Extraordinary Diligence

Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (GR L-23733, 31 October 1969)
Facts: Herminio L. Nocum, a passenger in Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.s Bus 120, which was then
making a trip within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was injured as a consequence of
the explosion of firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus and declared to its conductor as
containing clothes and miscellaneous items by a co-passenger.
Nocum filed a case against Laguna Tayabas Bus for damages. The CFI of Batangas (Civil Case
834)sentenced Laguna Tayabas to pay Nocum the sum of P1,351.00 for actual damages and P500.00
as attorneys fees, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint plus costs. Laguna Tayabas
appealed.The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment of the trial court, and dismissed the
case, without costs.
Issue: Whether or not Laguna Tayabas Bus Co exerted extraordinary diligence.
Held: Yes. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. Exerted extraordinary diligence and may not be held liable for
the damages borne by the explosion of firecrackers. Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides that
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. A common carrier is bound to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons,with a due regard for all the circumstances. However Carriers are not
mandated to require opening of baggage. Before the box containing the firecrackers were allowed to
be loaded in the bus by the conductor,inquiry was made with the passenger carrying the same as to
what was in it, since its opening was folded and tied with abaca.
According to the judge of the lower court, if proper and rigid inspection were observed by the
defendant, the contents of the box could have been discovered and the accident avoided. Refusal by
the passenger to have the package opened was no excuse because, as stated by Dispatcher Cornista,
employees should call the police if there were packages containing articles against company
regulations. Even it that may be true, the law does not require as much. Article 1733 is not as
unbending, for it reasonably qualifies the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers for the
safety of the passengers transported by them to beaccording to all the circumstances of each case.
While it is true the passengers of Laguna Tayabas bus should not be made to suffer for something
over which they had no control, fairness demands that in measuring a common carriers duty towards
its passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of
responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a
passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to
speak of his own. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness
of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words,
inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passengers baggage when such is not outwardly
perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed.

Mecenas v. CA, 180 SCRA 83 (1989)

Facts: On April 22, 1980, two vessels, Tacloban City and Don Juan collided at the Talbas Strait
within the vicinity of Mindoro. M/V Don Juan sank and hundreds of passengers died. Among them
were petitioners parents, whose bodies were never recovered. Petitioners filed a complaint seeking
damages against Negros Navigation. The trial court awarded P400,000, but the Court of Appeals
reduced the award to P100,000.
Issue: Whether the reduction of the award was properly ruled upon by the Court of Appeals
Held: In an action based upon a breach of the contract of carriage, the carrier under our civil law is
liable for the death of passengers arising from the negligence or wilful act of the carrier's employees
although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or even in violation of
the instructions of the carrier, which liability may include liability for moral damages. It follows that
petitioners would be entitled to moral damages so long as the collision with the "Tacloban City" and
the sinking of the "Don Juan" were caused or attended by negligence on the part of private
respondents.
Whether petitioners are entitled to exemplary damages as claimed must depend upon whether or not
private respondents acted recklessly, that is, with gross negligence. We believe that the behaviour of
the captain of the "Don Juan" in this instance playing mahjong "before and up to the time of
collision" constitutes behaviour that is simply unacceptable on the part of the master of a vessel to
whose hands the lives and welfare of at least seven hundred fifty (750) passengers had been entrusted.
There is also evidence that the "Don Juan" was carrying more passengers than she had been certified
as allowed to carry. We conclude that Capt. Santisteban and Negros Navigation are properly held
liable for gross negligence. We find no necessity for passing upon the degree of negligence or
culpability properly attributable to PNOC and PNOC Shipping or the master of the "Tacloban City,"
since they were never impleaded here.
Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape behaviour that is
socially deleterious in its consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents against such
behaviour. In requiring compliance with the standard of extraordinary diligence, a standard which is in
fact that of the highest possible degree of diligence, from common carriers and in creating a
presumption of negligence against them, the law seeks to compel them to control their employees, to
tame their reckless instincts and to force them to take adequate care of human beings and their
property. Both the demands of substantial justice and the imperious requirements of public policy
compel us to the conclusion that the trial court's implicit award of moral and exemplary damages was
erroneously deleted and must be restored and augmented and brought more nearly to the level required
by public policy and substantial justice.

Negros Navigation Co., Inc v. CA, 281 SCRA 534 (1997)

Facts: Sometime in April 1980, Ramon Miranda, one of the private respondents in this case purchased
four special tickets (Numbers 74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414) from the petitioner for his
wife,children and niece who were then bound to leave for Bacolod City to attend a family reunion.On
22 April 1980, private respondents aforementioned relatives boarded M/V Don Juan of Negros
Navigation Co., Inc., that was leaving Manila at 1:00 PM. As expected, said vessel sailed on time.
However, on the evening of 22 April, petitioners vessel collided with the M/T Tacloban City- an oil
tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) and the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). Obviously, several passengers perished in the sea tragedy.Some
bodies were found, and some, including the relatives of private respondents were never
found.Knowing the ill-fate of the M/V Don Juan, private respondents, namely Garcia and Sps de la
Victoria filed a complaint against the Negros Navigation, the PNOC, and the PNOC/STC. Private
respondents sought for damages for the death of their relatives.The RTC rendered a decision in favor
of the private respondents, and asked petitioners, including PNOC and PNOC/STC to pay the moral
damages and upon review by the Court Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the RTCs decision with
modification.
Issue: Whether or not the ruling in the Mecenas VS CA, finding the crew members of petitioners to be
grossly negligent in the performance of their duty, is binding in this case.
.
Held: Yes. The courts adherence to Mecenas case is not the entire consideration of the Court.
Although The Mecenas Case is another case arising from the incident that occurred on 22 April 1980
and is controlling, the court still found other evidence for Negros Navigation to pay for the Damages.
By the principle of Stare Decisis (Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled).
Under the principle of Stare Decisis, it is required that past decisions of the court be followed in the
adjudication of cases. The petitioners assail the lower courts reliance on the Mecenas Case, arguing
that although the same case arose out of the same incident as that involved in the Mecenas,The parties
are different and the trial was conducted separately. Furthermore they contend that the decision in this
case must be based on the allegations, the defenses pleaded and evidence adduced stated on the
records of the case.The Supreme Court ruled otherwise. The Supreme Court stated that although the
merits of the individual claims against the petitioner are different in both cases, there remains a
similarity which is material in the decision of the court vis--vis the case at hand, i.e. the cause of the
sinking of its ship on 22 April 1980 and the liabilities (of petitioner) for such accident. It has been well
entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that common carriers are liable if they do not exhibit
extraordinary diligence. In the case at bar, there was even negligence for the crew, specifically the
captain, for playing mahjong hence damages must necessarily be awarded to the family of Ramon
Miranda.

Korean Airlines v. CA, 234 SCRA 717 (1994)

Facts: Korean Airlines was asked by the RTC to pay for the damages to Juanito Lapuz. This case was
initiated because there was alllegedly a breach of the contract of carriage. The RTC directed KAL t o
pay actual/compensatory damages, with legal interest, attorney's fees and costs of suit hence the
appeal to the Court of Appeals which merely modified the the award of damages as to the
commencement of the legal interest. KAL's asseveration that the Court lacks jurisdiction to award
legal interest is devoid of merit. Both the complaint and amended complaint against KAL dated
November 27, 1980, and January 5, 1981, respectively, prayed for reliefs and remedies to which
Lapuz may be entitled in law and equity. The award of legal interest is one such relief, as it is based on
equitable grounds duly sanctioned by Article 2210 of the Civil Code which provides that: "interest
may, in the discretion of the Court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract."
Issue: Whether or not the interest may be added by the court in lieu of the violation by KAL in the
contract of carriage.
Held: Yes the court may add such needed payments for the damages committed by KAL. Violations of
the contract of carriage gives rise to liabilities and as such must necessarily be compensated. KALs
aversion that their right to due process was violated cannot also be sustained. This was raised by KAL
only in the motion for reconsideration at the Supreme Court level. Such is not the practice of the law.
It can be inferred from the multiple pleadings to delay the payment for 15 years. This court has time
and again frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse. The
Court shall not countenance KAL's undesirable moves. What attenuates KAL's unmeritorious
importuning is that the assailed decision has long acquired finality. It is a settled rule that a judgment
which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence may no longer be modified in
any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistake. Once a judgment becomes final, all the
issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. Although this case is more of an
administrative matter, the important transportation doctrine to consider is that when a contract of
carriage is breached, there will be damages and the court may set damages as well as the interest from
the decision of the trial court, not from the filling of the complaint.

PAL v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 621, G.R. No.120262, 17 July 1997.
Facts: On October 23, 1988, Leovegildo Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded a PAL
plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was supposed to take his connecting flight to
Surigao City. However, due to typhoon Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao City was canceled.
PAL initially gave out cash assistance of P100 and, the next day, P200 for their expected stay of two
days in Cebu.Pantejo requested instead that he be accommodated in a hotel at the expense of PAL as
he did not have cash with him at that time but PAL refused. Fortunately, Pantejo was accommodated
by Andoni Dumlao and he shared a room with the latter at Sky View Hotel with the promise to pay his
share of the expenses upon reaching Surigao. When the flight for Surigao was resumed, Pantejo was
informed that the hotel expenses of his co-passengers were reimbursed by PAL. At this point, Pantejo
informed the Manager for Departure Services of PAL at Mactan Airport that he was going to sue the
airline for discriminating against him. The manager offered to pay Pantejo P300 which the latter
declined. Pantejo filed a suit for damages against PAL in the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City.
Said court rendered judgment in favor of Pantejo,ordering PAL to pay Pantejo P300 for actual
damages, P150,000 as moral damages, P100,000 ase xemplary damages, P15,000 as attorney's fees,
and 6% interest from the time of the filing of the complaint until said amounts shall have been fully
paid, plus costs of suit. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision, but with the exclusion of the award of
attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not PAL was liable for damages.
Held: Yes. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other
contractual relation because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is
mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees naturally could give ground for an action for damages.
In this case, there was bad faith on the part of PAL. Contrary to the claim of PAL that cash assistance
was given instead because of non-availability of rooms in hotels, the evidence showed that Sky View
Hotel, where respondent Pantejo was billeted, had plenty of rooms available. Pantejo only came to
know about the reimbursements when other passengers informed him that they were able to obtain the
refund for their own hotel expenses. PAL offered to pay P300.00 to Pantejo only after the latter had
confronted the manager of PAL about the discrimination committed against Pantejo, which the
manager realized was an actionable wrong. The hotel accommodation was not a mere amenity or
privilege. It was a company policy whenever a flight is canceled as testified by several witnesses. And
even if it was a mere privilege, PAL was still liable for damages for its blatant refusal to accord the socalled amenities equally to all its stranded passengers.
In fact, Pantejo immediately proceeded to the office of PAL and requested for hotel accommodations.
He was not only refused accommodations, but he was not even informed that he may later on be
reimbursed for his hotel expenses. The refund of hotel expenses was surreptitiously and
discriminatorily made by PAL as only handful of passengers knew about it. Pantejo was exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment especially because of his government position and social prominence.

Calalas v. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 356, G.R. No. 122039, May 13, 2000
Facts: Private respondent Eliza Sunga, then freshman at Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney
owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity, Sunga was
given by the conductor an extension seat, a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the
vehicle. When the jeepney stopped to a let passenger off and Sunga was about to give way to the
outgoing passenger, an Izuzu truck driven by Verena and owned by Salva bumped the left rear portion
of the jeepney. Sunga sustained multiple injuries and remained on a cast for three months.
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, for breach of contract of carriage. Calalas, on the
other hand,filed a third party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the truck. The lower
court rendered judgment against Salva and absolved Calalas of liability. It took cognizance of other
case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena ,for quasi-delict, in which
branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to
his jeepney The CA reversed the lower courts ruling on the ground the ground that Sungas cause of
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-deplict, and that the common carrier failed to
exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party
complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
Issue: Whether or not the extension seat falls under extraordinary diligence.
Held: No, on the contrary it does not and is essentially a negligent act. In quasi-delict, the negligence
or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of
contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that
the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or have acted negligently unless they proved that they
observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate cause
of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
doctrine of proximate cause, wherein the effect is the direct, natural and logical effect, is applicable
only in action for quasi delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for
imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case,
the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between
parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created. Hence the liability of Calalas and the decision by the Court of
Appeals must necessarily be sustained.

Pilapil v. Court of Appeals and Alatco Transportation Co., Inc. G.R. No. 52159. December 22,
1989
Facts: Jose Pilapil, a paying passenger, boarded Alatco Transportation Co.s bus bearing number 409
at San Nicolas, Iriga City on 16 September 1971 at about 6:00 P.M. While said bus 409 was in due
course negotiating the distance between Iriga City and Naga City, upon reaching the vicinity of the
cemetery of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, on the way to Naga City, an unidentified man, a
bystander along said national highway, hurled a stone at the left side of the bus, which hit Pilapil
above his left eye. Alatcos personnel lost no time in bringing Pilapil to the provincial hospital in Naga
City where he was confined and treated. Considering that the sight of his left eye was impaired, Pilapil
was taken to Dr. Malabanan of IrigaCity where he was treated for another week. Since there was no
improvement in his left eyes vision, Pilapilwent to V. Luna Hospital, Quezon City where he was
treated by Dr. Capulong. Despite the treatment accorded to him by Dr. Capulong, Pilapil lost partially
his left eyes vision and sustained a permanent scar above the left eye.Thereupon, Pilapil instituted
before the CFI of Camarines Sur, Branch I an action for recovery of damages sustained as a result of
the stone-throwing incident. After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment ordering the transportation
company to pay Pilapil the sum of P10,000.00, representing actual and material damages for causing a
permanent scar on the face and injuring the eye-sight of Pilapil; ordering further the transportation
company to pay the sum of P5,000.00, to Pilapil as moral and exemplary damages; and ordering
furthermore,the transportation company to reimburse Pilapil the sum of P300.00 for his medical
expenses and attorneys fees in the sum of P1,000.00; and to pay the costs.From the judgment, Alatco
Transportation appealed to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals, in a Special Division of Five,
rendered judgment reversing and setting aside the judgment of the court a quo. Hence, the petition to
review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals is correct and whether the presumption that
the bus company did not exhibit extraordinary diligence was rebutted
Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from. Under Article 1733 of the Civil
Code, common carriers are required to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passenger
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.The requirement of extraordinary
diligence imposed upon common carriers is restated in Article 1755: A common carrier is bound to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. Further, in case of death of or
injuries to passengers, the law presumes said common carriers to be at fault or to have acted
negligently. Inferring from the law, the intention of the Code Commission and Congress was to curb
the recklessness of drivers and operators of common carriers in the conduct of their business . In
consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of transporting
passengers and goods, a common carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all
risks to passengers and goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law
imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof. While the law requires the highest degree of
diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of
negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its
passengers. Hence the liability of the bus is rebutted by the facts of the case. However herein, Pilapil
contends that it is to the greater interest of the State if a carrier were made liable forsuch stonethrowing incidents rather than have the bus riding public lose confidence in the transportation system.
Sad to say, the court is not in a position to so hold. Such a policy would be better left to the
consideration of Congress which is empowered to enact laws to protect the public from the increasing
risks and dangers of lawlessness in society

Fortune Express, Inc. v. CA, 305 SCRA 14 (1999)

Facts: Fortune Express Inc. is a bus company in northern Mindanao. On 18 November 1989, Fortune
Express bus figured in an accident with a jeepney in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, resulting in the
death of several passengers of the jeepney, including two Maranaos. At about 6:45 p.m. on 22
November 1989, 3 armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers, seized a bus of Fortune Express
at Linamon, Lanao del Norte while on its way to Iligan City. Among the passengers of the bus was
Atty. Talib Caorong. The leader of the Maranaos, identified as one Bashier Mananggolo, ordered the
driver, Godofredo Cabatuan, to stop the bus on the side of the highway. Mananggolo then shot
Cabatuan on the arm, which caused him to slump on the steering wheel. Then one of the companions
of Mananggolo started pouring gasoline inside the bus, as the other held the passengers at bay with a
handgun. The passengers, including Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the bus and went behind the bushes
in a field some distance from the highway. However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve
something from the overhead rack. At that time, one of the armed men was pouring gasoline on the
head of the driver. Cabatuan,who had meantime regained consciousness, heard Atty. Caorong pleading
with the armed men to spare the driver as he was innocent of any wrong doing and was only trying to
make a living. The armed men were,however, adamant as they repeated their warning that they were
going to burn the bus along with its driver. During this exchange between Atty. Caorong and the
assailants, Cabatuan climbed out of the left window of the bus and crawled to the canal on the
opposite side of the highway. He heard shots from inside the bus. Then the bus was set on fire. Some
of the passengers were able to pull Atty. Caorong out of the burning bus and rush him to the Mercy
Community Hospital in Iligan City, but he died while undergoing operation. In its decision, dated 28
December 1990, the trial court dismissed the complaint, and the corresponding counterclaim; without
costs. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not Fortune Express inc. is liable for negligence as it failed to prepare for the
impending retribution of the Maranaos.
Held: Yes Fortune Express is liable. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals
with modification that Fortune Express is ordered to pay Paulie, Yasser King, Rose Heinni, and Prince
Alexander Caorong.Art. 1755 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
person, with due regard for all the circumstances. In the present case, this factor of unforeseeablility
(the second requisite for an event to be considered force majeure) is lacking. As already stated, despite
the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos were planning to burn some of petitioners buses
and the assurance of petitioners operations manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary precautions
would be taken, nothing was really done by petitioner to protect the safety of passengers. Hence the
liability of Fortune Express remains.