Professional Documents
Culture Documents
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court attacking the validity of the assailed Bureau actions in 1983 and
1984. Considering that petitioner, throughout the period of its inaction, was not deprived of the
opportunity to seek relief from the courts which were normally operating at the time, its delay constitutes
unreasonable and inexcusable neglect, tantamount to laches. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari requiring
the reversal of these orders will not lie. There is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a
writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. A long line of cases establish
the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private
logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest
conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in
determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the
proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources. Timber licenses, permits and
license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter
a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They
may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests
so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause.
BENGUET CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
NO. the instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet resorted to an improper Remedy.
The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of
1995 states, A petition for review by certiorari and question of law may be filed by the aggrieved party
with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order or decision of the [MAB].
The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final orders are now required to
be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review. A quasi-judicial agency or body has been defined as
an organ of government, other than a court or legislature, which affects the rights of private parties
through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this definition; hence, it is no different from the
other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of
Circular No. 1-91among these agencies areindicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or
conclusive and acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not expressly
listed, should be deemed included therein.
The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from administrative
agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from the
appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
Thus Benguet should have filed the appeal with the CA.
Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of the MAB has become
final and executory. On this ground alone, the instant petition must be denied.
Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 x as amended by RA No. 7902, xi
factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-judicial bodies; and the CA, which is
likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact, has more elbow room to resolve them. By including questions
of factxii among the issues that may be raised in an appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, Section
3 of Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and Section 3 of Rule 43 explicitly expanded the list of such
issues.
According to Section 3 of Rule 43, [a]n appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals
within the period and in the manner herein provided whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law,
or mixed questions of fact and law. Hence, appeals from quasi-judicial agencies even only on questions
of law may be brought to the CA.
Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from administrative
agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be obtained from the
appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction. xiii
Consistent with these rulings and legal bases, we therefore hold that Section 79 of RA 7942 is likewise to
be understood as having been modified by Circular No. 1-91, BP Blg. 129 as amended by RA 7902,
Revised Administrative Circular 1-95, and Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In brief, appeals from decisions
of the MAB shall be taken to the CA through petitions for review in accordance with the provisions of Rule
43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
That public use is negated by the fact that the state would be taking private properties for the benefit of
private mining firms or mining contractors is not at all true.
There is also no basis for the claim that the Mining Law and its implementing rules and regulations do not
provide for just compensation in expropriating private properties. Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and
Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of just compensation
SEM also filed a Motion for Referral of Case to the Court En Banc and for Oral Arguments dated 22
August 2006.
Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision, praying that the Court elucidate
on the Decisions pronouncement that mining operations, are now, therefore within the full control of the
State through the executive branch. Moreover, Apex asks this Court to order the Mines and
Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an exploration permit.
In its Manifestation and Motion dated 28 July 2006, Balite echoes the same concern as that of Apex on
the actual takeover by the State of the mining industry in the disputed area to the exclusion of the private
sector. In addition, Balite prays for this Court to direct MGB to accept its application for an exploration
permit.
Camilo Banad, et al., likewise filed a motion for reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be
awarded to them.
ISSUE/S:
Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. (SEM) acquired a vested right over the disputed area, which
constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. SEM does not aver or prove that its mining rights had been perfected and completed when the
Philippine Bill of 1902 was still the operative law. Surely, it is impossible for SEM to successfully assert
that it acquired mining rights over the disputed area in accordance with the same bill, since it was only in
1984 that MMC, SEMs predecessor-in-interest, filed its declaration of locations and its prospecting permit
application in compliance with Presidential Decree No. 463. It was on 1 July 1985 and 10 March 1986
that a Prospecting Permit and EP 133, respectively, were issued to MMC. Considering these facts, there
is no possibility that MMC or SEM could have acquired a perfected mining claim under the auspices of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. Whatever mining rights MMC had that it invalidly transferred to SEM cannot, by
any stretch of imagination, be considered mining rights as contemplated under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and immortalized in McDaniel and Gold Creek Mining.
SEM likens EP 133 with a building permit. SEM likewise equates its supposed rights attached to the
exploration permit with the rights that a private property land owner has to said landholding. This analogy
has no basis in law. As earlier discussed, under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, national wealth,
such as mineral resources, are owned by the State and not by their discoverer. The discoverer or locator
can only develop and utilize said minerals for his own benefit if he has complied with all the requirements
set forth by applicable laws and if the State has conferred on him such right through permits, concessions
or agreements. In other words, without the imprimatur of the State, any mining aspirant does not have
any definitive right over the mineral land because, unlike a private landholding, mineral land is owned by
the State, and the same cannot be alienated to any private person as explicitly stated in Section 2, Article
XIV of the 1987 Constitution:
All lands of public domain, waters, minerals x x x and all other natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. (Emphases
supplied.)
Further, a closer scrutiny of the deed of assignment in favor of SEM reveals that MMC assigned to the
former the rights and interests it had in EP 133, thus:
1. That for ONE PESO (P1.00) and other valuable consideration received by the ASSIGNOR
from the ASSIGNEE, the ASSIGNOR hereby ASSIGNS, TRANSFERS and CONVEYS unto the
ASSIGNEE whatever rights or interest the ASSIGNOR may have in the area situated in Monkayo, Davao
del Norte and Cateel, Davao Oriental, identified as Exploration Permit No. 133 and Application for a
Permit to Prospect in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur respectively. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is evident that what MMC had over the disputed area during the assignment was an exploration permit.
Clearly, the right that SEM acquired was limited to exploration, only because MMC was a mere holder of
an exploration permit. As previously explained, SEM did not acquire the rights inherent in the permit, as
the assignment by MMC to SEM was done in violation of the condition stipulated in the permit, and the
assignment was effected without the approval of the proper authority in contravention of the provision of
the mining law governing at that time. In addition, the permit expired on 6 July 1994. It is, therefore, quite
clear that SEM has no right over the area.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has the jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts
and privileges?
HELD:
YES. It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has jurisdiction to cancel mining contracts and privileges.
After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279, RA 7942 and its implementing rules and
regulations, executive issuances, and case law, we rule that the DENR Secretary, not the POA, has the
jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements based on the following
reasons:
The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates from his administrative
authority, supervision, management, and control over mineral resources under Chapter I, Title XIV of
Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages, supervises, and regulates the use and development
of all mineral resources of the country. It has exclusive jurisdiction over the management of all lands of
public domain, which covers mineral resources and deposits from said lands. It has the power to
oversee, supervise, and police our natural resources which include mineral resources. Derived from the
broad and explicit powers of the DENR and its Secretary under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the
power to approve mineral agreements and necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements.
Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR Secretary over the MGB to cancel or
recommend cancellation of mineral rights clearly demonstrates the authority of the DENR Secretary to
cancel or approve the cancellation of mineral agreements.
The DENR Secretarys power to cancel mining rights or agreements through the MGB can be inferred
from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation, and termination of a
permit/mineral agreement/FTAA.
251 has amended Section 85 of RA 3844 by deleting and eliminating the original provision that Land Bank
bonds shall be accepted in the amount of their face value; and (b) to accept the said bonds at their face
value will impair the actuarial solvency of the GSIS and thoroughly prejudice its capacity to pay death,
retirement, insurance, dividends and other benefits and claims to its more than a million members, the
majority of whom are low salaried government employees and workers."
In her appeal to this Court, petitioner Maria Alicia Leuterio submits that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals should be reversed because it was "clear and patent error" on its part 1) to surmise "that the action of the petitioner for legitimation is based on voluntary recognition," and
2) to hold that the "facts and the laws involved place this case squarely on all fours with the case of
Colorado et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39948, February 28, 1985, although the action of herein
petitioner is one for compulsory recognition and for legitimation."
The petition is without merit, and cannot be granted.
It seems to this Court that both the Court of Appeals and the Probate Court were aware of the precise
nature of the petitioner's recourse: a judicial declaration of her compulsory or involuntary recognition as
Pablo Leuterio's natural child. The record discloses that the Probate Court went to some lengths to stress
the distinction between voluntary and compulsory recognition, and to make petitioner's counsel identify
the exact character of the remedy that she was seeking -- whether it be voluntary, or compulsory,
recognition -- quoting in this connection, the exchange between the Judge and petitioner's attorney, which
culminated in the latter's description of the desired relief as "not voluntary acknowledgment in the sense
that the decedent did not execute a public document expressly acknowledging the petitioner Maria Alicia
Leuterio as his natural child. Because we believe that a public document is one of the evidence of
compulsory acknowledgment." It said:
"There should not be confusion in terms: one thing is the acknowledgment of a child by the father, made
voluntarily; another is the action that should be instituted by the child against the father to compel the
latter to acknowledge him as a natural child. The continuous possession of the status of a natural child,
tolerated by his father and justified by direct acts of the latter, does not, of itself, constitute evidence of
acknowledgment that he is so in effect. It is, at most, an evidence to compel the father to acknowledge
him. However, the action for this purpose should be brought within the periods of time prescribed in
Article 137 of the old Civil Code (now Article 285 of the new Civil Code). (Gitt vs. Gitt, 68 Phil. 385)."
The Probate Court's statements correctly reflect the state of the law at the time. In fact, it is consistent
with the statement of the law attempted by petitioner's own distinguished counsel, citing Concepcion vs.
Untaran, 38 Phil., 737, 738, viz.:
"The father of a natural child may recognize it in two different ways: (a) by a voluntary recognition (Art,
131, civ. code); (2) by an involuntary recognition enforced by either a civil or criminal action (Art. 135, Civ.
Code; Art. 499, Pen. Code).
"A voluntary recognition of a natural child may be made: (a) in the record of births; (b) by will; and (c) by
any other public instrument. (Art. 131, Civil Code).
"An involuntary recognition of a natural child is made: (a) by an incontrovertible paper written by the
parent expressly recognizing his paternity; (b) by giving such child the status of a natural child of the
father, justified by direct act of the child of the father or his family (art. 135, Civ. Code); and (c) by a
criminal action for rape, seduction or abduction. (par. 2, art. 449, Pen. Code)."
It was in this sense, too, that the Court of Appeals appeared to have understood and applied the law to
the case. As much is apparent from its declaration that "(r)ecognition under the Civil Code of 1889 must
be precise, express and solemn (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 65 SCRA 161), whether voluntary or
compulsory (Baron vs. Baron, 63 OG No. 2, Jan. 9, 1967)." Like the Probate Court, whose judgment it
affirmed, the Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence failed to prove either the existence of "an
incontrovertible paper written by the parent expressly recognizing his paternity," or the "giving (to) such
child (of) the status of a natural child of the father" conformably with Article 135 of the Civil Code of 1889.
Hence, there was no factual basis on which to rest a declaration of involuntary recognition by Pablo
Leuterio of Maria Alicia as his natural daughter.
Now, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, by familiar doctrine, conclusive on this Court and are
not thus subject of review, specially where those findings are the same as those made by the Trial Court.
There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, but none obtains in the case at bar.
The petitioner also contests the Appellate Court's holding that Article 283 of the present (1950) Civil Code
has no retroactive effect. That conclusion was no doubt based on the fact that Article 2260 of the same
Code expressly accords such effect only to voluntary recognition thus by inference excluding compulsory
recognition for the causes or under the circumstances enumerated in Article 283, with its "catch-all"
provision that recognition may be compelled if the child has in his favor "any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father." While a contrary view, i.e., in favor of retroactivity, may find support in the
excepting clause of Article 2253, also of the Civil Code, which gives effect to rights declared for the first
time therein, though arising from acts done or events occurred under prior law provided no vested or
acquired rights of the same origin are prejudiced thereby, there is little point in pursuing that question
insofar as the resolution of this appeal is concerned.
Whether Article 283 has retroactive effect or it operates only prospectively, the fact is that both the
Probate Court and the Court of Appeals rejected in its entirety -- as variously, insufficient, unpersuasive
and spurious -- petitioner's evidence both oral and documentary bearing on her alleged status as a
natural child of Pablo Leuterio. That rejection forecloses the claim of petitioner to either voluntary or
compulsory recognition, be it made under the Civil Code of 1889 which was in force at the time of her
asserted birth or, in the case of compulsory recognition, under the more liberal Article 283 of the present
Code. It can hardly be disputed that in opening the door to "any evidence" of paternity in an action to
compel acknowledgment, Article 283 by no means did away with the usual tests of competence,
sufficiency and credibility to which such evidence is subject when offered in a court of law, or strip the
courts of their function and prerogative of passing upon its acceptability after applying such tests. Such
evidence here having been found wanting after due assessment as already stated, petitioner's claim was
properly denied.
To support their claim that OCT No. 4216 is genuine, the petitioners have submitted, among other things,
the following pieces of documentary evidence:
(1) The original of OCT No. 4216, as well as the owners duplicate certificates, on file with the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal;
(2) The publications (in the English and Spanish versions) of the Official Gazette (1927 editions),
containing notices of the initial hearing in Land Registration Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406),
instituted by the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos, covering a parcel of land in Tindig na
Mangga, Las Pias;
(3) The order of then CFI Judge Cecilia Muoz-Palma, dated 23 March 1961, in LRC Case No. N-2126
(GLRO Record No. N-6564), denying the registration of a parcel of land by reason of the certification,
dated 26 June 1959, of the Land Registration Commissioner, Antonio N. Noblejas, that a portion of the
property covered in this post-war land case had been decreed under Decree No. 351823, issued on 05
March 1929, in the name of the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana A. Carlos in LRC Case No. 672
(GLRO Record No. 30406), and while said case covered only a part of the property in dispute, it did show,
however, that the decree was, in fact, issued to the spouses Gana and Carlos;
(4) The Report, dated 07 June 1983, of the Land Registration Commission's Verification Committee,
sustaining the validity of Decree No. 351823 in favor of Lorenzo J. Gana and Maria Juliana A. Carlos;
(5) Page 209 of the Book of Decrees (Old Book) of the Land Registration Commission, showing that a
decree was "okayed" in GLRO Record No. 30406 (LRC Case No. 672), under the entry "Date O.K. for
Decree" on "1-22-29" (22 January 1929) and that a decree was issued under the entry "Date Decree
Issued" on "3-5-29" (05 March 1929);
(6) The certified true microfilm reproduction of plan Psu-49273 covering a parcel of land in Barrio Tindig
na Mangga, Las Pias, surveyed for Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos, approved by the Bureau of
Lands in 1926;
(7) The decision of this Court in Guico vs. San Pedro, 72 Phil. 415, pointing to the decision rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Rizal in LRC Case No. 672 in favor of the spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria
Juliana Carlos; and
(8) The letters of Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, stating that
the information and documents submitted to the Office of the Solicitor General by the Bureau of Lands
and the Land Registration Commission were not sufficient to support an action for cancellation of OCT
No. 4216 and the derivative titles thereof.
HELD: The above documentary evidence is much too overwhelming to be simply brushed aside. It is our
considered view that the appellate court has committed serious error in refusing to give any probative
value to such evidence. All that the private respondents could basically proffer against OCT 4216 are that
(1) The title is invalid, fake and spurious, which must have been the work of "some unscrupulous
elements" who could have access to "the Registry Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal," that explains petitioners' failure to present a copy of the decision in Land Registration
Case No. 672 or Decree No. 351823; and
(2) Assuming OCT No. 4216 to have been issued, the same is invalid having been issued on still
unclassified land of the public domain.
Section 3, Rule 130, of the Revised Rules of Court, taken from Section 321 of Act No. 190, states:
"Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office."
It has been plainly shown that the failure of the petitioners to produce the Decree is due to the burning of
the Archives of the Court of First Instance of Rizal during the liberation of Pasig, in consequence of which
all pre-war land registration cases in Rizal have been destroyed. The respondents own witness, Eduardo
Santos, Jr., has testified that the records of pre-war registration cases are thus incomplete as can be
expected. The Certification, dated 02 May 1980, of Reynaldo S. Vergara, Acting Chief of the Docket
Division of the Land Registration Authority, states that the pre-war record of LRC Case No. 672, GLRO
Record No. 030406 for the province of Rizal, is not among the records on file with the Vault Section of the
Docket Division since the same must have been lost or destroyed as a consequence of the last world war.
Certainly, the petitioners cannot be held to account for those lost or destroyed records.
The private respondents argue that the petitioners should have asked for the reconstitution of the LRC
case and the decree in accordance with Act No. 3110 and Republic Act No. 26, or that they could have
opposed, or intervened in, the proceedings in LRC Case No. N-6625 (LRC Record No. N-36579) where
OCT No. A-S-47 has been decreed. For failing to do so, the petitioners, it is now contended, should be
held bound by the order of default issued by the land registration court. The argument is unacceptable.
The petitioners are not covered by the general order of default in LRC Case No. N-6625. Republic Act
No. 26 only covers lost or destroyed certificates of title. The original of OCT No. 4216 is not extant; it has,
in fact, been presented in evidence. Act No. 3110, on the other hand, applies only to pending judicial
proceedings. This Court has heretofore held, thus "The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce or replace records lost or destroyed so that said
records may be complete and court proceedings may continue from the point or stage where said
proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records. x x x.
"xxx
xxx
xxx.
"If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost and they are not reconstituted, the parties and the
court should go back to the next preceding stage where records are available, but not beyond that;
otherwise to ignore and go beyond the stage next preceding would be voiding and unnecessarily ignoring
proceedings which are duly recorded and documented, to the great prejudice not only of the parties and
their witnesses, but also of the court which must gain perforce admit pleadings, rule upon them and then
try the case and decide it anew,--all of these, when the records up to said point or stage are intact and
complete, and uncontroverted.
"x x x. Act No. 3110, was not promulgated to penalize people for failure to observe or invoke its
provisions. It contains no penal sanction. It was enacted rather to aid and benefit litigants, so that when
court records are destroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings, instead of instituting a new case and
starting all over again, they may reconstitute the records lost and continue the case. If they fail to ask for
reconstitution, the worst that can happen to them is that they lose the advantages provided by the
reconstitution law. x x x.
"x x x. (T)o require the parties to file their action anew and incur the expenses and suf(f)er the annoyance
and vexation incident to the filing of pleadings and the conduct of hearings, aside from the possibility that
some of the witnesses may have died or left the jurisdiction, and also to require the court to again rule on
the pleadings and hear the witnesses and then decide the case, when all along and all the time the record
of the former pleadings of the trial and evidence and decision are there and are not disputed, all this
would appear to be not exactly logical or reasonable, or fair and just to the parties, including the trial court
which has not committed any negligence or fault at all.
Furthermore, Section 45 of Act No. 3110, provides that "(n)othing contained in (the) Act shall be construed
to repeal or modify the provisions of Section Three Hundred and Twenty One of Act Numbered One
Hundred and Ninety." Section 321 of Act No. 190 is now Section 3 (aforequoted), Rule 130, of the
Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule." Hence, even if the petitioners have
failed to have the records of the LRC case reconstituted, they are not precluded from establishing by
other evidence the requisite proof of validity of OCT No. 4216.
Quite recently, in Widows and Orphans Association, Inc. (WIDORA) vs. Court of Appeals, this Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Florentino Feliciano, said:
"x x x. The copy of OCT No. 351 offered by Ortigas was a certified true copy of the original thereof found
in the Registration Book of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. The admissibility of such a copy in court
proceedings is an exception to the ordinary rule on secondary evidence; such admissibility is in fact
mandated by Section 47 of Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act). Under the Land Registration Act
which was in force at the time OCT No. 351 issued, the original thereof found in the Registration Book of
the Register of Deeds of Rizal was an official transcript of Decree No. 1425, with respect to the land
covered by such decree situated in the Province of Rizal.
"Thus, OCT No. 351 constitutes direct proof of the existence of Decree No. 1425 upon which the Ortigas
TCTs (Nos. 77652 and 77653) are based. x x x." (Footnotes omitted; underscoring supplied.)
The private respondents maintain, nonetheless, that OCT No. 4216, issued in favor of the spouses Gana
and Carlos, is invalid, so covering, as it supposedly did, unclassified public lands. Here, the private
respondents base their claim on Forestry Administration Order (FAO) No. 4-1141 (1968), implementing
LC Map No. 2623, Project No. 13-A. According to them, Las Pias comprises 2,556 hectares, out of
which 1,200 hectares have been declared alienable and disposable public lands in 1928, under LC Map
No. 766, Project 13, and that "Tindig na Mangga" has not been covered thereby until the reclassification
in 1968. As such, they submit, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting as Land Registration Court in
1929, did not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the property in question to the petitioners predecessors-ininterest.
No cogent proof, however, has been given to support the above contention. To the contrary, in fact, is the
letter, dated 27 April 1988, of then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, which in part, reads:
"Thirdly, it is also alleged that the title is null and void because it allegedly covers land within the forest
zone. There is no clear-cut proof to that effect. The certification of Mr. Rogelio dela Rosa of the Timber
Management Division, Bureau of Forest Development, dated July 31, 1979, simply states that the tract of
land situated in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Pias, Metro Manila containing an area of 197,525 square
meters as shown and described on this plan Psu-04-006417 x x x was found to be within the Alienable or
Disposable Block of LC Project No. 13-A of Las Pias, Rizal certified as such on January 3, 1968 per BFD
Map LC-2623. The certification refers to land with an area of only 19.7525 hectares. It does not state the
relationship of said land with the land covered by OCT No. 4216 which has an area of 99.6157 hectares.
"xxx
xxx
xxx.
"Fifthly, the recommendation of the Director of Lands for the cancellation of OCT No. 4216 is premised
mainly on the allegation that the land is within the forest zone, having been allegedly released as A & D
land only in 1968. But the recommendation is based on the same certification of Mr. de la Rosa of the
Bureau of Forest Development which, as earlier observed, does not make any clear reference to the land
covered by OCT No. 4216 and is, therefore, vague and inconclusive."
Unfortunately, for all concerned, no authentic copy of LC Map No. 766, Project 13, could be presented,
albeit understandably, considering that even the records of the National Mapping and Resource Authority
(NAMREA) have apparently been lost or destroyed during the second World War.
In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (a case to annul a 1912
decision of the land registration court), the Republic sought to prove that, at the time an original certificate
of title was issued, the land covered thereby was still within the forest zone. It offered as evidence a land
classification map prepared by the Director of Forestry in 1961. The Court ruled:
x x x. When the proceedings were originally filed by the Republic before the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner contended that when the decree in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the
parcels of land were still part of the inalienable public forests. However, petitioner's case rested solely on
land classification maps drawn several years after the issuance of the decree in 1912. These maps failed
to conclusively establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior to that. Before
this Court, petitioner reiterates said contention and refers, for the first time, to a 1908 proclamation
reserving the land in Zambales as a naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of land are
parts thereof. These x x x are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the decree's
regularity x x x."
Furthermore, FAO No. 4-1141, signed by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R.
Tanco, Jr., on 03 January 1968, provides:
"1. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code, I hereby declare as
alienable or disposable and place the same under the control of the Bureau of Lands for administration
and disposition in accordance with the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be and to the
conditions herein specified, the portions of the public domain situated in the Municipalities of x x x Las
Pias, x x x Province of Rizal x x x which are designated and described as alienable or disposable on
Bureau of Forestry Map LC-2623, approved on January 3, 1968." (Underscoring supplied.)
The issuance of OCT No. 4216 in 1929, conferring a private right, is then amply protected by FAO No. 41141; otherwise, certificates of title issued prior to 1968 could possibly be all nullified.
Finally, the private respondents raise estoppel by laches on the part of the petitioners. Laches is "the
failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
has declined to assert it.
Contrary to private respondents claim that no action was taken by the petitioners until a petition for
quieting of title was filed in 1985 by the private respondents themselves, the records would indicate that
upon the subdivision of the lots in question by Espiritu and Gonzales, and the subsequent transfers of the
same to the private respondents in 1976, a demand was seasonably made by the petitioners for the
private respondents to vacate the premises. From the time OCT No. A-S-47 was issued to the private
respondents in 1969 until the demand was made in 1976, only seven (7) years had elapsed.
Lastly, it is a settled rule that "when two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering the
same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail, and, in case of successive registrations
where more than one certificate is issued over the land, the person holding a prior certificate is entitled to
the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certificate. The titles of the petitioners, having
emanated from an older title, should thus be upheld.
.
ruled,
upholding
the
Solicitor-General's
contention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not land is alienable
HELD:
The
SC
affirmed.
Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the
dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes, there must be a positive act from the Government.
Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest
land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural
lands
of
the
public
domain.
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not confer any validity on such title if
the property covered by the title or patent is part of the public forest.
Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest: Director of Lands v. IAC (1986)
Labels: 1986, Case Digest, Juris Doctor, Land Titles and Deeds, Land Titles and Deeds Case Digest
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and Deeds)
FACTS:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano
and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land
possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan
land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to
members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the
alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements
ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly recognized by the government
when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela
donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of
ISSUES:
W/N the land is already a private land - YES
W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations appliesNO
HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
YES
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefore is sufficient
it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of
the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also
be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural
lands in excess of 1,024 hectares
JOYA VS. PCGG [225 SCRA 568; G.R. No. 96541; 24 Aug 1993]
Friday,
January
30,
2009
Posted
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
by Coffeeholic
Writes
Facts: On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President Corazon
C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson andWoods International, Inc concerning
the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of eighty-two) Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware
seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manilaalleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth
of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. On 14 August 1990, then President Aquino,
through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., authorized Chairman Caparas to sign
the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of New York to auction off the subject art pieces for and in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. On 15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas,
representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed the Consignment Agreement with
Christie's of New York. According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public
auction the eighty-two Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan Museum of Manila as well as
the silverware contained in seventy-one cartons in the custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and
such other property as may subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be
subject
to
the
provisions
of
the
agreement.
On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo submitted to
President Aquino the audit findings and observations of COA on the Consignment Agreement of 15
August 1990 to the effect that: the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into
the Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; the contract was highly disadvantageous to the
government; PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, the assets
subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence, their disposal was prohibited
by
law.
After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued immediately our resolution denying
the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that
petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order and that proper parties had not been
impleaded.
On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of
$13,302,604.86
were
turned
over
to
the
Bureau
of
Treasury.
Issues:
(1)
Whether
or
not
petitioners
have
legal
standing.
(2) Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase "cultural
treasure
of
the
nation".
(3) Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on which can be
disposed
of
through
the
joint
concurrence
of
the
President
and
Congress.
(4) Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutory requirements for
the
exportation
and
sale
of
the
subject
items.
(5) Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether the above Issue
warrant
resolution
from
this
Court.
Held: This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in
the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court
will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and
to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a
desire
to
vindicate
the constitutional right
of
some
third
and
related
party.
There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal
standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for
the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity
of
a
governmental
act
authorizing
the
disbursement
of
public
funds.
Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. The ownership of these
paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has
been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.
The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to
mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without
complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these
properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their
acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners
thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes
and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the
valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever
to
question
their
alleged
unauthorized disposition.
Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any
expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is
worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private
sources
and
not
with
public
money.
Anent the second requisite of actual controversy, petitioners argue that this case should be resolved by
this Court as an exception to the rule on moot and academic cases; that although the sale of the paintings
and silver has long been consummated and the possibility of retrieving the treasure trove is nil, yet the
novelty and importance of the Issue raised by the petition deserve this Court's attention. They submit that
the resolution by the Court of the Issue in this case will establish future guiding principles and doctrines
on the preservation of the nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the public
as
a
whole.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of controversy one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations
not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become
stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent
public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991
which is long past, the Issue raised in the petition have become moot and academic.
The cultural properties of the nation which shall be under the protection of the state are classified as the
"important cultural properties" and the "national cultural treasures." On the other hand, a "national cultural
treasures" is a unique object found locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural, artistic and/or
scientific value which is highly significant and important to this country and nation. This Court takes note
of the certification issued by the Director of the Museum that the Italian paintings and silverware subject of
this petition do not constitute protected cultural properties and are not among those listed in the Cultural
Properties
Register
of
the
National
Museum.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus is DISMISSED.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as proFilipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting
rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that
the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the
rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.
MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village [328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000]
Friday,
January
30,
2009
Posted
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
by Coffeeholic Writes
Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency
tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent
herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use
of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of
persons and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act
No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separatingthe
subdivision
and
Kalayaan Avenue would
be
demolished.
The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do
so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower
courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent
of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory
and
police
powers.
Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity toexercise police power. Police power is
primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government
units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the
MMDA cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of
the government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable
in
the
said
act
that
grants
MMDA
police
power.
It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various national
government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for
the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.
cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of one Vicar Calix who, according to petitioner, bought the
Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. It was later found out that he converted the
narra trunk into lumber.
He was found guilty by the Trial Court but he appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial.
Petitioner also contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was based on
a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under Section 80 of PD 705. CA affirmed the
lower courts ruling, but ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. Also, it
sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the
narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR permit.
Ruling:
Yes, The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure list the cases which must be initiated by a
complaint filed by specified individuals, non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from
trying such cases. However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against chastity and
not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not
prohibit an interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section
68 of PD 705, as amended.
Moreover, here, it was not forest officers of employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who
reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who
claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an
investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or
report." At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules,
from filing a complaint ]before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
2. Yes, Petitioner is guilty of the second paragraph of section 80, which is the cutting, gathering, collecting, or
removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority. The court
also said that the lumber or processed log is covered by the forest products term in PD 705, as the law
does not distinguish between a raw and processed timber.
A.M. No. MTJ-93-874 March 14, 1995
AUGUSTUS L. MOMONGAN petitioner, vs. JUDGE RAFAEL B. OMIPON, respondent.
Issue:
Whether the respondent Judge erred in releasing the truck used to transport an illegal lumber
despite of prima facie evidence for violation of PD 705 as amended by EO 277.
Facts:
Augustus Momongan is the Regional Director of DENR in Tacloban City, while the respondent
Judge Omipon is the incumbent Judge of MCTC of Hinunangan Silago, Southern Leyte. At around 10:00
of November 14, 1992 the police officer of Hinunangan Silago, Southern Leyte apprehended a truck
loaded with illegally cut lumber. The truck was owned by Basilio Cabig drived by Dionisio Golpe. After the
apprehension and confiscation, a preliminary investigation was done to determine whether there is a
probable cause to engender the owner of the truck and the driver guilty on the violation of PD 705.
Despite of the presence of prima facie evidence the respondent Judge ordered the release of the truck
apprehended. Mr.Cabig was charged against PD 705 but Mr. Golpe the driver was not included in the
complaint.
The Regional Director Momongan filed an instant complaint against the judge alleging that the
release order was a violation of PD 705 Sections 68 and 68-A respectively, and Administrative Order No.
59.Complainant claims that respondent Judge has no authority to order the release of the truck despite
the non-inclusion of Mr. Golpe in the complaint. The truck should have been turned over to the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of San Juan, Southern Leyte for appropriate
disposition as the same falls under the administrative jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Office.
Respondent Judge explained that after conducting the preliminary investigation, he found that
Golpe, the owner of the truck, is principally engaged in the hauling of sand and gravel and the delivery of
hollow blocks, and the loading of the timber in the car is due to the request of his friend Cabig.
Respondent Judge observed that Golpe has a lesser participation in the crime of illegal logging. More
importantly, the fact that the complaint charged only Cabig, respondent Judge, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, ordered the release of the truck owned by Golpe.
Ruling:
No, The court found that the respondent order to release the truck owned and driven by Mr.
Dionisio Golpe legally justifiable. According to the RPC, Every penalty imposed for the commission of a
felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instrument or tools with which it
was committed." However, this cannot be done if such proceeds and instruments or tools "be the property
of a third person not liable for offense." In this case, the truck, though used to transport the illegally cut
lumber, cannot be confiscated and forfeited in the event accused therein be convicted because the truck
owner/driver, Mr. Dionisio Golpe was not indicted. Hence, there was no justification for respondent Judge
not to release the truck.
Complainant is correct in pointing out that the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized
representative has the power to confiscate any illegally obtained or gathered forest products and all
conveyances used in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws. The release of the truck did not render nugatory the administrative authority of the DENR
Secretary. Despite the order of release, the truck can be seized again either by filing a motion for
reinvestigation and motion to include the truck owner/driver, as co-accused, which complainant has done
as manifested before the lower court or by enforcing Adm. Order No. 59. Section 12.
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented
by
their
parents
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding
Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Issue
Whether children have the legal standing to file the case?
Facts
This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44 children, through their parents, claiming
that they bring the case in the name of their generation as well as those generations yet unborn. Aiming
to stop deforestation, it was filed against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to
cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The children invoked
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens
patriae.
The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing
them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural lawand violative of plaintiffs' right to
self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on nonimpairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to
file the case based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility. Their right to a healthy
environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In
this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the
law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the
interest of public welfare.
On March 23, 1977, the named accused filed a motion to quash the information
on 2grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and, (2) that the information
does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. Trial court thus dismissed the information based on
the respondents grounds.
Ruling:
The elements of the crime of qualified theft of logs are: 1) That the accused cut, gathered,
collected or removed timber or other forest products; 2) that the timber or other forest products cut
,gathered, collected or removed belongs to the government or to any private individual; and 3) that the
cutting, gathering, collecting or removing was without authority under a license agreement, leas, license, or
permit granted by the state. The failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the
state is not fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public
forest but from private woodland registered in the name of complainant's deceased father, Macario
Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease does not make the
state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the Philippines including those produced
in private woodlands. Thus, ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of
P.D. No. 705. As to the second issue raised, the regular courts still has jurisdiction. Sec. 80 of PD
705covers 2 specific instances when a forest officer may commence a prosecution for the violation of the
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines.
The first authorizes a forest officer or employee of the Bureau of Forestry to arrest without a warrant,
any person who has committed or is committing, in his presence, any of the offenses described in the
decree. The second covers a situation when an offense described in the decree is not committed in the
presence of the forest officer or employee and the commission is brought to his attention by a report or a
complaint. In both cases, however, the forest officer or employee shall investigate the offender and file a
complaint with the appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation and file the
necessary informations in court. Unfortunately, the instant case does not fall under any of the situations covered
by Section 80 of P.D. 705. The alleged offense was committed not in the presence of a forest officer and neither
was the alleged commission reported to any forest officer. The offense was committed in a private land
and the complaint was brought by a private offended party to the fiscal. As such, the OSG was
correct in insisting that P.D. 705 did not repeal Section 1687 of the Administrative Code giving
authority to the fiscal to conduct investigation into the crime of demeanour and have the necessary information
or complaint prepared or made against person charged with the commission of the crime. In short, Section 80
does not grant exclusive authority to the forest officers, but only special authority to reinforce the exercise of
such by those upon whom vested by the general law.
G.R. No. 136142
October 24, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO DATOR et.al , Accused- Appelant
Issue:
Whether the penalty imposed to Telan the accused is correct in violation of PD 705
Facts:
Pator Teala and his co accused Alfonso Dator and Benito Genol were charged with the crime of
violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.
The accused while transporting pieces of lumber bound to Maasin Souther Leyte, they were apprehended
by the police officer and seized pieces of lumber. As a result SPO1 Bacala issued a seizure receipt
covering the fifty-one (51) pieces of confiscated Dita and Antipolo lumber and one (1) unit of Isuzu cargo
truck with Plate No. HAF 628. The confiscated pieces of lumber and the cargo truck were turned over to
SPO3 Daniel Lasala, PNP Property Custodian of Maasin, Southern Leyte who, in turn, officially
transferred custody of the same to the CENRO, Maasin, Southern Leyte. The accused Telan alleged that
the pieces of lumber were cut from the track of land belonging to his mother in San Jose, Maasin,
Southern Leyte which he intended to use in the renovation of his house in Barangay Abgao of the same
municipality. He further contends that he secured verbal permission to Boy Leonor an officer-in -charge of
the DENR.
The lower courts found out that the accused is guilty in violation of PD 705 sentencing the
accused to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties
provided by law, which is two (2) degrees higher than PRISION MAYOR maximum, the authorized penalty
similar to Qualified Theft, and to pay the costs. Thus, this case was elevated to the court.
Ruling:
No, In the case at bench, the confiscated fifty-one (51) pieces of assorted Dita and Antipolo
lumber were classified by the CENRO officials as soft, and therefore not premium quality lumber. It may
be noted that the said pieces of lumber were cut by the appellant, a mere janitor in a public hospital, from
the land owned by his mother, not for commercial purposes but to be utilized in the renovation of his
house. It does not appear that appellant Telen had been convicted nor was he an accused in any other
pending criminal case involving violation of any of the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code (P.D. No.
705, as amended). In view of the attendant circumstances of this case, and in the interest of justice, the
basis for the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be the minimum amount under Article 309
paragraph (6) of the Revised Penal Code which carries the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods for simple theft.
Considering that the crime of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended,
is punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the said decree,
the imposable penalty on the appellant shall be increased by two degrees, that is, from arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods to prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed on the appellant should be six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WILSON B. QUE, accused-appellant
Issue:
Whether the appellants activities consist an offense
Facts:
Provincial Task Force got wind that a that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548
loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information,
members of the PTF went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo
Avenue in Laoag City. On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1
Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the
corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck
with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.On
June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of
Section 68 of P.D. 705as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged that, on or about the 8 th day of
March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten Wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control
and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products Chain saw lumber (Species of Tanguile) with
a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of
P93,232.50 atP25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the proper authorities
Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile
lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa and Elpidio Sabal
The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by the
permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by the PLTPs of Cayosa
and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services
Ruling:
Yes, Possession of the lumber without the necessary permit is a violation of the RFC. When the
police apprehended Que, he failed to present documentary evidence to prove that he has the permit to
possess and transport the lumber. All he had was the permit for the coconut slabs. He even concealed the
lumber so as to avoid it from being seen upon first inspection of the load. Under the circumstances, there
is no doubt that the accused was aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber,
but could not secure one and therefore, concealed such by placing it in such a manner that it could not be
seen by merely looking at the cargo. There are 2 ways of violating Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Code:
a. by cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without licence and
b. by possessing timber or other forest products without required legal documents.
In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of said acts. However, in the second
offense, mere possession without proper documentation consummates the crime.
G.R. No. 161798
October 20, 2004
PICOP RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. AUGUSTUS L. CALO, Presiding Judge, respondent
Issue;
Whether petitioner has the right to retain the seized confiscated products by the virtue of MOA
regarding the Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree Plantation.
Facts:
Petitioner PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) owns and operates a multi-billion peso pulp and
paper manufacturing facility in Bislig City, Agusan del Norte. It holds government-issued Pulpwood and
Timber License Agreement (PTLA) No. 47 and Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. 35
which gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and develop with the State almost 130,000
hectares of forest land within the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its officers, rendered
three Memoranda, dated August 22, 1997, February 16, 2001 and April 6, 2001 designating the petitioner
as DENR depository and custodian for apprehended forest products and conveyances within its
concession. On May 25, 2001, the Office of the CENRO-Bislig and petitioner entered into a Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) containing "Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Verification of Private Tree
Plantation." The MOA provided, among others, that field validation/verification of applications for
Certificates of Private Tree Ownership (CTPOs) shall be conducted jointly by the DENR, the local
government unit concerned, and petitioner. Pursuant to these Memoranda, petitioners security personnel
were deputized as DENR officers to apprehend and seize the tools, equipment and conveyance used in
the commission of illegal logging and the forest products removed and possessed by the offenders.
In the course of the enforcement of the aforesaid Memoranda, petitioner PICOP, through its
security personnel, had on numerous occasions apprehended within its concession and tree plantation
area. These illegally cut forest products and conveyances were kept in PICOPs impounding area.
A class suit was initiated among the members of UFAB asking for preliminary mandatory
Injunction. They further asked for the declaration of the memoranda null and void and sought to restrain
the DENR and those who are participants from enforcing the said memoranda. The RTC ordered Elias R.
Seraspio, Jr. to recall, withdraw and abrogate the enforcement of the assailed Memorandum dated
February 16, 2001 and to refrain and desist from implementation. Petitioner was also ordered to release
the confiscated falcata logs and vehicles to the owners thereof, or to the CENRO-Bislig or the Office of
the Government Prosecution-Surigao del Sur, where the administrative and criminal proceedings were
ongoing.
Ruling:
Petitioner had no right or interest to protect in the confiscated forest products and conveyances.
Petitioners compound was used only as a depository for the confiscated logs and conveyances by virtue
of the Memorandum. While it claimed that some of the confiscated forest products may have come from
its concession area, petitioner admitted that the ownership of the confiscated products was still to be
determined in the cases pending either at the CENRO-Bislig or at the Office of the Government
Prosecution-Surigao del Sur. Hence, petitioners interest in the confiscated forest products was merely
contingent and cannot be material as contemplated under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Petitioner contends that private respondents intrusion was in violation of petitioners PTLA
No. 47 and IFMA No. 35. These license agreements gave petitioner the exclusive right to co-manage and
develop forest lands, and recognized petitioner as owner of the trees and other products in the
concession area. In filing this petition, petitioner is merely defending its subsisting proprietary interest
pursuant to these license agreements.
It is clear that petitioner has no material interest to protect in the confiscated forest products and
conveyances. It has no subsisting proprietary interest, as borne out by its licensing agreements, which
need to be protected by annulling the writ of injunction issued by the trial court. Petitioner also cannot
claim the right to retain custody of the apprehended logs and conveyances by virtue of its being
designated a depository of the DENR pursuant to the assailed Memoranda. As such depository, petitioner
merely holds the confiscated products and conveyances in custody for the DENR while the administrative
or criminal proceedings regarding said products are pending.
the timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin and Latayada were personally involved in its
procurement, delivery and storage without any license or permit issued by any competent authority. Given
these and considering that the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners contention that the possession of
the illegally cut timber was not for personal gain but for the repair of said bridge is, therefore,
inconsequential.
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require. XXX
XXX
XXX
Hence, for the herein petitioners to lodge the instant action, they must first be a person
aggrieved, otherwise, they would be without legal standing to pursue this legal recourse. That having
been said, this Court rules that the herein petitioners are not persons aggrieved by the assailed decision
of the trial court in the subject criminal cases. It is elementary in criminal law that a crime is an offense
against the State, and is hence prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines. For this reason,
Section 5 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that all criminal actions
commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
prosecutor. Furthermore, Section 1 of P.D. 1275, provides the exclusive domain of the prosecutory arm
of the government as how best to deal with the prosecution of criminal cases. Hence, any grievance in
course thereof affecting the interest of the State must proceed only from such an arm of the government.
that its provisions on tariff differential, stocking of inventories, and predatory pricing inhibit fair
competition, encourage monopolistic power, and interfere with the free interaction of the market forces.
As a result of the Tatad decision, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8479, a new deregulation
law without the offending provisions of the earlier law. Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, a member of
Congress, has brought the petition seeking to declare Section 19 thereof, which sets the time of full
deregulation, unconstitutional. After failing in his attempts to have Congress incorporate in the law the
economic theory he espouses, petitioner asks the court, in the name of upholding the Constitution, to
undo a violation which he claims Congress has committed.
Ruling:
No, It bears stressing that R.A. 8180 was declared invalid not because deregulation is
unconstitutional. The law was struck down because, as crafted, three key provisions plainly encouraged
the continued existence if not the proliferation of the constitutionally proscribed evils of monopoly and
restraint of trade. It is not the function of the Court to safeguard the members of the congress on what law
they will enact because this is the exact tenet on the encroachment of power as stipulated on the principle
of separation of power. The court as a whole, respects the laws legislate by the congress. The validity of
such laws, may only be impugned if it violates the Constitution. In the case at bar, the Constitution perse
was not violated nor ridiculed.
G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE
HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 70, REGIONAL
TRIAL
COURT
OF
BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET DEVELOPMENT,
INC.
and CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF
BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.
Issue:
Whether the Local Government Code Code of 1991 repealed the Charter of Laguna Lake
Developmental Authority (RA NO. 4850) in the issuance of fish pen permits and other related activity
involving Laguna de Bay.
Facts:
This is a petition made by Laguna Lake Development Authority to declare an exclusive power on
the regulation of issuing a fish open permits over the businessmen engage in the Laguna de bay. The
power to issue a permit was then transferred to the office of the mayor on the different municipalities of
Laguna thus making the Laguna de bay crowded and unhealthy for living of natural resources and danger
to the livelihood among the folks of Laguna.
Ruling:
No, the court holds that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the
laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over
Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any express
provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there
was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments.
It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a
special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in
statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed
to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided
for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms,
provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the
general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law."
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail
since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken
as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere
implication.Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991.
G.R. No. L-68474 February 11, 1986
NUCLEAR FREE PHILIPPINE COALITION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs. NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. 70632 February 11, 1986
LORENZO M. TAADA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, ET AL.,
respondents.
Issue:
Whether the judgement of PAEC on the nuclear power plant safe.
Facts:
a. G.R. No. 70632, petitioners question the competence of respondent PAEC Commissioners to
pass judgment on the safety of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant-1 PNPP-1 in PAEC Licensing
Proceedings No. 1-77 without however seeking their ouster from office, although "proven competence" is
one of the qualifications prescribed by law for PAEC Commissioners. Petitioners also assail the validity of
the motion (application) filed by the National Power Corporation (NPC) for the conversion of its
construction permit into an operating license for PNPP-1 on the principal ground that it contained no
information regarding the financial qualifications of NPC, its source of nuclear fuel, and insurance
coverage for nuclear damage.
b.. In G.R. No. 68474, acting on the motion filed therein dated June 8, 1985 to order PAEC to
reconsider its orders of May 31 and June 5, 1985, the urgent motion for mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order dated August 3, 1985, the second urgent motion for mandatory injunction dated August
12, 1985, and the various pleadings and other documents submitted by the parties relative thereto, and
considering the paramount need of a reasonable assurance that the operation of PNPP-1 will not pose an
undue risk to the health and safety of the people, which dictates that the conduct of the inquiry into the
safety aspects of PNPP-1 be characterized by sufficient latitude, the better to achieve the end in view,
unfettered by technical rules of evidence (Republic Act 5207, section 34), and in keeping with the
requirements of due process in administrative proceedings.
Ruling:
a. The Court therefore resolved to RESTRAIN respondent PAEC Commissioners from further
acting in PAEC Licensing Proceedings No. 1-77.the said decision is due to the pamphlets that PAEC had
circulated. Having thus prejudged the safety of the PNPP-1 respondent PAEC Commissioners would be
acting with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction were they to sit in judgment upon
the safety of the plant, absent the requisite objectivity that must characterize such an important inquiry.
b. The respondent PAEC (once reconstituted) to re-open the hearing on PNPP-1 so as to give
petitioners sufficient time to complete their cross-examination of the expert witnesses on quality
assurance, to cross-examine the witnesses that petitioners have failed to cross-examine on and after
August 9, 1985, and to complete the presentation of their evidence, for which purpose, respondent PAEC
shall issue the necessary subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to compel the attendance of relevant
witnesses and/or the production of relevant documents. For the said purposes, the PAEC may prescribe a
time schedule which shall reasonably assure the parties sufficient latitude to adequately present their
case consistently with the requirements of dispatch. lt is understood that the PAEC may give NPC the
opportunity to correct or supply deficiencies in this application or evidence in support thereof.
Azucena
Salalima
vs.
Employees
Compensation
Comm.
and
Soc.
Sec.
System
G.R. No.-146360
Facts:
Petitioners husband Juancho Saldima was employed for twenty nine years as a route helper and
salesman for the Meycauayan Plant of Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines Inc. during the annual company
medical examination, Juancho was diagnosed with pulmonary tuberculosis. Later found him to have
cancer of the lungs and died after few months. Azucena, the wife of Juancho is now claiming for the
benefits of her husband from the company and the SSS. RTC dismissed the case. CA affirmed and this
petition was therefore filed.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is entitled to benefits provided by P.D. 626
Held:
SC answered in the affirmative. Because the facts of the case showed that the cause of Juanchos death
was his mere work and that his medical history states that his stay at Coca cola is a contributory to his
sickness. SSS was ordered to pay the claimant and the RTCs and CAs decisions were reversed and set
aside.
Social
Justice
Society,
et.
al.
vs.
Honorable
Jose
Atienza,
Jr.
G.R. No. 156052
Facts:
Chevron is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum products in the
Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged in the business of manufacturing, refining and likewise
importing and marketing of petroleum products. Petitioners sought to compel Mayor Tienza to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 which was enacted by Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila and became effective
upon approval by Mayor Atienza. This ordinance reclassifies the area described from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners to cease and desist from operating their business within 6 months.
Among the business is the Pandacan Terminal of the Oil companies. Oil companies intervened in the
issue attacking the validity of the ordinance.
Issue:
Whether the ordinance approved by respondent is valid or not
Held:
Valid. Because the tremendous event happened near the area which many were put into danger, the
Manila Municipal Office shall do its ministerial duty to protect all property and health of those people who
lived in the vicinity and nearby cities. The court ordered the transfer of Pandacan Terminal within a non
extendible period of 90 days. The life of the people shall be the utmost priority of the government in terms
of its security, though the business will lose billions of money, the municipality cannot sacrifice its people.
Filinvest
Credit
Corporation
vs.
IAC
and
Nestor
Sunga,
Jr.
G.R. No. 65935
Facts:
A case filed by Nestor Sunga Jr., businessman and owner of the NBS Machineries and the NAP-NAP
Transit. He purchased a minibus Mazda from Motorcester with an agreement to pay the balance in
monthly basis. Later, Nestor failed to pay his obligations to the company which cause the confiscation of
the minibus by the officers of Filinvest Corp. The minibus was mortgaged to Filinvest Corp. Sunga cleared
his obligations to Filinvest which the court rendered decisions granting Sunga moral, actual damages,
litigation expenses and Attorney's fees. Filinvest filed motion to review the decision of the court.
Issue:
Whether the award of damages to Sunga is valid
Held:
Yes. It is valid but it is unconscionable, therefore the SC reduced the amount granted to Sunga since the
facts show that the latter had not suffered much and that it is his obligation to pay the minibus as it was
stipulated between him and Filinvest Corp. Moral and actual damages were granted but litigation
expenses was eliminated for it has no price for litigation.
Laguna
Lake
Development
Authority
vs.
Court
of
Appeals,
et.
al.
G.R. Nos. 120865-71
Facts:
A case filed by authority against all those who were given permit by Municipal mayors Pacis, Papa and
Jala-Jala to include them as releasers of permits and other respondents for violating the provisions who
has the jurisdiction to give permits. But the issue not only lies on the granting of permits but the error on
deciding that authority is not a quasi-judicial agency that R.A. 4850 was amended by P.D. 813 and E.O.
927 s. of 1983 and the LGU has the power to issue permits.
Issue:
Whether LLDA has the power as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body
Held:
Yes. LLDA has express powers as regulatory and quasi-judicial body to cease and desist orders and on
matters affecting the construction of illegal fish pens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in
Laguna De Bay. It is not co-equal to RTC but only to its extent of power provided by law. All permits
issued were declared null and void and all structures on the said area shall be demolished because of the
void permits granted to owners and operators.
Agapito
Magbanwa,
et.
al.
vs.
IAC,
et.
al.
G.R. no. 66870-72
Facts:
A case where all plaintiffs who were tenants of the defendants complained the diversion of the free flow of
water from their farm lots which caused portions of their landholdings to dry up to their great damage and
prejudice and they were asked to vacate the areas for they could not plant any longer for lack of water.
Issue:
Whether plaintiffs are entitled to damages
Held:
Yes. Because the closing of water flow to the petitioners farm lots caused damage and prejudicial to them
in their harvest. It has no showing in the facts that petitioners were negligent but instead the respondents
bad faith which caused prejudice to the former. Under the law, the landowner has the obligation to keep
tenant in the peaceful and continuous cultivation of his landholding. A disturbance of possession such as
the act complained of is violative of the law. Therefore, the court granted moral and exemplary damages
and Attorneys fees to plaintiffs.
Ernesto Rodriguez, et. al. vs. IAC and Daytona Construction and Development Corporation
G.R. no. 74816
Facts:
Plaintiffs filed an action for abatement of a public nuisance with damages against defendant. After four
extensions of time to file an answer by defendant, Daytona moved to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction and cause of action. Motions denied, defendant was declared in default and authorized
plaintiffs to present evidence ex parte. The facts of the case at bar shows that there is other nearby
residents who were prejudiced by the Daytona Corp. for the running of its business. It affected their health
and property. But in this case, the delay of the respondents to answer id questionable and contrary to law.
Issues:
1.
Whether
petitioners
have
cause
of
action
to
file
the
case
2. Whether respondents are liable for damages
Held:
1. Yes. Because the business had greatly prejudiced their health and property. The permit given to
Daytona
is
valid
but
the
conditions
provided
were
not
met.
2. Yes. Respondents are liable for damages except nominal damages based on the discretion of the court
instead moral and actual damages were awarded because sufficient evidence had supported as such.
DENR
vs.
Gregorio
Daraman,
et.
al.
G.R. No. 125797
Facts:
This is a case filed by the DENR represented by RED Israel Gaddi against Gregorio Daraman and
Narciso Lucenecio who were caught by one Pablo opinion to transport illegal pieces of lumber using the
vehicle of one Baby Lucenecio, the Holy Cross Funeral Services. Here, the respondents alleged that one
Asan, owner of furniture shop ask the two to bring also some pieces of wood to his house located near
the funerals location. Opinion, DENR employee, saw the vehicle and inspected it, there he saw some
lumber and issued an order of forfeiture. The court granted bond and released the funeral car and lumber
because it was found out that Daraman and Lucenecio were not owners of the vehicle and lumber.
Hence, this complaint was filed.
Issue:
Whether the respondents violated P.D. 705 section 68-A
Held:
Yes. The court cannot deny the fact that Section 68-A P.D. 705 is also applicable to those who transport
lumber without proper documents. Here, Daraman and Lucenecio had no permit to transport lumber
although they were only asked to bring the lumber to the house of one Asan. The RTC has overstepped
its jurisdiction of the case since DENR was given the power to confiscate the property in favor of the
state/government. The release of this property defeated the purpose of section 68-A of P.D. 705.
Therefore, SC granted the petition of DENR, RTCs decision was reversed and set aside.
Republic
of
the
Philippines
vs.
Honorable
Roman
Cansino,
Jr.
et.
al.
G.R. No. L-17923
Facts:
On October 3, 1960, Magdayo Ramirez, owner of 85 tubs of fish filed a complaint for replevin against
Commander Abraham Campo and manager of Royal Cold Storage. Upon the filing by Ramirez of a P2,
000 bond, Judge Roman Cansino ordered the court sheriff to take possession of the 85 tubs of fish for
five days and release it to Ramirez. Commander Ocampo filed a petition to return the fish for the same
fish were caught in TONY LEX I boat. Here, the fish were caught through the use of dynamite, which is a
violation and crime under R.A. 428. Action for prohibition and injunction were filed by Ocampo against the
Judge and the sheriff.
Issues:
Whether respondent Judge erred in posting a bond in dissolving the warrant of seizure
Whether Ramirez violated R.A. 428
Held:
Yes. RTC Judge Cansino erred in dissolving the warrant of seizure because the petitioner is the R.P and
the
same
is
exempt
from
the
obligation
to
post
such
a
bond.
Yes. Ramirez violated R.A. 428 because under this law, it is violative to use dynamite in fishing which the
Bureau of Fisheries strictly observes the implementation of the said law.
Sea
Lion
Fishing
Corporation
vs.
People
of
the
Philippines
G.R. no. 172678
Facts:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of CA in denying the Motion for
Reconsideration and petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. Here, 17 Chinese fishermen were caught
poaching off Mangsee Island in Palawan. The Barangay officials and team of Philippine Marines found
F/V Sea Lion with five boats with fishing nets spread over the water. The court filed various cases against
the Chinese fishermen to wit: Violation of section 977 of R.A. 85508[8]; Violation of section 909[9] of R.A.
8550 and violation of Section 27(a) and (f) 10 [10] of R.A. 9141711(110 and section 8712(12) of R.A.
8550, F/V sea Lion filed an Urgent Motion for Release of evidence alleging that it owns the vessel. The
court released the vessel but later the court found out that the evidence of ownership of Sea Lion was not
supported by documents. Therefore, government forfeited the vessel.
Issue:
Whether the forfeiture of F/V Sea Lion in favor of the government was proper
Held:
Yes. The government was correct when it forfeited F/V Sea Lion since its motion was only filed after the
judgment has been rendered and it failed to seek all remedies given the sufficient time to do so. The
lower court had jurisdiction over the case and the petitioner was not denied of due process and gets it
failed to comply with the other requirements provided in the law.
Legaspi
VS.
Civil
Service
Commission
G.R. no. 72119
Facts:
Civil Service Commission denied Valentin Legaspis (petitioner) request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of 2 people employed as sanitarians, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, in the Health
Department in Cebu. Petitioner claims that his right to information is guaranteed by the Constitution prays
for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose
said information. The Solicitor General challenges the petitioners standing to sue upon the ground that
the latter does not possess any legal right to be informed of the civil services eligibilities of the
government employees concerned. SolGen further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of
the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.
Issue:
WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the
Health Department employees.
Held:
Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligible for the position of sanitarian, and to
confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in
the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.
Aldovino
vs
Alunan
G.R no. 102232
Facts:
The petitioners herein were affected by reorganizing of Ministry of Tourism as provided in Section 29 of
Executive Order No. 120 which took effect on January 30, 1987. These EO provides that incumbents
whose positions are not included in the new position structure and staffing pattern or who are not
reappointed are deemed separated from the service. Pursuant to this, the Department of Tourism issued
various office orders and memoranda declaring all positions thereat vacant. To that effect, it leads to the
separation of many of its employees including the petitioners. The court had previously decided similar
cases of Mandani, Abrogar and Arnaldo. The petitioners and intervenors claimed that they should not be
deprived of their life granted to their former co-employees plead for reinstatement without the loss of
seniority rights. Furthermore, they claimed for back salaries will be computed under the new staffing
pattern from dates of their invalid termination at rates not lower than their former salaries. The court aims
to determine whether the separation of herein petitioners and intervenors from service was pursuant to
office orders and memoranda declared void in Mandani case, thus reinstating and paying them with their
back wages.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners and intervenors must be reinstated and paid of their back wages.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that herein petitioners are reinstated immediately to their former positions
without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries computed under new staffing pattern from the dates
of their invalid dismissal at rates not lower than their former salaries but not to exceed a period of 5 years
with several provisions. Having found out that the Executive Order is unconstitutional, thus dismissal of
the employees is also unconstitutional. The courts declared its total nullity. An unconstitutional act is not a
law, it confers no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. In legal contemplation, it is
inoperative as if it had not been passed.
Issue:
W/N the ruling of the court is correct basing from the evidence presented.
Held:
Yes, the ruling of the court is correct.
Aside from Knight and Higginbothams testimonies, the other evidence in which the court based its ruling
is the letter received by the plaintiff on September 13, 1906 from Portland Cordage Company, of Oregon
which states that they are asking the plaintiff to offer them 500 bales of good current Leyte hemp, but the
plaintiffs cannot furnish 500 good current Leyte hemp, instead they offered 500 bales of good current
Manila hemp. On the same day, before sending the letter, Knight saw Don Leopoldo Criado who told him
that they could furnish 500 bales of good current Manila Bales, thus their verbal contract. Don Leopoldo
Criado denies that he had the conversation with Knight on that day, but the fact that the telegrams where
sent and received was undeniable.
Held:
No. Piadecos title is not registarable with the Breau of Forestry.
The pertinent statutory provision is Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, viz:
SEC. 1829. Registration of title to private forest land. Every private owner of land containing timber,
firewood and other minor forest products shall register his title to the same with the Director of Forestry. A
list of such owners, with a statement of the boundaries of their property, shall be furnished by said
Director to the Collector of Internal Revenue, and the same shall be supplemented from time to time as
occasion may require.
Upon application of the Director of Forestry the fiscal of the province in which any such land lies shall
render assistance in the examination of the title thereof with a view to its registration in the Bureau of
Forestry.
Ampliatory thereof is Section 7, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 of July 1, 1941, as amended by
Forestry Administrative Order 12-2, which took effect on January 1, 1963. It reads:
7. Titles that may be registered. Only the following titles covering lands containing timber, firewood and
other minor forest products may be registered under and pursuant to Section 1829 of the Revised
Administrative Code;
(a) Administrative titles granted by the present Government, such as homestead patent, free patent, and
sales patent; and
(b) Judicial titles, such as Torrens Title obtained under the Land Registration Act (Act 496, as amended)
or under the Cadastral Act (Act No. 2259, as amended).
The amendment of Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 by Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 consisted in
theomission of one paragraph, paragraph (c), which particularized as one of the titles registrable pursuant
to Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, "[t]itles granted by the Spanish sovereignty in the
islands and duly recognized as valid titles under the existing laws."
In the case at bar however, Piadecos title was issued during the Spanish regime. And it is state in Section
1829, does not describe with particularity titles that may be registered with the Bureau of Forestry.
Spanish titles are quite dissimilar to administrative and judicial titles under the present system. Although
evidences of ownership, these Spanish titles may be lost thru prescription. They are, therefore, neither
indefeasible nor imprescriptible. It should not have been allowed registration in the first place. Obviously,
registration thereof can never be renewed.
It should be quite apparent why no other decision except that of reversal of the appealed order is
warranted. For in addition to the lack of respect for the requirements of procedural due process, there was
on the part of the lower court a disregard of a basic state policy. The Constitution then in force, as is
similarly the case with the present Charter, was quite explicit on the point of forest resources being
inalienable. That is a paramount state objective.
produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by
prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, 30.
ground that the land covered thereby is a forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public
Land Act. And claimed that the said patent and title were obtained fraudulently as private respondent
Isagani Du Timbol never occupied and cultivated the land applied for. The case was dismissed.
Issue:
W/N Hon. Animas decision is correct.
Held:
No. The First decision was incorrect.
The complaint alleges that applicant Isagani Du Timbols actions constitutes as fraud.
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is procured
through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name although the property
belongs to another. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with
the conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void.
The plaintiff was formerly employed as a private secretary in the President's Private Office, Malacaang,
Manila.
Five of the employees who were separated not including the herein plaintiff filed a civil and were
reinstatement and the payment of their salaries. The plaintiff sent a letter to the Office of the President
requesting reinstatement to his former position and the payment of salary but the request was denied
repeatedly until he received a letter which declared the matter definitely closed. The plaintiff then filed a
complaint against the Executive Secretary, Alejandro Melchor and Federico Arcala, cash disbursing
officer, Office of the President of the Philippines. The defendants argued that the plaintiff had no cause of
action as he is deemed to have abandoned his office for failure to institute the proper proceedings to
assert his right within one year from the date of separation pursuant to Sec. 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court, he having come to court only after the lapse of more than nine years, thereby in effect acquiescing
to his separation, and therefore he is not entitled to any salary from termination of his employment. The
complaint was dismissed.
Issue:
W/N the court erred in dismissing the case.
Held:
Yes. The court made an error in dismissing the case.
There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of Jose Cristobal amounting to abandonment of his
right to reinstatement in office. Although Cristobal failed to file his complaint within one year from the date
of separation but, it is claimed, he allowed almost nine years passing before coming to court by reason of
which he is deemed to have acquiesced to his removal. The Court stated that in a general sense, laches
is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it. And it is the doctrine of laches which is invoked to defeat Jose Cristobal's suit, there
are exceptional circumstances attending which take this case out of the rule enunciated above and lead
us to grant relief to appellant. These are:
-There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of Jose Cristobal amounting to abandonment of his
right to reinstatement in office.
-It was an act of the government through its responsible officials more particularly then Executive
Secretary Amelito Mutuc and his successors which contributed to the alleged delay in the filing of
Cristobal's present complaint for reinstatement.
-The dismissal of appellant Cristobal was contrary to law on the strength of this Court's Decision.
Wherefore, the court ordered the reinstatement and payment of back wages of the plaintiff.
G.R. No. L-36142 March 31, 1973
JAVELLANA VS. TAN
Facts:
In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate implementation of the new 1973 Constitution. Javellana, a Filipino
and a registered voter sought to enjoin the Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries from implementing the
said constitution. Javellana averred that the said constitution is void because the same was initiated by
the president. He argued that the President is w/o power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people
of the proposed constitution. Further, the election held to ratify such constitution is not a free election
there being intimidation and fraud.
ISSUE:
W/N the SC must give due course to the petition.
HELD:
The SC ruled that they cannot rule upon the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices expressed the view
that they were concluded by the ascertainment made by the president of the Philippines, in the
exercise of his political prerogatives. Further, there being no competent evidence to show such fraud and
intimidation during the election, it is to be assumed that the people had acquiesced in or accepted
the 1973 Constitution. The question of the validity of the 1973 Constitution is a political question which
was left to the people in their sovereign capacity to answer. Their ratification of the same had shown such
acquiescence.
the number of directors did not likewise state a cause of action. Thus the court dismissed the case. The
plaintiffs appealed.
Issue:
W/N the plaintiffs have sufficient cause of action.
Held:
No,
there
was
no
sufficient
cause
of
action.
It having been shown that the complaint failed to state ultimate facts to constitute a cause of action, it
becomes unnecessary to discuss the other assignments of errors.
he
pleases.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue.
Held:
Yes. Considering that the Municipal Circuit Court lacked competent jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the criminal complaint against the accused respondents.
Presidential Decree No. 1058 is an amendatory decree, which increased the penalties for certain forms of
illegal fishing and for other acts made punishable under Presidential Decree No. 704 or the "Fisheries
Decree of 1975". The pertinent portion of Section 33 of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1058 reads:
Sec. 33. Illegal fishing; illegal possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing; dealing in illegally
caught fish or fishery/aquatic products. - It shall be unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or
cause to be caught, taken gathered fish or fisheries/aquatic products in Philippine waters with the use of
explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1),
(m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: Provided, that possession of such explosives with intent to
use the same for illegal fishing as herein defined shall be punishable as hereinafter provided. ...
(Emphasis supplied).
Section 38, subsection a (1) of Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1058, correspondingly provides:
(1) By the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years to twenty-five (25) years in the case of
mere possession of explosives intended for illegal fishing. ... (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Comment he filed for petitioner People of the
Philippines, respondent Judge's reference to Presidential Decree No. 9 is misplaced for, indeed, there is
no mention at all of, nor any reference to, Presidential Decree No. 9 in the Complaint.
It was held that Hon. Roldan acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
W/N is it lawful to apprehend fishing boats without warrant.
Held:
Yes. In the case at bar, it is lawful to apprehend the fishing boats without warrant.
The word boat in its ordinary sense, means any water craft, the fishing boats Tony Lex III and Tony Lex VI
are likewise vessels within the meaning of the term vessel. the accepted definition of vessel includes
"every description of water craft, large or small, used or capable of being used as a means of
transportation on water"
Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of the customs laws
have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the
vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought
before such warrant could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such
search or seizure can be constitutionally effected.
Since the crew of certain fishing vessels were caught, in flagrante, illegally fishing with dynamite and
without the requisite license, their apprehension without a warrant of arrest and the seizure of the vessel,
as well as its equipment and the dynamites found therein, as an incident to a lawful arrest was held to be
lawful.
G.R. No. L-9699
August 26, 1915
THE UNITED STATES vs. JUAN HERNANDEZ, ET AL.
Facts:
In 1947, Liberato Jimenez was appointed as a temporary legal investigator in the Philippine Veterans
Board (PVB). In 1949, he was promoted as the Chief of the Investigation Section but still in a temporary
capacity because he is not civil service eligible. In 1950, he took a promotional civil service exam. In July
1951, Jimenez received a letter from PVB Chairman Gen. Guillermo Francisco advising him that he is
being replaced by a civil service eligible. In September 1951, Jimenez received the results of the civil
service exam he took in 1950; he passed. He then appealed his separation from service.
ISSUE:
W/N Jimenez should be reinstated.
HELD:
No. In fact, he should have been separated from the service even before 1951. Under the law, he was
supposed to only hold such temporary appointment for three months while the appointing power is still
looking for a civil service eligible. His extended stay in the service is only upon the grace of the appointing
power. Further, there is no law which provides that a temporary appointment may ripen to a permanent
one. When he met the civil service eligibility, Jimenez did not become entitled to a permanent position in
the PVD. The power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of the proper authority, in this case
the head of the department. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified for any competitive position in the
Civil Service. Mere certification as a civil service eligible does not amount to an appointment. The Civil
Service Commission does not insure any appointment; it only certifies an eligible to be possessed of the
qualification as required for a position classified under its rules.
Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and Chief
Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of
Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of
Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit that discharged millions of tons of tailings
into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
The DOJ separately charged petitioners in the MTC of Boac, Marinduque with violation of Article 91(B),
sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines (PD
1067), Section 8 of PD No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984), Section 108
of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), and Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Information on the following grounds:
the Information were duplicitous as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a
single act;
petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident
subject of the Information took place; and
the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
MTC issued a Consolidated Order), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the
Information for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the Information for violation of RA
7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC of
Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the Informations for
violation of RA 7942. The RTC granted public respondents appeal but denied petitioners petition. Branch
94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and
PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated. RTC affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Petitioners contended that since the acts
complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are the very same acts
complained of in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence,
petitioners should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC. The Court of Appeals
affirmed RTCs ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for duplicity of charges
and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand.
HELD:
NO. The information filed by the petitioner should not be quashed.
There is no duplicity of charges in the present case.
There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense.
Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in a single
information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid
confusing the accused in preparing his defense. Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner
with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke
duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves
outright denial.
On March 12, 1982 petitioner entered into Option Agreements over the mining. Under the Agreements,
petitioner was granted the exclusive and irrevocable right to explore the mining claims for three (3) years
with provision for extension.
On December 23, 1982 and March 26, 1987 petitioner filed Prospecting Permit Applications (PPA) with
the Bureau of Forest Development, DENR, on the alleged ground that a portion of the area covered by
the mining claims was within the Magat River Forest Reservation under Proc. 573 of June 26, 1969 and
with DAR on account of alleged coverage of the other portion within the Nueva Vizcaya-Quirino Civil
Reservation under Proc. 1498 of 11 September 1975.
On 15 July 1991 Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat rejected petitioners Prospecting Permit Application
(PPA) on the ground that the Memorandum of July 08, 1991 endorsed by the Regional Technical Director
for Mines revealed that the area covered was outside government reservation; that the prospect claim
was in conflict with existing claims; and, that the area had been extensively explored in the early 1980's.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Regional Executive Director Samuel Paragas recommended to the
DENR Secretary that petitioner's request for reconsideration be denied; that the existing rights of mining
claim holders be respected; and, that the prior legal rights of MPSA/Financial and Technical Assistance
Agreement applicants over subject area be recognized.
As regards petitioner's PPA filed with the DAR, it appeared that it was issued a clearance to prospect for
six (6) months from December 11, 1995.
On August 15, 1997 petitioner appealed to public respondent Mines Adjudication Board (MAB). Petitioner
maintained that subject area was within the Magat River Forest Reservation. On June 11, 1998 the
rejection of the PPA was affirmed whereas the mining claims of respondents Alberto G. Bumolo et al. that
had been converted into a MPSA, subject to compliance with R.A. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, were given
due course.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Respondent MAB denied petitioners motion .
ISSUE:
Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject of the PPA was outside the Magat River
Forest Reservation.
HELD:
Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of Regional Executive Director Paragas in denying
petitioner's PPA.
The disapproval of Marcoppers PPA moreover, did not emanate from a single recommendation of the
RTD for Mines. Records would show that as early as May 31, 1989 x x x the Bumolo group of PD 463
claims which Marcopper has eventually surrounded by filing its own PAO 1-30 group of claims x x x x was
confirmed by the Forest Engineering Section of the region to be outside proclaimed watershed areas,
wilderness, national parks and existing government reforestation projects x x x x
In other words, the circumstance that the area covered by petitioner's PPA is outside the Magat River
Forest Reservation has been adequately established by the following evidence: (a) confirmation as early
as 31 May 1989 by the Forest Engineering Section of Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (b) the 8 July 1991
Memorandum Report of Regional Technical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c) plotting provided by the National
Mapping and Resources Information Authority per its 2 June 1995 indorsement of the maps to the office
of the Regional Executive Director. Petitioner contests the exclusion of the area subject of its PPA within
the Magat River Forest Reservation based merely on the alleged "typographical error committed by
somebody in the Engineering Section of the DENR." Aside from the fact that the allegation does not have
anything to support it, the aforementioned documents which the Regional Executive Directors relied upon
in denying the PPA had already settled the issue.
Furthermore, respondent MAB even fortified the bases for the rejection of petitioner's PPA. As plotted by
the Lands Management Sector of DENR Region 2 contained in the sketch plan of 11 November 1996 and
as shown in the Land Use map of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of Dupax,
Nueva Vizcaya, the area covered under the PPA is indeed outside any government reservation.
G.R. No. 98332
HELD:
NO. DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 are not unconstitutional.
The questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of
the law under which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of the public,
their economic growth and welfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and
82 must be sustained, and their force and effect upheld.
Administrative Order No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. It bears mention that
under the text of Executive Order No. 211, there is a reservation clause which provides that the privileges
as well as the terms and conditions of all existing mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity
of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, shall be subject to any and all
modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution. Hence, the strictures of the non-impairment of contract clause under Article III, Section 10 of
the 1987 Constitution do not apply to the aforesaid mining leases or agreements granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. They can be amended, modified
or altered by a statute passed by Congress to achieve the purposes of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution.
Moreover, nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which would lead us to conclude
that the questioned order authorizes the automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, to production-sharing
agreements. The provision in Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 that "all such leases or agreements
shall be converted into production sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these
guidelines" could not possibly contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of the Government that all
existing mining leases and agreements are automatically converted into production-sharing agreements.
On the contrary, the use of the term "production-sharing agreement" in the same provision implies
negotiation between the Government and the applicants, if they are so minded. Negotiation negates
compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by petitioner in the instant petition. A mineral
production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires a meeting of the minds of the parties after negotiations
arrived at in good faith and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the subsequent Administrative
Order No. 82.
- versus HON. JUDGE BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, and PLATINUM GROUP METAL
CORPORATION,
Respondents
PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus CITINICKEL MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, acting for its own interest and on behalf of
OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.
PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus COURT OF APPEALS and POLLY C. DY,
Respondents
FACTS:
In 1971 and 1980, Olympic was granted Mining Lease Contracts by the Secretary of the DENR covering
mining areas located in the municipalities of Narra and Espanola, Palawan.
On July 18, 2003, Olympic entered into an Operating Agreement with Platinum, by virtue of which
Platinum was given the exclusive right to control, possess, manage/operate, and conduct mining
operations, and to market or dispose mining products on the Toronto Nickel Mine in the Municipality of
Narra. In return, Platinum would pay Olympic a royalty fee of 2% of the gross revenues.
Olympic and Platinum applied for, and were subsequently granted the necessary government permits and
environmental compliance certificates.
On April 24, 2006, Olympic sent a letter to Platinum, informing the latter of the immediate termination of
the Operating Agreement on account of Platinums gross violations of its terms, and directing Platinum to
immediately surrender possession of the subject mining areas under the Operating Agreement.
Olympic instituted an action for the issuance of an injunctive writ before the RTC of Puerto Princesa
against Platinum. In its prayer, Olympic sought to enjoin Platinum from conducting mining operations on
the subject mining areas, and also to recover possession thereof. The RTC dismissed Olympics
complaint.
Olympic then filed two cases with the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) for the revocation of
the SSMPs of Platinum, on the ground of Olympics termination of the Operating Agreement because of
the alleged gross violations thereof by Platinum. This was dismissed and POA for the cancellation of the
Operating Agreement and the revocation of the SSMPs of Platinum. This case was subsequently
withdrawn by .
While these two administrative cases were pending, Olympic transferred its applications for mineral
agreements, including its rights under the Operating Agreement, to Citinickel via a Deed of , without the
knowledge or consent of Platinum. This assignment was thereafter approved by the Regional Director of
the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB).
After the assignment, Citinickel filed Civil Case No. 06-0185 before the RTC of Paraaque, on June 21,
2006, seeking to invalidate the Operating Agreement based on Platinums alleged violation of its terms.
This action was also dismissed by the trial court, citing forum shopping and improper venue as among the
grounds for dismissal. Citinickel did not bother to appeal this dismissal, opting instead to find other
remedies.
Citinickel thereafter filed three administrative cases: PMRB Case No. 002-06, DENR Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) Case No. 8253, and POA Case No. 2006-02-B.
Civil Case No. 4199 involved a complaint for quieting of title, damages, breach of contract, and specific
performance filed by Platinum against Olympic before the RTC of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Branch 95
on June 14, 2006.
Olympic sought the dismissal of Platinums Civil Case No. 4199 through a motion to dismiss where
Olympic alleged that the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on the issues raised in the case.
Olympic contended that the case involved a mining dispute requiring the technical expertise of the POA;
accordingly, jurisdiction should be with the PO
ISSUE:
Which body has the authority to hear and decide the dispute between Olympic/Citinickel and Platinum, as
parties to the operating agreement.
HELD:
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of
the complaint. It is thus obvious that the complaint falls within the ambit of the RTCs original jurisdiction,
to the exclusion of all other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies.
Although Section 77 (d) of the Mining Act has transferred to the POA jurisdiction over disputes pending
before the Bureau of Mines and the DENR, Section 77 (b) did not adopt the wording of Section 7,
paragraphs (a) and (c) of PD No. 1281 so as to include all other forms of contracts public or private
involving mining rights; Section 77 (b) in relation to Section 3 (ab) of the Mining Act did not include a
general catch-all phrase to cover other agreements involving mining rights similar to those in Section 7,
paragraphs (a) and (c) of PD No. 1281. Instead, the Mining Act, through the above-quoted Sections 3
(ab) and 26, has limited the jurisdiction of the POA, as successor of the adjudicatory functions of the
Bureau of Mines, to mineral agreements between the government and the private contractor. Otherwise
stated, while disputes between parties to any mining contract (including operating agreements) may
previously fall within the Bureau of Mines jurisdiction under Section 7 (a) or (c) of PD No. 1281, it can no
longer be so placed now within the authority of the POA to settle under Section 77 (b) of the Mining Law
because its jurisdiction has been limited to the resolution of disputes involving public mineral agreements.
The controlling factor in determining venue for cases is the primary objective for which said cases are
filed. Platinums primary objective in filing the complaint is to protect its interest in the subject mining
areas, although it joined its claims of breach of contract, damages, and specific performance in the case.
In any event, the Rules of Court allow joinder of causes of action in the RTC, provided one of the causes
of action (in this case, the cause of action for quieting of title or interest in real property located in
Palawan) falls within the jurisdiction of said court and venue lies therein. In fine, there is absolutely no
reason to disturb the CAs findings that venue was properly laid in the Palawan court.
FACTS:
Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity) entered into a Mines
Operating Agreement (Agreement for brevity) with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation
(Banahaw Mining for brevity) whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for the exploration,
development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCIs eighteen (18) mining claims located in
Agusan del Sur.
Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts
over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. So that Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary
Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims. Upon its
expiration, the temporary permit was subsequently renewed thrice by the Bureau of Mines, the last being
on June 28, 1991.
Since a portion of Banahaw Minings mining claims was located in petitioner PICOPs logging concession
in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement,
whereby, in mutual recognition of each others right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed
Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims. Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims
to applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA for brevity).
While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights
and interests over thirty-seven (37) mining claims in favor of private respondent Base Metals Mineral
Resources Corporation (Base Metals for brevity). The transfer included mining claims held by Banahaw
Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining operating agreement with
CMMCI.
Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment
made by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private
respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims.
On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Minings pending MPSA
applications with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submit additional documents
in support of the application. Area clearances from the DENR Regional Director and Superintendent of the
Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted, as required.
On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended MPSA applications were published in
accordance with the requirements of the Mining Act of 1995.
On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga
Regional Office No. XIII an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent Base Metals
application. After the submission of their respective position paper, the Panel Arbitrator issued an Order
disapproving private respondent Base Metals MPSA on the reasons that adverse claim was filed on time,
that the granting of the MPSA application on area subject of an IFMA or PTLA which is covered by a
Presidential Warranty, the panel believes it cannot, unless the grantee consents thereto, without the
grantees consent, the area is considered closed to mining location (sec. 19) (b) (No. 2), DAO No. 96-40)
and that the mining location in forest or timberland is allowed only if such forest or timberland is not
leased by the government to a qualified person or entity and if it is leased the consent of the lessor is
necessary, in addition to the area clearance to be issued by the agency concerned before it is subjected
to mining operation.
Plantation is considered closed to mining locations because it is off tangent to mining. Both are extremes.
They can not exist at the same time. The other must necessarily stop before the other operate.
Private respondent Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with public respondent MAB, the latter rendered
the assailed decision setting aside the Panel Arbitrators order. The Court of Appeals upheld the decision
of the MAB.
Hence this petition.
PICOP presents the following issues: (1) the 2,756 hectares subject of Base Metals MPSA are closed to
mining operations except upon PICOPs written consent pursuant to existing laws, rules and regulations
and by virtue of the Presidential Warranty; (2) its Presidential Warranty is protected by the nonimpairment clause of the Constitution; and (3) it does not raise new issues in its petition.
PICOP asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining operations as these are within the AgusanSurigao-Davao forest reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 of then Gov. Gen. Dwight Davis.
The area is allegedly also part of permanent forest established under Republic Act No. 3092 (RA 3092),
and overlaps the wilderness area where mining applications are expressly prohibited under RA 7586.
Hence, the area is closed to mining operations under Sec. 19(f) of RA 7942.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by law, closed to mining activities
Whether or not the Presidential Warranty is a contract protected by the non-impairment clause of the
1987 Constitution.
HELD:
Anent the first issue, the Court ruled that the area covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by law, not closed
to mining activities.
There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals MPSA has been proclaimed as
watershed forest reserves.
Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve,
such does not necessarily signify that the area is absolutely closed to mining activities. Contrary to
PICOPs obvious misreading of our decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, supra, to the effect that
mineral agreements are not allowed in the forest reserve established under Proclamation 369, the Court
in that case actually ruled that pursuant to PD 463 as amended by PD 1385, one can acquire mining
rights within forest reserves, such as the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, by initially applying for a
permit to prospect with the Bureau of Forest and Development and subsequently for a permit to explore
with the Bureau of Mines and Geosciences.
Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestty subject to existing rights and
reservations. Similarly, Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits mining operations in forest lands which include the
public forest, the permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest reservations
With regard to the second issue, the Court do not subscribe to PICOPs argument that the Presidential
Warranty dated September 25, 1968 is a contract protected by the non-impairment clause of the 1987
Constitution. An examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP
of the governments commitment to uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees
PICOPs peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of
raw materials for its wood processing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and
remove timber in its concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of other resources, such as
mineral resources, occurring within the concession.
The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47 and IFMA
No. 35. It is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOPs rights under its timber license.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked.
Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001 issued by
MGB to private respondent.
HELD:
NO. The Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EP No. 05-001 issued by
MGB to private respondent
Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942 establishes the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators, thus:
Sec. 77. Panel of Arbitrators. x x x. Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of the case by
the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the
following:
Disputes involving rights to mining areas;
Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;
Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and
Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the effectivity of this Act.
The Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over adverse claims, conflicts, and oppositions relating to
applications for the grant of mineral rights, but not over cancellation of mineral rights already granted and
existing.
As to who has jurisdiction to cancel an existing exploration permit, Section 28 of DAO NO. 96-40 explicitly
provides:
Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration Permit. The Director/concerned Regional Director may
cancel the Exploration Permit for failure of the Permittee to comply with any of the requirements and for
violation(s) of the terms and conditions under which the Permit is issued.
For
renewed
Exploration Permits, the Secretary upon the recommendation
of the Director shall cause the
cancellation of the same.
According to Section 5 of DAO No. 96-40, Director means the Director of the MGB Central Office, while
Regional Director means the Regional Director of any MGB Regional Office. As the authority to issue
an Exploration Permit is vested in the MGB, then the same necessarily includes the corollary power to
revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. Indisputably, the authority to deny, revoke, or cancel EP No. 05001 of private respondent is already lodged with the MGB, and not with the Panel of Arbitrators.
G.R. No. L-49109. December 1, 1987
SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES
JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR OF MINES JUANITO C. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner , Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc., is a mining corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines. It alleges that it is the holder of fifty (50) valid mining claims situated in Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress dated 1 July
1902 (Philippine Bill of 1902, for short).
On 14 October 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1214 was issued, requiring holders of subsisting and valid
patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease
application within one (1) year from the approval of the Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a mining
lease application, but "under protest", on 13 October 1978, with a reservation annotated on the back of its
application that it is not waiving its rights over its mining claims until the validity of Presidential Decree No.
1214 shall have been passed upon by this Court.
On 10 October 1978, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it
has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to protect its rights (except
by said petition). Petitioner assails Presidential Decree No. 1214 as unconstitutional in that it amounts to
a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had already been declared as its own private and
exclusive property in final judgments. The respondents, on the other hand, allege that petitioner has no
standing to file the instant petition as it failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional.
HELD:
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional.
It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of
which petitioner's mining claims still form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral
deposits are a valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover
all mining claims located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over which their locators had
failed to obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may still avail of the renewable twenty-five year
(25) lease prescribed by Pres. Dec. No. 463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974.
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution.
Petition is dismissed.
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL
MINING REGULATORY BOARD OF DAVAO (PMRB-Davao), respondents.
FACTS:
The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest
Reserve known as the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. Located at Mt. Diwata in the municipalities of Monkayo
and Cateel in Davao Del Norte, the land has been embroiled in controversy since the mid-80s due to the
scramble over gold deposits found within its bowels.
On March 10, 1988, Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper) was granted Exploration Permit No. 133
(EP No. 133) over 4,491 hectares of land, which included the hotly-contested Diwalwal area.
Not long thereafter, Congress enacted on June 27, 1991 Republic Act No. 7076, or the Peoples SmallScale Mining Act. The law established a Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program to be implemented by the
Secretary of the DENR and created the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) under the DENR
Secretarys direct supervision and control. The statute also authorized the PMRB to declare and set aside
small-scale mining areas subject to review by the DENR Secretary and award mining contracts to smallscale miners under certain conditions.
On December 21, 1991, DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran issued Department Administrative Order
(DAO) No. 66, declaring 729 hectares of the Diwalwal area as non-forest land open to small-scale mining.
The issuance was made pursuant to the powers vested in the DENR Secretary by Proclamation No. 369,
which established the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve.
On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which directs the DENR to
study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the mineral resources in the
Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall include, but shall not be limited to, studying and weighing the
feasibility of entering into management agreements or operating agreements, or both, with the
appropriate government instrumentalities or private entities, or both, in carrying out the declared policy of
rationalizing the mining operations in the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area; such agreements shall include
provisions for profit-sharing between the state and the said parties, including profit-sharing arrangements
with small-scale miners, as well as the payment of royalties to indigenous cultural communities, among
others. The Undersecretary for Field Operations, as well as the Undersecretary for Legal and Legislative
Affairs and Attached Agencies, and the Director of the Mines and Geo-sciences Bureau are hereby
ordered to undertake such studies. x x x
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals
against PMRB-Davao, the DENR Secretary and Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative (BCPMC),
which represented all the OTP grantees. It prayed for the nullification of the above-quoted Memorandum
Order No. 97-03 on the ground that the direct state utilization espoused therein would effectively impair
its vested rights under EP No. 133.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It ruled that the DENR Secretary did not abuse his
discretion in issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since the same was merely a directive to conduct
studies on the various options available to the government for solving the Diwalwal conflict.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the assailed memorandum order did not
adopt the direct state utilization scheme in resolving the Diwalwal dispute.
Held:
We agree with the Court of Appeals ruling that the challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt
direct state utilization as a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum
clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else.
Contrary to petitioners contention, it did not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement
to small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials concerned
to undertake studies to determine its feasibility.
Therefore, applying the aforequoted provision to the case at bar, we conclude that the issuance of the
lode patents on mineral claims by the President of the Philippines in 1962 in favor of the petitioner
granted to it only the right to extract or utilize the minerals which may be found on or under the surface of
the land. On the other hand, the issuance of the free patents by the respondent Director of Lands in 1979
in favor of the private respondents granted to them the ownership and the right to use the land for
agricultural purposes but excluding the ownership of, and the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which
may be found on or under the surface.
There is no basis in the records for the petitioner's stand that it acquired the right to the mineral lands
prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, thus, making such acquisition outside its purview and
scope.
Anent the second issue, the petitioner has no personality to institute the action below for annulment and
cancellation of patents. The mineral lands over which it has a right to extract minerals remained part of
the inalienable lands of the public domain and thus, only the Solicitor General or the person acting in his
stead can bring an action for reversion.
LOCAL GOVERNANCE CASES:
G.R. No. 110249. August 21, 1997
ALFREDO TANO, ET AL, petitioners,
vs.
GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES ET AL respondents.
Facts:
On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No.
15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF
ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO
JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
THEREOF.
To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23,
Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 which reads as follows:
In the interest of public service and for purposes of City Ordinance No. PD426-14-74, otherwise known
as AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON ENGAGED OR INTENDING TO ENGAGE IN ANY
BUSINESS, TRADE, OCCUPATION, CALLING OR PROFESSION OR HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION
ANY OF THE ARTICLES FOR WHICH A PERMIT IS REQUIRED TO BE HAD, TO OBTAIN FIRST A
MAYORS PERMIT and City Ordinance No. 15-92, AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF
ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO
JANUARY 1, 1998, you are hereby authorized and directed to check or conduct necessary inspections on
cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from the Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto
Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the City to any point of destinations [sic] either via
aircraft or seacraft.
On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted
Resolution No. 33 entitled: A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING,
POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC
ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS (SUNO).
CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND
SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL,
OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS MONODON (TIGER PRAWNBREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND
FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND
COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS,
and,
ORDINANCE NO. 2, Series of 1993
Entitled, Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live
marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms, to wit: 1. Family: Scaridae (Mameng), 2. Epinephelus Fasciatus
(Suno), 3. Cromileptes altivelis (Panther or Senorita), lobster below 200 grams and spawning), 4.
Tridacna Gigas (Taklobo), 5. Pinctada Margaretefera (Mother Pearl, Oysters, Giant Clams and other
species), 6. Penaeus Monodon (Tiger Prawn-breeder size or mother), 7. Epinephelus Suillus (Loba or
Green Grouper) and 8. Family: Balistidae (Topical Aquarium Fishes) for a period of five (5) years in and
coming from Palawan Waters.
Respondents implemented the said ordinances, thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole province
of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline
Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and
trade.
Petitioners filed this petition directly with the COURT alleging that the Ordinances deprived them of due
process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of
Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; that the Office Order No.
23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in
other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit and; that
Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession,
buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was
caught or gathered through lawful fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of petitionersfishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers
Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering into
contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful
conclusion.
And finally, to declare Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as null and void,
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSAILED ORDINANCES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
HELD:
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government units) enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with
the Constitution must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well founded,
there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.
After a scrunity of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution petitioners claim to
have been violated, we find petitioners contentions baseless and so hold that the former do not suffer
from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws.
Under the general welfare clause of the LGC, local government units have the power, inter alia, to enact
ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests
municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or
charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous
substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute other
methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishing laws. Finally, it
imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan
the duty to enact ordinances to [p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which
endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such
other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological
imbalance.
enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim
legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still
have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and
equal protection.
They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally
understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No.
229
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, "in violation of due
process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private
respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under
Operation Land Transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in
the name of the private respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied
without hearing. On February 17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted
upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered his motion moot and academic
because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the private respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:
(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.
(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be
taken without due process or just compensation.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn
lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their
respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating
such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from
his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant-farmers and the landowner shall
have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention
because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under
the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent
to issue the said rules.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are constitutional.
HELD:
R.A. No. 6657, Section 18 of the CARP Law, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
constitutional.
The Court declared that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in Section 18 of
the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution.
E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they
acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of fullfledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was
also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the
landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full
payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before
the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated
because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is
no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is
one of its most controversial provisions. This section declares:
Retention Limits. - Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or
indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility
as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case
shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each
child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of
age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area
originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same
areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one
subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does
not have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text.
ii
Id.
iii
iv
vi
Its precursors are Circular No. 1-91, which prescribed the rules governing appeals to the CA from the final
orders or decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies; and Administrative Circular No. 1-95,
which revised the earlier circular.
vii
viii
ix
Ibid.
Prior to BP Blg. 129, the jurisdiction of the CA, under the Judiciary Act of 1948, was as follows:
SEC. 29. Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. - The Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all cases, actions, and proceedings, not enumerated in section seventeen of this Act, properly brought to it,
except final judgments or decisions of Court of First Instance rendered after trial on the merits in the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction, which affirm in full the judgment or decision of a municipal or city court, in which cases the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to the Court of Appeals only on petition for review, to which the Court of
Appeals shall give due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the court has committed errors of
fact or of fact and law that would warrant reversal or modification of the judgment or decisions sought to be
reviewed. The decision of the Court of Appeals shall be final: Provided, however, That the Supreme Court in its
discretion may, in any case involving a question of law, upon petition of the party aggrieved by the decision and
under rules and conditions that it may prescribe, require by certiorari that the said case be certified to it for
review and determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal. (RA No. 5433)
SEC. 30. Original jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. - The Court of Appeals shall have original jurisdiction to
issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and
process in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
xi
The jurisdiction of the CA was expanded by BP Blg. 129 and RA No. 7902 to read:
xiii
St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission, 295 SCRA 494, 510, September 16, 1998.