RUBRICO VS.

ARROYO
FACTS:
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men
belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air
Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the
petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were
harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following
them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual
respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the
petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information
for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party.
It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of
them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material
inculpatory averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President
may not be sued during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et
al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition
and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
HELD:
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern
of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express
provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in
jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of
State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for
failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for
the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed.
CABALLO VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Christian 23 years old, a dancer, met AAA a 17 years old, his choreographers niece,
in her uncles place. When she stayed in her uncles place, AAA and Christian became
sweethearts. He succeeded in convincing her to have repeated sexual intercourse because
of his promise to marry and an assurance that they will use the withdrawal method so she
will not get pregnant. AAA, however, became pregnant, and Christian, was shocked with the
development, proposed that she had an abortion. She acceded to the request but
failed. Hence a child was born out of the relationship. When confronted by her mother,
Christian promised to marry AAA. The mother later filed a case for violation of Section 10(a)
of Republic Act 7610. He argues that his promise to marry and use of the withdrawal
method are not inducement or persuasion as to make the case within the purview of the
offense. The phrase due to the coercion or influence of any adult is the relevant phrase for

interpretation. According to him, it must

or intimidation to constitute child abuse.
ISSUE:
HELD:

be accompanied by some

form of coercion

Whether or not Christian may be convicted for violation of Republic Act 7610.
Christian is convicted for the violation of Republic Act 7610. The Supreme Court:
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male
or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballos actuations

may be classified as coercion and influence within the purview of Section 5, Article III of
RA 7610:
First, the most crucial element is AAAs minority. It is undisputed that AAA was only
17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime and is hence, considered a child
under the law.31 In this respect, AAA was not capable of fully understanding or knowing
the import of her actions and in consequence, remained vulnerable to the
cajolery and deception of adults, as in this case.
Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases
involving a violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument that AAA and
Caballo were sweethearts remains irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely instructive on this
point: For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under
RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to
other
sexual
abuse
cannot
validly
give
consent
to
sexual
intercourse with another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish [t]hose who commit the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse. Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving
violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or
committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to
sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed. A
child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she
can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the
nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take
care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection. The harm which
results from a childs bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to
her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her from the harmful
consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not be
deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the act
of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her special protection
against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner
will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair game and
vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational
consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.
Second, coupled with AAAs minority is Caballos seniority. Records indicate that
Caballo was 23 years old at the time of the commission of the offense and therefore, 6 years

older than AAA, more or less. The age disparity between an adult and a minor placed
Caballo in a stronger position over AAA so as to enable him to force his will upon the latter.
Third, Caballos actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and influence.
Records reveal that Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her, and even, promised
to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed that she would not get pregnant since he would
be using the withdrawal method for safety. Irrefragably, these were meant to influence
AAA to set aside her reservations and eventually give into having sex with him, with which
he succeeded.
Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties first sexual encounter, it is observed that
the brash and unexpected manner in which Caballo pursued AAA to her room and pressed
on her to have sex with him, effectively placed her in, to a certain extent, a position of
duress..
An important factor is that AAA refused Caballos incipient advances and in fact, asked him
to leave. However, AAA eventually yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that she was put in a
situation deprived bf the benefit of clear thought and choice. In any case,
the Court observes that any other choice would, nonetheless, remain tarnished
due to AAA s minority as above-discussed.
Hence,
considering
that
Caballos
acts
constitute
coercion
and
influence within the context of the law, and that AAA indulged in sexual intercourse
and/or lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the same, she is deemed as a child exploited
in prostitution and other sexual abuse; as such, the second element of the subject offense
exists. In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court hereby sustains Caballos
conviction for
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610

GEORGE BONGALON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Bongalon was charged for the crime of child abuse under Sec. 10 (a) of RA 7610.
Bongalon allegedly physically abused and/or maltreated Jayson (12 years old) with his palm
hitting the latter at his back and by slapping said minor hitting his left check and uttering
derogatory remarks to the latters family. On his part, Bongalon denied having physically
abused or maltreated Jayson but only confronted him when the latter threw stones at her
daughters, calling them as Kimi and for burning one of his daughters hair. Both the RTC
and CA held Bongalon guilty of child abuse.
ISSUE:
7610.

Whether or not the acts of Bongalon constituted child abuse within the purview RA

RULING:
NO. Sec 10 (a), Art. VI of RA 7610 under which Bongalon was charged states:
Sec. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other
Conditions Prejducial to the Childs Development (a) Any person who shall commit
any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those covered
by Art. 59 of PD 603, as amended, but not covered by the RPC, as amended, shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

Child abuse, on the other hand, is defined by Sec. 3 (b) as maltreatment, whether
habitual or not, of the child which includes:
(2.) Any acts by deeds or words which debases, degrades, or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes child abuse. Only
when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused
to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being
should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under RPC. In this case, the
records showed that the laying of hands on Jayson have been done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, indicative of his being overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the
personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of
Jayson and his companion. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked the specific intent to
debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being
that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. However, considering that Jayson suffered
physical injury requiring five to seven days of medical attention, Bongalon is liable for slight
physical injuries under Art. 266 (1) of the RPC

MALTO V. PEOPLE,
FACTS
Sometime during the month of November 1997 to 1998, Malto seduced his student,
AAA, a minor, to indulge in sexual intercourse several times with him. Prior to the incident,
petitioner and AAA had a mutual understanding and became sweethearts. Pressured and
afraid of the petitioners threat to end their relationship, AAA succumbed and both had
sexual intercourse.
Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, AAAs mother lodged a complaint in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. Assistant City Prosecutor charged the petitioner in
an Information a violation of Section 5(a), Article III, RA 7610. During the month of
November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert influence, relationship
and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption College,
complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct for several times with him as in fact said accused has carnal knowledge.
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioners
conviction and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Article III, Section 5(a), par. 3 of RA 7610, as amended and sentenced him
to reclusion temporal.
In a decision, the appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it found that his acts were
not covered by paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; and
thereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty prision mayor.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining petitioners conviction on the grounds that
there was no rape committed since their sexual intercourse was consensual by reason of
their sweetheart relationship

HELD
NEGATIVE. Petitioner is wrong.
Petitioner violated Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended. The first element
of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts committed by the accused.
The second element refers to the state or condition of the offended party. The third element
corresponds to the minority or age of the offended party. Since all three elements of the
crime were present, the conviction of petitioner was proper.
Consent of the child is immaterial in criminal cases involving violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of RA
7610. Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and consented to have
sexual intercourse with him. They engaged in these acts out of mutual love and affection.
The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed against
or without the consent of the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was
consensual. It requires proof that the accused and the victim were lovers and that she
consented to the sexual relations.30
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under
RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with
another person.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale
that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or
knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a childs bad decision in a sexual encounter may be
infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect her
from the harmful consequences of her attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a
child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity and to
surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford
her special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination. In other words, a child
is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual
intercourse.
To provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention
and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation, and
discrimination. [A]s well as to intervene on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian,
teacher or person having care or custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child
against abuse, exploitation, and discrimination or when such acts against the child are
committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the
same.
The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions
concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts
of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the principles of
First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their
opportunities for a useful and happy life.

ROSAL HUBILLA Y CARILLO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.
FULL CASE
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Court recognizes the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006) to protect the best interest of the child in conflict with the law through
measures that will ensure the observance of international standards of child protection, and
to apply the principles of restorative justice in all laws, policies and programs applicable to
children in conflict with the law.
The mandatenotwithstanding, the Court will not hesitate or halt to impose the
penalty of imprisonment whenever warranted on a child in conflict with the law.
Antecedents
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the petitioner with
homicide under
the following information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2000-0275 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 20, in Naga City, to wit:
That on or about the 30th day of March, 2000 at about 7:30 P.M., in Barangay
Dalupaon, Pasacao, Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, and without any justifiable cause, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab one JAYSON ESPINOLA Y
BANTA with a knife , inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in his body, thus, directly
causing his death, per Death Certification hereto attached as annex "A" and made an
integral part hereof, to the damage and prejudice of the deceased's heirs in such amount as
may be proven in court.
Acts Contrary to Law.
The CA summarized the facts established by the Prosecution and the Defense as
follows:
Alejandro Dequito testified that around seven in the evening or so of March 30, 2000,
he, together with his compadre Nicasio, was at the gate of Dalupaon Elementary
School watching the graduation ceremony of the high school students. While
watching,
his
cousin
Jason
Espinola, herein
victim, arrived.
Later,
however,
appellant approached the victim and stabbed the latter. When asked to
demonstrate in open court how the appellant stabbed the victim, this witness demonstrated
that with the appellant's left arm around the neck of the victim, appellant stabbed the victim
using a bladed weapon.
He aided the victim as the latter was already struggling to his feet and later brought
him to the hospital.
Nicasio Ligadia, witness Dequito's companion at the time of the incident,
corroborated the testimony of Dequito on all material points.
Marlyn Espinosa, the mother of the deceased, testified that her son was
stabbed in front of the [elementary] school and later brought to the Bicol Medical Center.
She stated that her son stayed for more than a month in the hospital. Thereafter, her son
was discharged. Later, however, when her son went back to the hospital for a

check-up, it was discovered that her son's stab wound

son was subjected to another operation, but died the day after.

had

a complication. Her

She, further, stated that the stabbing incident was reported to the police authorities.
She, likewise,
stated the amounts she incurred for the wake and burial of her son.
Robert Casin, the medico legal expert, testified that the cause of death of the victim,
as stated by Dr. Bichara, his co-admitting physician, was organ failure overwhelming
infection. He, further, stated that the underlined cause of death was a stab wound.
The appellant, in his testimony, narrates his statement of facts in this manner:
He testified that around seven in the evening or so of March 30, 2000, he was at the
Dalupaon High School campus watching the high school graduation rites. At half past seven,
while walking towards the gate of Dalupaon High School on his way home, he was ganged
up by a group of four (4) men.
The men attacked and started to box him. After the attack he felt dizzy and fell to the
ground. He was not able to see or even recognize who attacked him, so he proceeded home.
Shortly after leaving the campus, however, he met somebody whom he thought was one of
the four men who ganged up on him. He stabbed the person with the knife he
was, then, carrying. When asked why he was in possession of a knife, he stated
that he used it in preparing food for his friend, Richard Candelaria, who was graduating that
day. He went home after the incident.
While inside his house, barangay officials arrived, took him and brought him to the
barangay hall, and later to the Pasacao PNP. On his way to the town proper, he came to
know that the person he stabbed was Jason Espinola. He felt sad after hearing it.
Judgment of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the petitioner guilty of homicide
as charged, and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
for four years and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one
day of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay to the heirs of the victim P81,890.04 as
actual damages for medical and funeral expenses, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the petitioner's conviction but modified
the penalty and
the civil liability through the decision promulgated on July 19, 2006, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga
City, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal
Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide is, hereby,
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellants (sic) sentence is reduced to six months and
one day to six years of prision correccional as minimum, to six years and one day to twelve
years of prision mayor as maximum.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the
amount of Php 81,890.04, representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is

reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in

the amount of Php 50,000.00,
awarded to the legal heirs of the victim Jason Espinola. We affirm in all other respects.

is

SO ORDERED.
On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the
amended decision on December 7, 2006, decreeing as follows:

CA

promulgated

its

WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Our decision promulgated on July 16, 2006, which is the subject of the instant motion is,
hereby AMENDED such that the judgment shall now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga
City, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Number 2000-0275, finding appellant Rosal
Hubilla y Carillo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide is, hereby,
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
six months and one day of prison correctional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: The award of actual damages in the
amount of Php 81,890.04, representing expenses for medical and funeral services, is
reduced to Php 16,300.00. A civil indemnity, in
the amount of Php 50,000.00, is
awarded to the legal heirs of the victim Jason Espinola. We affirm in all other respects.
The case is, hereby, remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Naga, Branch 20, for
appropriate
action on the application for probation of, herein, appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court imputing grave error to the CA for not correctly
imposing the penalty, and for not suspending his sentence as a juvenile in conflict with the
law pursuant to the mandate of Republic Act No. 9344. In fine, he no longer assails the
findings of fact by the lower courts as well as his conviction, and limits his appeal to the
following issues, namely: (1) whether or not the CA imposed the correct penalty imposable
on him taking into consideration the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9344, the
Revised Penal Code and Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law); (2) whether or not he
was entitled to the benefits of probation and suspension of sentence under Republic Act No.
9344; and (3) whether or not imposing the penalty of imprisonment contravened the
provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 and other international agreements.
Ruling of the Court
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion
temporal for homicide. Considering that the petitioner was then a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime, being 17 years, four months and 28 days old when he
committed the homicide on March 30, 2000, such minority was a privileged mitigating
circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence
should be within the penalty next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was
prision correccional (i.e., six months and one day to six years). For the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence, prision mayor in its medium period - eight years and one day to 10
years -was proper because there were no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances
present. Accordingly, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
of six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
The petitioner insists, however, that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence of
eight years and one
day of prison mayor should be reduced to only six years of prision correccional to enable him
to apply for probation under Presidential Decree No. 968.
The petitioner's insistence is bereft of legal basis. Neither the Revised Penal Code,
nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor any other relevant law or rules support or justify the further
reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To yield to his insistence would be
to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately violate the law.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC
(Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law) provides certain guiding principles in the
trial and judging in cases involving a child in conflict with the law. One of them is that found
in Section 46 (2), in conjunction with Section 5 (k), whereby the restrictions on the personal
liberty of the child shall be limited to the minimum.
Consistent with this principle, the amended decision of the CA imposed the ultimate
minimums of the indeterminate penalty for homicide under the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. On its part, Republic Act No. 9344 nowhere allows the trial and appellate courts the
discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even for the sake of enabling the child in
conflict with the law to qualify for probation.
Conformably
with
Section
9(a)
of
Presidential
Decree
968, which
disqualifies
from
probation
an offender sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years, the petitioner could not qualify for probation. For this
reason, we annul the directive of the CA to remand the case to the trial court to determine if
he was qualified for probation.
Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence
of a child in conflict with the law adjudged
as guilty of a crime, the suspension is
available only until the child offender turns 21 years of age, pursuant to Section 40 of
Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
Section 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. -If the court
finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict
with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully
failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program,
the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while
under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years.

We note that the petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction
for homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence was no
longer legally feasible or permissible.
Lastly, the petitioner posits that condemning him to prison would be in violation of
his rights as a child in conflict with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and
international agreements.
A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that
imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5
(c) of Republic Act No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict with the law the right not to be
unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a
case is duly recognized, subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment,
namely: (a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the
detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time. Thereby, the
trial and appellate courts did not violate the letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by
imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the petitioner simply because the penalty was
imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from probation and from the
suspension of his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortest duration
permitted by the law.
A survey of relevant international agreements supports the course of action taken
herein. The United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing
Guidelines), the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency
(Riyadh Guidelines) and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived
of Liberty are consistent in recognizing that imprisonment is a valid form of disposition,
provided it is imposed as a last resort and for the minimum necessary period.
Lastly, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he
has to serve his sentence, may serve it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to
be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in
coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a manner
consistent with the offender child's best interest. Such service of sentence will be in lieu of
service in the regular penal institution.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the
amended decision promulgated on December 7, 2006 in C.A.- G.R. CR No. 29295, but
DELETING the order to remand the judgment to the trial court for implementation; and
DIRECTS the Bureau of Corrections to commit the petitioner for the service of his sentence in
an agricultural camp or other training facilities under its control,
supervision
and
management, in coordination with
the Department of
Social
Welfare and
Development.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED