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RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L14305August29,1961
GAUDENCIOT.MENDOZA,plaintiffappellant,
vs.
MAXIMOM.ALCALA,defendantappellee.
CadhitandCadhitforplaintiffappellant.
ConstancioPadillafordefendantappellee.
NATIVIDAD,J.:
Thisactionforasumofmoney,broughtintheCourtofFirstInstanceofNuevaEcija,wasoriginallyappealedtothe
CourtofAppeals.Thelattercourt,however,hascertifiedittousforthereasonthatthequestionsinvolvedtherein
arepurelyoflaw.
ItappearsthatsometimepriortoSeptember12,1965,aninformationwas,attheinstanceoftheplaintiff,Gaudencio
T.Mendoza,filedintheCourtofFirstInstanceofNuevaEcijachargingthedefendant,MaximoM.Alcala,withthe
crimeofestafa.Thechargewaspredicateduponareceiptwhichreadsasfollows:
RECIBO
TinanggapkokayGng.GaudencioT.MendozaanghalagangISANGLIBOATISANGDAANGpiso(1,100)
kualtangpilipinobilangpaunangbayadngISANGDAANG(Wagwag)kabangpalaysa56kilosbawa'tkaban,
puestosakanyangkamalig.
Ipinangakokongihahatidangpalaynaitosaobagodumatingangika5ngSeptiembre,1953,ditosaSan
Jose,NuevaEcija.
Sakatunayannglahataylumagdaakosaibabanitongayongika2ngSeptiembre,1953.
(Sgd.)MAXIMOM.ALCALA
ThecasewasdocketedasCriminalCaseNo.3219,CourtofFirstInstanceofNuevaEcija,Peoplevs.MaximoM.
Alcala. After trial, that court acquitted the defendant of the offense charged, with costs deoficio, on the following
findings:
The prosecution has not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had in fact represented to
GaudencioT.Mendozathathehad100cavansofpalaystoredinhissister'sbodega,whichheofferedtosell
forP1,100.00.TheCourtcannotbelievethatGaudencioT.Mendozawouldpaytothedefendantthesumof
P1,100.00onthemererepresentationofthedefendantthatthepalaywasinthebodegaofhissister,andon
his request to pay him first as he was going to Manila. In the first place, there is no showing why the
defendantwasinurgentneedofP1,100.00onSeptember2,andwhyitwasabsolutelynecessaryforhimto
goimmediatelytoManilaonthatdate,suchthathehadnotimetodeliverthe100cavansofpalayallegedly
depositedinhissister'sbodega,whichisonlyafewmetersdistantfromthehouseofGaudencioT.Mendoza.
Mendoza and the defendant are from the same town: they had known each other for a long time and they
wereevenfriends.Defendanttestifiedthathehadnopalayandhadnolandfromwhichtoraisethatpalay.
That denial has notbeensuccessfullyrebuttedbytheprosecution.Theprosecution could have shown that
thedefendanthadinfacttractsoflandwherehecouldraiseenoughpalaytoselltoMendoza.Mendozamust
haveknownthatthedefendanthadnopalaytosellandasdefendantwasnotengagedinthebusinessof
buyingandsellingpalay,Mendozacouldnothavebeendeceivedbythedefendant.Again,sincethebodega
isnearthehouseofMendoza,hecouldhaveverifiedfromthedefendanttheexistenceofthatpalay.Thefact
thatMendozadidnotevenattempttoverifytheexistenceofthatpalay,isampleproofthatthereceiptExhibit

Bwasnotinfactwhatitpurportstobe.TheCourtdoesnotexpresslypassuponthedefensethatthereceipt
signedbyhimarosefromausuriousloan,asthereissufficientevidencetowarrantafindingthattherehad
beennodeceitormisrepresentationandthatExhibitBisnotwhatitpurportstobe.Anyobligationwhichthe
defendantmayhaveincurredinfavorofGaudencioT.Mendozaispurelycivilincharacterandnotcriminal.
(Emphasisours)
OnDecember16,1954,whilesaidcriminalcasewasstillpending,theplaintifffiledintheJusticeofthePeaceCourt
of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, the complaint by which this case was initiated. That complaint was based on the very
samereceiptuponwhichthecriminalactionwaspredicated,andinitplaintiff,afterallegingviolationofthetermsof
saidreceipt,askedforjudgmentagainstthedefendantforthesumofP1,100.00,withlegalinterestfromSeptember
5,1953untilfullpaymentplusP550.00fordamages,P300.00forattorney'sfees,andthecostsofsuit.Defendant's
answerconsistsofspecificdenials,affirmativedefensestotheeffectthatthetransactionreferredtointhecomplaint
wasausuriousloaninthesumofP500.00,andthatthesamehadalreadybeenpaidinfull,andacounterclaimfor
actual,moralandexemplarydamages,andattorney'sfees,inthetotalsumofP6,000.00.Aftertrial,thejusticeof
the peace court rendered judgment sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,100.00, plus
P300.00asattorney'sfees,anddismissingdefendant'scounterclaim.Fromthisjudgment,thedefendantappealed
to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, where he reproduced the answer he had filed in the justice of the
peace court. At the hearing of the case the first witness for the plaintiff was testifying on the witness stand, the
followingproceedingswerehad:
AGREEMENT:
ATTY.PADILLA
The parties stipulate that the transaction which is now the object of this civil case is the same transaction
whichhadbeentheobjectinCriminalCaseNo.3219ofthisHon.Court.
ATTY.CADHIT
Agreed.
ATTY.PADILLA
Thattheaccusedwasacquittedinthatcasewasevidencedbythedecision,ExhibitA.
ATTY.CADHIT
Agreed.
ATTY.PADILLA
Inthesaidcriminalcasehavingmadeaspecificfindingthatthetransactionwasnotasaleofpalaybutitcan
beanyother,webelieveanyquestionwithrespecttothesaleofpalaywillbeoutofordernow.
COURT
SubmittedinaccordancewithRule107.
UpontheaboveagreementandthedecisionrenderedinCriminalCaseNo.3219abovereferredto,theCourtof
FirstInstanceofNuevaEcijarenderedjudgment,dismissingplaintiff'scomplaintanddefendant'scounterclaim,with
costsagainsttheplaintiff,onthefindings,amongothersthat
Onthebasisofthesaidstipulationaquestionoflawisraisedbytheparties,towit,whetherthedefendant
couldstillbeprosecutedforthecollectionoftheamountstatedinthesaidreceiptafterhehadbeenacquitted
bytheCourtonachargeofestafabasedonthesaidreceipt.Sectiond,Rule107,provides:
"Extinctionofpenalactiondoesnotcarrywithitextinctionofthecivil,unlesstheextinctionproceedsfroma
declarationinafinaljudgmentthatthefactfromwhichthecivilmightarisedidnotexist."
Inacquittingtheaccusedofthecrimeofestafa,theCourtexpresslymadeafindingasfollows:
"TheCourtdoesnotexpresslypassuponthedefensethatthereceiptsignedbyhimarosefromausurious
loan,asthereissufficientevidencetowarrantafindingthattherehadbeennodeceitormisrepresentation
andthatExh.B.isnotwhatitpurportstobe."
Ineffect,theCourtdidnotbelievethattheaccusedreceivedtheamountofP1,100.00asadvancepaymentof
the 100 cavans of palay weighing 46 kilos a cavan. Since the Court did not find this to be a fact, it cannot
serve as basis for a criminal action under the provisions of the rule abovecited. The reason for the rule is

that,oncethecourtmakesadefinitefindingastothenonexistenceofafact,nonexistenceshouldbefinal
andconclusiveagainstthepartyclaimingtheexistenceofthesame,otherwisetherewouldbenostabilityin
thedecisionofthecourts.Theonlypossibility,therefore,offilingacivilactionagainstthesamedefendantis
to work out a theory entirely different from the theory followed in the criminal action, which was, that the
defendant received the amount of P1,100.00 as advance payment for palay for as to any other theory, the
Courtdidnotmakeanyexpressfindingthatthesamedidnotexist.
Itmaybecontendedthataseparatecivilactionmayevenbefiledagainstthesamedefendantifacriminal
actionhadalreadybeenfiledagainsthim.Grantingthiscontentiontobetrueandtenable,itisnolesstrue
thatwhenacriminalactionisfiledagainstthedefendantthecivilactionmustyieldtothecriminalactionafter
theacquittalofthedefendant,ifthetwoactionsarebasedonthesamesetoffacts.Itmayalsobetruethata
separate civil action may be filed against him if he is acquitted on a reasonable doubt. But that is entirely
different from a finding that the facts from which the civil action may arise did not exist, for in case of
reasonabledoubt,thisfactmayyetexist.Inotherwords,whenthecourtmakesanexpressfindingthatthe
facts upon which the decision may be based do not exist, the same is conclusive and is a bar to the
prosecutionbasedonthesamesetoffacts.
Fromthisjudgment,theplaintiffappealed.
Theappellantcontendsthatthetrialcourtcommittederrorindismissingthepresentaction.Itisclaimedthatasinits
decisioninCriminalCaseNo.3219thetrialcourtdidnotmakeanyexpressfindingthatthefactonwhichtheaction
waspredicateddidnotexist,butmerelyfoundthat"theprosecutionhasnotprovedbeyondreasonabledoubtthat
the defendant had in fact represented to Gaudencio T. Mendoza that he had 100 cavans of palay stored in his
sister's bodega, which he offered to sell for P1,100.00," that "there is sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that
there had been no deceit or misrepresentation and that Exhibit B is not what it purports to be," and that "any
obligationwhichthedefendantmayhaveincurredinfavorofGaudencioT.Mendozaispurelycivilincharacter,and
notcriminal,"whichfindingsamounttoadeclarationthatthedefendantwasacquittedonreasonabledoubt,acivil
actionbasedonthesametransactionmaystillbeinstituted.
Theappellee,ontheotherhand,maintainsthatthejudgmentappealedfromiscorrect.Itisurgedthatthefindings
madeinthesaiddecision,particularlythosequotedabove,amounttoadeclarationthatthetransactionwhichwas
thesubjectmatterofthatcriminalcasedidnotexistandsonocivilactionbasedonthatsametransactionwouldlie.
ThepertinentprovisionsoflawareArticle29ofthenewCivilCodeandRule107,Section1,Subsection(d)ofthe
RulesofCourt.Article29ofthenewCivilCodeprovides:
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
provedbeyondreasonabledoubt,acivilactionfordamagesforthesameactoromissionmaybeinstituted.
Uponmotionofthedefendant,thecourtmayrequiretheplaintifftofileabondtoanswerfordamagesincase
thecomplaintshouldbefoundtobemalicious.
Ifinacriminalcasethejudgmentofacquittalisbaseduponreasonabledoubt,thecourtshallsodeclare.In
theabsenceofanydeclarationtothateffect,itmaybeinferredfromthetextofthedecisionwhetherornotthe
acquittalisduetothatground.
andRule107,Section1,Subsection(d),oftheRulesofCourt,readsasfollows:
Section 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses. Except as otherwise provided by law, the
followingrulesshallbeobserved:
xxxxxxxxx
(d)Extinctionofthepenalactiondoesnotcarrywithitextinctionofthecivil,unlesstheextinctionproceeds
from declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which he civil might arise did not exist. In the other
cases,thepersonentitledtothecivilactionmayinstituteitinthejurisdictionandinthemannerprovidedby
law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the
damagessuffered:
xxxxxxxxx
Interpreting the scope of the above quoted provisions of law, we held in the case of PhilippineNationalBankvs.
Catipon,52O.G.3589,that
The acquittal of the accused of the charge of estafa predicated on the conclusion 'that the guilt of the
defendant has not been satisfactorily established,' is equivalent to one on reasonable doubt and does not
precludeasuittoenforcethecivilliabilityforthesameactoromissionunderArticle29ofthenewCivilCode.
andinRepublicofthePhilippinesvs.Asaad,51O.G.703,that

A judgment of acquittal does not constitute a bar to a subsequent civil action involving the same subject
matter, even in regard to a civil action brought against the defendant by the State, nor is it evidence of his
innocenceinsuchaction,andisnotadmissibleinevidencetoprovethathewasnotguiltyofthecrimewith
whichhewascharged.(50C.J.S.,pp.27227330Am.Jur.,1003)
As we analyze the record in the light of the above provisions of law and jurisprudence, we are fully persuaded
foundation. It that appellant's contention is not without will be noted that nowhere in the decision rendered in
CriminalCaseNo.3219oftheCourtofFirstInstanceofNuevaEcijaisfoundanexpressdeclarationthatthefact
from which the civil action might arise did not exist. It is true that said decision likewise contains no express
declaration that the acquittal of the defendant was based upon reasonable doubt. Whether or not, however, the
acquittalisduetothatgroundmay,undertheabovequotedprovisionofArticle29oftheCivilCode,beinferredfrom
the text of the decision, and a close consideration of the language used in said decision, particularly the findings
quotedabove,whichareofsimilarimportasthephrase"thattheguiltofthedefendanthasnotbeensatisfactorily
established,"heldinPhilippineNationalBankvs.Catipon,supra,tobeequivalenttoadeclarationthattheacquittal
wasbasedonreasonabledoubt,convincesusthattheacquittalofthedefendantinthecriminalcaseinquestion
waspredicatedontheconclusionthathisguiltofthecrimechargedhasnotbeenprovedbeyondreasonabledoubt
anddoesnotprecludeasuittoenforcethecivilliabilityarisingfromthesametransactionwhichwasthesubject
matterofsaidcriminalaction.Theright,therefore,oftheappellanttobringthepresentactioncannotbequestioned,
thefactthathedidnotreservehisrighttofileanindependentcivilaction,andthatthisactionhasbeeninstituted
beforefinaljudgmentinthecriminalcasewasrenderednotwithstanding.ThedeclarationinthedecisioninCriminal
Case No. 3219 to the effect that "any obligation which the defendant may have incurred in favor of Gaudencio T.
Mendoza is purely civil in character, and not criminal," amounts to a reservation of the civil action in favor of the
offended party, Philippine National Bank vs. Catipon, supra, and the offense charged in said criminal case being
estafa, which is fraud, the present action falls under the exception to the general rule and it can be filed
independentlyofthecriminalaction.(Article33,newCivilCodeDianetavs.Makasiar,55O.G.10273Peoplevs.
Balagtas,51O.G.5714.)
WHEREFORE,thejudgmentappealedfromisherebyvacatedandsetaside,anditisorderedthattherecordsof
this case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law. With the costs taxed
againsttheappellee.Itissoordered.
Bengzon,C.J.,Labrador,Reyes,J.B.L.,Paredes,Padilla,Concepcion,Barrera,DizonandDeLeon,JJ.,concur.
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