ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL v. Motion for Reconsideration DENIED.

PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORAL
Judicial power granted to the Supreme
TRIBUNAL
Court by the same Constitution is
To
foreclose
all
arguments
of plenary. And under the doctrine of
petitioner, we reiterate that the necessary implication, the additional
establishment of the PET simply jurisdiction bestowed by the last
constitutionalized what was statutory paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of
before the 1987 Constitution. The the Constitution to decide presidential
experiential context of the PET in our and
vice-presidential
elections
country cannot be denied.
contests
includes
the
means
necessary to carry it into effect.
Petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal,
through a Motion for Reconsideration The traditional grant of judicial power
reiterates his arguments that Section is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
4, Article VII of the Constitution does Constitution which provides that the
not provide for the creation of the power "shall be vested in one
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) Supreme Court and in such lower
and that the PET violates Section 12, courts as may be established by law."
Article VIII of the Constitution. In order Consistent with our presidential
to strengthen his position, petitioner system of government, the function of
cites the concurring opinion of Justice "dealing with the settlement of
Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro in disputes, controversies or conflicts
Barok C. Biraogo v. The Philippine involving
rights,
duties
or
Truth Commission of 2010 that the prerogatives
that
are
legally
Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a demandable and enforceable" is
public office which cannot be created apportioned to courts of justice. With
by the president, the power to do so the advent of the 1987 Constitution,
being
lodged
exclusively
with judicial power was expanded to
Congress. Thus, petitioner submits include "the duty of the courts of
that if the President, as head of the justice to settle actual controversies
Executive Department, cannot create involving rights which are legally
the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, demandable and enforceable, and to
cannot create the PET in the absence determine whether or not there has
of an act of legislature.
been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
ISSUE:
jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or
instrumentality
of
the
Whether or not the creation of the Government."
The
power
was
Presidential Electoral Tribunal is expanded, but it remained absolute.
Constitutional.
HELD:

that the text of the provision itself and senatorial - exclusive and original
was the only basis for this Court to jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC
sustain the PETs constitutionality.
and in the House of Representatives
and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which
The Court reiterates that the PET is are not, strictly and literally speaking,
authorized by the last paragraph of courts of law. Although not courts of
Section
4,
Article
VII
of
the law,
they
are,
nonetheless,
Constitution and as supported by the empowered
to
resolve
election
discussions of the Members of the contests which involve, in essence, an
Constitutional
Commission,
which exercise of judicial power, because of
drafted the present Constitution.
the
explicit
constitutional
empowerment found in Section 2(2),
The explicit reference by the framers Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and
of
our
Constitution
to Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate
constitutionalizing what was merely and House Electoral Tribunals) of the
statutory before is not diluted by the Constitution. Besides, when the
absence of a phrase, line or word, COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET
mandating the Supreme Court to decide
election
contests,
their
create
a
Presidential
Electoral decisions are still subject to judicial
Tribunal.
review - via a petition for certiorari
filed by the proper party - if there is a
Suffice
it
to
state
that
the
showing that the decision was
Constitution, verbose as it already is,
rendered with grave abuse of
cannot contain the specific wording
discretion tantamount to lack or
required by petitioner in order for him
excess of jurisdiction.
to accept the constitutionality of the
PET.
It is also beyond cavil that when the
The set up embodied in the
Constitution
and
statutes
characterizes
the
resolution
of
electoral contests as essentially an
exercise of judicial power.
At the barangay and municipal levels,
original and exclusive jurisdiction over
election contests is vested in the
municipal or metropolitan trial courts
and
the
regional
trial
courts,
respectively.

At the higher levels - city, provincial,

Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal is going to
and regional, as well as congressional
town under the misplaced assumption

Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a

presidential
or
vice-presidential
election contest, it performs what is
essentially a judicial power. In the
landmark case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel
enucleated
that
"it
would
be
inconceivable if the Constitution had
not provided for a mechanism by
which to direct the course of
government
along
constitutional
channels." In fact, Angara pointed out
that "[t]he Constitution is a definition
of the powers of government." And
yet,
at
that
time,
the
1935

Constitution did not contain the

expanded definition of judicial power
found in Article VIII, Section 1,
paragraph
2
of
the
present
Constitution.
With the explicit provision, the
present Constitution has allocated to
the Supreme Court, in conjunction
with latter's exercise of judicial power
inherent in all courts, the task of
deciding
presidential
and
vicepresidential election contests, with full
authority in the exercise thereof. The
power wielded by PET is a derivative
of the plenary judicial power allocated
to courts of law, expressly provided in
the Constitution. On the whole, the
Constitution draws a thin, but,
nevertheless, distinct line between
the PET and the Supreme Court.
If the logic of petitioner is to be
followed, all Members of the Court,
sitting in the Senate and House
Electoral Tribunals would violate the
constitutional proscription found in
Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the
petitioner will be among the first to
acknowledge that this is not so. The
Constitution which, in Section 17,
Article VI, explicitly provides that
three Supreme Court Justices shall sit
in the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals,
respectively,
effectively
exempts the Justices-Members thereof
from the prohibition in Section 12,
Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the
Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article
VII, which exempts the Members of
the Court, constituting the PET, from
the same prohibition.

JRCMENDOZA|1

We have previously declared that the

PET is not simply an agency to which
Members
of
the
Court
were
designated. Once again, the PET, as
intended by the framers of the
Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from
the judicial department, i.e., the
Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of
Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power
without the means to use it, is a
nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of
this power, as intended by the
Constitution
and
specifically
mentioned by the Constitutional
Commissioners during the discussions
on the grant of power to this Court, is
the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like
the petitioner's, should not constrict
an absolute and constitutional grant
of judicial power
Finally, petitioners application of the
Courts
decision
in
Biraogo
v.
Philippine Truth Commission to the
present case is an unmitigated
quantum leap.
The decision therein held that the
Philippine Truth Commission (PTC)
finds justification under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution. A plain
reading
of
the
constitutional
provisions, i.e., last paragraph of
Section 4 and Section 17, both of
Article VII on the Executive Branch,
reveals that the two are differently
worded and deal with separate
powers of the Executive and the
Judicial Branches of government. And
as previously adverted to, the basis
for the constitution of the PET was, in

fact, mentioned in the deliberations of the office-holders time, also demands

the Members of the Constitutional undivided attention.
Commission during the drafting of the
But this privilege of immunity from
present Constitution.
suit, pertains to the President by
Maximo
Soliven
vs
Ramon virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the
Makasiar
office; not by any other person in the
FACTS: Luis Beltran is among the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused
petitioners in this case. He, together like Beltran et al, in a criminal case in
with others, was charged with libel by which
the
President
is
the
the then president Corzaon Aquino. complainant
cannot
raise
the
Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit presidential privilege as a defense to
against him and others. Makasiar prevent the case from proceeding
averred that Cory cannot file a against such accused.
complaint affidavit because this would
defeat her immunity from suit. He Moreover, there is nothing in our laws
grounded his contention on the that would prevent the President from
principle that a president cannot be waiving the privilege. Thus, if so
sued. However, if a president would minded the President may shed the
sue then the president would allow protection afforded by the privilege
herself to be placed under the courts and submit to the courts jurisdiction.
jurisdiction and conversely she would The choice of whether to exercise the
be consenting to be sued back. Also, privilege or to waive it is solely the
considering the functions of a Presidents prerogative. It is a
president, the president may not be decision that cannot be assumed and
able to appear in court to be a imposed by any other person.
witness for herself thus she may be
Estrada
v
DesiertoGR
liable for contempt.
146710-15,
March
2,
ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity Ponente : Puno, J.
can be invoked by Beltran, a person
Facts :
other than the president.
HELD: No. The rationale for the grant
to the President of the privilege of
immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is
a job that, aside from requiring all of

2. The Senate and the House of

Representatives
began
early
investigations
regarding
the
accusation, while key socio-political
figures like Cardinal Sin, former
Presidents Aquino and Ramos, the
vice president, senior advisers and
cabinet members called on the
president to resign, and resigned from
their cabinet posts themselves.

administer the oath of presidency to

the vice president at EDSA Shrine.
Estrada issued two statements - one
stating
reservations
on
the
constitutionality
of
Arroyos
presidency, and another stating that
he is incapable of dispensing his
responsibilities as president, thus
allowing Arroyo to be the acting
president.

3. The impeachment trial began on 7

December 2000, with 21 senatorjudges presided over by Chief Justice
HilarioDavide. At a point when 11
senator-judges ruled against opening
a second envelope of evidence
showing the presidents P3.3 billion
bank account under the name Jose
Velarde, the public prosecutors
resigned and a mass demonstration
at EDSA began.

7. The Arroyo administration was met

with acceptance by the different
branches of government, by majority
of the public, and by the international
community. The impeachment trial
was closed, despite sentiments such
as those of Senator DefensorSantiago that the impeachment court
had failed to resolve the case, leaving
open questions regarding Estradas
qualifications to run for other elected
posts.

4. CJ Davide granted Senator Raul

Rocos motion to postpone the
impeachment trial until the House of
Representatives resolved the lack of
public prosecutors.

Nos.
2001 5. With the defection of more officials
and of the army and police from the
Estrada administration, the president
attempted
to
appease
public
sentiment by announcing a snap
1. In 1998, Joseph Estrada was election and by allowing the second
elected President of the Philippines, envelope to be opened. The measures
while Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo was failed, and the calls for resignation
elected Vice-President. The president strengthened.
was
accused
with
corruption,
culminating in Ilocos Sur Governor 6. On 20 January 2001, the president
ChavitSingsons accusations that the negotiated with representatives of the
president received millions of pesos vice-president. News broke out that
from jueteng lords.
Chief Justice HilarioDavide would

8. The Office of the Ombudsman

proceeded to file a series of cases
regarding the corruption of Estrada.
Estrada filed a motion compelling the
Ombudsman to refrain from further
proceedings
until
his
term
as
president was over. He also filed a
petition to be confirmed as the lawful
and incumbent president, temporarily
unable to fulfill his duties, thus
making Arroyo an acting president
only.
9. The Supreme Court ruled a) to
inform the parties that they did not
declare the Office of the President
vacant on 20 January 2001, b) to
prohibit either party from discussing
in

JRCMENDOZA|2

public the merits of the case while in

its pendency, c) to enjoin the
Ombudsman from resolving pending
criminal cases against Estrada for 30
days.
Issues:
I. Whether the petitions present a
justiciable controversy.
II. Assuming that the petitions present
a justiciable controversy, whether
petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an
Acting President.

authority has been delegated to the

legislative or executive branch of Furthermore, Court cannot exercise its

government. --Former CJ Roberto judicial power to revise decision of
Concepcion
Congress in recognizing Arroyo. To do
so would be to transgress principle of

Arroyos government is NOT separation of powers, since this is a

revolutionary in character, since her political issue. III. Estrada contends
oath was taken under the 1987 that he has not been convicted in the
Constitution.
impeachment case and that he enjoys
immunity from all kinds of suit.
EDSA II is an exercise of people
power of freedom of speech and the Executive immunity provision of
right to assembly. It is intra 1973 Constitution was no longer
constitutional in this regard (within included in the 1986 Constitution.
the scope of the Constitution). The This is in accordance with SC ruling in
resignation of Estrada that it caused In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that
and the subsequent succession of of incumbent Presidents are immune
Arroyo are subject to judicial review. from suit or from being brought to
II. Estrada is NOT a President on leave court during the period of their
while Arroyo is Acting President.
incumbency and tenure but not

III.
Whether
conviction
in
the
impeachment
proceedings
is
a
condition precedent for the criminal
prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In
the negative and on the assumption

Under
that petitioner is still president, Section 11 Article VII, Estrada says
whether he is immune from criminal that only Congress has the ultimate
prosecution.
authority to determine whether the
President is incapable of performing
IV. Whether the prosecution of his functions in the manner provided
petitioner Estrada should be enjoined by said provision.
on the ground of prejudicial publicity

beyond.

When the president has resigned,

then proper criminal and civil cases
may already be filed against him IV.
Estrada argued that respondent
Ombudsman should be stopped from
conducting the investigation of the
cases filed against him because of

Hence, prejudicial publicity on his guilt, and

Ruling:
Arroyo has no power to judge that respondent has also developed
Estradas inability to do his job as bias.
I. The petitions present a justiciable
President.
controversy because the cases at bar

In People v Teehankee, Jr. and

pose
legal,
and
not
political,

However, Larranaga v Court of Appeals it was

questions. Hence, the cases are within both houses of Congress expressed
the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. their recognition and support of laid down that the right of an accused
to a fair trial is not incompatible to a
Arroyo as the new President, and it is free press. Responsible press.
Definition of political questions:
implicitly clear in this recognition that
...those questions which, under the
Estradas inability is no longer Our judges are smart enough to
Constitution, are to be decided by the
temporary.
Thus,
Congress
has know the law and to disregard camera
people in their sovereign capacity, or
rejected Estradas claim of inability.
drama and off-court evidence. Their
in regard to which full discretionary

exposure to media does not affect "Emergency

Intelligence
Agents"
their impartiality.
(EIA); that when the agency had
salary differential last Oct '88 all
Almonte v. Vasquez
money for the whole plantilla were
released and from that alone, Millions
Facts:
were saved and converted to ghost
agents of EIA; Almost all EIIB agents
This is a case wherein respondent collects payroll from the big time
Ombudsman,
requires
petitioners smuggler syndicate monthly and
Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as brokers every week for them not to be
chief
accountant
and
record apprehended.]
custodian,
respectively,
of
the
Economic
Intelligence
and In his comment on the letterInvestigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce complaint, petitioner Almonte denied
"all documents relating to Personal all the allegations written on the
Services Funds for the year 1988" and anonymous letter. Petitioners move to
all evidence such as vouchers from quash
the
subpoena
and
the
enforcing his orders.
subpoena duces tecum but was
Petitioner Almonte was formerly
Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez
is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal
Management Division. The subpoena
duces tecum was issued by the
Ombudsman in connection with his
investigation of an anonymous letter
alleging that funds representing
savings from unfilled positions in the
EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The
letter, purporting to have been
written by an employee of the EIIB
and
a
concerned
citizen,
was
addressed to the Secretary of Finance,
with
copies
furnished
several
government offices, including the
Office of the Ombudsman.

denied.
Disclosure of the documents in
question is resisted with the claim of
privilege of an agency of the
government on the ground that
"knowledge of EIIB's documents
relative to its Personal Services Funds
and its plantilla . . . will necessarily
[lead to] knowledge of its operations,
movements, targets, strategies, and
tactics and the whole of its being" and
this could "destroy the EIIB."
Issue:
Whether petitioners can be ordered to
produce
documents
relating
to
personal services and salary vouchers
of EIIB employees on the plea that
such documents are classified without
violating their equal protection of
laws.

May be erased: [The letter reads in

pertinent parts: that the EIIB has a
syndicate headed by the Chief of
Budget Division who is manipulating
funds and also the brain of the so
called
"ghost
agents"
or
the Held:

JRCMENDOZA|3

YES. At common law a governmental

privilege
against
disclosure
is
recognized with respect to state
secrets bearing on military, diplomatic
and similar matters and in addition,
privilege to withhold the identity of
persons who furnish information of
violation of laws. In the case at bar,
there is no claim that military or
diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by
the production of records pertaining
to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed,
EIIB's function is the gathering and
evaluation of intelligence reports and
information
regarding
"illegal
activities
affecting
the
national
economy, such as, but not limited to,
economic sabotage, smuggling, tax
evasion, dollar salting." Consequently,
while in cases which involve state
secrets it may be sufficient to
determine from the circumstances of
the case that there is reasonable
danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters
without compelling production, no
similar excuse can be made for a
privilege
resting
on
other
considerations.

Nor is there violation of petitioners'

right to the equal protection of the
laws. Petitioners complain that "in all
forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved
parties . . . can only hale respondents
via their verified complaints or sworn
statements with their identities fully
disclosed," while in proceedings
before the Office of the Ombudsman
anonymous letters suffice to start an
investigation. In the first place, there
can be no objection to this procedure
because it is provided in the
Constitution itself. In the second
place, it is apparent that in permitting
the filing of complaints "in any form
and in a manner," the framers of the
Constitution took into account the
well-known reticence of the people
which keep them from complaining
against official wrongdoings. As this
Court had occasion to point out, the
Office of the Ombudsman is different
from the other investigatory and
prosecutory
agencies
of
the
government because those subject to
its jurisdiction are public officials who,
through
official
pressure
and
influence, can quash, delay or dismiss
investigations held against them. On
The Ombudsman is investigating a the other hand complainants are more
complaint that several items in the often than not poor and simple folk
EIIB were filled by fictitious persons who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
and that the allotments for these
items in 1988 were used for illegal Finally, it is contended that the
purposes. The plantilla and other issuance of the subpoena duces
personnel records are relevant to his tecum would violate petitioners' right
investigation
as
the
designated against self-incrimination. It is enough
protectors of the people of the to state that the documents required
Constitution.
to be produced in this case are public
records and those to whom the
subpoena duces tecum is directed are

government
officials
in
whose
possession or custody the documents
are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim
the disbursement by the EII of funds
for personal service has already been
cleared by the COA, there is no reason
why they should object to the
examination of the documents by
respondent Ombudsman.

Culture and Sports and the National They shall strictly avoid conflict of
Manpower and Youth Council.
interest in the conduct of their office.

An information was then filed by the

Tanodbayan against Doromal for the APPLICATION:
said violation and a preliminary
The presence of a signed document
investigation was conducted
bearing the signature of Doromal as
The petitioner then filed a petition part of the application to bid shows
for
certiorari
and
prohibition that he can rightfully be charged with
questioning
the
jurisdiction
of the having participated in a business
DOROMAL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,
Tanodbayan
to
file
the
information
which act is absolutely prohibited by
G. R. No. 85468, 07 September
without
the
approval
of
the
Section 13 of Article VII of the
1989
Ombudsman.
Constitution" because "the DITC
remained a family corporation in
Topic:
Prohibitions
[Article
VII:
ISSUES:
which Doromal has at least an indirect
Sections 13]
interest."
Whether or not the act of Doromal
Ponente: GRIO-AQUINO, J.
would constitute a violation of the That admission allegedly belies the
Constitution.
MATERIAL FACTS:
averment in the information that the
petitioner
"participated'
in
the
Quintin S. Doromal, a public officer RULE:
business of the DITC in which he is
and being a Commissioner of the
prohibited by the Constitution or by
Presidential Commission on Good Article VII, Section 13 (1) of the law from having any interest. (Sec. 3Government,
participated
in
a Constitution provides:
h, RA No. 3019).
business
through
the
Doromal
The President, Vice-President, the
International
Trading
Corporation
The Sandiganbayan in its order of
Members of the Cabinet, and their
(DITC), a family corporation of which
August 19, 1988 correctly observed
deputies or assistants shall not,
he is the President, and which
that "the presence of a signed
unless otherwise provided in this
company participated in the biddings
document bearing the signature of
Constitution, hold any other office or
conducted by the Department of
accused Doromal as part of the
employment during their tenure. They
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
application to bid ... is not a sine qua
shall not, during said tenure, directly
and the National Manpower & Youth
non" (Annex O, p. 179. Rollo), for, the
or indirectly, practice any other
Council (NMYC) .
Ombudsman
indicated
in
his
profession,
participate
in
any
Memorandum/Clearance
to
the
In connection with his shareholdings business, or be financially interested Special Prosecutor, that the petitioner
and position as president and director in any contract with, or in any "can rightfully be charged ...with
of the Doromal International Trading franchise, or special privilege granted having participated in a business
the
Government
or
any
Corporation which submitted bids to by
which act is absolutely prohibited by
agency,
or
supply P61 million worth of electronic, subdivision,
Section 13 of Article VII of the
thereof,
including
electrical, automotive, mechanical instrumentality
Constitution" because "the DITC
or
controlled
and airconditioning equipment to government-owned
remained a family corporation in
theN THE Department of Education, corporations or their subsidiaries.

JRCMENDOZA|4

which Doromal has at least an indirect on the principal submission that it

interest." (pp. 107-108, Rollo).
adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of
the Constitution which provides:
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution
provides
that
"the Sec. 13. The President, VicePresident,
Vice-President,
the President, the Members of the
members of the Cabinet and their Cabinet, and their deputies or
deputies or assistants shall not... assistants shall not, unless otherwise
during (their) tenure, ...directly or provided in this Constitution, hold any
indirectly...
participate
in
any other office or employment during
business." The constitutional ban is their tenure. They shall not, during
similar to the prohibition in the Civil said tenure, directly or indirectly
Service Law (PD No. 807, Sec. 36, practice
any
other
profession,
subpar. 24) that "Pursuit of private participate in any business, or be
business ... without the permission financially interested in any contract
required by Civil Service Rules and with, or in any franchise, or special
Regulations" shall be a ground for privilege granted by the Government
disciplinary action against any officer or any subdivision, agency, or
or employee in the civil service.
instrumentality
thereof,
including
government-owned
or
controlled
CONCLUSION:
corporations or their subsidiaries.
They shall strictly avoid conflict of
Yes, the act of Doromal would interest in the conduct of their office.
constitute
a
violation
of
the
Constitution specifically of Section 13 CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase
of Article VII.
unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the only exceptions
Civil Liberties Union vs Executive against holding any other office or
Secretary
employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely:
FACTS: In July 1987, then President (i) The Vice-President may be
Corazon Aquino issued Executive appointed as a Member of the Cabinet
Order No.
284 which allowed under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii)
members of the Cabinet, their the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
undersecretaries
and
assistant member of the Judicial and Bar
secretaries to hold other government Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article
offices or positions in addition to their 8.
primary
positions
subject
to
limitations set therein. The Civil ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is
Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO constitutional.
averring
that
such
law
is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is
of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks

to prohibit the President, VicePresident, members of the Cabinet,

their deputies or assistants from
holding during their tenure multiple
offices
or
employment
in
the
government, except in those cases
specified in the Constitution itself and
as above clarified with respect to
posts
held
without
additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity
as provided by law and as required by
the primary functions of their office,
the citation of Cabinet members (then
called Ministers) as examples during
the debate and deliberation on the
general rule laid down for all
appointive
officials
should
be
considered as mere personal opinions
which
cannot
override
the
constitutions manifest intent and the
peoples understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given
to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7,
par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
Constitution,
EO
284
is
unconstitutional.
Ostensibly
restricting the number of positions
that
Cabinet
members,
undersecretaries
or
assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to
their primary position to not more
than 2 positions in the government
and government corporations, EO 284
actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate
of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting them from
doing so, unless otherwise provided in
the 1987 Constitution itself.

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER INC., accepted the second appointment,

LAUREANO
T.
ANGELES,
and but waived any renumiration that he
JOCELYN P. CELESTINO, vs.
may receive as CPLC. Petitioners
sought to have both appointments
MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, as Chief declared as unconstitutional and
Presidential Legal Counsel and as therefore, null and void.
Chairman of the Presidential
Commission
on
Good In its decision, the court declared that
Government,
and the concurrent appointments of the
RONALDOZAMORA, as Executive respondents as PCGG chairman and
Secretary, Accused Appellant
CPLC were unconstitutional. It ruled
that the concurrent appointment to
Facts:
these offices is in violation of section
7(2) OF ARTICLE ix-b of the 1987
For consideration is the omnibus constitution,
since
these
are
motion, dated 14 august 2006, where incompatible offices. The duties of
respondent Magdangal Elma sought CPLC include giving independent and
the following:
impartial legal advice on the action of
the heads of various executive
1. The reconsideration of the decision
departments
and
agencies
and
in the case Public Interest Center Inc.,
reviewing investigations
involving
et al. vs. Magdangal Elma, et.al ( GR.
heads of executive depart6mnets.
NO. 138965), promulgated on 30 June
Since the actions of the PCGG
2006;
Chairman, a head of an executive
2. The clarification of the dispositive agency, are subject to the review of
the CPLC, such appointments would
part of the decision ; and
be incompatible.
3. The elevation of the case to the
The court also decreed that the strict
court en banc.
prohibition under section 13 Article VII
The solicitor general, in behalf of the of the 1987 constitution would not
respondent, filed an omnibus motion, apply to the present case, since
dated
11
august
2006
with neither the PCGG chairman nor CPLC
is a secretary, under sectary or
substantially the same allegation.
assistant secretary. However, had the
Respondent Elma was appointed as rule hereunder been applicable to the
Chairman
of
The
Presidential case, the defect of these two
Commission on Good Government incompatible offices would be made
(PCGG)
ON
30
October
1998. more glaring. The said section allows
Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG the concurrent holding of position
Chairman, he was appointed as Chief only when second post is required by
Presidential legal counsel (CPLC). He the primary function of the first

JRCMENDOZA|5

appointments and is exercised in an

ex-officio
capacity.
Although
respondent Elma waived receiving
remuneration
for
the
second
appointment, the primary functions of
the PCGG chairman do not require his
appointment as CPLC.

decided en banc. Contrary to the

allegations of the respondent, the
decision of the court in this case does
not modify the ruling in Civil Liberties
Union vs. Executive Secretary. It
should be noted that Section 3 of
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89,
dated 7 February 1989 clearly
Ruling
provides that the court en banc is not
an appellate court to which decisions
1. After reviewing the arguments or resolutions of a division may be
propounded in respondents omnibus appealed.
motion, we find that the basic issues
that were raised have already been WHEREFORE, the respondents motion
passed
upon.
No
substantial for consideration and for elevation of
arguments were presented. Thus, the this case of court en banc is hereby
court denies the respondents motion DENIED.
for reconsideration.
2. In response to the respondents
request for clarification, the court
ruled
that
respondents
Elmas
concurrent appointments as PCGG
Chairman
and
CPLC
are
unconstitutional,
for
being
incompatible offices. This ruling does
not render both appointments void.
Following the common-law rule on
incompatibility of offices, respondent
Elma had, in effect, vacated his office
as PCGG Chairman when he accepted
the second office as CPLC.
3. There also is no merit in the
respondents motion to refer the case
to court en banc. What are in question
in the present case are the
constitutionality of respondent Elmas
concurrent appointments, and not the
constitutionality of any treaty, law or
agreement. The mere application of
the constitutional provisions does not
require the case to be heard and

from afar and to the fanatism and Marcoses to return to the Philippines,
blind loyalty of their followers in the the
President
is,
under
the
country.
Constitution, constrained to consider
these basic principles in arriving at a
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified decision. More than that, having
his wish to return to the Philippines to sworn to defend and uphold the
die.
Constitution, the President has the
obligation under the Constitution to
President Aquino, considering the dire protect the people, promote their
consequence to the nation of his welfare and advance the national
return, has stood firmly on the interest. It must be borne in mind that
decision to bar the return of Marcos the Constitution, aside from being an
and his family.
allocation of power is also a social
contract whereby the people have
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the
surrendered their sovereign powers to
exercise of the powers granted by the
the State for the common good.
Constitution, the President may
Hence, lest the officers of the
prohibit the Marcoses from retyrning
Government exercising the powers
MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS, G.R. to the Philippines.
delegated by the people forget and
No. 88211 September 15, 1989
the servants of the people become
RULING:
rulers, the Constitution reminds
FACTS:
The right to return to one's country is everyone that "[s]overeignty resides
in the people and all government
In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos not among the rights specifically
authority emanates from them." [Art.
guaranteed
in
the
Bill
of
Rights,
which
was deposed from precidency via the
II, Sec. 1.]
treats
only
of
the
liberty
of
abode
and
non-violent people power revolution
the
right
to
travel,
but
it
is
our
welland forced into exice.
considered view that the right to The Court cannot close its eyes to
present realities and pretend that the
Corazon
Aquino
was
declared return may be considered, as a
accepted
principle
of country is not besieged from within by
President of the Republic under a generally
well-organized
communist
international law and, under our a
revolutionary government.
insurgency,
a
separatist
movement
in
Constitution, is part of the law of the
Mindanao,
rightist
conspiracies
to
Her ascension to and consolidation of land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
power have not been unchallenged. Constitution.] However, it is distinct grab power, urban terrorism, the
The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 and separate from the right to travel murder with impunity of military men,
led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, and enjoys a different protection police officers and civilian officials, to
the takeover of television station under the International Covenant of mention only a few. The documented
Channel 7 by rebel troops with the Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against history of the efforts of the Marcose's
support of Marcos loyalists and the being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof and their followers to destabilize the
country, as earlier narrated in this
unsuccessful plot of the Marcos [Art. 12 (4).]
ponencia bolsters the conclusion that
spouse
to
return
from
Hawaii
awakened the nation to the capacity Faced with the problem of whether or the return of the Marcoses at this time
of the Marcoses to stir trouble even not the time is right to allow the would only exacerbate and intensify

the violence directed against

State and instigate more chaos.

the

The President has determined that the

destabilization caused by the return of
the Marcoses would wipe away the
gains achieved during the past few
years and lead to total economic
collapse. Given what is within our
individual and common knowledge of
the state of the economy, we cannot
argue with that determination.
WHEREFORE, and it being our wellconsidered opinion that the President
did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining
that the return of former President
Marcos and his family at the present
time and under present circumstances
poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting
their return to the Philippines, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
BIRAOGO VS PTC
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1
establishing
Philippine
Truth
Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July
30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed
under the Office of the President with
the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption
committed
by
third-level
public
officers and employees, their coprincipals,
accomplices
and
accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its

JRCMENDOZA|6

finding and recommendations to the

President,
Congress
and
the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers
of an investigative body. But it is not a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle,
or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of
graft and corruption and make
recommendations.
It
may
have
subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt, much less
order their arrest. Although it is a factfinding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause
exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the

Constitution and statutes when it
vested the Truth Commission with
quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if
not superseding, those of the Office of
the Ombudsman created under the
1987 Constitution and the DOJ
created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal
protection clause as it selectively
targets
for
investigation
and
prosecution officials and personnel of
the previous administration as if
corruption is their peculiar species
even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present,
who may be indictable.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare

through
OSG,
it unconstitutional and to enjoin the Respondents,
PTC from performing its functions. questioned the legal standing of
petitioners and argued that:
They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of
powers as it arrogates the power of
the Congress to create a public office
and
appropriate
funds
for
its
operation.

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the

powers of Congress because the
Presidents executive power and
power of control necessarily include
the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No.
141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970
and settled jurisprudence, authorize
the President to create or form such
bodies.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter

10, Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated authority
of the President to structurally
reorganize the Office of the President
to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power
to create an entirely new public office 2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the
which was hitherto inexistent like the power of Congress to appropriate
funds
because
there
is
no
Truth Commission.
appropriation but a mere allocation of

funds
already
Congress.

appropriated

by question the validity of the subject act

or issuance; otherwise stated, he
must have a personal and substantial
3] The Truth Commission does not interest in the case such that he has
duplicate or supersede the functions sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
because it is a fact-finding body and question of constitutionality must be
not a quasi-judicial body and its raised at the earliest opportunity; and
functions do not duplicate, supplant (4) the issue of constitutionality must
or erode the latters jurisdiction.
be the very lis mota of the case.
4] The Truth Commission does not
violate the equal protection clause
because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.

party
in
interest.
Real-party-in
interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi
arises in public suits. Here, the
plaintiff who asserts a public right in
assailing an allegedly illegal official
action, does so as a representative of
the general public. He has to show
that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. He has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of
the public order and the securing of
relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

1. The petition primarily invokes

usurpation of the power of the
Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. To the extent the
powers of Congress are impaired, so
ISSUES:
is the power of each member thereof,
since his office confers a right to
1. WON the petitioners have legal
participate in the exercise of the The person who impugns the validity
standing to file the petitions and
of a statute must have a personal
powers of that institution.
question E. O. No. 1;
and substantial interest in the case
Legislators have a legal standing to such that he has sustained, or will
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the
see to it that the prerogative, powers sustain direct injury as a result. The
principle of separation of powers by
and
privileges
vested
by
the Court, however, finds reason in
usurping the powers of Congress to
Constitution in their office remain Biraogos assertion that the petition
create and to appropriate funds for
inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to covers matters of transcendental
public
offices,
agencies
and
question the validity of any official importance to justify the exercise of
commissions;
action which, to their mind, infringes jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the on their prerogatives as legislators.
which deserve the attention of this
powers of the Ombudsman and the
With regard to Biraogo, he has not Court in view of their seriousness,
DOJ;
shown that he sustained, or is in novelty and weight as precedents
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the
protection clause.
implementation of E. O. No. 1.
The Executive is given much leeway
RULING:
Locus standi is a right of appearance in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
The power of judicial review is subject in a court of justice on a given executed. The powers of the President
to limitations, to wit: (1) there must question. In private suits, standing is are not limited to those specific
be an actual case or controversy governed by the real-parties-in powers under the Constitution. One of
recognized
powers
of
the
calling for the exercise of judicial interest rule. It provides that every the
action
must
be
prosecuted
or
President
granted
pursuant
to
this
power; (2) the person challenging the
act must have the standing to defended in the name of the real constitutionally-mandated duty is the

JRCMENDOZA|7

power to create ad hoc committees.

This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws
have been faithfully executed. The
purpose
of
allowing
ad
hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to
allow an inquiry into matters which
the President is entitled to know so
that he can be properly advised and
guided in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but
only an allotment or allocations of
existing funds already appropriated.
There is no usurpation on the part of
the Executive of the power of
Congress to appropriate funds. There
is no need to specify the amount to
be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds
the Congress has provided for the
Office of the President will be the very
source
of
the
funds
for
the
commission. The amount that would
be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and
regulations so there is no impropriety
in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the
Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the
investigative
function
of
the
commission will complement those of
the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the
filing of the appropriate complaints
before the courts remains to be with
the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs
power to investigate is limited to

obtaining facts so that it can advise

and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding
the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection
clause enshrined in Section 1, Article
III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.

The classification will be regarded as

invalid if all the members of the class
are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations
imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be

struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate
of truth commission is to investigate
and find out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration
only. The intent to single out the
Equal protection requires that all previous administration is plain,
persons or things similarly situated patent and manifest.
should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities Arroyo administration is but just a
imposed. It requires public bodies and member of a class, that is, a class of
institutions to treat similarly situated past administrations. It is not a class
individuals in a similar manner. The of its own. Not to include past
purpose of the equal protection clause administrations
similarly
situated
is to secure every person within a constitutes arbitrariness which the
states jurisdiction against intentional equal
protection
clause
cannot
and arbitrary discrimination, whether sanction.
Such
discriminating
occasioned by the express terms of a differentiation clearly reverberates to
statue or by its improper execution label the commission as a vehicle for
through the states duly constituted vindictiveness
and
selective
authorities.
retribution. Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.
There must be equality among equals
as determined according to a valid The PTC must not exclude the other
classification. Equal protection clause past administrations. The PTC must,
permits
classification.
Such at least, have the authority to
classification, however, to be valid investigate all past administrations.
must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) The The Constitution is the fundamental
classification rests on substantial and paramount law of the nation to
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the which all other laws must conform
purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited and in accordance with which all
to existing conditions only; and (4) It private rights determined and all
applies equally to all members of the public authority administered. Laws
that
do
not
conform
to
the
same class.

Constitution should be stricken down Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377)

for being unconstitutional.
shares of stock of Express Savings
Bank, Inc.
WHEREFORE,
the
petitions
are
GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is On April 14, 2011, petitioner received
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL an Order3 signed by Executive
insofar as it is violative of the equal Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.
protection clause of the Constitution.
requiring him and his co-respondents
to submit their respective written
PICHAY V. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY explanations
under
oath.
In
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2012)
compliance therewith, petitioner filed
a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad
ODES no power to try and decide Cautelam manifesting that a case
cases E.O. No. 13 empowering it is involving the same transaction and
unconstitutional
charge of grave misconduct entitled,
"Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero
FACTS:
Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMBC-A-10-0426-I, is already pending
On November 15, 2010, President
before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued
Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), ISSUE
abolishing the PAGC and transferring
its functions to the Office of the Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal for abrogating unto an administrative
Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to office a quasi-judicial function through
its newly-established Investigative and E.O. and not through legislative
and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
enactment by Congress.
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance
Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed
before the IAD-ODESLA a complaintaffidavit for grave misconduct against
petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of
the
Local
Water
Utilities
Administration (LWUA), as well as the
incumbent members of the LWUA
Board of Trustees, namely, Renato
Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas,
Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and
Daniel Landingin, which arose from
the purchase by the LWUA of Four
Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three

HELD
NO.
The
President
has
Continuing
Authority to Reorganize the Executive
Department under E.O. 292. In the
case of Buklodng Kawaning EIIB v.
Zamora the Court affirmed that the
President's authority to carry out a
reorganization in any branch or
agency of the executive department
is an express grant by the legislature
by virtue of Section 31, Book III, E.O.
292 (the Administrative Code of

JRCMENDOZA|8

1987), "the President, subject to the

policy of the Executive Office and in
order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency, shall have the
continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office
of the President."
The law grants the President this
power in recognition of the recurring
need of every President to reorganize
his office "to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency." The Office of
the President is the nerve center of
the Executive Branch. To remain
effective and efficient, the Office of
the President must be capable of
being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner he deems fit
to carry out his directives and
policies. After all, the Office of the
President is the command post of the
President. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and
the transfer of its functions to a
division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the
prerogative of the President under his
continuing
"delegated
legislative
authority to reorganize" his own office
pursuant to E.O. 292.
The President's power to reorganize
the Office of the President under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292
should be distinguished from his
power to reorganize the Office of the
President Proper. Under Section 31 (1)
of EO 292, the President can
reorganize the Office of the President
Proper by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units, or by transferring

functions from one unit to another. In

contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3)
of EO 292, the President's power to
reorganize offices outside the Office
of the President Proper but still within
the Office of the
President is limited to merely
transferring functions or agencies
from the Office of the President to
Departments or agencies, and vice
versa.
The distinction between the allowable
organizational actions under Section
31(1) on the one hand and Section 31
(2) and (3) on the other is crucial not
only as it affects employees' tenurial
security but also insofar as it touches
upon
the
validity
of
the
reorganization, that is, whether the
executive actions undertaken fall
within the limitations prescribed
under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was
created under E.O. 12, it was
composed of a Chairman and two(2)
Commissioners who held the ranks of
Presidential Assistant II and I,
respectively,9 and was placed directly
"under the Office of the President."10
On the other hand, the ODESLA, to
which the functions of the PAGC have
now been transferred, is an office
within the Office of the President
Proper.11 Since both of these offices
belong to the Office of the President
Proper, the reorganization by way of
abolishing the PAGC and transferring
its functions to the ODESLA is
allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O.
292.

What actions
include?

does

reorganization conduct of investigations, preparation

of
reports
and
submission
of
recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly
The Reorganization Did not Entail the states that the IADCreation of a New, Separate and
Distinct Office.
ODESLA
shall
"perform
powers,
functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."
The abolition of the PAGC did not
require the creation of a new, Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given
additional and distinct office as the the authority to "investigate or hear
duties and functions that pertained to administrative cases or complaints
the defunct anti-graft body were against
simply transferred to the ODESLA,
which is an existing office within the all presidential appointees in the
Office of the President Proper. The government" and to "submit its report
recommendations
to
the
reorganization required no more than and
President."
The
IAD-ODESLA
is
a
facta
mere
alteration
of
the
administrative
structure
of
the finding and recommendatory body to
ODESLA through the establishment of the President, not having the power to
a third division the Investigative and settle controversies and adjudicate
Adjudicatory Division through which cases. As the Court ruled in Cario v.
ODESLA could take on the additional Commission on Human Rights, and
functions it has been tasked to later reiterated in Biraogo v. The
Philippine Truth Commission:
discharge under E.O. 13.
Reorganization takes place when
there is an alteration of the existing
structure of government offices or
units therein, including the lines of
control, authority and responsibility
between them. It involves a reduction
of personnel, consolidation of offices,
or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and
recommendatory body not vested
with quasi-judicial powers.
While the term "adjudicatory" appears
part of its appellation, the IADODESLA cannot try and resolve cases,
its authority being limited to the

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it

cannot be likened to the judicial
function of a court of justice, or even
a quasi- judicial agency or office. The
function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining there from the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function.
To be considered as such, the act of
receiving evidence and arriving at
factual conclusions in a controversy
must be
accompanied
by the
authority of applying the law to the
factual conclusions to the end that
the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided
by law.

The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach

upon the powers and duties of the
Ombudsman.
Contrary to petitioner's contention,
the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach
upon the Ombudsman's primary
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of
the complaint affidavit filed against
him notwithstanding the earlier filing
of criminal and administrative cases
involving the same charges and
allegations before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute cases refers to criminal
cases
cognizable
by
the
Sandiganbayan
and
not
to
administrative cases. It is only in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction that
the Ombudsman may, at any time,
take over the investigation being
conducted by another investigatory
agency. Section 15 (1) of R.A. No.
6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
While the Ombudsman's function
goes into the determination of the
existence of probable cause and the
adjudication of the merits of a
criminal accusation, the investigative
authority of the IAD- ODESLA is
limited to that of a fact-finding
investigator whose determinations
and recommendations remain so until
acted upon by the President.
Finally, petitioner doubts that the IADODESLA can lawfully perform its
duties as an impartial tribunal,
contending that both the IAD-ODESLA
and respondent Secretary Purisima
are connected to the President. The

JRCMENDOZA|9

mere suspicion of partiality will not

suffice to invalidate the actions of the
IAD-ODESLA. Mere allegation is not
equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality
cannot be presumed. Petitioner must
present substantial proof to show that
the lAD-ODES LA had unjustifiably
sided against him in the conduct of
the investigation. No such evidence
has been presented as to defeat the
presumption of regularity m the
performance
of
the
fact-finding
investigator's duties. The assertion,
therefore,
deserves
scant
consideration.

immediate transfer of the DENR XII

Regional Offices from Cotabato City to
Koronadal (formerly Marbel), South
CotabatoProviding
for
the
Redefinition
of
Functions
and
Realignment of Administrative Units in
the Regional and Field Offices
o
Sec
1.
Realignment
of
Administrative
Units.
1.6.
The
supervision of the Provinces of South
Cotabato and Sarangani shall be
transferred from Region XI to XII

Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to 2. Whether or not the DENR Secretary

entertain this petition.
has the authority to reorganize the
DENR.
RTC then decided, ordering the
DENR to cease and desist from
enforcing their Memorandum Order
xxx for being bereft of legal basis and HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)
issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on their part, and they are
further ordered to return back the
seat of the DENR Regional Offices 12
to Cotabato City.

Respondents filed a petition for Petition for certiorari with the CA

nullity of orders with prayer for was dismissed for procedural errors:
(1) failure to submit a written
Every law has in its favor the preliminary injunction
explanation why personal service was
presumption of constitutionality, and
to justify its nullification, there must RTC of Cotabato issued TRO against not done on the adverse party; (2)
be a clear and unequivocal breach of DENR Sec and Regional Executive failure to attach affidavit of service;
(3) failure to indicate the material
the Constitution, not a doubtful and Director from transferring the offices
dates when copies of the orders of the
argumentative one.39 Petitioner has
DENR then filed a Motion for lower court were received; (4) failure
failed to discharge the burden of
Reconsideration, asserting that
to attach certified true copy of the
proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which
IS indubitably a valid exercise of the o The power to transfer the Regional order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration; (5) for improper
President's continuing authority to Office
of
the
Department
of
reorganize the Office of the President. Environment and Natural Resources verification, the same being based on
petitioners knowledge and belief, and
(DENR) is executive in nature.
(6) wrong remedy of certiorari under
DENR
vs
DENR
Region
12
Employees
o The decision to transfer the Rule 65 to substitute a lost appeal.
Regional Office is based on Executive
Motion for Reconsideration denied.
Order No. 429, which reorganized
Region XII.
Hence this petition.
Petition for review assailing CA
decision dismissing the petition for o The validity of EO 429 has been
certiorari and denial of motion for affirmed by the Honorable Supreme ISSUES
consideration.
Court in the Case of Chiongbian vs. 1. Whether or not (1) Whether DAOOrbos (1995) 245 SCRA 255.
99-14
and
the
Memorandum
November 15, 1999
Regional
implementing
the
same
were
valid;
Executive Director of the Department o Since the power to reorganize the
of Environment and Natural Resources Administrative Regions is Executive in
for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued Nature
citing
Chiongbian,
the
a Memorandum[3] directing the
FACTS

(1) Yes:
o The ratio below answers this one
lelz
(2) Yes:
o The qualified political agency
doctrine,
all
executive
and
administrative
organizations
are
adjuncts
of
the
Executive
Department, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, are presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive. It is
corollary to the control power of the
President as provided for under Art.
VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution:
"The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed."

President for the latter had

expressly repudiated the same.

not

RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the petition for review is GRANTED.
The resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58896
dated May 31, 2000 and August 20,
2001, as well as the decision dated
January 14, 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cotabato City, Branch 15, in
Civil Case No 389, are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction,
which enjoined the petitioner from
enforcing the Memorandum Order of
the DENR XII Regional Executive
Director, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Jose
Mondano
Silvosa

vs

Fernando

Jose Mondano was the mayor of

Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed
against
him
for
rape
and
concubinage. The information reached
the Assistant Executive Secretary who
ordered the governor to investigate
the matter. Consequently, Governor
Fernando Silvosa then summoned
Mondano and the latter appeared
before
him.
Thereafter
Silvosa
suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a
petition for prohibition enjoining the
governor from further proceeding.

o In this case, the DENR Secretary can

validly reorganize the DENR by
ordering the transfer of the DENR XII
Regional Offices from Cotabato City to
Koronadal, South Cotabato. The
exercise of this authority by the DENR In his defense, Silvosa invoked the
Secretary, as an alter ego, is Revised Administrative Code which
presumed to be the acts of the provided that he, as part of the
executive and by virtue o the order

JRCMENDOZA|10

given by the Assistant Executive

Secretary, is with direct control,
direction, and supervision over all
bureaus and offices under his
jurisdiction . . . and to that end may
order the investigation of any act or
conduct of any person in the service
of any bureau or office under his
Department
and
in
connection
therewith may appoint a committee
or designate an official or person who
shall conduct such investigations.

bureaus and offices under his

jurisdiction as provided for in section
79(c) of the Revised Administrative
Code, but he does not have the same
control of local governments as that
exercised by him over bureaus and
offices under his jurisdiction.

Likewise, his authority to order the

investigation of any act or conduct of
any person in the service of any
bureau or office under his department
is confined to bureaus or offices under
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, his jurisdiction and does not extend to
as agent of the Executive, can local governments over which, as
exercise the power of control over a already
stated,
the
President
mayor.
exercises only general supervision as
may be provided by law.
HELD: No. (Note that Silvosa was
asking as the agent of the Assistant If the provisions of section 79 (c) of
Executive Secretary who ordered him the Revised Administrative Code are
to investigate Mondano).
to be construed as conferring upon
the corresponding department head
The Constitution provides:
direct
control,
direction,
and
supervision over all local governments
The President shall have control of all and that for that reason he may order
the executive departments, bureaus, the investigation of an official of a
or
offices,
exercise
general local government for malfeasance in
supervision over all local governments office, such interpretation would be
as may be provided by law, and take contrary to the provisions of par 1,
care that the laws be faithfully sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935
executed.
Constitution.
Under this constitutional provision the
President has been invested with the
power of control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, but
not of all local governments over
which he has been granted only the
power of general supervision as may
be provided by law. The Department
head as agent of the President has
direct control and supervision over all

In administrative law supervision

means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the

power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter.

(such as rape or concubinage as in

this case), there must first be a final
conviction before a suspension may
be issued. The point is, the governor
must suspend a mayor not because
hes acting as an agent of the
Executive but because of the power
granted
him
by
the
Revised
The Congress has expressly and Administrative Code.
specifically lodged the provincial
supervision over municipal officials in Jose Villena vs Secretary of the
the provincial governor who is Interior
authorized to receive and investigate
complaints made under oath against Jose Villena was the then mayor of
in
the
1930s.
After
municipal officers for neglect of duty, Makati
oppression, corruption or other form investigation, the Secretary of Interior
of maladministration of office, and recommended the suspension of
conviction by final judgment of any Villena with the Office of the president
approved
the
same.
The
crime involving moral turpitude. And who
if the charges are serious, he shall Secretary then suspended Villena.
submit written charges touching the Villena averred claiming that the
matter to the provincial board, Secretary has no jurisdiction over the
furnishing a copy of such charges to matter. The power or jurisdiction is
the accused either personally or by lodged in the local government [the
registered mail, and he may in such governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the
case suspend the officer (not being Administrative Code.
the municipal treasurer) pending
action by the board, if in his opinion Further, even if the respondent
the charge be one affecting the Secretary of the Interior has power of
official integrity of the officer in supervision over local governments,
power,
according
to
the
question. Sec 86 of the Revised that
Administrative Code adds nothing to constitution, must be exercised in
the power of supervision to be accordance with the provisions of law
exercised by the Department Head and the provisions of law governing
over
the
administration
of trials of charges against elective
municipal officials are those contained
municipalities.
in sec 2188 of the Administrative
In this case, the governor can only Code as amended.
investigate Mondano for crimes
relating to Mondanos office. If the In other words, the Secretary of the
issue is not related to his office but Interior must exercise his supervision
involves a rime of moral turpitude over local governments, if he has that
power
under
existing
law,
in

accordance with sec 2188 of the

Administrative Code, as amended, as
the latter provisions govern the
procedure
to
be
followed
in
suspending and punishing elective
local officials while sec 79 (C) of the
Administrative Code is the genera law
which must yield to the special law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary
of Interior can suspend an LGU official
under investigation.
HELD: Yes.
There is no clear and express grant of
power to the secretary to suspend a
mayor of a municipality who is under
investigation. On the contrary, the
power
appears
lodged
in
the
provincial governor by sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code which provides
that The provincial governor shall
receive and investigate complaints
made under oath against municipal
officers
for
neglect
of
duty,
oppression, corruption or other form
of maladministration of office, and
conviction by final judgment of any
crime involving moral turpitude.
The fact, however, that the power of
suspension is expressly granted by
sec 2188 of the Administrative Code
to the provincial governor does not
mean that the grant is necessarily
exclusive and precludes the Secretary
of the Interior from exercising a
similar power. For instance, Villena
admitted in the oral argument that
the President of the Philippines may
himself suspend the petitioner from
office in virtue of his greater power of

JRCMENDOZA|11

removal (sec. 2191, as amended, April 13, 1954 - the portion

Administrative Code) to be exercised Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was
conformably to law.
officially released from the forest zone
as
pastureland
and
declared
Indeed, if the President could, in the agricultural land.
manner prescribed by law, remove a
municipal official; it would be a legal January 26, 1955 - Jose Pao and
incongruity if he were to be devoid of nineteen other claimants applied for
the lesser power of suspension. And the purchase of ninety (90) hectares
the incongruity would be more patent of the released area.
if, possessed of the power both to
March
29,
1955
-Plaintiff
suspend and to remove a provincial
official (sec. 2078, Administrative Corporation in turn filed its own sales
covering
the
entire
Code), the President were to be application
without the power to suspend a released area. This was protested by
Pao
and
his
nineteen
municipal official. The power to Jose
suspend a municipal official is not companions upon the averment that
exclusive. Preventive suspension may they are actual occupants of the part
be issued to give way for an impartial thereof covered by their own sales
application.
investigation.

of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Agriculture and Natural Resources

and
yielded an affirmative answer from
the lower court
(1) declared that "it would be for the
public interest that appellants, who HELD:
are mostly landless farmers who
depend on the land for their Judgment under review is hereby
existence, be allocated that portion affirmed. Executive Secretarys act
on
which
they
have
made cannot be assailed and therefore has
full force and effect.
improvements;" and
(2)directed that the controverted land
(northern portion of Block I, LC Map
1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan,
Davao,with Latian River as the
dividing line) "should be subdivided
into lots of convenient sizes and
allocated to actualoccupants, without
prejudice to the corporation's right to
reimbursement for the cost of
surveying this portion.

(1) The President's duty to execute

the law is of constitutional origin. So,
too, is his control of all executive
departments.
Thus
it
is,
that
department heads are men of his
confidence. His is the power to
appoint them; his, too, is the privilege
to
dismiss
them
at
pleasure.
Naturally, he controls and directs their
Plaintiff
corporation
took
the acts. Implicit then is his authority to
foregoing decision to the Court of First go over, confirm, modify or reverse
Instance praying that judgment be the action taken by his department
secretaries.
rendered declaring:

v July 31, 1956 - The Director of Lands,

following an investigation of the
conflict, rendered a decision on giving
Section 17. The President shall have due course to the application of
control
of
all
the
executive plaintiff corporation, and dismissing
departments, bureaus, and offices. He the claim of Jose Pao and his
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully companions. Amove to reconsider (1) that the decision of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources
failed.
executed.
has full force and effect; and
July 5, 1957 - the Secretary of
FACTS:
Agriculture and Natural Resources (2) that the decision of the Executive
1932 - Jose Magallanes was a on appeal by Jose Pao for himself Secretary is contrary to law and of no
permittee and actual occupant of a andhis companions held that the legal force and effect.
1,103-hectare pasture land situated in appeal was without merit and
ISSUE:
Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, dismissed the same.
Province of Davao.
June 25, 1958 -Executive Secretary Whether or not the Executive
January 9, 1953 -Magallanes ceded Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of the Secretary, acting by authority of the
his rights and interests to a portion President" decided the controversy, President, reverse a decision of the
(392,7569 hectares) of the above modified the decision of the Director
Director of Lands that had been
public land to plaintiff.
of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary
affirmed by the Executive Secretary of
Lacson-Magallanes
Pao

Co.

Inc.

RATIO:

In this context, it may not be said that

the President cannot rule on the
correctness of a decision of a
department secretary.
(2) Parenthetically, it may be stated
that the right to appeal to the
President
reposes
upon
the
President's power of control over the
executive departments.
Control simply means "the power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his

duties and to substitute the judgment

of the former for that of the latter."
(3) The rule which has thus gained
recognition is that "under our
constitutional setup the Executive
Secretary who acts for and in behalf
and by authority of the President has
an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm,
modify, or even reverse any order"
that the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, including the
Director of Lands, may issue.
(4) The action taken is "disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive,"
that remains the act of the Chief
Executive, and cannot be successfully
assailed. No such disapproval or
reprobation is even intimated in the
record of this case.
Rodolfo
Appeals

Ganzon

vs

Court

of

Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor

of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed
against him on grounds of misconduct
and misfeasance of office. The
Secretary of Local Government issued
several suspension orders against
Ganzon based on the merits of the
complaints filed against him hence
Ganzon was facing about 600 days of
suspension. Ganzon appealed the
issue to the CA and the CA affirmed
the suspension order by the Secretary.
Ganzon asserted that the 1987
Constitution does not authorize the
President nor any of his alter ego to
suspend and remove local officials;
this is because the 1987 Constitution
supports
local
autonomy
and

JRCMENDOZA|12

strengthens the same. What was the other in meaning and extent. In
given by the present Constitution was administration law supervision means
mere supervisory power.
overseeing or the power or authority
of an officer to see that subordinate
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary officers perform their duties. If the
of
Local
Government,
as
the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the
Presidents alter ego, can suspend former may take such action or step
and or remove local officials.
as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the
impression that the Constitution has Control, on the other hand, means the
left the President mere supervisory power of an officer to alter or modify
powers, which supposedly excludes or nullify of set aside what a
the power of investigation, and subordinate officer had done in the
denied her control, which allegedly performance of his duties and to
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a substitute the judgment of the former
mistaken impression because legally, for that of the latter. But from this
supervision is not incompatible with pronouncement
it
cannot
be
disciplinary authority.
reasonably inferred that the power of
The SC had occasion to discuss the
scope and extent of the power of
supervision by the President over
local government officials in contrast
to the power of control given to him
over executive officials of our
government
wherein
it
was
emphasized that the two terms,
control and supervision, are two
different things which differ one from

DADOLE VS COA

RULING:

G.R. No. 125350 December 3 2002

Yes.
Although
the
Constitution
guarantees
autonomy
to
local
government units, the exercise of
local autonomy remains subject to the
power of control by Congress and the
power of supervision by the President.
Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution:
"The President of the Philippines shall
exercise general supervision over
local governments. x x x" The said
provision has been interpreted to
exclude the power of control.

FACTS:

Acting on the DBM's Local Budget

Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City
Auditor
issued
notices
of
disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges,
in excess of the amount (maximum of
P1000 and P700 in provinces and
cities and municipalities, respectively)
authorized by said circular. The
additional monthly allowances of the
judges shall be reduced to P1000
each. They were also asked to
reimbursed the amount they received The members of the Cabinet and
in excess of P1000 from the last six other executive officials are merely
alter egos of the President. As such,
supervision of the President over local months.
they are subject to the power of
government officials does not include
control of the President; he will see to
the power of investigation when in his
it that the local governments or their
opinion the good of the public service ISSUE:
officials were performing their duties
so requires.
as provided by the Constitution and
Whether or not Local Budget Circular
The Secretary of Local Government, No. 55 void for going beyond the by statutes, at whose will and behest
they can be removed from office; or
as the alter ego of the president, in supervisory powers of the President.
their actions and decisions changed,
suspending Ganzon is exercising a
suspended or reversed. They are
valid power. He however overstepped
subject to the President's supervision
by imposing a 600 day suspension.

only, not control, so long as their acts

are exercised within the sphere of
their legitimate powers. The President
can only interfere in the affairs and
activities of a LGU if he or she finds
that the latter has acted contrary to
law. This is the scope of the
President's supervisory powers over
LGUs.

JRCMENDOZA|13