Today's Requirements To Load Shedding Schemes Against Cascading Outages in Electric Power Systems

IPASJ International Journal of Electrical Engineering (IIJEE)
Web Site: http://www.ipasj.org/IIJEE/IIJEE.htm

Email: editoriijee@ipasj.org
ISSN 2321-600X
A Publisher for Research Motivation........
Volume 4, Issue 8, August 2016
Todays requirements to load shedding schemes

against cascading outages in electric power
systems
N. I. Voropai, D. N. Efimov , D. A. Panasetsky
Melentiev Energy Systems Institute of Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Irkutsk, Russia
Abstract
The paper presents Russian experience of emergency control of electric power systems with accent to peculiarities of distributed
and adaptive automation; analyses place, role and specificity of electric load disconnection as an emergency control action and
load shedding scheme as an emergency control automation. Particular attention is paid to special load shedding scheme, its
place in prevention of cascading emergencies, and prospects of its development as disaggregated, distributed and adaptive
automation. On this base the requirements to the principles and algorithms of such automation action against stability loss and
overcurrents of electrical network components are formulated.
Keywords: electric power system, emergency control, special load shedding scheme, transient stability, overcurrent
protection
1. INTRODUCTION
Extreme contingencies and emergency conditions have to be managed in order to prevent a total collapse of electric
power system (EPS). This is the purpose of so-called defence plans. These plans include a set of coordinated and mostly
automatic countermeasures to ensure fast reaction to large disturbances, by means of which the spread of the
disturbances across the power system is limited, and the customers supply is interrupted in a controlled manner to an
inevitable extend.
Defence plans in EPS of different countries differ not only in the levels of technical equipment, but also in the basic
conceptual (aims and priorities) and organizational (structure and coordination) principles. The conceptual principles
vary from intention to prevent violation EPS integrity at any cost (including mass and often surplus disconnection of
consumers) to practically absolute ban of consumers disconnection until a danger of EPS breakdown becomes evident.
The organizational principles differ in degree and hierarchy of mutual coordination of automatic control devices, which
reflects coordination and centralization degrees of defence plan on the whole. Those are objective differences, since
EPSs were developing in conformity with grid topologies, capacity structures and taking into account home policies of
each specific country. The priorities of defence plan in Russia are centralization of emergency control and keeping the
system integrity rather than saving the power supply of consumers.
The paper is structured by the following way. Section 2 outlines functions and control actions of the automatic control
and regulation systems EPSs. Section 3 presents general structure of centralized and distributed emergency control
systems with special attention to disconnections of EPS components as emergency control actions. Section 4 analyses
load shedding as an emergency control action focusing to special load shedding schemes, their features and
requirements to development.
2. FUNCTIONS AND CONTROL ACTIONS OF THE AUTOMATIC CONTROL AND REGULATION

SYSTEMS IN ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS
In the process of operation, the topology and state variables of EPS are permanently changing. Therefore, the functions
of the automatic control and regulation systems in EPSs include:
Maintaining the values of state variables within a feasible region when normal conditions are controlled;
Bringing these values to the feasible region when emergency conditions are controlled.
Following [1], [2] the main functions of emergency control and corresponding types of the emergency control
automations may be classified as follows:
Prevention of stability violation (this is the function of centralized automatic stability control system);
Elimination of out-of-step conditions;
Limitation of frequency decrease or increase;
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Limitation of voltage decrease or increase;

Prevention of inadmissible overloads of equipment.
Applied control actions are mainly the following:
Long-term unloading of thermal and nuclear power plants turbines, and short-term (impulse) unloading of thermal
turbines;
Generation loading and generation rejection;
Load shedding;
Controlled opening the transmission lines (sometimes down to islanding the EPS);
Dynamic braking the generators;
Change of network topology;
Fast change of HVDC components capacity,
Automatic shunts switching.
The operation of emergency control devices can be triggered by the factors enumerated in Table 1.
Table 1: Triggering factors
Triggering factors
1) The value of a controlled state variable is beyond a
set value
Comments
This is the way how autonomous control systems work
2) Disconnection of a line, a transformer or a generator
This is the way how individual special types of

automation work
3) An instruction of a higher-level emergency control

system
This is the way how local devices of the automatic

stability control work
3. CENTRALIZED AND DISTRIBUTED EMERGENCY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3.1 General structure of Russian united power system defense plan
According to the organizational principles the emergency control automation (ECA) can be divided into local
(distributed) and centralized systems (LECA and CECA respectively):
LECA perform one function at the individual facility or prevent any parameter to deviate beyond acceptable
bounds, using the reduced set of the control actions and the local information mainly. Formed control action is
realized, as a rule, at the same facilities where the ECA devices are located. The LECA operation coordination at
different facilities is realized with settings or discrete commands.
Centralized systems of the emergency automatics protect the vast areas, like interconnected power systems on the
base of the representative volume of the telemetric information on the mode and composition of the grid; in the
control area all possible control actions are used and to realize them the low level devices are applied, including
local ECA.
LECA automatically reserve CECA to provide the stability and prevent dangerous current overload and also are used to
fulfil other tasks of ECA.
3.2 Disconnections of electric power system components as emergency control actions
Most conventional EPS automatic control devices are local (distributed) devices, in which a signal for control action
formation and execution are located at the same point or nearby points of the EPS. Local devices usually combine
functions of normal and emergency controls, and are targeted at keeping local parameters of EPS operational
conditions within specified limits. Prevalent automatic control devices include internal voltage regulator of generator,
voltage regulator of transformer, controlled source of reactive power, and speed governor of turbine.
The limits (fixed levels of the parameters) correspond to the technical feasibility of the EPS component operation. If the
local control devices prove unable to maintain admissible values of parameters (i.e. the equipment has to operate under
inadmissible conditions), protection devices start their action. The protection devices are destined to prevent breakdown
of equipment by way of the equipment disconnection [3]. Actions of prevalent protection devices are possible for the
generation (or load) components of EPS or the network components of EPS:
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Automatic disconnection of synchronous machines (generators and powerful motors) in case of inadmissible
voltage deviation at their buses or frequency deviation in the EPS. It entails power imbalance in EPS. The
imbalance can be compensated with the local automatic control devices by way of changing the synchronous
machines rotation speed. Should the machines compensating abilities be insufficient (i.e. if their speeds come to the
fixed limits) and in absence of additional compensating measures, the machines are disconnected by the protection
devices. Such disconnection can turn surplus and cause a new imbalance which might exceed the initial one. Hence
it is necessary to have some special emergency control devices which could selectively disconnect predetermined
parts of load (in case of power lack) or generation (in case of power surplus). Such devices exist and successfully
operate (already for many years) at some EPSs of the world. For instance, the load disconnection under the lack of
power is executed by so called Frequency Unloading Automation which has different stages depending on the
amount of disconnected load.
Automatic opening of network component (transmission line or transformer) in case of inadmissible (in
heating the wires) increase of the current in the line. In this case (when a network component is disconnected
and a transmission capability of remaining in operation network is insufficient) EPS demonstrates lack of
transmission capability. Here (as well as in case of the above described appearance of power imbalance) power flows
are redistributed in the network by natural way and some other network components can become overloaded.
Evidently the more heavily is the network initial loading, the more crucial is its weakening (component
disconnecting). Hence certain measures are to be undertaken for heavy loaded network to minimize the probability
of lines overloading.
If overloaded network has more or less complicated structure then usually not only one network component is
overloaded, but a set of them, i.e. certain cut-set. The presence of such cut-set makes it possible to identify power
surplus and power lack subsystems of the EPS. To unload the cut-set (i.e. to decrease power flow through it) it is
necessary to decrease power lack in the lack part (to put in action a reserve generation or to disconnect a part of load)
and to decrease power surplus in the surplus part (usually by way of decreasing the output power of generators or
disconnecting the part of generators). These measures evidently are to be executed automatically.
Thus the main (allowing to be implemented enough easily) measures of decreasing the probability of lines overloading
are the following:
Under the normal operation conditions restriction of the cut-sets load (by the meeting the fixed margins of
transmission capability when output and consuming powers in generating and load nodes are restricted to a
dispatcher).
Under the emergency conditions unloading the lines (also by the restriction of the output and consuming powers,
but this time by the automatic restriction or disconnection of generating and load nodes).
So, the simplest in technical respect (and also the most efficient, reliable and practice-proven) approaches to
prevention of system crashes are brought to automatic restriction (or disconnection) of generation or load when the
emergency situation arises.
When a network is heavy loaded, the disconnection of any network component worsens the conditions of the entire
network at the expense of cascade overloads of the other components. This situation most probably leads to the system
crash. Hence the probability of emergency disconnection of any network component shall be minimized. It is
impossible to avoid the emergency disconnection of network components owing to short circuits. At the same time, it is
possible and necessary to cancel out disconnection resulting from overloads of the components. Toward this end the
planned (by dispatcher) and emergency (by automatics) restriction of their load are to be provided.
4. LOAD SHEDDING AS AN EMERGENCY CONTROL ACTION

4.1 Special load shedding scheme
The automatic load shedding as an emergency countermeasure is most efficient when a small number of large loads
(supplied with high and medium voltage transmission lines) are disconnected. The possibility and acceptability of this
extraordinary efficient control action depend on consequences of the concrete EPS integrity violation:
If the EPS splitting is crucial then the consumers supply is limited strictly enough;
If the EPS islanding is acceptable and emergency control automation is able to provide it in a controlled way, then
the choice of amount and combination of limitations is a subject of relation of the costs of the system islanding vs
disconnection of consumers.
The so-called special load shedding scheme (SLSS) occupies a special place in the structure of emergency control. It
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aims at limiting or eliminating the network component overload, and, as a result, at maintaining it in operation, which
is naturally more preferable for the system than loss of the component.
The SLSS function is implemented through generation of a control action disconnecting some amount of load at a
receiving end of a transmission line or (more rarely) some generation at a supplying end. Normally, the loads
controlled by SLSS include concentrated energy intensive consumers, whose production process and degree of
significance allows a sudden interruption in supply for a time sufficient for the power system to take immediate
measures to mobilize the generation capacity reserves or impose limitations on the other consumers.
Currently SLSS is considered as a local device of automatic stability control system (see Section 2), which corresponds
to the third of enumerated in Table 1 triggering factors. It is worth noting, however, that this automation aimed initially
at operating in case of disconnection of the network or generation components (the second of the enumerated factors).
Originally, SLSS was decentralized (totally standalone) automation. Operation in response to disconnection determined
the specific feature of SLSS while the signal for the other emergency control systems to operate was a change (going
beyond a specified range the first factor in Table 1) in the load flow parameters. Therefore, the classical SLSS
operated proactively, i.e. before all the other types of automations did. Such SLSS outpaced also the relay protective
devices disconnecting overloaded components [4].
Three examples of important role of SLSS in prevention of crucial development of emergency are shown below,
following [4]:
Accident at Kalininskaya nuclear power plant in 2003, January: Current transducer explosion, firing of oil, five
short-circuits at 750 kV switchgear, cascading disconnections of 750 and 330 kV network components. 510 MW of
load was disconnected by SLSS of North-West interconnected power system, and cascading failure was stopped [5].
Accident in Volgograd EPS in 2004, January: Misoperation of emergency control system in 500 kV substation,
fourteen erroneous control actions, chaotic disconnections of network components. 412 MW of load was
disconnected by SLSS of Volgograd EPS, and cascading failure was stopped [6].
Notorious blackout in Moscow EPS in 2005, May: Under occurred emergency state (voltage drop and overloads of
the lines) the most effective action would be fast disconnection of loads. But there were no undervoltage (limiting
the voltage decrease) automation nor SLSS available. Hence EPS came to blackout state with cascading shortcircuits and disconnections of transmission lines by relay protection [7], [8].
However, payment for the fast operation is redundancy of control actions, since, first of all load shedding is envisaged
in discrete (and rather large) stages, and, secondly, when the control actions are pre-determined, the real-time deviation
of state variables is not taken into account. The first of the named reasons for redundancy can be coped with by
disaggregating (increasing the number of) the stages of load controlled by this automation (correspondingly, the
executive elements of the automation should also be located at lower voltage levels). The second reason can be
overcome by permanently updating (adaptation to the current pre-emergency operating conditions) the database used
for generating the control actions (i.e. the amount and composition of the disconnected load stages).
Load shedding is very effective control action (it is used virtually by all types of emergency control automations, listed
in Section 2). Therefore, it seems logical to make load shedding scheme universal, i.e. assign it with the functions of
not only eliminating the overload of the network components but also maintaining the transient stability. In this case,
the amount of load to be disconnected:
to provide stability is to be specified on a central basis from the upper-level automatic stability control devices
(the third factor in Table 1),
to prevent overcurrent in the network components is to be determined by the intelligent load shedding scheme
devices.
At the same time the optimal composition of disconnected loads is to be determined by SLSS in both cases, according
to the current topology and operating conditions.
4.2 Distributed load shedding scheme
As follows from above discussion, most of the difficulties in EPS operation are caused by electrical grid overloads.
Figure 1 represents an overload (a) of transmission line and ways of its unloading (b) and (c).
Load shedding in the receiving subsystem is the most efficient action among the remedies against overload (see
Subsection 3.2). From technical point of view, the easiest way of emergency load shedding is a piecemeal disconnection
of large industrial consumers, which are connected with the power system in high voltages, see Figure 1(b). It is the
usual present practice. At the same time, the economic damages caused by such kind of disconnections can be
considerable (for example, the loss of profit due to technological cycle interruption). The compensation of the potential
damages (for example, with preferential prices of electricity for consumers, which agree to emergency limitation of
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electricity supply) could be very unprofitable for power system.
OVERLOAD, MW
Normal flow, MW
Normal flow, MW
Substation
Substation
HV /
MV
Substation
MV
/ LV
Substation
HV /
MV
Large
consumer
Small consumers
(a)
Substation
MV
/ LV
HV /
MV
Large
consumer
Substation
MV
/ LV
Large
consumer
Small consumers
Small consumers
(b)
(c)
Figure 1: Possible control actions against overload of the line. Emergency situation overload of the main line (a);
Conventional control action a large load partial shedding (b); Alternate control action distributed load shedding (c).
Coming from these considerations an alternate load shedding scheme can be proposed as a combination of
disconnections either large or small consumers it means disaggregation and distribution of load shedding automation,
see Figure 1(c). It is more difficult technically than disconnection of large consumers, but present state of automation
and data transmission systems makes it feasible.
The advantages of small loads emergency disconnections are much smaller total damage, and ability of more accurate
dosing the disconnections (if the large consumers are disconnected then the surplus load disconnection is practically
imminent).
4.3 Requirements to distributed adaptive load shedding algorithms
However, in the case of small loads shedding the problem of optimal choice of amount, composition and order of
priorities of load to be shed is to be posed and solved. Besides, with such a disaggregation of SLSS stages and transfer
of control actions to the distribution network:
Rapid and hard foreseeable change of composition of the loads, which are available to disconnect, requires
developed algorithms to be adaptive i.e. be able to tune to the permanently changing topology and operation
conditions.
Distribution network undergoes overloads much more frequently than transmission network. For distribution lines
the overloads with a current are crucial. They can be caused with redistribution of power flows as a sequel among
others of load shedding. Such overcurrents also are to be removed with distributed automation in the framework of
unified algorithm, which chooses amount, composition and order of priorities of load to be shed.
Delay in the automatic emergency control action depends on applied triggering factor (see Table 1 in Section 2).
Besides the additional delays appear while the action is realized in distribution network. Hence there are to be
assessed either the criticality of load shedding delays for goals of emergency control or the extent of the control
necessary decentralization.
Basing on those considerations the principles and algorithms of distributed adaptive load shedding against stability loss
of the ties of main network and overcurrents of controlled subsystem lines are to be developed.
Load shedding scheme is addressed, depending on appeared emergency situation, to provision of stability of the ties of
main network or thermal stability, and stability of loads of controlled subsystem. Coming from the tasks to be fulfilled,
the load shedding algorithms should be subdivided as follows [9]:
1. Algorithms addressed to providing the stability of the ties of main network. These algorithms are to operate
with the close interaction with the centralized automatic stability control system (see Section 2). The automation
operation under those conditions consists in the procedure of choice and consequent disconnection of required
amount of the load. If the necessary amount of the load to be shed could not be collected from small consumers then
load of large consumers be partially shed. To minimize the shedding, the more precise balancing is needed by
means, among others, further splitting the steps of large consumers disconnection.
2. Algorithms preventing the overload with the current of controlled subsystem lines. These algorithms are to
provide an optimal amount of load shedding, i.e. to minimize the cost of unloading the overloaded transmission
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line. The automation is to operate as an intellectual emergency control system providing the fast disconnection of
the consumers load in a minimal necessary amount to prevent the equipment overload.
Coming from above analysis, the requirements to load shedding algorithms can be summarized as in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary of requirements to load shedding algorithms
Requirements
1. Keeping the balance
between complexity and
simplicity of
implementation
2. Provision a high level of
fault tolerance
3. High speed diagnostic selftesting
Comments
On the one hand, the algorithms are to be complex enough to provide an acceptable
level of control action precision.
On the other hand, they are to be simple enough to provide an acceptable speed of
calculations.
The algorithms do not fail in the case of uncritical loss of information. Should the loss of
information be critical, the algorithms either implement the excessive control actions, or
delegate control to a power system operator with information about its failure.
The possibility of implementing an effective self-testing procedure is related directly to the
requirement of maximal simplification of the algorithms.
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Main problems in implementation of distributed load shedding schemes can be structured as technical challenges,
methodological (algorithmic) problems, and legal regulatory problems.
5.1 Technical challenges
Technical challenges are in providing the remote control equipment to large number of small consumers and creating
an appropriate communication network. Technically it is more difficult and more expensive than the same for large
consumers, but present state of automation and data transmission systems makes it feasible.
Currently, the main object of special load shedding schemes is the loads of large industrial consumers. At the same
time, the disconnection of such consumers causes considerable economic loss. Bearing in mind the plans of electric
utilities to assign an increasingly larger number of consumers (in prospect down to voltage level of 0.4 kV) to load
shedding, it becomes sensible to implement the function of automatic disconnection of residential consumers from the
distributed of special load shedding schemes to afford the possibility of the fastest restoration of power supply to large
industrial consumers.
Besides (what is important), energy utilities are ready to solve these problems when disconnection of large consumers
brings significant loss of profit for utilities.
5.2 Methodological problems
Methodological problems are in optimal on-line distribution and redistribution of emergency load shed between small
consumers. In the case of small loads shedding, the problem of optimal choice of amount, composition and order of
priorities of load to be shed is to be posed and solved. A possible solution is proposed in [9], [10]. The proposed
algorithms aim to disconnect an optimal amount of load, which makes it possible to unload one or several overloaded
ties with the minimum damage due to the load shedding. There are centralized linear algorithms with the use of
sensitivity coefficients. Sensitivity coefficients determine an impact of change in the nodal load on change in the
transmission line flow line, and an impact of change in the line flow on change in the another line flow. Linear
statement of the optimization problem for selecting control actions makes it possible to find an optimal and practical
real-time solution.
The algorithms determine an area of the emergency control, form and update the sensitivity coefficient base, and
generate in real time the load shedding action. These algorithms, on the one hand, have an advantage of fast operation
since control action is formed in response to the disturbance itself (but not to the deviation of operating parameters). On
the other hand, unlike the algorithms of traditional automatic systems operating also in response to, proposed
algorithms are adaptable to the current operating conditions, i.e. have no redundant control actions.
5.3 Legal regulatory base
Development of legal regulatory base for interaction of utilities and consumers regarding emergency load shedding (as
one of the demand side issues) is a subject of special interest (see for example [11]). It is necessary to categorize
consumers according to reliability of their electricity supply (on the contract base, coming from desire and paying
capacity of the consumer) [10]. Special consumers-regulators are necessary, which can be forcedly disconnected in
dangerous for the EPS situation in order to maintain the system frequency. It is to be specified by proper agreements.
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Besides proper emergency control devices for their disconnection are to be available.
References
[1] National Standard P 55105-2012 (2012) United power system and isolated working systems. Operative-dispatch
management. Automatic emergency control of modes of power systems. Emergency control of power systems.
Norms and requirements. (in Russian). Online. http://files.stroyinf.ru/Data2/1/4293787/4293787549.pdf
[2] National Standard P 55438-2013 (2013) United power system and isolated power systems. Operative-dispatch
management. Relay protection and automation. Interaction of actors, consumers of electrical energy in creating
(modernization) and the exploitation. General requirements. (in Russian)
[3] Feasibility Study: Synchronous Interconnection of the Power Systems of IPS/UPS with UCTE / Final REPORT
118 p., 2008.
[4] Efimov D.N. If the special load shedding schemes have a future? // Methodical issues of bulk energy systems
reliability studies. International scientific workshop named after Yu.N. Rudenko. Vol.65 // Edited by N.I. Voropai.
Irkutsk:
ESI
SB
RAS
pp.
243-250,
2015.
(in Russian).
Online.
http://les.sei.irk.ru/media/uploads/booklet/86/rel_2014.rar
[5] SO UPS Information letter #93, 2003, February 12. Breakage prevention of current transformers TFRM.
(in Russian). Online. http://ftp.so-ups.ru/RZA/Letter_PDF/ip_cdu_93_120203.pdf
[6] Information letter IL-7-2004 (PD-RZA) 23.03.2004. Failures of ANKA appliances. (in Russian). Online.
http://ftp.so-ups.ru/RZA/Letter_PDF/ip_cdu_7_2004_230304.pdf
[7] JSC RAO UEPS of Russia. Report on Failure Inquiry in UES of Russia Took Place on May 25, 2005.
(in Russian). Online. http://www.kef.ru/art_010.shtml
[8] Reducing the risk of cascading blackouts in electric power systems / Edited by N.I. Voropai. Novosibirsk:
Publishing House of the Siberian Branch of the RAN, - 303 p., 2011. (in Russian). Online.
http://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=19578679
[9] Panasetsky D., Tomin N., Yang D., Kurbatsky V. A New Intelligent Algorithm for Load Shedding Against
Overload in Active Distribution Networks // Proc. of 2014 Intern. Conf. on Power System Technology
(POWERCON2014), China, Chengdu, 20-22 Oct. 8 p. 2014.
[10] Voropai N.I., Efimov D.N., Osak A.B., Panasetsky D.A., Novikov E.A., Karatayev B.N. Distributed Adaptive Load
Shedding Scheme to Maintain Transient Stability and Prevent Overload / IFAC-PapersOnLine, V. 48, Issue 30,
pp. 554559, 2015. Online. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405896315030803
[11] Voropai N.I., Efimov D.N., Khanaev V.V. Demand side management and load control in Russia: Experience and
perspective view for the next two decades // Proc. of IEEE PES 2010 GM, 25-29 July, 2010, Minneapolis, USA,
7 p., 2010.
AUTHORS
Nikolai I. Voropai is Director of the Energy Systems Institute of the Russian Academy of
Sciences, Irkutsk, Russia. He is also Head of Department at Irkutsk Technical University. He
graduated from Leningrad (St. Petersburg) Polytechnic Institute in 1966 and has been with the
Siberian Energy Institute since. N.I. Voropai received his degree of Candidate of Technical
Sciences from Leningrad Polytechnic Institute in 1974, and Doctor of Technical Sciences from the
Siberian Energy Institute in 1990. His research interests include modeling of power systems;
operation and dynamic performance of large interconnections; reliability, security, control and
restoration of power systems; development of national, international and intercontinental electric
power grids. N.I. Voropai is a member of CIGRE, IFAC, IAEE, Fellow of IEEE. He is Chair of
WG on Asian and Australazian Electricity Infrastructure of IEEE PES.
Dmitry N. Efimov is a senior researcher in the Energy Systems Institute of the Russian Academy
of Sciences (ESI), Irkutsk, Russia. He graduated from Irkutsk State Technical University in 1987.
Since then he has been with ESI. He received his degree of Candidate of Technical Sciences from
the ESI in 1998. Since 1998 till 2000 D.N. Efimov was an executive director of the International
Research Energy Laboratory, Budapest, Hungary. His research interests include simulation of
transients in electric power systems, development, operation and dynamic properties of the large
power interconnections.
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Daniil A. Panasetsky received his B.Sc. and Ph.D. degrees in 2006 and 2014, respectively, from
Irkutsk State Technical University (ISTU) and Energy Systems Institute (ESI) of the Russian
Academy of Sciences, Irkutsk, Russia. Since 2009 he is a senior researcher in ESI. Since 2014 he
is an associated professor of electrical engineering in ISTU. His research interests include power
system stability, emergency control, ac/dc converters and application of artificial intelligence to
power systems.
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IPASJ International Journal of Electrical Engineering (IIJEE)

Web Site: http://www.ipasj.org/IIJEE/IIJEE.htm

A Publisher for Research Motivation........

Volume 4, Issue 8, August 2016