Qualifications for Suffrage:

3. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.

(Sec. 1, Art. V, Constitution)

1. Filipino citizen;
2. At least 18 years of age;
3. Resident of the Philippines for at least one year;
4. Resident of the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6
months; and
5. Not otherwise disqualified by law.

Election Registration Board There shall be in each city and municipality

as many Election Registration Boards as there are election officers therein;
shall be composed of the Election Officer as chairman and as members, the
public school official most senior in rank and the local civil registrar, or in his
absence, the city or municipal treasurer. No member of the Board shall be
related to each other or to any incumbent city or municipal elective official
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity (Sec. 15, R.A. 8189).

It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to

the satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption
can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and
any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state
(Go v. Ramos)
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as
synonymous terms. Both import not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure,
or for like reasons, one intends to return (Pundaodaya v Comelec)
No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
There exists no presumption that a person is entitled to vote and that
the burden is in the voter to prove that he has the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications prescribed by law (U.S. v. Tria)
Any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality or
country solely by reason of his occupation; profession; employment in
private or public service; educational activities; work in military or naval
reservations; service in the army, navy or air force; the constabulary or
national police force; or confinement or detention in government
institutions in accordance with law, shall be deemed not to have lost
his original residence (Sec. 117, OEC).

Disqualifications:
(Sec. 118, OEC)
1. Person convicted by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not
less than 1 year, unless pardoned or granted amnesty; but right is
reacquired upon expiration of 5 years after service of sentence;
2. Person adjudged by final judgment as having committed any crime
involving disloyalty to government or any crime against national
security; but right is reacquired upon expiration of 5 years after
service of sentence; and
Arcilla | Election Law

Challenges to Right to Register Any voter, candidate or representative of

a registered political party may challenge in writing any application for
registration, stating the grounds therefor. The challenge shall be under oath
and be attached to the application, together with the proof of notice of
hearing to the challenger and the applicant. Oppositions to contest a
registrants application for inclusion in the voters list must, in all cases, be
filed not later than the second Monday of the month in which the same is
scheduled to be heard or processed by the Election Registration Board. The
hearing on the challenge shall be heard on the third Monday of the month
and the decision shall be rendered before the end of the month (Sec. 18,
R.A. 8189).
Deactivation of Registration The board shall deactivate the registration
and remove the registration records of the following persons from the
corresponding precinct book of voters and place the same, properly marked
and dated in indelible ink, in the inactive file after entering the cause or
causes of deactivation:
a. Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer
imprisonment for not less than one (1) year, such disability not
having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided,
however, That any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph
shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five
(5) years after service of sentence as certified by the clerks of courts
of the Municipal/ Municipal Circuit/ Metropolitan/ Regional Trial
Courts and the Sandiganbayan;
b. Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a
competent court or tribunal of having caused/committed any crime
involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as
rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws,
or any crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil
and political rights in accordance with law; Provided, That he shall
regain his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five (5) years
after service of sentence;
c. Any person declared by competent authority to be insane or
1

incompetent unless such disqualification has been subsequently

removed by a declaration of a proper authority that such person is no
longer insane or incompetent;
d. Any person who did not vote in the two successive preceding regular
elections as shown by their voting records. For this purpose, regular
elections do not include the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections;
e. Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the
Court; and
f. Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship (Sec. 27, R.A. 8189).

Reactivation of Registration Any voter whose registration has been

deactivated pursuant to the preceding Section may file with the Election
Officer a sworn application for reactivation of his registration in the form of an
affidavit stating that the grounds for the deactivation no longer exist any time
but not later than one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election
and ninety (90) days before a special election. The Election Officer shall
submit said application to the Election Registration Board for appropriate
action (Sec. 28, R.A. 8189).
Preparation and Posting of the Certified List of Voters The Board shall
prepare and post certified list of voters ninety (90) days before a regular
election and sixty (60) days before a special election and furnish copies
thereof to the provincial, regional and national central files. Copies of the
certified list, along with a certified list of deactivated voters categorized by
precinct per barangay, within the same period shall likewise be posted in the
office of the Election Officer and in the bulletin board of each city/municipal
hall. Upon payment of the fees as fixed by the Commission, the candidates
and heads of registered political parties shall also be furnished copies thereof
(Sec. 30, R.A. 8189).
Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings: COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
resolve the issue regarding the right to vote, the same being cognizable by
the courts in the proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters
(Canicosa v. COMELEC).
Common Rules Governing Judicial Proceedings in the Matter of
Inclusion, Exclusion and Correction of Names of Voters (Sec. 32, R.A.
8189):
a. Petition for inclusion, exclusion or correction of names of voters shall
be filed during office hours;
b. Notice of the place, date and time of the hearing of the petition shall
be served upon the members of the Board and the challenged voter
upon filing of the petition;
Arcilla | Election Law

c.

A petition shall refer only to one (1) precinct and shall implead the
Board as respondents;
d. No costs shall be assessed against any party in these proceedings.
However, if the court should find that the application has been filed
solely to harass the adverse party and cause him to incur expenses,
it shall order the culpable party to pay the costs and incidental
expenses;
e. Any voter, candidate or political party who may be affected by the
proceedings may intervene and present his evidence;
f. The decision shall be based on the evidence presented and in no
case rendered upon a stipulation of facts. If the question is whether
or not the voter is real or fictitious, his non- appearance on the day
set for hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the challenged
voter is fictitious; and
g. The petition shall be heard and decided within ten (10) days from the
date of its filing. Cases appealed to the Regional Trial Court shall be
decided within ten (10) days from receipt of the appeal. In all cases,
the court shall decide these petitions not later than fifteen (15) days
before the election and the decision shall become final and
executory.
Jurisdiction in Inclusion and Exclusion Cases The Municipal and
Metropolitan Trial Courts shall have ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE
jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their
respective cities or municipalities. Decisions of the Municipal or
Metropolitan Trial Courts MAY BE APPEALED by the aggrieved party to
the Regional Trial Court within five (5) days from receipt of notice thereof.
Otherwise, said decision shall become final and executory. The regional
trial court shall decide the appeal within ten (10) days from the time it is
received and the decision shall immediately become final and executory.
No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained (Sec. 33, R.A. 8189).
It is not within the competence of the trial court, in exclusion proceedings,
to declare the challenged voter as a resident of another municipality. The
jurisdiction of the trial court is limited only to determining the right of the
voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter
is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered, specifying
the ground for the voters disqualification. (Domino v Comelec)
Petition for Inclusion Any person whose application for registration has
been disapproved by the Board or whose name has been stricken out from
the list may file with the court a petition to include his name in the permanent
list of voters in his precinct at any time except one hundred five (105) days
prior to a regular election or seventy-five (75) days prior to a special election.
It shall be supported by a certificate of disapproval of his application and
proof of service of notice of his petition upon the Board. The petition shall be
2

decided within fifteen (15) days after its filing (Sec. 34, R.A. 8189).

ISSUE:

Petition for Exclusion: Any registered voter, representative of a political

party or the Election Officer, may file with the court a sworn petition for the
exclusion of a voter from the permanent list of voters giving the name,
address and the precinct of the challenged voter at any time except one
hundred (100) days prior to a regular election or sixty-five (65) days before a
special election. The petition shall be accompanied by proof of notice to the
Board and to the challenged voter and shall be decided within ten (10) days
from its filing (Sec. 35, R.A. 8189).

Is the non-eligibility of the respondent to hold a municipal office for the

reason that he was not a qualified voter in his municipality, connoting that
he was not a qualified elector therein, sufficient to nullify his election?

Annulment of Book of Voters: The Commission shall, upon verified petition

of any voter or election officer or duly registered political party, and after
notice and hearing, annul any book of voters that is not prepared in
accordance with the provisions of this Act or was prepared through fraud,
bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force or any similar irregularity,
or which contains data that are statistically improbable. No order, ruling or
decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed within ninety (90) days
before an election (Sec. 39, R.A. 8189).

The annulment of the list of voters shall not constitute a

ground for a pre-proclamation contest (Ututalum v.
COMELEC)

Marcos Yra v Maximo Abano

Maximo Abao is a native of the municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the
proper age, he transferred to Manila to complete hiseducation. While
temporarily residing in Manila, Abao registered as a voter there. Shortly
after qualifying as a member of the bar and after the death of is father, Abao
returned
to
Meycauayan
to
live.
From
May 10, 1927, until the present, Abao has considered himself a resident of
Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections were approaching ,he made an
application for cancellation of registration in Manila which was dated April 3,
1928, but the application was rejected by the city officials for the reason that
it
was
not
deposited
in
the
mails
on
or
before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless, Abao presented himself as a candidate
for municipal president of Meycauayan in the 1928 elections and was elected
by popular vote to the office. Marcos Yra assigns and argues that Abao is
ineligible to hold the position to which he was elected for the reason that he
had
not
been a resident of Meycauayan for at least one year before the
election.

Arcilla | Election Law

RULING:
One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his
candidacy is
that
he
must
be
a
duly qualified
elector.
The words qualified elector meant a person who had all of the
qualifications provided by law to be a voter and not a person registered in the
electoral list. The Executive Bureau has held that the term qualified when
applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a
registered voter. To become a qualified candidate, a person does not need to
register as an elector. Registering does not confer the right; it is a condition
precedent to exercise the right. The fact that a candidate failed to register as
an elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a
candidate and to be voted for.
AKBAYAN- YOUTH v COMELEC
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth
movements sought the extension of the registration of voters for the May
2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on December 27,
2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2day registration. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the
petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are
about 4 million youth who were not able to register and are now
disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which
provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular
election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of
Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by
powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts including voters
registration if the original period is not observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion
when it denied the extension of the voters registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the
clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters
registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular election.
The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters
registration which is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the
3

exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and
regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting
honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally
important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the
duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is
not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the
prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that
RA 8189s provision is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a
pre-election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration,
COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially
create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the additional
voters from the special two day registration will have to be screened, entered
into the book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then
entered into the computerized voters list; and then they will have to reprint
the voters information sheet for the update and distribute it by that time, the
May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy
processes after the special registration. In short, it will cost more
inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters are
disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youths pleading was
attached any actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any
inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters registration has ended on
December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading
that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on time for
some reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant
and not those who slumber on their rights.

VI. Candidates:
FRIVALADO v COMELEC
(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification for Public Office)
Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon
on January 22, 1988. On October 27, 1988, respondents filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the annulment of petitioners election and
proclamation on the ground that he was a naturalized American citizen and
had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on
January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected
governor.
Petitioner insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his
Arcilla | Election Law

naturalization as an American citizen was not impressed with voluntariness.

His oath in his COC that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient
act of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987
congressional elections had divested him of American citizenship under the
laws of the US, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship.
The Solicitor General contends that petitioner was not a citizen of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an
American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified for public office in the
Philippines. His election did not cure of this defect because the electorate
could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code and the
Omnibus Election Code.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was qualified to run for public office.
Held: No. First, petitioners loss of his naturalized American citizenship did
not and could not have the effect of automatic restoration of his Philippine
citizenship.
Second, the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is a
natural born Filipino citizen, is not a sufficient act of repatriation.
Third, qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.

MERCADO v MANZANO
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for
Vice-Mayor
of
Makati
in
the
May
11,
1998
elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number
of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending
petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he
was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a
US
citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate
for
said
elective
position.
4

However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the

disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to
have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and
registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on
August
31,
1998.
Thus

the

present

petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in
the
philippines.

declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of
our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative
department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation
and
application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate
of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and
that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as
the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d)
and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance
on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition.
Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view
of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship.
That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that
he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly
Arcilla | Election Law

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines,

when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in
past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the
denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking
his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he
was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship. The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
VILLABER v COMELEC
G.R.
PABLO
No.
C.
148326
VILLABER,
November
petitioner,
15,
2001
vs.
FACTS:
respondents.
Supervisor,
Commission
On
Elections
3
Davao
del
Sur,
a
petition
to
disqualify
Villaber
and
to
cancel
the
petition
that
on
March
2,
Criminal
Case
No.
86-46197
year
check
imprisonment.
that
bounced
The
was
in
the
sum
ofinvolves
P100,000.00.
4
Cagas
further
alleged
that
this
crime
is
disqualified
to
run
for
any
dated
April23,
1992
in
CA5
CR
No.
09017,
p
etition
for
R.
No.
106709.
However,
in
its
6
Resolution
F
ebruary
2,
1993,
7
our
Resolution
became
final
and
executory.
also
asserted
that
Villaber
made
aconsolidated
false
the
office
I(COMELEC),
seek
to
be
elected
certificate
78
of
the
Omnibus
pursuant
Election
to
Section
Code.
whether
ISSUE:
or
not
violation
of1990,
B.P.
Blg.
22
involves
moral turpitude.
HELD:
being
a
candidate
for
Code
which
provides:
competent
authority
subversion,
insurrection,
more
than
eighteen
candidate
and
amnesty.
removed
upon
the
been
removed
or
after
within
he
again
the
becomes
same
period
disqualified."
(Emphasis
ours)
definition
in
Black's
Law
which
a
man
owes
his
fellow
right
and
duty
between
man
morals."
The
elements
of
the
offense
under
the
above
provision
are:
value;
have
sufficient
upon
presentment;
its
and
On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Commission On Elections (COMELEC), Davao del Sur, a
consolidated petition3 to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter's
certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that
on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 86-46197 for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment.
5

The check that bounced was in the sum of P100,000.00. 4 Cagas further
alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (Tenth Division), in its Decision dated April23,
1992 in CA-G.R. CR No. 09017, 5 affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted,
Villaber filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Court of Appeals Decision, docketed as G. R. No. 106709. However, in its
Resolution6 of October 26, 1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed the
petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution became final and
executory.7 Cagas also asserted that Villaber made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is "Eligible for the office I
seek to be elected " - which false statement is a ground to deny due course
or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
ISSUE:
whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.
HELD:
YES. The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from
being a candidate for Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of
the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
"Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared
by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been
sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion,
or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral
turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any
office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.

The elements of the offense under the above provision are:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to
account or for value;
2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she
does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee
bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment;
and
3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment.19
The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude.

LONZANIDA v COMELEC
Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998.
However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested and
was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and void on
the
ground
of
failure
of
elections.
On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections,
Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ
of execution it issued. Juan Alvez, Lonzanidas opponent assumed office for
the
remainder
of
the
term.

"The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be

deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that
said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified."
(Emphasis ours)

In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy.
His opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground
that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in the same post.
On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.

As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted the

definition in Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society
in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals."

Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution

maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms
and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a
term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government
officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the
May 1995 elections. He also argued that the COMELEC ceased to have

Arcilla | Election Law

The

COMELEC

granted

the

petition

for

disqualification.

jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed

winner in the 1998 mayoral elections as the proper remedy is a petition for
quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of the
COMELEC
Rules
of
Procedure.
The private respondent maintained that the petitioners assumption of office
in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he
discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or
barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.
Issues:
1. WON petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales
from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the
purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government
officials.
2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification after petitioner was proclaimed winner.
Held:
1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur:
1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive
terms.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have
been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First,
the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post
in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.
After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC
itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May
1995 mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was
declared null and void. His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed
to have been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void
proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a proclaimed
Arcilla | Election Law

candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the

Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office
subject to the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a
term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998
because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as
presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the
COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995
mayoral
elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to
1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration
of the term. The respondents contention that the petitioner should be
deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he
served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it
disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e.,
that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of
the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear
intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a
term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not
cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of
the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the
legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.
Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of
service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold
office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to
March 1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the
three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on
this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set
aside.
2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation
or the assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for
disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the
COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on
the
merits.
7

Section

of

RA

6646

specifically

mandates

that:

Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been

declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and
hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is
rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before
the election but which remained unresolved after the proclamation of the
candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the said candidate and
may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of
the
petition
until
after
he
has
been
proclaimed.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to
prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to
prosecute him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a
candidate has been proclaimed elected does not signify that his
disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be the subject of a
separate investigation. (Lonzanida vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 135150. July 28,
1999)
ABUNADO v COMELEC
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and
2010 national and local elections, Ablardo Abundo, Sr. vied for the position of
municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the
winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding
terms as mayor.
In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers
initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres who, in due time, performed
the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation.
Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until
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the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little
over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again
opposed each other. Torres filed a petition to disqualify Abundo predicated on
the three-consecutive term limit rule.
On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding
for Abundo, who in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes and was
accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the
adverted disqualification case Torres initiated against Abundo, Ernesto R.
Vega commenced a quo warranto action before the RTC to unseat Abundo
on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.
RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor, citing Aldovino,
Jr. v. COMELEC, and found Abundo to have already served 3 consecutive
mayoralty terms, to wit,2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence,
disqualified for another,i.e., fourth, consecutive term. Abundo had been
declared winner in the aforesaid 2004 elections consequent to his protest
and occupied the position of and actually served as Viga mayor for over a
year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007, to be
exact.To the RTC, the year and a month service constitutes a complete and
full service of Abundos second term as mayor.
Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC
COMELEC Second Division affirmed the RTC ruling.
COMELEC en banc denied the motion for reconsideration. There was no
involuntary interruption of Abundos 2004-2007 term service which would be
an exception to the three-term limit rule as he is considered never to have
losttitle to the disputed office after he won in his election protest; and, what
the Constitution prohibits is for an elective official to be in office for the same
position for more than three consecutive terms and not to the service of the
term.
Hence, the petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or
preliminary injunction.
Meanwhile, the Comelec issued a resolution declaring its decision in the
disqualification case as final and executor. Upon a motion by Vega, a writ of
execution was also issued. The SC issued a TRO but on the same day it was
received, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O.
Cervantes of Viga, Catanduanes took their oaths of office as mayor and vicemayor respectively and assumed their posts the following day.
ISSUE: Whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an
elected official arising from his being declared as the duly elected official
upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes
8

of the application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local
officials?
RULING: NO. The two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was
serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively
removed Abundos case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule
RATIO:
**Procedural issue: SC ruled that Comelec en banc was correct in ruling that
the arguments in the MR were mere reiterations of what was brought up in
Abundos appeal brief before the Comelec division.
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three
successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 20042007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably
disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings,
was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is
found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected.
and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
xxxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective officialconcerned was elected.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to
the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following
requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for
three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and (2) that he
has fully served three consecutive terms.
Arcilla | Election Law

As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec.

43(b) of the LGC, voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent
elective local official for any length of time shall NOT, in determining service
for three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
In Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated the observation that the law does
not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of
service that does not affect continuity of service for a full term for purposes
of the three-term limit rule.
As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections, the principle behind the
three-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that what the
Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. There has, in fine, to be
a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her
third term. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected. This qualification was made as a deterrent
against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by
merely resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary
interruption as distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be
brought about by certain events or causes.
The prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms
and/or involuntary interruption are the following:
Re: Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the
official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on
succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion
of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term
as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory
provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any
term limit (Borja, Jr.vs Comelec, 1998). If the official runs again for
the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office,
then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is
considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon vs
Comelec, 2008).
Re: Recall election
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and
who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth
term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the
continuity of the officials service. For, he had become in the interim,
i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private
9

citizen (Adormeo vs Comelec, 2002 and Socrates vs Comelec,

2002).
Re: Conversion of a Municipality into a City
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a
municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the
incumbent officials continuity of service (Latasavs Comelec,2003).
Re: Period of Preventive Suspension
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective
officers continued stay and entitlement to the office remain
unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred
from exercising the functions of his office during this period
(Aldovino, Jr.vs Comelec, 2009)
Re: Election Protest
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position
and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an
election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from
serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of
office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida vs Comelec, 1999
and Dizon vs Comelec 2009). The break or interruption need not be
for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term;
an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is
involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates,
citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision
becomes final after said official had served the full term for said
office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an
interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to
finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the
application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation
came after the expiration of the term (Ong vs Alegre, 2006 and
Rivera III vs Comelec, 2007).
Aldovino, Jr is not applicable as that involves a preventive suspension which,
as ruled, did not interrupt the continuity of service of a term.
The Case of Abundo presents a different factual backdrop than those cases
whose doctrines are cited above. Unlike in other protest cases, , Abundo was
the winner during the election protest and was declared the rightful holder of
the mayoralty post. Also, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his
opponent and had assumed the remainder of the term.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the
monopolization of political power and prevent elected officials from
breeding proprietary interest in their position but also to enhance the
Arcilla | Election Law

peoples freedom of choice. In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,

while people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of power
may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not
unduly curtailed.
The two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as
mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively
removed Abundos case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
The first requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on the
three term limit that the official has been elected is satisfied. However, there
was an issue on whether such terms were served by Abundo. Subsumed to
this issue is the question of whether or not there was an effective involuntary
interruption during the three three-year periods, resulting in the disruption of
the continuity of Abundos mayoralty.
The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the
July 2004-June 2007 term.
A term, as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals,63 means, in a legal sense,
a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer
may hold an office. It also means the time during which the officer may
claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which the
several incumbents shall succeed one another. It is the period of time during
which a duly elected official has title to and can serve the functions of an
elective office. From paragraph (a) of Sec. 43, RA 7160,66 the term for local
elected officials is three (3) years starting from noon of June 30 of the first
year of said term.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from
June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he
wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither
can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective
office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and
the corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his
opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held
the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration,
following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May
2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month.
Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected
officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term
2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less.
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundos
opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an
involuntary interruption of Abundos continuity of service. An involuntary
interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be
considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.
10

The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the

concepts of interruption of service and voluntary renunciation of service.
The word interruption means temporary cessation, intermission or
suspension. To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent. When the
Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to
the obstruction to the continuance of the service by the concerned elected
official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in
the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word
renunciation connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right.
To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or resign. Voluntary renunciation
of the office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up or
abandon the title to the office and to cut short the service of the term the
concerned elected official is entitled to.
The COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length of the
actual service of the term is immaterial in his case as he was only
temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor. SC did not agree
As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election
protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion
of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the
mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundos full term has been
substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent
(Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of
Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007
term.
It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his
election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent
since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was
occupying the mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two years or from
July 1, 2004 the start of the termuntil May 9, 2006 or during which his
opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private
citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest.
Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the elective position
from July 1, 2004, such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the
finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayors office and,
in fact, had no legal right to said position.
Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to respondents cause of action, or
to COMELECs resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino Jr., the Court ruled
that temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an
elective does not involve loss of title to office or at least an effective break
from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred
from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.

temporarily unable or disqualified to exercise the functions of an elective

post. For one, during the intervening period of almost two years, reckoned
from the start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said to have
retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly
proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume and serve
such elective office. For another, not having been declared winner yet,
Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot
plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for
all intents and purposes, even if the belated declaration in the election
protest accords him title to the elective office from the start of the term,
Abundo was not entitled to the elective office until the election protest was
finally resolved in his favor.
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a
break and effective interruption of his service, until he assumed the office and
served barely over a year of the remaining term. Abundo became or was a
private citizen during the period over which his opponent was serving as
mayor.
If in Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there was interruption in Lonzanidas
service because of his subsequent defeat in the election protest, then with
more reason, Abundos term for 2004-2007 should be declared interrupted
since he was not proclaimed winner after the 2004 elections and was able to
assume the office and serve only for a little more than a year after winning
the protest.
As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the law
contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down
from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of
the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. Applying the
said principle in the present case, there is no question that during the
pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power
or authority over the good people of Viga, Catanduanes. Consequently, the
period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered
as a rest period or break in his service because, as earlier stated, prior to the
judgment in the election protest, it was Abundos opponent, Torres, who was
exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.
WHEREFORE, RTC ruling is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Abelardo
Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is
accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position.

Such pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply to the

instant case. Verily, it is erroneous to say that Abundo merely was
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11