Tano vs Socrates

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine

GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997
FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an
ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa
City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting
the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several
species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming
from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the
court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground
that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood,
and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution
and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners
qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII
aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on
the duty of the State to protect the nations marine wealth. The so-called
preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine
resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement
of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This
necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such
fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization
and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which

unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.

Case Digest: Republic vs. Imperial

Law on Natural Resources, Constitutional Law
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT
BUREAU vs. FELIX S. IMPERIAL JR., FELIZA SREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
represented by the DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU vs. FELIX S. IMPERIAL
JR., FELIZA S. IMPERIAL, ELIAS S. IMPERIAL, MIRIAM S. IMPERIAL, LOLITA ALCAZAR,
SALVADOR ALCAZAR, EANCRA CORPORATION, and the REGISTER OF DEEDS of
LEGASPI CITY
G.R. No. 130906, February 11, 1999
FACTS:
On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to Decree No. 55173 of then Court of First Instance of
Albay. OCT No. 55173 was subdivided and further subdivided resulting in the
issuance of several titles, which are now the subjects of herein petition in the name
of private respondents. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a case with the
trial court to judicially declare the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) issued to herein
private respondents null and void on the ground that the subject land, on which the
OCT was based, has the features of a foreshore land based on an investigation
conducted by the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City. Respondents, on the other hand
contend that Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655,
which stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area."
Within the time for pleading, private respondents EANCRA Corporation, Lolita
Alcazar and Salvador Alcazar filed their answer with cross-claim, while the rest,
namely, Felix S. Imperial, Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperial and Miriam S. Imperial
filed a motion to dismiss. They contended that the adjudication by the cadastral
court is binding against the whole world including the Republic since the cadastral
proceedings are in rem and the government itself through the Director of Lands
instituted the proceedings and was a direct and active participant therein.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an objection to the
motion to dismiss. After hearing the motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the judgment rendered by the cadastral court in G.R.
Cad. Rec. No. 88 and the Courts resolution in the petition to quiet title, G.R. 85770,
both decreed that the parcel of land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) was not
foreshore. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied

petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and for failure to file the
appellants brief within the extended period granted to petitioner.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
HELD: Yes.
At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of land in question are
foreshore lands. Foreshore land is a part of the alienable land of the public domain
and may be disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. It was defined as "that
part (of the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and
reflux of the tides." It is also known as "a strip of land that lies between the high and
low water marks and, is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide."
The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of
government, specifically the director of lands (now the director of the Lands
Management Bureau). The decision of the director of lands when approved by the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) as to questions of fact is conclusive upon the court. The principle behind this
ruling is that the subject has been exhaustively weighed and discussed and must
therefore be given credit. This doctrine finds no application, however, when the
decision of the director of lands is revoked by, or in conflict with that of, the DENR
Secretary.
There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the Director of Lands and the
DENR, Region V, in the present case. Respondents contend that the Director of
Lands found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed from
OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area." Petitioner, on the
other hand, claims that subsequent investigation of the DENR, Region V, Legazpi
City, disclosed that the land covered by OCT No. 408 (500) from whence the titles
were derived "has the features of a foreshore land." The contradictory views of the
Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City, on the true nature of the
land, which contradiction was neither discussed nor resolved by the RTC, cannot be
the premise of any conclusive classification of the land involved.
The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether the lands subject of
petitioner's reversion efforts are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient
cause for relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and fourth motions for
extension to file appellant's brief. Petitioner's appeal presents an exceptional
circumstance impressed with public interest and must then be given due course.
Petitioner Republic assailed the dismissal of its appeal on purely technical grounds.
Petitioner also alleged that it has raised meritorious grounds which, if not allowed to
be laid down before the proper Court, will result to the prejudice of, and irreparable

injury to, public interest, as the Government would lose its opportunity to recover
what it believes to be non-registerable lands of the public domain.
The Supreme Court granted the petition. The Court ruled that the question of what
constitutes good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is
discretionary upon the court. It has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to
except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrants or when
the purpose of justice requires it. In the case at bar, the need to determine once and
for all whether the lands subject of petitioners reversion efforts are foreshore lands
constitutes good and sufficient cause for relaxing the procedural rules and granting
the third and fourth motions for extensions to file appellants brief. Petitioner
Republics appeal presented an exceptional circumstance impressed with public
interest which in the Courts discretion must be given due course.

G.R. No. 69997. September 30, 1987

UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, GREGORIA BOLANOS, AUREA ARAOJO, GERVACIO
ARAOJO, MARIA BERNAL, FELIX DETECIO, JESUS ASUNCION, MELANIO ASUNCION and
BIENVENIDO ASUNCION, respondents.
FACTS:
On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted mining patents on mineral
claims located at Ungay Malobago, Rapu-Rapu, Albay to herein petitioners and other
private individuals.
Way back on October 30, 1959, John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos assigned
their rights to their mining claims in favor of the petitioner. The assignment of
rights was recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on December 2,
1959.
The aforestated mining patents, after their issuance on July 20, 1962, were all
recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on August 28, 1962 and
transcribed on September 4, 1962 in the Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds
of Albay. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Albay issued the respective
original certificates of titles pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496 in the names of
John Canson, Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and the petitioner.

Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, tree patents were granted by the respondent
Director of Lands and the corresponding original certificates of titles were issued by
the Register of Deeds to private respondents.
All of the above patents covered portions of the lots covered by the patents
belonging to the petitioner.
The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of patents against
the private respondents and prayed that all the free patent titles issued in their
favor for properties over which original certificates of title had already been issued
in its favor be declared null and void.
The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
a)

Whether or not the lands in question belong to the public domain;

b)
Whether or not the appellate court erred in dismissing the complaint on the
ground that the petitioner had no personality to institute the same

HELD:
No.
Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution provides:
"All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease,
or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under
this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be alienated and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except
as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, applying the aforequoted provision to the case at bar, we conclude that
the issuance of the lode patents on mineral claims by the President of the
Philippines in 1962 in favor of the petitioner granted to it only the right to extract or
utilize the minerals which may be found on or under the surface of the land. On the
other hand, the issuance of the free patents by the respondent Director of Lands in
1979 in favor of the private respondents granted to them the ownership and the
right to use the land for agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and
the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the
surface.
There is no basis in the records for the petitioner's stand that it acquired the right to
the mineral lands prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, thus, making such
acquisition outside its purview and scope.
Anent the second issue, the petitioner has no personality to institute the action
below for annulment and cancellation of patents. The mineral lands over which it
has a right to extract minerals remained part of the inalienable lands of the public
domain and thus, only the Solicitor General or the person acting in his stead can
bring an action for reversion.

Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest: Director of Lands v. IAC (1986)
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)
FACTS:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario,
acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of
land
possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was
discovered by Magellan
land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute
ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their

ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the
public domain
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of
improvements
ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized
by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
W/N the land is already a private land - YES
W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations
or associations applies- NO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property,
at least by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the
Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme
acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect
right to make such acquisition
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or
lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares

PALOMO v. CA
G.R. No. 95608 January 21, 1997
FACTS:
Diego Palomo is the owner of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive
Order No. 40. On 1916, he ordered the registration of these lands and donated the
same to his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two months before his death in April
1937.
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First

Instance of Albay on May 1970. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953.
Sometime in July 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47
converting the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the "Tiwi Hot Spring
National Park," under the control, management, protection and administration of the
defunct Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest
Development. The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the
provisions of the Public Land Law nor registerable under the Land Registration Act.
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate
taxes thereon and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and
coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio
Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land to guarantee a loan of
P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

ISSUE:

Whether or not forest land may be owned by private persons.

HELD:
The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title
in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public
domain. It is in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registerable and possession thereof, no matter
how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable. There is no question that the
lots here forming part of the forest zone were not alienable lands of the public
domain. As to the forfeiture of improvements introduced by petitioners, the fact that
the government failed to oppose the registration of the lots in question is no
justification for petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the
lots.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. JUDGE FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME

114 SCRA 799

DATE: June 29, 1982

PETITIONER: Manila Electric Company

RESPONDENTS: Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch XV and Republic of
the Philippines

PONENTE: J. Aquino
FACTS:
The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) with an assessed value
of P3270 in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses on August 13, 1976, who had
consequently purchased it from Olympia Ramos on the 3rd of July 1947, the original
owner of the land even before 1941. They consequently filed for the confirmation of
title on Dec. 1, 1976, a motion that was rejected by the Court of First Instance. The
Meralco consequently filed an appeal with the following contentions:
1.
The land after having been possessed by Olimpia Ramos and the Piguing
spouses for more than thirty years had essentially been converted to private land
by virtue of acquisitive prescription. Thus, the constitutional prohibition banning a
private corporation from acquiring alienable public land is not applicable.
2.
It had invoked section 48b of the Public Land Law, not for itself, but for the
Piguing spouses who, as Filipino citizens, could secure a judicial confirmation of their
imperfect title to the land
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the Meralco, as a juridical person, is qualified to apply for a
judicial confirmation of an imperfect/incomplete title.
2.

Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is recognized.

3.
Whether or not the conversion of the land from public to private property is
contingent on the judicial confirmation of title.
RULING:
1.
NO. According to Sec. 48b of the Public Lands Act, the Meralco, as a juridical
person, is disqualified from applying for the judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Furthermore, according to J. Aquino, Article XIV Sec. 14 of the 1973 Constitution
prohibits private corporations from hold alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease, not to exceed 1000 hectares in area. In fine, only natural persons and
citizens of the Philippines are allowed to apply for confirmation under the PLA.
2.
NO. It was held that the conversion from public land to private property is
contingent upon (1) fulfilling the necessary condition of possession by the
predecessors-in-interest for the statutory period of 30 years; and (2) the judicial
confirmation of the title by the Court of First Instance. C.J. Fernando concurred with
the decision, but accepted that a conversion indeed took place.
3.
HELD. This was maintained in the ruling of J. Aquino. C.J. Fernando, J. Abad
Santos and J. De Castro, concurred accordingly. J. Teehankee dissented and traced
the line of jurisprudence from Carino to Susi to Herico which maintained that the

conversion or acquisition effectively happens by the operation of law, ipso jure, as

soon as it can be conclusively presumed, juris et de jure, that all the conditions for
the confirmation of the grant have been met. According to his reasoning, upon the
fulfillment of the aforementioned conditions, the confirmation of an imperfect title is
only a formality.

Chavez v. Pea and Amari

Fact:

In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim

areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the
Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,
tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred
to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and
Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all
future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA.
It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register
of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a ThaiPhilippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the
mother of all scams).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to
AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President
Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim
that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint
venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open
to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government
can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the
public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In
their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and
outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,

ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify
the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer
needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.