Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78239

February 9, 1989

SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner,

vs.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:
The principal question raised in this petition for review is whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by
the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of
Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to
imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the government in
the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for
reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute
pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant
city treasurer since the same was still vacant.
Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of the provision of the Local Government Code
transferring the power of appointment of treasurers from the city governments to the said Ministry. In its 4th Indorsement dated March 1,
1985, the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier
than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of P4,892.50 which
the Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified in favor of the government as well as the costs of the litigation, be satisfied. 1
Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on April 17, 1985 stressing that the full pardon bestowed
on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of
her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay
for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.
The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner's letter to the Office of the President for further review and action. On April 15,
1986, said Office, through Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgenio S. Factoran, Jr. held:
We disagree with both the Ministry of Finance and the petitioner because, as borne out by the records, petitioner was convicted of the
crime for which she was accused. In line with the government's crusade to restore absolute honesty in public service, this Office
adopts, as a juridical guide (Miranda v. Imperial, 77 Phil. 1966), the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division, in People v. Lising,
Crim. Case No. 6675, October 4, 1985, that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement
to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his
suspension pendente lite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can reassume his former position. ...
Anent the civil liability of Monsanto, the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that "a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence." (Sec. 36, par. 2).
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office holds that Salvacion A. Monsanto is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis
of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an appointment to her former position and that, notwithstanding said absolute
pardon, she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction. 3
Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition in her behalf We gave due course
on October 13, 1987.

Petitioner's basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that she was extended
executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her
employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited. In other words, without that
final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of her employment remained
"suspended." More importantly, when pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no
offense to speak of. In effect, the President has declared her not guilty of the crime charged and has accordingly dismissed the same. 4
It is well to remember that petitioner had been convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and
sentenced to imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten years and one day of
prision mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal penalty. 5 Temporary absolute
disqualification bars the convict from public office or employment, such disqualification to last during the term of the sentence. 6 Even if
the offender be pardoned, as to the principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain unless the same have been expressly remitted by
the pardon. 7 The penalty of prision correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties, suspension from public office. 8
The propositions earlier advanced by petitioner reveal her inadequate understanding of the nature of pardon and its legal
consequences. This is not totally unexpected considering that the authorities on the subject have not been wholly consistent particularly
in describing the effects of pardon.
The benign mercy of pardon is of British origin, conceived to temper the gravity of the King's wrath. But Philippine jurisprudence on the
subject has been largely influenced by American case law.
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act
of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. ... A
pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance." 8-a
At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning power was governed by the 1973 Constitution as amended in
the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The pertinent provision reads:
The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, and with
the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty. 9
The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency
could be given even before conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in the High
Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it
may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the
result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed
conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.
Having disposed of that preliminary point, we proceed to discuss the effects of a full and absolute pardon in relation to the decisive
question of whether or not the plenary pardon had the effect of removing the disqualifications prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
In Pelobello v. Palatino, 10 We find a reiteration of the stand consistently adopted by the courts on the various consequences of pardon:
"... we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador, G.R. No. 47941, December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations
imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not
only blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. ... (W)e are of the opinion that the better
view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive
who, after an inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely
the party ... concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction.
The Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal v. Labrador cases, 11 and several others 12 show the unmistakable application of the doctrinal
case of Ex Parte Garland, 13 whose sweeping generalizations to this day continue to hold sway in our jurisprudence despite the fact
that much of its relevance has been downplayed by later American decisions.
Consider the following broad statements:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases
the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from
attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it
were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. 14
Such generalities have not been universally accepted, recognized or approved. 15 The modern trend of authorities now rejects the
unduly broad language of the Garland case (reputed to be perhaps the most extreme statement which has been made on the effects of
a pardon). To our mind, this is the more realistic approach. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of
guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all
purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
16

The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's innocence) as relieving the party from all the
punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. 17 But it relieves
him from nothing more. "To say, however, that the offender is a "new man", and "as innocent as if he had never committed the offense;"
is to ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though
pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society than
one never found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon him following his conviction." 18
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. 19 It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by
the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. "Since the offense
has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been
rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required." 20 This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned,
cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive declared her not guilty of the crime for which she
was convicted. In the case of State v. Hazzard, 21 we find this strong observation: "To assume that all or even a major number of
pardons are issued because of innocence of the recipients is not only to indict our judicial system, but requires us to assume that which
we all know to be untrue. The very act of forgiveness implies the commission of wrong, and that wrong has been established by the
most complete method known to modern civilization. Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a
conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of bad character, which has been definitely fixed. 22
In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal
consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that
once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot
perceive how pardon can produce such "moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has
constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.
Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which, despite the public manifestation of mercy and
forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor." 23
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But
unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. 24 This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the privilege.
Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are in full agreement with the commonly-held
opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the
conviction 25 although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. 26
The rationale is plainly evident Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good.
They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the
pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude
the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by
reason of the pardoned conviction.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities
referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed.
Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her
qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into
account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to
petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot
oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or
for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be
extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of
the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation. 27
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, 1986, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,CARPIO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - AZCUNA,TINGA,CHICO-NAZARIO,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,REYES,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.BERNARDINO gaffud, jr., Promulgated:
Accused-Appellant. September 19, 2008
x------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
For review before this Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00060 finding
the
accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. guilty of the complex crime of double murder and sentencing him to death, affirming with
modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dated August 28, 2002 in Criminal Case No. 1125.
The facts of this case were aptly summarized by the CA as follows:
Records show that accused-appellant Bernardino Gaffud, Jr., along with two John Does were indicted for Double Murder for the killing
of Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador, under the following Information:
"The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. and two (2) JOHN DOES of the crime of
DOUBLE MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about 8:00 oclock in the evening of May 10, 1994 at Sitio Biton, Barangay Wasid, Municipality of Nagtipunan, Province of
Quirino, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill and motivated by
long standing grudge, after conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, by means of fire, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, shot and burn Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador which caused their instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW." (p. 15, Records)
It appears that Manuel Salvador and his daughter Analyn Salvador were killed when the house they were staying in located at Sitio
Biton, Barangay Wasid, Nagtipunan, Quirino was burned down while they were inside. An eyewitness pointed to accused-appellant
Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. as one of the arsonists.
Upon preliminary investigation, where appellant Gaffud, Jr. failed to appear despite being subpoenaed to submit his counter-affidavit,
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ferdinand Orias resolved that charges for double murder by means of fire be filed against herein
appellant and two John Does, (p.14, Records).
When arraigned on June 6, 1995, accused-appellant Gaffud, Jr. entered a plea of Not Guilty, (p. 48, Records), paving the way for his
trial.
The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses against appellant Gaffud, Jr., namely Dominga Salvador, common-law wife of Manuel
Salvador and mother of Analyn Salvador, Orly Salvador, nephew of Manuel Salvador, Potado Ballang, Barangay Captain of Wasid,
Nagtipunan, Quirino, Dan Dangpal, a neighbor of the deceased, SPO2 Dominador Tabal, the investigating police, and Dr. Teodomiro
Hufana who conducted the autopsy on the deceased Manuel Salvador.
Evidence for the prosecution tended to prove that on the night of May 10, 1994, Orly Salvador was on his way to the house of his uncle
Manuel Salvador to fetch the latter as they were going to attend a wedding at the nearby barangay hall. He suddenly heard two
gunshots. Thereafter, he saw the house of his uncle burning. Because of the glow emanating therefrom, he saw three persons within
the vicinity of the burning house. He saw them hurriedly leaving the place towards the direction of the Cagayan river. One of the three
was holding a flashlight, whom he identified as appellant Gaffud, Jr. He could not identify the two other persons. After the house was
burned, Orly went towards the barangay hall to see if his uncle Manuel Salvador was there, but he met Brangay Captain Potado
Ballang who informed him that his uncle was not at the barangay hall. They then proceeded to the burned house, and found the charred
remains of Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador. (TSN, October 10, 1995, pp. 3-8)

Barangay Captain Potado Ballang testified that he saw appellant Gaffud, Jr. on the fateful day at around 6:30 PM, along the riverbank,
a few meters away from the house of Manuel Salvador. When Potado asked what he was doing there, Gaffud, Jr. said he was looking
for his boat. However, Potado knew that the appellant did not own a boat. After a few minutes, Potado left to attend the wedding party
being held at the barangay hall. (TSN, November 4, 1996, pp. 2-5)
Dan Dangpals testimony was dispensed with, but the defense agreed to the nature of the testimony he would have given, which tended
to show that sometime at about 8:00 PM on the fateful evening, while inside his house, he heard successive gunshots, and when he
went out of his house, he saw the deceaseds house burning about 200 meters away. He heard persons laughing and saw the light of a
flashlight and persons moving away from the burning house. He could not recognize any of them. (TSN, February 24, 1997; Exhibit "D",
p. 8, Records)
Dominga Salvadors testimony tended to show that the appellant Gaffud, Jr. was their neighbor. In the morning of May 10, 1994, she
went to the house of the appellant to see him about her husbands share in the construction of the barangay hall, which was contracted
to the appellant. Gaffud, Jr. told her that he would go to her house that afternoon to introduce his in-law Balbino Bravo to her husband.
Thereafter, she went home, and left again at around 11:00 AM, leaving behind her husband Manuel Salvador and their daughter Analyn.
Later that night, she was at Natipunan, Quirino attending a seminar for "hilot", (TSN, July 4, 1995, pp. 3-15). In her sinumpaang
salaysay, offered in evidence as Exhibit "A", Dominga also related that she had earlier filed a complaint in the barangay against the
appellant and his brother for slaughtering her pig.
SPO2 Dominador Tabal was a police investigator who investigated the killing of Manuel and Analyn Salvador. Thereat, he saw two dead
bodies hanging from a Melina tree. They were put there so that they would not be reached by the dogs. He saw that one of the victims
had a fractured head, while the other had a wound on the side. Pictures of the victims including the scene of the incident were taken by
them. Among those interviewed the appellant Gaffud, Jr. and his brother, (TSN, June 5, 1997, pp. 2-7).
Dr. Teodomiro Hufanas testimony was also dispensed with, (p. 127, Records) in view of the defense counsels admission of the
contents of his Autopsy Report on Manuel Salvador, (Exhibit "C"), which reads in pertinent part:
FINDINGS
-Cremated charcoaled, about 3 ft. long, stomach and intestine (Large) protruding from the abdomen.
-Presence of semi-burned rattan about 1 inch long about 1 cm. in diameter on the burned hand.
-Presence of a peculiar hole from the thoracic cavity directed downward to the body, probably gunshot wound.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
-CREMATION (Burned)
REMARKS: Cannot be identified if male or female
For the appellants defense, the defense presented the appellant himself. His defense of alibi was corroborated by his wife Juanita
Gaffud and in-law Balbino Bravo.
Appellant denied the accusation leveled against him, and testified that the approximate time of the burning of the victims house, he was
at home, entertaining his in-laws, Balbino Bravo and Rufina Bravo, who was there for a visit. After eating dinner, he and Balbino Bravo
talked. At around 7:00 to 8:00 PM, he and Balbino Bravo saw a blaze coming from the other side of the Cagayan River, about 50 to 80
meters away from the house of the Bravos. They did not mind the blaze, and instead went to sleep. The next morning, they heard news
about somebody being burned, and because of this, he and Balbino Bravo hiked to the place of the incident. Thats where he found that
his "pare" Manuel Salvador and his daughter were burned in their house. After seeing the dead bodies, appellant went home. He went
back later, and was even designated by the Barangay Captain to guard the bodies of the deceased. Thereafter, he was forced to
evacuate his family from Nagtipunan, because the Ilongot tribe was forcing him to testify against someone but he didnt want to. He was
told that something might happen to his family if he didnt leave, (TSN, June 3, 2002).
The appellants defense was corroborated on its material points by the testimony of his wife, Juanita Gaffud, and his in-law, Balbino
Bravo, both of whom testified that on May 10, 1994, the accused was at his residence entertaining visiting Bravo spouses and stayed
there the whole night, (TSN January 31, 2002 and March 18, 2002).
Juanita Gaffud also testified that during the pendency of the trial, she talked to Dominga Salvador about the settlement of the case and
even offered a certain amount for the said purpose, (TSN, March 10, 2002, p. 12).3
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of two (2) counts of murder, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. GUILTY for two (2) counts of murder and hereby
sentences him as follows, to wit:
a) Death penalty - for the death of Manuel Salvador;
b) Another death penalty - for the death of Analyn Salvador;
c) To pay the legal heirs of the victims:
c-1) SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) for each count or a total of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P150,000.00) as death indemnities;
c-2) FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) for each count or a total of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as
moral damages;
c-3) TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000) for each count or a total of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as exemplary
damages;
c-4) TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as nominal damages;
and
c-5) Costs.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.4
As the death penalty was imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review. In his Appellants Brief,5 accused-appellant
argued that the RTC erred in: (i) failing to rule and resolve whether or not conspiracy existed, as the information charged him with
conspiracy with two others in the commission of the crime; and (ii) convicting him despite the fact that conspiracy was not proven, and
also despite the fact that there was no proof whatsoever as to what overt act he committed which would constitute the crime of murder.
The case was transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition per Resolution6 of this Court dated August 24, 2004, in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Mateo.7 In disposing of the assigned errors, the CA held that the lack of discussion of conspiracy
among accused-appellant and his anonymous co-accused in the decision of the RTC was not antithetic to his conviction for the crime of
murder, since the charge that he was a principal performer in the killing of the victims was spelled out in the Information8 filed against
him.9 Moreover, in the absence of conspiracy, each of the malefactors is liable only for the act committed by him.10 As to the sufficiency
of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the CA held that the circumstantial evidence in this case established accused-appellants
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.11 Accordingly, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC, finding accused-appellant guilty of the complex
crime of double murder, with the following modifications:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED, although the decision of the lower court is hereby MODIFIED,
in that: The accused Bernardino Gaffud, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of the complex crime of double murder, and is hereby sentenced to
the supreme penalty of Death. He is also ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victims: (1) P100,000.00 or P50,000.00 for each victim,
as civil indemnity for the death of the victims; (2) P100,000.00 or P50,000.00 for each victim, as moral damages; and (3) P10,000.00 as
nominal damages plus costs.
SO ORDERED.12
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, the case was
elevated to this Court for review.
On the first assigned error, we concur with the CA that the failure to prove conspiracy in this case is not fatal.
The rule is that in the absence of evidence showing the direct participation of the accused in the commission of the crime, conspiracy
must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order to convict the accused.13 In the case at bar, however, we hold that the
direct participation of accused-appellant in the killing of the victims, Manuel Salvador and Analyn Salvador, was established beyond
doubt by the evidence of the prosecution. Hence, a finding of conspiracy in this instance is not essential for the conviction of accusedappellant.

On the second assigned error, we uphold the finding of both courts a quo that the evidence proffered by the prosecution, although
circumstantial in nature, leads to the conclusion that accused-appellant is the perpetrator of the act resulting in the death of the victims.
It is well-settled that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts
from which the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.14
In this case, the following facts or circumstances were proven:
(i) Accused-appellant was near the place of the incident just a few minutes before the crime was committed. Captain Potado Bollang
testified that he saw the accused-appellant at the riverbank, about 100 meters from the house of the victims, coming to and fro,
allegedly looking for his boat, when in fact, Captain Bollang knew that accused-appellant did not own one.15
(ii) Accused-appellant, together with two unidentified persons, was near the house of the victims at the time it was on fire. Accusedappellant was identified by Orly Salvador as one of the three men he saw about 5 meters from the house of his uncle, Manuel Salvador,
while it was burning. Previously, he heard two gunshots as he was on his way towards the said house. He also saw appellant fleeing
with the other malefactors, while holding a flashlight.16 His testimony was corroborated by the admitted testimony of Dan Dangpal who
said that he heard two gunshots while he was at his home, which was near that of the victims. When he went out, he also heard men
laughing, and saw them fleeing from the burning house, illumined by a flashlight.17
(iii) Accused-appellant was in a hurry to leave the place of the incident without giving any help to his kumpare Manuel Salvador and the
latters daughter, Analyn. Orly Salvador testified that he saw accused-appellant holding a flashlight, in a hurry to leave the burning
house of the victim, going towards the direction of the river.18
(iv) Accused-appellant had a motive to kill the victims because of the complaint filed by Manuel Salvadors wife, Dominga Salvador, and
the fact that he owed Manuel Salvador some money. Dominga Salvador testified that she had filed a complaint against accusedappellant and his brother in their barangay for their act of slaughtering her pig. Aside from this, in the morning of the same fateful day,
she went to the house of accused-appellant aiming to collect her husbands share in the profits for the construction of the barangay hall
they had built, but the accused-appellant only told her that he and his in-law would see her husband later that day.19
These circumstances, when taken together, are enough to produce the conclusion that accused-appellant was responsible for the
killing of the victims by means of burning them inside their house.
Moreover, we sustain the following observation of the CA that against the convincing evidence of the prosecution, accused-appellants
defense of denial and alibi must fail:
The Court finds incredible appellants story that after seeing the blaze across his house, he merely slept with his in-laws without
investigating. The Court finds it against human nature for one to sleep soundly during a fire occurring just 50-80 metes from ones
house, even though the blaze is occurring across a river. Also, appellant muse know, after seeing the location of the blaze, that the
house of his "pare", or close friend, was in danger, and his natural reaction at least was to verify the object of the conflagration.
Appellants story that he only slept soundly after seeing the blaze is therefore unbelievable, and taints the credibility of his alibi.
Another telling factor on the appellants defense is his flight. Appellant admitted that in his testimony that he fled Wasid, Nagtipunan,
Quirino after he was investigated at the Municipal Hall, (TSN, June 3, 2002, p. 19). Appellant said he fled because of threats from the
Ilongots. However, appellant said it never entered his mind to report the threats on him. Appellants explanation fails to convince. It
bears stressing that appellant fled right after being investigated and questioned by police authorities, and during the time that the
preliminary investigation of the case was ongoing. This is highly suspicious, as such time is the best time for him to defend his
innocence, if he is indeed innocent. As it is, appellant was arrested in San Vicente, Jones, Isabela, a remote barangay by the elements
of the NBI, (Id., at 23; reverse of p. 19, Records). Flight is consistently held as and indication of guilt, (People v. Magaro, 291 SCRA 601
[1998]). There is no showing why such conclusion should not be made in this case.20
We now go to whether or not accused-appellant should be held liable for two (2) separate counts of murder or for the complex crime of
double murder.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, reads:
ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied
in its maximum period.
In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as
in the conscience of the offender. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the commission of a complex crime.21

There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies. The second is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other.22
The classic example of the first of kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs
where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate
shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.23
In the landmark case People v. Guillen,24 the Court held that the single act of throwing a grenade at President Roxas resulting in the
death of another person and injuring four others produced the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murders. Under Article
248 of the RPC, murder is committed when a person is killed by means of explosion. Applying Article 48 of the RPC, the penalty for the
crime committed is death, the maximum penalty for murder, which is the graver offense.
More recently, in People v. Carpo et al.,25 we held that the single act of hurling a grenade into the bedroom of the victims causing the
death of three persons and injuries to one person constituted the complex crime of multiple murder and attempted murder. Also, in
People v. Comadre,26 we held:
The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the
accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The rationale being, that the accused who commits two
crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes are committed by different acts and several
criminal resolutions.
The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct
offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is
imposed because the offender was impelled by a "single criminal impulse" which shows his lesser degree of perversity.
In light of these precedents, we hold that the single act of accused-appellant burning the house of Manuel Salvador, with the main
objective of killing the latter and his daughter, Analyn Salvador, resulting in their deaths resulted in the complex crime of double
murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder is committed by means of fire. Since the maximum penalty imposed for murder was
death, when the case was pending in the CA, the CA correctly imposed the penalty of death for the complex crime of double murder
instead of the two death penalties imposed by the RTC for two counts of murder. In view, however, of the passage of Republic Act No.
9346 (otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines"), we reduce the penalty of death to
reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.27
Anent the award of damages, we increase the award of civil indemnity by the CA for the death of the victims from P100,000 or P50,000
for each victim, to P150,000 or P75,000 for each victim in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.28
As to the deletion of exemplary damages by the CA, we reinstate the award by the RTC of exemplary damages in the amount
of P50,000, or P25,000 for each victim.
By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance. It becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is especially sought by the
offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender's immunity from
capture.29 In this case, the RTC correctly appreciated nighttime as aggravating considering that nighttime was especially sought by
accused-appellant to carry out his evil plan. Evidence shows that accused-appellant waited for nighttime to consummate his plan. It
should be noted that accused-appellant was seen lurking near the house of the victims earlier in the evening. The fact that he brought
with him a flashlight clearly shows that he intended to commit the crime in darkness.
We sustain the award by the CA of moral damages in the amount of P100,000, or P50,000 for each victim, in view of the grief and
sorrow suffered by the heirs of the victims. We likewise affirm the award of nominal damages in the amount of P10,000 for the value of
the burned house as sufficiently explained by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM the March 31, 2005 decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00060 with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-appellant is REDUCED to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
(2) the civil indemnity for the death of the victims is increased to P150,000, or P75,000 for each victim; and
(3) accused-appellant is ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000, or P25,000 for each victim.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 118570 October 12, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BENEDICTO RAMOS y BINUYA alias "Bennie", accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC-Br. 78, Quezon City, in Crim. Case No. Q-94-58036 finding accused-appellant
BENEDICTO RAMOS y BINUYA guilty of two (2) separate heinous crimes kidnapping for ransom and murder and sentencing him to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH in each case and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 plus
P105,150.00 for funeral expenses. 1

On 13 July 1994, at about six-thirty in the morning, an American pastor named Malcolm Bradshaw was driving his car along EDSA to
take his daughter Michelle to school. At the bus stop between Corinthian Gardens and the corner to White Plains Avenue, Quezon City,
he saw a woman, later identified as the victim Alicia Abanilla, struggling to break away from the arms of a man known later to be
accused-appellant Benedicto Ramos y Binuya alias "Bennie." The woman hailed a passenger bus and then a white car to no avail.
Perhaps no one comprehended the situation she was in. Realizing that the woman was in deep trouble, Bradshaw stopped his car and
blew his horn repeatedly to attract the woman's attention. She was hysterical and Bradshaw was to her heaven-sent. She grabbed the
opportunity and ran towards Bradshaw's car and hopped in at the back seat. Unfortunately for her, Ramos caught up with her and
squeezed himself into the same car.

From EDSA Bradshaw turned right towards White Plains Avenue where he was flagged down by a traffic policeman. As Bradshaw
slowed down Ramos pulled out his gun and ordered him to go straight ahead, which the latter obeyed. As they cruised along White
Plains Avenue, Alicia handed her wallet to Michelle and asked the latter to look in there for some medicine herself. Later she took back
her wallet and tried to look for her medicine herself. As she went through the contents of her wallet a receipt fell off and landed on the
left side of Michelle. Alicia then asked the accsused, "Bennie, has Cecil had her baby?" "No," replied Ramos. "Is she having it by
caesarian?" Ramos did not answer. "Does Cecil know that you are doing this to me . . . . that you are holding me hostage?" Again
Ramos did not answer. 2

Upon reaching Katipunan Avenue in front of Blue Ridge Subdivision, Ramos told Bradshaw to stop at Rajah Matanda Street, Project 4,
Quezon City, where he got off and pulled Alicia out of the car. She clung to the shoulders of Michelle muttering, "God bless you. Pray for
me and notify my family." Then she placed her arm around Bradshaw's neck and softly whispered to him, "I will probably not get out of
this with my life. Tell my family my situation." At about ten of seven, Ramos finally succeeded in pulling Alicia out of the vehicle.

Soon after, Bradshaw discovered the receipt dropped by Alicia Abanilla which contained her name and residence telephone number.
Thus after taking his daughter to school, he proceeded to his office, called the number in the receipt and inquired about Mrs. Abanilla.
The maid informed him that Mr. and Mrs. Abanilla had already left for work at Meralco. Later that morning, at the instance of Bradshaw,
one of his employees called up a friend at Meralco to inquire about Mrs. Abanilla, and the former was told that Mrs. Abanilla was at that
time apparently being held hostage by a man who was demanding ransom for her release.

Meanwhile, at around seven-fifteen, Alicia called up her boss, Atty. Pastor del Rosario, for whom she worked as a confidential secretary
at Meralco. Atty. del Rosario was still in bed. She begged him not to ask any question but said that she needed P200,000.00 in cash
immediately, otherwise, she might not be able to go home anymore. She assured him that she had enough funds in the bank to repay
him. She then requested him to give the money to Inday, a lady messenger at Meralco, with instruction to deliver the money to her at
Glori Supermart at Sikatuna Village. Atty. del Rosario suggested that the money be delivered instead by a Meralco security personnel
but she refused, saying, "Please not security, I do not want them to know what happened to me." Towards the end of their conversation,
Alicia entreated, "Sir, you are the only one who can help me now, I cannot turn to anyone else. Please help me. " 3

Del Rosario hurriedly gathered P200,000.00 in cash, placed the money in a white envelope and tucked it in a plastic bag. He then
ordered his driver, Serrano Padua, to fetch Inday from Meralco. When Inday arrived, Del Rosario gave her the money and told his
driver to take her to Mrs. Abanilla at Glori Supermart with specific instruction to give the money to no one else but Mrs. Abanilla. 4

At around seven-thirty, a taxi cab driven by Antonio Pineda passed by. Ramos and Mrs. Abanilla boarded the cab and took the back
seat. They proceeded towards Anonas Extension in Sikatuna Village near Glori Supermart. Ramos instructed Pineda to park his taxi in
front of the supermarket as they had to wait for someone. For P700.00 Pineda agreed to wait for them so he could take them later to
Norzagaray, Bulacan.

Driver Serrano Padua and Inday finally arrived at their rendezvous. Pineda, who was requested by Alicia to receive the money,
approached them and asked about the package for Mrs. Abanilla. However, Inday refused to give the money saying that she was
instructed to deliver it only to Mrs. Abanilla. Pineda went back to the taxi and informed his passengers of Inday's refusal. Mrs. Abanilla
gave her identification card to Pineda and told him to ask Inday to face the taxi and show herself through the window. Pineda went back
to Inday, gave Mrs. Abanilla's ID and asked her to approach the taxi to see Mrs. Abanilla. Inday recognized Alicia so the former handed
the money to Pineda. Thereupon, Ramos told Pineda, "Tara, deretso tayo sa Norzagaray."

On the way to Norzagaray travelling along Commonwealth Avenue, Ramos suddenly changed his mind and decided to head for
Bocaue, Bulacan, instead. During the entire trip, Pineda noticed Alicia looking very pale, fidgety and apparently perturbed.

Upon arriving in Bocaue, they went straight to the St. Paul Hospital compound where they parked. Pineda and Ramos got off to relieve
themselves by a fence. Pineda noticed a revolver tucked in Ramos' waist. Afterwards, Ramos told Pineda to leave the taxi for a while
as he was going to discuss something with his companion. Obviously, he was interested in counting the money in the plastic bag. As
Pineda waited for his passengers to call him, he observed that his woman passenger kept opening and closing the rear door of his taxi
as if trying to get out.

Pineda became uneasy. He slowly inched himself towards his taxi. There he saw Ramos strangling his woman companion. So he told
Ramos, "Boss, iba na yata iyang ginagawa mo ah, baka mapadamay ako diyan!" He boarded his taxi and asked his passengers to
transfer to another vehicle as he did not want to get involved in what was going on. But Mrs. Abanilla pleaded, "Mama, huwag mo
akong iiwanan dito dahil papatayin ako ng lalaking ito. May kapatid ka din na babae." Ramos retorted, "Hoy! pati iyong isip ng driver
nililito mo." Then he ordered Pineda to take them back to MacArthur Highway where they would take another ride.

As Pineda drove out cf the hospital compound, Mrs. Abanilla panicked and held him by the shoulder pleading, "Huwag mo akong
iiwanan dito." When Pineda reached MacArthur Highway near Sto.

Nio Academy in Bocaue he saw a traffic aide, Gil Domanais, who was directing traffic. He, had a gun on his waist. Upon seeing the
armed traffic aide, Pineda stopped his cab, got of: and told Domanais that his male passenger had been strangling his female
companion. He also narrated that his passengers, who had been with him since morning, refused to get off his cab and he had not yet
been paid by them. Domanais suggested to him to bring his passengers to the police station.

Domanais peeped through the window of the taxi and saw Ramos with his left arm around the shoulders of Alicia. She was crying. She
told Domanais that Ramos was armed with a revolver and was hurting her. At that moment Ramos pulled out his gun prompting
Domanais and Pineda to run away and take cover. Ramos then transferred to the driver's seat and drove the cab away. In a desperate
effort to free herself, Alicia opened the left rear door and jumped out of the cab; unfortunately, her blouse was caught in the process. As
a consequence, she was dragged by the vehicle. Ramos suddenly stopped the taxi, and as Alicia attempted to rise, he aimed his gun at
the back of his hapless victim, fired at her twice, hitting her just above her nape. Domanais, who was armed with a .38 caliber pistol and
witnessing the shooting, fired at Ramos; but he missed him. Then he called for police assistance as Ramos fled on foot.

On the same day, responding elements of the Bocaue Police Station apprehended Ramos in a grassy area at the Violeta Metroville
Subdivision. The police connfiscated his .22 caliber Smith and Wesson Magnum with four (4) live ammunitions and two (2) spent shells,
and recovered a bag containing P138,630.00 consisting of P1,000.00 and P500.00 bills.

Mrs. Abanilla's body was left at the scene of the shooting, lying face down parallel to the taxi. Dr. Benito B. Caballero, Medico-Legal
Officer of the Province of Bulacan, conducted the autopsy and testified that the cause of death was "shock due to massive external. . .
intracranial. . . . hemorrhage due to gunshot wound in the head penetrating the skull and the brain tissues." 5

Thereafter an Information was filed against Benedicto Ramos y Binuya alias "Benni" charging him with the complex crime of kidnapping
for ransom with murder, to which he pleaded not guilty. To expedite the proceedings, the prosecution and the defense agreed during the
pre-trial that the testimony of their witnesses would be in the form of affidavits which would be the bases for the cross-examination. Trial
on the merits than ensued.

For his part, Ramos denied having kidnapped and killed the victim. In his Sinumpaang Salaysay 6 he narrated his versio of the incident.

3.
Na, ang bintang sa akin na "kidnapping for ransom with murder' ay walang katotohanan sapagkat ang totoo ay ang mga
sumusunod: a. Ang yumaong si Alicia Abanilla ay aking ninang sa kasal noong ikinasal kami ng aking asawang si Cecillia Pascual
noong 17 October 1993 sa Sta. Rita Parish Church, Quezon City. Bago ako at ang aking asawa ikasal sa nabanggkit na simbahan ay
kasal na kami sa isang civil marriage noong June 30, 1993 sa City Hall ng Maynila . . . d. Na, dahilan sa wala akong hanapbuhay mula
ng ako'y tanggalin sa Meralco, ako'y nagsabi sa aking ninang Alice na ako ay paluwagan ng kaunting halaga ng pera dahil sa ang
aking asawa ay manganganak at wala akong panggastos. Ang una kong sabi sa kanya ay noong unang linggo ng Hulyo, 1994 sa
pamamagitan ng telepono sa Meralco. Ang sabi niya sa akin huwag akong mag-alala pagkat tutulong siya sa akin kapag manganganak
na ang aking asawa. Ngunit pinagbawalan niya akong magpunta sa kanilang bahay o kaya sa kanyang opisina, kaya sa telepono
lamang kami nag-uusap . . . g. Sapagkat ako'y ayaw papuntahin ng aking ninang Alice sa kanyang at sa kanyang opisina, at ang sabi
niya ay abangan mo na lamang siya sa EDSA kanto ng White Plains, ang ginawa ko siya sa kanyang rota patungo sa kanyang opisina.
Ng kami ay magkita sa EDSA sa may kantong patungong White Plains, sinabi ko agad sa kanya na kailangan ko na 'yong ipinangako
niyang tulong para sa aking asawa. Ang sabi niya sa akin bukas na raw niya ibibigay at doon din sa lugar na iyon kami magkita. Hindi
ako pumayag at doon kami nagtalo, pagkat sabi ko sa kanya pupunta ng ospital ang asawa ko at ngayon din kailangan ko ng pera.
Habang kami nagtatalo, may dumating na sasakyang Toyota Corolla Station Wagon na ang driver ay Amerikano at pinara ng ninang
Alice ko at hinintuan kami ng kano na napag-alaman ko nitong bandang huli na si Malcolm Bradshaw, at isinakay si ninang Alice at
sumakay na rin ako . . . . j. Ng kami ay dumating sa St. Paul Hospital Bocaue, napag-alaman kong wala doon ang asawa ko, kaya't sabi
ko kay ninang Alice tutuloy kami sa Norzagaray, sa bahay ng aking biyenan at baka nandoon pa si Cecil. Ayaw ng sumama ni ninang
Alice sa Norzagaray dahil nahihiya daw siya sa biyenan ko, kaya't kami nagtalo. Gusto kong makumbinsi si ninang Alice na sumama sa
Norzagaray kaya pinakiusapan ko ang driver ng taxi na lumayo muna sandali pagkat may pag-uusapan kami ng ninang Alice at
sumunod naman ang driver na lumayo sa taxi . . . . k. Sinabi ko kay ninang Alice na kailangan sumama siya sa akin sa Norzagaray at
siya ang magbigay ng pera kay Cecil upang malaman ni Cecil na ang pera ay galing sa kanya. Ito sa dahilan na kung ako ang
magbibigay ng pera sa asawa ko, baka itong si Cecil ay magduda na masama ang pinanggalingan ng pera at matakot, at magkaroon
ng shock at duguin. Ang aking pangamba na baka magduda si Cecil na ang pera ay galing sa masamang paraan ay dahil sa ako nga
ay napagbintangan na nagpalsifica ng tseke ni Atty. del Rosario at yun din ang dahilan ng aking pagkakatanggal sa trabaho ko sa
Meralco . . . . 1. Hindi kami nagkasundo ng ninang ko at maya-maya dumating na ang driver at nagyaya na dahil gutom na raw siya.
Pumayag ako na lumakad na ang taxi at ang plano ko ay ituturo ko sa driver ang daan patungo sa Norzagaray, ngunit pagdating sa
MacArthur Highway, hininto ng driver ang taxi sa kanang parte ng Highway patungong Maynila at bumaba ang driver at kinausap yung
traffic aide na may baril at nakatayo sa tabi ng highway. Hindi ko narinig kung ano ang sinabi ng driver sa traffic aide ngunit ng
makapagusap na sila, ang traffic aide ay lumapit sa taxi na para bagang magiimbestiga. Ng sumilip ang traffic aide sa bintana ng taxi
sa tapat ng driver na noon ay nakabukas, sinabi ng ninang Alice na may baril ang kasama ko. Ang traffic aide ay natakot at biglang
lumayo at kumuber sa tabi ng pader at ang driver naman ay tumakbong palayo. Ang ginawa ko ay lumipat ako sa lugar ng driver at ang
plano ko ay ako na ang magmamaneho patungong Norzagaray pagkat ang driver tumakbo na at nangagamba ako na baka kung ano
na ang nangyayari kay Cecil at wala sa ospital . . . . m. Ng lumakad na ang taxi, si ninang Alice na noon ay nakaupo pa rin sa likuran ng
driver seat, biglang tumayo at dinampot ang baril na dala ko na noon ay nasa tabi ko sa upuan ng driver at biglang binuksan ang
kaliwang pinto sa hulihan at bababa ngunit nahawakan ko ang damit niya ng aking kaliwang kamay pagkat nakahawak sa manibela
ang kanang kamay ko at siya ay hindi nakababa agad. Sa aming pagbubuno pagkat hinihila ko siya na mapaupo muli at siya naman ay
pilit na bumababa, pumutok ang hawak niyang baril ng dalawang beses. Maya-maya may pumutok na isa at biglang tumumba si
ninang Alice at bumagsak sa kalsada na ang ulo ay patungo din sa direksyon ng taxi . . . . n. Ng makita ko si ninang Alice na bumagsak
sa kalsada, bigla akong bumaba at dinampot ko yung baril na noon ay nabitiwan na ni ninang Alice at dinampot ko rin ang bag ng
ninang ko at tumakbo akong papalayo pagkat naalala ko yung traffic aide na nakakuber sa tabi ng pader na noon ay malapit pa sa taxi.

After trial, the court a quo convicted Ramos of two (2) separate crimes kidnapping for ransom and murder instead of the complex
crime charged in the Information. It held that there was no proof that the victim was kidnapped for the purpose of killing her so as to
make the offense a complex crime. Thus, the killing of the victim was found to be merely an afterthought making accused-appellant
liable for two (2) separate offenses.

In this petition, accused-appellant imputes to the trial court the following errors: First, the lower court erred in concluding that his guilt
was proved beyond reasonable doubt; Second, the lower court erred in disregarding vital pieces of evidence in his favor; and, Third, the
lower court erred in finding him guilty of the crimes of kidnapping for ransom and murder.

Specifically, accused-appellant argues that kidnapping was never sufficiently established. He maintains that all throughout the incident
the victim was not under detention at any moment nor was she deprived in any manner of her liberty; that if there was some kind of
pressure or force employed upon the victim, such pressure or force did not amount to a deprivation of liberty but was merely a matter of
persuasion that moved the victim to go with him voluntarily.

We resolve. The essence of the crime of kidnapping as defined and penalized under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Sec. 8 of RA No. 7659, 7 is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty coupled with an indubitable proof of intent on the part of the
malefactor to effect such restraint on the offended party' liberty. The term "actual deprivation of liberty" consists not only of placing a
person in an enclosure but also of detaining a person or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. 8

In the instant case, actual restraint of the victim's liberty was evident from the moment she was forcibly prevented by accused-appellant
from going to work at Meralco and taken instead against her will to Bulacan. Her freedom of movement was effectively restricted by her
abductor who, armed with a .22 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver which instilled fear in her, compelled her to go with him to Bulacan.
This is clear from the testimonies of witnesses Bradshaw and Pineda, thus

Bradshaw:

4.
On 13 July 1994, at around 6:30 a.m., I was driving from my home in Wilson St. to the Marcos Highway, to bring my seventeen
(17) year old daughter, Michelle, to school. I was driving a 1981 Toyota Corolla station wagon, with plate no. PAZ 395. Between the
gate of Corinthian Village and the right turn towards White Plains Avenue, at the bus stop, I saw a lady, struggling and breaking away
from an unidentified male (the "male").

xxx

xxx

xxx

25.
The male got down and started to pull out the lady from the car. The lady held on to my daughter and in a quiet voice,
whispered to her, "God bless you, please tell my family my situation." The male kept trying to pull her out. As she was about to be pulled
out of the car, she then held on to me with her right arm and in a quiet voice, whispered to me, I will probably not get out of this with my
life. Tell my family my situation." I asked her, "How can we? We don't even know your name." 9

Pineda:

Q54:

Habang nasa biyahe kayo ay wala ka bang nakitang takot o tanda ng pangamba sa panig ng babae?

S:
takot.

Meron po. Pag tumitingin ako sa rear view mirror ko ay napapansin kong maputlang-maputla yung babae na parang takot na

xxx

xxx

Q56:

Pag nagsasalita ba yung babae ay may napapansin ka bang nerbiyos so boses niya?

xxx

S:

Meron ho.

xxx

xxx

Q71:

Pagkatapos ay ano ang sumunod na pangyayari?

xxx

S:
Noong naiinip na ako bumalik na ako sa dalawa at nagtanog ako ng ganito "ano ba boos?" ang sagot sa akin ng lalaki ay
bigyan ko uli sila ng fifteen minute na pag-uusap. Ang ginawa ko ay lumayo uli at nakipagkuwentuhan sa isang driver na gumagawa ng
pintuan ng kaniyang kotse. Pagkatapos tinanong ko ang kakuwentuhan ko kung anong oras na at ang sabi ay 12:45 p.m. na raw kaya
inip na inip na ako. Paglingon ko sa taxi ay napansin kong bukas-sara iyong pintuan sa side ng babae at sa wari ko ay parang gustong
bumaba ng taxi, maya-maya ay napansin kong sakal-sakal na noong lalake iyong babae.

Q72:

Ano ang ginawa mo pagkatapos mong makita na sinasakal iyong babae?

S:
Lumapit po ako at sinabi ko sa lalake na "Boss, iba na yata iyang ginagawa mo ah, baka mapadamay ako diyan." Pagkasabi
ko ay binitiwan noong lalake iyong babate na parang gustong palabasin parang walang nangyari. Pumasok ako sa taxi ko at sinabi ko
sa lalake na "lumipat na lang kayo ng sasakyan baka mapadamay pa ako diyan." Ang sabi sa akin ng babae "Mama, mo akong iiwanan
dito, dahil papatayin ako ng lalaking ito. May kapatid ka din na babae. " . . . At habang inilalabas ko ang taxi ay nagpapanic na ang
babae at kumakapit na sa kaliwang balikat ko at umiiyak na nagsasabing "huwag mo akong iiwan dito" . . . 10

From the narration of facts by the prosecution witnesses we note that on at least three (3) occasions the victim tried, albeit
unsuccessfully, to get away from appellant: the first attempt was at EDSA when she struggled to free herself from his clutches and
hailed a bus and a white car but without success, and later, when she jumped into the car of Bradshaw to escape; the second was at
St. Paul Hospital, Bocaue, when witness Pineda noticed from a distance the rear door of his taxi being repeatedly opened and closed
by his woman passenger as if trying to get out; and, finally, at MacArthur Highway when the victim jumped out of the taxicab but her
blouse was caught at the rear door (although appellant claims he grabbed her blouse and forced her back into the cab 11). It was
during this final attempt to free herself that she was gunned down from behind by accused-appellant in cold blood. If there really was no
restraint on her person, as appellant insists, there would have been no reason for her to attempt to escape.

Furthermore, from her statements to witnesses Bradshaw, Del Rosario and Pineda, the victim clearly hinted at her abduction and the
imminent threat on her life. She whispered to Bradshaw, "I will probably not get out of this with my life. Tell my family my situation." To
Atty. Del Rosario she said, "I need P200,000.00 in cash immediately, otherwise I might not be able to go home anymore; Sir, you are
the only one who can help me now, I cannot turn to anyone else. Please help me." And, to witness Pineda, "Mama, huwag mo akong
iiwanan dito dahil papatayin ako ng lalaking ito. May kapatid ka din na babae."

It may be observed at this juncture that the victim kept on repeating she was going to die. She even exclaimed to Pineda that she would
be killed by accused-appellant. One thing is certain from those statements of the victim, i.e., that she was virtually at the mercy of her
tormentor who at that moment was already in complete and effective control of her.

The claim of the defense that the force or pressure employed against the victim was in fact merely a matter of persuasion and not
constitutive of restraint on the victim's liberty, taxes credulity. Definitely, the acts of forcibly pulling the victim out of the car of witness
Bradshaw, strangling her while inside the taxi of Pineda, pulling her back into the cab when she attempted to flee, and eventually
shooting the victim twice in the head and hitting her, can hardly be considered as "merely a matter of persuasion." On the contrary,
these circumstances are positive indications of the victim's detention by appellant against her will.

The victim might have carried occasional conversations with the accused, but this fact did not negate the existence of kidnapping.
Evidently, that was just the victim's way of mentally and emotionally coping with the harrowing and dangerous situation she was in. After
all, appellant was not a total stranger to her, she being a principal sponsor at his wedding. She had to start a conversation not only to
calm herself down but also to appease her captor.

For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. It is
enough that, as in the instant case, she was in any manner deprived of her liberty, unable to move and get out as she pleased. 12

Accused-appellant next contends that there was no proof he demanded or received money from anybody, since it was the victim herself
who asked money from Atty. Del Rosario, and her statement that "she needed P200,000.00 immediately, otherwise, she might not be
able to go home anymore," does not suggest that someone was demanding money from her or that she was being kidnapped; that if
his intention was to kidnap the victim for the purpose of extorting ransom, then he could have just left the victim and brought the money
with him; that, in fact, when the victim gave the money to him after it was delivered to her by Pineda who received it in turn from Inday,
he (appellant) just dropped the money on the floor of the taxi and it was the victim who picked it up and placed it in her bag.

The arguments are as puerile as they are untenable. The statement of the victim that "she needed P200,000.00 immediately otherwise
she might not be able to go home anymore," should not be interpreted in isolation. Rather, its true meaning should be ascertained in the
light of all the surrounding circumstances. When the victim called up Atty. Del Rosario, she was already being held hostage against her
will by the accused who; armed and violent, had no qualms in maltreating his Ninang and subsequently shooting her twice and killing
her.

By his own admission, accused-appellant really did ask for money from the victim although he tried to impress upon the trial court that it
was merely a loan. Consider the following statement of accused-appellant

. . . sinabi ko agad sa kanya na kailangnn ko na 'yong pinangako niyang tulong para sa aking asawa. Ang sabi niya sa akin bukas na
raw niya ibibigay at doon din sa lugar na iyon kami magkita. Hindi ako pumayag at doon kami nagtalo, pagkat sabi ko so kanya
pupunta ng ospital ang asawa ko at ngayon din kailangan ko ng pera. 13

The tenor of the foregoing statement unmistakably shows that accused-appellant was not merely borrowing but was actually
demanding money from the victim, reminding her of her supposed promise to lend him money for his wife's delivery. Common
experience tells us that when borrowing money, persuasion is used, for debt implies a favor, a request. Thus, the words of accusedappellant "hindi ako pumayang," "doon kami nagtalo," and "ngayon din kailangan ko ng pera," are inconsistent with his excuse that he
was just borrowing money from the victim.

Moreover, while the records do not disclose that accused-appellant specified the exact amount he needed, the victim was nevertheless
explicit in her plea to Atty. Del Rosario to procure for her P200,000.00 in cash immediately. The nagging questions are: Why
P200,000.00? Why not just, say, P50,000.00 or even P100,000.00, which was more than enough to cover the hospitalization expenses
of appellant's wife? Why "loan" a hefty sum to a person who had been out of work for quite sometime due to a previous misconduct
likewise involving money, and whose capacity to pay was doubtful?

Nonetheless, the explanation of the accused that what happened was just a simple case of borrowing money coupled with a request
that the victim accompany him to Bulacan so his wife would believe the money was really borrowed and did not come from an illegal
source, was too lame and anemic, and disproved by subsequent events. Indeed, it hardly conforms to human nature that after appellant
was loaned a considerable amount he would suddenly turn vicious toward his own benefactress, strangle her and shoot her to death for
no sane reason than that she refused to go with him to Bulacan.

From all indications, therefore, no other logical meaning can be ascribed to the victim's statement to Atty. Del Rosario than that the
money was intended as ransom, i.e., as consideration for her release from captivity.

While it may be true that it was the victim, not accused-appellant, who made the call and asked for the money, it must be stressed
nonetheless that actual demand for ransom by the accused from the relatives or friends of the victim is not necessary, much less
essential, as the demand may be made directly on the victim herself. This convenient method commonly resorted to by kidnappers,
more often, proves to be very effective not only in compelling the relatives and friends of victims to pay ransom but also in concealing
the identities of the malefactors.

The fact also that the money was delivered to and received by the victim personally did not make it any less a ransom prize. After it was
handed to the victim, she gave it to accused-appellant, who was seated beside her at the back seat of the taxi. Clearly, accusedappellant, who was in total control of the situation, obtained actual and constructive possession of the ransom money when it was
delivered to the victim. 14

On his conviction for murder, accused-appellant points out contradictions in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Antonio Pineda
and Gil Domanais concerning their positive identification of appellant as the one who shot the victim. According to accused-appellant,
Antonio Pineda testified on direct examination thus

Q:
Sinabi mo kanina na nakita mong binaril ng dalawang beses sa ulo yung sakay mong babae noong kasama niyang lalaki,
nakita mo ba ito?

A:

Oo, po. 15

And on cross-examination Pineda testified

Q:

But you did not see the person who fired the shots?

A:

No, sir.

Q:

And you ran away, is that correct?

A:

Yes, sir. 16

The same witness also gave two (2) places of his birth, namely, tubo sa Baclaran and tubong Bisaya (taga Antique ang ama at Bicol
ang ina)

T:

Ano ang iyong tunay na pangalan, edad, tirahan at ibang bagay hinggil sa iyong pagkatao?

S:
Antonio Pineda Jr. y, Lirio, 22 taong gulang, binata, tubo sa Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila at nakatira/stay-in taxi driver
sa No. 65 Matahimik St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City, at ang aking mga magulang ay may permanent address sa Block F-28, Lot 9,
CDC 12 Area D, Barangay San Nicolas, Dasmarias, Cavite. 17

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q:

Pakisabi ang iyong buong pangalan at iba pang mga bagay-bagay na maaaring mapagkakilalan sa iyo?

S:
Ako po si Antonio Pineda Jr. y Lirio, 22 taong gulang, binata, tubong Bisaya (taga Antique ang ama at Bicol ang ina) at stay-in
taxi driver sa No. 65 Matahimik St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City, at ang aking mga magulang ay may permanent address sa Block F28, Lot 9, CDC 12 Area D, Barangay San Nicolas, Dasmarias,

Cavite. 18

Moreover, according to appellant, Pineda gave two (2) different versions as to who caused the taxi to stop at MacArthur Highway

S:
. . . Tuloy-tuloy po ako ng pagtakbo ko at pagdating ko sa kanto ng MacArthur Highway na malapit sa Petron station at Sto.
Nio Academy ay may nakita akong traffic aide na nakauniporme ng khaki at may sukbit na baril. Ang ginawa ko ay bigla akong
nagpreno sa tabi sabay labas ng taxi at nilapitan ko iyong traffic aide. 19

T:

Ano ang ginawa ninyo sa Highway kung mayroon?

A:

Pinatigil po ni Bennie yung taksi at nagtalo silang dalawa ng biktima. 20

On the part of witness Gil Domanais, appellant draws our attention to the witness' statement to the police that appellant shot the victim
twice in the head, while on cross-examination the same witness declared

Q:

But since you are (sic) at the back, your position was at the back of the taxi, you did not know who fired the gun, is that right?

A:

I know, sir.

Q:

Why do you say you know?

A:

Because the shots came from inside the taxi, sir.

Q:

But you did not know who actually fired the shots?

A:

I'm very sure that it was the suspect who fired the gun, sir.

Court:

Did you see the suspect fire the gun?

A:

I saw it sir.

Q:

But you did not hit him because actually you cannot (sic) see him when you fired your gun, is that correct?

A:

I saw him and it was the upper shoulder that was showing, sir. 21

Accused-appellant stresses that witness Domanais was merely presuming it was accused-appellant who fired at the victim. Thus,
insofar as the murder is concerned, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt.

We disagree. The shooting of the victim took place in the presence of and within the auditory perception of witness Pineda who was just
ten (10) meters away from the scene. He heard the shots from the taxi whose lone occupant at that time was accused-appellant. In
addition, witness Pineda explained that he earlier saw appellant attempting to kill the victim by strangulation; thus, he concluded, and
rightly so, that it was appellant who shot the victim to death.

With respect to Pineda's supposed inconsistent statements on where he was born, this was sufficiently explained by him during his
cross-examination

Q:
Mr. Pineda, you gave your statement to the police on July 13, at about 11:40 in the evening, and you were asked about your
name and other personal circumstances. Your answer is (sic) You are Antonio Pineda, tubo sa Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila.
Now in your second statement given to Atty. Abad on the 26th of July, you were asked the same question and you answered you are
(sic) Antonio Pineda, tubong Bisaya. Now will you explain to us why in your first statement you said that you are (sic) tubong Paraaque
and then in your second statement, you are (sic) tubong Bisaya, which is correct?

A:

My father is a Visayan and my mother is a Bicolana and I was born here in Manila, sir.

Q:

In other words, you were not born in the Visayas?

A:

No sir. 22

By saying therefore that he was "tubong Bisaya" despite the fact that he was born in Manila, Pineda was merely disclosing his Visayan
origin on his father's side.

The other alleged inconsistencies in Pineda's sworn statements as to who caused the cab to stop along the highway refer to
minor details which cannot impair his credibility. On the contrary, such consistencies even guarantee that his testimony was not a
product of perjury. 23 As succinctly observed by the trial court

. . . although the testimonies of the two (2) prosecution witnesses, namely, Antonio Pineda, driver of the taxi cab wherein accused and
the victim rode from Quezon City up to Bocaue, Bulacan, and Gil Domanais, the traffic aide, contained minor inconsistencies, the same
even bolstered their credibility showing that their testimonies were unrehearsed. So, also, prosecution witnesses testified in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner. 24

As for the allegation that Domanais was merely presuming it was accused-appellant who fired at the victim, suffice it to state that
Domanais categorically testified that it was accused-appellant who shot the victim in the head. On cross-examination, he gave a
detailed account of how the shooting took place

Q:

But since you are (sic) at the back, your position was at the back of the taxi, you did not know who fired the gun, is that right?

A:

I know, sir.

Q:

Why do you say you know?

A:

Because the shots came from inside the taxi cab, sir.

Q:

But you did not actually saw (sic) who fired the shots?

A:

I'm very sure that it was the suspect who fired the gun, sir.

Court:

Did you see the suspect fire the gun?

A:

I saw it, sir.

Court:

Where were you?

A:

I was on the side of the taxi, sir.

Court:

I thought you ran and took cover on the wall.

A:

The wall where I hid was only low, sir, that is why when I stood up, I could easily see, sir. 25

As can be seen from the foregoing dialogue, the trial court clarified the matter with witness Domanais who positively identified accusedappellant as the assailant. Moreover, in his sworn statement Domanais categorically stated

. . . . Sakay po siya ng isang taxi at siya po ay tumalon ngunit nakawit po sa pinto ang damit niya kaya po siya nakaladkad ng taxi ng
kaunti at ng ihinto po ng suspect ang taxi dahilan po sa bago nangyari ito ay tumakbo po ang driver ng taxi ay dinukwang na lang po ng
suspect ang biktima at binaril nga po ng dalawang beses sa ulo. 26

The suggestion that it was witness Domanais' shot which hit the victim is belied by the evidence. The medico-legal officer who
autopsied the victim testified that the entry wound at the back of the victim's head measured 0.75 centimeters and that based on the
character of the wound the bullet causing it was fired from a .22 caliber gun similar to that confiscated from accused-appellant.
Therefore, the fatal shot could not have come from witness Domanais' .38 caliber pistol. 27 Moreover, witness Domanais affirmed that it
was only after he saw accused-appellant shot the victim twice in the head that he opened fire at accused-appellant.

The rule in this jurisdiction on the matter of credibility of witnesses is well-settled. Unless there is a showing that the trial court had
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the
case, the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses while testifying and was in a better position to gauge their credibility and appreciate properly the relative weight of the
often conflicting evidence for both parties. 28

In the present case, we find no cogent reason to overrule the judgment of the trial court giving credence to the declarations of
prosecution witnesses Pineda and Domanais who positively identified accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Moreover, the
accused anchored his defense on bare denial. Certainly, this negative assertion cannot prevail over the unimpeached testimony of the
prosecution witnesses describing in sufficient detail how accused-appellant shot the victim. In the face of the clear and positive
declaration of witnesses, the defense of denial hardly assumes probative value and goes even farther down the drain in the absence of
any evidence of ill motives on the part of the witnesses to impute so grave a wrong against accused-appellant. 29

Thus when accused-appellant suddenly, unexpectedly and without warning, shot the victim from behind twice after the latter failed in
her attempt to escape but was dragged instead by the cab where she was held captive, and while in a pitiable state of utter
helplessness, the crime committed cannot be any less than murder qualified by treachery.

Considering the evidence extant on record, we agree with the trial court that victim Alicia Abanilla was indeed kidnapped for ransom and
then murdered by accused-appellant. But the kidnapping for ransom and murder should not be treated as separate crimes for which
two (2) death penalties must as a consequence be imposed. Instead, under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
No. 7659, accused-appellant should be convicted of the special complex crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER and
impose upon him the maximum penalty of DEATH.

Prior to 31 December 1993, the date of effectivity of RA No. 7659, the rule was that where the kidnapped victim was subsequently killed
by his abductor, the crime committed would either be a complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of The Revised Penal
Code, 30 or two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder. Thus, where the accused kidnapped the victim for the purpose of killing
him, and he was in fact killed by his abductor, the crime committed was the complex crime of kidnapping with murder under Art. 48 of
The Revised Penal Code, as the kidnapping of the victim was a necessary means of committing the murder. 31 On the other hand,

where the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of killing him but was subsequently slain as an afterthought, two (2) separate
crimes of kidnapping and murder were
committed. 32

However, RA No. 7659 amended Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code by adding thereto a last paragraph which provides

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed.

This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of "special complex crime" of kidnapping with murder or homicide. It
effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely
sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought.
Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor
be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by
RA No. 7659.

Obviously, the instant case falls within the purview of the aforequoted provision of Art. 267, as amended. Although the crime of
kidnapping for ransom was already consummated with the mere demand by the accused for ransom even before the ransom was
delivered the deprivation of liberty of the victim persisted and continued to persist until such time that she was killed by accusedappellant while trying to escape. Hence, the death of the victim may be considered "a consequence of the kidnapping for ransom."

Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People v. Echegaray 33
that RA No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the penalty of DEATH is unconstitutional, nevertheless, accede to the ruling of the Court, by a
majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant BENEDICTO RAMOS y BINUYA alias "BENNIE" is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH MURDER under Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by
RA No. 7659, and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH. Accused-appellant is ORDERED to indemnify the
heirs of victim Alicia Abanilla in the amount of P50,000.00 plus P105,150.00 for burial expenses.
Conformably with Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code as amended by Sec. 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the
records of the case be forwarded forthwith to the President of the Philippines for the exercise at his discretion of his power to pardon
the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-8922-24

February 28, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORENTINO ENGUERO, JOSE TARIMAN, NAZARIO NARVARTE and DIONISIO BUENO, defendant-appellants.
Manuel Bilog for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for appellee.

PADILLA, J.:

Florentino Enguero, Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte and Dionisio Bueno were charged with the crime of robbery in band in three
separate informations and after a joint trial the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur found them guilty as charged and sentenced
them as follows:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 2714, Florentino Enguero is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty which shall not be less than 8 years
and 21 days of prison mayor nor more than 14 years, 10 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal; Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte
and Dionisio Bueno each to suffer an indeterminate penalty which shall not be less than 4 years and 2 months of prison correccional
nor more than 8 years and 21 days of prison mayor; and all of them to indemnify Florentina Ogarte de Binaday in the amount of P36.75
and to pay the costs;

(b) In Criminal Case No. 2715, Florentino Enguero is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty which shall not be less than 8 years
and 21 days of prisons mayor nor more than 14 years, 10 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal; Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte
and Dionisio Bueno each to suffer an indeterminate penalty which shall not be less than 4 years and 2 months of prison correccional or
more than 8 years and 21 days of prison mayor; and all of them to indemnity Creseciano Magistrado and Juan Margarte in the amount
of P38.88 and P17.80 respectively, and to pay the cost; and

(c) In Criminal Case No. 2716, Florentino Enguero is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty which shall not be less than 8 years
and 21 days of prison mayor nor more than 14 years, 10 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal; Jose Tariman, Nazario Narvarte
and Dionisio Bueno each to suffer an indeterminate penalty which shall not be less than 4 years and 2 months of prison correccional
nor more than 8 years and 21 days of prison mayor; and all of them to indemnify Anatolia Bragais in the amount of P3 and to pay the
cost. In the three cases, they shall not suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency on account of the nature of the principal
penalty.

The one bottle of Siutong wine, Exh. B, shall be returned to Cresenciano Magistrado; the pair of red leather shoes; Exh. H; the Jacket,
Exh. G; the blue pant, Exh. H; and the hammer, Exh. I to Anatolia Bragais; and the birthstone ring, Exh. E, to Juan Margarte. The
balisong, Exh. M, and the bolo, Exh. C, and its scabbard Exh. C-1, are confiscated. The Pistol, Cal. 45, W/SM-394701, by decision of
this court in Criminal Case No. 2729, is already confiscated. The gray skin suit marked Exhs. K and K-1; the pair of tennis shoes Exh.
D; the raincoat, Exh. L; and the flashlight, Exh. N, shall be refused to Florentino Enguero. The towel, Exh. O; the skin pant Exh. P; and
the pair of shoes, black and white, Exh. Q, shall be returned to Nazario Narvarte.

They appealed. Jose Tariman withdrew his appeal. As no question of fact is raised, the only error assigned to have been committed by
the trial court being the conviction and sentence of the defendants for three robberies in band instead of only one, the Court of Appeals
certified the appeal to this Court.

The trial court found the following:

At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 9, 1952 the four defendants met at Yabo River, Lupi, Camarines Sur, after Florentino
Enguero had previously provided himself with a pistol. From the river they went to the house of Enguero where they took their supper.
After eating Enguero issued to Nazario Narvarte a bolo, to Jose Tariman a balisong and to Dionisio Bueno, a piece of hardwood, while
he himself had the pistol. Thus armed sagan, Lupi, but before reaching the barrio itself, they passed at the house of Teodulo Banta
where Enguero ordered him and his brother-in-law, Francisco Bugagao, at the point of his pistol to guide them to the barrio. At the
instance of Eugenio, their hands were tied behind their backs. With the two as guides, the group proceeded towards the barrio, and on
the way they met Pedro Bragais by the stairs of his house. Pointing his pistol at him, Enguero had his hands tied behind his back and
ordered him to go with them. They continued on their way and later they met again one Ernesto Belgado whose hands they also tied
behind his back. They took him along with them too. They arrived in the barrio at about 8:00 in the evening and went directly to the
store of Cresenciano Magistrado which adjoins his house. They made the four tied men sit on the ground in front of the store guarded
by Narvarte who had the bolo in his hand, while Enguero entered the store. Pointing his pistol at Magistrado, Enguero demanded
money from him. Fearing for his life, Magistrado ordered his wife who was in the house to give their money to them. Enguero, Bueno
and Tariman then went up the house and took P4.80 from Magistrado's wife. And upon finding Juan Margarte, the barrio school teacher
who was lodging with the Magistrados, in one of the rooms of the house, Bueno, who had the open balisong in his hand brought him
down to the ground and there tied his hands behind his back. Upon seeing a birthstone ring in Margarte's finger, Bueno forcibly took it
away from him. After a while Enguero and Tariman went down to the store and told Magistrado to give them wine which they drank.
After drinking Enguero took the goods displayed in the store and passed them on to Bueno and Tariman who piled them on the ground
in front of the store. The goods consisted of one dozen bottles of Coca-Cola worth P1,20; one dozen cans of Sardines worth P7.20; one
dozen bottles of wine, Hoctung, worth P3; one dozen Sardine at P4.80; one dozen bottles Pomade worth P4.80; two pairs of gold earrings worth P10; one dozen cartons Purico, valued at P3; and one package of Matches worth P0.33. The total value of these articles
together with the sum of P4.80 taken from the wife of Magistrado amounts to P39.13. The defendants also carried away the following
articles belonging to Juan Margate; one birthstone ring worth P70; one pair of tennis shoes worth P5.50; one pair of sock worth P2; one
cake of soap worth P.30; a medal and a crucifix worth P10, all with total value of P87.80.

After having committed the acts narrated above and when it was about 10:00 in the evening, the four defendants, together with
Magistrado, Margate whose hands were still tied behind his back and the four other tied individuals, all of whom they forced to go with
them, went to the nearby house of Victorino Togno about 14 meters from the house of Magistrado (See Exh. R). Upon arriving
Florentino Enguero, Jose Tariman and Clementino Carulla (this last one was originally accused with the four defendants, but the case
against him was later dismissed upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal) went up the house. while their abovenamed companions
remained on the ground guarded by Bueno and Narvarte. Anatolia Bragais, wife of Victorino Togno, and her son were in the house.
Pointing at the neck of Anatolia a sharp instrument, Enguero demanded money from her. Carulla opened a trunk and took P3 from it.
Enguero asked Anatolia where she kept the rest of her money, and to make her reveal it, he threatened to cut her throat with the sharp
instrument. She told him that she had no other money. However, Enguero took and carried away from her house a pair of shoes worth
P18, a jacket worth P12, a blue pant worth P12 and a hammer. These articles including the P3 in cash have a total value of P45. Then
they left the house.

After committing the acts mentioned in the next proceeding paragraph, the four accused and Carulla, together with Magistrado,
Margate and the four tied men whom they again forced to go with them, proceeded to the house of Florentina Ogarte, wife of Ireneo
Binday, located about 54 meters from the house of Cresenciano Magistrado (See sketch, Exh. R). The time was about 11:00 o'clock in
the evening. Upon arriving Enguero and Carulla went up the house while, Tariman, Narvate and Bueno again stood as guard on the
ground. Enguero pointed his pistol at Florentina and ordered her to produce her money and jewels. She replied that she had none; but
Enguero nonetheless searched her waistline. Not having found anything, he began to hold her private parts, but she begged for pity
and said they could get instead the goods in her store. Enguero left her and took from the store 2 dozen cans of Sardine worth P8.20;
15 tins of Salmon worth P11.15; 14 tins of tinapa worth P4.20; 2 dozen bottles of Hoctung wine worth P8.40 besides money amounting
to P4.80. He threw the goods to his co-defendants on the ground through the door. The value of the goods and money taken makes a
total of P36.75. Enguero and Carulla then asked Florentina to provide them with empty sacks which she did. Bueno, Tariman and
Narvarte gathered the goods and put them inside the sacks. They then left the house after cautioning Florentina not to report them to
the authorities.

From this last house the four defendants, together with those whom they forced to follow them, returned to the store of Magistrado.
Upon arriving they gathered the other stolen goods and put them inside the sacks. Then they looked for some one who could carry
goods for them. They found Glicerio Buensalida and Absalon Medrano, after which they untied the hands of Margate, Bragais, Belgado,
Banta and Bugagao. After warning them out to report to the authorities, the four defendants left and went away with the stolen goods
carried by Buensalida and Medrano.

After a few days the defendants were apprehended pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by the Justice of the Peace Court of Lupi on
July 16, 1952. After their arrest Enguero and Tariman were investigated by Capt. Dominador M. Gutierrez of the 1st Camarines Sur PC
Company, and Narvarte and Bueno by First Lieut. Jaope Nobleza of the same company. The investigation was made in question and
answer from and reduced to writing which later was subscribed and sworn to by the defendants before Mamerto M. Bonot, Justice of
the Peace of Lupi. Exhibit S is the sworn statement of Enguero, Exhibit T of Bueno, Exhibit U of Narvarte and Exhibit V of Tariman. In
there exhibits the four accused have admitted and confessed among other statements, their respective participation in the three
different robberies, pointing to the investigators the whereabouts of some of the stolen articles.

Following the lead in the written confessions Sgt. Fernando Narvaes took the defendants to their respective houses on July 22, 1952
and recovered from them some of the goods and arms used during the robberies. From Florentino Enguero the following were
recovered:

1 suit, skin, gray, Exhibits K and K-1

1 bottle of Siu Tung wine, Exhibit B
1 pair of Tennis shoes (Elpo), Exhibit D
1 raincoat, rubber, used during the robbery, Exhibit L
1 Knife (balisong) used during the robbery, Exhibit M
1 flashlight used during the robbery, Exhibit N
1 Pistol, Cal. 45 W/SN-394701 with one magazine and one ammunition used during the robbery.

From Nazario Narvarte, the following were recovered:

1 towel (white), Exhibit O

1 pant skin (Ceniza), Exhibit T
1 pair shoes, black and white, Exhibit Q
1 hammer (Steel) Exhibit I.

From Dionisio Bueno, the following were recovered:

1 ring, birthstone, Exhibit E.

1 pant skin (blue), Exhibit H
1 jacket, skin, light green, Exhibit G.
One pair of leather shoes (Red), Exhibit F, was recovered from Jose Tariman.

The above articles are listed in an inventory, Exhibit J, prepared by Sgt. Narvaez, in which all the four defendants certified that the
goods were taken from their custody. As evidence of this fact, each and everyone of them signed Exhibit J below the articles recovered
respectively from them (Exhibits J-1, J-2, J-3 and J-4).

Counsel de oficio argues that the appellants are guilty of one crime only citing in support of his contention the case of People vs. de
Leon, 49 Phil., 437. The contention is without merit. In the case cited by counsel the defendant entered the yard of a house where he
found two fighting this case, after committing the first crime of robbery in band the appellants went to another house where they

committed the second and after committing it they proceeded to another house where they committed the third. Obviously, the rule in
the case cited cannot be invoked and applied to the present.

The crime committed is robbery in band punished in articles 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 18, in connection with article 295 of the same Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 373, with prison correccional in its
maximum period to prison mayor in its medium period. As the robbery was committed in band, the penalty to be imposed is the
maximum period of the proper penalty, which is prison mayor in its medium period, or from 3 years and 1 day to 10 years. The second
paragraph of article 295 of the Revised Penal Code which impose the penalty next higher in degree upon the leader of the band has
been left out by Republic Act No. 373, amending further article 295 of the Revised Penal Code.

Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed upon each of the appellants is the next lower to that prescribed
by the Revised Penal Code for the offense, or 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, as minimum, and 8 years and 1 day of prison
mayor, as maximum, in each of the three crimes committed, and the accessories of the law.

Modified as to the penalty to be imposed upon each of the three appellants, the rest of the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with
proportionate costs in each case against the appellants.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.