IN RELATION TO:

SEPARATION OF POWERS (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution)

CASE:

In Re: Designation of JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO as Member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee On Justice

FACTS

Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Ilocos Norte, sent a letter to the Chief Justice of
Supreme Court informing the latter that he was designated by Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte,
Rodolfo Farinas, as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice pursuant to
Presidential EO No. 856, as amended by EO No. 326. In the letter, he also requested the issuance of
a Resolution by the Supreme Court, stating the following:

1.

That he is authorized to accept the appointment and to as assume and discharge the powers and
duties attached to the said position.

2.

That his membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary
nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section 7, Article IX (B),
both of the Constitution, and will not amount to an abandonment of his present position as
Executive Judge, and as a member of the Judiciary;

3.

That his membership in the said Committee is considered as part of the primary functions of an
Executive Judge.

ISSUE

WON judicial officers are allowed to be appointed to positions performing administrative functions

RULING

No. Request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED. His membership in the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice will be in violation of the Constitution because he will discharge administrative
functions. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions
(Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created
to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and
indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions.

Such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions:

Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge who may be found
to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for
appropriate action;

Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper
administration of criminal justice.

Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that
o

Section 6. Supervision.The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the supervision

of the Secretary of justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the
Secretary of Justice.

Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance
to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such
assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

RATIO

Former Chief Justice Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig sets forth:
o

While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic
rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a
member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in
character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command.
The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by
Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative
official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a
norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn
responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with
nothing less.

Note: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct
and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence.

Jose Angara, petitioner vs. The Electoral Commission, Pedro Ynsua,

Miguel Castillo and Dionisio C. Mayor, respondents July 15, 1936 LAUREL,
J.:

FACTS:
Jose Angara, petitioner, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and
Dionisio Mayor ran as candidates for the position of member of the National Assembly for
the first district of Tayabas in the 1935 elections. Jose Angara won the elections. On
December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the
position of those who won which have no pending electoral protests filed against them.
On December 8, 1935 Pedro Ynsua filed an electoral protest before the Electoral
Commission praying that he be declared the elected member of the National Assembly.
On December 9, the Electoral Commission passed a resolution declaring the same day as

the last day for filing electoral protests. On December 20, Angara filed a petition to
dismiss the protest alleging that the protest was filed out of the prescriptive period due
to Resolution No. 8. In turn, Ynsua answered that there is no constitutional provision
barring the presentation of a protest against a member of the National Assembly even
after confirmation.
Jose Angara instituted an original action in the Supreme Court for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the respondent Electoral Commission from
taking further cognizance of the Protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent.
ISSUE/S:
1 W/N the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy
2 W/N the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of petitioner.
HELD:
1 Yes. The Court ruled that although the Electoral Commission is a constitutional
organ, created for a specific purpose, to determine all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly and
generally may not be interfered with, it is NOT beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism and is subject to constitutional restrictions. Hence, the
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the present controversy.
2 No. The Electoral Commission acted within its jurisdiction in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by respondent Pedro Ynsua against Jose Angara as
the 1935 Constitution has transferred all the powers exercised previously by the
legislature to settle election contests to the Electoral Commission and that
Confirmation by the National Assembly is not essential and cannot deprive the
Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time within which
protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be
filed.
Notes:
1 Petition for writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is denied.

SHORTER FORM:
Casibang v. AquinoGR L-38025 August 20, 1979
Makasiar, J.:
Facts:
Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed as the elected Mayor of Rosales,Pangasinan in the 1971 local
elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, hereinpetitioner, Dante Casibang who seasonably filed on
November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the
grounds of (1)anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes
inspecified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting orballoting; and (5)
excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the 1971 ElectionCode.Proceedings therein continued with
respect to the election protest of petitioner before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, presided
by respondent Judge, who initially took cognizance of the same as it is unquestionably a justiciable controversy. In the
meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued Proclamation No.
1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law;
and two months thereafter, more or less, or specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention
passed and approved a Constitution to supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter

overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March
31, 1973, this Court declared that "there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force
and effect" (Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 [1973]). The petitioner had already completed presenting his
evidence and in fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground
that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution by reason of which principally (Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article
XI) a political question has intervened in the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the case is under the purview of political question and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the judiciary.
Ruling:
No, the case herein involved has remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into
this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or
interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means
in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. The trial under the Court of First Instance should proceed.
LONGER FORM:
Facts:
Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan
in the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed a protest
against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of (1) anomalies and
irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3)
rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign expenditures and other violations of the
1971 Election Code.
In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued
Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, or
specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to supplant
the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the Republic of the
Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, the Supreme Court declared that there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect.
Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in
fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court
had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which principally)
Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI a political question has intervened in
the case. Respondent Yu contended that ... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have
been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our parliamentary form of
government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI. He further submitted that local elective officials
(including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power
embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII.
The thrust of the political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9 of
Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are the
only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of, as the
same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative Department; and
that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure
by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the necessity and expediency of which
are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still continue assuming jurisdiction over the
pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a question or policy in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive branch of the government.

Issue:
Whether the issue involves a political question and therefore beyond judicial ambit.
Held:
No. Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election
protest cases. The constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of
persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be
fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of
an elective office, albeit under protest or contest and that subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9,
Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new
fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the timeframe prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a
judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elects right to the contested office.
The right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of
Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their
respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not duly
elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their
privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given to them
by said constitutional provision.
Until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to continue as
mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the court decide adversely
against him the electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even before a law or presidential decree
terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution.
There is a difference between the term of office and the right to hold an office. Aterm of office is the period
during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its privileges and
emoluments. A right to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers and responsibilities
of the office. In other words, the term refers to the period, duration of length of time during which the occupant of an
office is .entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence, although Section 9, Article XVII of
the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not foreclose any challenge by the herein
petitioners, in an election protest, of the right of the private respondents to continue holding their respective office. What
has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the term to the office, although the right of the incumbent
to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the term thereof, and that it is erroneous to conclude that
under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they
are now holding their respective offices under a new term. They hold their respective offices still under the term to which
they have been elected, although the same is now indefinite.
The New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide
election protests: Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with
this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified or repealed by the National Assembly. And there has
been no amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the herein petitioners
the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected, and according to Section 8, Article XVII of the
New Constitution all courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their
jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall
be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force. Consequently, the Courts of First Instance presided over by
the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests filed by
herein petitioners.
While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and city
officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests
concerning municipal elective positions.

General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section 9 of
Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional
provision.
General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral contests of
municipal elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order, after
affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil cases,
simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the validity, legality or
constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued by the President or his duly designated representative or by public
servants pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081.
In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, the electoral protest case herein involved has remained a justiciable
controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent President
or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the respondent Judge decides the election
protest. The term political question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers
to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction or
to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior legislative or
executive determination to which deference must be paid. Political questions should refer to such as would under the
Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is
vested either in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon.

Lorenzo M. Taada and Diosdado Macapagal vs. Mariano J. Cuenco,

Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio,
Placido Reyes, and Fernando Hipolito
G.R. No. L-10520 Feb. 28, 1957
FACTS: After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly
occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Taada who
belonged to the Citizens Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial
candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But
prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should
be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3
senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only
one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled
in by the NP. Taada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because
he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the
Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al
(members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue
because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the
SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Taada and Macapagal was not to raise the
issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question.
The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked
by Taada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Taada was

whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid which is a judicial
question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not
perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority
members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET,
apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those
will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET
(referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own
rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.

Sanidad Vs Comelec
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
Facts: On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE
CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power
vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws,
promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a
newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the
City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which
provides: Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. During the plebiscite campaign period,
on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use
his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues It is alleged by petitioner that said
provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of
the press enshrined in the Constitution.
Issue : WON the said Section 19 of resolution No 2167 is unconstitutional
Held: it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise
and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or
other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the
right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates
are ensured Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean
that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners
themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods.
Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor
the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite.
Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. While the limitation does not absolutely bar
petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No
reason was advanced by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a
restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern
and importance.
The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by
access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a
plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination
of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific
radio or television times.

Daza vs Singson G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989 Cruz, J. In relation to judicial
and political questions in Chapter 06 of Cruz.
FACTS:

After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve (12) seats in the Commission on Appointments
(COA) among the several political parties represented in that chamber in accordance
with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those
chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party (LP).
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized,
resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives. Members of LP
formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, swelling its number to 159 and
correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. On the basis of this
development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the COA by
withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP.
On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of
the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C.
Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court to challenge his removal from the COA and the
assumption of his seat by the respondent. The petitioner contends that he cannot be
removed from the COA because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine
announced in Cunanan v. Tan. 5 His claim is that the reorganization of the House
representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment
because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political
stability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue assailed by petitioners is political in nature, and beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court.
RULING:
No. The Court held that what is involved in the case is the legality, and not the
wisdom of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments. Hence, it is a justiciable rather than a political issue.
The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section
1, of the Constitution clearly provides that the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.