Civil Law Reviewer Cases III

Civil Law Review 1: Atty.
Legaspi
Section 5. Administration of the Conjugal Partnership Property (Articles 124 125); Article 165, 173, 1390 NCC; Rule on Forum Shopping; Article 124 FC v. Guardianship
v. Summary Proceedings
Title
1. Aggabao v.
Parulan
GR# 165803,
Sept. 1, 2010,
629 SCRA 563
Facts
In January 1991, real estate broker Marta K. Atanacio
(Atanacio) offered two parcels of land and their
improvements registered in the name of respondents
Spouses Maria Elena A. Parulan (Ma. Elena) and
Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr. (Dionisio), who have been
estranged from one another to the petitioners.
On February 2, 1991, Ma. Elena showed to them the
following documents, namely: (a) the owners original
copy of TCT No. 63376; (b) a certified true copy of TCT
No. 63377; (c) three tax declarations; and (d) a copy of
the special power of attorney (SPA) allegedly executed
by Dionisio authorizing Ma. Elena to sell the property.
Before the meeting ended, they paid P20,000.00 as
earnest money, for which Ma. Elena executed a
handwritten Receipt of Earnest Money, whereby the
parties stipulated that: (a) they would pay an additional
payment of P130,000.00 on February 4, 1991; (b) they
would pay the balance of the bank loan of the
respondents amounting to P650,000.00 on or before
February 15, 1991; and (c) they would make the final
payment of P700,000.00 once Ma. Elena turned over
the property on March 31, 1991.
The petitioners checked on the authenticity of TCT No.
63376 and TCT No. 63377 with the Office of the
Register of Deeds in Pasay City as the custodian of the
land records; and that they had also gone to the Los
Baos Rural Bank to inquire about the mortgage
annotated on TCT No. 63377.
Following their verification, the petitioners
delivered P130,000.00 as additional down payment on
February 4, 1991; and P650,000.00 to the Los Baos
Rural Bank on February 12, 1991, which then released
the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 63377 to them.11
On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final
amount of P700,000.00 to Ma. Elena, who executed a
deed of absolute sale in their favor. However, Ma.
Elena did not turn over the owners duplicate copy of
Issue/s
Whether the sale of
conjugal property
made by respondent
wife by presenting a
special power of
attorney to sell (SPA)1.
purportedly executed
by respondent
husband in her favor
was validly made to
the vendees, who
allegedly acted in
good faith and paid
the full purchase
price, despite the
showing by the
husband that his
signature on the SPA
had been forged and
that the SPA had
been executed during
his absence from the
country.
1) Which
between
Article 173
of the Civil
Code and
Article 124
of the Family
Code should
apply to the
sale of the
conjugal
property
executed
Held
We resolve the main issue against the vendees and sustain the CAs finding
that the vendees were not buyers in good faith, because they did not
exercise the necessary prudence to inquire into the wifes authority to sell.
We hold that the sale of conjugal property without the consent of the
husband was not merely voidable but void; hence, it could not be ratified.
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal
properties made after the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 254 the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the
Civil Code, among them the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the
property relations between husband and wife, Article 173 included, are found.
Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the
effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article
124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of
conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed
by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides: The administration and enjoyment
of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of
within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Thirdly, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the
Family Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired
xxx. Herein, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property
acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the
retroactive application of the Family Code.
Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio,
while holding the administration over the property, had delegated to his
1
Natalie Joyce Estacio Ciara Christia Infantado Stephen Jacobo Carence Janelle Navidad (SY 2014 2015)
Based on the outline of Atty. Domingo Legaspi
Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

TCT No. 63376, claiming that said copy was in the
possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong.
On March 19, 1991, TCT No. 63377 was cancelled and
a new one was issued in the name of the petitioners.
Ma. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owners copy
of TCT No. 63376 as promised. In due time, the
petitioners learned that the duplicate owners copy of
TCT No. 63376 had been all along in the custody of
Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA
executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell
both lots.
At Atanacios instance, the petitioners met on March
25, 1991 with Atty. Parulan. They recalled that Atty.
Parulan "smugly demanded P800,000.00" in exchange
for the duplicate owners copy of TCT No. 63376,
because Atty. Parulan represented the current value of
the property to be P1.5 million. As a counter-offer,
however, they tenderedP250,000.00, which Atty.
Parulan declined.
Hearing nothing more from the petitioners, Atty.
Parulan decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they
informed him that they had already fully paid to Ma.
Elena.
On April 15, 1991, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan,
commenced an action praying for the declaration of the
nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma.
Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the
petitioners by virtue thereof.
In turn, the petitioners filed on July 12, 1991 their own
action for specific performance with damages against
the respondents.
On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court annulled the
deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the
petitioners covering two parcels of registered land the
respondents owned for want of the written consent of
respondent husband Dionisio Parulan, Jr. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision.
without the
consent of
Dionisio?
2) Might the
petitioners
be
considered
in good faith
at the time of
their
purchase of
the
property?
brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that they
did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the
administration.
Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include
acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As
such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer,
and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by
following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to
Article 1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a
special agency, was limited to the sale of the property in question, and did
not include or extend to the power to administer the property.
Lastly, the petitioners insistence that Atty. Parulans making of a counter-offer
during the March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration.
Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction executed sans the
written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void; hence,
ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be ratified.32
On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing
offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of
accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma.
Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of the second paragraph of
Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of
the other spouses consent, the transaction should be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the
other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn
by either or both offerors.
2. A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another, without
notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property, and
pays the full and fair price for it at the time of such purchase or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. He buys
the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the thing
was the owner and could convey title to the property. He cannot close his
eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he
acted in good faith. The status of a buyer in good faith is never presumed but
must be proven by the person invoking it. xxx
Article 124 of the Family Code categorically requires the consent of both
spouses before the conjugal property may be disposed of by sale, mortgage,
or other modes of disposition. In Bautista v. Silva, the Court erected a
standard to determine the good faith of the buyers dealing with a seller who
had title to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was
restricted, in that the consent of the other spouse was required before the
2

conveyance, declaring that in order to prove good faith in such a situation,
the buyers must show that they inquired not only into the title of the seller but
also into the sellers capacity to sell. Thus, the buyers of conjugal property
must observe two kinds of requisite diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in
verifying the validity of the title covering the property; and (b) the diligence in
inquiring into the authority of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal property
in behalf of the other spouse.
It is true that a buyer of registered land needs only to show that he has relied
on the face of the certificate of title to the property, for he is not required to
explore beyond what the certificate indicates on its face. In this respect, the
petitioners sufficiently proved that they had checked on the authenticity of
TCT No. 63376 and TCT No. 63377 xxx.
Yet, it ought to be plain enough to the petitioners that the issue was whether
or not they had diligently inquired into the authority of Ma. Elena to convey
the property, not whether or not the TCT had been valid and authentic, as to
which there was no doubt xxx.
Firstly, the petitioners knew fully well that the law demanded the written
consent of Dionisio to the sale, but yet they did not present evidence to show
that they had made inquiries into the circumstances behind the execution of
the SPA purportedly executed by Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena. Had they
made the appropriate inquiries, and not simply accepted the SPA for what it
represented on its face, they would have uncovered soon enough that the
respondents had been estranged from each other and were under de
facto separation, and that they probably held conflicting interests that would
negate the existence of an agency between them. To lift this doubt, they
must, of necessity, further inquire into the SPA of Ma. Elena. The omission to
inquire indicated their not being buyers in good faith, for, as fittingly observed
in Domingo v. Reed:
What was required of them by the appellate court, which we affirm, was
merely to investigate as any prudent vendee should the authority of Lolita
to sell the property and to bind the partnership. They had knowledge of facts
that should have led them to inquire and to investigate, in order to acquaint
themselves with possible defects in her title. The law requires them to act
with the diligence of a prudent person; in this case, their only prudent course
of action was to investigate whether respondent had indeed given his
consent to the sale and authorized his wife to sell the property.
Indeed, an unquestioning reliance by the petitioners on Ma. Elenas SPA
without first taking precautions to verify its authenticity was not a prudent
buyers move. They should have done everything within their means and
power to ascertain whether the SPA had been genuine and authentic. xxx
Secondly, the final payment of P700,000.00 even without the owners
3
2. Ravina v.
Villa Abrille
GR# 160708,
Oct. 16, 2009,
604 SCRA
120
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro

Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four
children.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter
parcel of land adjacent, covered by TCT No. T-88674,
to a parcel of land, covered by TCT No. T-26471, which
Pedro acquired when he was still single. Through their
joint efforts, the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and
Pedros lot. The house was finished in the early 1980s.
In 1991, Pedro, by himself, offered to sell the house
and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and
Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the
petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless
sold the house and the two lots without Mary Anns
(1) whether the

subject property
covered by TCT No.
T-88674 is an
exclusive property of
Pedro or conjugal
property, and (2)
whether its sale by
Pedro was valid
considering the
absence of Mary
Anns consent.
duplicate copy of the TCT No. 63376 being handed to them by Ma. Elena
indicated a revealing lack of precaution on the part of the petitioners. It is true
that she promised to produce and deliver the owners copy within a week
because her relative having custody of it had gone to Hongkong, but their
passivity in such an essential matter was puzzling light of their earlier alacrity
in immediately and diligently validating the TCTs to the extent of inquiring at
the Los Baos Rural Bank about the annotated mortgage. Yet, they could
have rightly withheld the final payment of the balance. That they did not do
so reflected their lack of due care in dealing with Ma. Elena.
Lastly, xxx they did not take immediate action against Ma. Elena upon
discovering that the owners original copy of TCT No. 63376 was in the
possession of Atty. Parulan, contrary to Elenas representation. xxx Instead,
they contented themselves with meeting with Atty. Parulan to negotiate for
the possible turnover of the TCT to them.
3. xxx Veloso is inapplicable because the contested property therein was
exclusively owned by the petitioner and did not belong to the conjugal
regime. xxx
In contrast, the property involved herein pertained to the conjugal regime,
and, consequently, the lack of the written consent of the husband rendered
the sale void pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code. Moreover, even
assuming that the property involved in Veloso was conjugal, its sale was
made on November 2, 1987, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code;
hence, the sale was still properly covered by Article 173 of the Civil Code,
which provides that a sale effected without the consent of one of the spouses
is only voidable, not void. However, the sale herein was made already during
the effectivity of the Family Code, rendering the application of Article 124 of
the Family Code clear and indubitable. xxx
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which
was an exclusive property of Pedro. However, the lot covered by TCT No. T88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. xxx
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the
absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said
presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by
Pedro. xxx Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having
been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses xxx.
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124
of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a)
4

consent. Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name.
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house
and the four children were in school, Pedro together
with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) began transferring all their
belongings from the house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille
came home, they were stopped from entering it.
Respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a
complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance,
Damages and Attorneys Fees with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction7 against Pedro and herein
petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City.
During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was
built with his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina
testified that they bought the house and lot from Pedro,
and that her husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina,
examined the titles when they bought the property.
On September 26, 1995, the trial court and the CA
ruled in favor of herein respondent Mary Ann P. Villa
Abrille.
without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one
spouses inability, the authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family Code,
the governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit. xxx
The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years
to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family
Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal
partnership property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null
and void.
Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband,
without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale
is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the
wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the
instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract
implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale
within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.
However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and
lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property
exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without
Mary Anns consent.
On the second assignment of error the contention is bereft of merit. As
correctly held by the Court of Appeals, a purchaser in good faith is one who
buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a
right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the
same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property.15 To establish his status as a
buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land registered in the
name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face
of the sellers certificate of title. But for a person dealing with land registered
in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted,
such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of the
Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latters capacity to sell in
order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith.161avvphi1
In the present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro and his
wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that during the time of
the sale in 1991, Pedro was married to Mary Ann. Mary Anns conformity did
not appear in the deed. Even assuming that petitioners believed in good faith
that the subject property is the exclusive property of Pedro, they were
apprised by Mary Anns lawyer of her objection to the sale and yet they still
proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Anns written consent.
Moreover, the respondents were the ones in actual, visible and public
5
3. De La Cruz
v. Segovia
GR# 149801,
June 26, 2008,
555 SCRA 453
in July 1985, petitioner Florinda dela Cruz (Florinda)

wanted to purchase two (2) parcels of land located at
Paltok Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, Lot 503 with an
apartment unit erected thereon and Lot 505 with a
residential house. The two lots were being sold
together for P180,000.00. Inasmuch as Florinda had
onlyP144,000.00 at hand, she asked her sister,
possession of the property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus,
at the time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in
the subject properties and yet they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed
of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection accorded to
purchasers in good faith.
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been
given is proper. The relationship between the parties in any contract even if
subsequently annulled must always be characterized and punctuated by
good faith and fair dealing.17 Hence, in consonance with justice and equity
and the salutary principle of non-enrichment at anothers expense, we
sustain the appellate courts order directing Pedro to return to petitioner
spouses the value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. T88674 and the house thereon.
Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements and renovations on the
house and lot at the time when the complaint against them was filed. Ravina
continued introducing improvements during the pendency of the action.
Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides that, "(h)e
who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right to indemnity."
On the last issue, petitioners claim that the decision awarding damages to
respondents is not supported by the evidence on record.20
The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent
and her children were removed from the family home deserves our
condemnation. xxx
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: "Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."22 When
a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and
results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages
caused.23 It is patent in this case that petitioners alleged acts fall short of
these established civil law standards.
The four (4)-year period for filing an action for annulment of the September 9,
1991 Agreement, on ground of vitiated consent, had already lapsed when the
complaint subject of the present controversy was filed on March 8, 1996.
This is in accordance with Article 1391 of the Civil Code. xxx
xxx The Agreement was read to the parties before they affixed their
signatures thereon. Petitioners were thereafter furnished a copy of the
subject Agreement. Petitioners are presumed to have discovered the alleged
6

respondent Leonila Segovia (Leonila), to
contribute P36,000.00 to complete the purchase price.
The sisters agreed that Lot 503 and the apartment unit
thereat would belong to Leonila upon full payment of its
purchase price of P80,000.00, while Lot 505 with a
residential house would belong to Florinda.
The agreement was that the P36,000.00 contribution
of Leonila shall be applied to the 503 property which
upon full payment of the remaining balance
of P44,000.00 advanced by Florinda shall belong to
Leonila. On the other hand, of Florindas P144,000.00
contribution, P 100,000.00 shall be considered as full
payment for the purchase of the 505 property and
the P44,000.00 which was the balance of the purchase
price of Lot 503, as loan to Leonila. To secure payment
of the loan, Lot 503 was provisionally registered in the
name of petitioners. Hence Lot 503 was at the outset
not intended to be part of the conjugal asset of the
petitioners but only as a security for the payment of
the P44,000.00 due from respondents.
4. Villanueva
v. Chiong
GR# 159889,
June 05, 2008,
554 SCRA 197
Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were

married sometime in January 1960 but have been
separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage,
they acquired Lot No. 997-D-1, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-19393)-2325.
Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western
portion of the lot to petitioners forP8, 000, payable in
installments. Thereafter, Florentino allowed petitioners
to occupy the lot. Petitioners demanded from
respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their
favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
On July 5, 1991, Elisera filed with the RTC a Complaint
for Quieting of Title with Damages, docketed as Civil
Case No. 4383. On February 12, 1992, petitioners filed
with the RTC a Complaint for Specific Performance
1. Whether or not the

subject lot is an
Florentino or a
conjugal property of
respondents.
2. Whether or notits
sale by Florentino
without Elisera's
consent valid.
mistake on September 9, 1991. xxx

xxx. Article 124 of the Family Code relied upon by petitioners provides that
the administration of the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of
the husband and the wife. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
partnership, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
However, the power of administration does not include the power to dispose
or encumber property belonging to the conjugal partnership. In all instances,
the present law specifically requires the written consent of the other spouse,
or authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal
partnership property without which, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void.
xxx The transaction between Florinda and Leonila in reality did not involve
any disposition of property belonging to any of the sisters conjugal assets.
xxx
Moreover, while Florindas husband did not affix his signature to the abovementioned Agreement, xxx Renato, by his actuations, agreed and gave his
conformity to the Agreement. As found by the courts below, Renatos consent
to the Agreement was drawn from the fact that he was present at the time it
was signed by the sisters and their witnesses; he had knowledge of the
Agreement as it was presented to him for his signature, although he did not
sign the same because his wife Florinda insisted that her signature already
carried that of her husband; Renato witnessed the fact that Leonila
contributed her hard earned savings in the amount of P36,000.00 to
complete their share in the purchase price of the properties in question in the
total amount of P180,000.00. xxx
Anent the first issue, xxx respondents' separation in fact neither affected the
conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced Elisera's interest over it. Under
Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband and
wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot
retains its conjugal nature.
Likewise, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property acquired by the
spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. xxx
On the basis alone of the certificate of title, it cannot be presumed that the lot
was acquired during the marriage and that it is conjugal property since it was
registered "in the name of Florentino Chiong, Filipino, of legal age, married to
Elisera Chiong ."18 But Elisera also presented a real property tax
declaration acknowledging her and Florentino as owners of the lot. In
addition, Florentino and Elisera categorically declared in the Memorandum of
7

with Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 4460. The
RTC consolidated these two cases.
On May 13, 1992, Florentino executed the questioned
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners.
On July 19, 2000, the RTC, in its Joint Decision,
annulled the deed of absolute sale dated May 13,
1992, and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and
remove all improvements therein. The RTC likewise
dismissed Civil Case No. 4460, but ordered Florentino
to return to petitioners the consideration of the sale with
interest from May 13, 1992. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC's decision. Petitioners sought
reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this petition.
Agreement they executed that the lot is a conjugal property.19 Moreover, the
conjugal nature of the lot was admitted by Florentino in the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated May 13, 1992, where he declared his capacity to sell as a coowner of the subject lot.20
Anent the second issue, the sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent is
not, however, void ab initio. In Vda. de Ramones v.
Agbayani,21 citing Villaranda v. Villaranda,22 we held that without the wife's
consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior
to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely
voidable. Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code 23 provide:
ART. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos
mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in
a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's
consent
This article shall not apply to property acquired by the conjugal
partnership before the effective date of this Code.
ART. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten
years from the transaction questioned,ask the courts for
the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or
contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated
by the husband. (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is necessary
for the sale of a conjugal property to be valid. In this case, the requisite
consent of Elisera was not obtained when Florentino verbally sold the lot in
1985 and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on May 13, 1992. Accordingly,
the contract entered by Florentino is annullable at Elisera's instance, during
the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned,
conformably with Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera timely questioned the sale
when she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5, 1991, perfectly within ten years
from the date of sale and execution of the deed.
xxx In Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et al.,
xxx it was held that the alienation must be annulled in its entirety and not only
insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned.
Although the transaction in the said case was declared void and not merely
voidable, the rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction is the
same. Thus:
8
5. JaderManalo vs.
Camaisa
GR# 147978,
Jan.23, 2002,
374 SCRA 498
Both parties admit that there were negotiations for the

sale of four parcels of land between petitioner and
respondent spouses; that petitioner and respondent
Edilberto Camaisa came to an agreement as to the
price and the terms of payment, and a downpayment
was paid by petitioner to the latter; and that
respondent Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell.
Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance
and damages against respondent spouses before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati to compel respondent
Norma Camaisa to sign the contracts to sell.
On April 14, 1993, the trial court rendered a summary
judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that
under Art. 124 of the Family Code, the court cannot
intervene to authorize the transaction in the absence of
the consent of the wife since said wife who refused to
give consent had not been shown to be incapacitated.
Whether or not the

contracts to sell
between petitioner
and respondent
spouses were already
perfected such that
the latter could no
longer back out of the
agreement.
The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that
the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the
wife's consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress
intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall
"prejudice" the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out in
the statute. xxx
Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been
given is proper.27 Article 1398 of the Civil Code provides:
An obligation having been annulled, the contracting parties shall
restore to each other the things which have been the subject matter
of the contract, with their fruits, and the price with its interest, except
in cases provided by law.
In obligations to render service, the value thereof shall be the basis
for damages.
The effect of annulment of the contract is to wipe it out of existence, and to
restore the parties, insofar as legally and equitably possible, to their original
situation before the contract was entered into.28
Strictly applying Article 1398 to the instant case, petitioners should return to
respondents the land with its fruits and respondent Florentino should return
to petitioners the sum of P8,000, which he received as the price of the land,
together with interest thereon. xxx
A perusal of the pleadings submitted by both parties show that there is no
genuine controversy as to the facts involved therein.
The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the

husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of
the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family
Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers
of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the
9

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by the trial
court.
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be

construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or
both offerors. (Underscoring ours.)
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal;
hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband
and wife must concur.
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written
consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively
participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she
denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity.
Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the
contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the
negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely
aware of a transaction is not consent.[25]
xxx
It should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is only
resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is
incapacitated. In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that
respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In
the absence of such showing of the wifes incapacity, court authorization
cannot be sought.
6. Jardeleza
vs. Jardeleza
GR# 112014,
Dec. 05, 2000,
347 SCRA 10
Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza were

married long before 03 August 1988, when the Family
Code took effect. The union produced five children,
namely: petitioner, Ernesto, Jr., Melecio, Glenda and
Rolando. On 25 March 1991, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza,
Sr., suffered a stroke and lapsed into comatose
condition.
On 06 June 1991, petitioner commenced with the
Regional Trial Court, Special Proceedings No. 45689,
and petition for appointment of judicial guardian over
the person and property of Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. and
prayed for the issuance of letters of guardianship to his
Whether Article 124

of the Family Code
renders "superfluous"
the appointment of a
judicial guardian over
the person and
estate of an
incompetent married
person.
Very recently, in a related case, we ruled that Article 124 of the Family Code
was not applicable to the situation of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and that the
proper procedure was an application for appointment of judicial guardian
under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
10
7. Uy
(Jardeleza)
vs. Jardeleza
GR# 10955,
Nov. 29, 2000,
346 SCRA 246
mother, Gilda L. Jardeleza.2

On 19 June 1991, the trial court issued an order setting
the petition for hearing. On 3 July 1991, petitioner filed
with the trial court a motion for the issuance of letters of
guardianship to him, rather than to his mother, on the
ground that she considered the property acquired by
Dr. Jardeleza as her own and did not want to be
appointed guardian.
On 09 August 1991, respondents filed with the trial
court an opposition to the petition for guardianship and
the motion for issuance of letters of guardianship to
petitioner.
On 20 August 1993, the trial court issued an order
dismissing the petition for guardianship. The trial court
concluded, without explanation, that the petition is
superfluous and would only serve to duplicate the
powers of the wife under the explicit provisions of
Article 124, second paragraph, of the Family Code.
On 17 September 1993, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. On 24 September 1993, the trial court
denied the motion for reconsideration finding it
unmeritorious.
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered
him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition
in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their
conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same
as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge
his functions. She further contest that such illness of
the husband necessitated expenses that would require
her to sell their property in Lot 4291 and its
improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled in
favor of Gilda contending that such decision is
pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings
thereon are governed by the rules on summary
proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that the petition made by
her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship
of the person and properties of his father. As such it
cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the
Whether petitioner
Gilda L. Jardeleza as
the wife of Ernesto
Jardeleza, Sr. who
suffered a stroke, a
cerebrovascular
accident, rendering
him comatose,
without motor and
mental faculties, and
could not manage
their conjugal
partnership property
may assume sole
powers of
administration of the
conjugal property
under Article 124 of
the Family Code and
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the

Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code.
The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated
in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be
obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse
is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court
found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or
semi-comatose condition. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial
guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under the
Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal property,
the law provides that the wife who assumes sole powers of administration
has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the Rules of Court.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such
administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure for the
sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964
Revised Rules of Court.xxx
In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the
Revised Rules of Court. Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the
11

provisions on summary proceedings instead it should
follows the ruled governing special proceedings in the
Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due
process particularly the need for notice and a hearing
on the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2 of
the FC comes under the heading on Separation in
Fact Between Husband and Wife contemplating a
situation where both spouses are of disposing mind.
Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in
their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the
property to her daughter and son in law. Upon the
appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the
lower court.
dispose of a parcel of
land with its
improvements, worth
more than twelve
million pesos, with
the approval of the
court in a summary
proceedings, to her
co-petitioners, her
own daughter and
son-in-law, for the
amount of eight
million pesos.
requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.

xxx
Hence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be
heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process.
xxx
RTC granted said petition. Respondent opposed and

filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that such
petition is essentially a petition for guardianship of the
person and properties of Jardeleza Sr and that a
summary proceedings was irregularly applied.
RTC denied the motion. CA reversed RTCs decision
for lack of due process on the part of the incapacitated
spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the
petition should not be granted.
8. Guiang vs.
CA
GR# 125172,
June 26, 1998
291 SCRA 372
The sale
of a conjugal
property
requires
the
consent
of
both
the
husband and
Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are

legally married spouses. They were married on
December 24, 1968. The couple have three children,
namely: Junie 18 years old, Harriet 17 years of
age, and Jodie or Joji, the youngest, who was 15
years of age.
On February 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie
Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as vendee,
bought a lot located in Koronadal, South Cotabato,
and particularly known as Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd165409 from Manuel Callejo.
(1) Whether or not the

contract of sale (Deed
of Transfer of Rights)
was merely voidable.
(2) Whether or not
such contract was
ratified by private
respondent when she
entered into an
amicable settlement
with them.
1. In this instance, private respondents consent to the contract of sale

of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. This being the
case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family
Code, which was correctly applied by the two lower courts.
Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code, the
trial court adroitly explained the amendatory effect of the above provision in
this wise:
xxx The disposition or encumbrance is void. xxx Under Article 166
of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wifes consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made
12
the wife. The

absence of the
consent of one
renders
the
sale null and
void, while the
vitiation
thereof makes
it
merely
voidable. Only
in the latter
case
can
ratification
cure
the
defect.
On April 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz sold

one-half portion of their lot to the defendants-spouses
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.
In June 1989, Gilda Corpuz left for Manila to look for
work.
In January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her
father intended to sell the remaining one-half portion
including their house, of their homelot to defendants
Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother informing
her. She [Gilda Corpuz] replied that she was objecting
to the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father
about this; but instead gave the letter to Mrs.
Luzviminda Guiang so that she [Guiang] would advise
her father .
However, defendant Judie Corpuz pushed through the
sale of the remaining one-half portion of their conjugal
lot.
On March 11, 1990, when plaintiff returned home, she
was informed by her children that their father had a
wife already.
For staying in their house sold by her husband,
plaintiff was complained against by spouses Guiang
before the Barangay authorities for trespassing. On
March 16, 1990, the parties thereat signed a
document known as amicable settlement
Trial Court and Respondent Court found that any
alienation or encumbrance by the husband of the
conjugal property without the consent of his wife is null
and void as provided under Article 124 of the Family
Code.
however is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended

wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or
encumbrance. Thus, the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, to wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within
ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband
entered into without her consent, when such consent is
required, or any act or contract of the husband which
tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the
conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution
of the marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years x x x during
[the] marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not
carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation
or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code
took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property
without the consent of the wife is null and void.
The execution of the amicable settlement does not alter the void
character of the deed of sale between the husband and the petitionersspouses, as will be discussed later. The fact remains that such contract was
entered into without the wifes consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of
private respondents consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code
requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object,
and (3) consent,[14] the last element being indubitably absent in the case at
bar.
2. The trial court correctly held: By the specific provision of the law [Art.
1390, Civil Code] therefore, the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. A) cannot
be ratified, even by an amicable settlement. xxx It is a direct offshoot of the
Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. A). By express provision of law, such a
contract is also void. In summation therefore, both the Deed of Transfer of
13
Rights (Exh. A) and the amicable settlement (Exh. 3) are null and void.
9. Roxas vs.
CA
Plaintiff is married but living separately from husband,

one of the defendants herein.
GR#92245,
June 26, 1991,
198 SCRA 541
Plaintiff discovered that her estranged husband,

defendant Antonio S. Roxas, had entered into a
contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano
sometime on March 30, 1987 covering a portion of
their conjugal lot, described in T.C.T. No. 378197
(formerly T.C.T. No. 23881) without her previous
knowledge, much less her marital consent
Whether or not
a husband, as
the
administrator
of the conjugal
partnership,
may legally
enter into a
contract of
lease involving
conjugal real
property
without the
knowledge
and consent of
the wife.
That on the same lot, plaintiff had planned to put up

her flea market and mini-mart for which she had filed
an application for the corresponding Mayor's Permit
and Municipal License which had been approved since
1986, but when she attempted to renew it for 1986, the
same was disapproved last month due to the
complaint lodged by defendant Antonio M. Cayetano
whose application for renewal of Mayor's Permit and
License for the same business of putting up a flea
market, had been allegedly earlier approved;
Due to the illegal lease contract entered into between
the herein defendants and the resultant unlawful
deprivation of plaintiff from operating her own
legitimate business on the same lot of which she is a
Whether or not a
lease is an
encumbrance and/or
alienation within the
scope of Art. 166 of
the New Civil Code.
Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing offer

that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of
Article
124. The
order
of
the
pertinent
events
is
clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against
private respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured an
amicable settlement and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its
execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to
sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to
the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of
the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance
mentioned in Article 124.
Under the New Civil Code (NCC), "Art. 165. The husband is the administrator
of the conjugal partnership," in view of the fact that the husband is principally
responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family. If the
conjugal partnership does not have enough assets, it is the husband's capital
that is responsible for such support, not the paraphernal property.
Responsibility should carry authority with it.
The husband is not an ordinary administrator, for while a mere administrator
has no right to dispose of, sell, or otherwise alienate the property being
administered, the husband can do so in certain cases allowed by law. xxx
However, administration does not include acts of ownership. For while the
husband can administer the conjugal assets unhampered, he cannot alienate
or encumber the conjugal realty. Thus, under Art. 166 of NCC "unless the
wife has been declared a non-compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under
civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate
or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership the wife's consent.
If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to
grant the same." This rule prevents abuse on the part of the husband, and
guarantees the rights of the wife, who is partly responsible for the acquisition
of the property, particularly the real property. Contracts entered into by the
husband in violation of this prohibition are voidable and subject to annulment
at the instance of the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the Civil Code)
As stated in Black's Law Dictionary, the word "alienation" means 'the transfer
of the property and possession of lands, tenements, or other things from one
person to another . . . The act by which the title to real estate is voluntarily
assigned by one person to another and accepted by the latter, in the form
prescribed by law. Cf. In re Enrhardt U.S.D.C. 19 F. 2d 406, 407 . . . ." While
14

conjugal owner, plaintiff has been compelled to seek
redress and ventilate her grievance to the court.
Dated July 31, 1989 defendant Antonio M. Cayetano
moved to dismiss the complaint on the sole ground
that the complaint states no cause of action, to which
an Opposition was filed by plaintiff (now petitioner
herein), while defendant Antonio S. Roxas, estranged
husband of plaintiff-petitioner, filed an answer.
Confronted with the private respondent's Motion to
Dismiss, on August 16, 1989, respondent Judge
resolved said Motion by dismissing plaintiff-petitioner's
complaint in its Order dated August 16, 1989, the
dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
It is said that the test of sufficiency of the cause of
action is whether admitting the facts alleged to be true,
the court could render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer in the complaint.
After examining the material allegations in the
complaint, the Court finds that the complaint failed to
satisfy the test of sufficiency. Plaintiff-petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied.
Petitioner directly appealed the Decision of the lower
court to the Supreme Court but referred this case to
the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals rendered
judgment affirming in toto the Order of the trial court.
encumbrance "has been defined to be every right to, or interest in, the land
which may subsist in third persons, to the diminution of the value of the land,
but consistent with the passing of the fee by the conveyance; any (act) that
impairs the use or transfer of property or real estate . . ." (42 C.J.S., p. 549).
xxx
Under Art. 1643 of the New Civil Code "In the lease of things, one of the
parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a
price certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite. However,
no lease for more than ninety-nine years shall be valid." Under the law, lease
is a grant of use and possession: it is not only a grant of possession as
opined by the Court of Appeals. xxx
In the contract of lease, the lessor transfers his light of use in favor of the
lessee. The lessor's right of use is impaired, therein. He may even be ejected
by the lessee if the lessor uses the leased realty. Therefore, lease is a
burden on the land, it is an encumbrance on the land. xxx The concept of
encumbrance includes lease, thus "an encumbrance is sometimes construed
broadly to include not only liens such as mortgages and taxes, but also
attachment, LEASES, inchoate dower rights, water rights, easements, and
other RESTRICTIONS on USE." (Capitalization is Ours) (533 Pacific
Reporter [second series] 9, 12).
Moreover, lease is not only an encumbrance but also a "qualified alienation,
with the lessee becoming, for all legal intents and purposes, and subject to
its terms, the owner of the thing affected by the lease." (51 C C.J.S., p. 522)
Thus, the joinder of the wife, although unnecessary for an oral lease of
conjugal realty which does not exceed one year in duration, is required in a
lease of conjugal realty for a period of more than one year, such a lease
being considered a conveyance and encumbrance within the provisions of
the Civil Code requiring the joinder of the wife in the instrument by which real
property is conveyed or encumbered (See also 41 C.J.S., p. 1149). In case
the wife's consent is not secured by the husband as required by law, the wife
has the remedy of filing an action for the annulment of the contract. Art. 173
of the Civil Code states "the wife may, during the marriage and within ten
years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of
any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required. . . .
xxx Petitioner's estranged husband, defendant Antonio S. Roxas had entered
into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano without her
marital consent being secured as required by law under Art. 166 of the Civil
Code. Petitioner, therefore, has a cause of action under Art. 173 to file a case
for annulment of the contract of lease entered into without her consent.
Petitioner has a cause of action not only against her husband but also
15

against the lessee, Antonio M. Cayetano, who is a party to the contract of
lease.
Section 6. Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership Regime (Articles 126 128); Collection suits against the partnership; death of a spouse
Title
1. Espinosa v.
Omaa
AC. 9081, Oct
12, 2011, 659
SCRA 1
Facts
Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997,
Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal (Marantal)
sought Omaas legal advice on whether they could
legally live separately and dissolve their marriage
solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaa then prepared a
document entitled "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.
Marantal and Espinosa started implementing its terms
and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took
custody of all their children and took possession of
most of the property they acquired during their union.
Issue/s
Whether Omaa
violated the Canon of
Professional
Responsibility in the
notarization of
Marantal and
Espinosas
"Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay."
Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee,

complainant Glindo, a law graduate, who informed him
that the contract executed by Omaa was not valid.
Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer
to file a complaint against Omaa before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD).
Held
This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval is void.2 The Court has also ruled that a
notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the
family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially
dissolving the conjugal partnership,3 which is exactly what Omaa did in this
case.
In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4 the Court cited a number of cases where
the lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in
this case.
We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her part-time office staff
who notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself
notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who
notarized the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence in doing her
notarial duties. xxx
xxx Omaa knew fully well that the "Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay" has no
legal effect and is against public policy. Therefore, Omaa may be
suspended from office as an attorney for breach of the ethics of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Omaa denied that she prepared the contract. She

admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested
for the notarization of the contract but she told him that
it was illegal. Omaa alleged that her office staff forged
her signature and notarized the contract.
The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaa be
suspended for one year from the practice of law and for
two years as a notary public.
4. De Ugalde
v. De Ysasi
GR# 130623,
On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and

Jon de Ysasi (respondent) got married. They had a son
named Jon de Ysasi III.
Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in April
Whether the Court of

Appeals committed a
reversible error in
affirming the trial
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on the validity of petitioner
and respondent's marriage. The validity of petitioner and respondent's
marriage was the subject of another action, Civil Case No. 430 for Judicial
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage. The marriage between petitioner
16

Feb. 29, 2008,
547 SCRA 171
1957. On 26 May 1964, respondent allegedly

contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor
Smith (Smith). Petitioner further alleged that respondent
and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and
personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife.
Petitioner alleged that she had been defrauded of rental
income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties.
On 12 December 1984, petitioner filed a petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains against
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, Bacolod City.
Respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and
petitioner entered into an agreement which provided,
among others, that their conjugal partnership of gains
shall be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957. They
submitted an Amicable Settlement in Civil Case No.
4791 before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (CFI). In its Order dated 6 June 1961, the
CFI approved the Amicable Settlement.
Respondent further alleged that petitioner already
obtained a divorce from him before the Supreme Court
of Mexico. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains on the grounds of estoppel, laches, and res
judicata.
In his Supplemental Affirmative Defense, respondent
alleged that the marriage between him and petitioner
was void because it was executed without the benefit of
a marriage license.
The trial court ruled that the existence of a conjugal
partnership of gains is predicated on a valid marriage.
Considering that the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was solemnized without a marriage license,
the marriage was null and void, and no community of
property was formed between them. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's Decision.
court's Decision
which dismissed the
action for dissolution
of conjugal
partnership of gains.
and respondent was already judicially annulled as of 20 November 1995. The

trial court had no jurisdiction to annul again the marriage of petitioner and
respondent.
xxx
The finality of the 6 June 1961 CFI Order in Civil Case No. 4791 resulted in
the dissolution of the petitioner and respondent's conjugal partnership of
gains.
xxx The applicable law at the time of their marriage was Republic Act No.
386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code) which
took effect on 30 August 1950.16 Pursuant to Article 119 of the Civil Code, the
property regime of petitioner and respondent was conjugal partnership of
gains.
Article 142 of the Civil Code defines conjugal partnership of gains, as follows:
By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place
in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from
their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage
or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by
either spouse during the marriage.
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results
in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains:
Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article
191. (Emphasis supplied)
The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the
parties' separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal
partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.
Hence, when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the
conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already
dissolved.
xxx Petitioner cannot repudiate the Compromise Agreement on this ground.
A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any
17
5. Relucio vs.
Lopez
GR# 138497,
Jan.16, 2001,
373 SCRA 578
On September 15, 1993, herein private respondent

Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a petition for
"APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATIX OF
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES,
FORFEITURE, ETC.," against defendant Alberto Lopez
and petitioner Imelda Relucio. Private-respondent
alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who
is legally married to the private respondent, abandoned
the latter and their four legitimate children. He
arrogated unto himself full and exclusive control and
administration of the conjugal properties to the total
exclusion of the private respondent and their four
children. Defendant Lopez maintained an illicit
relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since
1976.
Defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during their
period of cohabitation since 1976, have amassed a
fortune. The properties, which are in the names of
defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly
or their dummies and proxies, have been acquired
principally if not solely through the actual contribution
of money, property and industry of defendant Lopez.
In order to avoid defendant Lopez obligations as a
father and husband, he excluded the private
respondent and their four children from sharing or
benefiting from the conjugal properties and the income
or fruits there from.
On December 8, 1993, a Motion to Dismiss the Petition
was filed by herein petitioner on the ground that private
respondent has no cause of action against her.
The Trial Court denied petitioner Relucio's Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration on the ground
that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable
party because some of the subject properties are
1. Whether
respondent's petition
for appointment as
sole administratrix of
the conjugal property,
accounting, etc.
against her husband
Alberto J. Lopez
established a cause
of action against
petitioner.
2. Whether
petitioner's inclusion
as party defendant is
essential in the
proceedings for a
complete adjudication
of the controversy.9
other judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies,
and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it.
The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and
respondent when it was approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The CFI's
approval of the Compromise Agreement on 6 June 1961 resulted in the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and
respondent on even date.
First issue: whether a cause of action exists against petitioner in the
proceedings below.
In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a
claim has been merely defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain.
xxx The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband. xxx

Respondent's causes of action were all against her husband.
The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as
administratrix of the conjugal partnership or absolute community property
arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete
stranger to this cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to
spouses, to wit:
"If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply
with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may
petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property,
or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership property xxx"
The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them,
to the exclusion of all other persons. xxx. There is no right-duty relation
between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of
action. xxx
The second cause of action is for an accounting "by respondent
husband." The accounting of conjugal partnership arises from or is an
incident of marriage. Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between
respondent Alberto J. Lopez. xxx
xxx The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez'
share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. It does not involve the
18

registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely
in her name.
On June 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's
denial of her motion to dismiss and its motion for
reconsideration.
6. Alipio vs.
CA
GR# 134100,
Sept. 29,
2000, 341
SCRA 441
Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a

14.5 hectare fishpond. On June 19, 1987, he subleased
the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to
the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses
Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. It is payable in two
instalments. Each of the four sublessees signed the
contract.
In the second installment, the sublessees only
satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid
balance. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to
comply with their obligation, so that, on October 13,
1989, private respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel
issue of validity of the co-ownership between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner.

The issue is whether there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez' share, if
any there be, in property co-owned by him with petitioner.
Respondent's asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez' share
alone. xxx Such cause of action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not
petitioner.
The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be compelled from a
stranger.
xxx
Finally, as to the moral damages, respondent's claim for moral damages is
against Alberto J. Lopez, not petitioner. To sustain a cause of action for moral
damages, the complaint must have the character of an action for interference
with marital or family relations under the Civil Code.
xxx Petitioners participation in Special Proceedings M-36-30 is not
indispensable. Certainly, the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto
J. Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership with respondent,
and give support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J.
Lopez' conjugal partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez'
share in property co-owned by him and petitioner. Such judgment would be
perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez.
xxx In the context of her petition in the lower court, respondent would be
accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez were ordered to account for his
alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to
respondent and her children, turn over his share in the co-ownership with
petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute community
property with respondent.
Whether a creditor
can sue the surviving
spouse for the
collection of a debt
which is owed by the
conjugal partnership
of gains, or whether
such claim must be
filed in proceedings
for the settlement of
the estate of the
decedent.
We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent

in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable
against the conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to file
a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.
First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten
months before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial court
xxx. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, 21 which deals with
dismissals of collection suits because of the death of the defendant during
the pendency of the case and the subsequent procedure to be undertaken by
the plaintiff xxx. As already noted, Rule 3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure now provides that the case will be allowed to continue until entry
of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein will
19
spouses for the collection of the said amount before the

Regional Trial Court. In the alternative, he prayed for
the rescission of the sublease contract should the
defendants fail to pay the balance.
Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio, had
passed away on December 1, 1988. She based her
action on Rule 3, 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which
then provided that "when the action is for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it
shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided in these rules."
The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the
ground that since petitioner was herself a party to the
sublease contract, she could be independently
impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses
and that the death of her husband merely resulted in his
exclusion from the case.[3] The Manuel spouses failed
to file their answer. For this reason, they were declared
in default.
On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered
judgment after trial, ordering petitioner and the Manuel
spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid balance
of P50,600.00.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court dismissed her appeal. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
then be enforced in the manner especially provided in the Rules for

prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. xxx
xxx Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels)
is one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. Under Art.
161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for All debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and
those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may
legally bind the partnership.
When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the
settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, 2 which
states: When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both
spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either.
As held in Calma v. Taedo, after the death of either of the spouses, no
complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal
partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim
must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the
conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse,
the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to
the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the
settlement of estate proceedings.[11] Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even
a de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property
belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal
partnership property is void.[12]
The ruling in Calma v. Taedo was reaffirmed in the recent case
of Ventura v. Militante.[13] In that case, xxx the Court, held that
xxx the conjugal partnership terminates upon the death of either spouse. . . . Where a
complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness
chargeable against said conjugal [partnership], any judgment obtained thereby is
void. The proper action should be in the form of a claim to be filed in the testate or
20

intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses, there
is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. xxx Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the
Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for letters of administration in his
capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased . . . if after thirty (30) days from his
death, petitioner failed to apply for administration or request that administration be
granted to some other person.[14]
xxx
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is
chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which
is primarily bound for its repayment.[17] Thus, when the spouses are sued for
the enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they are being
impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership
and not as independent debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary
liability, as between them, does not apply. xxx
From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain
the present suit against petitioner. Rather, his remedy is to file a claim
against the Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
petitioner's husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition
either for the issuance of letters of administration or for the allowance of
will, depending on whether petitioner's husband died intestate or testate. xxx
The inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is necessary before any claim
chargeable against it can be paid. xxx Such power exclusively pertains to the
court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's estate xxx.
Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to
pay private respondent the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the amount
of P50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount is to be paid by them
jointly or solidarily. In connection with this is Art. 1207 of the Civil Code xxx.
Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the
contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint xxx.
Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides
that when there are two or more lessees, or in this case, sublessees, the
latter's obligation to pay the rent is solidary. To be sure, should the lessees or
21
sublessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the expiration of the
lease period and despite due demands by the lessor, they can be held jointly
and severally liable to pay for the use of the property. The basis of their
solidary liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but the fact that they
have become joint tortfeasors. In the case at bar, there is no allegation that
the sublessees refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the term
of the sublease. xxx
Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when
there are more than two lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary. xxx
Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of
the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective
conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should be divided
into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of P25,300.00.
7. Partosa-Jo
vs. CA
GR# 82606,
Dec.18, 1992,
216 SCRA 692
The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to

having cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen
children. The first of these women, petitioner, claims to
be his legal wife whom he begot a daughter, Monina Jo.
In 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for
judicial separation of conjugal property, docketed as
Civil Case No. 51, in addition to an earlier action for
support, also against him and docketed as Civil Case
No. 36.
The two cases were consolidated and tried jointly. In
the decision, there was a definite disposition of the
complaint for support but none of the complaint for
judicial separation of conjugal property.
Jo elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the ruling of the trial court in the complaint for
support. The complaint for judicial separation of
conjugal property was dismissed for lack of a cause of
action and on the ground that separation by agreement
was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code. Their
motions for reconsideration were denied.
This petition deals only with the complaint for judicial
separation of conjugal property.
Whether or not the

judicial separation of
conjugal property
sought was not
allowed under Articles
175, 178 and 191 of
the Civil Code
Whether or not such
separation was
decreed by the trial
court in the
dispositive portion of
its decision.
The dispositive portion of the decision in question was incomplete insofar as

it carried no ruling on the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property although it was extensively discussed in the body of the decision.
xxx
The trial court made definite findings on the complaint for judicial separation
of conjugal property, holding that the petitioner and the private respondent
were legally married and that the properties mentioned by the petitioner were
acquired by Jo during their marriage although they were registered in the
name of the apparent dummy. xxx
xxx Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code has been superseded by Article 128 of
the Family Code, which states:
Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails
to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved
spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial
separation of property, of for authority to be the sole administrator of
the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary
conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph
refer to martial, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abondoned the other when he or she
has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning. The
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three
months or has failed within the same period to give any information
as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have
22

no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
Under the this provision, the aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial
separation on either of these grounds:
1. Abondonment by a spouse of the other without just cause; and
2. Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her obligations to the
family without just cause, even if she said spouse does not leave
the other spouse.
Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent
never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and
without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although able
to do so. 5 There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and
rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. 6This idea is clearly
expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a spouse is
deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal
dwelling without any intention of returning."
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already
rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in
Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she
was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention
of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968 until the
determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the private
respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical
separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent
to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a
ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.
In addition, the petitioner may also invoke the second ground allowed by
Article 128, for the fact is that he has failed without just cause to comply with
his obligations to the family as husband or parent. Apart form refusing to
admit his lawful wife to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City, Jo has freely
admitted to cohabiting with other women and siring many children by them. It
was his refusal to provide for the petitioner and their daughter that prompted
her to file the actions against him for support and later for separation of the
conjugal property, in which actions, significantly, he even denied being
married to her. The private respondent has not established any just cause for
his refusal to comply with his obligations to his wife as dutiful husband.
Their separation thus falls also squarely under Article 135 of the Family
Code, providing as follows:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause
23
for judicial separation of property:

xxx xxx xxx
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouse have been separated
in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
The amendments introduced in the Family Code are applicable to the case
before us although they became effective only on August 3, 1988. As we held
in Ramirez v. Court of Appeals: 7
The greater weight of authority is inclined to the view that an
appellate court, in reviewing a judgment on appeal, will dispose of a
question according to the law prevailing at the term of such
disposition, and not according to the law prevailing at the time of
rendition of the appealed judgement. xxx
The order of judicial separation of the properties in question is based on the
finding of both the trial and respondent courts that the private respondent is
indeed their real owner. It is these properties that should now be divided
between him and the petitioner, on the assumption that they were acquired
during coverture and so belong to the spouses half and half.
Section 7. Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership Assets & Liabilities (Articles 129-133); Succession; Probate; Sec. 3, Rule 87; See also Arts. 147, 148, FC; Section 2,
Rule 73
Go v. Servacio
GR 157537
Sept 2011
FACTS
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two
parcels of land (17,140 SQM) to Protacio B. Go, Jr.
Twenty three years later, Protacio, Jr. executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he
affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go,
Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two
parcels of land (the property). In 1987, Marta Barola Go
died. She was the wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of
the petitioners. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr.
and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Ritos wife Dina B.
Go) sold aportion of the property (5,560 SQM) to Ester
L. Servacio (Servacio). On March 2, 2001, the
ISSUES
Whether or not the
sale by Protacio, Sr.
to Servacio was void
for being made
without prior
liquidation?
RULING
NO.
Article 130 of the
Family Code reads:
Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership
property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall
liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially
within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of
the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall
24
Agtarap v.
Agtarap
petitioners demanded the return of the property, but

Servacio refused to heed their demand. They sued
Servacio and Rito for the annulment of the sale of the
property.
be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without

compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage.
RTC affirmed the validity of the sale. However, declared

the property was the conjugal property and not the
exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were
three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio,
Sr.,Rito, and Dina). The participation of Rito and Dina
as vendors had been by virtue of their being heirs of the
late Marta. Under Article 160 of the
Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was
acquired, all propertyacquired by either spouse during
the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that
the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
Eduardo filed with the RTC a petition for the judicial
settlement of the estate of hisdeceased father Joaquin.
The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on
without any knowndebts or obligations. During his
lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with
Lucia, andsecond with Carida. Joaquin and Lucia had
three children
Jesus (dead), Milagros, and Jose(survived by three

children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin
and Caridad hadthree children--Eduardo, Sebastian,
and Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile). At
thetime of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land
with improvements. Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin,
had been leasing and improving the said realties and
had been appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per
month since April 1994. Eduardo further alleged that
there was animperative need to appoint him as special
administrator to take possession and charge of
theestate assets and their civil fruits, pending the
appointment of a regular administrator. Inaddition, he
prayed that an order be issued (a) confirming and
declaring the named compulsoryheirs of Joaquin who
would be entitled to participate in the estate; (b)
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving

spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family
Code
is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or
extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the
requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
Whether or not the

parcels of land belong
to the conjugal
partnership of
Joaquin andLucia
notwithstanding their
registration under
their registration
under the existing
certificates of title as
registered in the
name of Joaquin
Agtarap, casado con
Caridad Garcia?
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found by the RTC

and the CA,the claim of Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and
38255 conclusively show that theowners of the properties covered therein
were Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the registrationin the name of Joaquin
Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia, deserves
scantconsideration. This cannot be said to be a collateral attack on the said
TCTs. Indeed, simplepossession of a certificate of title is not necessarily
conclusive of a holder's true ownership of property. A certificate of title under
the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot beused as an
instrument for the deprivation of ownership. Thus, the fact that the properties
wereregistered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, is
not sufficient proof thatthe properties were acquired during the spouses'
coverture. The phrase "married to CaridadGarcia" in the TCTs is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Joaquin as the registered owner,and does not
necessarily prove that the realties are their conjugal properties.
25

apportioning andallocating unto the named heirs their
aliquot shares in the estate in accordance with law; and
(c)entitling the distributees the right to receive and enter
into possession those parts of the estateindividually
awarded to them.The RTC issued an order setting the
petition for initial hearing and directing Eduardo tocause
its publication. Sebastian filed his comment, generally
admitting the allegations in thepetition, and conceding
to the appointment of Eduardo as special administrator.
Joseph, Gloria,and Teresa filed their answer/opposition.
They alleged that the two subject lots belong to
theconjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that,
upon Lucia's death, they became the
pro indiviso
owners of the subject properties. They said that their
residence was built with theexclusive money of their
late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to
the house wereshouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while
the restaurant was built with the exclusive money of
Joseph and his business partner. They opposed the
appointment of Eduardo as administrator on the
following grounds: (1) he is not physically and mentally
fit to do so; (2) his interest in thelots is minimal; and (3)
he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed
that the bestinterests of the estate dictate that Joseph
be appointed as special or regular administrator.The
RTC issued a resolution appointing Eduardo as regular
administrator of Joaquin'sestate. Consequently, it
issued him letters of administration. After the parties
were given the opportunity to be heard and to submit
their respectiveproposed projects of partition, the RTC,
issued an Order of Partition, and held that the 2
parcelsof land are conjugal properties of Joaquin and
Lucia. On appeal, the CA dismissed the appeal. After
the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and
to submit their respectiveproposed projects of partition,
the RTC, issued an Order of Partition, and held that the
2 parcelsof land are conjugal properties of Joaquin and
Lucia. On appeal, the CA dismissed the appeal.Both
Eduardo and Sebastian maintains that the certificates
of title of real estateproperties subject of the
26

controversy are in the name of Joaquin Agtarap,
married to CaridadGarcia, and as such are conclusive
proof of their ownership thereof, and thus, they are
notsubject to collateral attack, but should be threshed
out in a separate proceeding for thatpurpose. According
to them, the RTC, acting as an intestate court with
limited jurisdiction, wasnot vested with the power and
authority to determine questions of ownership, which
properlybelongs t
o another court with general jurisdiction. Sebastian
further alleged that Joaquins
estate have already been settled in 1965 after the
payment of the inheritance tax. Moreover,Eduardo
alleges that the CA erroneously settled, together with
the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of
Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros, in
contravention of the principle of settling only one estate
in one proceeding. He particularly questions the
Vda de
Consuerga v.
GSIS
distribution of the estate of Milagros in the intestate

proceedings despite the fact that aproceeding was
conducted in another court for the probate of the will of
Milagros, bequeathingall to Eduardo whatever share
that she would receive from Joaquin's estate. He states
that thisviolated the rule on precedence of testate over
intestate proceedings.
Appeal on purely questions of law from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte, dated
March 7, 1967, in its Special Proceeding No. 1720. The
late Jose Consuegra was employed as a shop foreman
in the province of Surigao del Norte. He contracted two
marriages, the first with Rosario Diaz and the second,
which was contracted in good faith while the first
marriage was subsisting, with Basilia Berdin.
Consuegra died, while the proceeds of his GSIS life
insurance were paid to petitioner Basilia Berdin and her
children who were the beneficiaries named in the policy.
They received Php 6,000.
To whom should this

retirement insurance
benefits of Jose
Consuegra be paid,
because he did not
designate the
beneficiary of his
retirement insurance?
NO.
Berdin averred that because the deceased Jose Consuegra failed to
designate the beneficiaries in his retirement insurance, the appellants who
were the beneficiaries named in the life insurance should automatically be
considered the beneficiaries to receive the retirement insurance benefits.
The GSIS offers two separate and distinct systems of benefits to its members
one is the life insurance and the other is the retirement insurance. These
two distinct systems of benefits are paid out from two distinct and separate
funds that are maintained by the GSIS.
In the case of the proceeds of a life insurance, the same are paid to whoever
is named the beneficiary in the life insurance policy. As in the case of a life
27

Consuegra did not designate any beneficiary who
would receive the retirement insurance benefits due to
him. Respondent Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first
marriage, filed a claim with the GSIS asking that the
retirement insurance benefits be paid to her as the only
legal heir of Consuegra, considering that the deceased
did not designate any beneficiary with respect to his
retirement insurance benefits.
Petitioner Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a
similar claim with the GSIS, asserting that being the
beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy of
Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to receive
the retirement insurance benefits due the deceased
Consuegra.
The GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the late Jose
Consuegra were Rosario Diaz, his widow by his first
marriage who is entitled to one-half, or 8/16, of the
retirement insurance benefits, on the one hand; and
Basilia Berdin, his widow by the second marriage and
their seven children, on the other hand, who are entitled
to the remaining one-half, or 8/16.
Basilia Berdin didnt agree. She filed a petition declaring
her and her children to be the legal heirs and exclusive
beneficiaries of the retirement insurance.
The trial court affirmed stating that: "when two women
innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy
matrimony to the same man, they and their children,
born of said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate
children and each family be entitled to one half of the
estate.
Hence the present appeal by Basilia Berdin and her
children.
insurance provided for in the Insurance Act, the beneficiary in a life insurance
under the GSIS may not necessarily be a heir of the insured. The insured in a
life insurance may designate any person as beneficiary unless disqualified to
be so under the provisions of the Civil Code. And in the absence of any
beneficiary named in the life insurance policy, the proceeds of the insurance
will go to the estate of the insured.
Retirement insurance is primarily intended for the benefit of the employee, to
provide for his old age, or incapacity, after rendering service in the
government for a required number of years. If the employee reaches the age
of retirement, he gets the retirement benefits even to the exclusion of the
beneficiary or beneficiaries named in his application for retirement insurance.
The beneficiary of the retirement insurance can only claim the proceeds of the
retirement insurance if the employee dies before retirement. If the employee
failed or overlooked to state the beneficiary of his retirement insurance, the
retirement benefits will accrue to his estate and will be given to his legal heirs
in accordance with law, as in the case of a life insurance if no beneficiary is
named in the insurance policy.
GSIS had correctly acted when it ruled that the proceeds should be divided
equally between his first living wife and his second. The lower court has
correctly applied the ruling of this Court in the case of Lao v Dee.
Gomez vs. Lipana- in construing the rights of two women who were married
to the same man, held "that since the defendant's first marriage has not been
dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that
marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status
as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in
his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as
conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has
an interest in the husband's share in the property here in dispute....
With respect to the right of the second wife, although the second marriage
can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, "the only lust
and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the
second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her
husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership
of the first marriage."
Chapter 6. Regime of Separation of Property
28

Maquilan v.
Maquilan
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are

spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of
which were blessed to have a son. However, their once
sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner
discovered that private respondent was having illicit
sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted
the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private
respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently,
both accused were convicted of the crime charged.
Is the conviction of
the respondent of the
crime of adultery a
disqualification for her
to share in the
conjugal property?
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a

Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of
Gains and Damages imputing psychological incapacity
on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the
said case, petitioner and private respondent entered
into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during
the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship,
either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the
right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by
any act or any conveyance inter vivos.
Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read
with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides:
Art. 43. Prision correccional Its accessory penalties. The penalty of
prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office,
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment
shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification
provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless
the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the

repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This motion was
denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground that
the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery
disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. The
Petition was dismissed.
Chapter 7: Property Regimes of Unions without Marriage
Ventura v.
In 1952, Socorro and Crispin were married where they
Abuda
had a son Edilberto Sr. who was married to Leonora.
Edilberto Sr. and Leonora are the parents of herein
petitioner Edilberto Jr. (Edilberto). In 1980, Socorro
married Esteban even if she had a subsisting marriage
with Crispin. Esteban on the other hand was also
married before but the same was dissolved by virtue of
the death of his previous wife. Esteban had a daughter
named Evangeline.
Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of lot
in Tondo, Manila, while the remaining portion was
purchased by Evangeline on her fathers behalf (Vitas
Property). In 1978, Esteban and Evangeline also had
small business establishments located in Delpan st.
No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil
interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the
consequences of civil interdiction:
It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of
adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which
deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of
such property inter vivos.
Whether or not
petitioner is entitled to
any right or interest
over the subject
properties
NO.
In unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each
other, the ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of
that relationship shall be based on the actual contribution of the parties
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution
to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of
it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in
the assailed decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are incapacitated to
marry each other, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by
them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence
29

Tondo (Delpan Property). When Esteban was
diagnosed with colon cancer, he decided to sell the
properties to Evangeline.
Esteban passed away on September 1997, while
Socorro on July 1999. When Leonora, petitioners
mother discovered the sale sometime in 2000, they filed
a petition for annulment of the sale, claiming that
petitioner is entitled to a right or interest over the
properties purchased by Esteban. . Respondents, on
the other hand, argued that because of Socorros prior
marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to
Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor
her heirs can claim any right or interest over the
properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents, ruling that Vitas and
Delpan properties were not conjugal properties of
Socorro and Esteban. CA affirmed the decision,
applying Article 148 of the Family Code.
Salas v. Aguila
In 1985, Petitioner Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr. and

respondent Eden Villena Aguila were married. In 1986,
Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no
longer communicated with Aguila or their daughter.
In 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage citing psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they
"have no conjugal properties whatsoever.".
In May 2007, the RTC rendered a decision declaring
of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are

presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be
considered common property if: (1) these were acquired during the
cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the
properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows
that the parcel of land is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the
Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or several
months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to
"Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro Torres."
The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The
phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status,
and does not show that Socorro co-owned the property.The evidence on
record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property
prior to his marriage to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after
the celebration of the marriage. Registration under the Torrens title system
merely confirms, and does not vest title.
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the
Delpan property was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered
some of the amortizations.Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro
jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan property.
Civil Law - Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to
be reimbursed by the debtor is deemed to be a donation, which requires the
debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor who
has accepted it.
Whether or not the

Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the
trial courts decision
ordering the partition
of the parcels of land.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties
intended that the Delpan property would be owned by and registered under
the name of Esteban.
Since the original manifestation was an action for partition, this Court cannot
order a division of the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the
existence of a co-ownership.Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., G.R. No. 165427, 21
March 2011 Salas alleged that contrary to Aguilas petition stating that they
had no conjugal property, they actually acquired the Waived Properties during
their marriage. However, the RTC found, and the CA affirmed, that Salas
failed to prove the existence and acquisition of the Waived Properties during
their marriage.
30

the nullity of the marriage of Salas and Aguila. The RTC
Decision further provides for the "dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of gains, if any."
In September 2007, Aguila filed a Manifestation and
Motionstating that she discovered properties covering
TCTs under the name of "Juan S. Salas, married to
Rubina C. Salas, found to be the common-law wife of
Salas. Thereafter, Salas filed a Manifestation with Entry
of Appearancerequesting for an Entry of Judgment of
the RTC Decision since no motion for reconsideration
or appeal was filed and no conjugal property was
involved.
Salas filed an Opposition to the Manifestationalleging
that there is no conjugal property to be partitioned
based on Aguilas petition. According to Salas, Aguilas
statement was a judicial admission and was not made
through palpable mistake. Salas claimed that Aguila
waived her right to the Discovered Properties. Salas
likewise enumerated properties he allegedly waived in
favor of Aguila, namely, parcels of land in Batangas,
cash amounting toP200,000.00 and motor vehicles.
Thus, Salas contended that the conjugal properties
were deemed partitioned.
The RTC ruled in favor of Aguila confirming the partition
of the properties.
The RTC held that pursuant to the Rules,even upon
entry of judgment granting the annulment of marriage,
the court can proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the conjugal partnership of gains if it has
not been judicially adjudicated upon, as in this case.
The RTC found that the Discovered Properties are
among the conjugal properties to be partitioned and
distributed between Salas and Aguila. However, the
RTC held that Salas failed to prove the existence of the
Waived Properties.
Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that :
(1) she is Rubina Cortez, a widow and unmarried to
Salas; (2) the Discovered Properties are her
paraphernal properties; (3) Salas did not contribute
money to purchase the Discovered Properties as he
had no permanent job in Japan; (4) the RTC did not
Such evidence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, has the presumption
of regularity.
On the other hand, Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were
acquired by Salas during their marriage. Both the RTC and the CA agreed
that the Discovered Properties registered in Salas name were acquired during
his marriage with Aguila. The TCTs of the Discovered Properties were entered
on 2 July 1999 and 29 September 2003, or during the validity of Salas and
Aguilas marriage.
Considering that Rubina failed to prove her title or her legal interest in the
Discovered Properties, she has no right to intervene in this case. The Rules
of Court provide that only "a person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action." Rules of Court,
Rule 19, Sec. 1.
In Di v. Di, G.R. No. 178044, 19 January 2011we held that Article 147 of the
Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this
case.
Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through the couples joint efforts and
governed by the rules on co-ownership.Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon
City, 328 Phil. 1289 (1996)
In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case
where the ground for nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we
held that the properties acquired during the union of the parties, as found by
both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-ownership.
31
Lacbayan v.
SAmoy
acquire jurisdiction over her as she was not a party in

the case; and (5) she authorized her brother to
purchase the Discovered Properties but because he
was not well-versed with legal documentation, he
registered the properties in the name of "Juan S. Salas,
married to Rubina C. Salas."
The RTC further held that Salas and Rubina were at
fault for failing to correct the TCTs, if they were not
married as they claimed.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC. The
CA denied the Motion for Reconsiderationfiled by Salas.
Hence, this petition.
Betty Lacbayan (petitioner) and Bayani S. Samoy
(respondent) had an illicit relationship.
During their relationship, they, together with three more
incorporators, were able to establish a manpower
services company.
The company acquired five parcels of land were
registered in petitioner and respondents names,
ostensibly as husband and wife.
When their relationship turned sour, they decided to
divide the said properties and terminate their business
partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.
Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that
the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights
be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the
three other properties will go to respondent.
However, when Lacbayan wanted additional demands
to be included in the partition agreement, Samoy
refused.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for
judicial partition of the said properties.
Petitioners contention: She claimed that they started to
live together as husband and wife in 1979 without the
benefit of marriage and worked together as business
partners, acquiring real properties amounting to
P15,500,000.00.
Respondents contention: He purchased the properties
using his own personal funds.
RTC and CA ruled in favor or respondent.
1.
WON an
action for
partition
precludes a
settlement
on the issue
of
ownership.
2. Would a resolution
on the issue of
ownership subject the
Torrens title issued
over the disputed
realties to a collateral
attack?
1. No.
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same
is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the
parties. Until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.
More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in
this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement
indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior
settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as to whether
the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject
properties.
2. No.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The
certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known
as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is,
more often than not, represented by that document.
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system
does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Mere
issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership
with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a
32

trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property
subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Needless to say,
registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best
evidence thereof.
Other topic:
Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the
subject realties.
YES. Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition
Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters.
Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement
she intentionally refused to sign.
Mercado Fehr
v. Fehr
In 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, Elna

moved in to Bruno's residence and lived with him.
During the time they lived together, they purchased
Suite 204, at LCG Condominium on installment. They
got married in 1985.
In 1998, the trial court declared the marriage between
Elna and Bruno void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their
conjugal properties. The properties were divided into
three: 1/3 for Elna, 1/3 for Bruno and 1/3 for the
children. The custody of children was awarded to Elna,
being the innocent spouse. Accordingly, Elna is directed
to transfer ownership of Suite 204 LCG Condominium
because it was declared to have been the exclusive
property of Bruno Fehr, acquired prior his marriage.
Whether or not the

Suite 204 of LGC
Condominium is the
Bruno Fehr.
Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to allow respondent not

only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who
may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties.
No. SC held that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of
Elna and Bruno and the property regime of the parties should be divided in
accordance with the law on co-ownership. Suite 204 was acquired during the
parties cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said
property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Article 147 applies in this case because (1) Elna and Bruno are capacitated to
marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife;
and (3) their marriage is void under Article 36. All these elements are present
in the case at bar.
The trial court also erred in its judgment in regards the settlement of the
common properties of Elna and Bruno. The three-way partition only applies to
voidable marriages and to void marriages under Article 40 of the Family
Code.
Elna filed a motion for reconsideration of said order.

The court held in an order that Art. 147 of the Family
Code should apply, being the marriage void ab initio.
However, the court reminded Elna of the previous
agreement in dividing of properties and/or proceeds
33

from the sale thereof proportionately among them. It
also affirmed of the previous ruling regarding the Suite
204. Elna filed special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The CA in its
Decision dismissed the petition for review for lack of
merit.
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but
separated de facto from her husband, when she met
and cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996,
the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year
cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for
Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with
Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that
she be declared the sole owner of these personal
properties and that the amount of P70,000.00,
representing her contribution to the construction of their
house, be reimbursed to her.
WON there are actual

contributions from the
parties
It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each
other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of
her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships
where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple
alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions Proof of actual contribution is required.
Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies
because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code.
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to
an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent
evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal
properties of the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she
contributed P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere
in her testimony did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears
in the record are receipts in her name for the purchase of construction
materials.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account
deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their
respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the
absence of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share
shall be presumed to be equal.
Carino v.
CArino
Mallilin Jr. v.
Castillo
Mallilin and Castillo cohabited together while their

respective marriage still subsisted. During their union,
they set up Superfreight Customs Brokerage
Whether or not coownership exists

between them.
Yes. Co-ownership exists between Mallilin and Castillo even though they are
incapacitated to marry each other. Article 144 of the Civil Code does not cover
parties living in an adulterous relationship. Their property regime falls under
34

Corporation. The business flourished and the couple
acquired real and personal properties which were
registered solely in Castillo's name. Due to
irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Mallilin
filed a complaint for partition and/or payment of Coownership share, accounting and damages against
Castillo. Castillo, in her answer, alleged that coownership could not exist between them because
according to Article 144 of the Civil Code, rules on coownership shall govern the properties acquired by a
man and a woman living together as husband and wife
but not married, they are not capacitated to marry each
other because of their valid subsisting marriage. She
claimed to be the exclusive owner of all real and
personal properties involved in Mallilin's action of
partition on the ground that they were acquired entirely
out of her own money and registered solely in her
name.
Article 148 of the Family Code where co-ownership is limited, properties

acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be
equal.
Valdez v. RTC
Br 102
Family Home
Chapter 1: Family as an Institution
Iing v. Vega
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez

(Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel
of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and
Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his
siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria
Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.
Sibling #1: Romana was survived by her daughter
Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent
Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased).
Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and
children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena
Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted
respondents.
Sibling # 2: Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived
by her six children. In short, herein petitioners, except
1. Whether Leonardo
is entitled to a share
in Leons estate;
2. Whether Leon sold
the subject property
to Lucimo Sr.; and
3. Whether
Leonardos claim has
prescribed, or that he
is barred by estoppel
or laches.
No, the Court of Appeals is correct based on the following reasons:

1. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been
settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the
property remained part of Leons estate.
2. Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
3. Gregorias and Romanas heirs are co-owners of the subject property. no
prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
4. For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. The
CA held that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 or
even in 1980 when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo
Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the
property. The CA thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997,
or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period
prescribed under Article 1141.
35
Tinggangay v.
Wacas
for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto

Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregorias grandchildren or
spouses thereof (Gregorias heirs). Tresvalles and
Tajonera are transferees of the said property.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject
property belonged to him as Romanas surviving heir,
Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 5275 for partition, recovery
of ownership and possession, with damages, against
Gregorias heirs.
In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregorias heirs
(through son Antipolo) claimed that Leonardo had no
cause of action against them; that they have become
the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo
Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from
Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the
same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact.
YES. There is, despite a dearth of specific legal
provisions, enough recognition on
the inherent and natural right of parents over their
children. Article 150 of the Family Code
expresses that "(f)amily relations include those . . . (2)
(b)etween parents and children; . . . ."
Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the Code states
that it is the natural right and duty of
parents and those exercising parental authority to,
among other things, keep children in their
company and to give them love and affection, advice
and counsel, companionship and
understanding. The Constitution itself speaks in terms
of the "natural and primary rights" of
parents in the rearing of the youth. 4 There is nothing
conclusive to indicate that these
Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of

Gregoria; he is merely Antipolos son-in-law, being married to Antipolos
daughter Teodora.
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the
latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedents property.
Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the
estate that was formed among the decedents heirs.
Whether or not the

subject land and
house are exempt
from execution
considering that the
land
was acquired through
patent while the
house was an
instituted family
home.
No. Alienation of land acquired thru patent is restricted only for such period
and not indefinitely;
considering also that the land was already alienated before the patent was
issued; concerning the
house, it was not instituted in accordance with law and that it was also
established, granting that it was
a family home, after the debt (judgment) was incurred.
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute
disposable agricultural lots of the
State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to
such benevolent intention
the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116)
within five years after the
grant of the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits
alienation of the homestead;
but in line with the primordial purpose to favor the homesteader and his family
36

provisions are meant to solely address themselves to
legitimate relationships. Indeed, although
in varying degrees, the laws on support and
successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go
beyond the legitimate members of the family and so
explicitly encompass illegitimate
relationships as well. 5 Then, too, and most importantly,
in the declaration of nullity of
marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or
inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family
Code provides for appropriate visitation rights to
parents who are not given custody of their
the statute provides

that such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject to the right
of repurchase by the
homesteader, his widow or heirs within five years. This Section 117 is
undoubtedly a complement of
Section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader
that portion of public land
which the State had gratuitously given to him. It would, therefore, be in
keeping with this fundamental
idea to hold, as we hold, that the right to repurchase exists not only when the
original homesteader
makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by his widow or heirs.
children.
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his
interest and welfare is always the
paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of
the Solicitor General, who has
The date when the prohibition against the alienation of lands acquired by
homesteads or free patents
commences is the date of the approval of the application and the prohibition
embraces the entire
five-year period from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant.
recommended due course to the petition, that a few

hours spent by petitioner with the
children, however, could not all be that detrimental to
the children.
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private
respondent and their well-meant concern
for the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that
petitioner would have ulterior motives or
undue designs more than a parent's natural desire to
be able to call on, even if it were only on
The application of Pablo Taneo for a free patent was approved only on 19
October 1973 and Free Patent
was issued on 10 December 1980. Under the aforecited provision, the subject
land could not be made
liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted from the time of the
application and during the 5-year
period following 10 December 1980, or until 10 December 1985. However,
debts contracted prior to the
approval of the application for free patent, that is prior to 18 October 1973,
are not covered by the
37

brief visits, his own children. The trial court, in any case,
has seen it fit to understandably
provide this precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case
(can petitioner) take out the children
prohibition. This is because they do not fall within the scope of the prohibited
period. In this case, the
judgment debt in favor of defendant-appellee was rendered on 24 June 1964,
the writ of execution
without the written consent of the mother."

issued on 22 November 1965, notice of levy made on 1 December 1965, the
execution sale held on 12
February 1966, and the certificate of sale registered on 2 March 1966, all
before Pablo Taneos
application for free patent was approved on 19 October 1973. The execution,
therefore, was not
violative of the law.
The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as family
residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment, except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the
house in question, erected on
the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument
constituting the family home was
registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo
Taneo was rendered on
January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the debt was incurred, the family
home was not yet
38

constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners alleged family home, as
constituted by their father
is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243(2).
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful
considering that such
constitution did not comply with the requirements of the law. The trial court
found that the house was
erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of one
Plutarco Vacalares. By the very
definition of the law that the family home is the dwelling house where a
person and his family resides
and the land on which it is situated, it is understood that the house should be
constructed on a land
notbelonging to another. Apparently, the constitution of a family home by
Pablo Taneo in the instant
Hontiveros v.
RTC
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed

a complaint for damages against private respondents
Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The
petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel
of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income
from the land as a result of the filing of the land
registration case. In the reply, private respondents
denied that they were married and alleged that
Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single.
They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of
and income from the land. On the contrary, according
to the private respondents, the possession of the
property in question had already been transferred to
petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial
court denied petitioners motion that while in the
amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts
WON the court can

validly dismissed the
complaint due to lack
of efforts exerted
towards a
compromise as stated
in Article 151.
case was merely an afterthought in order to escape execution of their

property but to no avail.
SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant
and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article
151. Under this provision, the phrase members of the same family refers to
the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants,
and brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and
relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction.
Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros are regarded as strangers
to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.
39
Silva v. CA
towards a compromise were made, it was not verified

as provided in Article 151.
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne
T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress, cohabited
without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth
of two children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not
very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It
began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to
resume her acting career over his vigorous objections.
The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who
claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped working
throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two
eventually parted ways.
The instant controversy was spawned, in February
1986, by the refusal of Gonzales to allow Silva, in
apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to
have the children in his company on weekends. Silva
filed a petition for custodial rights over the children
before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 78, of
Quezon City. The petition was opposed by
Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in
"gambling and womanizing" which she feared could
affect the moral and social values of the children.
In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch
national. The newlyweds emigrated to Holland with
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in
favor of Gonzales; it held:
"In all questions, regarding the care, custody, education
and property of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration" not the welfare of the
parents (Art. 8, PD 603).
WON visitation right

of a parent over his
illegitimate children is
properly granted.
YES. There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough

recognition on the inherent and natural right of parents over their children.
Article 150 of the Family Code expresses that "(f)amily relations include
those . . . (2) (b)etween parents and children; . . . ."
Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural
right and duty of parents and those exercising parental authority to, among
other things, keep children in their company and to give them love and
affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The
Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural and primary rights" of
parents in the rearing of the youth. 4 There is nothing conclusive to indicate
that these provisions are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate
relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on support and
successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate
members of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships
as well. 5 Then, too, and most importantly, in the declaration of nullity of
marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article
49 of the Family Code provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents who
are not given custody of their children.
There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is
always the paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of the
Solicitor General, who has recommended due course to the petition, that a
few hours spent by petitioner with the children, however, could not all be that
detrimental to the children.
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their
well-meant concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems unlikely that
petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parent's
natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own
children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide
this precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out the
children without the written consent of the mother."
With Articles 3 and 8 of PD 603, in mind, We find it to

the best interest of the minor children, to deny visitorial
and/or temporary custodial rights to the father, even at
40

the expense of hurting said parent
Hence, this petition.
CHAPTER 2. THE FAMILY HOME (Arts 152-162); ARTS 225. 229-231, 233; 240. 242 NCC
1.
TITLE
Fortaleza
Lapitan
vs.
GR# 178288/ August

15, 2012
FACTS
Spouses Fortalezaobtained a loan from
spouses Rolando and AmparoLapitan. As
security, spouses Fortaleza executed a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgageover their residential house.
When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay the
indebtedness including the interests and
penalties, the creditors applied for extrajudicial
foreclosure
At the sale, the creditors spouses Lapitan
emerged as the highest bidders. The one-year
redemption period expired without the spouses
Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage.
RTC- Issues a Writ of Possession explaining that
it is their ministerial duty. CA-Affirmed.
ISSUE/S
Whether
the subject
property is a family home
exempt from forced sale.
HELD
As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment. However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code explicitly
allows the forced sale of a family home "for debts secured by mortgages
on the premises before or after such constitution." In this case, there is
no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed on January 28,
1998 a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property which
was even notarized by their original counsel of record. And assuming
that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not
set up and prove to the Sheriff such exemption from forced sale before it
was sold at the public auction. As elucidated in Honrado v. Court of
Appeals:
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from
execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such
claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before
the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop
the party from later claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in
Gomez v. Gealone:
Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period
within which to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, wellsettled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the
judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but
by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable
period thereafter.
Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on
exemption does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year
period for a judgment debtor to redeem the property.
Although the rule on redemption is liberally interpreted in favor
41
2.
Olivia
de
Mesa vsAcero
GR# 185064/ Jan. 16,

2012
This involves a parcel of land situated at

No. 3 Forbes Street, Mount Carmel Homes
Subdivision, Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan. The
petitioners jointly purchased the subject property
on April 17, 1984 while they were still merely
cohabiting before their marriage. A house was
later constructed on the subject property, which
the petitioners thereafter occupied as their family
home after they got married sometime in January
1987.
Sometime in September 1988, Araceli
obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr.
(Claudio) which was secured by a mortgage over
the subject property. As payment, Araceli issued
a check drawn against China Banking
Corporation payable to Claudio. When the check
was presented for payment, it was dishonored as
the account from which it was drawn had already
been closed. The petitioners failed to heed
Claudios subsequent demand for payment. A BP
22 case was instituted by the creditors against
the debtors.
RTC rendered a Decisionacquitting the
petitioners. A writ of execution was issued and
Sheriff levied upon the subject property. On
March 9, 1994, the subject property was sold on
public auction; Claudio was the highest bidder
and the corresponding certificate of sale was
issued to him.
Claudio leased the subject property to
the petitioners and a certain JuanitoOliva
(Juanito), the petitioners and Juanito defaulted in
the payment of the rent.
Unable to collect the aforementioned
rentals due, Claudio and his wife Ma. Rufina filed
a complaint for ejectment. In their defense, the
petitioners claimed that Spouses Acero have no
Whether
the subject
exempt from forced sale
of the original owner of the property, we cannot apply the privilege of

liberality to accommodate the spouses Forteza due to their negligence
or omission to exercise the right of redemption within the prescribed
period without justifiable cause.
The family homes exemption from execution must be set
up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at
public auction.
We agree with the CA that the petitioners should have asserted
the subject property being a family home and its being exempted from
execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.
As the CA aptly pointed out:
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt
from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code,
such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff
before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming the exemption. As this Court ruled in
Gomez v. Gealone:
Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period
within which to claim the exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, wellsettled that the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted to the
judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but
by the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a reasonable
period thereafter;
In the absence of express provision it has variously held that
claim (for exemption) must be made at the time of the levy if the debtor
is present, that it must be made within a reasonable time, or promptly, or
before the creditor has taken any step involving further costs, or before
advertisement of sale, or at any time before sale, or within a reasonable
time before the sale, or before the sale has commenced, but as to the
last there is contrary authority.
In the light of the facts above summarized, it is self-evident that
appellants did not assert their claim of exemption within a reasonable
time. Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes of the law on exemption,
does not mean a time after the expiration of the one-year period
provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for judgment
debtors to redeem the property sold on execution, otherwise it would
render nugatory final bills of sale on execution and defeat the very
purpose of executionto put an end to litigation. We said before, and
We repeat it now, that litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice
42

right over the subject property. The petitioners
deny that they are mere lessors; on the contrary,
they are the lawful owners of the subject property
and, thus cannot be evicted therefrom.
The petitioners filed against the
respondents a complaintto nullify TCT No. T221755 (M) and other documents with damages
with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Therein, the
petitioners asserted that the subject property is a
family home, which is exempt from execution
under the Family Code and, thus, could not have
been validly levied upon for purposes of
satisfying the March 15, 1993 writ of execution.
3.
Ramos
vsPangilinan
GR# 185920/ July 20,

2010
Respondents
filed
in
2003
a
complaintfor illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos
Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M.
Ramos (Ramos). The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor
of respondents and ordered Ramos and the
company to pay the aggregate amount of
P1,661,490.30 representing their backwages,
separation pay, 13th month pay & service
incentive leave pay.
Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution
which the Deputy Sheriff implemented by levying
a property in Ramos name.
Alleging that the Pandacan property was
the family home, hence, exempt from execution
to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the
company moved to quash the writ of
execution.Respondents, however, averred that
the Pandacan property is not the Ramos family
that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. We now
rule that claims for exemption from execution of properties under
Section 12 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court must be presented before
its sale on execution by the sheriff.
Under the cited provision, a family home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence;
there is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.
The settled rule is that the right
to exemption or forced sale under Article
153 of the Family Code is a personal
privilege granted to the judgment debtor
and as such, it must be claimed not by the
sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the
sale of the property at public auction. It is
not sufficient that the person claiming
exemption merely alleges that such property is
a family home. This claim for exemption must
be set up and proved to the Sheriff. xxx.
Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff the supposed
exemption of the subject property before the sale thereof at public
auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising the same. Failure to
do so estop them from later claiming the said exemption.
Whether
the subject
exempt from forced sale
Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right
which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted
over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which
confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which
must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be
seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc. lays down the rules relative to the
levy on execution over the family home, viz:
No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution
provided it was duly constituted as such. There must be proof that the
alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or
by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the house where they and
their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The family
home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with
the latters consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the
family.
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction
43

home, as it has another in Antipolo, and the
Pandacan property in fact served as the
companys business address as borne by the
companys letterhead.
4.
Cabang
Basay
vs.
GR#180587/March 20,
2009
Deceased Felix Odong was the

registered owner of Lot located Zamboanga del
Sur. However, Felix Odong and his heirs never
occupied nor took possession of the lot. Plaintiffappellants bought said real property from the
heirs of Felix Odong and did not occupy the said
property also.
must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted

and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor
or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are
applicable.
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the
Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been
constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles
225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the
family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and
the registration of the courts order with the Registry of Deeds of the
area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution
is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the
execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the
Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either one of these two
modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the
privilege.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to
constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from
the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
under Art. 154actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home
should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if
exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent
of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending
upon the area where it is
located. 1avvphi1
And in both cases, whether under the Civil Code or the Family
Code, it is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely
alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption
must be set up and proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was
constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must
comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code.
Whether or not the

improvements introduced
by petitioners are family
homes into a mere
afterthought.
As defined, "[T]he family home is a sacred symbol of family

love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones
lifetime. It is the dwelling house where the husband and wife, or an
unmarried head of a family reside, including the land on which it is
situated. It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family." Article 153 of the Family Code provides
44

Defendant-appellees, on the other hand,
had been in continuous, open, peaceful and
adverse possession of the same parcel of land
since 1956 up to the present. During the said
cadastral
proceedings,
defendant-appellees
claimed Lot No. 7778 on the belief that the area
they were actually occupying was Lot No. 7778.
As it turned out, however, when the Municipality
of Molave relocated the townsite lots in the area
in 1992 as a big portion of Lot No. 7778 was
used by the government as a public road and as
there were many discrepancies in the areas
occupied, it was then discovered that defendantappellees were actually occupying Lot No. 7777.
Plaintiff-appellants filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Property against defendantappellees.
RTC- in favor of the defendants. CReversed
Petitioners insist that the property
subject of the controversy is a duly constituted
family home which is not subject to execution,
thus, they argue that the appellate tribunal erred
in reversing the judgment of the trial court.
that
The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law.
Under the afore-quoted provision, a family home is deemed
constituted on a house and a lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.
There can be no question that a family home is generally
exempt from execution, provided it was duly constituted as such. It is
likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on property
owned by the persons constituting it. Indeed as pointed out in Kelley,
Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc. "[T]he family home must be part of the
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of
the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latters consent, or on
the property of the unmarried head of the family." In other words: The
family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute
community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the exclusive property
of either spouse with the consent of the other. It cannot be established
on property held in co-ownership with third persons. However, it
can be established partly on community property, or conjugal property
and partly on the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of
the latter.1avvphi1
If constituted by an unmarried head of a family, where
there is no communal or conjugal property existing, it can be
constituted only on his or her own property.
Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. For all
their arguments to the contrary, the stark and immutable fact is that the
property on which their alleged family home stands is owned by
respondents and the question of ownership had been long laid to rest
with the finality of the appellate courts judgment in CA-G.R. CV No.
55207. Thus, petitioners continued stay on the subject land is only by
mere tolerance of respondents.
All told, it is too late in the day for petitioners to raise this issue.
Without doubt, the instant case where the family home issue has been
vigorously pursued by petitioners is but a clear-cut ploy meant to
forestall the enforcement of an otherwise final and executory decision.
The execution of a final judgment is a matter of right on the part of the
45

prevailing party whose implementation is mandatory and ministerial on
the court or tribunal issuing the judgment.
5.
Josef
Santos
vs
GR# 165060/ Nov. 27,

2008
Petitioner Albino Josef was the

defendant in a case for collection of sum of
money filed by herein respondent Otelio Santos,
who claimed that petitioner failed to pay the shoe
materials which he bought on credit from
respondent on various dates.
RTC
found
petitioner
liable
to
respondent. CA- Affirmed
A writ of execution was issued and
certain personal properties subject of the writ of
execution were auctioned off. Thereafter, a real
property located at Marikina City was sold by way
of public auction and Respondent emerged as
the winning bidder.
Petitioner, in
his
opposition
to
respondents motion for issuance of a writ of
execution, claimed that he was insolvent; that he
had no property to answer for the judgment
credit; that the house and lot in which he was
residing at the time was his family home thus
exempt from execution; that the household
furniture and appliances found therein are
likewise exempt from execution; and that these
furniture and appliances belonged to his children
Jasmin Josef and Jean Josef Isidro. Thus, as
early as during proceedings prior to the issuance
of the writ of execution, petitioner brought to the
fore the issue of exemption from execution of his
home, which he claimed to be a family home in
contemplation of the civil law.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues
that petitioners alleged family home has not
been shown to have been judicially or
WHETHER OR NOT THE

LEVY AND SALE OF
THE
PERSONAL
BELONGINGS OF THE
PETITIONERS
CHILDREN AS WELL AS
THE ATTACHMENT AND
SALE
ON
PUBLIC
AUCTION
OF
HIS
FAMILY
HOME
TO
SATISFY
THE
JUDGMENT AWARD IN
FAVOR
OF
RESPONDENT
IS
LEGAL.
Upon being apprised that the property subject of execution

allegedly constitutes petitioners family home, the trial court should have
observed the following procedure:
1. Determine if petitioners obligation to respondent falls under either of
the exceptions under Article 155of the Family Code;
2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioners claim that the property
was his family home; conduct an ocular inspection of the premises; an
examination of the title; an interview of members of the community
where the alleged family home is located, At the same time, the
respondent is given the opportunity to cross-examine and present
evidence to the contrary;
3. If the property is accordingly found to constitute petitioners family
home, the court should determine:
a) if the obligation sued upon was contracted or incurred prior to, or
after, the effectivity of the Family Code;
b) if petitioners spouse is still alive, as well as if there are other
beneficiaries of the family home;
c) if the petitioner has more than one residence for the purpose of
determining which of them, if any, is his family home; and
d) its actual location and value, for the purpose of applying the
provisions of Articles 157and 160 of the Family Code.
The same is true with respect to personal properties levied
upon and sold at auction. Despite petitioners allegations in his
Opposition, the trial court did not make an effort to determine the nature
of the same, whether the items were exempt from executionor not, or
whether they belonged to petitioner or to someone else.
Respondent moved for issuance of a writ of execution on
February 17, 2003 while petitioner filed his opposition on June 23, 2003.
The trial court granted the motion on July 16, 2003, and the writ of
execution was issued on August 20, 2003. Clearly, the trial court had
enough time to conduct the crucial inquiry that would have spared
petitioner the trouble of having to seek relief all the way to this Court.
Being void, the July 16, 2003 Order could not have conferred
any right to respondent. Any writ of execution based on it is likewise
46

extrajudicially constituted, obviously referring to
the provisions on family home of the Civil Code
not those of the Family Code which should apply
in this case; that petitioner has not shown to the
courts satisfaction that the personal properties
executed upon and sold belonged to his children.
Respondent argues that he is entitled to
satisfaction of judgment considering the length of
time it took for the parties to litigate and the
various remedies petitioner availed of which have
delayed the case.
6.
Kelly
Planters
Products
vs
GR# 172263/ July 09,

2008
Petitioner Auther acquired agricultural

chemical products on consignment from
respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989.
Due to Authers failure to pay despite demand,
PPI filed an action for sum of money. After trial on
the merits, the RTC decided in favor of PPI and
issued a writ of execution. Pursuant thereto,
respondent sheriff Jorge A. Ragutana sold on
execution real property and PPI emerged as the
highest bidder.
After being belatedly informed of the
said sale, petitioners Auther and his Doris filed a
motion to dissolve or set aside the notice of levy
in the RTC on the ground that the subject
property was their family home which was
exempt from execution. Petitioners motion was
denied for failure to comply with the three-day
notice requirement. The dismissal was upheld by
the CA.
void. Although we have held in several casesthat a claim for exemption

from execution of the family home should be set up and proved before
the sale of the property at public auction, and failure to do so would
estop the party from later claiming the exemption since the right of
exemption is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor which
must be claimed by the judgment debtor himself at the time of the levy
or within a reasonable period thereafter, the circumstances of the instant
case are different. Petitioner claimed exemption from execution of his
family home soon after respondent filed the motion for issuance of a writ
of execution, thus giving notice to the trial court and respondent that a
property exempt from execution may be in danger of being subjected to
levy and sale. Thereupon, the trial court is called to observe the
procedure as herein laid out; on the other hand, the respondent should
observe the procedure prescribed in Article 160 of the Family Code, that
is, to obtain an order for the sale on execution of the petitioners family
home, if so, and apply the proceeds less the maximum amount
allowed by law under Article 157 of the Code which should remain with
the petitioner for the rebuilding of his family home to his judgment
credit. Instead, both the trial court and respondent completely ignored
petitioners argument that the properties subject of the writ are exempt
from execution.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the
family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed
after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted
as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August
3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to
the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution
of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family home
is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988.
Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged
family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or
extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code.
The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact,
expressly provides for the following exceptions:
Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except:
47

(1)
For non-payment of taxes;
(2)
For debts incurred prior to the constitution of
the family home;
(3)
For debts secured by a mortgage on the
premises before or after
such constitution; and
(4)
For debts due to laborers, mechanics,
architects, builders,
materialmen and others who have rendered service or
furnished material for the construction of the building.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Article 160. When a creditor whose claim is not among those
mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has
reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth
more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to
the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of
the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the
actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed
by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value
exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law in Article 157 and results
from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or
persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the
property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure
shall apply.
7.
Arriola
Arriola
vs.
GR# 177703/ Jan, 28,

2008
John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed

Special Civil Action against Vilma G. Arriola and
Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners) for judicial
partition of the properties of decedent Fidel
Arriola. Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel
with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while
petitioner Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel
with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.
RTC rendered a Decision on the
partition of the properties. As the parties failed to
agree on how to partition among them the land
covered by TCT No. 383714 (subject land),
respondent sought its sale through public
auction, and petitioners acceded to it.
Accordingly, the RTC ordered the public auction
of the subject land. The public auction sale was
scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had to be reset
Whether
the
subject
house should be included
in the public auction of
the subject land.
One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is

the automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its
occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the judicial
or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251
of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore,
Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home
not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to
the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject
house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it
stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and
petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a
family residence 20 years back.
It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on
which it stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the
same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The
Family Code, viz:
Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death o f one or
48

when petitioners refused to include in the auction
the house (subject house) standing on the
subject land. This prompted respondent to file
with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion
for Contempt of Court. The RTC denied the
motion and said that petitioners are correct in
holding that the house or improvement erected
on the property should not be included in the
auction sale. A cursory reading of the
aforementioned Decision and of the evidence
adduced during the ex-parte hearing clearly show
that nothing was mentioned about the house
existing on the land subject matter of the case.
CA granted the Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioners contends that said house
has been their residence for 20 years.Taken
together, these averments on record establish
that the subject house is a family home within the
contemplation of the provisions of The Family
Code, particularly:
Article
152.
The
family
home,
constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or
by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling
house where they and their family reside, and the
land on which it is situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it
is occupied as a family residence. From the time
of its constitution and so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family
home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the
value allowed by law.
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten
years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns
the property or constituted the family home.
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the
family unit following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the
family home as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by
imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs
cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death
of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a
longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and
second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid
periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No
compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC
found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home,
either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or
through auction sale as suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against
the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership.
This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to
the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them,
this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary
property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The
rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot
subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the
family home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of
the subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at
this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the
parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10
years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if
there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he
constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason
exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the
partition of the property.
The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals that a claim for
exception from execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be set
up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public
auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the subject
house although for a different reason.
49

8.
Honrdovs CA
GR# 166333/ Nov. 25,

2005
Premium filed with the RTC a complaint

for sum of money against Jose Honrado, who
was doing business under the name and style of
J.E. Honrado Enterprises. For failure of Honrado,
as well as his counsel, to appear at the pre-trial
conference, he was declared in default. Premium
was, thus, allowed to present evidence ex parte.
It turned out that the Spouses Jose
and AndreritaHonrado had filed a petition with the
RTC of Calamba for the judicial constitution of the
parcel of land registered in Honrados name and
the house thereon, as their family house. In his
petition, Honrado declared that his creditors were
Atty. Domingo Luciano, P & J Agriculture Trading,
Inc., and Mr. Tito Dela Merced.
Honrado filed a Notice of Appeal.
However, appeal was dismissed for his failure to
file his brief as appellant. Premium filed a Motion
for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The Sheriff
levied on the parcel of land . The Notice of Levy
was annotated at the dorsal portion of the title on
April 4, 2001. The Sheriff set the sale of the
property at public auction and was sold to
Premium, the highest bidder.
In the meantime, the RTC of
Calamba City rendered a Decisiondeclaring the
property a family home.
Honrado filed a Motion to Declare
Properties Exempt from Execution. It was alleged
therein that the property is exempt from
execution because it is a family home which had
been constituted as such before he incurred his
indebtedness with Premium. He also alleged that
he and his family had no other real property
except the land which was levied upon and sold
on execution. Premium opposed the motion on
the ground that Honrado was already estopped
or barred by laches from claiming the exemption,
and that said claim has been mooted by the
lapse of the redemption period for Honrado to
Whether Honrado can

still claim the exemption
from execution of family
home
In this case, the RTC acted in accord with case law when it
issued the assailed order. The petitioner admits to having been notified
of the levy of his property and of its sale at public auction at 9:30 a.m.
on May 17, 2001 at the Municipal Hall of Calamba, Laguna. However,
he did not bother to object to the levy and the projected sale on the
ground that the property and the house thereon was a family home.
The petitioner allowed the sale at public auction to proceed and the
Sheriff to execute a certificate of sale over the property in favor of the
private respondent for P650,204.10. He even vacated the property after
the said sale. The petitioner remained silent and failed to seek relief
from the Sheriff or the court until May 3, 2002, when he filed his motion
to declare the property exempt from execution under Article 155 of the
Family Code and Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Even then, there was no showing that, during the hearing of said
motion, the petitioner adduced evidence to prove the value of the
property and that it is, indeed, a family home.
Moreover, the petitioner set the hearing of his motion on
May 10, 2002 at 8:30 a.m. The private respondent opposed the motion,
but the petitioner did not file any reply thereto. Moreover, the petitioner
never informed the Court that the RTC of Calamba, Laguna, had
rendered judgment in SP Case No. 489-1998-C earlier on April 29,
2002. It was only on November 25, 2002 that the petitioner revealed to
the RTC of Quezon City that there was such a case and a decision had
already been rendered. The petitioner has not justified why he
concealed such matters for such considerable period of time.
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a
house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is
exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family
Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the
Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so
would estop the party from later claiming the exemption
50
9.
Taneovs CA
GR # 108562/ March
09, 1999
redeem the property. Premium averred that, after

the sale at public auction, Honrado and his family
even vacated the property. Honrado re-occupied
the property only in April or May 2002. It further
averred that the law does not automatically
exempt a family home from levy or execution and
there was no showing that its present value does
not exceed the amount allowed by law under
Article 157 of the Family Code.
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case
(For recovery of property) in favor of private
respondent, two (2) petitioner's properties were
levied to satisfy the judgment: one was a parcel
of land located in Misamis Oriental and the other
was the family home. The subject properties
were sold at public auction to the private
respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently,
after petitioners failure to redeem the same, a
final deed of conveyance was executed.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners
filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance
void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. In their
complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are the
children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and
NarcisaValaceras. Upon their death, they left the
subject property. Considering that said property
has been acquired through free patent, such
property is therefore inalienable and not subject
to any encumbrance for the payment of debt,
pursuant to Commonwealth Act. No. 141.
Petitioners aver that the house which their
father constituted as family home is exempt from
execution.
whether or not the family

home is exempt from
execution.
While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family
home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence, it does not mean that said article has a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioners
included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the
time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and
henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
(Modequillo vs. Breva, 185 SCRA 766). Neither does Article 162 of said
Code state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V thereof have
retroactive effect. It simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code (Modequillo vs. Breva, .Since
petitioners debt was incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code. His property is therefore
not exempt from attachment
The applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil
Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a
prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where the
family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment.
Article 243 reads:
The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment, except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the
Registry of Property;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
such record of the declaration;
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building.
The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo
51

constituted the house in question, erected on the land of
PlutarcoVacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the
family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money
judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964.
Thus, at that time when the debt was incurred, the family home was
not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners alleged
family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under
the exception of Article 243(2).
TITLE VI. PATERNITY & FILIATION

See also RA 9225- Use of Fathers Surname; Rules of Evidence (DNA); RA 9262- Anti- Violence on Women & Children; RA 9858 & Art. 177 FC, Art 345 RPC; Filial
Privilege, Art 965 NCC. Sec. 25 Rule 130 ROC
1.
TITLE
Republic
vsSagun
GR# 187567/ Feb. 15,

2012
FACTS
Respondent is the legitimate child of Albert S.
Chan, a Chinese national, and Marta Borromeo, a
Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in
Baguio Cityand did not elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, at the
age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun,
she executed an Oath of Allegianceto the Republic
of the Philippines. Said document was notarized
by Atty. CristetaLeung .
Sometime
in
September
2005,
respondent applied for a Philippine passport. Her
application was denied due to the citizenship of her
father and there being no annotation on her birth
certificate that she has elected Philippine
citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial
declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship
and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio
City be ordered to annotate the same on her birth
certificate.
In her petition, respondent averred that
she was raised as a Filipino, speaks Ilocano and
Tagalog fluently and attended local schools in
Baguio City, including Holy Family Academy and
the Saint Louis University. Respondent claimed
ISSUE/S
HELD
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing
charter was the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the
Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Sec.
1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching
the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right
to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973
Constitution when it provided that [t]hose who elect Philippine
citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this
recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that [t]hose born before January 17, 1973
of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority are Philippine citizens. It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the
election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having
52

that despite her part-Chinese ancestry, she always
thought of herself as a Filipino. She is a registered
voter o and had voted in local and national
elections.
She asserted that by virtue of her positive
acts, she has effectively elected Philippine
citizenship and such fact should be annotated on
her record of birth so as to entitle her to the
issuance of a Philippine passport.
Trial court- Grants the Petition;
2.
Reyes
Mauricio
vs.
GR# 1705080/ Nov. 24,

2010
Eugenio Reyes was the registered

owner of a parcel of land. The subject property was
adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial
settlement among the heirs following the death of
his parents.
The controversy stemmed from a
complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos,
Whether or not the

question on legitimacy
can
be
collaterally
attacked
a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship

for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a
person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution.
Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that
of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of
majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a settled rule that
only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that
illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother
and follow her nationality. An illegitimate child of Filipina need not
perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges
attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a
citizen himself. But in the case of respondent, for her to be
considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant to
Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election
of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the
Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to
administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry.
The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines.
Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of
electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under
oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government
of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election
and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it
ruled that Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in
the instant petition.
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.
Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book Civil Code
of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, noted that the
aforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of
53
3.
Lee vs CA
GR# 177861/ July 13,

2010
Bulacan by respondents Librada and her alleged

daughter Leonida for annulment of contract
denominated as Kasunduanand between Librada
and Eugenio as parties.
Respondents alleged that they are the
legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio
(Godofredo), who was the lawful and registered
tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-ininterest to the subject land; that through fraud,
deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio
caused the preparation of a document
denominated as Kasunduan to eject respondents
from the subject property.
Eugenio averred that no tenancy
relationship
existed
between
him
and
respondents. He clarified that Godofredos
occupation of the subject premises was based on
the formers mere tolerance and accommodation.
He maintained that Librada, accompanied by a
relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the
Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the
contents of the document
As an incidental issue, Leonidas legal
standing as a party was also assailed by Eugenio.
Eugenio submitted that the complaint was
rendered moot with the death of Librada,
Godofredos sole compulsory heir. Eugenio
contended that Leonida is a mere ward of
Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.
Spouses Lee and Keh entered the Philippines in
the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11
children. In 1948, Lee brought from China a young
woman named Tiu, supposedly to serve as
housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children
believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved
into another property of Lee nearby, and had a
relation with him.
Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the LeeKeh children learned that Tius children with Lei
claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and
the Philippines. He explained thus:

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning
the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article
335) which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the
husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the
competent court; any contest made in any other way is void. This
principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the
code confirm this view, because they refer to the action to impugn
the legitimacy. This action can be brought only by the husband or
his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental, the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party, and not through collateral attack.
Whether
or
not the CA erred in ruling
that the trial court may
compel Tiu to testify in the
correction of entry case
that respondent Lee-Keh
children filed for the
correction of the certificate
of birth of petitioner Emma
Lee to show that she is
not Kehs daughter.
Petitioner Emma Lee raise objection to requiring Tiu to

come to court and testify it would violate her parental right not to be
compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.
Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify
against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:
SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be
compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
54

Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to
request the NBI to investigate the matter. After
conducting such an investigation, the NBI
concluded in its report:
[I]t is very obvious that the mother of
these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK
CHENG, but a much younger woman, most
probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation
and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG
is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK
CHENG possibly to conform with his grand
design of making his 8 children as their own
legitimate children, consequently elevating the
status of his second family and secure their
future. The doctor lamented that this complaint
would not have been necessary had not the
father and his second family kept on insisting
that the 8 children are the legitimate children of
KEH SHIOK CHENG.
On the basis of this report, the
respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate
petitions, one of them before the RTC for the
deletion from the certificate of live birth of the
petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lees other children,
the name Keh and replace the same with the name
Tiu to indicate her true mothers name.
The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in

Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But
those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the
prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or
administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or
descendants.
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that
she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot
apply to them because the rule applies only to direct ascendants
and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article
965 thus provides:
Art. 965. The direct line is either descending
or ascending. The former unites the
head of the family with those who
descend from him. The latter binds a
person with those from whom he
descends.
Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner
Emma Lee.
In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed

with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance
of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu,
Emma Lees presumed mother, to testify in the
case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved
to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was
oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege,
she being Emma Lees stepmother.
CHAPTER 1. LEGITIMATE CHILDREN (Articles 163-171)
55
1.
LiyaovsTanhotiLiyao
GR# 138961/ March 7, 2002
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the

deceased, as represented by her mother
(Corazon), filed a petition ordering Tanhoti-Liyao,
Tan, Liyao to recognize and acknowledge him as
a compulsory heir of the deceased. Liyao Jr. was
in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status as the child of the deceased having been
recognized and acknowledged as such child by
the decedent during his lifetime. Corazon
maintained that she and the deceased were
legally married but living separately for more than
10 years and that they cohabited with other
people from 1965 until the death of the
deceased.
May petitioner impugn

his own legitimacy to be
able to claim from the
estate of his supposed
father, William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived
during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The
presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from
a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is
not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence
to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Codeprovides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty
days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other
than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of
the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately
from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was
conceived and born is of no moment. While physical impossibility
for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of
the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears
emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the
child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be
invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the
conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning
the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the
husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason
that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule
which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one
to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of
the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional
cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn
legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.
56
2.
Labagala
Santiago
vs.
GR# 132305/ December 04,

2001
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land

located in Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose
had fraudulently registered it in his name alone,
his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda sued Jose for
recovery of 2/3 share of the property/ The trial
court in that case decided in favor of the sisters,
recognizing their right of ownership over portions
of the property. Jose died intestate and
respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title,
ownership, and possession against herein
petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, to recover from her
the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose
but which came into petitioners sole possession
upon Joses death.
Respondents alleged that Joses share in
the property belongs to them by operation of law,
because they are the only legal heirs of their
brother, who died intestate and without issue. On
the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true
name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by
respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed to
be the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his
share in the subject property. She maintained
Whether or not
respondents may impugn
petitioners filiation in this
action for recovery of title
and possession
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by

Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein
petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner
William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao
cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid
marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his
present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that
only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs,
could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and
subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own
filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not
impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is
fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers
alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of
legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of
the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.
We find petitioners reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code
to be misplaced. Said article provides:
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child
shall be brought within one year from the recording of the birth in
the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or
in a proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen
months if they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if
abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term
shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud.
This article should be read in conjunction with the other
articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil
Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it
contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is
indeed a mans child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper
cases, his heirs) denies the childs filiation. It does not refer to
situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a
particular couple.
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of
a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a mans child by
his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning
petitioners legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that
petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a
57
3.
Babiera vs. Catotal
GR# 138493/ June 15 2000
that she had always stayed on the property, ever

since she was a child.
Apart from respondents testimonies, the
appellate court noted that the birth certificate of
Ida Labagala presented by respondents showed
that Ida was born of different parents, not Jose
and his wife. It also took into account the
statement made by Jose in Civil Case No. 56226
that he did not have any child.
Petitioner points out that respondents had,
before the filing of the instant case, previously
considered her as the daughter of Jose who,
during his lifetime, openly regarded her as his
legitimate daughter. She asserts that her
identification as Joses daughter in his ITR
outweighs the strange answers he gave when
he testified in Civil Case No. 56226.
Petitioner asserts further that respondents
cannot impugn her filiation collaterally, citing the
case of Sayson v. Court of Appealsin which we
held that (t)he legitimacy of (a) child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that
purpose, by the proper parties and within the
period limited by law. Petitioner also cites Article
263 of the Civil Code in support of this contention.
Presentacion filed with the RTC, a
petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of
Teofista.
"From
the
petition
filed,
PRESENTACION asserted 'that she is the only
surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and HermogenaCariosa,. That on
September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by
'hilot' in the house of spouses Eugenio and
HermogenaBabiera and without the knowledge of
said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the
child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and
HermogenaBabiera,
caused
the
registration/recording of the facts of birth of her
child, by simulating that she was the child of the
spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and
Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made
child of Jose at all. Moreover, the present action is one for

recovery of title and possession, and thus outside the scope of
Article 263 on prescriptive periods.
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not
conclusive proof of filiation. More so are the entries made in an
income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been
paid and the amount thereof.
We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure
a copy of her birth certificate but petitioner, without advancing any
reason therefor, failed to do so. Neither did petitioner obtain a
certification that no record of her birth could be found in the civil
registry, if such were the case. We find petitioners silence
concerning the absence of her birth certificate telling. It raises
doubt as to the existence of a birth certificate that would show
petitioner to be the daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza
Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth certificate would raise the
presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be
adverse to her claim. Petitioners counsel argued that petitioner
had been using Santiago all her life. However, use of a family
name certainly does not establish pedigree.
Whether
Respondent
(plaintiff in the lower court
a quo) does not have the
legal capacity to file the
special proceeding of
appeal under CA GR No.
CV-56031 subject matter
of
this
review
on
certiorari;
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to

sue, because Article 171of the Family Code states that the child's
filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special
circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is
not subject to a collateral attack.
This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite
standing to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The interest of
respondent in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action
for partition which the latter filed against the former. The case
concerned the properties inherited by respondent from her
parents.
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the present case. A close reading of this provision
58

HermogenaBabiera appear as the mother by
forging her signature. The natural father, the
carpenter, did not sign it; that the respondent
TeofistaBarbiera's birth certificate is void ab initio,
and it is patently a simulation of birth, since it is
clinically and medically impossible for the
supposed parents to bear a child in 1956
TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on
the grounds that 'the petition states no cause of
action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the
respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio
Babiera and HermogenaCariosaBabiera; that
plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant
petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family
Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred
by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of
the Family Code.'
shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the

legitimacy of his wifes child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the
mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did
not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not
to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but
to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the
present action does not impugn petitioners filiation to Spouses
Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera, because there is no blood
relation to impugn in the first place.
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled
thus:
"Petitioners insistence on the applicability of Articles
164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench
cannot be sustained. These articles provide:
xxx.....x xx.....x xx
"A careful reading of the above articles will show that
they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case,
where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological
child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation
where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his
wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn
the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically
impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within
the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded
the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific
reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case
of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles
170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the
prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs
should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child.
Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to
apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench
is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that
petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission
is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in
Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451,
457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
Petitioners recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil
59

Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This
legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents
to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless
deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner VioletaCabatbat
Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the
decedents child at all. Being neither [a] legally adopted child, nor
an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of
Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased."
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN (Articles 163-171)
Title
4. Benitez-Badua vs. CA
.
Facts
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian were owners of various
properties located in Laguna.
Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died
in 1989.
Vicentes sister and nephew filed a
complaint for the issuance of letters of
administration of Vicentes estate in favor of
the nephew, herein private respondent.
The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was
raised and cared by the deceased spouses
since childhood, though not related to them
by blood, nor legally adopted. To prove that
she is the only legitimate child of the
spouses submitted documents such as her
certificate of live birth where the spouses
name were reflected as her parents. She
even
testified
that
said
spouses
continuously treated her as their legitimate
daughter.
On the other hand, the relatives of Vicente
declared that said spouses were unable to
physically procreate hence the petitioner
cannot be the biological child.
Issues
Whether or not
petitioners
certificate of live
birth will suffice to
establish her
legitimacy.
Ruling
The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere
registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not confer upon
the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such
act amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or
her birth certificate, which is a public document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they were the
sole heirs of the deceased because she died without descendants
and ascendants. In executing such deed, Vicente effectively
repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner where it
appeared thathe was the petitioners father.
60
Mariategui v CA
Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner

as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of
the spouses.
Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages
during his lifetime. He had 4 children with
his first wife, Eusebia Montellano. He had 1
child with his second wife, Flaviana
Montellano. And he had 3 children with his
third wife, Felipa Velasco.
Lupo died instestate. Upon his death,
descendants from his first and second
marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition on Lot No. 163.
However, the children on Lupos third
marriage filed with the lower court an
amended complaint claiming that they were
deprive on the partition of Lot No. 163 which
were owned by their common father.
The petitioners, children on first and second
marriage, filed a counterclaim to dismiss the
said complaint.
Trial court denied the motion to dismiss and
also the complaint by the respondents,
children on third marriage.
Respondents elevated the case on CA on
the ground that the trial court committed an
error for not finding the third marriage to be
lawfully married and also in holding
respondents are not legitimate children of
their said parents.
CA rendered a decision declaring all the
children and descendants of Lupo, including
the respondents, are entitled to equal
shares of estate of their father. However,
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of said decision.
Whether
or
not
respondents
are
legitimate children of
Lupo Mariategui.
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand

for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of
Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate
children of the deceased. Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco
were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930.
This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo
Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when his father was still
living, he was able to mention to him that he and his mother
were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of
Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband
and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect,
no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts.
Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists
does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present. Under these circumstances, a marriage
may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa.
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than
that private respondents are legitimate children and heirs of
Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in
Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to
this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private
respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition
so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked,
have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In
other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie
except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the coowner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA
55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription
the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of
co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners
(Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an
action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be
barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On
the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
61

segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Title
Perla v Baring
Facts
Respondent Mirasol Baring and her then
minor son, Randy, filed before the RTC a
complaint for support against Antonio Perla.
According to Mirasol, she and Antonio had a
common law relationship for 2 years, and
Randy was the result of their affair.
Randy testified in court that the Perla family
treated him as a member of their family.
Antonio denied the allegations of Mirasol.
He claimed that he had sexual intercourse
with Mirasol only once.
He further alleged inaccuracies in the birth
certificate of Randy.
RTC ordered Antonio to support Randy.
CA upheld the decision of the RTC
Issues
Whether or not
Randy is entitled
to receive support
from Antonio
Ruling
No. Respondent failed to establish Randys illegitmate filiation to
Antonio
The rules for establishing filiation are found in Articles 172 and 175
of the Family Code which provide as follows:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
xxxx
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
62
children.
xxxx
Respondents presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Randy
identifying Antonio as the father. However, said certificate has no
probative value to establish Randys filiation to Antonio since the
latter had not signed the same. It is settled that "a certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate." We also
cannot lend credence to Mirasols claim that Antonio supplied
certain information through Erlinda. Aside from Antonios denial in
having any participation in the preparation of the document as well
as the absence of his signature thereon, respondents did not
present Erlinda to confirm that Antonio indeed supplied certain
entries in Randys birth certificate. Besides, the several unexplained
discrepancies in Antonios personal circumstances as reflected in
the subject birth certificate are manifestations of Antonios nonparticipation in its preparation. Most important, it was Mirasol who
signed as informant thereon which she confirmed on the witness
stand.
Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his illegitimate
filiation. That during their first encounter in 1994 Randy called
Antonio "Papa" and kissed his hand while Antonio hugged him and
promised to support him; or that his Aunt Lelita treated him as a
relative and was good to him during his one-week stay in her place,
cannot be considered as indications of Randys open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child under the
second paragraph of Article 172(1). "[T]o prove open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there
must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of
the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and
clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be
attributed to pure charity.
Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the
conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and
63
treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously."
Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and
promised to support him cannot be considered as proof of
continuous possession of the status of a child. To emphasize, "[t]he
fathers conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and
uninterrupted for this ground to exist.Here, except for that singular
occasion in which they met, there are no other acts of Antonio
treating Randy as his son.64Neither can Antonios paternity be
deduced from how his sister Lelita treated Randy. To this Court,
Lelitas actuations could have been done due to charity or some
other reasons.
Makati-Shangri-La v. Harper
Christian Frederik, a Norwegian national, an

executive of a Nowegian company, came to
Manila for a business trip. He checked in at
Room 1428 of the Shangri-La Hotel in
Makati. On November 6, 1999, he was
found murdered inside his hotel room, his
eyes and mouth gagged, and his hands tied
by a white rope.
Aggrieved by the sudden loss of Christian,
his heirs, wife Ellen Johanne and Jonathan
Christopher filed a suit against the hotel for
damages arising out of the death of
Christian in the hotel. The alleged
negligence on the part of the hotel, priding
itself as a five-star hotel. After trial, the RTC
rendered judgment in favour of the plaintiffs
and sentenced the hotel to pay damages,
which the Court of Appeals affirmed. The
hotel thus elevated its case to the Supreme
Court.
In its brief, one of the issues it presented for
consideration was that the widow and son
of Christian failed to prove by competent
Whether or not the

widow and son of
Christian Frederik failed
to prove by competent
evidence that they are
the
heirs
of
the
deceased
The Supreme Court:

Section 24 and Section 25 of Rule 132 provide:
Section 24. Proof of official record.The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Section 25. What attestation of copy must state.Whenever a copy
of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the
seal of such court.
Although Exhibit Q, Exhibit Q-1, Exhibit R and Exhibit R-1 were not
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record or by
his deputy in the manner required in Section 25 of Rule 132, and
64
evidence that they are the heirs of Christian

In support of their allegation, the plaintiffs offered
the following documentary evidence:
Exhibit Q -Birth Certificate of Jonathan
Christopher Harper, son of Christian Fredrik
Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper;
Exhibit Q-1 -Marriage Certificate of Ellen
Johanne Clausen and Christian Fredrik Harper;
Exhibit R -Birth Certificate of Christian Fredrick
Harper, son of Christopher Shaun Harper and
Eva Harper; and
Exhibit R-1 -Certificate from the Oslo Probate
Court stating that Ellen Harper was married to
the deceased, Christian Fredrick Harper and
listed Ellen Harper and Jonathan Christopher
Harper as the heirs of Christian Fredrik Harper.
said documents did not comply with the requirement under Section
24 of Rule 132 to the effect that if the record was not kept in the
Philippines a certificate of the person having custody must
accompany the copy of the document that was duly attested stating
that such person had custody of the documents, the deviation was
not enough reason to reject the utility of the documents for the
purposes they were intended to serve.
Exhibit Q and Exhibit R were extracts from the registry of births of
Oslo, Norway issued on March 23, 2004 and signed by Y. Ayse B.
Nordal, Registrar, and corresponded to respondent Jonathan
Christopher Harper and victim Christian Fredrik Harper, respectively.
Exhibit Q explicitly stated that Jonathan was the son of Christian
Fredrik Harper and Ellen Johanne Harper, while Exhibit R attested
to the birth of Christian Fredrik Harper on December 4, 1968. Exhibit
Q and Exhibit R were authenticated on March 29, 2004 by the
signatures of Tanja Sorlie of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway as well as by the official seal of that office. In turn, Consul
Marian Jocelyn R. Tirol of the Philippine Consulate in Stockholm,
Sweden authenticated the signatures of Tanja Sorlie and the official
seal of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway on Exhibit Q
and Exhibit R, explicitly certifying to the authority of Tanja Sorlie to
legalize official documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway.
Exhibit Q-1, the Marriage Certificate of Ellen Johanne Clausen
Harper and Christian Fredrik Harper, contained the following data,
namely: (a) the parties were married on June 29, 1996 in Ullern
Church; and (b) the certificate was issued by the Office of the Vicar
of Ullern on June 29, 1996. Exhibit Q-1 was similarly authenticated
by the signature of Tanja Sorlie of the Royal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Norway, with the official seal of that office. Philippine
Consul Tirol again expressly certified to the capacity of Sorlie to
legalize official documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway, and further certified that the document was a true
translation into English of a transcript of a Marriage Certificate
issued to Christian Frederik Harper and Ellen Johanne Clausen by
the Vicar of the Parish of Ullern on June 29, 1996.
Exhibit R-1, a Probate Court certificate issued by the Oslo Probate
Court on February 18, 2000 through Morten Bolstad, its Senior
Executive Officer, was also authenticated by the signature of Tanja
Sorlie and with the official seal of the Royal Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Norway. As with the other documents, Philippine Consul
65

Tirol explicitly certified to the capacity of Sorlie to legalize official
documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, and
further certified that the document was a true translation into English
of the Oslo Probate Court certificate issued on February 18, 2000 to
the effect that Christian Fredrik Harper, born on December 4, 1968,
had reportedly died on November 6, 1999.
The Oslo Probate Court certificate recited that both Ellen Johanne
Harper and Christopher S. Harper were Harpers heirs, to wit:
The above names surviving spouse has accepted responsibility for
the commitments of the deceased in accordance with the provisions
of Section 78 of the Probate Court Act (Norway), and the above
substitute guardian has agreed to the private division of the estate.
The following heir and substitute guardian will undertake the private
division of the estate:
Ellen Johanne Harper
Christopher S. Harper
This probate court certificate relates to the entire estate.
Oslo Probate Court, 18 February 2000.
The official participation in the authentication process of Tanja Sorlie
of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway and the
attachment of the official seal of that office on each authentication
indicated that Exhibit Q, Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1 were
documents of a public nature in Norway, not merely private
documents. It cannot be denied that based on Philippine Consul
Tirols official authentication, Tanja Sorlie was on the date of
signing, duly authorized to legalize official documents for the Royal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. Without a showing to the
contrary by petitioner, Exhibit Q, Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit
R-1 should be presumed to be themselves official documents under
Norwegian law, and admissible as prima facie evidence of the truth
of their contents under Philippine law.
At the minimum, Exhibit Q, Exhibit R, Exhibit Q-1 and Exhibit R-1
substantially met the requirements of Section 24 and Section 25 of
Rule 132 as a condition for their admission as evidence in default of
a showing by petitioner that the authentication process was tainted
with bad faith. Consequently, the objective of ensuring the
authenticity of the documents prior to their admission as evidence
was substantially achieved. In Constantino-David v. PangandamanGania, the Court has said that substantial compliance, by its very
nature, is actually inadequate observance of the requirements of a
rule or regulation that are waived under equitable circumstances in
66

order to facilitate the administration of justice, there being no
damage or injury caused by such flawed compliance.
The Court has further said in Constantino-David v. PangandamanGania that the focus in every inquiry on whether or not to accept
substantial compliance is always on the presence of equitable
conditions to administer justice effectively and efficiently without
damage or injury to the spirit of the legal obligation. There are,
indeed, such equitable conditions attendant here, the foremost of
which is that respondents had gone to great lengths to submit the
documents. As the CA observed, respondents compliance with the
requirements on attestation and authentication of the documents
had not been easy; they had to contend with many difficulties (such
as the distance of Oslo, their place of residence, from Stockholm,
Sweden, where the Philippine Consulate had its office; the volume
of transactions in the offices concerned; and the safe transmission
of the documents to the Philippines). Their submission of the
documents should be presumed to be in good faith because they
did so in due course. It would be inequitable if the sincerity of
respondents in obtaining and submitting the documents despite the
difficulties was ignored.
The principle of substantial compliance recognizes that exigencies
and situations do occasionally demand some flexibility in the rigid
application of the rules of procedure and the laws. That rules of
procedure may be mandatory in form and application does not
forbid a showing of substantial compliance under justifiable
circumstances, because substantial compliance does not equate to
a disregard of basic rules. For sure, substantial compliance and
strict adherence are not always incompatible and do not always
clash in discord. The power of the Court to suspend its own rules or
to except any particular case from the operation of the rules
whenever the purposes of justice require the suspension cannot be
challenged. In the interest of substantial justice, even procedural
rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance are
frequently relaxed. Similarly, the procedural rules should definitely
be liberally construed if strict adherence to their letter will result in
absurdity and in manifest injustice, or where the merits of a partys
cause are apparent and outweigh considerations of non-compliance
with certain formal requirements. It is more in accord with justice
that a party-litigant is given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his claim or defense than for him to lose his life, liberty,
honor or property on mere technicalities. Truly, the rules of
67

procedure are intended to promote substantial justice, not to defeat
it, and should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.
Gotardo v Buling
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina

Buling filed a complaint with the RTC of
Maasin, Southern Leyte, for compulsory
recognition and support pendente lite,
claiming that the Charles Gotardo is the
father of her child Gliffze. (answer)
Petitioner denied the paternity.
Parties failed to amicably settle the dispute,
the
RTC
terminated
the
pre-trial
proceedings. Trial on the merits ensued.
Evidence for Divina (casual employee)
showed that she met Charles (accounting
supervisor) on December 1, 1992 at the
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank,
Maasin, Southern Leyte branch.
Charles courted Divina in the third week of
December 1992 and they became
sweethearts in the last week of January
1993. Charles gave the respondent greeting
cards on special occasions, (Valentines
Day and her birthday); she reciprocated his
love and took care of him when he was ill.
In September 1993, Charles started
intimate
sexual
relations
with
the
respondent in the formers rented room in
the boarding house managed by Rodulfo
(Divinas uncle). Rented the room from
March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994.
The sexual encounters occurred twice a
month and became more frequent in June
1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, she
got pregnant. Charles was happy and made
plans to marry Divina. BUT, Charles backed
out of the wedding plan. (Divina filed for
damages for breach of promise to marry but
was amicably settled).
Divina gave birth to Gliffze on March 9,
1995. (When Charles did not show up and
WON Gliffze is entitled

to receive child support
and to be recognized
as Charles son.
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the

record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an
admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate
child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.32 We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be
a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which
[his] name has been entered, common reputation respecting [his]
pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof [admissible] under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares
supported by corroborative proof that she had sexual relations
with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to
the putative father. We explained further that the two affirmative
defenses available to the putative father are: (1) incapability of
sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or
impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual relations with other
men at the time of conception.
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the
petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she
had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the
time of her conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the
petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship.
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual
encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much
later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically
impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months
pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the
pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his
allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of
evidentiary support. The petitioners denial cannot overcome the
respondents clear and categorical assertions.
68
o
o
o
failed to provide support to Gliffze, Divina

sent him a demand letter on July 24, 1995
for recognition and support of their son)
Due to unanswered demand, Divina took
her demands in Court.
Charles denied being Gliffzes father in
Court.
RTC approved monthly child support.
RTC (appeal) reversed former decision
CA ordered Charles to recognize Gliffze
and give monthly child support
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was

an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises,
Inc.On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni
Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno,
initiateda complaint for specific performance
against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is
the son of thedeceased with the latters
common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving
heir, he claimed entitlement tothe rights and
privileges of his latefather as stockholder of
respondent. The complaint thus prayed that
respondent allow petitioner toinspect its
corporate book, render an accounting of all the
transactions it entered into from 1962, andgive
petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or
income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L.
Puno.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that petitioner did not have the legal
personality to sue because his birth certificate
names him as Joselito Musni Muno. Apropos,
there was yet a need for a judicial declaration
that Joselito Musni Puno and Joselito Musni
Muno were one and the same.
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of

obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is
variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of
support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient.47 It may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the
recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to
support.
1.
2.
Whether or not
Joseltio Musni
Puno was able to
prove satisfactorily
his filiation to the
deceased
stockholder.
Whether or not
Joselito Musni
Puno may inspect
respondents
corporations
books and receive
dividends on the
stocks owned by
Carlos L. Puno
Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the

deceased stockholder. However, we agree with the appellate court
that petitioner was not able to prove satisfactorily his filiation to the
deceased stockholder; thus, the former cannot claim to be an heir of
the latter.
Incessantly, we have declared that factual findings of the
CA supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and
binding. In an appeal via certiorari, the Court may not review the
factual findings of the CA. It is not the Courts function under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh
the probative value of the evidence presented.
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the
certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the
paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person.
As correctly observed by the CA, only petitioners mother supplied
the data in the birth certificate and signed the same. There was no
evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his son.
As for the baptismal certificate, we have already decreed
that it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not of the veracity of the entries
with respect to the childs paternity.
69

RTC- ruled in favor of Joselito Puno
CA- reversed the decision of the RTC.
In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code

enumerate the persons who are entitled to the inspection of
corporate books, thus
Sec. 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer
agent. x x x.
The records of all business transactions
of the corporation and the minutes of any meeting
shall be open to the inspection of any director,
trustee, stockholder or member of the
corporation at reasonable hours on business days
and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of
excerpts from said records or minutes, at his
expense.
xxxx
Sec. 75. Right to financial statements.
Within ten (10) days from receipt of a written
request of any stockholder or member, the
corporation shall furnish to him its most recent
financial statement, which shall include a balance
sheet as of the end of the last taxable year and a
profit or loss of statement for said taxable year,
showing in reasonable detail its assets and
liabilities and the result of its operations.
2)No. Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not
automatically become stockholders of the corporation and
acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as
shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be
distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the
transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the
corporation.
Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this
case to establish that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he
would still not be allowed to inspect respondents books
and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent,
absent any showing in its transfer book that some of the
70

shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him.
This would only be possible if petitioner has been
recognized as an heir and has participated in the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
Tayag v Tayag-Gallor
Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind

two (2) real properties both of which are in
the possession of petitioner, Victoria Tayag,
and a motor vehicle which the latter
sold preparatory to the settlement of the
decedents
estate. Petitioner
allegedly
promised to give respondent and her
brothers P100,000 each as their share in
the proceeds of the sale. However,
petitioner only gave each of them half the
amount she promised. Respondent further
averred that, petitioner intends to dispose of
these properties to the respondents and
her brothers prejudice.
Respondent Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed
a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over the estate of Ismael
Tayag. Respondent alleged in the petition
that she is one of the three (3) illegitimate
children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester
C. Angeles. The decedent was married to
petitioner herein, Victoria C. Tayag, but the
two allegedly did not have any children of
their own.
Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting
that she purchased the properties subject of
the petition using her own money. She
claimed that she and Ismael Tayag got
married in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA on 25
October 1973, and that they have an
adopted daughter, Carmela Tayag, who is
presently residing in the USA. It is allegedly
not true that she is planning to sell the
properties. Petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of the suit because respondent
failed to state a cause of action. Petitioner
W/N
respondents
petition for the issuance
of
letters
of
administration
sufficiently states a
cause
of
action
considering
that
respondent
merely
alleged therein that she
is an illegitimate child of
the decedent, without
stating that she had
been acknowledged or
recognized as such by
the latter
Yes, the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the

decedent suffices even without further stating that she has been so
recognized or acknowledged.
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person. In Saguinsin v. Lindayag, the Court defined an interested
party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor. This interest, furthermore, must be material and direct, not
merely indirect or contingent.
Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters of administration is
a suit for the settlement of the intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The
right of respondent to maintain such a suit is dependent on
whether she is entitled to successional rights as an illegitimate
child of the decedent which, in turn, may be established
through voluntary or compulsory recognition.
Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a record of
birth appearing in the civil register, a final judgment, a public
instrument or private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned. The voluntary recognition of an illegitimate child by his
or her parent needs no further court action and is, therefore, not
subject to the limitation that the action for recognition be brought
during the lifetime of the putative parent. Judicial or compulsory
recognition, on the other hand, may be demanded by the
illegitimate child of his parents and must be brought during the
lifetime of the presumed parents.
Petitioners thesis is essentially based on her contention that by
Ismael Tayags death, respondents illegitimate filiation and
necessarily, her interest in the decedents estate which the Rules
require to be material and direct, may no longer be
established. Petitioner, however, overlooks the fact that
respondents successional rights may be established not just
71

reiterated her sole ownership of the
properties and presented the transfer
certificates of title thereof in her name. She
also averred that it is necessary to allege
that respondent was acknowledged and
recognized by Ismael Tayag as his
illegitimate child. There being no such
allegation, the action becomes one to
compel recognition which cannot be brought
after the death of the putative father. The
motion was denied by the trial court.
CA affirmed. The CA ruled that the allegation
that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices
for a cause of action, without need to state that
she had been recognized and acknowledged as
such. However, respondent still has to prove
her allegation and, correspondingly, petitioner
has the right to refute the allegation in the
course of the settlement proceedings.
Estate of Ong v. Diaz
o
o
o
o
o
Minor Joanne Diaz, represented by her

mother Jinky Diaz filed a complaint for
compulsory recognition with prayer for
support against Rogelio Ong before RTC
February 1993: Jinky married Japanese
Hasegawa Katsuo
November 1993: Jinky and Rogelio got
acquainted and fell in love
January 1994-September 1998: Jinky and
Rogelio cohabited
February 1998: Joanne was born, Rogelio
paid all expenses, recognized child as his
September 1998: Rogelio abandoned
them and stopped giving support, alleging
that he is not the father of the child
RTC ordered defendant to recognize
plaintiff as natural child and provide monthly
support
RTC granted Rogelios Motion for New Trial
(because he was declared in default before)
RTC declared Joanne to be the illegitimate
child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky Diaz.
Support to continue until she reaches
by a judicial action to compel recognition but also by proof that

she had been voluntarily acknowledged and recognized as an
illegitimate child.
Respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to
present evidence to show whether she had been voluntarily
recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father because of
petitioners opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on
affirmative defenses. There is, as yet, no way to determine if her
petition is actually one to compel recognition which had already
been foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed she
has a material and direct interest to maintain the suit by reason of
the decedents voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her
illegitimate filiation.
Whether or not the CA

erred in remanding the
case for DNA analysis
despite the fact that it is
no longer feasible due
to Rogelios death
Petitioners argument is without basis especially as the New Rules

on DNA Evidence[28] allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu
proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order.
The appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any
person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall
issue after due hearing and notice to the parties
upon a showing of the following:
(a)
A biological sample exists that is relevant

to the case;
(b)
The biological sample: (i) was not

previously subjected to the type of DNA
testing now requested; or (ii) was
previously subjected to DNA testing, but
the results may require confirmation for
72
majority age.
Rogelio appealed to CA but he died in
February 2005 during its pendency
December 2000: CA granted appeal and
remanded case to RTC for the issuance of
an order directing the parties to make
arrangements for DNA analysis for the
purpose of determining the paternity of
Joanne
good reasons;
(c)
The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid

technique;
(d)
The DNA testing has the scientific

potential to produce new information that
is relevant to the proper resolution of the
case; and
(e)
The existence of other factors, if any,

which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or
integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the

petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing
for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term biological sample means any
organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in
inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes
blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.[29]
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological
samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be used
for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the
impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can
be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA
testing. In People v. Umanito,[30] citing Tecson v. Commission on
Elections,[31] this Court held:
The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on
Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424
SCRA 277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of
DNA testing in our jurisdiction in this wise: [i]n
case proof of filiation or paternity would be
unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
73

difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to.
It is obvious to the Court that the
determination of whether appellant is the father of
AAAs child, which may be accomplished through
DNA testing, is material to the fair and correct
adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section
4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized, after
due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a
DNA testing. However, while this Court retains
jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it
is to receive and act on the matter in controversy,
the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does
not, in the course of daily routine, conduct
hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate
that the case be remanded to the RTC for
reception of evidence in appropriate hearings,
with due notice to the parties. (Emphasis
supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of

Appeals[32]:
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children
have been marginalized by fathers who choose to
deny their existence. The growing sophistication
of DNA testing technology finally provides a much
needed equalizer for such ostracized and
abandoned progeny. We have long believed in
the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly
expressed as much in the past. This case comes
at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally
evolved into a dependable and authoritative form
of evidence gathering. We therefore take this
opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that
DNA testing is a valid means of determining
paternity.
74
Verceles v Posada
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada,met a 1.

close family friend, petitioner Teofisto
Verceles, mayor of Pandan.He then offered
Posada a job. Posada accepted Verceless
offer and worked as a casualemployee in
the mayors office. Along with some other
employees, Posada accompaniedVereceles
to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town 2.
planning. One day, Vercelesstarted to make
amorous advances on her. She succumbed
to his advances. She kept the incident to
herself.
Posada missed her menstruation and she
wrote Verceles that she feard she was 3.
pregnant. In a handwritten leter, Verceles
told Posada that she should have no regrets
should she become pregnant even
unexpectedly, and that they shall both take
care of the child.
Posada explained Verceles used an alias
Ninoy and addressed her as Chris, probably
because of their 25 year gap.
In court, Posada identified Verceles
penmanship which she claimed she was
familiar with as an employee of his office.
On September 23, 1987, she gave birth to a
baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada.
The Posadas filed a complaint for Damages
coupled with Support Pendente Lite before
the RTC against Verceles. The RTC issued
a judgment in favor of the Posadas. The CA
affirmed the judgment of the RTC, ordering
Verceles to pay a montly support to Verna
Aiza Posada from her birth and to pay
damages to Maria Clarissa and her parents.
Whether or not
paternity and filiation
can be resolved in
an action for
damages with
support pendente
lite
Whether or not the
filiation of Verna Aiza
Posada as the
illegitimate child of
petitioner was
proven.
Whether or not
respondents are
entitled to damages
1.
2.
3.
In determining the nature of an action, it is not the caption,

but the averments in the petition and the character of the
relief sought, that are controlling. A perusal of the complaint
before the RTC, shows that although its caption states
Damages coupled with Support Pendente lite, Posadas
averments therein, all clearly established a case for
recognition of paternity. This court has held that the due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will,
a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action
is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just
as a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval.
The letters are private handwritten instruments of Verceles
which established Verna Aizas filiation under Article 172
(2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array of evidence
presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and
testimonies, to us, are convincing and irrefutable evidence
that Verna Aiza is, indeed Verceles illegitimate child.
Verceles not only failed to rebut the evidence presented,
he himself presented no evidence of his own.
However, we cannot rule that the Posadas are entitled to
damages. Article 2219 of the New Civil Code states that
moral damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is
inapplicable in this case because respondent was already
an adult at the time she had an affair with Verceles, Neither
can her parents be entitled to damages. Respondent
Constantino and Francisca Posada have not cited any law
or jurisprudence to justify an award for damages to them.
Bernabe v Alejo
75

Tijing v CA
Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus

in order to recover their son from
respondent and presented witnesses to
substantiate their petition. Respondent
claimed on the other hand that she is the
natural mother of the child.
The trial court held in favor of the petitioners
and granted the petition for habeas corpus.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside
the decision rendered by the trial court. The
appellate court expressed its doubts on the
propriety of the habeas corpus.
Whether or
not habe
as
corpus is
the
proper
remedy?
(2) Whether
or
not
Edgardo
Tijing,
Jr., and
John
Thomas
Lopez
are one
and the
same
person
and
is
the son
of
petitioner
s?
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal

confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto.Thus, it is the proper legal remedy
to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the
latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may
even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of
illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying
rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over
a child. It must be stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings,
the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual
presumptions including those as to identity of the person.
In this case, the minors identity is crucial in determining the
propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it must be resolved first whether
the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the
same minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita insists to
be her offspring. We must first determine who between Bienvenida
and Angelita is the minors biological mother. Evidence must
necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought
of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and
the same. Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in
whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the person upon
whom they have rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of
the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made,
petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over
the said minor.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the
evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John
Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear
children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth of her
second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in
1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of
marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978,
as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child
76
between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who
allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical
records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever
submitted.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that
Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez
declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the
accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez
was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal
wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen
years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private
respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John
Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and
on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the
child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in
attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only
in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register the
birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil
registrar within thirty days after the birth.[16] Significantly, the birth
certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent
were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan,
which is false because even private respondent had admitted she is
a common-law wife.[17] This false entry puts to doubt the other
data in said birth certificate.
Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the
child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong
similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head
shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish parentage.
[18] Needless to stress, the trial courts conclusion should be given
high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical
appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in
Bienvenidas giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike
77
private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a

log book, discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.
All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject
minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is
proper to regain custody of said child.
Cenido v Apacionado
Respondent spouses Amadeo Apacionado

and Herminia Sta. Ana filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Rizal a
complaint against petitioner Renato Cenido
for Declaration of Ownership, Nullity, with
Damages.
The spouses alleged that: (1) they are the
owners of a parcel of unregistered land, 123
square meters in area and located at Rizal
Street, Barrio Layunan, Binangonan, Rizal.
Petitioner Cenido answered claiming
that: (1) he is the illegitimate son of
Bonifacio Aparato, the deceased owner of
the subject property; (2) as Aparato's sole
surviving heir, he became the owner of the
property as evidenced by the cancellation of
Tax Declaration No. 02-0274 in Bonifacio's
name and the issuance of Tax Declaration
No. 02-0368 in his name; (3) his ownership
over the house and lot was also confirmed
in 1985 by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch
1, Binangonan in Case No. 2264 which
adjudicated various claims involving the
same subject property wherein plaintiffs
were privy to the said case; (4) that in said
1. Whether or not
Petitioner Renato
Cenido is the
illegitimate son of
Aparato, the deceased
owner of the subject
property.
The illegitimate child can file an action for compulsory

recognition only during the lifetime of the presumed parent. After
the parent's death, the child cannot bring such action, except,
however, in only two instances: one is when the supposed parent
died during the minority of the child, and the other is when after the
death of the parent, a document should be discovered in which the
parent recognized the child as his. The action must be brought
within four years from the attainment of majority in the first case,
and from the discovery of the document in the second case. The
requirement that the action be filed during the parent's lifetime is to
prevent illegitimate children, on account of strong temptations to
large estates left by dead persons, to claim part of this estate
without giving the alleged parent personal opportunity to be heard. It
is vital that the parent be heard for only the parent is in a position to
reveal the true facts surrounding the claimant's conception.
In the case at bar, petitioner Cenido did not present any record
of birth, will or any authentic writing to show he was voluntarily
recognized by Bonifacio as his illegitimate son. In fact, petitioner
admitted on the witness stand that he had no document to prove
Bonifacio's recognition, much less his filiation. The voluntary
recognition of petitioner's filiation by Bonifacio's brother before the
MTC does not qualify as a statement in a court of record. Under
78
Heirs of Cabais v CA
Evidentiary Value of
Baptismal Certificate
case, the Apacionado spouses participated

in the execution of the compromise
agreement partitioning the deceased's
estate among his heirs, which agreement
was adopted by the Municipal Trial Court as
its judgment; (5) that the Apacionado
spouses were allowed to stay in his father's
house temporarily; (6) the mortgages on the
property were obtained by his father upon
request of the Apacionados who used the
proceeds of the loans exclusively for
themselves; (7) the real estate taxes on the
property were paid for by his father, the
principal, and the spouses were merely his
agents; (8) the instrument attesting to the
alleged sale of the house and lot by
Bonifacio Aparato to the spouses is not a
public document; (8) petitioner Cenido was
never summoned to appear before the
barangay for conciliation proceedings
Respondent spouses replied that Cenido is
not the illegitimate son of Bonifacio,
Cenido's claim of paternity being spurious;
RTC- ruled in favor of petitioner
CA- reversed the decision of the RTC
Petitioners are legal heirs of Pedro Cabais,

who died on April 16, 1982, leaving a parcel
of land situated in Basud, Tabaco, Albay,
with an area of 1,638 square meters, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-55640 in the name of Pedro Cabais.
The said property was inherited by Pedro
Cabais from his grandmother Eustaquia
Caeta by right of representation.
His mother, Felipa Caeta Buesa, who was
the
only
daughter
of
Eustaquia
Caeta, predeceased the latter, leaving him
as the only legal heir of Eustaquia. Thus,
the law, this statement must be made personally by the parent

himself or herself, not by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the
concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary declaration by
the parent, or if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish
the paternity or maternity of children born outside wedlock.
The compromise judgment of the MTC does not qualify as a
compulsory recognition of petitioner. In the first place, when he filed
this case against Gavino Aparato, petitioner was no longer a
minor. He was already pushing fifty years old. Secondly, there is no
allegation that after Bonifacio's death, a document was discovered
where Bonifacio recognized petitioner Cenido as his son. Thirdly,
there is nothing in the compromise judgment that indicates that the
action before the MTC was a settlement of Bonifacio's estate with a
gross value not exceeding P20,000.00. Definitely, the action could
not have been for compulsory recognition because the MTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The Real Property Tax Code provides that real property tax be
assessed in the name of the person owning or administering the
property on which the tax is levied. Since petitioner Cenido has not
proven any successional or administrative rights to Bonifacio's
estate, Tax Declaration No. 02-6368 in Cenido's name must be
declared null and void.
Whether trial court

correctly relied on the
baptismal certificate of
Felipa Caneta Buesa in
establishing filiation of
Pedro Cabais.
A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima

facie evidence of filiationand a high degree of proof is needed to
overthrow the presumption of truth contained in such public
document.This is pursuant to the rule that entries in official records
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.The evidentiary nature of
such document must, therefore, be sustained in the absence of
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.
On the contrary, a baptismal certificate, a private document,
which, being hearsay, is not a conclusive proof of filiation. It does
not have the same probative value as a record of birth, an official or
79
Pedro Cabais executed a Deed of SelfAdjudication,adjudicating in his favor

subject property. By virtue thereof, Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-3433 (23899)
was cancelled and in lieu thereof, the
aforementioned transfer certificate of title
issued in his name
Shortly after Pedro Cabais had adjudicated
to himself the property in question, a
complaint for partition and accounting was
brought by Simon Bonaobra, Heirs of
Victoria Caeta and Heirs of Anastacio
Caeta against Pedro Cabais
During the pendency, Pedro Cabais died.
Respondents herein entered the property in
dispute and constructed houses thereon,
depriving petitioners of possession thereof.
petitioners filed with the lower court, , for
quieting of title, recovery of possession and
ownership with a prayer for preliminary
injunction, against the herein respondents,
alleging that the acts of the latter with
regard to the disputed property cast a cloud
on their title thereto.
In their Answer, respondents theorized that
the petitioners have no cause of action and
were in estoppel, and that the issuance of
Transfer Certificate was in derogation of
respondents successional rights.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners.
public document. In US vs. Evangelista, this Court held that church

registers of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the
promulgation of General Orders No. 68and the passage of Act No.
190, are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly
authorized public officials. Thus, in this jurisdiction, a certificate of
baptism such as the one herein under controversy is no longer
regarded with the same evidentiary value as official records of
birth. Moreover, on this score, jurisprudence is consistent and
uniform in ruling that the canonical certificate of baptism is not
sufficient to prove recognition.
The unjustified failure to present the birth certificate instead of
the baptismal certificate now under consideration or to otherwise
prove filiation by any of the means recognized by law weigh heavily
against respondents. In Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, et
al., this Court declared that a baptismal certificate is evidence only
to prove the administration of the sacrament on the dates therein
specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with
respect to his kinsfolk. The same is conclusive only of the baptism
administered, according to the rites of the Catholic Church, by the
priest who baptized subject child, but it does not prove the veracity
of the declarations and statements contained in the certificate
concerning the relationship of the person baptized. It is
indispensable that such declarations and statements are shown by
proof recognized by law.
There is thus no reason to further sustain respondents stance
in the face of the aforecited rulings explaining the significance of
baptismal certificates. The lower court erred in giving too much
credence on the baptismal certificate of Felipa Caeta Buesa to
prove that Felipa was the daughter of one Gregoria Caeta and not
of Eustaquia Caeta, the original registered owner of the property
under controversy.
The grant by the lower court of the motion for reconsideration
from its own decision, quieting the title of Pedro Cabais (and
consequently of herein petitioners-successors in interest) to the said
property, on the basis mainly of such proof was unwarranted. To
repeat, a baptismal certificate, like all documents in general, attests
80
the fact leading to its execution and the date thereof, the
administration of the sacrament on the day therein specified, but not
to the veracity of the statements therein contained regarding the
kinsfolk of the person baptized.
Rodriguez v CA
This is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of
Court of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated
November 2, 1988 in CAG.R. SP No. 14276, which
allowed, in an action for
compulsory recognition, the
testimony of the mother of a
natural child on the identity
of the putative father.
On October 15, 1986, an action for

compulsory recognition and support was
brought before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 9, Baguio-Benguet, by respondent
Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos against Bienvenido
Rodriguez, petitioner herein. At the trial, the
plaintiff presented his mother, Felicitas
Agbulos Haber, as first witness. In the
course of her direct examination, she was
asked by counsel to reveal the identity of
the plaintiff's father but the defendant's
counsel raised a timely objection which the
court sustained.
Petitioner contended that Felicitas Agbulos
Haber should not be allowed to reveal the
name of the father of private respondent
because such revelation was prohibited by
Article 280 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Said Article provided:
When the father or the mother makes the
recognition separately, he or she shall not
reveal he name of the person with whom he
or she had the child; neither shall he or she
state any circumstance whereby the other
party may be identified.
On the other hand, private respondent
argued that his mother should be allowed to
testify on the identity of his father, pursuant
to paragraph 4, Article 283 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines and Section 30, Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 283 of the Civil Code of the
Whether or not Felicitas

Haber may be allowed
to reveal the name of
the father of private
respondent
Private respondent cannot invoke our decision in Navarro v.

Bacalla, 15 SCRA 114 (1965). While we ruled inNavarro that
the testimony of the mother of the plaintiff in said case, could be
used to establish his paternity, such testimony was admitted
during the trial without objection and the defendant accepted
the finding of the trial court that he was the father of the plaintiff.
In the case at bench, petitioner timely objected to the calling of
the mother of private respondent to the witness stand to name
petitioner as the father of said respondent.
Likewise, in Navarro we clearly stated:

We are not ruling whether the mere testimony of
the mother, without more, is sufficient to prove the
paternity of the child. Neither are we ruling on the
scope of Art. 280, New Civil Code which enjoins
the mother in making a separate and voluntary
recognition of a child from revealing the name of
the father, specifically, as to whether the mother's
testimony identifying the father is admissible in an
action to compel recognition if and when a timely
objection to such oral evidence is interposed (at p.
117).
Navarro, therefore, is not the end but only the beginning of our
quest, which felicitously was reached with our conclusion that the
prohibition in Article 280 against the identification of the father or
mother of a child applied only in voluntary and not in compulsory
recognition. This conclusion becomes abundantly clear if we
consider the relative position of the progenitor of Article 280, which
was Article 132 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, with the other
provisions on the acknowledgement of natural children of the same
81
Philippines provided:
In any of the following cases, the father is
obliged to recognize the child as his natural
child:
In cases of rape, abduction or seduction,
when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;
When the child is in continuous possession
of status of a child of the alleged father by
the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
When the child was conceived during the
time when the mother cohabited with the
supposed father;
When the child has in his favor any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his
father.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court provides:
Testimony generally confined to personal
knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness
can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his own knowledge, that is, which
are derived from his own perception, except
as otherwise provided in these rules.
Code.
82

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Civil Law Review 1: Atty.

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro

(1) whether the

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

in July 1985, petitioner Florinda dela Cruz (Florinda)

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were

1. Whether or not the

mistake on September 9, 1991. xxx

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Both parties admit that there were negotiations for the

Whether or not the

The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be

Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza were

Whether Article 124

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

mother, Gilda L. Jardeleza.2

In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

requirements of the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.

RTC granted said petition. Respondent opposed and

Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are

(1) Whether or not the

1. In this instance, private respondents consent to the contract of sale

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

the wife. The

On April 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz sold

however is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Plaintiff is married but living separately from husband,

Plaintiff discovered that her estranged husband,

That on the same lot, plaintiff had planned to put up

Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing offer

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee,

Omaa denied that she prepared the contract. She

On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and

Whether the Court of

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

1957. On 26 May 1964, respondent allegedly

and respondent was already judicially annulled as of 20 November 1995. The

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

On September 15, 1993, herein private respondent

xxx The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband. xxx

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a

issue of validity of the co-ownership between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner.

We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

spouses for the collection of the said amount before the

then be enforced in the manner especially provided in the Rules for

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

Civil Law Review 1: Atty. Legaspi

The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to

Whether or not the

The dispositive portion of the decision in question was incomplete insofar as