Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 116123 March 13, 1997

SERGIO F. NAGUIAT, doing business under the name and style SERGIO F. NAGUIAT
ENT., INC., & CLARK FIELD TAXI, INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION), NATIONAL
ORGANIZATION OF WORKINGMEN and its members, LEONARDO T. GALANG, et
al., respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Are private respondent-employees of petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Inc., who were separated from
service due the closure of Clark Air Base, entitled to separation pay and, if so, in what amount?
Are officers of corporations ipso facto liable jointly and severally with the companies they
represent for the payment of separation pay?
These questions are answered by the Court in resolving this petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission
(Third Division) 1 promulgated on February 28, 1994, 2 and May 31, 1994. 3 The February 28,
1994 Resolution affirmed with modifications the decision 4 of Labor Arbiter Ariel C. Santos in
NLRC Case No. RAB-III-12-2477-91. The second Resolution denied the motion for
reconsideration of herein petitioners.
The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter by granting separation pay to herein
individual respondents in the increased amount of US$120.00 for every year of service or its
peso equivalent, and holding Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T.
Naguiat, jointly and severally liable with Clark Field Taxi, Inc. ("CFTI").
The Facts
The following facts are derived from the records of the case:

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Petitioner CFTI held a concessionaire's contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services
("AAFES") for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio F. Naguiat was
CFTI's president, while Antolin T. Naguiat was its vice-president. Like Sergio F. Naguiat
Enterprises, Incorporated ("Naguiat Enterprises"), a trading firm, it was a family-owned
corporation.
Individual respondents were previously employed by CFTI as taxicab drivers. During their
employment, they were required to pay a daily "boundary fee" in the amount of US$26.50 for
those working from 1:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, and US$27.00 for those working from 12:00 noon
to 12:00 midnight. All incidental expenses for the maintenance of the vehicles they were driving
were accounted against them, including gasoline expenses.
The drivers worked at least three to four times a week, depending on the availability of taxicabs.
They earned not less than US$15.00 daily.
In excess of that amount, however, they were required to make cash deposits to the company,
which they could later withdraw every fifteen days.
Due to the phase-out of the US military bases in the Philippines, from which Clark Air Base was
not spared, the AAFES was dissolved, and the services of individual respondents were officially
terminated on November 26, 1991.
The AAFES Taxi Drivers Association ("drivers' union"), through its local president, Eduardo
Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation benefits that should be awarded in
favor of the drivers. They arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers will be given
P500.00 for every year of service as severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted said amount in
December 1991 and January 1992. However, individual respondents herein refused to accept
theirs.
Instead, after disaffiliating themselves from the drivers' union, individual respondents, through
the National Organization of Workingmen ("NOWM"), a labor organization which they
subsequently joined, filed a complaint 5against "Sergio F. Naguiat doing business under the name
and style Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., Army-Air Force Exchange Services (AAFES) with
Mark Hooper as Area Service Manager, Pacific Region, and AAFES Taxi Drivers Association
with Eduardo Castillo as President," for payment of separation pay due to termination/phase-out.
Said complaint was later amended 6 to include additional taxi drivers who were similarly situated
as complainants, and CFTI with Antolin T. Naguiat as vice president and general manager, as
party respondent.
In their complaint, herein private respondents alleged that they were regular employees of
Naguiat Enterprises, although their individual applications for employment were approved by
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CFTI. They claimed to have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by
CFTI, and that the former thence managed, controlled and supervised their employment. They
averred further that they were entitled to separation pay based on their latest daily earnings of
US$15.00 for working sixteen (16) days a month.
In their position paper submitted to the labor arbiter, herein petitioners claimed that the cessation
of business of CFTI on November 26, 1991, was due to "great financial losses and lost business
opportunity" resulting from the phase-out of Clark Air Base brought about by the Mt. Pinatubo
eruption and the expiration of the RP-US military bases agreement. They admitted that CFTI had
agreed with the drivers' union, through its President Eduardo Castillo who claimed to have had
blanket authority to negotiate with CFTI in behalf of union members, to grant its taxi driveremployees separation pay equivalent to P500.00 for every year of service.
The labor arbiter, finding the individual complainants to be regular workers of CFTI, ordered the
latter to pay them P1,200.00 for every year of service "for humanitarian consideration," setting
aside the earlier agreement between CFTI and the drivers' union of P500.00 for every year of
service. The labor arbiter rejected the allegation of CFTI that it was forced to close business due
to "great financial losses and lost business opportunity" since, at the time it ceased operations,
CFTI was profitably earning and the cessation of its business was due to the untimely closure of
Clark Air Base. In not awarding separation pay in accordance with the Labor Code, the labor
arbiter explained:
To allow respondents exemption from its (sic) obligation to pay separation pay
would be inhuman to complainants but to impose a monetary obligation to an
employer whose profitable business was abruptly shot (sic) down by force
majeure would be unfair and unjust to say the least. 7
and thus, simply awarded an amount for "humanitarian consideration."
Herein individual private respondents appealed to the NLRC. In its Resolution, the NLRC
modified the decision of the labor arbiter by granting separation pay to the private respondents.
The concluding paragraphs of the NLRC Resolution read:
The contention of complainant is partly correct. One-half month salary should be
US$120.00 but this amount can not be paid to the complainant in U.S. Dollar
which is not the legal tender in the Philippines. Paras, in commenting on Art.
1249 of the New Civil Code, defines legal tender as "that which a debtor may
compel a creditor to accept in payment of the debt. The complainants who are the
creditors in this instance can be compelled to accept the Philippine peso which is
the legal tender, in which case, the table of conversion (exchange rate) at the time
of payment or satisfaction of the judgment should be used. However, since the
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choice is left to the debtor, (respondents) they may choose to pay in US dollar."
(Phoenix Assurance Co. vs. Macondray & Co. Inc., L-25048, May 13, 1975)
In discharging the above obligations, Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, which is
headed by Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat, father and son at the same time
the President and Vice-President and General Manager, respectively, should be
joined as indispensable party whose liability is joint and several. (Sec. 7, Rule 3,
Rules of Court) 8
As mentioned earlier, the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners was denied by the
NLRC. Hence, this petition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order. Upon
posting by the petitioners of a surety bond, a temporary restraining order 9 was issued by this
Court enjoining execution of the assailed Resolutions.
Issues
The petitioners raise the following issues before this Court for resolution:
I. Whether or not public respondent NLRC (3rd Div.) committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the appealed resolution;
II. Whether or not Messrs. Teofilo Rafols and Romeo N. Lopez could validly
represent herein private respondents; and,
III. Whether or not the resolution issued by public respondent is contrary to law. 10
Petitioners also submit two additional issues by way of a supplement 11 to their petition, to wit:
that Petitioners Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process; and that
petitioners were not furnished copies of private respondents' appeal to the NLRC. As to the
procedural lapse of insufficient copies of the appeal, the proper forum before which petitioners
should have raised it is the NLRC. They, however, failed to question this in their motion for
reconsideration. As a consequence, they are deemed to have waived the same and voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the appellate body.
Anent the first issue raised in their original petition, petitioners contend that NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in unilaterally increasing the
amount of severance pay granted by the labor arbiter. They claim that this was not supported by
substantial evidence since it was based simply on the self-serving allegation of respondents that
their monthly take-home pay was not lower than $240.00.

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On the second issue, petitioners aver that NOWM cannot make legal representations in behalf of
individual respondents who should, instead, be bound by the decision of the union (AAFES Taxi
Drivers Association) of which they were members.
As to the third issue, petitioners incessantly insist that Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. is a
separate and distinct juridical entity which cannot be held jointly and severally liable for the
obligations of CFTI. And similarly, Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat were merely officers
and stockholders of CFTI and, thus, could not be held personally accountable for corporate
debts.
Lastly, Sergio and Antolin Naguiat assail the Resolution of NLRC holding them solidarily liable
despite not having been impleaded as parties to the complaint.
Individual respondents filed a comment separate from that of NOWM. In sum, both aver that
petitioners had the opportunity but failed to refute, the taxi drivers' claim of having an average
monthly earning of $240.00; that individual respondents became members of NOWM after
disaffiliating themselves from the AAFES Taxi Drivers Association which, through the
manipulations of its President Eduardo Castillo, unconscionably compromised their separation
pay; and that Naguiat Enterprises, being their indirect employer, is solidarily liable under the law
for violation of the Labor Code, in this case, for nonpayment of their separation pay.
The Solicitor General unqualifiedly supports the allegations of private respondents. In addition,
he submits that the separate personalities of respondent corporations and their officers should be
disregarded and considered one and the same as these were used to perpetrate injustice to their
employees.
The Court's Ruling
As will be discussed below, the petition is partially meritorious.
First Issue: Amount of Separation Pay
Firmly, we reiterate the rule that in a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, which is the only way a labor case may reach the Supreme Court, the petitioner/s must
clearly show that the NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. 12
Long-standing and well-settled in Philippine jurisprudence is the judicial dictum that findings of
fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but
even finality; and are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of
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discretion, or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the
evidence on record. 13
Nevertheless, this Court carefully perused the records of the instant case if only to determine
whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in granting the clamor of private respondents that their separation pay should be
based on the amount of $240.00, allegedly their minimum monthly earnings as taxi drivers of
petitioners.
In their amended complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch in San Fernando, Pampanga,
herein private respondents set forth in detail the work schedule and financial arrangement they
had with their employer. Therefrom they inferred that their monthly take-home pay amounted to
not less than $240.00. Herein petitioners did not bother to refute nor offer any evidence to
controvert said allegations. Remaining undisputed, the labor arbiter adopted such facts in his
decision. Petitioners did not even appeal from the decision of the labor arbiter nor manifest any
error in his findings and conclusions. Thus, petitioners are in estoppel for not having questioned
such facts when they had all opportunity to do so. Private respondents, like petitioners, are bound
by the factual findings of Respondent Commission.
Petitioners also claim that the closure of their taxi business was due to great financial losses
brought about by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo which made the roads practically impassable to
their taxicabs. Likewise well-settled is the rule that business losses or financial reverses, in order
to sustain retrenchment of personnel or closure of business and warrant exemption from payment
of separation pay, must be proved with clear and satisfactory evidence. 14 The records, however,
are devoid of such evidence.
The labor arbiter, as affirmed by NLRC, correctly found that petitioners stopped their taxi
business within Clark Air Base because of the phase-out of U.S. military presence thereat. It was
not due to any great financial loss because petitioners' taxi business was earning profitably at the
time of its closure.
With respect to the amount of separation pay that should be granted, Article 283 of the Labor
Code provides:
. . . In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation
of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or
financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or
at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A
fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.

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Considering the above, we find that NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling
that individual respondents were entitled to separation pay 15 in the amount $120.00 (one-half of
$240.00 monthly pay) or its peso equivalent for every year of service.
Second Issue: NOWM's Personality to
Represent Individual Respondents-Employees
On the question of NOWM's authority to represent private respondents, we hold petitioners in
estoppel for not having seasonably raised this issue before the labor arbiter or the NLRC.
NOWM was already a party-litigant as the organization representing the taxi driver-complainants
before the labor arbiter. But petitioners who were party-respondents in said complaint did not
assail the juridical personality of NOWM and the validity of its representations in behalf of the
complaining taxi drivers before the quasi-judicial bodies. Therefore, they are now estopped from
raising such question before this Court. In any event, petitioners acknowledged before this Court
that the taxi drivers allegedly represented by NOWM, are themselves parties in this case. 16
Third Issue: Liability of PetitionerCorporations and Their Respective Officers
The resolution of this issue involves another factual finding that Naguiat Enterprises actually
managed, supervised and controlled employment terms of the taxi drivers, making it their
indirect employer. As adverted to earlier, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies are binding
upon the court in the absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Unfortunately, the NLRC did not discuss or give any explanation for holding Naguiat Enterprises
and its officers jointly and severally liable in discharging CFTI's liability for payment of
separation pay. We again remind those concerned that decisions, however concisely written, must
distinctly and clearly set forth the facts and law upon which they are based. 17 This rule applies as
well to dispositions by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.
Naguiat Enterprise Not Liable
In impleading Naguiat Enterprises as solidarily liable for the obligations of CFTI, respondents
rely on Articles 106,18 107 19 and 109 20 of the Labor Code.
Based on factual submissions of the parties, the labor arbiter, however, found that individual
respondents were regular employees of CFTI who received wages on a boundary or commission
basis.
We find no reason to make a contrary finding. Labor-only contracting exists where: (1) the
person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the
form of tools, equipment, machinery, and work premises, among others; and (2) the workers
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recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the
principal business of the employer. 21 Independent contractors, meanwhile, are those who
exercise independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work according to their own
methods without being subject to control of their employer except as to the result of their
Work. 22
From the evidence proffered by both parties, there is no substantial basis to hold that Naguiat
Enterprises is an indirect employer of individual respondents much less a labor only contractor.
On the contrary, petitioners submitted documents such as the drivers' applications for
employment with CFTI, 23 and social security remittances24 and payroll 25 of Naguiat Enterprises
showing that none of the individual respondents were its employees. Moreover, in the
contract 26 between CFTI and AAFES, the former, as concessionaire, agreed to purchase from
AAFES for a certain amount within a specified period a fleet of vehicles to be "ke(pt) on the
road" by CFTI, pursuant to their concessionaire's contract. This indicates that CFTI became the
owner of the taxicabs which became the principal investment and asset of the company.
Private respondents failed to substantiate their claim that Naguiat Enterprises managed,
supervised and controlled their employment. It appears that they were confused on the
personalities of Sergio F. Naguiat as an individual who was the president of CFTI, and Sergio F.
Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., as a separate corporate entity with a separate business. They presumed
that Sergio F. Naguiat, who was at the same time a stockholder and director 27 of Sergio F.
Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., was managing and controlling the taxi business on behalf of the latter.
A closer scrutiny and analysis of the records, however, evince the truth of the matter: that Sergio
F. Naguiat, in supervising the taxi drivers and determining their employment terms, was rather
carrying out his responsibilities as president of CFTI. Hence, Naguiat Enterprises as a separate
corporation does not appear to be involved at all in the taxi business.
To illustrate further, we refer to the testimony of a driver-claimant on cross examination.
Atty. Suarez
Is it not true that you applied not with Sergio F. Naguiat but with
Clark Field Taxi?
Witness
I applied for (sic) Sergio F. Naguiat.
Atty. Suarez
Sergio F. Naguiat as an individual or the corporation?
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Witness
Sergio F. Naguiat na tao.
Atty. Suarez
Who is Sergio F. Naguiat?
Witness
He is the one managing the Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises and he is
the one whom we believe as our employer
Atty. Suarez
What is exactly the position of Sergio F. Naguiat with the Sergio F.
Naguiat Enterprises?
Witness
He is the owner, sir.
Atty. Suarez
How about with Clark Field Taxi Incorporated what is the position
of Mr. Naguiat?
Witness
What I know is that he is a concessionaire.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Suarez
But do you also know that Sergio F. Naguiat is the President of
Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated?
Witness
Yes, sir.
Atty. Suarez
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How about Mr. Antolin Naguiat what is his role in the taxi
services, the operation of the Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated?
Witness
He is the vice president. 28
And, although the witness insisted that Naguiat Enterprises was his employer, he could not deny
that he received his salary from the office of CFTI inside the base. 29
Another driver-claimant admitted, upon the prodding of counsel for the corporations, that
Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while CFTI was in taxi services. 30
In addition, the Constitution 31 of CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association which, admittedly, was
the union of individual respondents while still working at Clark Air Base, states that members
thereof are the employees of CFTI and "(f)or collective bargaining purposes, the definite
employer is the Clark Field Taxi Inc."
From the foregoing, the ineludible conclusion is that CFTI was the actual and direct employer of
individual respondents, and that Naguiat Enterprises was neither their indirect employer nor
labor-only contractor. It was not involved at all in the taxi business.
CFTI president
solidarily liable
Petitioner-corporations would likewise want to avoid the solidary liability of their officers. To
bolster their position, Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T. Naguiat specifically aver that they were
denied due process since they were not parties to the complaint below. 32 In the broader interest
of justice, we, however, hold that Sergio F. Naguiat, in his capacity as president of CFTI, cannot
be exonerated from joint and several liability in the payment of separation pay to individual
respondents.
A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC 33 is the case in point. A.C. Ransom Corporation was
a family corporation, the stockholders of which were members of the Hernandez family. In 1973,
it filed an application for clearance to close or cease operations, which was duly granted by the
Ministry of Labor and Employment, without prejudice to the right of employees to seek redress
of grievance, if any. Backwages of 22 employees, who engaged in a strike prior to the closure,
were subsequently computed at P164,984.00. Up to September 1976, the union filed about ten
(10) motions for execution against the corporation, but none could be implemented, presumably
for failure to find leviable assets of said corporation. In its last motion for execution, the union
asked that officers and agents of the company be held personally liable for payment of the
backwages. This was granted by the labor arbiter. In the corporation's appeal to the NLRC, one
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of the issues raised was: "Is the judgment against a corporation to reinstate its dismissed
employees with backwages, enforceable against its officer and agents, in their individual, private
and personal capacities, who were not parties in the case where the judgment was rendered!" The
NLRC answered in the negative, on the ground that officers of a corporation are not liable
personally for official acts unless they exceeded the scope of their authority.
On certiorari, this Court reversed the NLRC and upheld the labor arbiter. In imposing joint and
several liability upon the company president, the Court, speaking through Mme. Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, ratiocinated this wise:
(b) How can the foregoing (Articles 265 and 273 of the Labor Code) provisions
be implemented when the employer is a corporation? The answer is found in
Article 212(c) of the Labor Code which provides:
(c) "Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly
or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its
officers or agents except when acting as employer.
The foregoing was culled from Section 2 of RA 602, the Minimum Wage Law.
Since RANSOM is an artificial person, it must have an officer who can be
presumed to be the employer, being the "person acting in the interest of (the)
employer" RANSOM. The corporation, only in the technical sense, is the
employer.
The responsible officer of an employer corporation can be held personally, not to
say even criminally, liable for nonpayment of back wages. That is the policy of
the law. . . .
(c) If the policy of the law were otherwise, the corporation employer can have
devious ways for evading payment of back wages. . . .
(d) The record does not clearly identify "the officer or officers" of RANSOM
directly responsible for failure to pay the back wages of the 22 strikers. In the
absence of definite Proof in that regard, we believe it should be presumed that the
responsible officer is the President of the corporation who can be deemed the
chief operation officer thereof. Thus, in RA 602, criminal responsibility is with the
"Manager or in his default, the person acting as such." In RANSOM. the
President appears to be the Manager. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the president of CFTI who actively managed the business.
Thus, applying the ruling in A.C. Ransom, he falls within the meaning of an "employer" as
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contemplated by the Labor Code, who may be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations
of the corporation to its dismissed employees.
Moreover, petitioners also conceded that both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were "close family
corporations" 34owned by the Naguiat family. Section 100, paragraph 5, (under Title XII on Close
Corporations) of the Corporation Code, states:
(5) To the extent that the stockholders are actively engage(d) in the management
or operation of the business and affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders
shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to each other and among themselves. Said
stockholders shall be personally liable for corporate tortsunless the corporation
has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance. (emphasis supplied)
Nothing in the records show whether CFTI obtained "reasonably adequate liability
insurance;" thus, what remains is to determine whether there was corporate tort.
Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of "corporate tort." Essentially, "tort"
consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. 35 Simply
stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty. 36 Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates the employer to
grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of operations of establishment
or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is the condition
obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or obligation. Consequently,
its stockholder who was actively engaged in the management or operation of the business should
be held personally liable.
Furthermore, in MAM Realty Development vs. NLRC, 37 the Court recognized that a director or
officer may still be held solidarily liable with a corporation by specific provision of law. Thus:
. . . A corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors,
officers and employees. Obligations incurred by them, acting as such corporate
agents, are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they
represent. True, solidary liabilities may at times be incurred but only when
exceptional circumstances warrant such as, generally, in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law,
personally liable for his corporate action. (footnotes omitted)
As pointed out earlier, the fifth paragraph of Section 100 of the Corporation Code specifically
imposes personal liability upon the stockholder actively managing or operating the business and
affairs of the close corporation.
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In fact, in posting the surety bond required by this Court for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order enjoining the execution of the assailed NLRC Resolutions, only Sergio F.
Naguiat, in his individual and personal capacity, principally bound himself to comply with the
obligation thereunder, i.e., "to guarantee the payment to private respondents of any damages
which they may incur by reason of the issuance of a temporary restraining order sought, if it
should be finally adjudged that said principals were not entitled thereto. 38
The Court here finds no application to the rule that a corporate officer cannot be held solidarily
liable with a corporation in the absence of evidence that he had acted in bad faith or with
malice. 39 In the present case, Sergio Naguiat is held solidarily liable for corporate tort because he
had actively engaged in the management and operation of CFTI, a close corporation.
Antolin Naguiat not personally liable
Antolin T. Naguiat was the vice president of the CFTI. Although he carried the title of "general
manager" as well, it had not been shown that he had acted in such capacity. Furthermore, no
evidence on the extent of his participation in the management or operation of the business was
preferred. In this light, he cannot be held solidarily liable for the obligations of CFTI and Sergio
Naguiat to the private respondents.
Fourth Issue: No Denial of Due Process
Lastly, in petitioners' Supplement to their original petition, they assail the NLRC Resolution
holding Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T. Naguiat jointly and severally liable with petitionercorporations in the payment of separation pay, averring denial of due process since the individual
Naguiats were not impleaded as parties to the complaint.
We advert to the case of A.C. Ransom once more. The officers of the corporation were not parties
to the case when the judgment in favor of the employees was rendered. The corporate officers
raised this issue when the labor arbiter granted the motion of the employees to enforce the
judgment against them. In spite of this, the Court held the corporation president solidarily liable
with the corporation.
Furthermore, Sergio and Antolin Naguiat voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter when they, in their individual capacities, filed a position paper 40 together with
CFTI, before the arbiter. They cannot now claim to have been denied due process since they
availed of the opportunity to present their positions.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
assailed February 28, 1994 Resolution of the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

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(1) Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated, and Sergio F. Naguiat, president and co-owner
thereof, are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, the individual respondents their separation
pay computed at US$120.00 for every year of service, or its peso equivalent at the time of
payment or satisfaction of the judgment;
(2) Petitioner Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated, and Antolin T. Naguiat are
ABSOLVED from liability in the payment of separation pay to individual respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

DIGEST
Sergio Naguiat was the president of Clark Field Taxi, Inc. (CFTI) which supplied taxi services to
Clark Air Base. At the same time, Naguiat was a director of the Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises,
Inc. (SFNEI), their family owned corporation along with CFTI.
In 1991, CFTI had to close due to great financial losses and lost business opportunity resulting
from the phase-out of Clark Air Base brought about by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the
expiration of the RP-US military bases agreement.
CFTI then came up with an agreement with the drivers that the latter be entitled to a separation
pay in the amount of P500.00 per every year of service. Most of the drivers accepted this but
some drivers did not. The drivers who refused to accept the separation pay offered by CFTI
instead sued the latter before the labor arbiter.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the taxi drivers. The National Labor Relations Commission
affirmed the labor arbiter. It was established that when CFTI closed, it was in profitable standing
and was not incurring losses. It ruled that the drivers are entitled to $120.00 per every year of
service subject to exchange rates prevailing that time.
The NLRC likewise ruled that SFNEI as well as CFTIs president and vice president Sergio
Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat should be held jointly and severally liable to pay the drivers. The
NLRC ruled that SFNEI actively managed CFTI and its business affairs hence it acted as the
employer of the drivers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling of the NLRC is correct.
HELD: It is only partially correct.
It is correct when it ruled that the Sergio Naguiat is jointly and severally liable to pay the drivers
the award of separation pay in the amount so determined. As president of CFTI, Sergio Naguiat
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is considered an employer of the dismissed employees who is therefore liable for the
obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees. Moreover, CFTI, being a close family
corporation, is liable for corporate torts and stockholders thereof shall be personally liable for
corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance (par.
5, Section 100, Close Corporations, Corporation Code). Antolin Naguiat is absolved because
there was insufficient evidence as against him.
SFNEI is not liable jointly or severally with CFTI. SFNEI has nothing to do with CFTI. There is
no sufficient evidence to prove that it actively managed CFTI especially so when even the
drivers testified that their employer is CFTI and that their payroll comes from CFTI. Further,
SFNEI was into trading business while CFTI was into taxi services.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 141309

June 19, 2007

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner assails the May 7, 1999 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47167,
which affirmed the September 29, 1997 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina,
Branch 272, in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK, denying petitioners motion to dismiss. The
complaint filed by respondent sought to recover damages for the alleged violation of its
constitutional rights arising from petitioners issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No.
37-93 (RMC 37-93), which the Court declared invalid in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Court of Appeals.3
Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while
respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different
brands of cigarettes, among which are "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took effect
on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands Champion," "Hope," and "More" were
15 | P a g e

considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July
1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying
"Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign
brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.4 RMC 37-93 in effect subjected "Hope," "More,"
and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142,5 (c)(1) on
locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which
imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five
Pesos (P5.00) per pack."6
On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr.
sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in
particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy
of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the
recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993.7 The same letter assessed
respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of
RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof.8 On August 3, 1993,
respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September
30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93.9 In its decision dated
August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and
further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC
No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.10 It was held, among others, that RMC
37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.
On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint11 for damages against petitioner
in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to
equal protection of the laws.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss12 contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action
against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within
the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and
therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action
for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was
signed by respondents counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff or the principal party
who should sign the same.
On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss holding that to rule on
the allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the merits of the case without
allowing the parties to present evidence. It further held that the defect in the certification against
16 | P a g e

forum shopping was cured by respondents submission of the corporate secretarys certificate
authorizing its counsel to execute the certification against forum shopping. The dispositive
portion thereof, states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by the
defendant Liwayway Vinzons-Chato and the motion to strike out and expunge from the
record the said motion to dismiss filed by plaintiff Fortune Tobacco Corporation are both
denied on the grounds aforecited. The defendant is ordered to file her answer to the
complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED.13
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
However, same was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability
may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court
ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the civil
liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the
instant case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages.
It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the certification against forum shopping
was cured by the submission of the corporate secretarys certificate giving authority to its
counsel to execute the same.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is grounded on her acts
done in the performance of her functions as a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code which should be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only
when there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. She further averred that
the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damages for violation of
constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public officers; while Section 38, Book I
of the Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public officers liability, such that, if
the complaint, as in the instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the
same is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action. As to the defect of the certification
against forum shopping, she urged the Court to strictly construe the rules and to dismiss the
complaint.
Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the public officers "acts"
from which civil liability may arise, is a general law; while Article 32 which deals specifically
with the public officers violation of constitutional rights, is a special provision which should
determine whether the complaint states a cause of action or not. Citing the case of Lim v. Ponce
de Leon,14 respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is enough that there was
a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is not required that said public officer
should have acted with malice or in bad faith. Hence, it concluded that even granting that the
17 | P a g e

complaint failed to allege bad faith or malice, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action should be denied inasmuch as bad faith or malice are not necessary to hold petitioner
liable.
The issues for resolution are as follows:
(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in
connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office?
(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code should govern in determining whether the instant complaint states a
cause of action?
(3) Should the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with the rule on certification
against forum shopping?
(4) May petitioner be held liable for damages?
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person
may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks.15 An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office
which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would
virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary
claims without its consent.16 However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in
his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.17
Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where
there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under
Section 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officers act
is characterized by willfulness or negligence. Thus
Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable
for acts done in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of
bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
xxxx
Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. No subordinate officer or employee
shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties.
However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary
18 | P a g e

to law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he acts under orders or
instructions of his superior.
In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,18 that a public officer who
directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or
bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said
public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer
violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action
and that the decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code.
A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any
subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is generally
understood, is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a particular
portion or section of the state only.19
A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should,
accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to both.
The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the other
general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the
special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than
that of a general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular and
specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to construe it in order to
give its words any meaning at all.20
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change
the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a
qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will be
construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary
implication.21
Thus, in City of Manila v. Teotico,22 the Court held that Article 2189 of the Civil Code which
holds provinces, cities, and municipalities civilly liable for death or injuries by reason of
defective conditions of roads and other public works, is a special provision and should prevail
over Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409, the Charter of Manila, in determining the liability for
defective street conditions. Under said Charter, the city shall not be held for damages or injuries
19 | P a g e

arising from the failure of the local officials to enforce the provision of the charter, law, or
ordinance, or from negligence while enforcing or attempting to enforce the same. As explained
by the Court:
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because
Republic Act 409 is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas
the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true
that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special
law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject matter of the
provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule
regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or property
arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any
other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or
other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other
hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making
"provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury
suffered by, any person by reason" specifically "of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence,
in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability
due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the
alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.23
In the case of Bagatsing v. Ramirez,24 the issue was which law should govern the publication of a
tax ordinance, the City Charter of Manila, a special act which treats ordinances in general and
which requires their publication before enactment and after approval, or the Tax Code, a general
law, which deals in particular with "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges,"
and which demands publication only after approval. In holding that it is the Tax Code which
should prevail, the Court elucidated that:
There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act since it
relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it
applies universally to all local governments. Blackstone defines general law as a
universal rule affecting the entire community and special law as one relating to particular
persons or things of a class. And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not
ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other
general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an
exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a
particular case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special
20 | P a g e

statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular.
Th[is] exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e.,
irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax
Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in
particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity
when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other
charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general
provision must give way to a particular provision. Special provision governs.
Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar. Article 32 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
xxxx
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
xxxx
The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code Commission, as
follows:
"DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights, Attorney Cirilo Paredes
proposes that Article 32 be so amended as to make a public official liable for violation of
another persons constitutional rights only if the public official acted maliciously or in
bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this suggestion for these reasons:
"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not
necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite
would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of
individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object
of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United
States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.
21 | P a g e

"Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles introduced in the
New Civil Code to implement democracy. There is no real democracy if a public official
is abusing and we made the article so strong and so comprehensive that it concludes an
abuse of individual rights even if done in good faith, that official is liable. As a matter of
fact, we know that there are very few public officials who openly and definitely abuse the
individual rights of the citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to
enforce the law to comply with ones duty. And so, if we should limit the scope of this
article, that would practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the opening
object of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justified by a plea of good faith,
which is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual rights."25
The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private
individuals civilly liable for violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. It
is not necessary that the defendant under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith,
otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights.
It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.26
Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law.27 A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which
has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another
receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation.28 There are cases in
which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the
mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the
defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine
whether the act was wrongful.29 Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil
motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that
is, liability in tort is not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.30
The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the
nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the
defendant.31 This is a fundamental innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the
Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative powers, then President Corazon C.
Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this constitutional protection on civil liberties.
In Aberca v. Ver,32 it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the principle of
accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and assumes a
larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to
supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the
transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of
the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held
perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the
22 | P a g e

rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be too naive to expect that violators
of human rights would easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should
nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the
persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression, joint tortfeasors.
On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on
the civil liability of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of
their duties. For both superior and subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice,
and negligence are vital elements that will make them liable for damages. Note that while said
provisions deal in particular with the liability of government officials, the subject thereof is
general, i.e., "acts" done in the performance of official duties, without specifying the action or
omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.
Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular
specie of an "act" that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is,
a tort for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals
specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of
public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. While the Civil
Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same
Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress
from a particular class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared
thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising
from errors in the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision
which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek damages for violation of
constitutional rights.
The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering
that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the
failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The
courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right of
the plaintiff.
Anent the issue on non-compliance with the rule against forum shopping, the subsequent
submission of the secretarys certificate authorizing the counsel to sign and execute the
certification against forum shopping cured the defect of respondents complaint. Besides, the
merits of the instant case justify the liberal application of the rules.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 7, 1999 which affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina,
Branch 272, denying petitioners motion to dismiss, is AFFIRMED. The Presiding Judge,
23 | P a g e

Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, is herebyDIRECTED to continue with the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK with dispatch.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, JJ., concur.

DIGEST
FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway
as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured
cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of
55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack. Prior to
effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More
(all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to
the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already
covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule
violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and
the right to equal protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of
action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and
within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic
and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint
states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the
ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or
bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:

24 | P a g e

Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for
acts done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office
o
Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I,
Administrative Code
o

HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person
may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office
which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would
virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary
claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in
his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is
bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39
of the same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officers act is
characterized by willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly
or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under
Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said
public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer
violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a special law,
which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which
has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another
receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in
which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the
mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the
defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that
otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine
whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive,
does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is,
liability in tort in not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
25 | P a g e

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 168512

March 20, 2007

ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under the name and style COMMUNITY
DIAGNOSTIC CENTER and BU CASTRO,1 Petitioners,
vs.
RANIDA D. SALVADOR and RAMON SALVADOR, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the February 27, 2004
Decision3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668 finding petitioner Orlando D.
Garcia liable for gross negligence; and its June 16, 2005 Resolution4 denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration.
On October 1, 1993, respondent Ranida D. Salvador started working as a trainee in the
Accounting Department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc. (the Company). As a
prerequisite for regular employment, she underwent a medical examination at the Community
Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia who is a medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag
(Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test and on October 22, 1993, CDC issued the test
result5 indicating that Ranida was "HBs Ag: Reactive." The result bore the name and signature of
Garcia as examiner and the rubber stamp signature of Castro as pathologist.
When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company physician, the latter
apprised her that the findings indicated that she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease.
26 | P a g e

Thus, based on the medical report6submitted by Sto. Domingo, the Company terminated
Ranidas employment for failing the physical examination.7
When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her ailment, the latter suffered a heart attack
and was confined at the Bataan Doctors Hospital. During Ramons confinement, Ranida
underwent another HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the result8 indicated that she is nonreactive. She informed Sto. Domingo of this development but was told that the test conducted by
CDC was more reliable because it used the Micro-Elisa Method.
Thus, Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory testing, and this time, the Anti-HBs test
conducted on her indicated a "Negative" result.9
Ranida also underwent another HBs Ag test at the Bataan Doctors Hospital using the Micro-Elisa
Method. The result indicated that she was non-reactive.10
Ranida submitted the test results from Bataan Doctors Hospital and CDC to the Executive
Officer of the Company who requested her to undergo another similar test before her reemployment would be considered. Thus, CDC conducted another HBs Ag test on Ranida which
indicated a "Negative" result.11 Ma. Ruby G. Calderon, Med-Tech Officer-in-Charge of CDC,
issued a Certification correcting the initial result and explaining that the examining medical
technologist (Garcia) interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or reactive.12
Thereafter, the Company rehired Ranida.
On July 25, 1994, Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint13 for damages against petitioner Garcia
and a purportedly unknown pathologist of CDC, claiming that, by reason of the erroneous
interpretation of the results of Ranidas examination, she lost her job and suffered serious mental
anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business
opportunities.
On September 26, 1994, respondents amended their complaint14 by naming Castro as the
"unknown pathologist."
Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence and reiterated the scientific
explanation for the "false positive" result of the first HBs Ag test in his December 7, 1993 letter
to the respondents.15
For his part, Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and only when a case was
referred to him; that he did not examine Ranida; and that the test results bore only his rubberstamp signature.
On September 1, 1997,16 the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to
present sufficient evidence to prove the liability of Garcia and Castro. It held that respondents
should have presented Sto. Domingo because he was the one who interpreted the test result
issued by CDC. Likewise, respondents should have presented a medical expert to refute the

27 | P a g e

testimonies of Garcia and Castro regarding the medical explanation behind the conflicting test
results on Ranida.17
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial courts findings, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one
entered ORDERING defendant-appellee Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. to pay plaintiff-appellant Ranida
D. Salvador moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount of P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.18
The appellate court found Garcia liable for damages for negligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag
result. On the other hand, it exonerated Castro for lack of participation in the issuance of the
results.
After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Garcia filed the instant petition.
The main issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision of the
trial court, correctly found petitioner liable for damages to the respondents for issuing an
incorrect HBsAG test result.
Garcia maintains he is not negligent, thus not liable for damages, because he followed the
appropriate laboratory measures and procedures as dictated by his training and experience; and
that he did everything within his professional competence to arrive at an objective, impartial and
impersonal result.
At the outset, we note that the issues raised are factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or
not is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari which
is limited to reviewing errors of law.19
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,20 whereby such
other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is:
did the health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care
provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient;21 if yes, then
he is guilty of negligence.
Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate
causation.
All the elements are present in the case at bar.

28 | P a g e

Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as
rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people by
preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported
clinical laboratories and by improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory
examinations.22 Their business is impressed with public interest, as such, high standards of
performance are expected from them.
In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we found the owner of a furniture shop liable for
the destruction of the plaintiffs house in a fire which started in his establishment in view of his
failure to comply with an ordinance which required the construction of a firewall. In Teague v.
Fernandez, we stated that where the very injury which was intended to be prevented by the
ordinance has happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only an act of negligence,
but also the proximate cause of the death.23
In fine, violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty
to do something, his omission or non-performance will render him liable to whoever may be
injured thereby.
Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4688, otherwise known as The Clinical Laboratory Law,
provides:
Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to be professionally in-charge of a registered clinical
laboratory unless he is a licensed physician duly qualified in laboratory medicine and authorized
by the Secretary of Health, such authorization to be renewed annually.
No license shall be granted or renewed by the Secretary of Health for the operation and
maintenance of a clinical laboratory unless such laboratory is under the administration, direction
and supervision of an authorized physician, as provided for in the preceding paragraph.
Corollarily, Sections 9(9.1)(1), 11 and 25(25.1)(1) of the DOH Administrative Order No. 49-B
Series of 1988, otherwise known as the Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the
Registration, Operation and Maintenance of Clinical Laboratories in the Philippines, read:
Sec. 9. Management of the Clinical Laboratory:
9.1 Head of the Clinical Laboratory: The head is that person who assumes technical and
administrative supervision and control of the activities in the laboratory.
For all categories of clinical laboratories, the head shall be a licensed physician certified by the
Philippine Board of Pathology in either Anatomic or Clinical Pathology or both provided that:
(1) This shall be mandatory for all categories of free-standing clinical laboratories; all tertiary
category hospital laboratories and for all secondary category hospital laboratories located in
areas with sufficient available pathologist.
xxxx
29 | P a g e

Sec. 11. Reporting: All laboratory requests shall be considered as consultations between the
requesting physician and pathologist of the laboratory. As such all laboratory reports on various
examinations of human specimens shall be construed as consultation report and shall bear the
name of the pathologist or his associate. No person in clinical laboratory shall issue a report,
orally or in writing, whole portions thereof without a directive from the pathologist or his
authorized associate and only to the requesting physician or his authorized representative except
in emergencies when the results may be released as authorized by the pathologist.
xxxx
Sec. 25. Violations:
25.1 The license to operate a clinical laboratory may be suspended or revoked by the
Undersecretary of Health for Standards and Regulation upon violation of R.A. 4688 or the rules
and regulations issued in pursuance thereto or the commission of the following acts by the
persons owning or operating a clinical laboratory and the persons under their authority.
(1) Operation of a Clinical Laboratory without a certified pathologist or qualified licensed
physician authorized by the Undersecretary of Health or without employing a registered medical
technologist or a person not registered as a medical technologist in such a position.
And Section 29(b) of R.A. No. 5527, otherwise known as The Philippine Medical Technology
Act of 1969, reads:
Section 29. Penal Provisions.- Without prejudice to the provision of the Medical Act of 1959, as
amended relating to illegal practice of Medicine, the following shall be punished by a fine of not
less than two thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, or imprisonment for not less
than six months nor more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court:
xxxx
(b) Any medical technologist, even if duly registered, who shall practice medical technology in
the Philippines without the necessary supervision of a qualified pathologist or physician
authorized by the Department of Health;
From the foregoing laws and rules, it is clear that a clinical laboratory must be administered,
directed and supervised by a licensed physician authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a
pathologist who is specially trained in methods of laboratory medicine; that the medical
technologist must be under the supervision of the pathologist or a licensed physician; and that the
results of any examination may be released only to the requesting physician or his authorized
representative upon the direction of the laboratory pathologist.
These rules are intended for the protection of the public by preventing performance of
substandard clinical examinations by laboratories whose personnel are not properly supervised.
The public demands no less than an effective and efficient performance of clinical laboratory
examinations through compliance with the quality standards set by laws and regulations.
30 | P a g e

We find that petitioner Garcia failed to comply with these standards.

First, CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by
law, but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist.24 In the License to Open and
Operate a Clinical Laboratory for the years 1993 and 1996 issued by Dr. Juan R. Naagas, M.D.,
Undersecretary for Health Facilities, Standards and Regulation, defendant-appellee Castro was
named as the head of CDC.25 However, in his Answer with Counterclaim, he stated:
3. By way of affirmative and special defenses, defendant pathologist further avers and plead as
follows:
Defendant pathologist is not the owner of the Community Diagnostic Center nor an employee of
the same nor the employer of its employees. Defendant pathologist comes to the Community
Diagnostic Center when and where a problem is referred to him. Its employees are licensed
under the Medical Technology Law (Republic Act No. 5527) and are certified by, and registered
with, the Professional Regulation Commission after having passed their Board Examinations.
They are competent within the sphere of their own profession in so far as conducting laboratory
examinations and are allowed to sign for and in behalf of the clinical laboratory. The defendant
pathologist, and all pathologists in general, are hired by laboratories for purposes of complying
with the rules and regulations and orders issued by the Department of Health through the Bureau
of Research and Laboratories. Defendant pathologist does not stay that long period of time at the
Community Diagnostic Center but only periodically or whenever a case is referred to him by the
laboratory. Defendant pathologist does not appoint or select the employees of the laboratory nor
does he arrange or approve their schedules of duty.26
Castros infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an effective administrative
supervision and control over the activities in the laboratory. "Supervision and control" means the
authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve,
revise or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units.27
Second, Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of
defendant-appellee Castro, who admitted that:
[He] does not know, and has never known or met, the plaintiff-patient even up to this time nor
has he personally examined any specimen, blood, urine or any other tissue, from the plaintiffpatient otherwise his own handwritten signature would have appeared in the result and not
merely stamped as shown in Annex "B" of the Amended Complaint.28
Last, the disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida without the
authorization of defendant-appellee Castro.29
Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences which followed after the release of the
HBsAG test result. However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and
issued for the protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a

31 | P a g e

reasonably prudent health care provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a
breach of duty.
Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcias failure to comply with the
mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for failing the
physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo
several more tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been
scrupulously followed in conducting the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
The foregoing provision provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers
damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision.30 This was
incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers damage because
another has violated some legal provision.31
We find the Court of Appeals award of moral damages reasonable under the circumstances
bearing in mind the mental trauma suffered by respondent Ranida who thought she was afflicted
by Hepatitis B, making her "unfit or unsafe for any type of employment."32 Having established
her right to moral damages, we see no reason to disturb the award of exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. Exemplary damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages,33 and attorneys fees
may be recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded.34
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668 dated February
27, 2004 finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. guilty of gross negligence and liable to pay to
respondents P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00
as attorneys fees, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Asscociate Justice
32 | P a g e

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

DIGEST
Ranida Salvador worked as a trainee in the accounting department of Limay Bulk Handling
Terminal. As a prerequisite for regular employment, she underwent a medical exam at the
Community Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia, a medical technologies conducted the HBs Ag
(Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test and issued the test result indicating that Ranida was HBs Ag:
Reactive. The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as examiner and the rubber stamp
signature of Bu Castro as pathologist.
When Ranida submitted the result to company physician Dr. Sto. Domingo, the latter told her
that the result indicated that she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Based on the the
doctors medical report, the company terminated Ranidas employment for failing the physical
exam.
When she informed her father Ramon, he suffered a heard attack and was confined at Bataan
Doctors Hospital. During her fathers confinement, she had another HBs Ag test at the same
hospital. The result indicated that she is non-reactive. She informed Sto. Domingo but was told
that the test by the CDC was more reliable because it used the Mirco-Elisa Method.

33 | P a g e

She went back to CDC for confirmatory testing and the Anti-HBs test conducted on her had a
Negative result. She also had another test at the hospital using the Micro-Elisa Method and the
result indicated that she was non-reactive.
She submitted both results to the Executive Officer of the company who requested her to
undergo another similar test before her re-employment would be considered. The CDC
conducted another test which indicated a Negative result. The Med-Tech OIC of CDC issued a
certification correcting the initial result and explaining that the examining med tech Garcia
interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or negative.
The company rehired Ranida. She then filed a complaint for damages against Garcia and an
unknown pathologist of CDC. She claimed that because of the erroneous interpretation of the
results of the examination, she lost her job and suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma, sleepless
nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities. In an amended complaint,
she named Castro as the pathologist.
Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence and reiterated the scientific
explanation for the false positive result of the first HBs Ag tests in a letter to the respondents.
Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and only when a case was referred to
him; that he did not examine Ranida; and that the test results bore only his rubber-stamp
signature.
RTC dismissed the complaint because the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to
prove the liability of Garcia and Castro. CA reversed the RTCs ruling and found Garcial liable
for damages for negligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag result. The appellate court exonerated
Castro for lack of participation.
ISSUE:
Whether Castro has been negligent in issuing the test result and thus liable for damages
HELD:
YES.
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is:
did the health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care
provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient; if yes, then
he is guilty of negligence.
Thus, the elements of actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate
causation.
34 | P a g e

All the elements are present in the case at bar.

Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as
rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people by
preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported
clinical laboratories and by improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory
examinations. Their business is impressed with public interest, as such, high standards of
performance are expected from them.
In fine, violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty
to do something, his omission or non-performance will render him liable to whoever may be
injured thereby.
From provisions RA 4688, otherwise known as the The Clinical Laboratory Law, it is clear that a
clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician
authorized by the Sec. of Health, like a pathologist who is specially trained in methods of
laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must be under the supervision of the
pathologist or licensed physician; and that the results of any examination may be released only to
the requesting physician or his authorized representative upon the direction of the laboratory
pathologist.
These rules are intended for the protection of the public by preventing performance of
substandard clinical examinations by laboratories whose personnel are not properly supervised.
The public demands no less than an effective and efficient performance of clinical laboratory
examinations through compliance with the quality standards set by laws and regulations.
We find that petitioner Garcia failed to comply with these standards.
First: CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by
law.
Second: Garcia conducted the HBs Ag test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of
defendant-appellee Castro.
Third: The HBs Ag test result was released to Ranida without the authorization of defendantappellee Castro.
Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequence which followed after the release of the
test result. However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued for the
protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably prudent
health care provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcias failure to comply with the
mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for failing the
physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo
several more tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been
scrupulously followed in conducting the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.

35 | P a g e

Art. 20, NCC provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage
whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision. This was incorporated by the
Code Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers damages because another has
violated some legal provision.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 178763

April 21, 2009

PETER PAUL PATRICK LUCAS, FATIMA GLADYS LUCAS, ABBEYGAIL LUCAS

AND GILLIAN LUCAS,Petitioners,
vs.
DR. PROSPERO MA. C. TUAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioners
Peter Paul Patrick Lucas, Fatima Gladys Lucas, Abbeygail Lucas and Gillian Lucas seek the
reversal of the 27 September 2006 Decision2 and 3 July 2007 Resolution,3 both of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68666, entitled "Peter Paul Patrick Lucas, Fatima Gladys Lucas,
Abbeygail Lucas and Gillian Lucas v. Prospero Ma. C. Tuao."
In the questioned decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 14 July 2000
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150, Makati City, dismissing the complaint
filed by petitioners in a civil case entitled, "Peter Paul Patrick Lucas, Fatima Gladys Lucas,
Abbeygail Lucas and Gillian Lucas v. Prospero Ma. C. Tuao," docketed as Civil Case No. 922482.

36 | P a g e

From the record of the case, the established factual antecedents of the present petition are:
Sometime in August 1988, petitioner Peter Paul Patrick Lucas (Peter) contracted "sore eyes" in
his right eye.
On 2 September 1988, complaining of a red right eye and swollen eyelid, Peter made use of his
health care insurance issued by Philamcare Health Systems, Inc. (Philamcare), for a possible
consult. The Philamcare Coordinator, Dr. Edwin Oca, M.D., referred Peter to respondent, Dr.
Prospero Ma. C. Tuao, M.D. (Dr. Tuao), an ophthalmologist at St. Lukes Medical Center, for
an eye consult.
Upon consultation with Dr. Tuao, Peter narrated that it had been nine (9) days since the problem
with his right eye began; and that he was already taking Maxitrol to address the problem in his
eye. According to Dr. Tuao, he performed "ocular routine examination" on Peters eyes,
wherein: (1) a gross examination of Peters eyes and their surrounding area was made; (2) Peters
visual acuity were taken; (3) Peters eyes were palpated to check the intraocular pressure of each;
(4) the motility of Peters eyes was observed; and (5) the ophthalmoscopy4 on Peters eyes was
used. On that particular consultation, Dr. Tuao diagnosed that Peter was suffering from
conjunctivitis5 or "sore eyes." Dr. Tuao then prescribed Spersacet-C6 eye drops for Peter and
told the latter to return for follow-up after one week.
As instructed, Peter went back to Dr. Tuao on 9 September 1988. Upon examination, Dr. Tuao
told Peter that the "sore eyes" in the latters right eye had already cleared up and he could
discontinue the Spersacet-C. However, the same eye developed Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis
(EKC),7 a viral infection. To address the new problem with Peters right eye, Dr. Tuao
prescribed to the former a steroid-based eye drop called Maxitrol,8 a dosage of six (6) drops per
day.9 To recall, Peter had already been using Maxitrol prior to his consult with Dr. Tuao.
On 21 September 1988, Peter saw Dr. Tuao for a follow-up consultation. After examining both
of Peters eyes, Dr. Tuao instructed the former to taper down10 the dosage of Maxitrol, because
the EKC in his right eye had already resolved. Dr. Tuao specifically cautioned Peter that, being
a steroid, Maxitrol had to be withdrawn gradually; otherwise, the EKC might recur.11
Complaining of feeling as if there was something in his eyes, Peter returned to Dr. Tuao for
another check-up on 6 October 1988. Dr. Tuao examined Peters eyes and found that the right
eye had once more developed EKC. So, Dr. Tuao instructed Peter to resume the use of Maxitrol
at six (6) drops per day.
On his way home, Peter was unable to get a hold of Maxitrol, as it was out of stock.
Consequently, Peter was told by Dr. Tuano to take, instead, Blephamide12 another steroid-based
medication, but with a lower concentration, as substitute for the unavailable Maxitrol, to be used
three (3) times a day for five (5) days; two (2) times a day for five (5) days; and then just once a
day.13
Several days later, on 18 October 1988, Peter went to see Dr. Tuao at his clinic, alleging severe
eye pain, feeling as if his eyes were about to "pop-out," a headache and blurred vision. Dr. Tuao
37 | P a g e

examined Peters eyes and discovered that the EKC was again present in his right eye. As a
result, Dr. Tuao told Peter to resume the maximum dosage of Blephamide.
Dr. Tuao saw Peter once more at the formers clinic on 4 November 1988. Dr. Tuaos
examination showed that only the periphery of Peters right eye was positive for EKC; hence, Dr.
Tuao prescribed a lower dosage of Blephamide.
It was also about this time that Fatima Gladys Lucas (Fatima), Peters spouse, read the
accompanying literature of Maxitrol and found therein the following warning against the
prolonged use of such steroids:
WARNING:
Prolonged use may result in glaucoma, with damage to the optic nerve, defects in visual acuity
and fields of vision, and posterior, subcapsular cataract formation. Prolonged use may suppress
the host response and thus increase the hazard of secondary ocular infractions, in those diseases
causing thinning of the cornea or sclera, perforations have been known to occur with the use of
topical steroids. In acute purulent conditions of the eye, steroids may mask infection or enhance
existing infection. If these products are used for 10 days or longer, intraocular pressure should be
routinely monitored even though it may be difficult in children and uncooperative patients.
Employment of steroid medication in the treatment of herpes simplex requires great caution.
xxxx
ADVERSE REACTIONS:
Adverse reactions have occurred with steroid/anti-infective combination drugs which can be
attributed to the steroid component, the anti-infective component, or the combination. Exact
incidence figures are not available since no denominator of treated patients is available.
Reactions occurring most often from the presence of the anti-infective ingredients are allergic
sensitizations. The reactions due to the steroid component in decreasing order to frequency are
elevation of intra-ocular pressure (IOP) with possible development of glaucoma, infrequent optic
nerve damage; posterior subcapsular cataract formation; and delayed wound healing.
Secondary infection: The development of secondary has occurred after use of combination
containing steroids and antimicrobials. Fungal infections of the correa are particularly prone to
develop coincidentally with long-term applications of steroid. The possibility of fungal invasion
must be considered in any persistent corneal ulceration where steroid treatment has been used.
Secondary bacterial ocular infection following suppression of host responses also occurs.
On 26 November 1988, Peter returned to Dr. Tuaos clinic, complaining of "feeling worse."14 It
appeared that the EKC had spread to the whole of Peters right eye yet again. Thus, Dr. Tuao
instructed Peter to resume the use of Maxitrol. Petitioners averred that Peter already made
38 | P a g e

mention to Dr. Tuao during said visit of the above-quoted warning against the prolonged use of
steroids, but Dr. Tuao supposedly brushed aside Peters concern as mere paranoia, even
assuring him that the former was taking care of him (Peter).
Petitioners further alleged that after Peters 26 November 1988 visit to Dr. Tuao, Peter
continued to suffer pain in his right eye, which seemed to "progress," with the ache intensifying
and becoming more frequent.
Upon waking in the morning of 13 December 1988, Peter had no vision in his right eye. Fatima
observed that Peters right eye appeared to be bloody and swollen.15 Thus, spouses Peter and
Fatima rushed to the clinic of Dr. Tuao. Peter reported to Dr. Tuao that he had been suffering
from constant headache in the afternoon and blurring of vision.
Upon examination, Dr. Tuao noted the hardness of Peters right eye. With the use of a
tonometer16 to verify the exact intraocular pressure17 (IOP) of Peters eyes, Dr. Tuao discovered
that the tension in Peters right eye was39.0 Hg, while that of his left was 17.0 Hg.18 Since the
tension in Peters right eye was way over the normal IOP, which merely ranged from 10.0 Hg
to 21.0 Hg,19 Dr. Tuao ordered20 him to immediately discontinue the use of Maxitrol and
prescribed to the latter Diamox21 and Normoglaucon, instead.22 Dr. Tuao also required Peter to
go for daily check-up in order for the former to closely monitor the pressure of the latters eyes.
On 15 December 1988, the tonometer reading of Peters right eye yielded a high normal
level, i.e., 21.0 Hg. Hence, Dr. Tuao told Peter to continue using Diamox and Normoglaucon.
But upon Peters complaint of "stomach pains and tingling sensation in his fingers,"23 Dr. Tuao
discontinued Peters use of Diamox.24
Peter went to see another ophthalmologist, Dr. Ramon T. Batungbacal (Dr. Batungbacal), on 21
December 1988, who allegedly conducted a complete ophthalmological examination of Peters
eyes. Dr. Batungbacals diagnosis was Glaucoma25 O.D.26 He recommended Laser
Trabeculoplasty27 for Peters right eye.
When Peter returned to Dr. Tuao on 23 December 1988,28 the tonometer measured the IOP of
Peters right eye to be 41.0 Hg,29 again, way above normal. Dr. Tuao addressed the problem by
advising Peter to resume taking Diamox along with Normoglaucon.
During the Christmas holidays, Peter supposedly stayed in bed most of the time and was not able
to celebrate the season with his family because of the debilitating effects of Diamox.30
On 28 December 1988, during one of Peters regular follow-ups with Dr. Tuao, the doctor
conducted another ocular routine examination of Peters eyes. Dr. Tuao noted the recurrence of
EKC in Peters right eye. Considering, however, that the IOP of Peters right eye was still quite
high at 41.0 Hg, Dr. Tuao was at a loss as to how to balance the treatment of Peters EKC vis-vis the presence of glaucoma in the same eye. Dr. Tuao, thus, referred Peter to Dr. Manuel B.
Agulto, M.D. (Dr. Agulto), another ophthalmologist specializing in the treatment of
glaucoma.31 Dr. Tuaos letter of referral to Dr. Agulto stated that:

39 | P a g e

Referring to you Mr. Peter Lucas for evaluation & possible management. I initially saw him
Sept. 2, 1988 because of conjunctivitis. The latter resolved and he developed EKC for which I
gave Maxitrol. The EKC was recurrent after stopping steroid drops. Around 1 month of steroid
treatment, he noted blurring of vision & pain on the R. however, I continued the steroids for the
sake of the EKC. A month ago, I noted iris atrophy, so I took the IOP and it was definitely
elevated. I stopped the steroids immediately and has (sic) been treating him medically.
It seems that the IOP can be controlled only with oral Diamox, and at the moment, the EKC has
recurred and Im in a fix whether to resume the steroid or not considering that the IOP is still
uncontrolled.32
On 29 December 1988, Peter went to see Dr. Agulto at the latters clinic. Several tests were
conducted thereat to evaluate the extent of Peters condition. Dr. Agulto wrote Dr. Tuao a letter
containing the following findings and recommendations:
Thanks for sending Peter Lucas. On examination conducted vision was 20/25 R and 20/20L.
Tension curve 19 R and 15 L at 1210 H while on Normoglaucon BID OD & Diamox tab every
6h po.
Slit lamp evaluation33 disclosed subepithelial corneal defect outer OD. There was circumferential
peripheral iris atrophy, OD. The lenses were clear.
Funduscopy34 showed vertical cup disc of 0.85 R and 0.6 L with temporal slope R>L.
Zeiss gonioscopy35 revealed basically open angles both eyes with occasional PAS,36 OD.
Rolly, I feel that Peter Lucas has really sustained significant glaucoma damage. I suggest that we
do a baseline visual fields and push medication to lowest possible levels. If I may suggest
further, I think we should prescribe Timolol37 BID38 OD in lieu of Normoglaucon. If the IOP is
still inadequate, we may try Depifrin39 BID OD (despite low PAS). Im in favor of retaining
Diamox or similar CAI.40
If fields show further loss in say 3 mos. then we should consider trabeculoplasty.
I trust that this approach will prove reasonable for you and Peter.41
Peter went to see Dr. Tuao on 31 December 1988, bearing Dr. Agultos aforementioned letter.
Though Peters right and left eyes then had normal IOP of 21.0 Hg and 17.0 Hg, respectively, Dr.
Tuao still gave him a prescription for Timolol B.I.D. so Peter could immediately start using said
medication. Regrettably, Timolol B.I.D. was out of stock, so Dr. Tuao instructed Peter to just
continue using Diamox and Normoglaucon in the meantime.
Just two days later, on 2 January 1989, the IOP of Peters right eye remained elevated at 21.0
Hg,42 as he had been without Diamox for the past three (3) days.

40 | P a g e

On 4 January 1989, Dr. Tuao conducted a visual field study43 of Peters eyes, which revealed
that the latter had tubular vision44 in his right eye, while that of his left eye remained normal. Dr.
Tuao directed Peter to religiously use the Diamox and Normoglaucon, as the tension of the
latters right eye went up even further to 41.0 Hg in just a matter of two (2) days, in the
meantime that Timolol B.I.D. and Depifrin were still not available in the market. Again, Dr.
Tuao advised Peter to come for regular check-up so his IOP could be monitored.
Obediently, Peter went to see Dr. Tuao on the 7th, 13th, 16th and 20th of January 1989 for
check-up and IOP monitoring.
In the interregnum, however, Peter was prodded by his friends to seek a second medical opinion.
On 13 January 1989, Peter consulted Dr. Jaime Lapuz, M.D. (Dr. Lapuz), an ophthalmologist,
who, in turn, referred Peter to Dr. Mario V. Aquino, M.D. (Dr. Aquino), another ophthalmologist
who specializes in the treatment of glaucoma and who could undertake the long term care of
Peters eyes.
According to petitioners, after Dr. Aquino conducted an extensive evaluation of Peters eyes, the
said doctor informed Peter that his eyes were relatively normal, though the right one sometimes
manifested maximum borderline tension. Dr. Aquino also confirmed Dr. Tuaos diagnosis of
tubular vision in Peters right eye. Petitioners claimed that Dr. Aquino essentially told Peter that
the latters condition would require lifetime medication and follow-ups.
In May 1990 and June 1991, Peter underwent two (2) procedures of laser trabeculoplasty to
attempt to control the high IOP of his right eye.
Claiming to have steroid-induced glaucoma45 and blaming Dr. Tuao for the same, Peter, joined
by: (1) Fatima, his spouse46; (2) Abbeygail, his natural child47; and (3) Gillian, his legitimate
child48 with Fatima, instituted on 1 September 1992, a civil complaint for damages against Dr.
Tuao, before the RTC, Branch 150, Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 922482.
In their Complaint, petitioners specifically averred that as the "direct consequence of [Peters]
prolonged use of Maxitrol, [he] suffered from steroid induced glaucoma which caused the
elevation of his intra-ocular pressure. The elevation of the intra-ocular pressure of [Peters right
eye] caused the impairment of his vision which impairment is not curable and may even lead to
total blindness."49
Petitioners additionally alleged that the visual impairment of Peters right eye caused him and his
family so much grief. Because of his present condition, Peter now needed close medical
supervision forever; he had already undergone two (2) laser surgeries, with the possibility that
more surgeries were still needed in the future; his career in sports casting had suffered and was
continuing to suffer;50 his anticipated income had been greatly reduced as a result of his "limited"
capacity; he continually suffered from "headaches, nausea, dizziness, heart palpitations, rashes,
chronic rhinitis, sinusitis,"51 etc.; Peters relationships with his spouse and children continued to
be strained, as his condition made him highly irritable and sensitive; his mobility and social life
had suffered; his spouse, Fatima, became the breadwinner in the family;52 and his two children
41 | P a g e

had been deprived of the opportunity for a better life and educational prospects. Collectively,
petitioners lived in constant fear of Peter becoming completely blind.53
In the end, petitioners sought pecuniary award for their supposed pain and suffering, which were
ultimately brought about by Dr. Tuaos grossly negligent conduct in prescribing to Peter the
medicine Maxitrol for a period of three (3) months, without monitoring Peters IOP, as required
in cases of prolonged use of said medicine, and notwithstanding Peters constant complaint of
intense eye pain while using the same. Petitioners particularly prayed that Dr. Tuao be adjudged
liable for the following amounts:
1. The amount of P2,000,000.00 to plaintiff Peter Lucas as and by way of compensation
for his impaired vision.
2. The amount of P300,000.00 to spouses Lucas as and by way of actual damages plus
such additional amounts that may be proven during trial.
3. The amount of P1,000,000.00 as and by way of moral damages.
4. The amount of P500,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages.
5. The amount of P200,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees plus costs of suit.54
In rebutting petitioners complaint, Dr. Tuao asserted that the "treatment made by [him] more
than three years ago has no causal connection to [Peters] present glaucoma or condition."55 Dr.
Tuao explained that "[d]rug-induced glaucoma is temporary and curable, steroids have the side
effect of increasing intraocular pressure. Steroids are prescribed to treat Epidemic Kerato
Conjunctivitis or EKC which is an infiltration of the cornea as a result of conjunctivitis or sore
eyes."56 Dr. Tuao also clarified that (1) "[c]ontrary to [petitioners] fallacious claim, [he] did
NOT continually prescribe the drug Maxitrol which contained steroids for any prolonged
period"57 and "[t]he truth was the Maxitrol was discontinued x x x as soon as EKC disappeared
and was resumed only when EKC reappeared"58; (2) the entire time he was treating Peter, he
"continually monitored the intraocular pressure of [Peters eyes] by palpating the eyes and by
putting pressure on the eyeballs," and no hardening of the same could be detected, which meant
that there was no increase in the tension or IOP, a possible side reaction to the use of steroid
medications; and (3) it was only on 13 December 1988 that Peter complained of a headache and
blurred vision in his right eye, and upon measuring the IOP of said eye, it was determined for the
first time that the IOP of the right eye had an elevated value.
But granting for the sake of argument that the "steroid treatment of [Peters] EKC caused the
steroid induced glaucoma,"59 Dr. Tuao argued that:
[S]uch condition, i.e., elevated intraocular pressure, is temporary. As soon as the intake of
steroids is discontinued, the intraocular pressure automatically is reduced. Thus, [Peters]
glaucoma can only be due to other causes not attributable to steroids, certainly not attributable to
[his] treatment of more than three years ago x x x.

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From a medical point of view, as revealed by more current examination of [Peter], the latters
glaucoma can only be long standing glaucoma, open angle glaucoma, because of the large C:D
ratio. The steroids provoked the latest glaucoma to be revealed earlier as [Peter] remained
asymptomatic prior to steroid application. Hence, the steroid treatment was in fact beneficial to
[Peter] as it revealed the incipient open angle glaucoma of [Peter] to allow earlier treatment of
the same.60
In a Decision dated 14 July 2000, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 92-2482 "for insufficiency
of evidence."61The decretal part of said Decision reads:
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant complaint is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The counter claim (sic) is likewise dismissed in the absence of bad faith or malice on the part of
plaintiff in filing the suit.62
The RTC opined that petitioners failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that Dr. Tuao
was negligent in his treatment of Peters condition. In particular, the record of the case was bereft
of any evidence to establish that the steroid medication and its dosage, as prescribed by Dr.
Tuao, caused Peters glaucoma. The trial court reasoned that the "recognized standards of the
medical community has not been established in this case, much less has causation been
established to render [Tuao] liable."63 According to the RTC:
[Petitioners] failed to establish the duty required of a medical practitioner against which Peter
Pauls treatment by defendant can be compared with. They did not present any medical expert or
even a medical doctor to convince and expertly explain to the court the established norm or duty
required of a physician treating a patient, or whether the non taking (sic) by Dr. Tuao of Peter
Pauls pressure a deviation from the norm or his non-discovery of the glaucoma in the course of
treatment constitutes negligence. It is important and indispensable to establish such a standard
because once it is established, a medical practitioner who departed thereof breaches his duty and
commits negligence rendering him liable. Without such testimony or enlightenment from an
expert, the court is at a loss as to what is then the established norm of duty of a physician against
which defendants conduct can be compared with to determine negligence.64
The RTC added that in the absence of "any medical evidence to the contrary, this court cannot
accept [petitioners] claim that the use of steroid is the proximate cause of the damage sustained
by [Peters] eye."65
Correspondingly, the RTC accepted Dr. Tuaos medical opinion that "Peter Paul must have been
suffering from normal tension glaucoma, meaning, optic nerve damage was happening but no
elevation of the eye pressure is manifested, that the steroid treatment actually unmasked the
condition that resulted in the earlier treatment of the glaucoma. There is nothing in the record to
contradict such testimony. In fact, plaintiffs Exhibit S even tends to support them."
Undaunted, petitioners appealed the foregoing RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. Their
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 68666.

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On 27 September 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 68666
denying petitioners recourse and affirming the appealed RTC Decision. The fallo of the
judgment of the appellate court states:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.66
The Court of Appeals faulted petitioners because they
[D]id not present any medical expert to testify that Dr. Tuanos prescription of Maxitrol and
Blephamide for the treatment of EKC on Peters right eye was not proper and that his palpation
of Peters right eye was not enough to detect adverse reaction to steroid. Peter testified that Dr.
Manuel Agulto told him that he should not have used steroid for the treatment of EKC or that he
should have used it only for two (2) weeks, as EKC is only a viral infection which will cure by
itself. However, Dr. Agulto was not presented by [petitioners] as a witness to confirm what he
allegedly told Peter and, therefore, the latters testimony is hearsay. Under Rule 130, Section 36
of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own
personal knowledge, x x x. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is
inadmissible as evidence.67
Like the RTC, the Court of Appeals gave great weight to Dr. Tuaos medical judgment,
specifically the latters explanation that:
[W]hen a doctor sees a patient, he cannot determine whether or not the latter would react
adversely to the use of steroids, that it was only on December 13, 1989, when Peter complained
for the first time of headache and blurred vision that he observed that the pressure of the eye of
Peter was elevated, and it was only then that he suspected that Peter belongs to the 5% of the
population who reacts adversely to steroids.68
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated 3 July 2007.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
premised on the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS COMPLAINT
FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENT ON THE GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE;
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING
THE PETITIONERS COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENT ON
THE GROUND THAT NO MEDICAL EXPERT WAS PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONERS
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TO PROVE THEIR CLAIM FOR MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AGAINST THE RESPONDENT;

AND
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT
FINDING THE RESPONDENT LIABLE TO THE PETITIONERS FOR ACTUAL, MORAL
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, ASIDE FROM ATTORNEYS FEES, COSTS OF SUIT, AS
A RESULT OF HIS GROSS NEGLIGENCE.69
A reading of the afore-quoted reversible errors supposedly committed by the Court of Appeals in
its Decision and Resolution would reveal that petitioners are fundamentally assailing the finding
of the Court of Appeals that the evidence on record is insufficient to establish petitioners
entitlement to any kind of damage. Therefore, it could be said that the sole issue for our
resolution in the Petition at bar is whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in
affirming the judgment of the RTC that petitioners failed to prove, by preponderance of
evidence, their claim for damages against Dr. Tuao.
Evidently, said issue constitutes a question of fact, as we are asked to revisit anew the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals, as well as of the RTC. In effect, petitioners would have us sift
through the evidence on record and pass upon whether there is sufficient basis to establish Dr.
Tuaos negligence in his treatment of Peters eye condition. This question clearly involves a
factual inquiry, the determination of which is not within the ambit of this Courts power of
review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules Civil Procedure, as amended.70
Elementary is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts; only errors of law are generally
reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari criticizing decisions of the Court of Appeals.
Questions of fact are not entertained.71
Nonetheless, the general rule that only questions of law may be raised on appeal in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court admits of certain exceptions, including the
circumstance when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence, but is contradicted by the evidence on record. Although petitioners may not
explicitly invoke said exception, it may be gleaned from their allegations and arguments in the
instant Petition.1avvphi1.zw+
Petitioners contend, that "[c]ontrary to the findings of the Honorable Court of Appeals, [they]
were more than able to establish that: Dr. Tuao ignored the standard medical procedure for
ophthalmologists, administered medication with recklessness, and exhibited an absence of
competence and skills expected from him."72Petitioners reject the necessity of presenting expert
and/or medical testimony to establish (1) the standard of care respecting the treatment of the
disorder affecting Peters eye; and (2) whether or not negligence attended Dr. Tuaos treatment
of Peter, because, in their words
That Dr. Tuao was grossly negligent in the treatment of Peters simple eye ailment is a simple
case of cause and effect. With mere documentary evidence and based on the facts presented by
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the petitioners, respondent can readily be held liable for damages even without any expert
testimony. In any case, however, and contrary to the finding of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, there was a medical expert presented by the petitioner showing the recklessness
committed by [Dr. Tuao] Dr. Tuao himself. [Emphasis supplied.]
They insist that Dr. Tuao himself gave sufficient evidence to establish his gross negligence that
ultimately caused the impairment of the vision of Peters right eye,73 i.e., that "[d]espite [Dr.
Tuaos] knowledge that 5% of the population reacts adversely to Maxitrol, [he] had no qualms
whatsoever in prescribing said steroid to Peter without first determining whether or not the (sic)
Peter belongs to the 5%."74
We are not convinced. The judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the RTC are in accord
with the evidence on record, and we are accordingly bound by the findings of fact made therein.
Petitioners position, in sum, is that Peters glaucoma is the direct result of Dr. Tuaos
negligence in his improper administration of the drug Maxitrol; "thus, [the latter] should be liable
for all the damages suffered and to be suffered by [petitioners]."75 Clearly, the present
controversy is a classic illustration of a medical negligence case against a physician based on the
latters professional negligence. In this type of suit, the patient or his heirs, in order to prevail, is
required to prove by preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree
of skill, care, and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession; and that as a
proximate result of such failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages.
For lack of a specific law geared towards the type of negligence committed by members of the
medical profession, such claim for damages is almost always anchored on the alleged violation
of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which states that:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist a physician-patient
relationship between the doctor and the victim. But just like any other proceeding for damages,
four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate
causation,76 must be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements must co-exist in order
to find the physician negligent and, thus, liable for damages.
When a patient engages the services of a physician, a physician-patient relationship is generated.
And in accepting a case, the physician, for all intents and purposes, represents that he has the
needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field; and
that he will employ such training, care, and skill in the treatment of the patient.77 Thus, in treating
his patient, a physician is under a duty to [the former] to exercise that degree of care, skill and
diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of
practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases.78 Stated otherwise, the physician has the

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duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent physician would
use to treat the condition under similar circumstances.
This standard level of care, skill and diligence is a matter best addressed by expert medical
testimony, because the standard of care in a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly
within the knowledge of experts in the field.79
There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such duty, by
the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health [and this] constitutes the
actionable malpractice.80 Proof of such breach must likewise rest upon the testimony of an expert
witness that the treatment accorded to the patient failed to meet the standard level of care, skill
and diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of
practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases.
Even so, proof of breach of duty on the part of the attending physician is insufficient, for there
must be a causal connection between said breach and the resulting injury sustained by the
patient. Put in another way, in order that there may be a recovery for an injury, it must be shown
that the "injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes";81 that is, the negligence must be
the proximate cause of the injury. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.82
Just as with the elements of duty and breach of the same, in order to establish the proximate
cause [of the injury] by a preponderance of the evidence in a medical malpractice action, [the
patient] must similarly use expert testimony, because the question of whether the alleged
professional negligence caused [the patients] injury is generally one for specialized expert
knowledge beyond the ken of the average layperson; using the specialized knowledge and
training of his field, the experts role is to present to the [court] a realistic assessment of the
likelihood that [the physicians] alleged negligence caused [the patients] injury.83
From the foregoing, it is apparent that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of
expert witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of
practice as defendant physician or surgeon. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of
qualified physicians [or surgeons] stems from the formers realization that the latter possess
unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently
evaluating;84 hence, the indispensability of expert testimonies.
In the case at bar, there is no question that a physician-patient relationship developed between
Dr. Tuao and Peter when Peter went to see the doctor on 2 September 1988, seeking a consult
for the treatment of his sore eyes. Admittedly, Dr. Tuao, an ophthalmologist, prescribed
Maxitrol when Peter developed and had recurrent EKC. Maxitrol or neomycin/polymyxin B
sulfates/dexamethasone ophthalmic ointment is a multiple-dose anti-infective steroid
combination in sterile form for topical application.85 It is the drug which petitioners claim to have
caused Peters glaucoma.
47 | P a g e

However, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, "[t]he onus probandi was on the
patient to establish before the trial court that the physicians ignored standard medical procedure,
prescribed and administered medication with recklessness and exhibited an absence of the
competence and skills expected of general practitioners similarly situated."86 Unfortunately, in
this case, there was absolute failure on the part of petitioners to present any expert testimony to
establish: (1) the standard of care to be implemented by competent physicians in treating the
same condition as Peters under similar circumstances; (2) that, in his treatment of Peter, Dr.
Tuao failed in his duty to exercise said standard of care that any other competent physician
would use in treating the same condition as Peters under similar circumstances; and (3) that the
injury or damage to Peters right eye, i.e., his glaucoma, was the result of his use of Maxitrol, as
prescribed by Dr. Tuao. Petitioners failure to prove the first element alone is already fatal to
their cause.
Petitioners maintain that Dr. Tuao failed to follow in Peters case the required procedure for the
prolonged use of Maxitrol. But what is actually the required procedure in situations such as in
the case at bar? To be precise, what is the standard operating procedure when ophthalmologists
prescribe steroid medications which, admittedly, carry some modicum of risk?
Absent a definitive standard of care or diligence required of Dr. Tuao under the circumstances,
we have no means to determine whether he was able to comply with the same in his diagnosis
and treatment of Peter. This Court has no yardstick upon which to evaluate or weigh the
attendant facts of this case to be able to state with confidence that the acts complained of, indeed,
constituted negligence and, thus, should be the subject of pecuniary reparation.
Petitioners assert that prior to prescribing Maxitrol, Dr. Tuao should have determined first
whether Peter was a "steroid responder."87 Yet again, petitioners did not present any convincing
proof that such determination is actually part of the standard operating procedure which
ophthalmologists should unerringly follow prior to prescribing steroid medications.
In contrast, Dr. Tuao was able to clearly explain that what is only required of ophthalmologists,
in cases such as Peters, is the conduct of standard tests/procedures known as "ocular routine
examination,"88 composed of five (5) tests/procedures specifically, gross examination of the
eyes and the surrounding area; taking of the visual acuity of the patient; checking the intraocular
pressure of the patient; checking the motility of the eyes; and using ophthalmoscopy on the
patients eye and he did all those tests/procedures every time Peter went to see him for followup consultation and/or check-up.
We cannot but agree with Dr. Tuaos assertion that when a doctor sees a patient, he cannot
determine immediately whether the latter would react adversely to the use of steroids; all the
doctor can do is map out a course of treatment recognized as correct by the standards of the
medical profession. It must be remembered that a physician is not an insurer of the good result of
treatment. The mere fact that the patient does not get well or that a bad result occurs does not in
itself indicate failure to exercise due care.89 The result is not determinative of the performance
[of the physician] and he is not required to be infallible.90

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Moreover, that Dr. Tuao saw it fit to prescribe Maxitrol to Peter was justified by the fact that the
latter was already using the same medication when he first came to see Dr. Tuao on 2
September 1988 and had exhibited no previous untoward reaction to that particular drug. 91
Also, Dr. Tuao categorically denied petitioners claim that he never monitored the tension of
Peters eyes while the latter was on Maxitrol. Dr. Tuao testified that he palpated Peters eyes
every time the latter came for a check-up as part of the doctors ocular routine examination, a
fact which petitioners failed to rebut. Dr. Tuaos regular conduct of examinations and tests to
ascertain the state of Peters eyes negate the very basis of petitioners complaint for damages. As
to whether Dr. Tuaos actuations conformed to the standard of care and diligence required in
like circumstances, it is presumed to have so conformed in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.
Even if we are to assume that Dr. Tuao committed negligent acts in his treatment of Peters
condition, the causal connection between Dr. Tuaos supposed negligence and Peters injury
still needed to be established. The critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is
proof of the causal connection between the negligence which the evidence established and the
plaintiffs injuries.92 The plaintiff must plead and prove not only that he has been injured and
defendant has been at fault, but also that the defendants fault caused the injury. A verdict in a
malpractice action cannot be based on speculation or conjecture. Causation must be proven
within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.93
The causation between the physicians negligence and the patients injury may only be
established by the presentation of proof that Peters glaucoma would not have occurred but for
Dr. Tuaos supposed negligent conduct. Once more, petitioners failed in this regard.
Dr. Tuao does not deny that the use of Maxitrol involves the risk of increasing a patients IOP.
In fact, this was the reason why he made it a point to palpate Peters eyes every time the latter
went to see him -- so he could monitor the tension of Peters eyes. But to say that said
medication conclusively caused Peters glaucoma is purely speculative. Peter was diagnosed
with open-angle glaucoma. This kind of glaucoma is characterized by an almost complete
absence of symptoms and a chronic, insidious course.94 In open-angle glaucoma, halos around
lights and blurring of vision do not occur unless there has been a sudden increase in the
intraocular vision.95Visual acuity remains good until late in the course of the disease.96 Hence, Dr.
Tuao claims that Peters glaucoma "can only be long standing x x x because of the large
C:D97 ratio," and that "[t]he steroids provoked the latest glaucoma to be revealed earlier" was a
blessing in disguise "as [Peter] remained asymptomatic prior to steroid application."
Who between petitioners and Dr. Tuao is in a better position to determine and evaluate the
necessity of using Maxitrol to cure Peters EKC vis--vis the attendant risks of using the same?
That Dr. Tuao has the necessary training and skill to practice his chosen field is beyond cavil.
Petitioners do not dispute Dr. Tuaos qualifications that he has been a physician for close to a
decade and a half at the time Peter first came to see him; that he has had various medical
training; that he has authored numerous papers in the field of ophthalmology, here and abroad;
that he is a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Ophthalmology; that he occupies various
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teaching posts (at the time of the filing of the present complaint, he was the Chair of the
Department of Ophthalmology and an Associate Professor at the University of the PhilippinesPhilippine General Hospital and St. Lukes Medical Center, respectively); and that he held an
assortment of positions in numerous medical organizations like the Philippine Medical
Association, Philippine Academy of Ophthalmology, Philippine Board of Ophthalmology,
Philippine Society of Ophthalmic Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, Philippine Journal of
Ophthalmology, Association of Philippine Ophthalmology Professors, et al.
It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant
case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases, he takes the necessary precaution
and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is
sufficiently established.98 In making the judgment call of treating Peters EKC with Maxitrol, Dr.
Tuao took the necessary precaution by palpating Peters eyes to monitor their IOP every time
the latter went for a check-up, and he employed the best of his knowledge and skill earned from
years of training and practice.
In contrast, without supporting expert medical opinions, petitioners bare assertions of negligence
on Dr. Tuaos part, which resulted in Peters glaucoma, deserve scant credit.
Our disposition of the present controversy might have been vastly different had petitioners
presented a medical expert to establish their theory respecting Dr. Tuaos so-called negligence.
In fact, the record of the case reveals that petitioners counsel recognized the necessity of
presenting such evidence. Petitioners even gave an undertaking to the RTC judge that Dr. Agulto
or Dr. Aquino would be presented. Alas, no follow-through on said undertaking was
made.1avvphi1
The plaintiff in a civil case has the burden of proof as he alleges the affirmative of the issue.
However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his
favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie
case; otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff.99 The party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.100 The concept of "preponderance
of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is
offered in opposition to it;101 in the last analysis, it means probability of truth. It is evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.102 Rule 133, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the guidelines for
determining preponderance of evidence, thus:
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the
number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

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Herein, the burden of proof was clearly upon petitioners, as plaintiffs in the lower court, to
establish their case by a preponderance of evidence showing a reasonable connection between
Dr. Tuaos alleged breach of duty and the damage sustained by Peters right eye. This, they did
not do. In reality, petitioners complaint for damages is merely anchored on a statement in the
literature of Maxitrol identifying the risks of its use, and the purported comment of Dr. Agulto
another doctor not presented as witness before the RTC concerning the prolonged use of
Maxitrol for the treatment of EKC.
It seems basic that what constitutes proper medical treatment is a medical question that should
have been presented to experts. If no standard is established through expert medical witnesses,
then courts have no standard by which to gauge the basic issue of breach thereof by the physician
or surgeon. The RTC and Court of Appeals, and even this Court, could not be expected to
determine on its own what medical technique should have been utilized for a certain disease or
injury. Absent expert medical opinion, the courts would be dangerously engaging in speculations.
All told, we are hard pressed to find Dr. Tuao liable for any medical negligence or malpractice
where there is no evidence, in the nature of expert testimony, to establish that in treating Peter,
Dr. Tuao failed to exercise reasonable care, diligence and skill generally required in medical
practice. Dr. Tuaos testimony, that his treatment of Peter conformed in all respects to standard
medical practice in this locality, stands unrefuted. Consequently, the RTC and the Court of
Appeals correctly held that they had no basis at all to rule that petitioners were deserving of the
various damages prayed for in their Complaint.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision dated 27 September 2006 and Resolution dated 3 July 2007, both of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68666, are hereby AFFIRMED. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

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AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

DIGEST
DOCTRINES:
In a medical negligence suit, the patient or his heirs, in order to prevail, is required to prove by
preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of skill, care, and
learning possessed by other persons in the same profession; and that as a proximate result of such
failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages.
There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such duty, by
the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health constitutes the actionable
malpractice.
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Peter Lucas, first consulted respondent, Dr. Tuao, on a complaint of soreness
and redness on his right eye. The respondent, after a series of examinations, found that the
former was suffering from conjunctivitis or sore eyes and prescribed the use of the SpersacetC. However, after the petitioners condition seemed to have worsened, he sought for the
respondents second finding wherein the latter said that his condition had progressed to Epidemic
Kerato Conjunctivitis (EKC), a viral infection. The respondent then prescribed the use of

52 | P a g e

Maxitrol, a steroid-based eye drop. The petitioners condition worsened overtime, yet he
obediently complied with all the prescriptions and orders of the respondent.
Four months later and after the petitioner suffered from significant swelling of his right eyeball,
headaches, nausea and blindness on this right eye, he sought for the opinion of another doctor,
Dr. Aquino. Dr. Aquino found that the petitioner had been suffering from glaucoma and needed
to undergo laser surgery, lest he might suffer from total blindness.
After reading the literature on the use of the medicine Maxitrol, Fatima, one of the petitioners
herein and Peter Lucas wife, read that one of the adverse effects of prolonged use of steroidbased eye drops could possibly be glaucoma. Peter, Fatima, and their two children instituted a
civil case for damages against herein respondent for medical malpractice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners amply proved that Dr. Tuao failed to exercise diligence in the
performance of his duty as petitioner Peter Lucas physician.
RULING:
No. Absent a definitive standard of care or diligence required of Dr. Tuao under the
circumstances, the Court has no yardstick upon which to evaluate the attendant facts of the case
at hand to be able to state with confidence that the acts complained of, indeed, constituted
negligence and, thus, should be the subject of pecuniary reparation.
In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist a physician-patient
relationship between the doctor and the victim. But just like any other proceeding for damages,
four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation, must
be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements must co-exist in order to find the
physician negligent and, thus, liable for damages.
As the physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care as that of any other reasonably
competent physician would use in the treatment of his patient, said standard level of care, skill
and diligence must likewise be proven by expert medical testimony, because the standard of care
in a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts in the field.
The same is outside the ken of the average layperson.
There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such duty, by
the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health [and this] constitutes the
actionable malpractice. Hence, proof of breach of duty on the part of the attending physician is
insufficient. Rather, the negligence of the physician must be the proximate cause of the injury.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 150898

April 13, 2011

OCEAN BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION CORP., and/or DENNIS HAO, Petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES ANTONIO and ANICIA CUBACUB, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed as maintenance man by petitioner company Ocean
Builders Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan City.
On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner
Dennis Hao (Hao), the companys general manager, to rest for three days which he did at the
companys "barracks" where he lives free of charge.
Three days later or on April 12, 1995, Bladimir went about his usual chores of manning the gate
of the company premises and even cleaned the company vehicles. Later in the afternoon,
however, he asked a co-worker, Ignacio Silangga (Silangga), to accompany him to his house in
Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimirs intention, Hao gave
Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.

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Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado, Silangga thus brought Bladimir to the
Caybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a primary-care hospital around one kilometer
away from the office of the company.
The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the hospital. He was then confined, with Narding
keeping watch over him. The next day, April 13, 1995, a doctor of the hospital informed Narding
that they needed to talk to Bladimirs parents, hence, on Silanggas request, their co-workers
June Matias and Joel Edrene fetched Bladimirs parents from Tarlac.
At about 8 oclock in the evening of the same day, April 13, 1995, Bladimirs parents-respondent
spouses Cubacub, with their friend Dr. Hermes Frias (Dr. Frias), arrived at the Caybiga Hospital
and transferred Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) where he was placed in
the intensive care unit and died the following day, April 14, 1995.
The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimirs immediate cause of death as
cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as pneumonia. On the other hand, the death
certificate issued by Dr. Frias recorded the causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ
system failure, septicemia and chicken pox.
Bladimirs parents-herein respondents later filed on August 17, 1995 before the Tarlac Regional
Trial Court (RTC) at Capas a complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was
guilty of negligence which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimirs condition leading to his
death.
By Decision of April 14, 1997,1 Branch 66 of the Tarlac RTC at Capas dismissed the complaint,
holding that Hao was not negligent. It ruled that Hao was not under any obligation to bring
Bladimir to better tertiary hospitals, and assuming that Bladimir died of chicken pox aggravated
by pneumonia or some other complications due to lack of adequate facilities at the hospital, the
same cannot be attributed to Hao.
On respondents appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of June 22, 2001, reversed the trial
courts decision, holding that by Haos failure to bring Bladimir to a better-equipped hospital, he
violated Article 161 of the Labor Code. It went on to state that Hao should have foreseen that
Bladimir, an adult, could suffer complications from chicken pox and, had he been brought to
hospitals like St. Lukes, Capitol Medical Center, Philippine General Hospital and the like,
Bladimir could have been saved.
Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66 in Civil
Case No. 349 dated April 14, 1997 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
rendered holding the defendants solidarily liable to plaintiffs-appellants for the following:
1. P50,000.00 for the life of Bladimir Cubacub;
2. P584,630.00 for loss of Bladimirs earning capacity;
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3. P4,834.60 as reimbursement of expenses incurred at Quezon City General Hospital as

evidenced by Exhibits "E" to "E-14" inclusive;
4. P18,107.75 as reimbursement of expenses for the 5-day wake covered by Exhibits "F"
to "F-17";
5. P30,000.00 as funeral expenses at Prudential Funeral Homes covered by Exhibit "I";
6. P6,700.00 for acquisition of memorial lot at Sto. Rosario Memorial Park covered by
Exhibit "J";
7. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
8. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
9. P15,000.00 as attorneys fees and
10. Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
The motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution3 of November 26, 2001, hence this
petition.
Petitioners maintain that Hao exercised the diligence more than what the law requires, hence,
they are not liable for damages.
The petition is meritorious.
At the onset, the Court notes that the present case is one for damages based on torts, the
employer-employee relationship being merely incidental. To successfully prosecute an action
anchored on torts, three elements must be present, viz: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and
proximate causation. The assailed decision of the appellate court held that it was the duty of
petitioners to provide adequate medical assistance to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor
Code, failing which a breach is committed.
Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 161. Assistance of employer. It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all
the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and
treatment to an injured or sick employee in case of emergency. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Implementing Rules of the Code do not enlighten what the phrase "adequate and immediate"
medical attendance means in relation to an "emergency." It would thus appear that the
determination of what it means is left to the employer, except when a full-time registered nurse
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or physician are available on-site as required, also under the Labor Code, specifically Art. 157
which provides:
Article 157. Emergency Medical and Dental Services. It shall be the duty of every employer to
furnish his employees in any locality with free medical and dental attendance and
facilities consisting of:
(a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of employees exceeds
fifty (50) but not more than two hundred (200) except when the employer does not
maintain hazardous workplaces, in which case, the services of a graduate first-aider shall
be provided for the protection of workers, where no registered nurse is available. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment shall provide by appropriate regulations, the services
that shall be required where the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall
determine by appropriate order, hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article;
(b) The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist, and an
emergency clinic, when the number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not
more than three hundred (300); and
(c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-time registered nurse as well
as a dental clinic and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every
one hundred (100) employees when the number of employees exceeds three hundred
(300). (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, there is no allegation that the company premises are hazardous. Neither is
there any allegation on the number of employees the company has. If Haos testimony4 would be
believed, the company had only seven regular employees and 20 contractual employees still
short of the minimum 50 workers that an establishment must have for it to be required to have a
full-time registered nurse.
The Court can thus only determine whether the actions taken by petitioners when Bladimir
became ill amounted to the "necessary assistance" to ensure "adequate and immediate
medical . . . attendance" to Bladimir as required under Art. 161 of the Labor Code.
As found by the trial court and borne by the records, petitioner Haos advice for Bladimir to, as
he did, take a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to the nearest hospital constituted
"adequate and immediate medical" attendance that he is mandated, under Art. 161, to provide to
a sick employee in an emergency.
Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical background. He may not be
thus expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better
facilities than the Caybiga Hospital, contrary to appellate courts ruling.
AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of
the death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would
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not have occurred.5 An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act,
whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial
part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage
was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.6
Verily, the issue in this case is essentially factual in nature. The dissent, apart from adopting the
appellate courts findings, finds that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker and Hao
was negligent in not bringing that co-worker to the nearest physician, or isolating him as well.
This finding is not, however, borne by the records. Nowhere in the appellate courts or even the
trial courts decision is there any such definite finding that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from
a co-worker. At best, the only allusion to another employee being afflicted with chicken pox was
when Hao testified that he knew it to heal within three days as was the case of another worker,
without reference, however, as to when it happened.7
On the issue of which of the two death certificates is more credible, the dissent, noting that Dr.
Frias attended to Bladimir during his "last illness," holds that the certificate which he issued
citing chicken pox as antecedent cause deserves more credence.
There appears, however, to be no conflict in the two death certificates on the immediate cause of
Bladimirs death since both cite cardio-respiratory arrest due to complications from
pneumonia per QCGH, septicemia and chicken pox per Dr. Frias. In fact, Dr. Frias admitted that
the causes of death in both certificates were the same.8
Be that as it may, Dr. Frias could not be considered as Bladimirs attending physician, he having
merely ordered Bladimirs transfer to the QCGH after seeing him at the Caybiga Hospital. He
thereafter left Bladimir to the care of doctors at QCGH, returning to Capas, Tarlac at 4 oclock
the following morning or eight hours after seeing Bladimir. As he himself testified upon crossexamination, he did not personally attend to Bladimir anymore once the latter was brought to the
ICU at QCGH.9
It bears emphasis that a duly-registered death certificate is considered a public document and the
entries therein are presumed correct, unless the party who contests its accuracy can produce
positive evidence establishing otherwise.10 The QCGH death certificate was received by the City
Civil Registrar on April 17, 1995. Not only was the certificate shown by positive evidence to be
inaccurate. Its credibility, more than that issued by Dr. Frias, becomes more pronounced as note
is taken of the fact that he was not around at the time of death.
IN FINE, petitioner company and its co-petitioner manager Dennis Hao are not guilty of
negligence.1avvphil
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED, and the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

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WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

DIGEST
Facts:

Bladimir Cubacub was employed as maintenance man by petitioner company Ocean Builders
Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan City. On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with
chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner Dennis Hao, the companys general manager, to
rest for three days which he did at the companys barracks where he lives free of charge.
Later in the afternoon, however, he asked a co-worker, Ignacio Silangga, to accompany him to
his house in Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimirs intention, Hao
gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.
59 | P a g e

Bladimir was brought to the Caybiga Community Hospital, a primary-care hospital around one
kilometer away from the office of the company. At about 8 oclock in the evening of the same
day, April 13, 1995, Bladimirs parents-respondent spouses Cubacub, arrived at the Caybiga
Hospital and transferred Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital where he was placed in
the intencive care unit and died the following day.
The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimirs immediate cause of death as
cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as pneumonia.
Bladimirs parents-herein respondents later filed on August 17, 1995 before the Tarlac Regional
Trial Court a complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of
negligence which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimirs condition leading to his death.
Issue:

Whether the manager was guilty of negligence for not bringing his employee, who later died, to a
better hospital, and hence liable for torts based on Article 161 of the Labor Code.

Held:

No, the manager, Hao, was not guilty of negligence for not bringing his employee, who later
died, to a better hospital.
ART. 161. Assistance of employer. It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all
the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and
treatment to an injured or sick employee in case of emergency.
Haos advice for Bladimir to, as he did, take a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to the
nearest hospital constituted adequate and immediate medical attendance that he is mandated,
under Art. 161, to provide to a sick employee in an emergency.
Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical background. He may not be
thus expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better
facilities than the Caybiga Hospital.

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At all events, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the
death of Bladimir. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act,
whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial
part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage
was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48006

July 8, 1942

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,

vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:

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This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo,
liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla,
a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab
driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was
overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year
and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the
petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario,
parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of
Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in
favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision
was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest
from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the
cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to
Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's
brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught
several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation
which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to
himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of
the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised
Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against
Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case.
The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro
Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of
Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the
Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes
said article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because
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Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903
of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful
or negligent acts or commission not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon
him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the
crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code
by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action
against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903
of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's
negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only
subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his
property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that
has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes
under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This
should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are
distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the
perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in
previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit
article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely
anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts
and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by
the provisions of the Penal Code.
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ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence,
not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title
XVI of this book.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault
or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages
caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their
authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages
caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed,
or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if
the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty
of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article
shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their
pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein
prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from
the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for
a felony is also civilly liable.
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ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from
criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in
subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed
by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over
nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve
upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears
that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority,
legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or
minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution,
in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit
the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they
may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each
one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the
liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in
all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their
agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or
causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those
doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from
execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of
establishment. In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and
any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or
theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value
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thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or
the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may
have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability
shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons,
and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad
enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasidelitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is this
overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that
such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between
the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extracontractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This
legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the
Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa
aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under
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the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda,
porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one
of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then
article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of
Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasidelito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code,
by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a
penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any
king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the
penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation
of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant,
"Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the
employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola" (Vol.
XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a
diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en
ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia
indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different
persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries
with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the
penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."

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Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision
between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del
Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company
had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been
acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been
exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil
action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative,
stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia
menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de
indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo
en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las
responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea,
una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos
severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere
restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma ataen al orden
publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro
es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa
procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no
borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a
cuento y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de
toda accion u omision, causante de daos o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o
negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo
civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los
articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales
y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades
civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa
que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria
intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar
a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en
el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o
falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales
estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en
defecto de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil,
cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no
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solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se
debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y
empleados de los establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion
de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas,
despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su
responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y
aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado
de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de
suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes
modos de proceder, habiendose, por aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la
Compaia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece
innegable que la de indemnizacion por los daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no
estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio
intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido
de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada
para despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad
dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se
redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion
para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraa a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable
that there should beres judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on
account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the action
for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime,
because there exists in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpasurrounded with
aggravating aspects which give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The
injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions,
reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this
reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is
clear that if by this means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no
longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the
peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not
pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil
Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or
negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the
civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to
128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of
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that Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime,
separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in
accordance with legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to
make a detailed comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the
obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to
point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or
misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and
establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character,
that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are
criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not coincide because article
1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates and employees of
establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the occasion of
their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial
decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases
because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and
sentenced directly and separately with regard to theobligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive
justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have
different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes of procedure,
and inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part
in the criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable
that the action for indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision
was not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence,
but it remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict
had not been that of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been
legitimately reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of
the non-existence of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from
the crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Juradohad
jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer
that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the
Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the
French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
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The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without
including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense
that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not
subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the
author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for
responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of
French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that
the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones
de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para
contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto
legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a
primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima
universal, segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le
son imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o
culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la
imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del
establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el
articulo citado (menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un
dao, la ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de
negligencia para prevenir o evitar el dao. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay,
pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la
responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea
subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of
those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this
question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is
it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first
sight; but such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all
faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him.
The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not
because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or
negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the
teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to
(minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law
presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in
not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is,
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therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the
responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary
is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil
Espaol," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa,
doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de
aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la
responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el
Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando
directa la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el
orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo
que impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de
quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for
his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for
the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the
responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the
Penal Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and
other persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article
19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law,
in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to
the tenor of that articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those
persons for whom one should be responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the
principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct
legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that
an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the
negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case,
Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the
"compaia Electric Madrilea de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but
he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car company,
paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the
company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the

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Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared.
The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de
que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compaia Electrica Madrilea al pago del dao
causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos
juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el
mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo
diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su
competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber
mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico
fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas,
fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el
1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daos
causados por sus dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo
civil, al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compaia
recurrente a la indemnizacion del dao causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de
infringer los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de
Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones
ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la
causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that
the trial court, in sentencing the Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the damage
caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical
effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of
the same act, when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same
act in its different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its
authority that the act in question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave
carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude
the co-existence of fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil
obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with
article 1903, among other persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by
reason of the damages caused by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest
that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in
ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by
one of its employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116
of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes
which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the decision
in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)

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It will be noted, as to the case just cited:

First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car
company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been
sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme
Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is
not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present
case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his
civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil
damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs
are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed
negligence which he did not overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities
of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from
the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under
article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the
second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be observed in passing,
that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla
was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably without property
which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable
civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case,
with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in
a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence
of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla,
because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found guilty
of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day
to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought
against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company,
had unjustly andfraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The
Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code,
the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna
con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1., que las expediciones facturadas por la compaia
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ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan
tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que
llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el
jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de
entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daos
y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era
de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los
pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que
integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene
accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda
en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre
las partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo
de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir
la reparaction de los daos y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la
injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre
consignadas, segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente
sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la
Compaia demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter
economico y de jurarquia administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it
declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad
company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in
the complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when
the said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was
refused by the station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that
the lack of delivery of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him
losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines
and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent
to him by the consignors of the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error,
as the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment
of a contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the goods
nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of
the Code of Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable;
but it limits to asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of
the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver
the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's
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responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue
of the next article, the defendant company, because the latter is connected with the person
who caused the damage by relations of economic character and by administrative
hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a
proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it
was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year
1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the
latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while
iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary
conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies
only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made
primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory
the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company
accountable for not repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have
been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article
1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished
by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that
chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx

xxx

xxx
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"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the

damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point
out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or
maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished
by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may
be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced
construction of these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would
rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the
civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for
prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of
the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always
stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon
their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these Islands, was
formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both
classes of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while
the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal
action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been
waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for
the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be
enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished.
These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on
the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these
articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the
criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law.
Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that
the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must
be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.

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Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as
subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in
process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act
from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in
the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person.
Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident in
question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction
renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in
penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the
American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from
the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093,
"fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of
offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of
an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be
regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles
1902 and 1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts
unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903
of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be
those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where
relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi
contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the
same code. A typical application of this distinction may be found in the consequences of a
railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his
employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the
contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent
act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child
Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death
of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The
trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as
indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had
to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were
going along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana
Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real
Street and to continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the
speed of the auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had
78 | P a g e

completely reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the
auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred if
the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the
moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction,
could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the
right to that on the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the
automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had already been
stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of about 2
meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street from
Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these
precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the
death of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal
case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code.
Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter
either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquilianaunder the
Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which
the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after
such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and
Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the fiveyear-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's
death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of
April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with
her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same. After
the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Capitan
Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V.
House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl, who was
slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but
unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing.
The child died that same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of
the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no
contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the
time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court
said in part:

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Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless
was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by
the trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of
Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was
nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother.
No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened
child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the
much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still
rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence
of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest
sense could only result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his
criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the
death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in
driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the
steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage of
Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was
ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court
reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care
of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903.
This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence
of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was,
so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a
standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and
apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the
accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either
actual or constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but
also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
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"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant
or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It
follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and
not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37
[year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so
negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said
automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and
following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director
of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is
engaged in his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs.
Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages
brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way
to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the
boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who
were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the
crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court,
applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater
familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence
and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624;
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)

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In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the
plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by
the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a
duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that
the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F.
C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability
against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid
down by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from
all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the
six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible
in damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of
Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City
of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was
damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the
crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found
guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio,
the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment,
claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was governed
by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language
authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its
application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall
be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a
misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was
not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil
obligation connected up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code.
In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its
jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and
not a case of civil negligence.
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xxx

xxx

xxx

Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil
Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the
master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised
all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That
would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil
action either as a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By
way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the statements here made are offered to
meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the
Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of
Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under
article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's
criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is
predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising
from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil
Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A
motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by
simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of
P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as
employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed
exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the
exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who
have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the
subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the
action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the
Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's
primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case
destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle that the
employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character
from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
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In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize
the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code,
and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise
failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be
set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime.
Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil
liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act
may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more
concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in
this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code,
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.
Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even the
slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter
that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay
in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
84 | P a g e

defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to
sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the
plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a
remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary
and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the
law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the
defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that
professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means
with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through
this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts
have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and
their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees
should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters
or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel
and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at
least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And
according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall
upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not
upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee
because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists
also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the
principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before
third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por
refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality
by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All
these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents,
and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it
85 | P a g e

has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective
remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to
help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done
by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for
the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or
his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the defendant-petitioner.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.

DIGEST

FACTS:
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head- on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab
driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was
overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS (CRIMINAL CASE):
1. CFI- Rizal Fontanilla was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year
and one day to two years ofprision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the
petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved.
2. CA: affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case.
Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of
the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS (CIVIL CASE):
1. CFI Manila: Fausto Barredo is liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by
negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by Barredo in the amount of 2,000.
2. CA: reduced the damages to 1,000.
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ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making
him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of
Pedro thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code
as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla
RULING:
Yes.
The responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of
the same, but because of thecuasi- delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the
father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever
anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons,
employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher,
etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault
that is condemned by the law.
One is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his own faults, this
being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons
with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility.
Crimes under penal code
1. affect public interest
2. Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act
3. not as broad as quasi-delicts because crimes are punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them
4. proof beyond reasonable doubt is required

Culpa aquiliana / Cuasi-delito

1. Only of private concern
2. Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage (includes both reckless
and simple negligence)
3. include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes
when there is exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved from liability.
4. only preponderance of evidence is required
Note: not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility.
The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a
prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be
instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the
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principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action.
(Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law) The basis of civil law liability is not respondent
superior but the relationship ofpater familias. This theory bases the liability of the master
ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant.A quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil
responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of
the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability
of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary
liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to
take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It
might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method
of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was
probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for
damages.
Section 1902 of that chapter reads: "A person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx "Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be
employed or in the performance of their duties. xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individually of acuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil
Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which
the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which,
after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his
crime.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12191

October 14, 1918

JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
Ramon Sotelo for appellant.
Kincaid & Hartigan for appellee.

FISHER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in
the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of
P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line
of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the
city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to
ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question, January 20, 1915,
the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit
through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with
his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement
platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's
office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of
several coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio Zuiga, also an
employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the
platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther
the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack
of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the
platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where
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his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the
train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was
lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the
accident occurred were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted
is found in the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot
had been brought to the station for the shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous
sacks which has been piled on the platform in a row one upon another. The testimony shows that
this row of sacks was so placed of melons and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of
the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he
stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is
readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the
injuries which he had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain
hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The
result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital
where a second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near
the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of
medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence
of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform
and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the
company's trains. At the hearing in the Court of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found
the facts substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the effect that,
although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of
melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the
plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore
precluded form recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant
company, and the plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in
piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the
plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal
cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company
is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own
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contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions
of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if
at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care
in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in
legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed
by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in
their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations
arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of
expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code,
clearly points out this distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the
case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article
1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent,
which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by
any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an obligation already
existing . . . ."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the
proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which
constitute the breach of a contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are
understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one
another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from
contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103,
and 1104 of the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at
365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in
certain cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of
their employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the
English Common Law, upon the principle ofrespondeat superior if it were, the master would
be liable in every case and unconditionally but upon the principle announced in article 1902
of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to
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another, the obligation of making good the damage caused. One who places a powerful
automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of managing
such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all the
consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage arises at the very
instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the scope of his employment causes the
injury. The liability of the master is personal and direct. But, if the master has not been guilty of
any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts
of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the
servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant
relieves the master from liability for the latter's acts on the contrary, that proof shows that the
responsibility has never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extracontractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent,
but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all
possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they
should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and
directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is
bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence
of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third person suffer damage.
True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he has been
negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield
to proof of due care and diligence in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto Rico
Code, has held that these articles are applicable to cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively.
(Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of
Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the theory
of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the
carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment. The Court, after
citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It
follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in

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selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and
not on that of his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence.
It is, of course, in striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with
strangers, the negligence of the servant in conclusively the negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extracontractual culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault
attributable to the defendant personally, and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely
establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with the authoritative opinion of
Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason
of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority existing
between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission,
was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of
their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach
of a contact, is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or
control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the
master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual
obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society
imposes upon it members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain
members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of
each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative
in character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The
breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive
of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction
between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that
in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which
creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of
the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual
relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission,
it is competent for the legislature to elect and our Legislature has so elected whom such an
obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to
extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility
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for the negligence of those person who acts or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others
who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which
adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability with certain welldefined exceptions to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons
to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in the
selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of
their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to
another, is wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the
obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the
burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence if he does not his action fails. But
when the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff,
and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for
plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to
negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of
its nonperformance is sufficientprima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor
should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action
is based; while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence
of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken,
it is not necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the
breach was due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in
fact the actual cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the
negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would not
constitute a defense to the action. If the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a
means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would be that
person acting through the medium of agents or servants in the performance of their contracts,
would be in a better position than those acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to
watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its
destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from his liability for the
breach of his contract, which involves the duty to exercise due care in the preservation of the
watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose negligence caused the injury? If such a theory
could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy practically complete immunity from damages
arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts as such juridical persons can
of necessity only act through agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances
that reasonable care had been taken in selection and direction of such servants. If one delivers
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securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of the negligence of
some clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve
itself of liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of the
debt by proving that due care had been exercised in the selection and direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa
contractual as a mere incident to the performance of a contract has frequently been recognized
by the supreme court of Spain. (Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and December
13, 1896.) In the decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action arose ex
contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil
Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or
negligence, such as those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages
caused by the defendant's failure to carry out the undertakings imposed by the
contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for damage
done by the negligent acts of their servants will show that in no case has the court ever decided
that the negligence of the defendant's servants has been held to constitute a defense to an action
for damages for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of a carriage
was not liable for the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that case the court
commented on the fact that no evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the defendant
had been negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he had any knowledge of his lack of
skill or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the
plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff
which was allowed to get adrift by the negligence of defendant's servants in the course of the
performance of a contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if
the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we
do not think that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the defendant to
recover damages for the personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant's chauffeur
while driving defendant's automobile in which defendant was riding at the time. The court found
that the damages were caused by the negligence of the driver of the automobile, but held that the
master was not liable, although he was present at the time, saying:

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. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of time as to give the
owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist
therefrom. . . . The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for
such length of time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil.
Rep., 8), it is true that the court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon
article 1903, although the facts disclosed that the injury complaint of by plaintiff constituted a
breach of the duty to him arising out of the contract of transportation. The express ground of the
decision in this case was that article 1903, in dealing with the liability of a master for the
negligent acts of his servants "makes the distinction between private individuals and public
enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the
selection or direction of servants; and that in the particular case the presumption of negligence
had not been overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's action as
though founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and an
examination of the pleadings and of the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact
discussed upon this theory. Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant the practical result must
have been the same in any event. The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant
was grossly negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also
affirmatively appeared that defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise
proper discretion in the direction of the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury
suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa
aquiliana or culpa contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether negligence
occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or its itself the
source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.
There is always an act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the
part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds that a defendant is liable in damages
for having failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in the
selection and direction of his servants, the practical result is identical in either case. Therefore, it
follows that it is not to be inferred, because the court held in the Yamada case that defendant was
liable for the damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to whom it was bound by
contract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant was negligent in the selection and
control of its servants, that in such a case the court would have held that it would have been a
good defense to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the breach of the contract,
for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and control of the
servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative spheres
of contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field of non- contractual obligation is much
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more broader than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of
juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the
mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extracontractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may
break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an
extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry
him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article
1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could
not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent
conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual
obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate
cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait
until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative
negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own
negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely
contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to
ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before
alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends, and
cites many authorities in support of the contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to
alight from a moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form.
We are of the opinion that this proposition is too badly stated and is at variance with the
experience of every-day life. In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when
plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the
place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions
every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from
dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any
injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform
its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in
Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It
is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of
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the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed
by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be
used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would
use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on
Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil.
rep., 809), we may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding
the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of
average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so,
the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory
negligence.1awph!l.net
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to
the effect that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without
being able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly
moving. In considering the situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff
was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of
melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a
public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had
a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the
platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also
is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the
plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path
of alighting passengers, the placing of them adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the
following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level
higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the
car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus
reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform,
constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface
on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as
the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of
contributory negligence in performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted
prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.
Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with safety
under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the
limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his
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daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in
his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the
character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the
plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized
by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a
copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from
continuing that employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open
to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is approximately
thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him
for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover of
defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other
incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of
P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street and Avancea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full accord, namely, "It may be admitted
that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular
injury suffered by him could not have occurred." With the general rule relative to a passenger's
contributory negligence, we are likewise in full accord, namely, "An attempt to alight from a
moving train is negligence per se." Adding these two points together, should be absolved from
the complaint, and judgment affirmed.
Johnson, J., concur.

DIGEST
FACTS:

January 20, 1915 around 7 to 8 p.m.: Jose Cangco arose from his seat in the 2nd class-car
where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps
of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for support

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As the train slowed down another passenger and also an employee of the railroad
company Emilio Zuiga got off the same car alighting safely at the point where the platform
begins to rise from the level of the ground.
When the train had proceeded a little farther Cangco stepped off but 1 or both of his feet
came in contact with a sack of watermelons so his feet slipped from under him and he fell
violently on the platform.
His body rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his
right arm was badly crushed and lacerated.
the car moved forward possibly 6 meters before it came to a full stop
He was bought to the hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was made and
his arm was amputated
operation was unsatisfactory so he had second operation at another hospital was
performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder expending a
total of P790.25
It is customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the
station for the shipment to the market
CFI: favored Manila Railroad Co. (MRR)- Cangco had failed to use due caution in
alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form recovering

ISSUE:
W/N MRR should be held liable.
HELD:
YES. lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25

It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of
negligence. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage
thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit,
the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff should be separately examined
Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but
only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that article
relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual
article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which
constitute the breach of a contract
two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant
or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part
of the master or employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and
not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome
and he is relieved from liability.
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As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor

should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is
based; while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a
contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not
necessary for him to prove negligence.
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is
to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the
passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the
prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under
similar circumstances, to avoid injury.
Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of
alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs
the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar
to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could,
therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he
was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion
is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly
under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of
contributory negligence.
at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that the
injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that
employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff.
His expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is approximately thirtythree years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him
for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover of
defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other
incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito
Elcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said
minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in
Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant
Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the
son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said
accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

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1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107,
which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in resadjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because
he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by
marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants
of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14,
1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court
finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby
reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on
Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our
resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING
THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION
OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS
APPLICABLE;
II

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THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW

FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE
CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS
GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION
BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has
favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not
dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants
filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of
the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification
of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which
was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this
Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature
of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault, with pertinent
citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and
earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only
under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
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The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come
under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent
killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a
criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer
and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted
in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was
punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of
negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasidelito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
(p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been
criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but
also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this
Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines
that have been little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to
indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal
import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of negligence even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of
civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would
remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
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lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor
are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth
rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law
to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or
concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising
from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our
laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extracontractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course.
But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice
and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream
of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its
waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This
will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a
criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is
more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts
from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein
referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper
reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in
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fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the
Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of
fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here
at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or
omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of
Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo
construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth
lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana orquasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission
that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which
was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law,"
thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in
character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding
provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations
derived fromquasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this
Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of
the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first
sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa
aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence
and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding
Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil
action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasidelict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code)
Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the
same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift107 | P a g e

rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in
applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new
Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action
for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from
crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under
Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with
the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the
felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as
We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, thatculpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the
possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the
conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327,
Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor
(child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the
minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to
administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and
be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case
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of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald,
although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on
his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary
liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third
persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the
parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do
any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And
surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor
child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does
not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property
which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399;
Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now
of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J, concurring:

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Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when
judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to
include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600).
See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the
injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by
Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when
judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to
include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society." (Street, J. in Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600).
See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the
injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by
Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).

DIGEST
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case
against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano
then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the
criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that
his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD:
Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil
action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
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made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e)
of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not
as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327,
Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor
child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the
minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession
shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer
his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable
to Marvin Hill the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of
age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a matter of equity.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and
MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
Lope E. Adriano for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for private respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a
corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances
within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly
liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the
resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated
in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of
Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial
lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young
man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the
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lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and
other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82,
before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi,
Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for
destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent
corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular
inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent
corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further
hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court
issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of
jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved.
Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which
provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted
until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with
Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the
Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasidelict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party
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filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations
and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its
title or heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of
substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be
liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective
claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite,
adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed
waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or
opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete
hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the
provincial highway, and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected
cement culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise
beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected
culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower
portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said
cemented gate, which hole or opening is likewise connected by defendant to the
cemented mouth of a big canal, also constructed by defendant, which runs
northward towards a big hole or opening which was also built by defendant thru
the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which separates the land of
plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of the
floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same time, the entrancepoint of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy
or stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of
plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil,
which utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water system thru interconnected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during
rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the
excess water above it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned
water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to
death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:

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a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to

deep, wide and long canals, such that the same can no longer be
planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several
occasions, washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their
laborers are always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of
plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are
present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or
some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion
of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by
petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the
recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the
Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike,
stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss
and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and
damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property
subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint
sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the
waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the
complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent
corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the
act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear
case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.

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It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to
injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must
use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of
others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such
structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If
the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can
claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act
or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he
is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores,
and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having
always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14
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In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has
declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction
of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is
entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in
the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal
would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18
(Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is
ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R.
Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the
case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent
corporation.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

DIGEST
Doctrine:

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It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to
injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.

Facts:
Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in Biga Silang, Cavite which is
adjacent to that of private respondent corporation, Missionaries of Our lady of La Salette, Inc.
Within the land of the latter, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners land, caused a young man to
drown, damagaed petitioners crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the
livesofthepetitioners and their laborers and some other destructions.
This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for destruction by means of inundation
under Article 324 of the RPC and a civil action for damages.

Issue:
Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction caused by respondents
waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasidelicts.

Held:
Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are
present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or
some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioners complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion
of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by
petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the
recovery of damages.

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It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to
injure the rights of a third person. SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must
use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of
others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such
structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If
the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can
claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set
aside the Decision 1of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which
affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not
damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of
their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years
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old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments,
Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed
to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore
agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year;
petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure
their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with
him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before
the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a
confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of
the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him
anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of
not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's
fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the
parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true
facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought the
consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat
her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived
him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a
representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is
baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and
compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he
prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order 4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano
Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan
City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
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3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez

Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school
graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff
on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16
October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay
the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at
(sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied. 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and
private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or
questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations,
deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive
promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful
promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance with Filipino customs and
traditions made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October
1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f)
petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a
foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good
customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's
testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court
and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for
the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:

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According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she
never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after
they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted
his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same
day he went with her to her hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he
wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their
intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their
submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff,
were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and
brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in
October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted
him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they
likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few
days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to
Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant's apartment. However,
in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet
while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the
morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a
result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave
her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with
defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her
that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City.
That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter
consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan
City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the
barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff,
but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a
girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial,
is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed
them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the
wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and
even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed
the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in
not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral
damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.

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On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in

toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact,
respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was
already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is
uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with
defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a
barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly
would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise
made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that
plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have
thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have
allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and
tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot
believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a
waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he
went to plaintiff's hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at
(sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a
beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he
allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 5556, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in
the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Baaga, Bugallon,
unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them? And this
special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of
marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and
(sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and
where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and
defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason
why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted
defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino
women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several
years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study
medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also
lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like
what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction
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or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young,

innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on
the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise
these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against
morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who
has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant
should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the
lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises
therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any
moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or
proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the
trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact
that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and
culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses
that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is
excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code
which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis
thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his
controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in
civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private
respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in
relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he
had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts
would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable. 14
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On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the
petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his
thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of
witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb
the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the
witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had
overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze
or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are,
however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, inMedina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the
time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15
[1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil.
453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz
v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v.
Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court
(Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142
SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth
in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is

126 | P a g e

premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence

on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must
be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions
that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is
not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the
abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the
American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy
for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they
have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in
a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been
127 | P a g e

made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws,
there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil
action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous
moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages.
But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of
action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it
is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law
concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader
than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal
acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general
scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for
drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are
to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be
covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus,
Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it
has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that
where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.
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It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction the kind illustrated by the Code
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for
criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code
because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of
promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction,
not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a
former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when
she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
because the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to
petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him
by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there
had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that
such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the
said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the
Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially
the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part
of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil.
121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
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To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient

promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal
lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction
(43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to
depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have
that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately submitting
her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,
persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere
proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of
sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely
affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It
has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases
would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a
reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be
swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year,
from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate
sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and
mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant,
she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut
short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is
made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
complaint. 27

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In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired
from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal
knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to
mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra
vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248,
Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the
EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or
moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other
way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust
has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the
wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding
the incorporation of the present article 31 in the Code. The example given by the
Code Commission is correct, if there wasseduction, not necessarily in the legal
sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is
accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority
or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a
man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action
lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to
deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive
a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman
thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury,
there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal
law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for
that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for
argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless
also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1)
of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent
cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating that if the
131 | P a g e

private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily
because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner
or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee .
. . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and
without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic security. Her
family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988).
And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been
offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors
a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's
ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable
employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith
and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have even remotely
occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he
loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he
wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and
proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly
violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos
have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not
have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in
sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had
qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was
not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in
legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the
party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his

132 | P a g e

consent to the transaction was itself procured by

fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no
action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however,
has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or
less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the
other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that
this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay
together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn
duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of
morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

DIGEST
FACTS:
Private respondent Marilou Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against Gasheem
Shookat, an Iranian Citizen, of breach of promise to marry. She said that both of them agreed to
marry after the end of the school semester and the petitioner asked the approval of her parents.
She stated that the petitioner forced to live with him in his apartments. Respondent was a virgin
before she was forced to live with the Iranian (petitioner). A week before she filed her
complaint, petitioner maltreated, assaulted and asked not to live with him anymore and; the
petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.

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On the petitioners counterclaim, he said that he never proposed marriage with the
private respondent; he neither forced her to live with him and he did not maltreat her but only
told her to stop from coming into his apartment because he discovered that she had deceived him
by stealing his money and passport. He insisted that he must be awarded for damages for he
suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation due to the complaint of the private
respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is to be held liable for damages for breach of promise to
marry.
HELD:
A breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This court held that
where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of fraud and deceit and
the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. Such act done by the
petitioner is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country. The
court ordered that the petition be denied with costs against the petitioner.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second
Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondentsappellees.
Eriberto Seno for appellant.
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Jose M. Mesina for appellees.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
rendered on November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his
automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos
Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal
case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in
the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final
determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever
stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered;
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension of
the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25,
1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
respondent Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and
jurisprudence. 2
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that
there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action
inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action is
proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to
submit his claim for damages in the criminal case; that the resolution of the City Court is
interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the Petition is defective inasmuch as
what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus (Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated November 14,1970 (Annex
"S" and Annex "U").
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Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on February
25, 1971. 3
Petitioner makes these:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN
THE CITY COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL
AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID
DELAY THE OFFENDED PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR
DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR
certiorari IS NOT PROPER, BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS
INTERLOCUTORY.
4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS
DEFECTIVE. 4
all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there can be an
independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is
evident that the nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
caned a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx xxx xxx

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Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage. (1903a)
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver,
Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision
between his automobile and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner because of
the collision; that there was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered and the
fault and negligence of private respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant, Valeriana
Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly of
her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict. 5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. (n)
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-delict, which is
readily discernible from the foregoing codal provision, has been expounded
in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-621, 6 thus:
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple imprudence. if we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal
import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution ofculpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to personsand damage to property through any degree of negligence
even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil
hability arising from crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain
for quasidelito or culpa aquiliana We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
137 | P a g e

intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the
spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother
and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 11910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code, otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effective,
and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be
tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome
method of obtaining a reliel True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there
is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of
the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure
indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of
common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public
conveyances usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages.
Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws,
courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of
employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect
society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in
order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally
reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is
but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel
and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and
all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable
and just that such responsibility should fail upon the principal or director who
could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the such
138 | P a g e

employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622,
2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the
principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the
work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and
employee vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del
dependiente en la de quien la emplea y utihza (become as one personality by the
merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes
him.) All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it
comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to overlapping or concurrence
of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the Civil responsibility arising from crime,
forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of
the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the
present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it
is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the
Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the bet ter safeguarding of private rights because it reestablishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the issues, stations and results of a
criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel is
more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (Garcia vs. Florida 52
SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section
2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32,
33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the c action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as

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required in the preceding section. Such civil action shag proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for
in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in
surrounding the civil action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, supra which refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included in the section
just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in which case 6 once the criminal action has
being commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same
shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and
3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has
been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation
"not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code
bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of
quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes
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not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between
"damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word
"damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with
respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not
limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law itself
include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds
proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful to
persons or property."
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, suspending the civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally
terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of the other errors assigned becomes
unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that
Court.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

DIGEST
FACTS:

Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated
by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular accident

At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the
civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3
(b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be
found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered

City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case

CFI by certiorari: dismissed

ISSUE:
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W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the
criminal action
HELD:
YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for

nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant

primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are
principles calculated to protect society

The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in
section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after
the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil
action based on quasi-delict

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to
persons but also damage to property

word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm
done

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