Civ Rev SC Rulings (1 51)

Compilation
of Supreme Court Rulings

Articles 1 to 51 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
OVERVIEW
This document is a compilation of issues and rulings by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines involving Articles 1 to 51 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Submitted by: 4-B (1st Semester, SY 2014-2015)
Submitted to: Atty. Marciano G. Delson

School of Law, San Beda College Alabang

Compilation of Supreme Court Rulings
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

I. Effect and Application of Laws (Arts. 1-18)
1. Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446
2. De Roy vs. CA 146 SCRA 757
3. People vs, Que Po Lay 94 Phil 640
4. Garcia vs. Recio G.R. No. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002
5. D.M. Consunji vs. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001
6. Cui vs. Arellano University 2 SCRA 205
7. Beso vs. Dagunan, 323 SCRA 566
8. People v. Licera G.R. No. L-39990, July 2, 1975
9. People v. Jabinal G.R. No. L-30061, February 27, 1974
10. Chuayan vs. Bernas, 34 Phil 631
11. People vs. Veneracion, 249 SCRA 251
12. People vs. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542
13. Martinez vs. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil 79
14. Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736
15. Garcia vs. Recio, 366 SCRA 437
16. CIR vs. Primetown, G.R. 162155, August 28, 2007
17. Miciano vs. Brimo 50 Phil 867
18. Van Dorn vs. Ronillo, Jr. et al., 139 SCRA 139
19. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653
20. Barreto vs. Gonzales 58 ,Phil 67
21. Govt. vs. Frank. 13 Phil 238
22. Barnuevo vs. Fuster, 29 Phil 606
23. Testate Estate of Bohanan vs. Bohanan, et al., 106 Phil 997
24. Bellis vs. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358
25. Aznar vs. Garcia 7 SCRA 95
26. Roehr vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
27. Garcia vs. Recio G.R. No. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002

II. Human Relations (19-36)
28. Development Bank of the Phils. Vs. CA, 449 SCRA 57
29. Uypitching vs. Quiamco, 510 SCRA 172
30. Wassmer vs. Velez, 12 SCRA 648
31. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et all vs. Reyes G.R. No. 154259, Feb. 28, 2005
32. Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA, 219 SCRA 115
33. Pe vs. Pe, 5 SCRA 200
34. Spouses Quisumbing vs. MERALCO, G.R. No. 142943 April 3, 2002
35. Globe Mackay Cable vs. CA, 176 SCRA 778
36. University of the East vs. Jader, G.R. No. 132344, Feb 7, 2000
37. Villalva vs. RCBC Savings Bank
38. Tenchavez vs. Escano, 15 SCRA 355
San Beda College, Alabang School of Law
By: 4TH year, section B (SY 2014-2015)
Professor: Atty. Marciano G. Delson
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
39. St Louis Realty vs. CA, 133 SCRA 179

40. Ching vs. CA, 331 SCRA 16
41. Te vs. CA, 346 SCRA 327
42. Mercado vs. Tan, 337 SCRA 122
43. Morigo vs. People, G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004
44. Spouses Yu vs. PCIB, G.R. No. 147902, 17 March 2006
45. Donato vs. Luna, G.R. No. 53642, April 15, 1988

III. Persons (Art. 37-51)
46. Quimiguing vs. Icao, G.R. No. L-26795, July 31, 1970
47. Geluz vs. CA, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
48. Limjuco vs. Estate of Pedro Fragante
49. Dumlao vs. Quality Plastics, G.R. No. L-27956, April 30, 1976
50. Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. CID, 41 SCRA 292
51. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996
52. Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
Case # 1
Taada vs. Tuvera

G.R. No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446) April 24, 1985
Topic ART.2 Civil code. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
Issue Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its
enforcement.
Ruling Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided The Court has ruled that
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the
date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity,
which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the
law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does
not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of
general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on
the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.
By ALCARAZ, JOHN VICTOR

Case # 2
De Roy vs. CA
146 SCRA 757
Topic Article 2, Publication
Issue Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding.
Ruling There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in
the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to
their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in
active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated
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and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and

in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.
By ALTARES, PHILIP WILLIAM C.

Case # 3
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By

People vs Que Po Lay

G.R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954
Effectivity of Laws
When are circulars containing penal provisions considered binding
and effective?
As a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of
the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its
violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the
general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular
must first be published and the people officially and specifically
informed of said contents and its penalties.
ARCILLA, Marianne Rose
TIBAYAN, Carlo
Case # 4
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs. REDERICK A.

RECIO
G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001
Topic ARTICLE 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
Issue Whether or not a divorce decree, may be given recognition in
Philippine jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of the foreign
law allowing absolute divorce and the alleged divorce decree itself.
Ruling No. The Supreme Court explained that, At the outset, we lay the
following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of
Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a
Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26of the Family Code allows the former
to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens,
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective national laws.
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading
and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo
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Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
By BACURIO, Maica Elaine T.

Case # 5.1
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 137873

April 20, 2001
Article 6.
Whether or not Marias availment of the death benefits provided under
the Labor Code amounts to a waiver of her rights to claim for damages
from petition under the Civil Code?
NO.

It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge
or a mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact" that served as a basis for
nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioners employees, of
which private respondent purportedly learned only after the
prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil liability.
In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and
its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or
violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter,
however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the
courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the
courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle that
ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied
in Floresca and in the case at bar.
Bautista, Anna Margarita P.

Case # 5.2
DM CONSUNJI INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS

G. R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001
Topic Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors
from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. According to the
report made by PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District,
who investigated the tragedy, Jose Juego was crushed to death when
the platform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the
falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the
pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain
block and platform but without a safety lock.
On May 9, 1991 Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial
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Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds

employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria
Juego awarding actual, compensatory and moral damages.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
decision of the RTC in toto.
Issue Is the respondent precluded from claiming damages under the Civil
Code after having previously availed of the death benefits under the
Labor Code?
Ruling A claimant who has been paid under the Act could still sue under the
Civil Code. The Court said:

In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by
workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under
the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further
claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in
favor of the new rule that the claimants may invoke either the
Workmens Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code,
subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude
the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy
chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other
remedy. The exception is where a claimant who has already been paid
under the Workmens Compensation Act may still sue for damages
under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments
occurring after he opted for the first remedy.

Here, the CA held that private respondents case came under the
exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioners
negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for
damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report
and the Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint
against petitioners personnel. While stating that there was no
negligence attributable to the respondents in the complaint, the
prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all," the
"case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca.
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of
the facts, but of her rights as well.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election
between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any
action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the
absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a
bar. Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is
designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the
moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their
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choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to

any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong.

The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a
waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that a claimant cannot
simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute
an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his
choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.

Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.

It is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has
knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be
generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the person against
whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of the partys rights or of all material
facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a
right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a
material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a
consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.

A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person
knows that a right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to
make an intelligent decision.

Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the
right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is
made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or
by the evidence.

That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy
is the basis for the exception in Floresca.

It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioners
contentions.

Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private
respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she had availed
of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden
private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it
is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages
2-3 of its Answer; otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore,
perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the
proceedings before the trial court.

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Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that
led to her husbands death and the rights pertaining to a choice of
remedies?

It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a
mistake of fact. In this case, the "fact" that served as a basis for
nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioners employees, of
which private respondent purportedly learned only after the
prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil liability.
In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and its
violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation
of government rules and regulations, for that matter, however, is not a
fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the courts have the final
say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It
appears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact
nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in the case at
bar.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her
husband died in the elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she
accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police
investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the
accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her
behalf on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies
available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the
contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her
rights.

Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code,
ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private
respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Courts ruling in Floresca
allowing a choice of remedies.

The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to
mandatory and prohibitory laws.42 This may be deduced from the
language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a persons
ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The
rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is
neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof
cannot be held against her.

Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The
records do not indicate the total amount private respondent ought to
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receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit "K"43 that she
received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the accrued
pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly
pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present
total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will
eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in
total damages awarded by the trial court is subject to speculation, and
the case is remanded to the trial court for such determination. Should
the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC,
payments already received by private respondent under the Labor
Code shall be deducted from the trial court' award of damages.
Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to
prevent double compensation.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is
more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court
be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to
private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted
therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
By UNAY, Elizabeth, A.

Case # 6
Cui vs. Arellano University

[G.R. No. L-15127, May 30, 1961]
Topic Article 6 (Waiver of Rights)
Issue Whether or not the stipulation to refund tuition in case of
discontinuance of scholarship is a valid waiver.
Ruling No. The Supreme Court cited the Director of Private Schools in its
decision, to wit: Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to
keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the
understanding of that university scholarships award is a business
scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education
institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy
but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this definition.
It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of morality
which have received some kind of social and practical confirmation.
The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep
them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of
social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as
in Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which
implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference
to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require
San Beda College, Alabang School of Law 10
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scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if

they transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges and
universities of the United States after which our educational practices
or policies are patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted
not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their
propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom
society has an established interest or a first lien.
By BAUTISTA, Buenavista Mae M.
VALERA, Carla Angela M.

Case # 7
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By

Case # 8
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
People vs. Licera

G.R. No. L-39990
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines
1. What are the effects of judicial decisions?
When are judicial decisions deemed part of the law?
1. These decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute
evidence of what the laws mean.
The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is
part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the
Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to
carry into effect.
BRAGADO, Cassandra I.

Case # 9
People vs Jabinal
GR NO. L-30061 Feb. 27, 1974
Topic
Issue Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the
Supreme Courts ruling in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero.
Ruling YES. Desions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean and this is the reason
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why Article 8 of the New Civil Code ( judicial decisions applying or

interpreting the laws or the constitution shall for part of the law of the
legal system). The interpretation upon a law by this court constitutes
in a way a part of the law as of the date the law was originally passed,
since this courts construction merely established the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed
intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim legis interpretado legis
um oblinct the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law.
By BRUSOLA, JOHNSTON R.

Case # 10
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
Chu Jan vs. Lucio Bernas

34 Phil. 631, G.R. No. 10010, August 1, 1916
Article 9 Duty of Judges
Whether the court was correct to dismiss the case without a decision
The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law
applicable to a case submitted to him for decision, the fact that the
court does not know the rules applicable to a certain matter that is the
subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and not knowing
where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that can
serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by
dismissing them without deciding the issues. Such an excuse is the less
acceptable because, foreseeing that a case might arise to which no law
would be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, in the second paragraph of
Article 6, provides that the customs of the place shall be observed and,
in the absence, thereof, the general principles of law.
Billie Kristel De Guzman Cabal 4B

Case # 11
People vs. Veneracion

249 SCRA 251, October 12, 1995
Topic
Issue Whether or not the judge can impose a penalty lower than that
prescribed by law.
Ruling No. The Supreme Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the
judge should impose the proper penalty provided for by the law on the
accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case
the respondent judge must impose the death penalty. This is provided
in Article 9 of the Civil Code of the Philippines that no judge or court
shall decline to render judgement by reason of the silence, obscurity,
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or insufficiency of the laws.

By CALVEZ, Reinalee Susan N.

Case # 12
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
People vs. Purisima

86 SCRA 542
Doubtful Statutes (Art. 10)
Did P.D. 9 (3) repealed Act. No. 1780 and Ordinance No. 3820 of the
City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928?
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and
the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does
not contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by
implication is not favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater
force with regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed
strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact,
Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
VENENOSO, Amor G.

Case # 13
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
Martinez vs Van Buskirk

18 Phil 79
Article 11-12 CUSTOM AND USAGE; NEGLIGENCE
Is the employer, who furnished a gentle and tractable team (of horses)
and a trusty and capable driver, liable for the negligence of such
driver?
That acts, the performance of which has not proven destructive or
injurious and which have been generally acquiesced in by society for so
long a time as to have ripened into a custom, can not be held to be
unreasonable or imprudent and that, under the
circumstances, the driver was not guilty of negligence in so leaving his
team while assisting in unloading his wagon.
CASABUENA, April R.

Case # 14
Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales

G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988 ( 167 SCRA 736 )
Topic Customs (Art. 11-12)
Issue WHETHER THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT
TO YAO HAVE BEEN PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF
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THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Ruling Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts,
uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of
the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July 30,
1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law,
Fourth Ed., Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be proved
as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.]

On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a
source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such
custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other
fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if
not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.

The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code
which states that:

Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were performed and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or
incestuous marriages, as determined by Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied.) ***

Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a
valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged
foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of
Court. With respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45
states that:

SEC. 45. Unwritten law.The oral testimony of witnesses,
skilled therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten
law of a foreign country, as are also printed and
published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the
foreign country, if proved to be commonly admitted in
such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is
provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus:

SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.An official
record or an entry therein, when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
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thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the

legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country,
the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.

The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence
like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written
foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-
701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil.
471 (1935).]

In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence
relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of
Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or
custom
on
marriage
not
only
because
they
are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that
they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove
the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the
marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between
Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they
are not duty bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial
notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v.
Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]

This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the
principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v.
Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610
(1930).]

Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the
foreign marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that
matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by the contracting parties
constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to be considered duly
solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the
Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese
marriage, what was left to be decided was the issue of whether or not
the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven
[Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
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Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has
indeed taken judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the
aforecited case, petitioners however have not shown any proof that the
Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage
was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of
Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633
(1916)] as being applicable to the instant case. They aver that the
judicial pronouncement in the Memoracion case, that the testimony of
one of the contracting parties is competent evidence to show the fact of
marriage, holds true in this case.

The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as
said case did not concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was
whether or not the oral testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to
prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it
should be presumed that it is the same as ours *** [Wong Woo Yiu v.
Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao
Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as
is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her
alleged marriage to Sy Mat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p.
51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true,
cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra.,
pp. 555-556.]

By CASIQUIN, Rica Ysabelle L.

Case # 15
GARCIA VS RECIO
G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001
Topic Art 15 and 17 of the Civil Code
Issue Whether or not Art 15 and 17 has an application to the case.
Ruling Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17of the
Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce
obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in
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the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national

laws.
That aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously
married, the applicant shall be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously
married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth
or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death
certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute
divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of
his or her previous marriage. x x x.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code
is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him
with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized
citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum
juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
By Castro, Remy B.

Case # 16
CIR & ARTURO PARCERO as Revenue District Officer of Revenue

District No. 049 VS. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC.
(G.R. No. 162155; August 28, 2007)
Topic ART. 13, NCC
Issue Whether the Primetime Property Group, Inc. filed within the
reglementary period.
Ruling Yes. Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular
year and a leap year. In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap
year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April
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15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a
total of 730 days.

Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year,
it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing
Corporation v. Tecson, we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365 days
regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.
However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was
enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. "Year" shall be understood to be twelve
calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific
calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the
number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-
four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset.

A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without
regard to the number of days it may contain."28 It is the "period of time
running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not
including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if
there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to
and including the last day of that month."29 To illustrate, one calendar
month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to
January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be
from February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter
the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is
equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed
of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative
Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of

computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section
31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being
the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods.
By ADHARA KAYE G. CELERIAN

Case # 17
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927 (50 Phil 867)

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Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO,

administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs. ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Topic Civil Laws (Art. 15-17)
Issue Whether or not Philippine laws shall be applied on the estate of Joseph
Brimo, who is a Turkish citizen who have resided for a considerable
length of time in the Philippines?
Ruling The institution of legatees in Brimos will is conditional, and the
condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will
to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who
fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor (Andre) who, by his
attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator,
as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to
law, under article 792 of the civil Code, because it expressly ignores the
testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code,
such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is
considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is
unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the
law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the
legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed

that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to
include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and
the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is
approved in all other respects.
By CRUZ, CHANINE MAE P.

Case # 18
G.R. No. L-68470

October 8, 1985
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, petitioner
Vs.
Hon. Manuel Romillo, Jr., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional
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Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and Richard
Upton, respondents.
Topic Exception to Article 15 of the Civil Code
Issue Whether or not divorce obtained abroad is binding in the Philippines.
Ruling Yes, The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had
obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before
the court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over
private respondent who authorized his attorneys in the divorce case.

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
any of the States of the States. The decree is binding on private
respondent as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as
her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this
case is that divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the
same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only the Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wifes obligations under Art. 109, et. Seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby
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ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed Civil Case No. 1075-P of his
Court.
By Cuenca, Pamela M.

Case # 19
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
Nationality Principle
W/N the divorce obtained in Germany can be recognized in our
jurisdiction
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted.
Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent,
being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
CUERDO, Winnie Anne S.

Case # 20
Barreto Vs. Gonzales

58 Phil. 67
Topic Nationality principle
Issue WON the divorce obtained in Reno, Nevada by Gonzales may be
recognized in this jurisdiction.
Ruling The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation
until the case was submitted to this court, in which they all prayed that
the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a purpose
to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and
to secure for themselves a change of status for reasons and under
conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the matrimonial
domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the
residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband of the
purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did
not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the
bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in 1919. While the
decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize the validity
of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have
been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we
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have not overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now in force in
these Islands. Article 9 thereof reads as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity or persons, are
binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a
foreign country.
And article 11, the last part of which reads:
. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their
property, and those intended to promote public order and good
morals, shall nor be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or
judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a
foreign country.
By DELA FUENTE, Rafael Kenneth M.

Case # 21
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
[G. R. No. 2935. March 23, 1909.]

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. GEORGE I. FRANK, Defendant-Appellant.
Article 17, New Civil Code (Renvoi Doctrine)
Whether or not the petitioner has capacity to contract although he is
considered a minor in Philippine laws.
Yes. Since the contract was executed in Chicago, Illinois, wherein the
petitioner is considered to be of legal age, he is bound by such contract
even though he is in the Philippines wherein by its laws, he is
considered a minor. The execution, interpretation and validity of a
contract are determined the law of the place where the contract is
made. (Scudder vs. Union National Bank, 91 U. S., 406.). Matters
connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at
the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the
bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations,
depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.
Deona, Neil Owen B.

Case # 22
Barnuevo vs. Fuster , GR No. L7487, 12/29/1913
Topic Articles 15, 16, 17
Issue
WON the personal laws of a foreigner follows him when he
transfers his domicile?
WON the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to issue the divorce
decree and affect partition of the property?
Ruling
The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only
binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany
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the persons of the Spanish subject wherever he may go. He

could not successfully invoke it if he resided in Japan, in China,
in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the
dominion of Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject
to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to
the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege lack of
jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a
law of their nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to
territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without the
territory of their nation.
In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of
the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were
residents of this city and had their domicile herein.
By Dumalanta, Kristine Draei V.

Case # 23
TESTATE ESTATE of C.O. BOHANAN v. BOHANAN

G.R. No. L 12105 January 30, 1960
Topic Renvoi Doctrine
Issue The claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia, who had
received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore,
have not been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance
with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by
the testator. Is the failure of the testator to give his children two-thirds
of the estate left by him at the time of his death, in accordance with the
laws of the forum valid?
Ruling The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator
died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal
property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question. Says the law on this point:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to
the order of succession as well as to the extent of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the
property and the country in which it is found. (par. 2, Art. 10, old
Civil Code, which is the same as par. 2 Art. 16, new Civil Code.)
In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it
was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada
because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent
residence.
It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of
all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada Laws of
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1925, supra)
By FUCOY, Nicandro II S.

Case # 24
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-
appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
G.R. No. L-23678
Civil Laws (Art 15-17)
Do the Philippine laws apply in determining the successional rights of
an aliens compulsory heirs?
No. According to the Supreme Court, In the absence, however, of proof
as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed
different from ours. Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it
in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039
of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a)
the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to
succeed. xx Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph
three, of the Civil Code xx prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of
the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress
deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the
next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without
substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code
as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the
second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be
applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this
legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the
national law of the decedent. It is therefore evident that whatever
public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave,
inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Gloria, Nadine Alessandra Siblario
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

Case # 25
AZNAR V. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
Topic RENVOI DOCTRINE
Issue Is the will of Edward E. Chirstensen governed by the law of California
which is his national law, or the law of his domicile, the Philippines?
Ruling Applying the renvoi doctrine, the will of Edward is governed by the law
of his domicile, the Philippines. Under article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the law that governs the validity of his testamentary
dispositions as provided as follows:
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary
dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law
of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the
determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is used
therein. There is no single American law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union
having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force
only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the
Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to
any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private
law of the State of California.
The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the
executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator
may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires,
citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d
952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil
Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner,
and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's
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opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil

Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case
cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. It is argued on
executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the
State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the
abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force
in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant,
on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in
accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the
question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question
should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is
the Philippines.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no
law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec.
946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the
provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased
should govern. This contention cannot be sustained. As explained in
the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or
return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict
of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back
the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of
his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the
domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such
action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the
case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and
the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own
law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent,
if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the
internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.
By GUILLARTE, DESSERIE MARIE L.

Case # 26
Roehr vs. Rodriguez, et al.

G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
Topic
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Issue Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen married to Carmen Rodriguez, a

Filipina in 1980 in Germany. They begot two children. In 1996, Carmen
filed an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage. A motion to
dismiss was denied but in 1997 while a second motion to dismiss was
pending, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce in Germany and
granted parental custody over their children to him.

An order granting the Motion to Dismiss was issued because of
the dissolution of the marriage. A motion was filed asking that the case
be set for hearing for the purpose of determining the issues of custody
of the distribution of their properties. It was opposed on the ground
that there was nothing to be done anymore as the marital tie of the
spouses had already been severed by the divorce decree and that the
decree has already been recognized by the court in its order. The lower
Court issued an order partially setting aside the former order for the
purpose of tackling the issues of the property relations of the spouses
as well as support and custody of their children. This order was
questioned on the basis of the contention that the divorce decree
obtained in Germany had already severed marital relations of the
parties, hence, nothing can be done anymore. Is the contention proper?
Why?
Ruling No. In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
139 SCRA 139 (1985) and Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 592
(2000), it has been consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by
an alien may be recognized on jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the
present case, Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989), where the
Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a
German citizen in his country, the divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in
view of the nationality principle n our civil law on the status of
persons.

In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court
dated December 16, 199 has not been challenged by either of the
parties. In fact, save for the issues of the parental custody, even the
trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby
endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the
present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their
two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by the foreigners in
other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal
effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children, must
still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect
of the res judicata to a foreign judgement, such as the award of custody
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to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties

opposed to the judgement had been given the ample opportunity to do
so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court
(now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

It is essential that there should be an equal opportunity to
challenge the foreign judgement, in order for the court in this
jurisdiction to give effect to it. Our Rules of Court clearly provide that
with respect to the actions in personam, as distinguished from the
actions in rem, a foreign judgement merely constitutes prima facie
evidence of the justness of the clain of a party and, as such, is subject to
proof to the contrary.

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent
was given the opportunity to challenge the judgement of the German
court so that there is basis for declaring that the judgement as res
judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody
of their children. The proceedings in German court were summary. The
divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented on the
proceedings nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office.
Unlike petitioner who was represented by two layers, private
respondent had no counsel to assist her in said proceedings. More
importantly, the divorce judgement was issued to petitioner by virtue
of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that the couple lived
separately for three years, the marriage deemed irrefutably dissolved.
The decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse
was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain
custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue
for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support
and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in
consonance with the provisions in the Child and Youth Welfare Code
that the Childs welfare is always paramount consideration in all
questions concerning his care and custody.

On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserted that the
public respondent exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction when it
claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property relations between
petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has
admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
dated August 26, 1996, filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of this
case, that: petitioner and respondent have not acquired any conjugal
or community property nor have they incurred any debts during the
marriage. Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is
rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the
proof. Given the factual admission by the parties in their pleadings that
there is no property to be accounted for, respondent judge has no basis
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to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter longer deemed in

the controversy.
By Franklin Hernandez

Case # 27
Garcia vs Recio
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
Topic Art. 15-17 of the Civil Code
Issue Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to
marry petitioner.
Ruling Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce,
respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was
validly admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity
to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce
means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are
(1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or
a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no
showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same
as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may
follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some
foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some
other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the
guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery
may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a
remarriage only after proof of good behavior.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction
that reads:
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"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree

becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy."
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by
respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish
his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we
find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's
capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a
disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status
based on Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for the simple
reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the
divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.

By INTING, Nia Ma. Socorro B.

Case # 28
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

449 SCRA 57
Human Relations (Articles 19, 20, and 21)
Will an agent be liable for not disclosing the limits of his authority to a
third person?
If the third person dealing with an agent is unaware of the limits of the
authority conferred by the principal on the agent and he (third person)
has been deceived by the non-disclosure thereof by the agent, then the
latter is liable for damages to him (V Tolentino, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 422 [1992], citing
Sentencia [Cuba] of September 25, 1907). The rule that the agent is
liable when he acts without authority is founded upon the supposition
that there has been some wrong or omission on his part either in
misrepresenting, or in affirming, or concealing the authority under
which he assumes to act (Francisco, V., Agency 307 [1952], citing Hall
v. Lauderdale, 46 N.Y. 70, 75). Inasmuch as the non-disclosure of the
limits of the agency carries with it the implication that a deception was
perpetrated on the unsuspecting client, the provisions of Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines come into play.
JOYAS, Edwin Lawrence B.

Case # 29
ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS UYPITCHING SONS,

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
INC. vs ERNESTO QUIAMCO

G.R. No. 146322
CORONA, J
Topic
Issue Whether or not there was violation of the civil code specifically human
relations
Ruling Yes, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching,
blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its
right, to the prejudice of respondent. Petitioners acts violated the law
as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human
relations. The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article
19 of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right,"
prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary
to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It
seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or
duty) as a means to unjust ends.

There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to
prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not
be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm
another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will
attach.

Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement,
petitioners exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was
utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the
precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way
be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right
to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners
actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and
publicly ridicule respondent.
By Tyrone John Judit

Case # 30
Wassmer vs Velez
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Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
12 SCRA 648
ARTICLE 19-21
Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?
The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that
any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damages.

This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk
out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs
for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.

When a breach to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil
Code, moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219(10) of the
said Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Article
2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in
a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
VILLARIN, DONNIE WAYNE M.

Case # 31
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,

vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. AMAY BISAYA, respondent. [G.R. No.
154259. February 28, 2005]
Topic Arts. 19-21
Issue 1. Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes,
a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, to leave the party where he was not invited by
the celebrant thereof, thereby becoming liable under Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code.
2. Whether or not the Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria should be
applied in this case, thereby making the private respondents not
liable for damages.
Ruling
1. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to
humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is
highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close
distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty
years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated,
the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not
inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was
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correct in observing that

Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the
request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they
nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by
him only and there could have been no intention on her part to
cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs reaction to the
request that must have made the other guests aware of what
transpired between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no
need for the police to take him out.[56]
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave
the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to
pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be
held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.[58]
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights,[59] is not a panacea for all human
hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights
but also in the performance of ones duties.[61] These standards
are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.[62] Its antithesis, necessarily, is
any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are
the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is
exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.[63]When Article 19 is violated, an action for
damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil
Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of
law[64] which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly
within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the
other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

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Article 21[65] refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the
following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or
public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.[66]
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,[67] and that
is, the act complained of must be intentional.[68]
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has
not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against
him. These two people did not know each other personally
before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had
nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive
conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being single at 44
years old, had a very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr.
Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the
hotel with foreign businessmen.[69] The lameness of this
argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a
complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must
necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos
and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes
to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the
circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on
the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims act of personally
approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart
if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action
predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one
person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but
respect of such dignity.[70] Without proof of any ill-motive on
her part, Ms. Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount
to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs.
Filarts companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite
Mr. Reyes.[71] If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment
which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
2. The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is
not esteemed in law as injury[47]) refers to self-inflicted injury[48] or to
the consent to injury[49] which precludes the recovery of damages by
one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger,
even if he is not negligent in doing so.[50] As formulated by petitioners,
however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar
because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to
leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil
Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to
expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
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By LANDAGAN, MARIA LITA G.

Case # 32
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs CA

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
Breach of promise to marry.
Whether or not breach of promise to marry actionable.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts
or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy
for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. In
the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that
he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise
was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her
to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify
the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It
is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal
knowledge, moral damages may be recovered together with "ACTUAL
damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding
presentations.
In the instant case, it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on
the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it
was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage.
MALIGAYA, JOHARIC ATIENZA

Case # 33
Cecilio Pe, et. al. vs. Alfonso Pe

G.R. No. L 17396 May 30, 1962
Topic Article 21 Acts Contra Bonus Mores
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Issue Whether or not the illicit affair carried on between defendant Alfonso
Pe and Lolita Pe had caused great damage to the name and reputation
of the plaintiffs making the defendant liable to pay damages?
Ruling The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's
affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who,
thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent
of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted
her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of
his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he
was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family,
the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted
clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita
used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit
affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden
from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even
filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese
national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita
until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other
conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant
not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in
winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit
relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is
indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in
Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is

hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages
and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs
against appellee.
By MANAPSAL, Kristoffer Marc Jerome D.

Case # 34
Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing vs. Manila Electric

Company (MERALCO)
G.R. No. 142943. April 3, 2002
Topic Human Relations (Article 19-36)
Issue Whether or not the act of the defendant-appellants inspectors in
immediately disconnecting the electrical service of MERALCO
constituted a violation of rights of the plaintiffs-appellees, making the
respondent liable to pay damages to petitioner.
Ruling Article 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral damages
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may be recovered. One such case is when the rights of individuals,

including the right against deprivation of property without due process
of law, are violated. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Although
incapable of pecuniary computation, such damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate results of the defendants wrongful act or
omission.

Case law establishes the following requisites for the award of moral
damages: (1) there is an injury -- whether physical, mental or
psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a
culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated
on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

To reiterate, respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect
petitioners electrical supply without observing the requisites of law
which, in turn, are akin to due process. Had respondent been more
circumspect and prudent, petitioners could have been given the
opportunity to controvert the initial finding of alleged meter
tampering.
By MANGUBAT, Jan G.

Case # 35
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
Topic Article 19,20,21
Issue 1. Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private
respondent.
2. Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked.
Ruling 1. Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act
with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good
faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all
rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
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source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which

does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law,
provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate
any provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal right
to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private
respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides
that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes,
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should
"vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes
The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment
during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already
ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not
be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the
effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the
employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to
exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the
latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
2. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has
been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or
other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of
each case. And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record
and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all
petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing
damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be
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indemnified.
By JOSE CEZAR N. MARAVILLA

Case # 36
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
University of the East vs Jader

G.R. No. 132344, February 7,2000
Article 19
Whether or not an educational institution can be held liable for
damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had
satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case
Supreme Court held liable for damages.it is the contractual obligation
of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student as to where he or she had
already complied with the entire requirement for the conferment of a
degree or whether they should be included among those who will
graduate.the school cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Its
absence must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution
by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of right under article 19 of the
civil code.
MARCAIDA, EDUARDO IV D.

Case # 37
Topic
Issue
Ruling
Villalva vs. RCBC

Did the respondent unjustly enrich himself?
The respondent has adverted to the provisions on quasi-contractual
obligation in the civil code. Enrichment consists of every patrrimonial,
physical or moral advantage. So long as it is appreciable in money, it
may also take the form of avoidance of expenses and other
indispensable reductions inthe patrimony of a person or even
prevention of loss or injury
By Aron Kerr Menguito.

Case # 38
Tenchavez v Escano
G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965
Topic Article 26
Issue Whether or not a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipino
Citizens is valid in the Philippines.
Ruling For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to
a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be
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a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in

view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that
prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, policy and good
customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign

divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and
scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment
of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to
sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
By MORALES, Jonathan Gil A

Case # 39
ST. LOUIS REALTY VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR L-46061
Topic Art 26 (Respect for other's privacy, personality, etc)
Issue Whether or not is the said act is covered in Art. 26 of the Civil Code
Ruling St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the
Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like
the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written
apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a
cavalier "rectification ".
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by
the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence
from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his
private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered
diminution of income and mental anguish.
By MORTEGA, MATTHEW, M.

Case # 40
ALFREDO CHING, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, RTC- BR. 58,
MAKATI, METRO MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED
BANKING CORPORATION, respondents

G.R. No. 110844 April 27, 2000
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
Topic Prejudicial Question (Art. 36)

Issue Will the pendency of a civil action for damages and declaration of
nullity of documents warrant the suspension of criminal proceedings
instituted for the crime of Estafa? Can it be considered a prejudicial
question?
Ruling "We agree with the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, that no prejudicial question exists in the present case.

As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court
but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in
another court or tribunal.

Verily, under the prevailing circumstances, the alleged prejudicial
question in the civil case for declaration of nullity of documents and for
damages, does not juris et de jure determine the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal action for estafa. Assuming arguendo that
the court hearing the civil aspect of the case adjudicates that the
transaction entered into between the parties was not a trust receipt
agreement, nonetheless the guilt of the accused could still be
established and his culpability under penal laws determined by other
evidence. To put it differently, even on the assumption that the
documents are declared of null, it does not ipso facto follow that such
declaration of nullity shall exonerate the accused from criminal
prosecution and liability."
By MURILLO, Angelo L.

Case # 41
Te vs. CA and Choa

346 SCRA 327, G.R. No. 126746. November 29, 2000
Topic Article 36 (Prejudicial Question)
Issue Whether the CA commited a serious error in refusing to suspend the
criminal and administrative proceedings against Te despite the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Choa.
Ruling NO.
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with
it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
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prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue
or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of
suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions.
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency
of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against
private respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which would
necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said
civil case is terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners
marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper
is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage
is contracted. Petitioners argument that the nullity of his marriage to
private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the
criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their
marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from
criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza
and People vs. Aragon cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is void ab
initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of
the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of petitioners
marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article states
that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for
purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one
which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case
for annulment of petitioners marriage to private respondent did not
give rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of
the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time of the
alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law,
still valid and subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate
the suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRC
Board. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question
involves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that
there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and
the other is civil.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
By PADILLA, Nastasia Anne C.

Case # 42
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
Mercado v. Tan
337 SCRA 122
Prejudicial Question (Art. 36)
What is the effect of Nullity of the Previous Marriage?
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and
Aragon that there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code.
Such declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second
marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged
with and convicted of bigamy.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although
there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In
fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void
only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already
been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages
delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency
of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot
allow that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge
against him.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
PAGKALINAWAN, REA LOISE GUTIERREZ

Case # 43
People vs. Morigo

G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004
Topic Prejudicial Question (Article 36)
Issue Whether or not the civil case for judicial nullification of the appellant's
marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case.
Ruling The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from
Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
was already celebrated. We held therein that: A judicial declaration of

nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can
be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as void.[26] It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the
first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first
before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then
again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at
least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later
declared void ab initio. In the instant case, however, no marriage
ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract
on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears
no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed
to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might
be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of
nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
By PARCE, Vienna Olga G.

Case # 44
Spouses Yu vs PCIB
G.R. No. 147902
Topic Prejudicial Question
Issue Whether a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale is a
prejudicial question to a petition for issuance of a writ of possession.
Ruling A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes
into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are
both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. 1avvph!l.net
In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of
Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action and the respondents petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07-021410,
TCT No. 44668 is but an incident in the land registration case and,
therefore, no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of the
two actions.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
By Katherine Pichay

Case # 45
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY
FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.
Topic Article 36. Prejudicial Question
Issue The question for the resolution of the Court is whether or not a
criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of
Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of
marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on
the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
Ruling
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case
at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not
determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of
bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein
private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for
annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was
obtained through deceit.

Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova,
petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since
a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that
the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of
duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in
the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same
cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist
in the case at bar.
By Cyrill Jason S. Ramos

Case # 46
QUIMIGIUNG v. ICAO
G.R. 26795; 31 July 1970
Reyes, J.B.L.:
Topic Personality, When child is considered born
Issue Whether or not an unborn child has provisional personality?
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
Ruling A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional

personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn
child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed
admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said
child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as
yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the
same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may
result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the
testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after the death of
the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
By REYES, Jenny C.

Case # 47
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the
husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could
recover damages from physician who caused the same.
(Otherwise stated, is an unborn child endowed with personality so that
if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents may recover damages
from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child?)
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no
action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn
child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone
can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical
capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to
invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro
nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same
article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it
be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In
the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
RUBIO, Mishelle A.
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

Case # 48
Limjoco vs. Estate of Pedro Fragrante
Topic
Issue Whether or not the estate of Fragrante be extended an artificial
juridical personality
Ruling The estate of Fragrante must be extended artificial juridical
personality. The estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left
by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and
charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his
demise.the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain
purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is
the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility
of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the
decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. The
estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or
juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of
his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial
administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those
obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights
was the one involved in his pending application before the Public
Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of
said application to its final conclusion.
By Salting, Jessica J.

Case # 49
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
Dumlao v Quality Plastics

GR No. L27956, April 30, 1976
Persons (Juridical Capacity)
Whether or not judgment against Oria and execution against his land
be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity.
Yes. No jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against
him is a patent nullity. Lower courts judgment against Oria in T-662 is
void for lack of jurisdiction over his person as far as Oria was
concerned. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity
which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through
death.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its
judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void
for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by
OCT No. 28732 is also void.
Vanna Katrina T. Sanson

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

Case # 50
Topic
Issue
Ruling
By
MOY YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

GR NO. L21289 Oct. 4, 1971

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citzen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying
a Filipino, a native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under
Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an
alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino
citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said section 4. Whether the alien woman
requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, section 15 is a
parallel provision to section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be
considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of
a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
SANTELLA, LAWRENCE MARI C.

Case # 51
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]
Topic Citizenship: Repatriation
Issue Whether or not the repatriation of Frivaldo was valid and legal
therefore having a retroactive effect as to cure his ineligibility and
qualify him to hold the Office of Governor.
Ruling YES. Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. In repatriation the
applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to
reacquire his previous citizenship.

It will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date
or time when the candidate (like Frivaldo) must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's
residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least
twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for
holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern
or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the
day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-
assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day the term of
office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was
therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In
short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native
Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life
and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose
for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as
distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that
Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of
"ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why then should such
qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the
filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such
qualifications unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case
of age and residence should thus be possessed when the "elective
[or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed
and at the start of his term in this case, on June 30, 1995.
Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giapand Li Seng Giap &
Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our
people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e.,
persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would
not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship
qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected
official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised
during the oral argument to the effect that the citizenship qualification
should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the
elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from
requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of
qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And, under the law a
"voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo
could not have been a voter-much less a validly registered one if he
was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose
of the requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to
be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being
a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a
SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore
stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a
qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter
requirement was included as another qualification (aside from
"citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require
that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY
he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be
elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code
requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require
him to vote actually. Hence, registrationnot the actual votingis the
core of this "qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this
second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually
registered in the area he seeks to govern and not anywhere else.
By SIAPNO, Lorie P.

Case # 52
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC
Topic DOMICILE
Issue Whether or not the petitioner has satisfied the one year residency
requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First
District of Leyte.
Ruling The Supreme Court said: Residence is used synonymously with
domicile for election purposes. The Court are in favor of a conclusion
supporting petitioners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in
the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas
domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to
Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or
change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with
the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of
origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because
the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in
Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954,
she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not
domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres.
Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated
that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in
1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even
kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and
individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is
or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be
plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely
committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space
provided for the residency qualification requirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously
resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to
write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her
period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in
the space provided. This honest mistake should not, however, be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact
were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a
piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile. We have stated,
many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile
even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.
Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given
place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or
domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a
temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of
residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not
have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time
she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of
many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this
Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and
domicile for election law purposes.
By SUSANA, GLADYS T.

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