West European Politics

ISSN: 0140-2382 (Print) 1743-9655 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fwep20

The 2015 Greek parliamentary elections: from

great expectations to no expectations
Lamprini Rori
To cite this article: Lamprini Rori (2016) The 2015 Greek parliamentary elections: from
great expectations to no expectations, West European Politics, 39:6, 1323-1343, DOI:
10.1080/01402382.2016.1171577
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2016.1171577

Published online: 18 May 2016.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 211

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 1 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fwep20
Download by: [University of Peloponnisos]

Date: 03 September 2016, At: 18:27

West European Politics, 2016

VOL. 39, NO. 6, 13231343
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2016.1171577

ELECTIONS IN CONTEXT

The 2015 Greek parliamentary elections: from great

expectations to no expectations
Lamprini Rori
The year 2015 was an electorally intense one for the European South, with contests in Spain, Portugal and Greece indicating significant changes in the party
systems and the emergence of new political actors elected in parliament and/or
coming to power.1 Austerity functioned like a structure of political opportunity
that altered party competition in a way nobody could have predicted three
years before. Among the left-wing coalition in Portugal, the rise of Podemos
to the third position among Spanish political parties followed by the collapse
of two-partyism and the two consecutive victories of the Coalition of Radical
Left (SYRIZA), the latter certainly provoked the most contradictory feelings
and calamitous economic results.
Between the January 2015 election, in which SYRIZA was the first party of
the radical left to have won power in the history of the EU (Rori 2015a), and
the September 2015 election which confirmed its dominance, extraordinary
events occurred, even for the turbulent politics of crisis-ridden Greece. Change
confirms the course that started with the earthquake elections of May and June
2012 (Voulgaris and Nikolakopoulos 2014), ended the old two-partyism and
brought about a new polarised, two-party system (Dinas and Rori 2013). It
remains to be seen whether the September landslide constitutes the end of a
realignment process which will stabilise the new, weaker two-partyism enacted
by SYRIZA and New Democracy (ND) or whether it will be followed by large
shifts and unsteady electoral performance (Moschonas 2015).

Background to the January 2015 election

The June 2012 parliamentary election led to a coalition, bringing under the
same government the two sworn enemies of the past 30 years ND and
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and the Democratic Left (DIMAR).
The three-party government, consisting of ND, PASOK, DIMAR, was founded
on a majority of 179 seats,2 while four opposition parties stood against the
bailout package and its measures. The coalition partners agreed on a common
CONTACT Lamprini Rori

lrori@bournemouth.ac.uk

2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

1324

L. Rori

platform whose main objective was to negotiate the terms of the agreement with
the creditors, provided that the negotiations did not undermine the countrys
place in the Eurozone.
The talks held between the government and the so-called troika European
Commission, European Central Bank, International Monetary Fund resulted
in a new package of austerity measures and reforms in exchange for an estimated loan of 13.5 billion. The suspended loan tranches would be released as
long as Greece continued to generate a primary surplus. Even though the new
agreement specified better loan terms, the debate on debt relief was postponed
due to the troikas ambivalent stance. A tranche of 49 billion was released
by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in December. While the
risk of leaving the Eurozone seemed to have abated, the economic downturn
continued.
The ruling coalition was severely tested throughout 2013. Heavy reforms and
measures were implemented. In April, the parliament voted for the dismissal
of 15,000 employees by the end of 2014, fostering anger among the opposition. The government recapitalised the banks for 25 billion and proceeded
to privatisations, an act which was described by SYRIZA as liquidation of the
states assets. Law and order issues were also high on the governments agenda.
Although there was a decline in massive and violent demonstrations, the social
climate remained restless and local violent movements persisted, becoming a
point of conflict between SYRIZA and the government.
The governments decision to put an abrupt end to the public broadcasting
group (ERT) by decree in June exacerbated government instability. Perceived
as a symbol of authoritarianism, ERTs black screen led to the redundancy of
2,656 workers, which reflected the governments attempt to meet its commitment to the troika to dismiss 2,000 employees by the end of June. DIMAR, the
opposition parties, ERT employees and international commentators reacted
forcefully, accusing ND and PASOK of an undemocratic decision. The crisis escalated into journalists strikes, the occupation of the building by ERT
employees, daily gatherings of several hundreds of citizens outside Radio
Hall. The ground was fertile for the rapprochement of SYRIZA with society
and certain social groups, as well as with the far right, national-populist party
Independent Greeks (ANEL). Both parties accused the government of staging
a coup and promised to reinstate the laid-off employees. The government put
an end to the occupation of the former ERT building by having it evacuated
by force. The failure of negotiations among the coalition partners led DIMAR
to withdraw from the government, further weakening the government majority, hitherto constituted of 153 deputies. The inevitable reshuffle promoted
PASOK President Evangelos Venizelos to Deputy Prime Minister and Minister
of Foreign Affairs, while senior party members joined the government.
Barely a month after the ERT crisis, the parliament voted in new measures,
among which was the mobility plan for 25,000 civil servants. Amidst a climate

West European Politics

1325

of strong social discontent, SYRIZA initiated a censure motion against the government in November, which was backed by the deputies of ANEL, the Greek
Communist Party (KKE) and the right-wing extremist Golden Dawn (HA).
Although the motion was rejected by 153 votes, the governments majority
was tested again in December during the vote for the budget of 2014. Despite
numerous reactions from all sides, it was voted for by 153 MPs.
Even though the economy remained in recession, and unemployment had
risen to 28% at the end of 2013, the image of Greece abroad had improved. The
government reduced the deficit and achieved a primary surplus for the first
time. The success of a trial return to the markets in spring 2014 and the positive
feedback from partners on the path taken by Greece constituted the elements
on which the government built the Greek success story. This was the main
narrative with which it hoped to win the forthcoming European, municipal
and regional elections.
Elections took place on 25 May. With the slogan We vote on the 25th,
they leave on the 26th, SYRIZA tried to convert the European elections into
a referendum on the government, a fact which maximised polarisation and
led to higher levels of turnout than usual (Figure 1). By winning 26.56% of
the vote in the European elections, SYRIZA confirmed the lead that had been
registered in the polls since December 2013. ND came second with 22.72%,
followed by HA. The right-wing extremist party secured 9.39%, despite the fact
that its leader, the majority of MPs and key party members had been in prison
since September 2013, awaiting trial for, among other things, participation in
a criminal organisation after an assassination by a party member.

Figure 1. Voter turnout, 19742015. Source: http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm, for

19741993; authors elaboration of official results, Ministry of Interior, for 19962015.

1326

L. Rori

ND interpreted the result as a severe defeat, which portended a poor performance in the upcoming parliamentary elections. In order to anticipate intraparty discontent and minimise the loss, the Prime Minister proceeded to a
ministerial reshuffle that gave posts to prominent cadres of the party apparatus,
associated with long-entrenched patronage practices. In order to win back
voters who had opted for a far right, protest option, ND implicitly adopted a
quasi-anti-bailout rhetoric, at the cost of possibly alienating moderate voters.
Anger and the will to punish the government only increased in the aftermath
of the European elections, as taxpayers were called upon to pay a new property
tax. Unable to reach an agreement with the creditors regarding the final evaluation of the programme resuming on 31 December, the government was forced
to ask for a two-month extension. This undermined the image of government
effectiveness and nurtured doubts about the claim that the country was now
able to borrow from the markets.
The difference between the two parties had been widening in the polls in
favour of SYRIZA, which precipitated the forthcoming ballot by taking advantage of the election for the President of the Republic, scheduled for December
2014. The government proposed as a candidate in the presidential election a
former European Commissioner, former Minister and member of ND. SYRIZA
and ANEL used their institutional leeway to provoke early elections: they
refused to vote for any candidate, thus precluding the possibility to agree on a
consensual candidacy. As the candidate proposed by the government majority
received only 168 votes,3 a general election was convened for 25 January 2015.
This would be the fourth anticipated parliamentary election since the outbreak
of the financial crisis.
The stance vis--vis the bailout remained the dividing line in party competition throughout this period, whereas fragmentation of the party system (Dinas
and Rori 2013) persisted.4 The biggest shifts took place in the centre-left of the
political spectrum. Consistent in its pro-bailout stance and a faithful ally to its
erstwhile conservative opponent, PASOK suffered the greatest loss, in terms of
both members and voters. Three splinter parties were founded by ex-cadres,
one of them by former PASOK leader and Prime Minister Giorgos Papandreou.
It was mainly a personalised party, structured around its leader.
DIMARs exit from the coalition government and its ambiguous position
towards the bailout caused disturbances in the party. Despite the will of many
prominent party members, its leader refused to cooperate with PASOK under
the initiative of 58 politicians and academics who tried to unify the forces of
the centre-left. DIMAR finally cooperated with the Greens in the January elections. PASOK backed the Initiative of 58, which nonetheless did not flourish.
The failure of the alliance between PASOK and DIMAR left a void in the
broader space of the centre and centre-left, which was soon covered by the
River (POTAMI). Created in February 2014 by a popular television journalist,
Stavros Theodorakis, the POTAMI is a cadre party whose candidates came

West European Politics

1327

from DIMAR, former liberal parties, and public figures from the media, arts
and letters. It represents a social-liberal trend, committed to Greeces European
identity, the reform of the state and the economy, as well as the renewal of the
political system. It supported the idea of creating a national negotiating committee and declared its will to participate in a coalition government.
Acting like a vote-maximiser from June 2012, SYRIZA was arguably the
biggest beneficiary of the financial crisis. The shock of the crisis acted as a
catalyst for its exponential rise (Moschonas 2013). By investing in polarisation, denunciation and national populism, SYRIZA called for change in Greece
and Europe. It launched the idea of an alliance of the countries of southern
Europe, which was only backed by its sister party in Spain, the newly founded
Podemos. SYRIZAs march to power was marked by organisational changes
consistent with constitutional requirements: the unification of the party since
the July 2013 congress, which was sealed by the election of Alexis Tsipras as
party president, and the formalisation of a significant intra-party opposition.
Abolishing its federational structure was an indispensable act for SYRIZA in
order to benefit from the 50-seat bonus, should it come first in the next election.
At least two political lines were expressed, even if the boundaries between them
were not clear: the majoritarian, which remained critical towards Europe but
supported the negotiations with EU partners, and the more radical and intransigent which called for the return to a national currency. The latter represented
30% of the party. Although the economic programme of SYRIZA gradually
changed after 2012, it remained fully incompatible with the creditors requirements. From 2012 SYRIZA hosted unionists that came mainly from PASOK.
By forging links with professional associations and the labour movement, it
expanded its social base. Although it drew the demarcation line with parties
that supported austerity measures, in order to maximise its supporters, Tsipras
rallied around him dissidents from PASOK and DIMAR, as he did later with
ANEL. Professionalisation, local organisational penetration and programme
development have marked its internal life throughout the period 20122015
(Rori 2015a).
Having switched from anti-bailout to pro-bailout stances, from 2012 to 2015
ND focused on the implementation of the agreement and on public order.
Although the party suffered defections, it managed to maintain its parliamentary representation better than PASOK and DIMAR. Vote shifts from ND to
HA embarrassed the party leadership and raised ambivalence on how to face
HAs paramilitary action. The strategy of the party changed after the murder of
an antifascist rapper musician Pavlos Fyssas by a HA militant; nonetheless, the
revelation of close relations between the Secretary General of the Government
and HA officials triggered an internal crisis in April 2014.
The pro-Nazi HA strengthened its position in its strongholds, achieving territorial diffusion and organisational penetration (Georgiadou and Rori 2013).
Its violent and grassroots activism escalated until September 2013, when it

1328

L. Rori

faded after the assassination of Fyssas. Despite the judicial inquiry into the
partys criminal activities, the lifting of its deputies parliamentary immunity,
the imprisonment of its leader, MPs and members and the suspension of party
funding, HA came third in the 2014 elections, both national and European.
The nationalist, populist radical right-wing party of ANEL, on the contrary,
lost terrain in terms of both votes and parliamentary presence: more than half
of its MPs went independent before the end of their mandate. In addition to
their extreme anti-bailout discourse, their rhetoric included populist, antipartisan, hyper-nationalist, anti-European, anti-immigration, homophobic and
conspiracy elements (Georgiadou 2015). The common parliamentary strategies of ANEL and SYRIZA from 2012 to 2015 in the confidence vote and
the presidential election showed the rapprochement of the two players and
presaged their future collaboration in government.

The January 2015 campaign

As the victory of SYRIZA appeared certain in the polls from December 2013,5
the agenda and the dynamics of the campaign played only a minor role. The
challenge of the campaign resided in SYRIZAs possibility or not of obtaining a
majority. The rivals communication strategies symbolically represented hope
versus fear. SYRIZA tried to maximise its advantage, while ND rather struggled
to limit its looming defeat.
The government countered the fear of a SYRIZA administration with its own
proven responsibility. ND highlighted the hard-won successes in the economy
and proposed the post-electoral formation of a coalition government uniting all pro-European forces around ND. It over-emphasised the dangers that
a potential SYRIZA government would entail, and countered the dominant
anti-austerity rhetoric with a narrative about the end of bailouts. Its communication lacked clarity, though: the party tried to project positive messages, while
its cadres expressed a crude alarmism which sometimes echoed an outdated
type of anticommunism. For all its apparent aggressiveness, ND essentially
conducted a defensive campaign.
PASOK tried to position itself as the guarantor of stability in a forthcoming
coalition government, insisting on its credentials of responsibility throughout
the whole crisis period and its unwavering commitment to the presence of
Greece in the EU. POTAMI wanted to incarnate the new face of the political system and introduced itself as a potential partner in a coalition government. ANEL stressed the utility of its presence in Parliament as a reasonable
anti-memorandum force that would contain SYRIZAs radicalism.
In contrast to the pre-election offensive and the polarising strategies of
2012 and 2014, SYRIZA conducted a more restrained campaign, expressing positive messages. Its communication was structured around four axes.
Firstly, high-sounding assertions, in an intensely populist register, about the

West European Politics

1329

forthcoming end of austerity. Secondly, determined negotiations within the

euro area about the Greek debt relief following the German model of 1953.
Thirdly, a smooth alternation in government and the renewal of the political system according to the rules. The integration of former executives from
PASOK and other parties into the party apparatus acted as a symbolic guarantee of continuity, albeit without associating these newcomers with the partys
exacerbated negative discourse vis--vis the old political personnel. Finally, in
the collective imaginary of the left the coming victory of SYRIZA was seen as
an end to the neoliberal hegemony and the inequalities among countries in
Europe, to be achieved through an alliance of Southern European countries.

The January 2015 result

Participation increased slightly after 2012, whereas fragmentation of the party
system remained the same: although the number of parties that got over 1% rose
from 9 to 11, parties exceeding the 3% threshold and thus obtaining parliamentary representation remained at 7. ND lost almost 9.5%, whereas HA gained 17
seats and thus secured the third position. The big losers of the elections were the
forces of the centre-left. The balkanisation of PASOK (Anastasakis 2015) that
had started in 2012 resulted in an unprecedented fragmentation of the political
space into four parties. Although they made a total of 13.68%, only PASOK and
POTAMI managed to secure their presence in parliament.
Having augmented its power by 9.5 points since 2012, SYRIZA was the big
winner of the elections (Table 1). SYRIZA succeeded in better mobilising its
electorate,6 as well as attracting voters from all competing political parties. Some
25% of those who voted for PASOK in June 2012 voted for SYRIZA in 2015, along
with 32% from DIMAR, 20% from KKE, 20% from ANEL and 10% from HA,
while direct shifts of June 2012 votes from ND to SYRIZA reached 1113% (just
over 3% of the electorate). As in the 2012 elections (Nezi and Katsanidou 2014),
the hypothesis of an economic-based voting seems at first glance to be confirmed
at least for those who passed straight onto the other side: voters who offered their
one-off support to ND in June 2012, in an attempt to avert the potentially negative economic consequences of a SYRIZA victory, now shifted towards SYRIZA
to punish the incumbent for its economic performance (Konstantinidis 2015).
The advance of SYRIZA among voters who had cast a vote exceeded six
points. Data from the exit polls show that the determinant factor in the vote
for SYRIZA was more the desire for an alternation in government than identification with the party: 52.4% of voters wishing to condemn the government
moved towards SYRIZA (33% of the entire population), whereas only 28.5%
of those who voted in order to support a particular party chose SYRIZA (36%
of the population).7 The desire to punish the incumbent government and the
candidacy of Alexis Tsipras were the most salient drivers of support for the
party of the radical left.

1,926,526
1,526,400
379,722
341,732
301,684
222,349
200,532
186,644
155,320
46,183
41,626
35,594
28,909

15,282
8,873

16,000
5,567,930

145
75
18
17
15
11
10
9
0
0
0
0

0
0

Votes (N)

20 September 2015

0.28
0.16

0.29
56.16

35.46
28.09
6.99
6.29
5.55
4.09
3.69
3.44
2.86
0.85
0.77
0.66
0.53

Votes (%)

7,999
152,557
109,500
63,669
29,820

18,584
6,330,356

39,497

0
0
0
0
0

2,245,978
1,718,694
388,387
289,469
338,188
373,924
293,683
110, 923

Votes (N)

25 January 2015
149
76
17
13
15
17
13
0

Seats (N)

0.13
2.47
1.77
1.03
0.48

0.3
63.62

0.64

36.34
27.81
6.28
4.68
5.47
6.05
4.75
1.79

Votes (%)

0
17
0
0

71
129
18
33
12

20
0

Seats (N)

7,628

97,099
385,079
54,421
81,069
6,216,798

98,063

20,416

1,655,053
1,825,609
425,980
755,832
277,179

462,456
17,145

Votes (N)

17 June 2012

0.12

1.58
6.26
0.88
1.31
62.49

1.59

0.33

26.89
29.66
6.92
12.28
4.5

7.51
0.28

Votes (%)

In September 2015, PASOK and DIMAR cooperated under the name DISY ( , ). The electoral power indicated for PASOK corresponds to their joint force.
In 2012, the three liberal parties ran together. In January 2015 they did not participate in the elections, whereas in 2015 DRASSI cooperated with POTAMI and DIXAN ran autonomously.
The percentage indicated for September 2015 corresponds to the electoral power of DIXAN.
c
In June 2012 and September 2015 KKE M-L cooperated with M-L KKE. The figures for 2012 and September 2015 correspond to their combined power.
d
In 2012 DIMAR participated autonomously in the elections, and the figures for 2012 correspond to that. In January 2015, DIMAR and a section of the GREENS cooperated. The January
2015 figures represent their combined electoral force.
e
The others for January 2015 are EDEM, ELDA, EEK, OKDE, independent candidates, KEAN, ELKSI, ROMA. For September 2015 they include ELLAS, ELLADA, OKDE, OAKKE, independent
candidates.
f
Turnout is underrepresented due to out-of-date electoral registration records.
Source: Ministry of Interior, http://www.ypes.gr.

SYRIZA
ND
A
PASOKa
KKE
POTAMI
ANEL
EK
LAE
ANTARSYA
EPAM
KOINONIA
DRASSIDIXANFISYb
DIMOKRATIKOI
MLc
KIDISO
TELEIA
LAOS
DIMARd
ECOLO
Otherse
Turnoutf

Seats (N)

Table 1.Greek election results, 2012 and 2015.

1330
L. Rori

West European Politics

1331

The new government

SYRIZA nonetheless did not gain a majority and thus formed a coalition government with ANEL. Though this unprecedented and striking coalition between
a radical left and a far right party cannot be interpreted according to the classic
leftright division, it needs to be understood on the basis of new dimensions
which emerged during the financial crisis and structured the choices of voters
and parties. The link between staying in the Eurozone, austerity measures and
specific policies has coordinated choices in two dimensions, the first grouping
leaning towards economic issues and European unification and the second
addressing cultural challenges (Katsanidou and Otjes 2015). Stances related
to economic policies are structured according to attitudes towards Europe,
whereas the leftright axis, which used to be the best predictor of vote choice
since 1974 (Dinas 2008), now determines positioning towards cultural issues.
Hence the coalition follows the smallest policy distance criterion: both government partners had exactly the same position on a specific political and
economic subject the rejection of the memorandum which nevertheless
was the most salient issue for both parties, regardless of important differences
between them on cultural issues. Thus the alliance is not based on a substantial
programme agreement, but on opposition to the memorandum, austerity and
partly to the EU. Through this striking coalition, SYRIZA opted to emphatically and firmly express that negotiations with partners were the core of the
government. Finally, the choice corresponds to the minimum winning coalition
theory: in arithmetical terms the electoral power of ANEL was as much as
SYRIZA needed in order to form a majority, a fact that, among others, guaranteed its maximum autonomy in the cabinet. The compatibility of the two
allies was reinforced by the pronounced radical populism they have adopted
throughout the crisis period (Pappas 2014).
The systems transition towards a new two-partyism (Dinas and Rori 2013) is
advancing but has yet to consolidate. The combined electoral force of SYRIZA
and ND, which increased from 35.6% to 56.5% between May and June 2012,
rose to 64.1% in January 2015. Although the tendency is clear, it remains far
from the pre-crisis levels of two-partyism (77.4% in October 2009). It differs
also in terms of distance between the main antagonists, as well as between
the second and third parties. The 8.5% distance between the first and second
party differs from the symmetric bipartisan system established back in the
1980s, whereas the distance between the second and third parties, which rose
from 3.6% to 14.6% between May and June 2012, increased to 21.5% in 2015.
The distance has widened gradually, but has not yet reached pre-crisis levels
(26% in 2009). It is an imperfect and asymmetric two-partyism on the way to
consolidation.

1332

L. Rori

Background to the September 2015 election

The early days after the election were marked by enthusiasm among the public,
declarations about radical change by government officials and highly symbolic moves. The Prime Ministers first public act was to visit a memorial for
200 Greek Resistance members killed by the Nazis during World War II, as
well as to object loudly to a supposedly unanimous EU statement criticising
Russias aggression in Ukraine. These went hand-in-hand with declarations
about the end of austerity, a backtrack on reforms and insistence on debt relief.
The intransigent posture of the government was backed by a plan inspired by
game theory, designed by the flamboyant Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis
and solidified by the appointment to key cabinet posts of Marxists, nationalists
and fierce opponents of austerity.
Nonetheless, political change brought back an atmosphere of uncertainty
and fragility regarding the Greek economy: bank deposits fell, tax revenue and
the stock market declined, yields rose. A series of contacts between European
officials and the government soon revealed the chasm in their perceptions: the
former insisted on adhering to the existing programme and urged Greece to
resolve the question of its extension, while the latter rejected the programme
and the troika and demanded a new deal and debt relief.
Although Greece remained dependent on external support, the government
persisted with its denunciatory, national-populist aggression against creditors
and political opponents alike. Within the country it adopted the divisive strategy those who are not with us are with the creditors, and abroad it procrastinated, believing that the creditors would ultimately give in. The linchpin of
the rationale behind this delaying tactic was that a Greek bankruptcy would be
financially detrimental to the Eurozone and geopolitically harmful to the EU.
Given the substantial payments the country would have to make in the
next few months, and pressed by the approaching expiry of the extended programme on 28 February, the government was forced to take a first step back
from its tough line. On 20 February it acknowledged the memorandum and
the need to finalise the evaluation and asked for a four-month extension to the
lending agreement. In return the government gained time and the change of
the negotiation label from troika to the Brussels group. For all this symbolic
victory which was handy for domestic use essentially the negotiation terms
had become tougher and the country was being isolated within the EU.
While many within the country and abroad believed the deal of 20 February
to be the end of the negotiation, all it did was to expose the limits of the governments capacity and reliability in implementing measures and the difficult
game in which the PM was trying to strike a balance. On the one hand it went
against its commitment not to rescind measures or make unilateral changes,
reopening ERT, allocating funds to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, renegotiating maturing debts, and reinstating or offering tenure to public servants. On

West European Politics

1333

the other hand, it had to negotiate simultaneously with its European partners
and within the party, where the dissident voices were getting louder. Resistance
among MPs and within the government meant that the deal was never brought
to Parliament for ratification.
While negotiations went on fruitlessly at all levels, with the creditors claiming that the Greek sides proposed measures were neither specific nor sufficient,
liquidity within the country was dwindling. A bill was hastily passed in April
for the transfer of all cash reserves held by public organisations, pension funds
and local authorities to the Bank of Greece. Ambivalence and doublespeak
continued: while the government momentarily softened the edge of its discourse towards the partners, assuring them that it would fulfil its obligations
and accelerate the evaluation, some of its members pushed for total rupture.
Trapped in its anti-bailout, anti-Western attitude, the government sought in
vain various forms of financing from China, Iran and Russia, which the PM
visited twice, while pushing for a political solution on the European level.
As Europe remained adamant about completing the evaluation, uncertainty
reigned and the country was being isolated, the Greek negotiating team was
restructured with the removal of the Minister of Finance. Yet by then the situation had seriously deteriorated. The exaggerations, insults and threats uttered
from both sides had exacerbated the lack of mutual trust. And while the government assured the Greek public that an agreement was ante portas, Europe
was abuzz with Grexit scenarios.
In the summit of 22 June the Greek government submitted a proposal
with 7.9 billion of measures in order to secure a further extension to the
programme. The creditors proposed some changes in the mix of measures.
Negotiations failed, with European leaders urging Greece to accept the offer
of 25 June, which the Prime Minister described as a humiliating ultimatum
of measures that contravened the founding principles and values of Europe.
After five months of unfruitful negotiations and only four days before the
bailout was due to expire, Alexis Tsipras shocked his counterparts as well as
the Greek and European public opinion by announcing that the forthcoming
EU/ECB/IMFGreek agreement would be put to a referendum. Announced
on 27 June, the referendum was scheduled for 5 July. The results of the vote by
the 62.25% of 9,914,244 registered citizens who participated were 61.31% No
and 38.69% Yes.8
The referendum took place in a context of unprecedented polarisation. The
country was quickly divided into two opposed camps: on the one side, the
coalition partners SYRIZA and ANEL and the right-wing extremist HA
campaigned against the agreement; on the other, the pro-European parties
ND, PASOK, DIMAR (moderate left), POTAMI (centre) campaigned in
favour of the bailout.
The two sides framed the question of the referendum differently. The No
camp invoked national pride and dignity and maintained that the referendum

1334

L. Rori

was not about the currency or belonging in the Eurozone, but a powerful negotiation weapon for the Greek side. In multiple appearances over the campaign
week the Prime Minister insisted, often in dramatic tones, that a win for the
No camp would put him in a stronger position to negotiate a more favourable
deal. The referendum was presented as an opportunity to assess democracy and
popular sovereignty, according to SYRIZA, or national sovereignty according
to ANEL and GD.
In line with statements by European leaders and counterparts, the Yes camp
framed the question as a stance towards Greeces membership in the Eurozone
and the EU. Using various tones, language and arguments, the Yes parties
accused the government of dividing the people and jeopardising the countrys
European orientation. The Yes vote was given existential dimensions, equating the No vote with an act of suicide. The government was accused of never
intending to reach an agreement but rather to pull the country out of the euro
and ultimately the EU.
Whilst the heated debate in the mass and social media and at crowded
rallies reflected the mobilisation in the two camps, various issues polarised
the agenda. Institutional aspects the very short notice and the one-week
campaign, the complex way in which the question was phrased, the extremely
technical character of the two documents of the agreement, the placement of
the No vote before the Yes on the ballot paper, the fact that the document
put to vote was a draft version that did not reflect the last stance of the negotiations, since the Greek side left unilaterally provoked strong reactions from
national constitutional experts, foreign experts and political parties. Most of
all, the bank holiday and capital controls imposed by the government in order
to avoid collapse, since the creeping political uncertainty provoked an immediate and increasing deposit outflow and the ECB did not raise the ceiling of
the Emergency Liquidity Assistance. Practical problems occurred due to poor
market liquidity, which fostered fear and stress among the electorate. Things got
worse as the bailout agreement, already extended twice, expired on 30 June and
the European counterparts refused to provide the extension requested by the
Greek government until after the referendum. Among other problems, default
posed the question of how the state would service an imminent 1.5 billion
($1.7 billion) payment to the IMF. Nonetheless, four days before the referendum
the IMF published a report which called for debt relief and a 20-year grace
period for Greece. The IMF report and US support for Greece was framed as
giving justification to the No camp and vindicating the government. Whilst the
government put the blame for the bank holiday and the refusal to extend the
programme on EU, the Yes camp accused the government of irresponsibility
and destroying the economy.
Partisan narratives concerning the likely consequences of the referendum
weighted heavily in vote choice and proved more powerful than individual
preferences about the countrys position in the Eurozone or the EU. In a survey9

West European Politics

1335

Figure 2.Vote in the July 2015 referendum on the basis of voting in the January election.
Source: Authors elaboration of data from ProRata, 1 July 2015, N = 1,000.

conducted a day before the referendum, a substantial share of No voters wanted

a different status vis--vis the EMU and the EU, whilst all Yes voters wanted
Greece to stay in the Eurozone. A majority of Yes supporters expressed beliefs
that a Grexit would follow a No vote, whilst more than 90% of No supporters expected continued negotiations in the aftermath of the referendum. The
vote was divided along partisan lines (Figure 2), but occupation and education
played only a minimal role in vote intention. Apart from the massive No among
the unemployed, small differences were detected between other professional
groups. Rural areas voted overwhelmingly in favour of No, while results were
more balanced in the urban centres. The referendum revealed an intergenerational divide, with young voters voting massively No and older ones supporting
Yes (Figure 3). Last but not least, the imposed bank holiday affected the vote
intention of about one-fifth of the survey respondents, who mostly switched
their vote in favour of Yes. Hence, albeit smaller than partisan narratives,
material interests were found to influence vote intentions.10
The resounding No in the referendum had unexpected consequences. While
it was seen as an indisputable personal victory for Alexis Tsipras, a Grexit
seemed closer than ever. Given the clear pro-Euro majority in the polls, and the
authorisation to negotiate that he was given by 251 MPs on 11 July,11 Tsipras
isolated his intra-party opposition, fired Varoufakis as Finance Minister and
interpreted the vote as a plebiscite in his favour, for him to do what he wanted.
As a protagonist in the most fateful days in the history of the beleaguered single
currency, yet also faced with the toughest demands stemming from Germans
Finance Minister Schubles plan among which was a five-year exit from
the Eurozone and a Luxembourg trust fund authorised to sell off Greek state
assets during a 17-hour session with EU leaders and officials he pulled a
180-degree turn and accepted firstly a series of prior actions that were voted

1336

L. Rori

Figure 3.Voters motives in the July 2015 referendum. Source: Authors elaboration of data
from ProRata, 1 July 2015, N = 1,000.

through parliament,12 and then a new 86 billion bailout package from the
European Stability Mechanism over the next three years. In return, the agreement extended the fiscal adjustment and structural reforms of previous deals
and provided for extensive supervision by the EC/ECB/IMF/ESM. The Greek
parliament approved this package in mid-August with an unprecedented and
overwhelming majority13 and a striking absence of social unrest. Nonetheless,
the back-down itself and the express parliamentary procedure brought onethird of SYRIZAs MPs into direct conflict with the rest of the government. Thus
the most unequivocal rejection of austerity directly by the Greek people led
to an even tougher bailout package, leaving , HA and a minority within
SYRIZA as the sole anti-bailout forces.
Both the absence of legitimacy, given that SYRIZA had been elected in
January with an anti-austerity mandate, and the intra-party rift which left the
government with just 118 MPs, gave the Prime Minister the excuse to resign
and trigger another snap election. On 20 September, the Greek people would
vote for the third time in 2015.

The September 2015 campaign

Complaints about Tsipras manoeuvres were among the dominant issues. The
announcement of one more snap election amidst the summer holidays, after
only a three-week campaign, exacerbated criticism from opponents who wanted
the vote to be pushed back. For the Prime Minister, though, it was a race
against time. Having lost the majority, with 25 SYRIZA MPs defecting to form
Popular Unity (LAE), Tsipras chose from among sub-optimal options express

West European Politics

1337

summer legislation, a vote of confidence in parliament, a minority government

dependent on the oppositions will, or elections the one than seemed most
risky yet also most optimal, once all parameters had been taken into account.
Anticipation of the effects of the harsh austerity measures whose impact had
yet to be felt, as well as lack of time mainly for LAE to organise at constituency
level, were major drivers to his choice. After all, despite grave battle wounds,
the capitulation, the unprecedented political turbulence at the European level,
the bank holiday and last-minute avoidance of economic collapse, Tsipras
remained the most popular among the contenders. The campaign was thus
highly personalised: Tsipras made the case that he fought tooth and nail to get a
better deal; that his defeat resulted from miscalculations regarding the strategies
of other European countries, and the power differential between Greece and
Germany. Renewal of his mandate was nonetheless justified on the grounds
of the legitimacy needed for implementing the agreement, but also a parallel
programme that would benefit the most vulnerable and fight corruption. A
soft communication strategy opposed the new to the old, describing SYRIZA
as the new and arguing that change and reform could not be conducted by the
old political personnel the establishment.
The main argument of the opposition on both the left and the right was the
discrepancy between the anti-austerity platform that SYRIZA had defended
in January and the pro-austerity agreement it had voted in parliament. LAE
accused Tsipras of treason and claimed the legacy of the No camps victory; its
members publicly advocated a return to national currency and exit from the
EU. It brought together the majority of dissident cadres from SYRIZA, among
whom was the President of Parliament Zoe Konstantopoulou, popular for her
combative stance against the creditors and the pro-European parties despite
the authoritarian and formalistic manner she frequently used against the government. SYRIZAs inconsistency and competition with LAE nourished KKEs
campaign, which stuck to its permanently anti-European and anti-austerity
stance but avoided any sort of alliance.
Extreme polarisation partly due to the polls predicting a tight race between
the two major parties made survival the primary goal for the parties of the
political centre (Rori 2015c). POTAMI, having paid the price of its ambivalence towards SYRIZA at the polls, acted like a policy entrepreneur, countering the logic of party nomenclature with meritocracy and preselecting the
successful professionals and the policies it would propose should it be asked
to collaborate. Under its new leader Fofi Gennimata, PASOK also altered its
strategy. Focused on returning to the partys roots, it reclaimed figures and
symbols that SYRIZA had tried to appropriate. Although still advocating for
the convergence of the centre-left forces which it achieved with the electorally negligible DIMAR the new scheme adopted an office-seeking strategy
in the run-up to the election, hinting at the possibility of collaborating with
SYRIZA after the election.

1338

L. Rori

Leadership change in ND after the referendum personalised its campaign

as well. The transitional leader Meimarakis came from the old guard, was populist and not too competent, but he was popular enough to unify the party
and attract some voters beyond the party audience. ND invested in SYRIZAs
record of indecision, false strategy, delays and economic failure. It promoted as
credentials NDs capacity to guarantee stability, cooperation and the countrys
place in the Eurozone, hoping to appeal to voters of the Yes camp. Sharing
responsibility for the political instability and for giving in to austerity measures
as a coalition partner, ANEL also faced huge criticism and struggled to pass
the 3% threshold. HA tried to capitalise on the refugee crisis, whilst its leaders
desire to draw attention drove him to publicly accept political responsibility for
the assassination of Pavlos Fyssas. Last but not least, two political debates took
place for the first time after 2009, one among all political leaders and another
between Tsipras and Meimarakis.

The September 2015 results

The abstention rate and the failure of surveys and exit polls to validly predict
the result hit new record highs in this election: 43.83% of eligible voters did
not turn out (i.e. 764,491, or 12% less than in January) (Figure 1). Even when
discrepancies between the out-dated electoral registers and the data from the
latest census are taken into account, it remains the biggest and most abrupt
increase in non-voting in contemporary Greek politics (Nikolakopoulos and
Koustenis 2015). Electoral fatigue, social despair and disaffection with political
parties become even more alarming given the mobilisation effect triggered by
the victory of SYRIZA in the January election. Of the individuals who had
intended to abstain before the January election, 47% had abstained or voted
blank or void, whereas 25% had voted for SYRIZA and 8% for ND.14 Of the
abstainers, 52% had also abstained in the referendum, whereas 35% had voted
No and 9% Yes.15 Most pre-election surveys indicated a close battle, but this
helped the two main opponents minimise their losses. Nonetheless, there was
no single-party majority, notwithstanding the 3% threshold for winning a seat
and the 50-seat bonus, which merely turns the electoral system into plurality.
The election marked an easy landslide for SYRIZA, which saw only miniscule losses in its vote share (0.88%), despite the transfer of 155,320 voters
to the splinter party LAE, which, however, did not manage to gain parliamentary representation (Table 1). ANEL, DISY (PASOK and DIMAR) and
POTAMI secured their parliamentary presence but failed to enlarge their
audience. On the contrary, ANEL lost three seats and POTAMI six, whereas
the alliance of the remnants of PASOK and DIMAR got four extra seats. The
collapse of POTAMI stemming mainly from rural areas and the revival of
PASOK fostered mostly locally, in strongholds where the party apparatus
survives underlined the importance of organisational networks and restored

West European Politics

1339

PASOK as the strong actor within the traumatised space of the centre-left.
ND lost almost 200,000 voters, but maintained its force in terms of seats. HA
remained the third-strongest party, winning almost 7% of the vote. Whilst its
power shrank in urban areas, it rose in islands where refugee flows are more
visible (Georgiadou 2015). A flash party of the centre, Union of Centrists (EK),
managed to pass the threshold and thus become the eighth party in parliament.
Tsipras was undoubtedly the winner of this election. The risky strategy paid
off: not only did he get rid of his internal opposition, but he was also lucky
enough to see ANEL winning 10 seats and thus saving SYRIZA from forming a coalition government with some moderate, pro-European party, which
he described as corrupt. SYRIZAs penetration is relatively uniform in all age
groups. In geographic terms, SYRIZA is a nationwide party. Sociologically
it remains first among the unemployed, and gets its highest support among
private-sector employees, public servants and women. Its popularity was considerably increased among farmers and fell among professional people.16
Three different factors contributed to this victory. Firstly, the fact that during the seven months of its mandate the government did not implement any
new austerity measures, while those from the new agreement were yet to be
specified, let alone adopted. Hence the voters did not feel the need to punish
or reward the government for its economic policy, whilst it seemed premature
to judge it on future austerity. Evidence from pre-electoral surveys (Dinas and
Konstantinidis 2015) shows that vote intention for SYRIZA remained high,
despite the negative evaluations by the majority (over 60%) of respondents of
the governments economic performance or assessments (over 70%) that the
economic situation had been better one year earlier.
In fact, the economic performance of the government was not the benchmark that determined vote intention in favour of SYRIZA: reward or disapproval of the governments work figures fourth among voters motives, whereas
reward or punishment for the negotiations prevails (Figure 3).17 Having elevated the negotiations with creditors to the quintessence of the incumbent
governments existence, SYRIZA succeeded in being evaluated not on its overall
macroeconomic record or on the impact of its policies on individuals personal economic well-being as the theory of economic voting would suggest
(Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2007) but on the field of the negotiation per se.
By voting for SYRIZA, citizens approved the governments enduring, persistent
and difficult effort to bring a better agreement, whereas, at the same time, they
by majority evaluated the new agreement as worse than the previous ones.18 In
a survey experiment19 conducted pre-electorally in order to assess the impact
on the vote of perceptions about the effort and the outcome of the negotiations,
propensity to vote for SYRIZA increased when the governmental effort was
emphasised, whereas pointing to the negative aspects of the agreement did not
make people more critical towards the government. On the contrary, reference
to the austerity measures brought about by the new agreement, when the efforts

1340

L. Rori

Table 2.Motives for the September 2015 vote.

GENERAL SAMPLE
SYRIZA
ND
HA
PASOK-DIMAR
KKE
POTAMI
ANEL
EK
LAE
OTHER

Support the
country staying
in the Eurozone
36
27.3
45.6
1.5
9.2
0.6
8.4
2.5
3.2
0.4
1.3

Disapprove of
the new bailout
agreement
15
21
6.9
18.2
1.3
15.2
1.8
3
6.3
15.6
10.8

Choose the Prime

Minister
23
66.5
23
2.4
1.7
1.3
0.9
2.1
0.7
0.6
0.7

Support the
party I like
26
30.6
25.6
6.8
9.1
12.7
3.4
3.7
4.2
1
2.9

Source: Metron Analysis, common exit poll, 20 September 2015, N = 8.000.

of the government had been underlined, was said to operate as proof of the
immense difficulties Tsipras faced during the negotiations.
Political manoeuvring and blame politics aside, the leadership effect also
affected the electoral outcome. Despite a significant decrease in his popularity, Tsipras remained the most popular and most convincing in the debates
and topped his opponent Meimarakis in almost all personality characteristics
measured in the polls, especially among Januarys SYRIZA voters.20 Last but
not least, 66% of those who cast their vote on the basis of whom they preferred
as a Prime Minister voted for SYRIZA, falling to 23% when the total sample is
taken into account (Table 2).
Just as in the referendum SYRIZA successfully sold its partisan narrative to
the majority of the electorate (Jurado et al. 2015), in the September election it
managed to set its core argument as the decisive parameter of choice. The result
sealed the end of the anti-bailout hegemony: 77.62% of the vote supported
parties which had voted for the third bailout agreement.

The new government

Although Tsipras could opt for another coalition, he remained faithful to the
national-populist kind of politics that went hand-in-hand with this partnership,
claiming that any other coalition would seem unnatural. Despite the populist
hegemony (Pappas 2015), there is little room left for political experiments.
Externalising guilt, blaming Germany and the former Greek governments will
certainly not vanish from the rhetoric of the new government. However, their
effectiveness will be all the more limited, given the acute economic pain and
intense social unrest which will inevitably resurface whether the government
honours the agreement or not. In the first case, claiming ownership and succeeding in its implementation will involve sacrificing power and popularity, an
ideological re-profiling of SYRIZA towards moderation. It will test the limits

West European Politics

1341

of government majority and may ultimately force the government to seek new
partners. Furthermore, any convergence with the former opponents will have
an impact on the shape of the party system stemming from institutional reforms
that the new coalition partners might trade off like an eventual reform of the
electoral system which is difficult to anticipate. In the second case, hesitation,
temporisation, delays in the implementation of reforms will minimise the losses
of the national-populist realm, Tsipras himself and his party, but will keep the
country in limbo, in a slow but steady decline, perpetuating an artificial polarisation and a clientelism based on the redistribution of poverty. Despite electoral
shrinkage, fragmentation and loss of political identity in the opposition camp,
the new leadership in ND after the election of the reformist Kyriakos Mitsotakis
in late 2015 portends a restructuring of the political competition and sets a time
limit to any delaying tactics on the part of government strategy.

Notes
1.For other recent contributions in the elections in context series, see for example
Andr and Depauw (2015), Aylott and Bolin (2015), Arter (2015), Faas (2015),
and Haugsgjerd Allern and Karlsen (2014).
2.The Greek parliament is constituted of 300 seats. The electoral law is a mixed
system of proportional and majority representation, with a bonus of 50 seats
given to the leading party. However useful it may be in order to produce stable
government, this unfair electoral arrangement creates distortions and, thus,
crude deviations from proportionality.
3.The mandate of the President of the Republic came to an end in March 2015.
The parliamentary elections were to be held in June 2016. According to the
Constitution, the President is elected by the parliament with enhanced majority:
two-thirds of the deputies, i.e. 200 out of the 300. If this is not reached in the
first round, a second round takes place within five days. Should no candidate
be elected again, a third round is to be held within five days, this time reducing
the majority to three-fifths, or 180 MPs. In case of failure in all three rounds,
the parliament is dissolved within 10 days and parliamentary elections must
then be held, after which the parliament appoints a President by simple majority.
4.An extended version of the analysis of the January 2015 election was primarily
published in Rori (2015b).
5.Research Unit of the University of Macedonia, 20132015.
6.SYRIZA mobilised 89% of its past voters, against 78% for ND and 34% for
PASOK according to data from the Unit of Research for Public Opinion and
the Market of the University of Macedonia (2015).
7.Exit poll conducted by Metron Analysis, Alco, GPO, Marc, MRB, 25 January
2015.
8.Void and blank votes came to 5.80%; official results, Ministry of Interior,
http://ekloges.ypes.gr
9.Survey designed by Stefanie Walter, Elias Dinas, Ignacio Jurado and Nikitas
Konstantinidis, fielded by the University of Macedonias Survey Unit on 5 July,
N = 989 (Jurado et al. 2015).
10.Jurado et al. (2015).

1342

L. Rori

11.It was voted for by ANEL, ND, PASOK, POTAMI and the majority of SYRIZA,
but the government lost its majority, with only 145 out of 162 government MPs
supporting the Prime Minister.
12.The first set of measures was approved on 14 July by 229 MPs and rejected by
64, while 6 MPs voted Present. Among SYRIZA delegates 32 voted against,
6 voted Present and 1 was absent. On 22 July, the second set got 230 votes in
favour (out of 298 MPs in attendance), 63 votes against and 5 Present. SYRIZA
had 36 dissidents.
13.The memorandum was voted in on 14 August by 222 MPs, rejected by 64 and
11 MPs voted Present. SYRIZA had 47 dissidents.
14.ProRata, 17 September 2015.
15.Ibid.
16.Metron Analysis, common exit poll, 20 September 2015.
17.ProRata, 79 September 2015, N = 1300.
18.56% perceive the agreement as worse, whereas 21% perceive it as better, ProRata,
79 September 2015.
19.Ibid. Phone survey, conducted by the University of Macedonia and funded by
the universities of York and Cambridge, with a random sample of 1018 Greek
citizens on 7 and 8 September.
20.ProRata, 9 September 2015, 16 September 2015.

Acknowledgements
I thank Iannis Konstantinidis for providing me with survey data from ProRata. Any
errors or omissions are my own.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Note on contributor
Lamprini Rori is a Marie-Curie post-doctoral research fellow in the Faculty of Media
and Communication at Bournemouth University. Her current research focuses on rightwing extremism, radicalism, the role of emotions in political behaviour, traditional and
social media effects. She holds a PhD from Universit Paris I, Panthon-Sorbonne. Her
thesis examined how the professionalisation of political communication affected the
organisational change of socialist parties in Europe and most particularly in France
and Greece. Her articles have appeared, among others, in Party Politics, West European
Politics and Ple Sud. [lrori@bournemouth.ac.uk]

References
Anastasakis, Othon (2015). The Balkanization of Greeces Centre-Left Politics, Open
Democracy, 04.02.
Andr, Audrey, and Sam Depauw (2015). A Divided Nation? The 2014 Belgian Federal
Elections, West European Politics, 38:1, 22837.

West European Politics

1343

Arter, David (2015). A Pivotal Centre Party" Calls the Shots: The 2015 Finnish General
Election, West European Politics, 38:6, 1345353.
Aylott, Nicholas, and Niklas Bolin (2015). Polarising Pluralism: The Swedish
Parliamentary Election of September 2014, West European Politics, 38:3, 73040.
Dinas, Elias (2008). Big Expectations, Small Outcomes: The Impact of Leaders' Personal
Appeal in the 2004 Greek Election, Electoral Studies, 27:3, 50517.
Dinas, Elias, and Nikitas Konstantinidis (2015). Tsipras Reaps Benefits of Brinkmanship
Politics, ekathimerini, 13.10.
Dinas, Elias, and Lamprini Rori (2013). The 2012 Greek Parliamentary Elections: Fear
and Loathing in the Polls, West European Politics, 36:1, 27082.
Faas, Thorsten (2015). The German Federal Election of 2013: Merkels Triumph, the
Disappearance of the Liberal Party, and Yet Another Grand Coalition, West European
Politics, 38:1, 23847.
Georgiadou, Vasiliki (2015). Consolidation and Change Processes: HA in the September
2015 Elections, Conference of Centre for Political Research, Panteion University,
10.11.
Georgiadou, Vasiliki, and Lamprini Rori (2013). Economic Crisis, Social and Political
Impact. The New Right-Wing Extremism in Greece, in Jaime Pastor and Nicols
Rojas Pedemonte (eds.), Anuari del Conflicte Social 2013. Barcelone: Universitat de
Barcelona, 32239.
Haugsgjerd Allern, Elin, and Rune Karlsen (2014). A Turn to the Right: The Norwegian
Parliamentary Election of September 2013, West European Politics, 37:3, 65363.
Jurado, Ignacio, Nikitas Konstantinidis, and Stephanie Walter (2015). Why Greeks Voted
the Way they did in the Bailout Referendum. EUROPP, LSE blogs.
Katsanidou, A., and Simon Otjes (2015). How the European Debt Crisis Reshaped
National Political Space: the Case of Greece, European Union Politics, doi:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116515616196.
Konstantinidis, Iannis (2015). Passing on the Opposite Bank: The Direct Transfers
from ND to SYRIZA, Free Sunday, 07.03 [in Greek].
Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Mary Stegmaier (2007). Economic Models of Voting,
in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Russel J. Dalton (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
Political Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 51835.
Moschonas, Gerassimos (2013). A New Left in Greece. Pasoks Fall and Syrizas Rise,
Dissent, 60(4).
Moschonas, Gerassimos (2015). Critical Elections and the Interpretation of Elections
of September 2015, Sygchrona Themata, 37:13031, 268 [in Greek].
Nezi, Roula, and Alexia Katsanidou (2014). From valence to position: Economic voting
in extraordinary conditions, Acta Politica, 49:4, 41330.
Nikolakopoulos, Elias, and Panagiotis Koustenis (2015). Why the Real Abstention
Reached 32%, Ta Nea, 2627.09, 223.
Pappas, Takis (2014). Populism and Crisis Politics in Greece. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Pappas, Takis (2015). Populist Hegemony, Open Democracy, 25.09.
Rori, Lamprini (2015a). De la contestation au pouvoir. Les ressorts de lascension
lectorale de Syriza, Savoir/Agir, 32, 611.
Rori, Lamprini (2015c). Centre-Left: Electoral Shrinking and Lost Coalition
Opportunities, Makedonia, Political Almanac, 13.12, 5 [in Greek].
Rori, Lamprini (2015). Les lections lgislatives grecques de 2015: alterner et punir,
Ple Sud, 43:2, 13752.
Voulgaris, Yannis, and Elias Nikolakopoulos (eds.) (2014). 2012. The Double Political
Earthquake. Athens: Themelio [in Greek].