2015 SUPPLEMENTAL PRE-WEEK REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER

JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
1. Performance of duty of police - Although an officer in making a lawful arrest
is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the
offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and
protect himself from bodily harm, yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force
or in treating him wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the
arrest could be effected otherwise (People vs. Oanis and Galanta, G.R. No. 47722, July
27, 1943). A peace officer is never justified in using necessary force in effecting arrest
or in treating with wanton violence the arrested person or in resorting to dangerous
means when the arrest could be effected otherwise ( Galang vs. CA and People, G.R. NO. 128536,
January 31, 2000). Performance of duty of a custodian - Custodian could only fire at

prisoners in self-defense or if absolutely necessary to avoid his escape (People

vs. Lagata, G.R. No. L-1940-42, March 24, 1949).
2. If the offender and victim were living in the same dwelling, the former could
not have transgressed the sanctity of privacy due to the dwelling by committing a
crime therein. The right of privacy in the dwelling can only be invoked against those,
who are not living therein (People vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. 148991, Jan. 21, 2004, En
Banc). However, two rooms in a house separately rented by the offender and the victim
are considered as separate dwellings (U.S. vs. Co, G.R. No. 3418, March 8, 1907;
Santiago, G.R. No. 147314, Feb. 6, 2004, En Banc).
In adultery, if all parties (husband, unfaithful wife and her paramour) are living
in the same house, disregard of dwelling shall not be appreciated (US vs. Destrito, 23
Phil. 28). Offenders could not have transgressed the sanctity of privacy due to the
dwelling since they and the victim were living therein. But abuse of confidence may be
appreciated if the offenders took advantage of the trust reposed on them by the victim
(US vs. Barbicho, 13 Phil. 616). If the paramour is living in a different house, and
adultery is committed in the conjugal house, disregard of dwelling is appreciable not
only against the paramour but the wife as well because both of them violated the
respect due to the conjugal home (US vs. Ibaez and Manalili, G.R. NO. 10672
October 26, 1915).

3. Confession to lesser offense If the crime charged is murder, but the

crime proven is homicide, the plea to a lesser offense of homicide constitutes a
mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession because it is not the fault of
the accused that the prosecution erroneously alleged a qualifying circumstance
in the information without supporting evidence (P eople vs. Yturriaga, G.R. No. L2816, May 31, 1950). If the crime charged and proven is murder, the plea to a
lesser offense of homicide does not constitute a mitigating circumstance since
the confession does not pertain to the crime proven ( People vs. Dawaton, G.R. No.
146247, September 17, 2002, En Banc).
4. The attack is continuous if there is neither break in the continuity of the
aggression nor intervention of any factor, which materially changes the conditions of
the aggression; there must be no appreciable time intervening between the first attack
and the final fatal attack (People vs. Quiban, G.R. No. L-57809-10, August 28, 1984;
U.S. vs. Elicanal, G.R. No. 11439, October 28, 1916). If the attack is continuous, it is
not material whether the fatal wound was inflicted at the initial or last stage of the
assault. If the attack is continuous, treachery is appreciable as long as same is
present at the beginning of the attack even though the fatal wound was inflicted at the
last stage thereof (Castillo vs. Torrempo and People, G.R. No. 139033, December 18,
2002). If the attack is not continuous, the same may be broken into two independent
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2015 SUPPLEMENTAL PRE-WEEK REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
phases. If fatal wound was inflicted at the second phase, and treachery is present at
that phase, treachery will be appreciated (US vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385). If fatal wound
was inflicted at the second phase, but treachery is present at first phase, treachery
will not be appreciated (People vs. Geneblazo, G.R. No. 133580, July 20, 2001).
5. It is not necessary that the principal should be first declared guilty before an
accessory can be made liable as such (People vs. Billon, [C.A.] 48 O.G. 1391). One can
be held liable as an accessory even if the principal was not convicted because (1) he is
at large (People vs. Inovera, 65 O.G. 3168); (2) he was not identified; (3) he died; or (4)
he was acquitted due to technicality (Vino vs. People, G.R. No. 84163, October 19,
1989) The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory
are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly
established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or
accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal (People vs. Bayabos, G.R.
No. 171222, February 18, 2015).
The English text of Article 19 of RPC, which provides whenever the author of
the crime is guilty of treason x x x., is an inaccurate translation of the Spanish text.
Settled is the rule that the Spanish text prevail over the English text (People vs.
Billon).
6. Concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments
thereof to prevent its discovery, which will make one liable as an accessory, is not just
a mere omission to report the crime to police authorities but it involves a positive act
of destroying or concealing the corpus delict such as burning the dead body of a
murdered victim or throwing it into the river (People vs. Devaras, G.R. Nos. 10093839, December 15, 1993) or enjoining a witness not to reveal what he knew about the
crime (People vs. Talingdan, G.R. No. L-32126, July 6, 1978, En Banc).
7. A with intent to steel money open the safe of his company, but the same is
empty. A is liable for impossible crime. But if there is a P20 bill inside the safe, and
yet A did not take it, impossible crime is not committed since it is not inherently
impossible to commit theft. Neither attempted theft is committed since he
spontaneously desisted from taking the P20 bill. In attempted crime, the offender fails
to perform all acts of execution due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous
desistance. If there is a used check inside the safe, and A took the same, the crime
committed is consummated theft. Even if A cannot encash the used check, he is
liable for theft for taking the property with intent to gain. Actual gain is not an element
of this crime. Taking property without consent gives rise to the presumption of intent
to gain.
8. Under the Revised Penal Code, corporation cannot commit a crime because:
(1) intentional felony is committed with malice; an artificial and juristic person cannot
act with the mens rea which is essential for criminal liability; culpable felony is
committed by means of culpa. Artificial person cannot act with negligence (Reyes); (2)
the law prescribed that for the commission of crime the penalty consisting of
imprisonment and other deprivation of liberty such as destierro, which can only be
executed by a natural person.
If a corporation violated a law with penal provision, the following shall be liable
for the crime committed, (1) the officers and employees of the corporation, who actively
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2015 SUPPLEMENTAL PRE-WEEK REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
and consciously participated in the commission of corporate acts, which constitute the
crime; and (2) the officers specified by law as criminally liable for corporate acts
(People vs. Corpuz, G.R. No. 148198, October 1, 2003.
8. Failure to have duly forthcoming the property upon demand by duly
authorized officer is prima facie evidence that he puts such missing funds or property
to personal use (Article 217 of RPC). However, immediately refunding the missing
money upon demand will negate the presumption (US vs. Feliciano, 15 Phil. 149). 8.
Restitution of fund is a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary surrender if it
was immediately and voluntarily made before the case was instituted (Navarro vs.
Meneses III, CBD Adm. Case No. 313, January 30, 1998, En Banc);
9. The period of prescription for violation of RA No. 3019 is fifteen (15) years
(Section 11) while that of plunder under RA 7080 is twenty (20) years (Section 6). The
right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees through corruption or plunder, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel (Section 15 of
Article XI of the Constitution; Section 6 of RA No. 7080),
10. The provisions on imposition of penalties under RPC are applicable to the
crime of plunder. RA No. 7080 adopted the technical nomenclature of the penalty of
RPC. Moreover, Section 2 of RA N. 7080 expressly states that the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as
provided by RPC, shall be considered by the court. Thus, one who profited from the
proceeds of plunder can be held liable as an accessory provided that he is aware that
the principal committed plunder.
11. If the check is unfunded, stealing the check and presenting the same for
payment with the bank is impossible crime (Jacinto vs. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13,
2009). If the check is funded, stealing the check and presenting the same for payment

with the bank is not impossible crime. Even if the accused failed to encash the same
due to external cause such as apprehension by police or stop payment, he will be held
liable for consummated theft. In theft, taking or gaining possession of property with
intent to appropriate and gain consummates the crime. Actual gain is not an element
of this crime. Thus, failure to gain will not prevent the consummation of the crime
(See: People vs. Seranilla, G.R. No. L-54090, May 9, 1988);
11. Lending weapon such a gun to a killer for purpose of killing a specific
person such as Pedro is an act of accessory. But if the killer used the weapon in killing
a different person such as Juan, the lender is not liable as an accessory. To be held
liable as an accessory, it is important that that he knows and concurs in the criminal
design of the principal and participates after the commission of the crime by
supplying moral or material aid in an efficacious way. In this case, the lender
concurred in the killing of Pedro but not Juan. Hence, he is not liable as an accessory.
If the killer used another weapon such as knife instead of the gun borrowed in killing
Pedro, the lender is not liable as an accessory. Although the lender concurred in the
killing of Pedro, he did not supply the killer material or moral aid in an efficacious way
since the weapon used is not the one borrowed from him.
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2015 SUPPLEMENTAL PRE-WEEK REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
12. Destierro prescribed for death under exceptional circumstance is not a
penalty but a measure designed to protect accused from acts of reprisal principally by
relatives of victim (People vs Araquel, 57 O.G. 6229; People vs. Lauron, 57 O.G. 7367).
In People vs. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, September 14, 1987, the SC did not consider
death

under

exceptional

circumstance

as

an

intentional

felony

within

the

contemplation of Article 4 of RPC. According the SC, Article 4 presupposes that the act
done

amounts

to

felony. If

the

act

constitutes

death

under

exceptional

circumstances, and not murder, the accused cannot be held liable on the basis of
Article 4.
13. Plaintiff gave money to the judge, who in consideration thereof subsequently
rendered an unjust decision in favor of the former. The judge is liable of direct bribery
and rendering unjust decision, while the plaintiff is liable of corruption of public
officer. But if the plaintiff gave money to the judge, who subsequently rendered a
decision against the former, the crime committed by the judge is indirect bribery while
the plaintiff is liable of corruption of public officer. The judge is not liable of direct
bribery since rendering a decision against the corruptor indicates that the former did
not receive the money in consideration of rendering a decision in favour of the latter. It
seems that the plaintiff merely gave the money to the judge by reason of his position
as such.

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