whether or not
Judges, who act as
solemnizing officers of
marriage, has no duty to
ascertain the authenticity
of marriage licenses and
affidavit of cohabitation
for marriages contracted
pursuant to Article 34 of
the Family Code.
by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as
they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences
of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent
was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention
to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was
that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented
by Sally was not authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to
both parties in view of the alleged marriage. The marriage between them was
merely in jest and never complied with the essential requisites of marriage.
Hence, there is no bigamous marriage to speak.
The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the
ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license is beyond the scope of the
duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of
evidence that point to the contrary. The presumption of regularity accorded to a
marriage license disappears the moment the marriage documents do not
appear regular on its face.
In People v. Jansen (54 Phil. 176, 180 (1929) as cited in Alcantara v.
Alcantara), this Court held that:
the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a
marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar.
All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by
7

the local civil
registrar. All the
solemnizing officer
needs to know is
that the license has
been issued by the
competent official,
and it may be
presumed from the
issuance of the
license that said
official has fulfilled
the duty to
ascertain whether
the contracting
parties had fulfilled
the requirementsof
law.
However, the
presumption of
regularity of official
acts may be
rebutted by
affirmative
evidence of
irregularity or
failure to perform a
duty." The visible
superimpositions
on the marriage
licenses should
have alerted the
solemnizing judges
to the irregularity
of the issuance.
the MTCC Branches indicate a higher

number of solemnized marriages than the
number of marriage certificates in the
courts custody. There is also an unusual
number of marriage licenses obtained
from the local civil registrars of the towns
of Barili and Liloan, Cebu. There were
even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with
marriage licenses obtained on the same
day. The town of Barili, Cebu is more than
sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City
and entails a travel time of almost two (2)
hours. Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is
more than ten (10) kilometers away from
Cebu City.
In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court
treated the Memorandum dated 6 July
2007 of the judicial audit team as a formal
administrative complaint and directed
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil
R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis,
and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to
submit their respective comments.
Respondent argues that: (1) it is not their
duty to verify the signature on the
marriage license to determine its
authenticity because he relies on the
presumption of regularity of public
documents; and (2) marriages solemnized
under Article 342 of the Family Code had
the required affidavit of cohabitation. He
claims that pro forma affidavits of
cohabitation have been used by other
judges even before he became a judge.
the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the
license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the
contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas (G.R. No. 167684, July 31,
2006, 497 SCRA 428, 443.), that "the presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty." The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have
alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance.
The judges gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized
marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code without the required
qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such as minority of a
party. Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article 34
are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but reasonably construed. The
affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and accepted pro forma
particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The fiveyear period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law
but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. The
parties should have been capacitated to marry each other during the entire
period and not only at the time of the marriage.
It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a
license constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary layman.
They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It
is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones
involved in the instant case. It is not too much to expect them to know and
apply the law intelligently.
2 Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other.
The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage. (76a)
8

5. Abbas v. Abbas
GR 183896, Jan 23,
2013, 689 SCRA 646
Certification
issued by the civil
registrar, stating
that no marriage
license was
issued, enjoyed
probative value, as
his duty was to
maintain records
of data relative to
the issuance of a
marriage license.
The present case stems from a petition

filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas
(Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas as a
ground for the annulment of his marriage
to Gloria. At the trial court, Syed, a
Pakistani citizen, testified that he was told
that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his
stay in the Philippines, but was not told of
the nature of said ceremony. During the
ceremony he and Gloria signed a
document. He claimed that he did not
know that the ceremony was a marriage
until Gloria told him later. He further
testified that he did not go to Carmona,
Cavite to apply for a marriage license,
and that he had never resided in that
area.
The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia
C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on
July 11, 2003 to the effect that the
marriage license number appearing in the
marriage contract he submitted, Marriage
License No. 9969967, was the number of
another marriage license issued to a
certain ArlindoGetalado and Myra
Mabilangan.
Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as
Marriage License No. 9969967 had
been issued to ArlindoGetalado and
Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had
certified that no marriage license had
been
1. Whether or not a
person may rely on the
marriage contract as well
as the testimonies of her
witnesses to prove the
existence of said license
as against the
certification issued by the
Civil Registrar that such
license was issued to
another person.
In that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative
value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing
her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as
Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court.
The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria
and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a
diligent search of the records of her office.
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the
absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when
it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the
Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void
from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under
Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage
cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well
be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit.
Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent
to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence
presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be
attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law
must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent,
the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
9
6. Alcantara v.
Alcantara
GR 167746, Aug 28,
2007, 531 SCRA 446
The use of
marriage license
issued in a city or
municipality which
is not the residence
of either
contracting parties
is a mere
irregularity that will
not invalidate a
marriage
celebrated using
such license.
The CA reversed the decision of the trial

court on the following grounds: (1) that
petitioner had admitted that he had sign
the marriage contract; (2) marriage
ceremony took place with witnesses to
prove the same; (3) the certification
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona failed to state therein that due
diligence was done in searching for a
marriage license but to no avail.
A petition for annulment of marriage3 was
filed by petitioner against respondent
Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8
December 1982 he and respondent,
without securing the required marriage
license. Petitioner and respondent went
through another marriage ceremony at
the San Jose de Manuguit Church in
Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The
marriage was likewise celebrated without
the parties securing a marriage license.
The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the
marriage contract, is a sham, as neither
party was a resident of Carmona, and
they never went to Carmona to apply for a
license with the local civil registrar of the
said place.
1. Whether or not the

issuance of a marriage
license in a city or
municipality, not the
residence of either of the
contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage
license despite the
absence of publication or
prior to the completion of
the 10-day period for
publication will invalidate
the marriage celebrated
using such license.
The law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent
on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from
the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.
In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent
reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued
by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.25 The certification moreover is
precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license
was issued, namely RestitutoAlcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating
the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular
conduct of official business. The presumption of regularity of official acts may
be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is
rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in
support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers act being
lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that
a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage
license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona,
Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul
petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city
or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to
the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
10

irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any
of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license
number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the
marriage license issuedto the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage
contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number
7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to
assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of
the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such
that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore
does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of
said marriage license to the parties.
7. Araes v.
Occiano
AM 02-1390, Apr 11,
2002, 380 SCRA 402
A judge may only
solemnized
marriages within its
territorial
jurisdiction.
Violation of this
rule will warrant a
disciplinary action
against the judge
who solemnized
marriage outside
his jurisdiction
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges 1.

respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of
the Law
Petitioner alleges that on 17 February
2000, respondent judge solemnized her
marriage to her late groom Dominador B.
Orobia without the requisite marriage
license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. 2.
Respondent judge further avers that
before he started the ceremony, he
carefully examined the documents
submitted to him by petitioner. When he
discovered that the parties did not
possess the requisite marriage license, he
refused to solemnize the marriage and
suggested its resetting to another date.
However, due to the earnest pleas of the
Whether or not a
judge may solemnize
marriage outside their
territorial jurisdiction
on account of the
request of the
contracting parties.
Whether or not the
subsequent issuance
of marriage license
will validate the
marriage solemnized
without license.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean
hands, petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the
marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite
marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because
he "initiated it."
1. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of
the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize
marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme
Court.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of
petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage.
2. Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without
the requisite marriage license. In People vs. Lara (C.A. O.G. 4079.), we held
that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void,
and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even
add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
11
8. Cario v. Cario
GR 132529, Feb 2,
2001, 351 SCRA 127
The nullity of the
first marriage does
not make the
second marriage
valid. There must
first be a prior
judicial declaration
of the nullity of a
previous marriage,
though void, before
a party can enter
into a second
marriage,
otherwise, the
second marriage
would also be void.
parties, the influx of visitors, and the

delivery of provisions for the occasion, he
proceeded to solemnize the marriage out
of human compassion. He also feared
that if he reset the wedding, it might
aggravate the physical condition of Orobia
who just suffered from a stroke. After the
solemnization, he reiterated the necessity
for the marriage license and admonished
the parties that their failure to give it
would render the marriage void. Petitioner
and Orobia assured respondent judge
that they would give the license to him in
the afternoon of that same day. When
they failed to comply, respondent judge
followed it up with Arroyo but the latter
only gave him the same reassurance that
the marriage license would be delivered
to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4
Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two
second spouse may
marriages, the first was on June 20, 1969,
invoked the invalidity of
with petitioner Susan NicdaoCario and
the first marriage by
the second was on November 10, 1992,
reason of lack to
with respondent Susan Yee Cario, with
marriage license to
whom he had been cohabiting with
prove the validity of the
starting way back in 1982.
formers marriage.
Both petitioner and respondent filed
claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased
from various government agencies.
Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to
collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI,
PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and]
Pag-ibig, 3 while respondent Susan Yee
received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS
Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he

solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted
in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance
filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that
the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of
exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.
1. No. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the
deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals (236 SCRA 257, 261262), the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the nonissuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in
the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death
benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous
marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the
12
But for any other

purposes, other
than remarriage,
judicial declaration
for nullity is not
required.
On December 14, 1993, respondent

2. Whether the second
Susan Yee filed the instant case for
spouse, who married
collection of sum of money against
the deceased without
petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter
judicial declaration of
alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to
the latters first
her at least one-half of the one hundred
marriage, may collect
forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00)
from the first spouse
collectively denominated as death
the half of the death
benefits which she (petitioner) received
benefits of the
from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
deceased.
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her
marriage to the deceased took place
during the subsistence of, and without first
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity
of, the marriage between petitioner and
the deceased. She, however, claimed that
she had no knowledge of the previous
marriage and that she became aware of it
only at the funeral of the deceased, where
she met petitioner who introduced herself
as the wife of the deceased. To bolster
her action for collection of sum of money,
respondent contended that the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased is void ab
initio because the same was solemnized
without the required marriage license. In
support thereof, respondent presented: 1)
the marriage certificate of the deceased
and the petitioner which bears no
marriage license number; and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial
decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio.
2. Yes. For any other purposes, other than remarriage, judicial
declaration for nullity is not required.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the
case of Vda. deConsuegra v. Government Service Insurance System (37
SCRA 316, 1971) where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits
of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding
that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared
void the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor
has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband
under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should
she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting
marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in
the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife,
this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be
void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the
conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before
judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable solution in this
case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of onehalf in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other
half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the
rule which requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the
rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (226 SCRA 572, 579, 1993), however, the
Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and
separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition
precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously
married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a
13

judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract
said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage would be void. The
same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties
are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their
marriage. However, for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for
collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no
prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party
has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove
that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon,
the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the
status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the
parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus,
in Nial v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary
even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family
Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose
of remarriage.
9. Ty v. CA
GR 127406, Nov 27,
2000, 346 SCRA 86
Private respondent married Anna Maria

Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on
March 29, 1977, in Manila. However, on
August 4, 1980, the Court declared their
marriage null and void ab initio for lack of
a valid marriage license. Even before the
decree was issued nullifying his marriage
to Anna Maria, private respondent wed
Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4,
1979.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent
filed a Civil Case praying that his
marriage to petitioner be declared null
and void. He alleged that they had no
marriage license when they got married.
1. Whether or not a
marriage may be
declared invalid when the
marriage license
previously use in a civil
ceremony was
subsequently used in a
church ceremony years
after its validity.
Hence decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC Quezon City
ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 is affirmed.
As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize
the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e.
that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial.
In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the
essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement
of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used
legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the
ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the
marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to
fortify the first.
14

He stated that at the time he married
petitioner the decree of nullity of his
marriage to Anna Maria had not been
issued.
Petitioner pointed out that his claim that
their marriage was contracted without a
valid license is untrue. She submitted
their Marriage License No. 5739990
issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979,
as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not
question this document when it was
submitted in evidence. The said marriage
license was use during their civil marriage
and was later on used in their church
wedding
10. Sy v. CA
GR 127263, Apr 12,
2000, 330 SCRA 350
A marriage
celebrated based
on a marriage
license issued a
year after the
ceremony is VOID.
The Pasig RTC declared his marriage to

herein petitioner null and void ab initio in
its decision dated November 4, 1991.
Both parties appealed to respondent
Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the
appellate court affirmed the trial courts
decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna
Maria) must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly
contracted.
Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private
respondent Fernando Sy contracted
marriage on November 15, 1973. On
August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for
the declaration of absolute nullity of her
marriage to Fernando on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
On appeal, Petitioner, for the first time,
raises the issue of the marriage being
void for lack of a valid marriage license at
the time of its celebration. It appears that,
according to her, the date of issue of the
1. Whether or not a
marriage celebrated
based on a marriage
license issued a year
after the ceremony is
valid.
The answer is in the negative. From the documents she presented, the
marriage license was issued on September 17, 1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that
the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Nowhere do
we find private respondent denying these dates on record. Article 80 of the
Civil Code is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an
exceptional character, the purported marriage between petitioner and private
respondent could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 7279 of the Civil Code. We thus conclude that under Article 80 of the Civil Code,
the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning.
15

marriage license and marriage certificate,
September 17, 1974, is contained in their
marriage contract . While the date of
celebration of their marriage is on
November 15, 1973, is admitted both by
petitioner and private respondent, as
stated in paragraph three of petitioner's
petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before the trial court,
and private respondent's answer
admitting it.
11. Navarro v.
Domogtoy
AM 96-1088, July
19, 1996, 259 SCRA
129
The lack of
authority of
solemnizing officer
does not invalidate
the marriage
solemnized by
such officer.
NB: In this case,
marriage was
judicially declared
as void in an action
for gross
misconduct filed
against the
solemnizing officer.
This is an administrative case filed by the

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro against MTC
Judge Hernando Domagtoy. Navarro
contends that on two occasions
Domagtoy exhibits gross misconduct as
well as inefficiency in office and ignorance
of the law, to wit:
(1) On September 27, 1994, Respondent
solemnized the wedding between
Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F.
Borga, despite the knowledge that
the groom is merely separated from
his first wife.
(2) he performed a marriage ceremony
between FlorianoDadorSumaylo and
Gemma G. del Rosario outside his
court's jurisdiction on October 27,
1994.
In relation to the charges against him,

respondent judge seeks exculpation from
his act of having solemnized the marriage

court the marriage
solemnized by a person
who exceeded or is
without authority is
considered void.
The marriage remains valid.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a

previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
16

between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man
separated from his wife, and Arlyn F.
Borga by stating that he merely relied on
the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial
Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the
fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife
have not seen each other for almost
seven years. 1 With respect to the second
charge, he maintains that in solemnizing
the marriage between Sumaylo and del
Rosario, he did not violate Article 7,
paragraph 1 of the Family Code which
states that: "Marriage may be solemnized
by: (1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;"
and that article 8 thereof applies to the
case in question.
The law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a
subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely
incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where
it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing
spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent
provisions of law.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorga is considered

bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside

the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the

court's jurisdiction;
xxxxxxxxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the

judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office
17
of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and

not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point
of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place
designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
The elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the

solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is
the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be
solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within
the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to
the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority
of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Noncompliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta.

Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage
in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the
exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law.
4. Declaration of Nullity; NCC v. FC, AM 02-11-10 SC; Civil Code; Muslim Code (PD 1083)
1.
Title
Garcia-Quiazon
vs. Belen
In relation to:
b. Retroactivity
of
Laws. Vested
Rights. Arts. 3
Facts
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December
1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes
Elise Quiazon (Elise) represented by
her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen
(Lourdes), common law wife and
daughter, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial
Issue/s
I. Whether or not
Eliseo Quiazon
was a resident of
Las Pias and
therefore, the
petition for letters
of administration
was properly filed
Held
1. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. xxx In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
18

& 4, NCC. Arts.
105 & 256 FC.
Art. 40, FC &
SC AM
02-11-10
g. Domicile;
Arts 50 & 51
NCC; Arts. 68 &
69, FC;
Residence v.
Domicile;
Annulment or
Nullity of
Marriages AM
02-11-10 SC;
Settlement of
Estate;
Election laws
10. Art. 40, FC;
AM -02-10-11
SC;
March 15, 2003;
NCC; Rule 108
Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. Elise

claims that she is the natural child of
Eliseo. Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming
that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of
the latters marriage.
Claiming that the venue of the petition
was improperly laid, Amelia, married to
Eliseo, together with her children,
Jenneth and Jennifer opposed the
issuance of the letters of administration
by filing an Opposition/Motion to
Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that
as shown by his Death
Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of
Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias
City, at the time of his death. Pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the petition for
settlement of decedents estate should
have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and
not in Las Pias City.
The RTC directed the issuance of
Letters of Administration to Elise.
Court of Appeals held that Elise was
able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes
lived together as husband and wife by
establishing a common residence from
1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in
1992. It also upheld the conclusion
reached by the RTC that the decedent
was a resident of Las Pias City. The
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
was denied.
with the RTCof

Las Pias;
II. Whether
Amelia GrciaQuiazon was not
legally married to
eliseo quiazon
due to preexisting
marriage; and
III. Whether Elise
Quiazon has not
shown any
interest in the
petition for letters
of administration.
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of

abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue
for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be
faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of
the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City.
While the recitals in death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedents
residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding
on the courts. Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is
consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of
properties against Amelia, on the ground that their marriage is void for being
bigamous. That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia
before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners position that Eliseo
spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. xxx
2. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it
cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It must be pointed out that at the time of
the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the
Civil Code, and not the Family Code.xxx
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the
action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where
the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. xxx
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional
rights would be prejudiced by her fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the
existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. xxx Ineluctably,
Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of
either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
xxx The existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was
sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage. xxx We take
judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50
19
2.
Ilupa vs.
Abdulla
The complainant alleges in support of

the charge that the respondent
exhibited ignorance of his duties as
clerk of court when he issued a
certificate of divorce, (OCRG Form No.
102) relying mainly on an illegal
"Kapasadan" or Agreement. He claims
that the agreement was executed under
duress and intimidation; the certificate
of divorce itself is defective and
unreliable as there were erroneous
entries in the document and unfilled
blanks.
To save his marriage with Nella Rocaya
Mikunug originally solemnized on
May 19, 1959, based on the Maranao
Whether or not the the

entry of the Divorce
Decree by Clerk of Court is
merely a ministerial duty.
years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be
found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely
remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had
been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore,
void ab initio.
3. Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that
Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred
persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
xxx
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as
a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in
the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by
the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. xxx It is
founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her
legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.Having a vested right in the
distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully
be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
The issuance of a certificate of divorce is within the respondents duties, as
defined by law. (Articles 81 and 83 of the Muslim Code of the Philippines).
The OCAs Report stated that respondent Clerk of Court merely performed his
ministerial duty in accordance with the foregoing provisions. xxx It is only his
duty to receive, file and register the certificate of divorce presented to him for
registration. Further, even if there were indeed erroneous entries on the
certificate of divorce, such errors cannot be corrected nor cancelled through
[his] administrative complaint.
Anent the legality of the divorce of the complainant and Dr. Nella Rocaya
Mikunug-Ilupa, this Office is bereft of any authority to rule on the matter. The
issue is judicial in nature which cannot be assailed through this administrative
proceeding.
xxx It is a settled rule in administrative proceedings that the complainant has
the burden of proving the allegations in his or her complaint with substantial
evidence. xxx
20
3.
Juliano-Llave
vs. Republic
In relation to:
b. Retroactivity
of
Laws. Vested
Rights. Arts. 3
& 4, NCC. Arts.
105 & 256 FC.
Art. 40, FC &
SC AM
02-11-10
culture, and later renewed through a

civil wedding before a judge the
complainant filed a petition for
restitution of marital rights with the
SCC, Marawi City. To his dismay, the
judge dismissed the petition without
any notice or summons to him.
The respondents comment: He
explains that as court registrar, it is his
ministerial duty to accept and register
marriage contracts, conversions to
Islam and divorce certificates. When he
performs this duty, he assumes no
responsibility with respect to the entries
made by the applicants or owners of
the documents to be registered.
The administrative investigation:
Executive Judge Gamor B. Disalo of
the RTC investigated the complaint,
and submitted a Report and
Recommendation dated January 19,
2010.
Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice
initially under the Islamic laws and
tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato
City and, subsequently, under a civil
ceremony officiated by an RTC
Judge.In their marriage contracts, Sen.
Tamanos civil status was indicated as
divorced. Sen. Tamano died after 11
months.
On November 23, 1994, private
respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A.
Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib
Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own
behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamanos legitimate children with
Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC
of Quezon City for the declaration of
nullity of marriage between Estrellita
1.
2.
Whether the
marriage between
Estrellita and the
late Sen. Tamano
was bigamous;
Whether Zorayda
and Adib have the
legal standing to
have Estrellitas
marriage declared
void ab initio.
xxx The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano;
their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamanos subsequent
marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in
1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing
marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil
Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any
given time. Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not
recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not
availed of during its effectivity.
xxx PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that
the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or
wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we
already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide
for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law
cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain
21

and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that
Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May
31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this
marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993.
rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly
provided for the prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise
provided. xxx
The xxx provisions are consistent with the principle that all laws operate
prospectively, unless the contrary appears or is clearly, plainly and
unequivocably expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, every case of
doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186 xxx
enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to have its provisions applied
prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body
of law, specifically, the Civil Code in respect of civil acts that took place
before the Muslim Codes enactment.
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is Article 186(2)
which states: A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the effectivity of
this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law shall be considered as one
contracted under Muslim law provided the spouses register their mutual desire
to this effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to
be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of
mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as
both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim
laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their
personal status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. In view of Sen. Tamanos prior marriage which subsisted at the time
Estrellita married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the
CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file the
declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the
husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application
and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a
bigamous subsequent marriage.
xxx Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can
file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. However, this interpretation
does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses may file the
petition to the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, we said: xxx Only an
aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable
marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition
cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the
22

death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On
the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to
seek its dissolution.
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured spouse." xxx
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had
only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous,
and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in
such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is
the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be
a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage
which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son from
impugning the subsequent marriage.1wphi1 But in the case at bar, both
Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the
Supreme Court Resolution governs marriages celebrated under the Family
Code, such is prospective in application and does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003.58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellitas marriage
in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper
party who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage
has taken place and cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may
attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be
filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.59 Since A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who
has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in
interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.60
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a couple, they should be
interpreted in a way that would preserve their respective rights which include
striking down bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly
rendered.
23

4.
Bolos vs.
Bolos
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia

Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to
respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC
granted the petition for annulment in a
Decision, dated August 2, 2006.
A copy of said decision was received by
Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely
filed the Notice of Appeal on September
11, 2006.
The RTC denied due course to the
appeal for Danilos failure to file the
required motion for reconsideration or
new trial, in violation of Section 20 of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. On
November 23, 2006, a motion to
reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal
was likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued
the order declaring its August 2, 2006
decision final and executory and
granting the Motion for Entry of
Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Danilo filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA
granted the petition and stated that the
requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to
appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did
not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was
solemnized on February 14, 1980
before the Family Code took effect. It
stated that the "coverage [of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC] extends only to those
marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which
Whether or not A.M. No.

02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule
on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages," is applicable to
the case at bench.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment

of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court
promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. xxx
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt.
The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule
sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and
those solemnized under the Civil Code.
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.
This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed
in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention."
Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the
words of a statute there should be no departure."10
xxx In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC
decision which denied due course to respondents appeal and denying
petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for
review a final judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed
with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal. In the case at
bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct
institution of marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution.
24
5.
Ablaza vs.
Republic
In relation to:
b. Retroactivity
of
Laws. Vested
Rights. Arts. 3
& 4, NCC. Arts.
105 & 256 FC.
Art. 40, FC &
SC AM
02-11-10
And
10. Art. 40, FC;
AM -02-10-11
SC;
March 15, 2003;
NCC; Rule 108
took effect on August 3, 1988."

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner
filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a
petition for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of the marriage
contracted on December 26, 1949
between his late brother Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage
between Cresenciano and Leonila had
been celebrated without a marriage
license, due to such license being
issued only on January 9, 1950,
thereby rendering the marriage void
ab initio
He insisted that his being the surviving
brother of Cresenciano who had died
without any issue entitled him to onehalf of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby
making him a real party in interest.
The RTC and CA dismissed the petition
on the ground that he was not the
proper party to file.
Whether the petitioner is a

real party in interest in the
action to seek the
declaration of nullity of the
marriage of his deceased
brother.
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife
and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such
relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the
validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the
marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already
celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing
law. xxx
xxx Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the
limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to
distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect
on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in
application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:1. Those
commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC; and 2. Those filed vis--vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of
the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior
to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was
contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code,
the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule
on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the
action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had
absolutely no application to the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog,
the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and
explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary
in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require
a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary,
yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained
and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." "Under
ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the
25

conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can
be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material,
either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife,
and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable
marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding
instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of
the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action
or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or
the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary
to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise
in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. xxx
xxx According toCarlos v. Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be the party who
stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit,
for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the party who can
demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action. Interest within the meaning
of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest
to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action.
When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the
ground of lack of cause of action.
xxx Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has
a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected
by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a
26
6.
Carlos vs.
Sandoval
ONLY a spouse
can initiate an
action to sever
the marital bond
for marriages
solemnized
during the
effectivity of the
Family Code,
except cases
commenced
prior to March
15, 2003. The
nullity and
annulment of a
marriage cannot
be declared in a
judgment on the
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa

Elemia died intestate. They left six
parcels of land to their compulsory
heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan
De Dios Carlos.
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he
agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo.
Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and
turn over the share of the other legal
heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
The first three (3) parcels of land were
transferred and registered in the name
of Teofilo. Parcel No. 4 was registered
in the name of petitioner.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate.
He was survived by respondents
Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II
(Teofilo II). Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were
registered in the name of respondent
Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II.
1.
Whether a
marriage may
be declared
void ab initio
through a
judgment on
the pleadings
or a summary
judgment and
without the
benefit of a
trial.
2.
Whether or
not the
brother of
one spouse
may initiate
an action to
sever the
marital bond
for marriages
solemnized
during the
effectivity of
the Civil
Code.
compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the
estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and
Article 1003 of the Civil Code. xxx
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or
illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the
petitioner from succeeding to the deceaseds estate. Necessarily, therefore, the
right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of
whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate
or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresencianos
surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the
inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the
late Cresencianos surviving wife,19stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the
nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all
marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required a marriage license for
their validity;20 hence, her participation in this action is made all the more
necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated
without a marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a
marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. She was truly
an indispensable party who must be joined herein.
Both the rules on judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no
place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in
annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the
question on the application of summary judgments or even judgment on the
pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of marriage has been stamped with
clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule, which took effect on
March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the
trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be
allowed except as to matters involving property relations of the
spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of
marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring
supplied)
xxx By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of
its lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State
is not terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion
27

pleadings,
summary
judgment, or
confession of
judgment.
In relation to:
10. Art. 40, FC;
AM -02-10-11
SC;
March 15, 2003;
NCC; Rule 108
Petitioner and respondent entered into

compromised agreements to divide the
land equally. In August 1995, petitioner
filed an action with the following
causes: (a) declaration of nullity of
marriage; (b) status of a child; (c)
recovery of property; (d) reconveyance;
and (e) sum of money and damages. In
his complaint, petitioner asserted that
the marriage between his late brother
Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a
nullity in view of the absence of the
required marriage license. He likewise
maintained that his deceased brother
was neither the natural nor the adoptive
father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
exists between the parties. The State should have been given the opportunity
to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.
xxx
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage.
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of
the Rule is enlightening, viz.:
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment
of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate
heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief
that they do not have a legal right to file the petition.Compulsory or
intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to
preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.17 (Underscoring
supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects
of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. xxx The innovation incorporated in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by
the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends
only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988.
xxx While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it
does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse
under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in
the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs
can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts.19
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within
the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became
28

effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application. xxx
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the
time of its celebration.24 But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an
action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring
an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. A person must appear to be the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest.
xxx
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished
from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.
One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the
case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.27
xxx
Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs.
These heirs were respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse
and child, respectively.
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But
although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of
a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. xxx
xxx Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of
the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to
Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest
to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio,
petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
xxx Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to
determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for.
5. Arts. 15 17, 50 5, NCC; Art.26, FC; Divorce [Filipino; Foreigner; Parenting; Children, Property Rights; Succession rights]; Declaratory Relief; Rule 108;; Art. 412
NCC
1.
Title
Fujiki vs.
Marinay
Facts
Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki), petitioner,
Japanese, married Maria Paz Galela
1.
Issue/s
Whether the Rule on
Declaration of
Held
1. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a
29
In relation to: d.
Arts 15, 16, 17,
50, 51 (NCC);
Art 26 FC;
Rules 103/108;
Civil Register
(Arts. 407-413
NCC)
11. Arts. 40 (35
(4) & 41, FC;
Art. 349 RPC;
Civil & Criminal
Bigamy; Art. 83,
NCC;
Title X.
EMANCIPATION
AND AGE OF
MAJORITY; See
RA 6809; 2176
& 2180 NCC
Title XVI. CIVIL
REGISTER
(Articles 407
413) See RA
10172
(amending RA
9048; Expanded
Clerical Error
Law) & IRRs
See Rules 103
& 108, Revised
Rules of Court
Marinay (Marinay), respondent,

Filipina in 2004. However, Fujiki went
back to Japan and lost communication
with Marinay.
In 2008, Marinay met another
Japanese, Shinichi Maekera, and
married the same within the same
year. Maekera brought Marinay to
Japan.
Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and
Annulment of
Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10SC) is applicable.
2.
Whether a husband
or wife of a prior
marriage can file a
petition to recognize a
foreign judgment
nullifying the
subsequent marriage
between his or her
spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground
of bigamy.
3.
Whether the Regional

Trial Court can
recognize the foreign
judgment in a
proceeding for
cancellation or
correction of entries
in the Civil Registry
under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
Marinay allegedly suffered physical

abuse from Maekera. She contacted
Fujiki. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan
which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy.
On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)."
petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage

where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in JulianoLlave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that
only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules
of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted
in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove
the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If
the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
xxx
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume
to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered.
They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state.
Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a
fact according to the rules of evidence.
xxx Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are
not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled
on grounds external to its merits, i.e., "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited
review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, Philippine courts have recognized
foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
successfully proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce involves the
dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does
not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules
of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine
courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to
30

remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law,
the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. xxx
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is
a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are
recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.. xxx
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married
to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under
Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the
civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
xxx The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation,
but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the
moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include
the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"
and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution, but a spouses right in a marriage extends further to relational
rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband
and Wife") of the Family Code. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
integrity of his marriage. In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the
31

husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a
subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the
ground of bigamy. xxx The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage
is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void
from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can
initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77If anyone can file a criminal action
which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a
subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested
in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is
clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.
xxx Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to
declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially
declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action
is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
other related laws. xxx a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a
civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. xxx A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and
decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither
32

can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here
a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law." xxx
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address
the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do
not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The
anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. xxx
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a
Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. xxx If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminatedthe foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse
cannot remarry.
xxx Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign
divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that
bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to
undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her.
xxx
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They
cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine
courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the
33
2.
Catalan vs.
Catalan
In relation to: d.
Arts 15, 16, 17,
50, 51 (NCC);
Art 26 FC;
Rules 103/108;
Civil Register
(Arts. 407-413
NCC)
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized

American citizen. After allegedly
obtaining a divorce in the United
States from his first wife, Felicitas
Amor, he contracted a second
marriage with petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died
intestate in the Philippines.
Thereafter, petitioner filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Petition
for the issuance of letters of
administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of
Orlando, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 228.
While Spec. Proc. No. 228 was
pending, respondent Louella A.
Catalan-Lee, one of the children of
Orlando from his first marriage, filed a
similar petition with the RTC docketed
as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of
Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of
Whether or no petitioner
rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and
(2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the
foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with
public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign
judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties."
Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and
the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in
the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and
fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment
and the public records in the Philippines .xxx
Tthe trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it
follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing
to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage
between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was
not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case
No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of
comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of
foreign nationality. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity
of Orlandos divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage
between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the
proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the
fact of divorce. xxx
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent
marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be
issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the
deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
34
3.
Corpuz vs. Sto.

Tomas
In relation to: d.
Arts 15, 16, 17,
litis pendentia, considering that Spec.

Proc. No. 228 covering the same
estate was already pending. On the
other hand, respondent alleged that
petitioner was not considered an
interested person qualified to file a
petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of
Orlando. In support of her contention,
respondent alleged that a criminal
case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner.
The RTC had acquitted petitioner of
bigamy.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the
RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan
dismissed the Petition for the issuance
of letters of administration filed by
petitioner and granted that of private
respondent. Contrary to its findings in
Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held
that the marriage between petitioner
and Eusebio Bristol was valid and
subsisting when she married Orlando.
Thus, the trial court held that petitioner
was not an interested party who may
file a petition for the issuance of letters
of administration.4
After the subsequent denial of her
Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner
elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals (CA) via her Petition for
Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in
dismissing her Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration.
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a
Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship in 2000. On January 18,
2005, Gerbert married respondent
Whether the second

paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends
to aliens the right to
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this
35

50, 51 (NCC);
Art 26 FC;
Rules 103/108;
Civil Register
(Arts. 407-413
NCC)
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. Due

to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada
after the wedding. He returned to the
Philippines in April 2005, but was
shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair. Gerbert returned to
Canada and filed a petition for
divorce. The Superior Court of Justice,
Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerberts petition for divorce on
December 8, 2005. The divorce
decree took effect on January 8, 2006.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert
has found another Filipina to love. He
wanted tomarry his new Filipina
fiance in the Philippines so he went
to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce
decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
certificate. Despite the registration of
the divorce decree, an official of the
National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still
subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially
recognized by a competent Philippine
court.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
The RTC denied Gerberts petition.
The RTC concluded that Gerbert was
not the proper party to institute the
action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled
petition a court of this

jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.
provision.
xxx The provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Article 17 of the Civil Code
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this
rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, xxx if the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse
to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that
already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the
party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
xxx The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition
the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law
have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
xxx To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an
action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a
divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an
alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is
valid according to his or her national law.
xxx Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens
applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself
36

that only the Filipino spouse can avail
of the remedy.
or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for

the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as
an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law
of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the
documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,
these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to
include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at
this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence,
unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce
law.
xxx Every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before
a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have
the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.
xxx
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.
We consider the recording to be legally improper. xxx
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register."
The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce
legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status.xxx
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a
persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753
or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of
divorce decrees in the civil registry.
xxx The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.
In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing
37
4.
Rep. vs.
Orbecido
Given a valid
marriage
between two
Filipino citizens,
where one party
is later
naturalized as a
On 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III

married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at
the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter,
Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and
Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the
Whether or not respondent

can remarry under article
26 of the family code.
the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted
totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength
alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
xxx Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the
RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules
of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements
Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed
with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;
that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be
made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must
be published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot
consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court.
xxx The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party
or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
ART. 26. xxx Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, xxx it seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the
parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
38

foreign citizen
and obtains a
valid divorce
decree
capacitating him
or her to
remarry, can the
Filipino spouse
likewise remarry
under Philippine
law?
In relation to: d.
Arts 15, 16, 17,
50, 51 (NCC);
Art 26 FC;
Rules 103/108;
Civil Register
(Arts. 407-413
NCC)
United States bringing along their son

Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned
from his son that his wife had obtained
a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial
court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was
filed. Finding merit in the petition, the
court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (O0SG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the
U.S.A.
xxx Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that
the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
The Van Dorn case xxx held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by
the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
xxx In Quita, the Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage. xxx
xxx
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen,
there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and
Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
xxx Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his
allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise,
39

before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved
as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact,
such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also
show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
6. Article 36, FC; AM 02 11 10 SC; See also Articles 48, 68 71, 220 221 & 225 FC
1.
Title
Baccay vs. Baccay
Facts
Noel courted Maribel, but it was only
after years of continuous pursuit that
Maribel accepted Noels proposal and
the two became sweethearts. Noel
considered Maribel as the snobbish
and hard-to-get type, which traits he
found attractive
Noel observed that Maribel was
inordinately shy when around his family,
so to bring her closer to them he
always invited Maribel to attend family
gatherings and other festive occasions.
Whenever she attended those
occasions with Noels family, he
observed that Maribel was invariably
aloof or snobbish.
Around 1997, Noel decided to break up
but Maribel. Despite their efforts to
keep their meetings strictly friendly,
however, Noel and Maribel had several
romantic moments together. Sometime
in November 1998, Maribel informed
Noel that she was pregnant with his
child. Noel married Maribel on
November 23, 1998 before Judge
Issue/s
Whether the marriage
between the parties is
null and void under
Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Held
The Court held in Santos v. Court of Appeals21 that the phrase
"psychological incapacity" refers to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code xxx. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to
the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.
In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court laid down the
guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
40

Gregorio Dayrit.
Noel and Maribel agreed to live with
Noels family. Maribel remained aloof
and did not go out of her way to endear
herself to them. She never contributed
to the familys coffer leaving Noel to
shoulder all expenses for their support.
Also, she refused to have any sexual
contact with Noel.
Surprisingly, despite Maribels claim of
being pregnant, Noel never observed
any symptoms of pregnancy in her.
Then, sometime in January 1999,
Maribel did not go home for a day, and
when she came home she announced
to Noel and his family that she had a
miscarriage.
Noel confronted her about her alleged
miscarriage sometime in February
1999. The discussion escalated into an
intense quarrel. Maribel left Noels
house and did not come back anymore.
Noel tried to communicate with Maribel
but when he went to see her at her
house nobody wanted to talk to him
and she rejected his phone calls.
On September 11, 2000 or after less
than two years of marriage, Noel filed a
petition7 for declaration of nullity of
marriage with the RTC of Manila.
The RTC found that Maribel failed to
perform the essential marital
obligations of marriage, and such
failure was due to a personality
disorder called Narcissistic Personality
Disorder characterized by juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability as
determined by a clinical psychologist.
On appeal by the OSG, the CA
reversed the decision of the RTC. The
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage

and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the
principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I
dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.1avvphi1 Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession
or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
41

appellate court held that Noel failed to
establish that Maribels supposed
Narcissistic Personality Disorder was
the psychological incapacity
contemplated by law and that it was
permanent and incurable. The CA
stressed that the law requires nothing
short of mental illness sufficient to
render a person incapable of knowing
the essential marital obligations.
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential

obligation of marriage.1avvphi1
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. x x x.
xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
42
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The

Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
(Emphasis ours.)
The totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a
finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noels evidence
merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with
him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he
confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root
cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the
requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. As
correctly observed by the CA, the report of the psychologist, who
concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish
how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming
the essential obligations of the marriage. Indeed, the same psychologist
even testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage
except that it would be difficult for her to sustain one. Mere difficulty, it
must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law.
The Court emphasizes that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to
prove that private respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but
also that such psychological disorder renders her "truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage."25Psychological incapacity
must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. An unsatisfactory marriage is
not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:26
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting
a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x
x.
2.
Republic vs. De
Gracia
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on

February 15, 1969 and had two (2)
children, namely, Ma. Reynilda R. De
Whether or not the CA

erred in sustaining the
RTCs finding of
"Psychological incapacity," as a ground to nullify a marriage under

Article 3632 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental
not merely physical incapacity that causes a party to be truly
43

Gracia (Ma. Reynilda) and Ma. Rizza
R. De Gracia (Ma. Rizza).
On December 28, 1998, Rodolfo filed a
verified complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage (complaint) before
the RTC alleging that Natividad was
psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations.
Rodolfo testified that he first met
Natividad when they were students at
the Barangay High School of
Sindangan, and he was forced to marry
her barely three (3) months into their
courtship in light of her accidental
pregnancy. At the time of their
marriage, he was 21 years old, while
Natividad was 18 years of age. He had
no stable job and merely worked in the
gambling cockpits. When he decided to
join and train with the army, Natividad
left their conjugal home and sold their
house without his consent. Thereafter,
Natividad moved to Dipolog City where
she lived with a certain Engineer Terez
(Terez), and bore him a child named
Julie Ann Terez.14 After cohabiting with
Terez, Natividad contracted a second
marriage on January 11, 1991 with
another man named Antonio Mondarez
and has lived since then with the latter.
Rodolfo was left to take care of Ma.
Reynilda and Ma. Rizza. He exerted
earnest efforts to save their marriage
which, however, proved futile because
of Natividads psychological incapacity
that appeared to be incurable.17
Natividad and Rodolfo submitted
themselves for psychiatric examination
to Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos (Dr. Zalsos). Dr.
Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and
psychological
incapacity.
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be

assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed in Article 6833 of the Family Code, among others,34 include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. xxx In Santos v. CA36 (Santos), the
Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized
by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved).xxx
Keeping with these principles, the Court, in Dedel v. CA, held that
therein respondents emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not
be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make her
completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations of the
marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual
promiscuity. xxx In Pesca, the Court upheld the appellate courts finding
that the petitioner therein had not established that her husband "showed
signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family
Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is
incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because
of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the
incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been
proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable
in nature."
Based on the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or
legal basis to conclude that Natividads emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with
The psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos does not explain in
reasonable detail how Natividads condition could be characterized as
grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of
psychological incapacity jurisprudence. Aside from failing to disclose the
types of psychological tests which she administered on Natividad, Dr.
Zalsos failed to identify in her report the root cause of Natividad's
condition and to show that it existed at the time of the parties' marriage.
44
3.
Republic vs.
Encelan
Natividad were psychologically

incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations, finding
that both parties suffered from "utter
emotional immaturity [which] is unusual
and unacceptable behavior considered
[as] deviant from persons who abide by
established norms of conduct."22 As for
Natividad, Dr. Zalsos also observed
that she lacked the willful cooperation
of being a wife and a mother to her two
daughters. Similarly, Rodolfo failed to
perform his obligations as a husband,
adding too that he sired a son with
another woman. Further, Dr. Zalsos
noted that the mental condition of both
parties already existed at the time of
the celebration of marriage, although it
only manifested after. Based on the
foregoing, Dr. Zalsos concluded that
the "couples union was bereft of the
mind, will and heart for the obligations
of marriage.
Tthe Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), representing petitioner Republic
of the Philippines (Republic), filed an
opposition to the complaint, contending
that the acts committed by Natividad
did not demonstrate psychological
incapacity as contemplated by law, but
are mere grounds for legal separation
under the Family Code.
RTC and CA declared the marriage
void on the ground of Psychological
Incapacity.
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married
Lolita5 and the union bore two children,
Maricar and Manny. Cesar went to work
in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On
June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in
Neither was the gravity or seriousness of Natividad's behavior in relation

to her failure to perform the essential marital obligations sufficiently
described in Dr. Zalsos's report. Further, the finding contained therein on
the incurability of Natividad's condition remains unsupported by any
factual or scientific basis xxx. Verily, although expert furnished by
psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties are
usually given considerable weight by the courts, the existence of
psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence.
xxx To the Court's mind, Natividad's refusal to live with Rodolfo and to
assume her duties as wife and mother as well as her emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility and infidelity do not rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties'
marriage. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one
thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another.xxx In
the final analysis, the Court does not perceive a disorder of this nature to
exist in the present case.
Whether there exists

sufficient basis to nullify
Cesars marriage to
Lolita on the ground of
psychological
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a

ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. xxx
xxx We have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity
contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
to assume the basic marital obligations";21 not merely the refusal,
45

Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had
been having an illicit affair with Alvin
Perez and allegedly left the conjugal
home with her children and lived with
Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had
been separated. On June 16, 1995,
Cesar filed with the RTC a petition
against Lolita for the declaration of the
nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas
Lolita denied that she had an affair with
Alvin. She insisted that she is not
psychologically incapacitated and that
she left their home because of
irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law.
Cesar presented the psychological
evaluation report on Lolita prepared by
Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the
National Center for Mental Health. Dr.
Flores found that Lolita was "not
suffering from any form of major
psychiatric illness," but had been
"unable to provide the expectations
expected of her for a good and lasting
marital relationship";1 her "transferring
from one job to the other depicts some
interpersonal problems with co-workers
as well as her impatience in attaining
her ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go
with her husband abroad signifies her
reluctance to work out a good marital
and family relationship."16
RTC declared Cesars marriage to
Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to
declare Lolita psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The CA
originally set aside the RTCs verdict.
Cesar sought reconsideration of the
incapacity.
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.22 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical
antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of
marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.23
In this case, Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged
psychological incapacity. xxx In any event, sexual infidelity and
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal
separation. To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown that
the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered
personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations.27 No evidence on record
exists to support Cesars allegation that Lolitas infidelity and
abandonment were manifestations of any psychological illness.
The psychological evaluation established that Lolita did not suffer from
any major psychiatric illness. Dr. Flores observation on Lolitas
interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to our mind, does not suffice
as a consideration for the conclusion that she was at the time of her
marriage psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital union
with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wifes psychological
fitness as a spouse cannot simply be equated with her professional/work
relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles apart
from their marital counterparts. xxx Dr. Flores further belief that Lolitas
refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good
marital relationship30 is a mere generalization unsupported by facts and
is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.
xxx
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution
protected by the State. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of its
existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and
nullity.
46

CAs decision and, in due course,
attained his objective. The CA set aside
its original decision and entered
another, which affirmed the RTCs
decision. The OSG then filed the
present petition.
4.
Republic vs. De
Quintos
Eduardo and Catalina were married on

March 16, 1977 in civil rites by the
Municipal Mayor of Lingayen,
Pangasinan. The couple was not
blessed with a child.
On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage, citing Catalinas
psychological incapacity to comply with
her essential marital obligations.
Eduardo testified that Catalina always
left their house without his consent; that
she engaged in petty arguments with
him; that she constantly refused to give
in to his sexual needs; that she spent
most of her time gossiping of doing the
household chores and caring for their
adopted daughter; that she squandered
by gambling all his remittances as an
overseas worker since 1993; and that
she abandoned the conjugal home in
1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her
paramour.
Eduardo presented the results of the
neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted
by Dr. Annabelle L. Reyes, a
psychiatrist. Based on the tests, Dr.
Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited
traits of Borderline Personality Disorder
that was no longer treatable. Dr. Reyes
found that Catalinas disorder was
mainly characterized by her immaturity
that rendered her psychologically
Whether there was

sufficient evidence
warranting the
declaration of the nullity
of Catalinas marriage
to Eduardo based on
her psychological
incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code.
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code

contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal,
or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists
of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b)
the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is,
the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual
help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a
spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married
person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.16
xxx The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have
remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the
psychological incapacity of a spouse. xxx Indeed, the incapacity should
be established by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making
it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the
Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement of
sufficiently explaining the gravity, root cause and incurability of
Catalinas purported psychological incapacity. xxx
To start with, Catalinas supposed behavior were not even established..
Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of
the neuro-psychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes despite the paucity of
factual foundation to support the claim of Catalinas psychological
incapacity.
The report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and
incurability of Catalinas supposed psychological incapacity. xxx Dr.
Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause that could have
brought about such behavior on the part of Catalina. They did not
specify which of Catalinas various acts or omissions typified the conduct
of a person with borderline personality, and did not also discuss the
gravity of her behavior that translated to her inability to perform her basic
47

incapacitated to meet her marital
obligations.
Catalina admitted her psychological
incapacity, but denied leaving the
conjugal home without Eduardos
consent and flirting with different men.
She insisted that she had only one livein partner.
The RTC ruled that Catalinas infidelity,
her spending more time with friends
rather than with her family, and her
incessant gambling constituted
psychological incapacity that affected
her duty to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.
On appeal, the CA promulgated its
decision affirming the judgment of the
RTC. The CA concluded that Eduardo
proved Catalinas psychological
incapacity.
marital duties. Dr. Reyes only established that Catalina was childish and
immature, and that her childishness and immaturity could no longer be
treated due to her having already reached an age "beyond maturity."
Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases of
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity
presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe
and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.26We have explained
this need in Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim, stating: xxx The probative force of the
testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or
opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in
showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons
upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.
But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not
personally seek out and meet with other persons, aside from Eduardo,
who could have shed light on and established the conduct of the
spouses before and during the marriage. For that reason, Dr. Reyes
report lacked depth and objectivity..
xxx Her immaturity alone did not constitute psychological incapacity. To
rule that such immaturity amounted to psychological incapacity, it must
be shown that the immature acts were manifestations of a disordered
personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state, which inability was merely due
to her youth or immaturity.31
Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo that there must be proof of a natal
or supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the
respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital obligations,
viz:
xxx Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity
rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness;
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the
same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
xxx Abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of marriage
under the Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological
incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article
55(10) of the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was
48
5.
Mendoza vs.
Republic
To entitle petitioner
spouse to a
declaration of the
nullity of his or her
marriage, the totality
of the evidence must
sufficiently prove that
respondent spouse's
psychological
incapacity was grave,
incurable and existing
prior to the time of the
marriage.
Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989.

After a month of courtship, they
became intimate and their intimacy
ultimately led to her pregnancy with
their daughter whom they named Allysa
Bianca. They got married on June 24,
1991, after which they moved to her
place, although remaining dependent
on their parents for support.
When petitioner delivered Alyssa
Bianca, Dominic had to borrow funds
from petitioners best friend to settle the
hospital bills. He remained jobless and
dependent upon his father for support
until he finished his college course in
October 1993. She took on various jobs
to meet the familys needs and she
shouldered all of the familys expenses.
Dominic sold Colliers Encyclopedia for
three months before he started working
as a car salesman for Toyota Motors in
1994. He spent his first sales
commission on a celebratory bash with
his friends. In September 1994, she
discovered his illicit relationship with
Zaida, his co-employee. Eventually,
communication between them became
rare until they started to sleep in
separate rooms, thereby affecting their
sexual relationship.
In November 1995, Dominic gave her a
Daihatsu Charade car as a birthday
1.
Whether or
not the
evidence
presented and
findings of the
expert in this
case are
sufficient to
establish
psychological
incapacity
(Whether or
not expert's
testimony are
indispensable
evidence in
determining
the merits for
psychological
incapacity as
a ground for
declaration of
nullity of
marriage)
2.
Whether AM
No. 02-11-10
SC rendered
appeals by
OSG no
longer
required and
that could be
deemed to be
functus officio
if not totally
disregarded
not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, considering that there should be a showing that such
marital infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality that
made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
marriage. xxx
In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological
incapacity of Catalina, we cannot but resolve in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that she harbored towards
Dominic, which she admitted during her consultation with Dr. Samson,
furnished the basis to doubt the findings of her expert witness; that such
findings were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself subjected to
an actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioners expert; and that he also
did not participate in the proceedings; and that the findings and
conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were solely based
on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and characterizations of him
rendered by petitioner and her witnesses.
Moreover, Dr. Samson conceded that there was the need for her to
resort to other people in order to verify the facts derived from petitioner
about Dominics psychological profile considering the ill-feelings she
harbored towards him. xxx
In fine, the failure to examine and interview Dominic himself naturally
cast serious doubt on Dr. Samsons findings. xxx
In Dagdag, we ruled that "Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2
which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since
no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband." But here, the experts testimony on
Dominics psychological profile did not identify, much less prove, the root
cause of his psychological incapacity because said expert did not
examine Dominic in person before completing her report but simply
relied on other peoples recollection and opinion for that purpose.
In Hernandez, we ruminated that: xxx expert testimony should have
been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondents
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage rests upon petitioner. In contrast, the expert evidence
submitted here did not establish the precise cause of the supposed
psychological incapacity of Dominic, much less show that the
psychological incapacity existed at the inception of the marriage.
49

present. Later on, he asked her to issue
two blank checks. She soon found out,
however, that the checks were not paid
for the cars insurance coverage but for
his personal needs. Worse, she also
found out that he did not pay for the car
itself, forcing her to rely on her fatherin-law to pay part of the cost of the car.
To make matters worse, Dominic was
fired from his employment after he ran
away with P164,000.00 belonging to his
employer. Other criminal charges
ensued.
On October 15, 1997, Dominic
abandoned the conjugal abode. A
month later, she refused his attempt at
reconciliation, causing him to threaten
to commit suicide. At that, she and her
family immediately left the house to live
in another place concealed from him.
On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in
the RTC her petition for the declaration
of the nullity of her marriage with
Dominic based on his psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The RTC found that all the
characteristics of psychological
incapacity which are gravity,
antecedence and incurability, were
attendant, establishing Dominics
psychological incapacity. The Republic
appealed to the CA, arguing that there
was no showing that Dominics
personality traits either constituted
psychological incapacity existing at the
time of the marriage or were of the
nature contemplated by Article 36 of the
Family Code; that the testimony of the
expert witness was not conclusive upon
The Court in Pesca observed that: Emotional immaturity and

irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.
Apparent from the aforecited pronouncements is that it was not the
absence of the medical experts testimony alone that was crucial but
rather petitioners failure to satisfactorily discharge the burden of
showing the existence of psychological incapacity at the inception of the
marriage. In other words, the totality of the evidence proving such
incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage was the crucial
consideration, as the Court has reminded in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is
logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions
furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of
parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such
opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in
granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts
must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in
determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given
case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the
expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
xxx To be clear, the statement in Marcos ran as follows:
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier
mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals: "psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
In light of the foregoing, even if the expert opinions of psychologists are
not conditions sine qua non in the granting of petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination of Dominic was to be
50

the court, and that the real reason for
the parties separation had been their
frequent quarrels over financial matters
and the criminal cases brought against
Dominic. CA reversed the decision of
RTC. Hence, this petition.
dispensed with only if the totality of evidence presented was enough to

support a finding of his psychological incapacity. xxx What was
essential, we should emphasize herein, was the "presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition," as the
Court said in Marcos.
xxx
We find the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner insufficient to
prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit to discharge the duties
expected of him as a husband, and that he suffered from such
psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage. Accordingly, the
CA did not err in dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
xxx The medical report failed to show that his actions indicated a
psychological affliction of such a grave or serious nature that it was
medically or clinically rooted. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and
lack of remorse for his dishonesty and lack of affection did not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. His inability to share or
to take responsibility or to feel remorse over his misbehavior or to share
his earnings with family members, albeit indicative of immaturity, was not
necessarily a medically rooted psychological affliction that was
incurable. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility did not equate with
psychological incapacity.24 Nor were his supposed sexual infidelity and
criminal offenses manifestations of psychological incapacity. If at all,
they would constitute a ground only for an action for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code.
2. The Courts Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10 nowhere stated that
appeals by the OSG were no longer required. On the contrary, the
Resolution explicitly required the OSG to actively participate in all stages
of the proceedings, to wit:
a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office
of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial
Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and
submit to the court proof of such service within the same
period.26
b) The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor,
in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file
their respective memoranda support of their claims within
fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require
the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if
the case is of significant interest to the State. No other
51

pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court.
After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be
considered submitted for decision, with or without the
memoranda.27
c) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision
personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned
by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part
of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of
general circulation.28
d) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen
days from notice to the parties.1wphi1 Entry of judgment shall
be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal
is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the
Solicitor General.29
e) An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from
the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from
notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial.
The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the
adverse parties.30
The obvious intent of the Resolution was to require the OSG to appear
as counsel for the State in the capacity of a defensor vinculi (i.e.,
defender of the marital bond) to oppose petitions for, and to appeal
judgments in favor of declarations of nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code, thereby ensuring that only the meritorious cases for
the declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacitythose sufficiently evidenced by gravity, incurability and juridical
antecedence-would succeed.
ARTICLE 36 FC, AM 02-11-10 SC; ARTICLES 48, 68- 71, 220-221 & 22
52
6. Kalaw
Fernandez
vs.
G.R.
No.
166357/
September 19,
2011
A finding of
psychological
incapacity must
be supported by
well-established
facts.
Petitioner Tyron and respondent Malyn

met in 1973. They maintained a
relationship and eventually married in
Hong Kong on November 4, 1976.
They had four children.Tyrone had an
extramarital affair with Jocelyn. Malyn
left the conjugal home and her four
children with Tyrone. Tyrone started
living with Jocelyn, who bore him
children.
Tyrone went to the United States with
Jocelyn and their children. He left his
four children from his marriage with
Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde
with only a househelp and a driver. Nine
years since the de facto separation from
his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage based
on Article 36 of the Family Code. He
alleged that Malyn was psychologically
incapacitated to perform and comply
with the essential marital obligations at
the time of the celebration of their
marriage.
1. She left the children without proper
care and attention as she played
mahjong all day and all night
2. She left the house to party with male
friends and returned in the early hours of
the following day; and
3. She committed adultery on June 9,
1985, which act Tyrone discovered in
flagrante delicto. He saw Malyn with
another man half naked in Hyatt Hotel.
Whether
petitioner
has
sufficiently
proved
that
respondent
suffers
from
psychological incapacity
Civil
Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or

inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on
the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party,
Law
Review 1: Atty. Legaspi
based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious
psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the
marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must
have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife
(respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented
the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who
concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but
the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged
acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently
proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners
allegations of respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of
their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents
alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of
quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and
wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
Tyrone presented a psychologist

Dr. Gates, and a Catholic canon law
expert, Fr. Healy, to testify on Malyns
psychological
incapacity.
However,
observation is based only by their
interview with Tyrone and on the
transcript only.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand
that the factual allegations regarding
Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity,
habitual mahjong playing, and her
frequent nights-out with friends may
reflect a narcissistic personality disorder
(NPD). That this may have been evident
even prior to her marriage because
it ison the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Based
rooted in her family background.
53

7.
DECLARATION OF NULLITY; PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; SEC 7, RULE 117, RULES OF PROCEDURE
1.
Pimentel
Pimentel
vs
GR no. 172060/
September 13, 2010
Civil Case Must be

Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Annulment of Marriage is
not
a
Prejudicial
Question
in Criminal Case for
Parricide
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine

Pimentel (private respondent) filed an
action for frustrated parricide against
Joselito
R.
Pimentel
(petitioner).
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to
suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question.
Petitioner asserted that since the
relationship between the offender and the
victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of Civil Case would have a
bearing in the criminal case filed against
him before the RTC Quezon City.
The RTC ruled that it not a
prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case before it.
The CA ruled that even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent
would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the
alleged acts constituting the crime of
frustrated parricide had already been
committed.
Whether the resolution of the

action for annulment of
marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal
case for frustrated parricide
against petitioner.
1. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before
the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the Information for
Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. Respondents
petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and
was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment
was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide.
As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
2. Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial
question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action
an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal
action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the
victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution
which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime,
petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution
of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is
granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed
54

at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
2.
Jarillovs
People
GR
No.
164435/
September 29, 2009
The outcome of the civil
case for annulment of
petitioners marriage
tohad no bearing upon
the determination of
petitioners innocence or
guilt in the criminal case
for bigamy, because all
that is required for the
charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at
the time the second
marriage is contracted.
8.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and

Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil
wedding ceremony. Victoria Jarillo and
Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage
in a church wedding ceremony.
Appellant Victoria Jarillo
thereafter contracted a subsequent
marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos
Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City. On
April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel
Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a
church wedding in Manila.
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed
against the appellant Civil Case No. 9993582 for annulment of marriage before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was
charged with bigamy before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City. Petitioner
moved for suspension of proceeding
based on prejudicial question but RTC
denied it.
The court a quo promulgated
the assailed decision finding him guilty of
bigamy.
On appeal to the CA,
petitioners conviction was affirmed in
toto.
Whether or not there is a

prejudicial question
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v.

Peoplewhere it was held thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the
first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy
cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to
declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that
action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow
that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners
marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal
case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the
time the second marriage is contracted.
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted
cases, petitioners conviction of the crime of bigamy must be
affirmed.
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid
defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a
second marriage without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second
marriage, petitioners marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been
declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was
deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of
the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference.
DECLARATION OF NULLITY; ARTS. 36, 40, 45; SSECTION 19 (1) AM 02-10-11 SC; ARTS. 147 & 148
1.
BeumervsAmo
res
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and

respondent, a Filipina, married in March
Whether the foreigner can

recover his property after
In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena

Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller It held that Helmut Muller
55
GR
No.
195670/
December 03, 2012
In pari delicto
"MEMO CUM ALTERIUS

DETER DETREMENTO
PROTEST" (No person
should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of
another)
29, 1980. After several years, the RTC

declared the nullity of their marriage on
the basis of the formers psychological
incapacity. Consequently, petitioner filed
a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
praying for the distribution of 6 Lots.
In defense, respondent averred
that, with the exception of their two (2)
residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142,
she and petitioner did not acquire any
conjugal properties during their marriage,
the truth being that she used her own
personal money to purchase Lots 1,
2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal
funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by
way of inheritance.
During trial, petitioner testified
that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were
registered in the name of respondent,
these properties were acquired with the
money he received from the Dutch
government as his disability benefitsince
respondent did not have sufficient income
to pay for their acquisition.
For her
part, respondent
maintained that the money used for the
purchase of the lots came exclusively
from her personal funds, in particular, her
earnings from selling jewelry as well as
products from Avon, Triumph and
Tupperware.
RTC dissolved the parties
conjugal partnership.
CA
promulgated
a
Decisionaffirming in toto the judgment
rendered by the RTC . The CA stressed
the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of
the constitutional prohibition for aliens to
acquire lands in the Philippines. Hence,
he cannot invoke equity to support his
claim for reimbursement.
dissolution of marriage
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear

that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined
under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which
reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations,
or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the
above-cited constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that,
because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the
subject properties in the latters name. Clearly, petitioners actuations
showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition.
Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law
is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces
no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil
Code, petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or
allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase
thereof.
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New
Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another,
or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something
at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him.
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS
DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of
what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an
accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case,
the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of
the pari delicto doctrine.
56

2.
Dino vs Dino
GR
No.
178044/
January 19, 2011
Alain M. Dio and Ma. Caridad

L. Dio were childhood friends and
sweethearts. On 14 January 1998, they
were married each other. On 30 May
2001, petitioner filed an action for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
respondent, citing psychological
incapacity..
Petitioner later learned that
respondent filed a petition for
divorce/dissolution of her marriage with
petitioner, which was granted by the
Superior Court of California on 25 May
2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5
October 2001, respondent married a
certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
The RTC ruled that based on
the evidence presented, petitioner was
able to establish respondents
psychological incapacity. Petitioner filed a
motion for partial reconsideration
questioning the dissolution of the
absolute community of property and the
ruling that the decree of annulment shall
only be issued upon compliance with
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Petitioner assails the ruling of
the trial court ordering that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be
issued after liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages does not apply to
Article 147 of the Family Code.
Whether the trial court erred

when it ordered that a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties
properties under Article 147 of
the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering

that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because
Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule
provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision
granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of
absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court
only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as
implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution
of Properties.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section
19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void
ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of
the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not
apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36
of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting
for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void
under Article 36of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45.
Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common
by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In
Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by
Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on coownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on coownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, [p]artition may be
made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings.
xxx. It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in
the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage
57
3.
CamachoReyes
Reyes
vs
GR No. 185286/ August

18, 2010
4.
MBTC
vsPascual
GR
no.
163744/
February 29, 2008
Only proof of acquisition
during the marriage is
needed to raise the
presumption of conjugal
partnership.
Termination of Conjugal
Property
regime does
not ipso facto end the
nature
of
conjugal
ownership.
During the union, Florencia

bought from spouses Clarito and Belen
Sering a 250-square meter lot with a
three-door apartment standing thereon
located in Makati City. Subsequently,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was
issued in the name of Florencia, "married
to Nelson Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson
Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for
the declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC
declared the marriage null and void. In
the same decision, the RTC, inter alia,
ordered the dissolution and liquidation of
the ex-spouses conjugal partnership of
gains.
Florencia, together with spouses
Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a
PhP 58 million loan from petitioner
Metropolitan Bank . To secure the
obligation, Florencia and the spouses
Oliveros executed several real estate
mortgages (REMs) on their properties,
including the above mentioned lot.
Among
the
documents
Florencia
submitted to procure the loan were a
copy of TCT, a photocopy of the
marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a
document denominated as "Waiver" that
Nicholson purportedly executed on April
a. Whether or not the [CA]

erred in declaring subject
property as conjugal by
applying Article 116 of the
Family Code.
b. Whether or not the [CA]

erred in not holding that the
declaration
of
nullity
of
marriage
between
the
respondent Nicholson Pascual
and
FlorenciaNevalgaipso
facto dissolved the regime of
community of property of the
spouses.
1. First, while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of

the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal
provision since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of
the Family Code, it errs in its theory that, before conjugal ownership
could be legally presumed, there must be a showing that the
property was acquired during marriage using conjugal funds.
Contrary to Metrobanks submission, the Court did not, in
Manongsong, add the matter of the use of conjugal funds as an
essential requirement for the presumption of conjugal ownership to
arise. Nicholson is correct in pointing out that only proof of
acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption
that the property is conjugal. Indeed, if proof on the use of conjugal is
still required as a necessary condition before the presumption can
arise, then the legal presumption set forth in the law would veritably
be a superfluity.
Second,Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce Metrobanks theory.
The correct lesson of Francisco and Jocson is that proof of
acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by
the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an
indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.
2. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and
Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal
partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such
declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after
the liquidation and partition of the partnership. This conclusion holds
true whether we apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of
58

9, 1995.
Due to the failure of Florencia
and the spouses Oliveros to pay their
loan obligation when it fell due,
Metrobank initiated a foreclosure. At the
auction sale, Metrobank emerged as the
highest bidder.
Nicholson filed before the RTC a
Complaint to declare the nullity of the
mortgage of the disputed property. In it,
Nicholson alleged that the property,
which is still conjugal property, was
mortgaged without his consent.
5.
Valdes vs RTC
Br. 102, QC
GR No. 122749/ July 31,

1996
In a void marriage,
regardless of the cause
thereof, the property
relations of the parties
during the period of
cohabitation is governed
by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148,
such as the case may be,
of the Family Code.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo

Gomez were married on 05 January
1971. Begotten during the marriage were
five children. In a petition, dated 22 June
1992, Valdes sought the declaration of
nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article
36 of the Family Code. The Trial court,in
its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the
petition; viz:
Consuelo Gomez sought a
clarification of that portion of the decision
directing compliance with Articles 50, 51
and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted
that the Family Code contained no
provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in "unions
without marriage." Petitioner submits that
Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code
should be held controlling; he argues
that:
"I
"Article 147 of the Family Code does not
apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated.
"II
"Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to
Whether
property
should be based
ownership
regime
on co-
the conjugal partnerships assets and liabilities which is generally

prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I
(Arts. 179 to 185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal
Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant provisions of both Codes first
require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a regime of
separation of property reigns.
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern
the property relationship between the former spouses, where:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect
of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in
the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as
interpreted and so applied in previous cases; it provides:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages
and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and
a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so
exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage
or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the
provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of
the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both
spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly
59

Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code
govern the disposition of the family
dwelling in cases where a marriage is
declared void abinitio, including a
marriage declared void by reason of the
psychological incapacity of the spouses.
"III
"Assuming arguendo that Article 147
applies to marriages declared void ab
initio on the ground of the psychological
incapacity of a spouse, the same may be
read consistently with Article 129.
6.
AtienzavsBrilla
ntes
AM MTJ 92-706/ March

29, 1995
Article 40 is a rule of
procedure.
This is a complaint by Lupo A.

Atienza for Gross Immorality and
Appearance of Impropriety against Judge
Francisco Brillantes. Complainant alleges
that he has two children with Yolanda De
Castro, that he stays in said house,
which he purchased in 1987, whenever
he is in Manila. In December 1991, upon
opening the door to his bedroom, he saw
respondent sleeping on his bed. Upon
inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that
respondent had been cohabiting with De
Castro. Complainant did not bother to
wake up respondent and instead left the
house after giving instructions to his
houseboy to take care of his children.
Complainant
claims
that
respondent
is
married
to
one
ZenaidaOngkiko with whom he has five
children.
Respondent
alleges
that
complainant was not married to De
Castro. Respondent also denies having
been married to Ongkiko, although he
admits having five children with her. He
alleges that while he and Ongkiko went
if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the

family household."[ Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits
of the couple's separate property are not included in the coownership.
Whether Article 40 of the

Family Code is applicable in
this case despite that marriage
is
contracted
before
enactment of Family Code
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the

effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the
date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family
Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40,
which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested
right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith.
He made a mockery of the institution of marriage and employed
deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five
children. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies
with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any
marriage license.
60

through a marriage ceremony before a
Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25,
1965, the same was not a valid marriage
for lack of a marriage license. Upon the
request of the parents of Ongkiko,
respondent
went
through
another
marriage ceremony with her in Manila on
June 5, 1965. Again, neither party
applied for a marriage license.
Respondent argues that the
provision of Article 40 of the Family Code
does not apply to him considering that his
first marriage took place in 1965 and was
governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage
took place in 1991 and governed by the
Family Code.
9.
RA 9262- Law on Violation against Women and their Children; Support; Art. 213 Family Code
Title
1. Tua v. Mangrobang
Facts
Issues
Ruling
2. The answer is in the negative
Respondent RossanaHonrado-Tuafiled a3. W/N Section 15 of RA 9262
violates the due process
Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:
verified petition for issuance of
GR No. 170701, Jan.
clause
of
the
Constitution.
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. Temporary
protection order for herself and her
4.
W/N
RA
9262
grants
an
invalid
22, 2014, 714 SCRA 428
Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by
children,
against
her
husband
delegation
of
powers
by
the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte
RalphTua.
Congress
to
the
Courts.
determination that such order should be issued. A court may grant
Acting on the verified petition, the trial
in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and
court issued a Temporary Protection
shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule a
Order good for 30 days and required
hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order] PPO
Ralph to comment on the petition.
prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall
In his comment questioning the propriety
order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the
of the temporary protection order, he
respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of
maintained that Rosanna had been
law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall include
staying with another man; she
notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a
surreptitiously moved her children out
PPO.
of their abode despite their written
In Garcia v. Drilon,wherein petitioner therein argued that Section
agreement;
and
Rosanna
is
61

psychologically,
emotionally
and
mentally unfit to keep the children in
her custody.
Without waiting for his Comment to be
resolved by the trial court, Ralph filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, with a prayer for issuance of
writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order. In order
not to render the petition moot, the CA
issued a temporary restraining order for
the parties to enjoin them implementing
the temporary protection order. Ralph
later filed an Urgent Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, to restrain the RTC from
conducting proceedings therein.
The CA later dismissed his petition for
certiorari. It ruled that the petition is still
pending with the RTC, hence the
factual matters could be raised thereon.
The RTC validly issued the TPO; As to
Ralphs contention that RA 9262 is
unconstitutional, since the issue raised
in the CA was the alleged grave abuse
of disruption by the RTC in issuing the
TPO, the issue could be resolved
without ruling on the constitutionality of
Republic Act 9262, which is not the
very lismota of the petition.
Ralph thus filed his petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court, questioning
the constitutionality of Republic Act
9262. According to him, RA 9262,
particularly Section 15 thereof which
allows the grant of protection orders, is
unconstitutional, since it deprives the
respondent of due process before
issuance. It is also an invalid delegation
15 of RA 9262 is a violation of the due process clause of the

Constitution, we struck down the challenge and held:
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of
violence against women and their children, their family or
household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure
that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies
necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This
serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to
accord the victim and any designated family or household member
safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from
committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of
the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of
minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent
their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial
support.
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing,
signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full
responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since
time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to
be prevented, the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO
after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or
property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable
ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim
from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur.
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational
basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to
verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her
witnesses
affidavits
to
the
petition.
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as
violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary
attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because
the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable
the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same
way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
62
of powers by Congress to the courts.
death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could
be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is
protection of women and children from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the
court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the
respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days
from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of
the petition and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by
the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30)
days from service on the respondent.
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order
the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the
respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within
five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference
and hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall
verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and
shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order
should not be issued.
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition
for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to
him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. x xx. The
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of ones defense. To be heard does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.
x xx
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 hereof. Hence, the primary judge of the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is
primarily the function of the legislature. The act of Congress
63

entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in
pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or
disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable
before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations
of such rights.
Dabalos v. RTC Br. 59 Petitioner Karlo Angelo Dabalos y San

Diego was charged with violation of
GR NO. 193960, 688
Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the
SCRA 64, Jan.7, 2013
RTC of Angeles City, Branch 59
After examining the supporting evidence,
the RTC found probable cause and
consequently, issued a warrant of arrest
against petitioner.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause with
Motion to quash because he averred
that at the time of the alleged incident,
he was no longer in a dating
relationship with private respondent;
hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
The RTC denied petitioners motion.It did
not consider material the fact that the
parties dating relationship had ceased
prior to the incident, ratiocinating that
since the parties had admitted a prior
dating relationship, the infliction of
slight physical injuries constituted an
act of violence against women and their
children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA
9262.
1. whether RA 9262 should

be construed in a manner3. No. Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries
that will favor the accused;
to private respondent is not covered by RA 9262 because its
and
proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he
2. whether the RTC has
claims that the offense committed was only slight physical injuries
jurisdiction over the offense;
under the Revised Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court.
3) whether the Information
alleging a fact contrary to
Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:
what has been admitted
should be quashed.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence
against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had
a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x xx.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications
for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of
violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is
committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the
offenders wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or
dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it
results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court enumerated the elements of
the crime of violence against women through harassment, to wit:
64
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the

offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or
series of acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to her.6
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual
or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be
applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such
limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should
the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of
violence against women with whom the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is
immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as
there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence
of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the
physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot
depart from the parallelism in Ang and give credence to
petitioner's assertion that the act of violence should be due to the
sexual or dating relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner
using the rule of lenity7 because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262
that would necessitate any construction. While the degree of
physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 8 of the Revised
Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for
prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative
intent is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the
offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with whom
they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their
children with the end in view of promoting the protection of women
and children.
65

2. Yes. Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the
necessary elements of the crime, such as: a dating relationship
between the petitioner and the private respondent; the act of
violence committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical
harm to private respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262
which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in accordance with
Sec. 7 of the said law which reads:
SEC. 7. Venue The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was
committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court
where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the
option of the complainant.
No. The Court finds the Order9 of the RTC, giving the prosecutor
a period of two (2) days to amend the Information to reflect the
cessation of the dating relationship between the petitioner and the
offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to
quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall
order that an amendment be made.1wphi1
Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides
that an information may be amended, in form or in substance,
without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea. In the present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been
arraigned, hence, the RTC was correct in directing the
amendment of the Information and in denying the motion to quash
the same.
66

Title
Dolina v. Vallecera
Facts
CherrylDolina filed a petition with aprayer
for the issuance of a temporary
GR No. 182367,
protection
order
against
Glenn
December 15, 2010, 638
Vallecera before the RTC for violation
SCRA 707
of RA 9262. In the pro forma
complaint, Cherryl added a prayer for
This case is about a
support for their supposed child.
mothers claim for
Vallecera opposed the said petition and
temporary support of
claimed that Dolinas petition was
an unacknowledged
essentially
one
for
financial
child, which she sought
in an action for the
support rather
than for
issuance of a
protection against woman and child
temporary protection
abuses, that he was not the childs
order that she brought
father and that the signature in the birth
against the supposed
father.
certificate was not his. Furthermore,
that the petition is a harassment suit
intended to force him to acknowledge
the child as his and give it financial
support; and that Vallecera has never
lived nor has been living with Dolina,
rendering unnecessary the issuance of
a protection order against him.
The RTC dismissed the petition after
hearing since no prior judgment exists
establishing the filiation of Dolinas son
and granting him the right to support as
basis for an order to compel the giving
of such support.
Issues
whether or not the RTC
correctly
dismissed
Dolinas
action
for
temporary
protection
and
denied
her
application
for
temporary support for
her child.
Ruling
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her
child. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case
is the protection and safety of women and children who are
victims of abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a
protection order against the respondent in the case can include
the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes
that both are entitled to a protection order and to legal support.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action,
first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her son is
based on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the
latter is not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged
him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him.7 The childs
remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against
Vallecera for compulsory recognition.8 If filiation is beyond
question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short,
illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights
but their filiation must be duly proved.
Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action
against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish
filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly
file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory
recognition may be integrated and resolved.
While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases
involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the
disturbance that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy
and peace of the putative fathers legitimate family.12 Vallecera
disowns Dolinas child and denies having a hand in the
preparation and signing of its certificate of birth. This issue has to
be resolved in an appropriate case.
Ocampo v. ArcayaChua
AM OCA 07-2630, April
23, 2010, 619 SCRA 59,
67

Ang v. CA/ Saguid
GR No. 182835, April
20, 2010
The public prosecutor charged petitioneraccused RustanAng (Rustan) before

the RTC of violation of RA 9262 in an
information that reads:
On or about June 5, 2005, the said
accused willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless
conduct, sent through the Short
Messaging Service using his mobile
phone a pornographic picture to Irish
Sagud, who was his former girlfriend,
whereby the face of the latter was
attached to a completely naked body of
another woman making it appear that it
was said Irish Sagud who is pecited in
the said obscene and pornographic
picture, thereby causing substantial
emotional anguish, psychological
distress and humiliation to the said Irish
Sagud.
The RTC foundRustan guilty of violation
of Sec. 5(h) of RA 9262.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
The principal issue in this

case is whether or not
accused Rustan sent Irish by
cellphone
message
the
picture with her face pasted
on the body of a nude
woman, inflicting anguish,
psychological distress, and
humiliation on her in violation
of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
The
issues are:
subordinate
1.
Whether or
not a dating relationship
existed between Rustan and
Irish as this term is defined
in R.A. 9262;
2.
Whether or
not
a
single
act
of
harassment, like the sending
of the nude picture in this
case, already constitutes a
violation of Section 5(h) of
R.A. 9262;
3.
Whether or
not the evidence used to
convict Rustan was obtained
from him in violation of his
constitutional rights; and
4.
Whether or
not the RTC properly
admitted in evidence the
obscene picture presented in
the case.
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against

women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with
whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in
this Act,
(a)
Violence against women and their
children refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is
his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
x xxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence
against women and these include any form of harassment that
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a
woman. Thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women
and Their Children. The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any
of the following acts:
x xxx
h.
Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or
reckless conduct, personally or through another, that
alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child.
This shall include, but not be limited to, the following
acts:
68
x xxx
5.
or violence;
Engaging in any form of harassment
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the

elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassment are:
1.
The offender has or had a sexual or
dating relationship with the offended woman;
2.
The offender, by himself or through
another, commits an act or series of acts of
harassment against the woman; and
3.
The harassment alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution
needed to prove that accused Rustan had a dating relationship
with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a dating relationship
includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved
over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. Thus:
(e)
Dating relationship refers to a
situation wherein the parties live as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or are
romantically involved over time and on a continuing
basis during the course of the relationship. A casual
acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two
individuals in a business or social context is not a
dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being romantically involved,
implies that the offender and the offended woman have or had
sexual relations. According to him, romance implies a sexual
act. He cites Websters Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia
Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the
word romance used as a verb, i.e., to make love; to make love
69

to as in He romanced her.
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its
provisions the colloquial verb romance that implies a sexual
act. It did not say that the offender must have romanced the
offended woman. Rather, it used the noun romance to describe
a couples relationship, i.e., a love affair.[9]
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that violence against
women x xx refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman x xx with whom the person has or had
a sexual or dating relationship. Clearly,
the
law
itself
distinguishes
a
sexual
relationship
from
a
dating
relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines dating
relationship while Section 3(f) defines sexual relations. The
latter refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in
the bearing of a common child. The dating relationship that the
law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual
intercourse taking place between those involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between
Irish and him was of the on-and-off variety (away-bati), their
romance cannot be regarded as having developed over time and
on a continuing basis. But the two of them were romantically
involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to December of
2003. That would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of
mutual trust and love.
An away-bati or a fight-and-kiss thing between two
lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean
that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed
broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining what
away-bati meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could
not reply to Rustans messages, he would get angry at her. That
was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic
relation as continuous.[10]
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an
offensive picture should not be considered a form of
harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him
70

personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a)
of R.A. 9262 punishes any act or series of acts that constitutes
violence against women. This means that a single act of
harassment, which translates into violence, would be
enough. The object of the law is to protect women and
children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed
would license isolated ones.
Rustan alleges that todays women, like Irish, are so
used to obscene communications that her getting one could not
possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial
emotional or psychological distress. He claims having previously
exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already
desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his
wife give their testimonies was not impressed with their claim that
it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 27). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish since her
face did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustans wife, claimed that she deleted several
other pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her
testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know
that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the
pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to
delete them.[11] And, if she thought that she had deleted all the
pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to
keep and hide such memory card. There would have been nothing
to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the
card, there was no reason for her to keep it for several years,
given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything
connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving
credence to her testimony.
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish
experienced based on Rustans low regard for the alleged moral
sensibilities of todays youth. What is obscene and injurious to an
offended woman can of course only be determined based on the
circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the
71

picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irishs head and face,
was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and
offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the
pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees
herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that,
as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in
the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and
certain items were seized from him without any warrant, the
evidence presented against him should be deemed
inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not present in
evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police
officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution
did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the
prosecution was but a photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson
P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted
owning during the pre-trial conference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him
consisted in Irishs testimony that she received the obscene
picture and malicious text messages that the senders cellphone
numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had been previously
in communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers
belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to
summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did.
[12]
Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the
confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent
those messages.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text
messages to Irish.[13] His defense was that he himself received
those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing
Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his
cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of
the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to
authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such
version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for
Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her
identify the sender.
72
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to

Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an
electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the
admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time
before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have
objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the
time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection.[14]
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present
criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to
civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings.[15]
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has
proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
Go Tan v. Tan
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. GoTan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan were
married. Out of this union, two female
children were born, Kyra Danielle and
Kristen Denise.On January 12, 2005,
barely six years into the marriage,
petitioner Go-Tan filed a Petition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order (TPO) against Steven
and her parents-in-law Spouses
Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents) before the RTC. She
alleged that Steven, in conspiracywith
respondents, were causing verbal,
psychological and economic abuses
upon her in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)
Whether or not Perfecto and

Juanita Tan, Parents-in-Law
of Sharica, may be included
in the petition for the
issuance of a protective
order in accordance with RA.
9262.
YES!!
(1) Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women
and their children'' as
"any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or
with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological
harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such
acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be related or
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual
or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the RPC.
73

of
Republic
Act
(R.A.)
No.
9262, otherwise known as the "AntiViolence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004."
Petitioners Contention: Petitioner GoTan contends that R.A. No. 9262 must
be understood in the light of the
provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No.
9262 which explicitly provides for the
suppletory application of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly,
the provision on "conspiracy" under
Article 8 of the RPC can be
suppletorilyapplied to R.A. No. 9262;
that Steven and respondents had
community of design and purpose in
tormenting her by giving her insufficient
financial support; harassing and
pressuring her to be ejected from the
family home; and in repeatedly abusing
her verbally, emotionally, mentally and
physically.
Respondents
Contention:Spouses
Tans were contending that the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over their persons
since, as parents-in-law of the
petitioner, they were not covered by
R.A. No. 9262. They submit that they
are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since
Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that
the offender should be related to the
victim only by marriage, a former
marriage, or a dating or sexual
relationship; that allegations on the
conspiracy of respondents require a
factual determination which cannot be
done by this Court in a petition for
review.
The Court Granted respondents
Motion To Dismiss and issued a
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the

suppletory application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act,
the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall
have suppletory application.
(2) Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts
of violence against women and their children may be committed
by an offender through another.
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This
shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public
or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the
residence of the woman or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the
woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting
harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x xx
(3) In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the
purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the woman
or her child may include individuals other than the offending
husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. x xx The protection orders that may
be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the
following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or
committing, personally or through another, any of the acts
mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying,
telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the
petitioner, directly or indirectly; x xx
(4) Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal
construction of the law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to
promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against
women and their children.
74

resolution dismissing the case as to
respondents on the ground that, being
the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they
were
not
included/covered
as
respondents under R.A. No. 9262
under the well-known rule of law
"expressiouniusestexclusioalterius."
Thus,
contrary
to
the
RTC's
pronouncement,
the
maxim "expressiouniosestexclusioalterius" finds no application
here.
11. Arts. 40 and 41, FC; Art. 349 RPC; Civil and Criminal Bigamy; Art 83, NCC;
75
Title
1. People v Odtuhan
Facts
On July 2, 1980, respondent Edgardo

Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina. On
October 28, 1993, he also married
Eleanor Alagon. He later filed a petition
for annulment of his marriage with
Modina. The RTC granted respondents
petition and declared his first marriage
void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage
license. On November 10, 2003, Alagon
died. In the meantime, private
complainant Evelyn Alagon learned of
respondents previous marriage with
Modina and thus filed a ComplaintAffidavit charging respondent with
Bigamy.
Respondent moved to quash the

information on two grounds: (1) that the
facts do not charge the offense of
bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action
or liability has been extinguished.
GR NO. 191566, July

17, 2013, 701 SCRA 506
Capili v People
GR No. 183805, July 3,
2013, 700 SCRA 443
The RTC held that the facts constitute the

crime of bigamy. There was a valid
marriage between respondent and
Modina and without such marriage
having been dissolved, respondent
contracted a second marriage with
Alagon. It further held that neither can
the information be quashed on the
ground that criminal liability has been
extinguished, because the declaration
of nullity of the first marriage is not one
of the modes of extinguishing criminal
liability.
Respondent appealed to the CA on
certiorari and it concluded that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in denying
respondents motion to quash the
information, considering that the facts
alleged in the information do not charge
an offense.
Issues
1. Whether or not the motion
to quash by respondent is
proper
Civil
2. Whether or not the courts
judgment
declaring
respondents first marriage
void ab initio extinguished
respondents criminal liability
Ruling
. No. A motion to quash information is the mode by which an
accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information
filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for
Law
Review 1: Atty. Legaspi
defects which are apparent in the face of the information. In this
case however, there is sufficiency of the allegations in the
information to constitute the crime of bigamy. It contained all the
elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code: (1) that respondent is legally married to Modina; (2)
that without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that
respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a
second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity.
Respondents evidence showing the courts declaration that his
marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning should not
be considered because matters of defense cannot be raised in a
motion to quash. It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges
at the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial.
2. No. Respondents claim that there are more reasons to quash
the information against him because he obtained the declaration
of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy
against him is without merit. Criminal culpability attaches to the
offender upon the commission of the offense and from that instant,
there is already liability. The time of filing of the criminal complaint
or information is material only for determining prescription.
It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of

nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may
still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a
subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so
long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second
marriage was celebrated.
The petition on review on ceritorari is granted. The CAs decision is
set aside and the case is remanded to the RTC.
Whether
or
not
the
No. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners
Petitioner James Walter Capili was
subsequent declaration of
second marriage had no bearing upon the determination of
charged with bigamy. There is a
nullity
of
the
second
petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, 76
pending civil case for declaration of
marriage
is a ground
for
because
all that
is required
for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is
Natalie
Joyce
Estacio
Ciara
Christia
Infantado
Stephen
Jacobo
Carence
Janelle
Navidad
(SY 2014
2015)
nullity of the second marriage before
Based on the
outline of
of Atty.
dismissal
the Domingo
criminal Legaspi
that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
the RTC of Antipolo City filed by the first
case for bigamy.
marriage is contracted.

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Civil Law Reviewer Cases (Part 1)

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty.

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

would marry her when he passes the

making him ineligible

FC Marriage Requirements; Civil Wedding v. Church Wedding; Certificate of Civil Registrar

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Rex M. Tupal filed with the Office of the

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an

Whether or not the

A competent evidence of identity guarantees that the person appearing before

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan,

Whether or not the

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

the MTCC Branches indicate a higher

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

The present case stems from a petition

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

The CA reversed the decision of the trial

1. Whether or not the

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges 1.

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

parties, the influx of visitors, and the

marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

But for any other

On December 14, 1993, respondent

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Private respondent married Anna Maria

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

The Pasig RTC declared his marriage to

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

This is an administrative case filed by the

In relation to the charges against him,

1. Whether or not the

The marriage remains valid.

Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and ArlynBorga is considered

The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the

xxxxxxxxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and

The elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the

Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta.

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. Elise

with the RTCof

personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

The complainant alleges in support of

Whether or not the the