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police officers requested that the box be opened) be considered a waiver. Held: The
right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution. The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants
belongings under the first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A
search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is
significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent
jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be
reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the
outset of the search. The question, therefore, is whether the police herein had
probable cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction,
applied with a great degree of consistency, is that reliable information alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule
requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate
that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two
elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. Reliable information alone is insufficient. Thus, herein, in no sense
can the knowledge of the arresting officers that Tudtud was in possession of
marijuana be described as personal, having learned the same only from their
informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his information only
from his neighbors and the friends of Tudtud. Soliers information is hearsay.
Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to
conduct their own surveillance. This surveillance, it turns out, did not actually
consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade, but of
a mere gathering of information from the assets there. The police officers who
conducted such surveillance did not identify who these assets were or the basis
of the latters information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal
knowledge. Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures only if the following requisites are present: (1) It must appear
that the rights exist; (2) The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; (3) Said person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites.
Records disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and
requested Tudtud that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly
containing the marijuana, Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and opened
the box himself. Tudtud's implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more
than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances
and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee. Consequently, Tudtud's lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the
warrantless search and seizure. As the search of Tudtud's box does not come under
the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves
obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other
than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the
conviction of Tudtud, et. al. cannot be sustained.
People vs. Molina [GR 133917, 19 February 2001] En Banc, Ynares-Santiago (J): 14
concur Facts: Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City,
received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in
Davao City. The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was
during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer
when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver,
Gregorio Mula y Malagura (@"Boboy"), as the pusher. As to Nasario Molina y
Manamat (@ "Bobong"), SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him prior to 8
August 1996. At about 7:30 a.m. of 8 August 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an
information that the alleged pusher Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 ) Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) will be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time that morning.
Consequently, at around 8:00 a.m. he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct 3,
Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio
Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and
SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they
would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 a.m., while the team
were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying Mula and
Molina passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to Mula and Molina as
the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and overtook the "trisikad."
SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, 30 meters from where Mula and Molina were
accosted. The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, Mula,
who was holding a black bag, handed the same to Molina. Subsequently, SPO1
Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked Molina to open the bag.
Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." SPO1 Pamplona insisted on
opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, Mula
and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers. On 6 December 1996, the
accused Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as
evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial court. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by the accused, but this was likewise denied.
The accused waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint
memorandum. On 25 April 1997, the trial court rendered the decision, finding the
accused guilty of the offense charged, and sentenced both to suffer the penalty of
death by lethal injection. Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule
122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court
on automatic review. Issue: Whether Mula and Molina manifested outward indication
that would justify their arrest, and the seizure of prohibited drugs that were in their
possession. Held: The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and
seizures be carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength
11.) PEOPLE vs. BINAD SY CHUA G.R. Nos. 136066-67 February 4, 2003 Facts:
SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo Nunag received a report from their
confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night
at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The informer further reported
that accused-appellant distributes illegal drugs in different karaoke bars in Angeles
City. On the basis of this lead the PNP Chief of Angeles City immediately formed a
team of operatives. At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car
driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the
Thunder Inn Hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed
Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and
introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet,
a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right
back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded
twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When
SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a
crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent
plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm
bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the
other police operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to
the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.
The initial field test conducted by SPO2 Danilo Cruz at the PNP Headquarters
revealed that the siezed items contained shabu. Accused-appellant narrated a
different version of the incident. However, the trial court convicted him guilty as
charged with illegal possession of Drugs.
Issue:
Whether there is a valid warrantless arrest.
Held:
No.
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the stop and frisk principles
is applicable to justify the warrant
less arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on
accused-appellant. In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the
very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an
offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Accordingly, for this exception to
apply two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held that reliable
information alone, absent any overt act indicati
ve of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to
stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or
contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial
inquiries,
approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in
order to check the latters outer clothing fo
electronic and one mechanical scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol
with magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
The trial court held that the warrantless arrest was illegal and that warrantless
search incidental to the arrest was also unlawful.
Issue:
Whether or not Hon. Laguio erred in acquitting the accused due to the invalid
warrantless arrest?
Held:
No. The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on
warrantless arrest provide: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; b) When an offense has just been committed, and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under
paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any
overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of
the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify
an in flagrante delicto arrest. Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under
paragraph (b) of Section 5. And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under
paragraph (c) of Section 5. The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial
court, is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search
incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
The Peoples contention that Wang waived his right against
unreasonable search and seizure has no factual basis. While we agree in principle
that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, however, based on the
evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person and
belongings. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not
have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. Moreover, the continuing objection
to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during the arraignment
bolsters Wangs claim that he
resisted the warrantless arrest and search.