G.R. No.

L-52304 January 28, 1980

RAMON B. CENIZA, FEDERICO C. CABILAO, JR., NELSON J. ROSAL
and
ALEJANDRO
R.
ALINSUG,petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

The City of Baguio, because of its special functions as the

summer capital of the Philippines, shall be classified as a
highly urbanized city irrespective of its income.
The registered voters of a component city may be entitled to
vote in the election of the officials of the province of which
that city is a component, if its charter so provides. However,
voters registered in a highly urbanized city, as hereinabove
defined shall not participate nor vote in the election of the
officials of the province in which the highly urbanized city is
geographically located.

Petition for prohibition and mandamus moth a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction.

To implement this Act, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC, for short)

adopted Resolution No. 1421, which reads as follows:

On December 22. 1979, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg.
51 providing for local elections on January 30, 1980. Section of the statute
provides:

WHEREAS, Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 in calling for the

election of the provincial governor, provincial vice-governor
and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in each
province classified the chartered cities of the Philippines into
"highly urbanized" and "component" cities based on the
annual regular income of each city, and provided that "the
registered voter of a component city may be entitled to vote
in the election of the officials of the province of which that
city is a component, if its charter provides", but that "voters
registered in a highly urbanized city, shall not participate nor
vote in the election of the officials of the province in which
the highly urbanized city is geographically located";

SEC. 3. Cities. There shall be in each city such elective

local officials as provided in their respective charters,
including the city mayor, the city vice-mayor, and the elective
members of the sangguniang panglungsod, all of whom
shall' be elected by the qualified voters in the city. In addition
thereto, there shall be appointive sangguniang panglungsod
members consisting of the of the city association of
barangay councils, the President of the city federation of the
kabataang barangay, and one representative each from the
agricultural and industrial labor sectors who shall be
appointed by the President (Prime Minister) whenever, as de
by the sangguniang panglungsod, said sectors are of
sufficient number in the city to warrant representation.
Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and
component cities in accordance with the standards
established in the Local Government Code as provided for in
Article XI, Section 4(1) of the Constitution. any city now
existing with an annual regular derived from infrastructure
and general funds of not less than forty million pesos
(P40,000,000.00) at the time of the approval of this Act shag
be classified as a highly urbanized city. All other cities shall
be considered components of the provinces where they are
geographically located.

WHEREAS, inasmuch as the charters of the different cities

vary with respect to the right of their registered voters to vote
for the provincial officials of the provinces where they are
located, there is need to study the various charters of the
cities and determine what cities shall and shall not vote for
provincial officials pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 51;
WHEREAS, the voters in the cities should be accordingly
informed if they are going to vote for provincial officials or
not, for their proper guidance;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections, by virtue
of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the 1978
Election Code and Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 (51)
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that the qualified
voters in each city shall or shall not be entitled to vote for the

provincial officials of the province

geographically located, to wit:

where

they

are

A. Cities not entitled to participate in the

election of pro- provincial officials
1. Baguio

11. Mandaue

2. Bais

12. Manila

3. Canlaon

13. Naga

4. Caloocan

14. Ormoc

5. Cebu

15. Oroquieta

6. Cotabato

16. Ozamis

7. Dagupan

17. Pasay

8. Davao

18. Quezon

9. General Santos
(Pangasinan)
10. Iloilo

19.

San

Carlos

20. Zamboanga

Because the City of Cebu has an income of P51,603,147,64, it is classified

as a highly urbanized city and the voters thereof cannot take part in the
election of the elective provincial officials of the province of Cebu, although
the Charter of Cebu City 1 allows the qualified voters of the city to vote in the
election of the provincial officials of the Province of Cebu.
The City of Mandaue, not having an annual regular income of not less than ?
40 million, is classified as a component city. But the registered voters of the
city cannot vote for the provincial elective officials because its
Charter 2 expressly provides that the registered voters of the city cannot
participate in the election of the provincial officials of the Province of Cebu,
except to be a candidate therefor.
The petitioners filed the instant suit as taxpayers and registered voters in the
Cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They are members of a civic and non-partisan
group known as D-O-E-R-S (an accronym for "DEMOCRACY OR

EXTINCTION: RESOLVED TO SUCCEED) which counts lawyers among its

members, and extends free legal assistance to citizens regardless of
economic and social status in meritorious cases involving violation of civil
liberties and basic human rights. They vigorously assail Section 3 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 51, which uses the annual income of a given city as the basis
for classification of whether or not a particular city is a highly urbanized city
whose voters may not participate in the election of provincial officials of the
province where the city is geographically located; and Republic Act No. 5519,
otherwise known as the Charter of Mandaue City, which went into effect
without the benefit of ratification by the residents of Mandaue in a plebiscite
or referendum. They pray that upon filing of the instant petition, a restraining
order be issued "temporarily prohibiting the holding of election for Provincial
Governor and other elective provincial officials in the province where the 18
cities listed by the respondent COMELEC are located, particularly Cebu City
and Mandaue City, and temporarily prohibiting the National Treasurer to
release public funds and the COA to pass in audit said funds in connection
with and for the purpose of holding local elections in said provinces; and after
hearing, to make the injunction permanent declaring unconstitutional and
therefore void Section 96, Art. XVIII of the Charter of Mandaue, otherwise
known as RA 5519," and should the stopping of the provincial elections in the
provinces concerned be not possible, the respondent COMELEC be directed
"to allow the qualified registered voters in the cities listed by said respondent,
particularly Cebu City and Mandaue City, to participate in the election of, and
vote for, the Provincial Governor and other elective provincial officials and
preparing the corresponding official ballots for this purpose which shall
provide spaces therein for Provincial Governor and other elective provincial
officials of the provinces concerned, particularly the province of Cebu."
The petitioners contend that "Section 3 of Batas Blg. 885 3 insofar as it
classifies cities including Cebu city as highly urbanized as the only basis for
not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and
palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on
substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect
provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore
such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection."
We find no merit in the petition. The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards
the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, it is stated that "The state shall guarantee and
promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the barrio, to
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities." 4 To this end,
the Constitution directs the National Assembly to "enact a local government
code which may not thereafter be amended except by the majority vote of all
its members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government
structure with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different
local governments their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and

providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers,
functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of local government units," 5 and empowered
local government units "to create its own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes, subject to limitations as may be provided by law." 6 Art. XI, Section
4(1) of the said Constitution places highly urbanized cities outside the
supervisory power of the province where they are geographically located.
This is as it should be because of the complex and varied problems in a
highly urbanized city due to a bigger population and greater economic activity
which require greater autonomy.
Corollary to independence however, is the concomitant loss of the right to
participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective
provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any
governmental jurisdiction and authority over said city. Thus, in the case
of Teves vs. Commission on Election 7 this Court, in holding that the
registered voters of the City of Dumaguete cannot vote for the provincial
officials of Negros Oriental because the charter of the city does not expressly
allow the voters in the city to do so, ruled:
The creation of Dumaguete City has made it a political entity
separate from and independent of the province of Negros
Oriental. The purpose of an election is to enable the
electorate to choose the men that will run their government,
whether national, provincial, municipal or city. It so, no useful
end will be served by allowing in the absence of express
legislative preference the voters of a city to ceased to
have any governmental jurisdiction and authority over said
city.
To confirm our view that the city of Dumaguete has been
segregated from the province of Oriental Negros for
purposes of provincial elections, we should point to the
penultimate section of the charter providing that "until
otherwise provided by law, the City of Dumaguete shall
continue as part of the first representative district of the
Province of Oriental Negros." This is an express exception to
the general effect of separation an exception that serves
to reiterate or even establish the rule. In other words, the
Congress meant that the inhabitants of the city may not vote
for provincial officials, but may vote for their representative in
Congress.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities
on the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial
distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of

existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic,

and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic
or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it
is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued
support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued
participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some
instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied
equal protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are
allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The
practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial
officials and denying the same privilege to voters in another component city
is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor
the voter's right of suffrage. In the case of Teves v. Commission on
Election 8 the Court said.
Petitioners' contention is that, as the Charter of Dumaguete
City is silent as to the right of its qualified voters to
participate in the election of provincial officials of Negros
Oriental and as said voters are residents of the province,
they are clearly entitled to vote for said provincial officials.
The charters of other recently formed cities are articulate on
the matter. Thus, in the case of Bacolod, Cabanatuan
Legaspi Naga, and Ormoc, their charters expressly prohibit
the residents therein from voting for provincial officials of the
province to which said cities formerly belonged. Upon the
other hand, the charters of Cagayan de Oro, Butuan, Cavite,
Iloilo, Calbayog Lipa San Pablo, and Dagupan contain
provisions extending their part in the election of the
provincial official cities were previously included.
The question that presents itself has reference to the effect
of the omission in the charter of Dumaguete City of an
express provision on the right of its residents to vote for
provincial officials of Negros Oriental, in the light of the
legislative practice that, when desired, the right is either
recognized or withdrawn expressly. We are inclined to
overrule petitioners' position.
The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of
similar rights and privileges granted by law. It would have been discriminatory
and a denial of the equal protection of the law if the statute prohibited an

individual or group of voters in the city from voting for provincial officials while
granting it to another individual or groups of voters in the same city.
Neither can it be considered an infringement upon the petitioners' rights of
suffrage since the Constitution confers no right to a voter in a city to vote for
the provincial officials of the province where the city is located. Their right is
limited to the right to vote for elective city officials in local elections which the
questioned statues neither withdraw nor restrict.
The petitioners further claim that to prohibit the voters in a city from voting for
elective provincial officials would impose a substantial requirement on the
exercise of suffrage and would violate the sanctity of the ballot, contrary to
the provisions of Art. VI, Section 1 of the Constitution. The prohibition
contemplated in the Constitution, however, has reference to such
requirements, as the Virginia poll tax, invalidated in Harper vs. Virginia Board
of Elections, 9or the New York requirement that to be eligible to vote in a
school district, one must be a parent of a child enrolled in a local public
school, nullified in Kramer vs. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621,
which impose burdens on the right of suffrage without achieving permissible
estate objectives. In this particular case, no such burdens are imposed upon
the voters of the cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They are free to exercise their
rights without any other requirement, save that of being registered voters in
the cities where they reside and the sanctity of their ballot is maintained.
It is also contended that the prohibition would subvert the principle of
republicanism as it would deprive a citizen his right to participate in the
conduct of the affairs of the government unit through the exercise of his right
of suffrage. It has been pointed out, however, that the provincial government
has no governmental supervision over highly urbanized cities. These cities
are independent of the province in the administration of their affairs. Such
being the case, it is but just and proper to limit the selection and election of
the provincial officials to the voters of the province whose interests are vitally
affected and exclude therefrom the voters of highly urbanized cities.
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for
not having been ratified by the residents of the city in a plebiscite. This
contention is untenable. The Constitutional requirement that the creation,
division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city,
municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected 10 is a new
requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is
prospective 11 in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City
of Mandaue which came into existence on June 21, 1969.

Finally, the petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were
behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of
Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and
historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716
registered voters in the province, 234,582 are from Cebu City and 44,358
come from Mandaue City, so that 278,940 electors, or close to one-third (1/3)
of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial
officials of the province of Cebu. Such charge has no factual and legal basis.
"Gerrymandering" is a "term employed to describe an apportionment of
representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the
party in power. 12 The questioned statutes in this particular case do not
apportion representative districts. The said representative districts remain the
same. Nor has it been shown that there is an unfair advantage in favor of the
candidates of the party in power. As the Solicitor General pointed out, it may
even be that the majority of the city voters are supporters of the
administration candidates, so that the enactment of the questioned statutes
will work to their disadvantage.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D.
GABRIEL,
and
ROBERTO
R.
TOBIAS,
JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM
MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein
petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise
known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon.
Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this
legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No.
7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.

Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is

that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI,
Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject
law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division
of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate
districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the
subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law.
Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the
title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and
(4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:

Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on

April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they
approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite
was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes"
whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was
deemed ratified and in effect.

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675,
specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being
violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in this section.

Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:

As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative
district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections
after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of
San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with
its first representative to be elected at the same election.

Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has
resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives
beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore,
petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census
showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population
requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of
preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant
to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.

The contentions are devoid of merit.

Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General
that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with
a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains
compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3),
Constitution).

Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that

the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong
is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the
subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and
logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the
title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong
Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and
contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of
a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the
constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1)
"should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further
elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).

Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the

effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the
same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said
Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of
Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate
legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from
the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the
enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the
number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the
applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the
present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly
provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable
import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may
be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.
Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A.
No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify
to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the
right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument
borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was
Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed
law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on
a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present
further arguments against the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to
participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change
in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal
subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only

ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded
from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of
neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in
"gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor
a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo
Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the
former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both
localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency
has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered
as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 169588

October 7, 2013

JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION represented by its

manager and authorized representative Norma Tan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., Presiding Judge of The Municipal
Trial Court Branch 3, Baguio City, BENEDICTO BALAJADIA, EDWIN
ANG, "JOHN DOES" and "PETER DOES" Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
We are asked to rule on this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, praying that the assailed Decision of Branch 7 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City and Order dated August 15, 2005 be
reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 be ordered
reinstated and prosecuted before the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City.
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking
operator duly authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in
Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under
Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by
placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. 1
According to the Resolution of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, San
Fernando City, La Union, the facts leading to the filing of the Informations are
the following:
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell), thru [sic] its General
Manager Norma Tan and Jadewell personnel Januario S. Ulpindo and
Renato B. Dulay alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003, the
respondents in I.S No. 2003-1996 Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John
Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp attached to the left front
wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin
Ang. Accordingly, the car was then illegally parked and left unattended at a
Loading and Unloading Zone. The value of the clamp belonging to Jadewell
which was allegedly forcibly removed with a piece of metal is P26,250.00.
The fines of P500.00 for illegal parking and the declamping fee of P500.00
were also not paid by the respondents herein.

In I.S. No., 2003-1997, Jadewell thru [sic] its General Manager Norina C.
Tan, Renato B. Dulay and Ringo Sacliwan alleged in their affidavit-complaint
that on May 7, 2003, along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, herein
respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan and two (2) John Does
forcibly removed the clamp on the wheel of a Nissan Cefiro car with Plate
No. UTD 933, belonging to Jeffrey Walan which was then considered illegally
parked for failure to pay the prescribed parking fee. Such car was earlier
rendered immobile by such clamp by Jadewell personnel. After forcibly
removing the clamp, respondents took and carried it away depriving its
owner, Jadewell, its use and value which is P26,250.00. According to
complainants, the fine of P500.00 and the declamping fee ofP500.00 were
not paid by the respondents.2
The incident resulted in two cases filed by petitioner and respondents against
each other. Petitioner Jadewell filed two cases against respondents: Robbery
under I.S. Nos. 2003-1996 and 2003-1997. Petitioner filed an AffidavitComplaint against respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and
three (3) John Does, one of whom was eventually identified as respondent
Ramon Ang. The Affidavit-Complaint was filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003. 3 A preliminary investigation took
place on May 28, 2003. Respondent Benedicto Balajadia likewise filed a
case charging Jadewell president, Rogelio Tan, and four (4) of Jadewell's
employees with Usurpation of Authority/Grave Coercion in I.S. No. 20031935.
In his Counter-affidavit for the two cases he filed for himself and on behalf of
his co-respondents, respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was
parked illegally. He admitted that he removed the clamp restricting the wheel
of his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the wheel of the
vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not
to steal it but to remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family
could continue using the car. He also confirmed that he had the clamp with
him, and he intended to use it as a piece of evidence to support the
Complaint he filed against Jadewell.4
In the Resolution5 of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando
City, La Union, Acting City Prosecutor Mario Anacleto Banez found probable
cause to file a case of Usurpation of Authority against the petitioner.
Regarding the case of Robbery against respondents, Prosecutor Banez
stated that:
We find no probable cause to charge respondents in these two (2) cases for
the felony of Robbery. The elements of Robbery, specifically the intent to gain

and force upon things are absent in the instant cases, thereby negating the
existence of the crime.
xxxx
We, however, respectfully submit that the acts of respondents in removing
the wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in these cases and their
failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City
Ordinance No. 003-2000 which prescribes fines and penalties for violations
of the provisions of such ordinance. Certainly, they should not have put the
law into their own hands. (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is probable cause against all the
respondents, except Jeffrey Walan or Joseph Walan (who has been dragged
into this controversy only by virtue of the fact that he was still the registered
owner of the Nissan Cefiro car) for violation of Section 21 of City Ord. No.
003-2000 in both cases and we hereby file the corresponding informations
against them in Court.6

Balajadia and the other accused through their counsel Paterno Aquino filed a
January 20, 2004 Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation 8 on February 2,
2004. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the
two Informations on the following grounds: extinguishment of criminal action
or liability due to prescription; failure of the Information to state facts that
charged an offense; and the imposition of charges on respondents with more
than one offense.
In their Motion to Quash, respondents argued that:
1. The accused in this case are charged with violation of Baguio City
Ordinance No. 003-2000.
2. Article 89 of the Revised Penal [sic] provides that criminal liability
is totally extinguished by prescription of the crime.
3. Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1.
x x x Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribed
[sic] after two months."

Prosecutor Banez issued this Resolution on July 25, 2003.

On October 2, 2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the Municipal
Trial Court of Baguio City dated July 25, 2003, stating:
That on May 17, 2003 at Baguio City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with unity of action and
concerted design, did then and there, with unity of action and concerted
design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously forcibly dismantled [sic] and took
[sic] an immobilizing clamp then attached to the left front wheel of a
Mitsubishi Adventure vehicle with Plate No. WRK 624 belonging to Edwin
Ang which was earlier rendered immobilized by such clamp by Jadewell
Personnel's for violation of the Baguio City ordinance No. 003-2600 to the
damage and prejudice of private complainant Jadewell Parking System
Corporation (Jadewell) which owns such clamp worth P26,250.00 and other
consequential damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW,
San Fernando City, La Union for Baguio City, this 25th day of July 2003. 7
The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 with
the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3. Respondent Benedicto

4. As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was

committed on May 7, 2003. 5. As can be seen from the right hand
corner of the Information, the latter was filed with this Honorable
Court on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged
commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the
accused in this case, if any, was already extinguished by prescription
when the Information was filed.9
In an Order10 dated February 10, 2004, respondent Judge Nelson F. Lidua,
Sr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3,
granted the accused's Motion to Quash and dismissed the cases.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 27, 2004
responding to the February 10, 2004 Order 11 to argue among other points
that:
6.b. For another, the offenses charged have not yet prescribed. Under the
law, the period of prescription of offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of
the complaint or information. While it may be true that the Informations in
these cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the private
complainant has, however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well
within the prescribed period.12

Respondents filed their Opposition13 on March 24, 2004, and petitioner filed a
Reply14 on April 1, 2004.

prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise provided in special

laws."17

The respondent judge released a Resolution15 dated April 16, 2004 upholding
the Order granting respondents' Motion to Quash. The Resolution held that:

Petitioner contended further that:

For the guidance of the parties, the Court will make an extended resolution
on one of the ground [sic] for the motion to quash, which is that the criminal
action has been extinguished on grounds of prescription.
These offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure being
alleged violations of City Ordinances.
Under Section 9 of the Rule [sic] on Summary Procedure, the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and
not on any date before that (Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342, July 3,
1992, En Banc).
In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as the special law
prevails over Sec. 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and also
Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure must yield to Act No. 3326 or
"AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS
PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO
PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN" (Ibid).
Petitioner then filed a Petition 16 for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City. The case was raffled to Branch 7 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City. Petitioners contended that the respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 on the
ground of prescription. Petitioners argued that the respondent judge ruled
erroneously saying that the prescriptive period for the offenses charged
against the private respondents was halted by the filing of the
Complaint/Information in court and not when the Affidavit-Complaints were
filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. Petitioner cited
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure:
x x x "criminal actions shall be instituted x x x in x x x other chartered cities,
the complaint shall be filed with the office of the prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charter" and the last paragraph thereof states that "the
institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of

the filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information before this Honorable
Court, is the reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action
in these cases had prescribed.
xxxx
The offenses charged in Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935 are covered
by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, not by the old Rules on
Summary Procedure. Considering that the offenses charged are for
violations of a City Ordinance, the criminal cases can only be commenced by
informations. Thus, it was only legally and procedurally proper for the
petitioner to file its complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio
City as required by Section 11 of the new Rules on Summary Procedure,
these criminal cases "shall be commenced only by information." These
criminal cases cannot be commenced in any other way.
Moreover, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia vs. Reyes cited in the
assailed Resolution does not apply in this case. The offense charged in
Zaldivia is a violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint
should have been filed directly in court as required by Section 9 of the old
Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand, Criminal Case Nos.
112934 and 112935 are for violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated,
"shall be commenced only by information."18
Thus, petitioner contended that the filing of the criminal complaint with the
Office of the City Prosecutor stopped the running of the two-month
prescriptive period. Hence, the offenses charged have not prescribed.
In their Comment,19 respondents maintained that the respondent judge did
not gravely abuse his discretion. They held that Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, provides that:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation
and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against

the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.20 (Emphasis supplied)
21

Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes held that the proceedings

mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to judicial
proceedings . Thus, this Court, in Zaldivia, held that the filing of the
Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a judicial
proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the
commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and ended two months after on July
7, 2003. Since the Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court on
October 2, 2003, the respondent judge did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 112934 and 112935.
In a Decision dated April 20, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City
Branch 7, through Judge Clarence F. Villanueva, dismissed the Petition for
Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court held that, since cases of city ordinance
violations may only be commenced by the filing of an Information, then the
two-month prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of
Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the
respondents in court. The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 7, ruled
in favor of the respondents and upheld the respondent judges Order dated
February 10, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 16, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a May 17, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the Regional Trial Court in an August 15, 2005 Order.

Complaint shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise
provided in their charters.
In their Comment,22 respondents maintain that respondent Judge Lidua did
not err in dismissing the cases based on prescription. Also, respondents
raise that the other grounds for dismissal they raised in their Motion to
Quash, namely, that the facts charged constituted no offense and that
respondents were charged with more than one offense, were sustained by
the Metropolitan Trial Court. Also, respondents argue that petitioner had no
legal personality to assail the Orders, since Jadewell was not assailing the
civil liability of the case but the assailed Order and Resolution. This was
contrary to the ruling in People v. Judge Santiago 23 which held that the
private complainant may only appeal the civil aspect of the criminal offense
and not the crime itself.
In the Reply,24 petitioner argues that the respondent judge only dismissed the
case on the ground of prescription, since the Resolution dated April 16, 2004
only cited that ground. The Order dated February 10, 2004 merely stated but
did not specify the grounds on which the cases were dismissed. Petitioner
also maintains that the proceedings contemplated in Section 2 of Act No.
3326 must include the preliminary investigation proceedings before the
National Prosecution Service in light of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure25 and Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
Lastly, petitioner maintains that it did have legal personality, since in a
Petition for Certiorari, "persons aggrieved x x x may file a verified
petition"26 before the court.

Hence, this Petition.

The Petition is denied.
The principal question in this case is whether the filing of the Complaint with
the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription
period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents
Balajadia, Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No.
3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, does not apply because respondents
were charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal
ordinance. In any case, assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is
indeed two months, filing a Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor
tolled the prescription period of two months. This is because Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in other chartered cities, the

The resolution of this case requires an examination of both the substantive

law and the procedural rules governing the prosecution of the offense. With
regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only
statute that provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special
laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other
prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any other distinction.
Petitioner may not argue that Act No. 3326 as amended does not apply.
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, 27 this Court defined the parameters of
prescription:

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following

should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged;
(2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the
prescriptive period was interrupted.28 (Citation omitted)
With regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is
two months for the offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
The commencement of the prescription period is also governed by statute.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the
attendants of the petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively
commenced the running of the prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure.
SECTION 1. Scope This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases
falling within their jurisdiction:
xxxx
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances (Emphasis supplied)
Section 11 of the Rules provides that:

Sec. 11. How commenced. The filing of criminal cases falling within the
scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided,
however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases
shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de officio.
The Local Government Code provides for the classification of cities. Section
451 reads:
SEC. 451. Cities, Classified. A city may either be component or highly
urbanized: Provided, however, that the criteria established in this Code shall
not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent
component cities shall be independent of the province.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly
urbanized cities or component cities. An independent component city has a
charter that proscribes its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It
stands that all cities as defined by Congress are chartered cities. In cases as
early as United States v. Pascual Pacis,29 this Court recognized the validity of
the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as
the charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of
an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is
involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied
the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
In Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez,
Rizal also featured similar facts and issues with the present case. In that
case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was
received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. This Court ruled
that:
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the
offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should
follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a
municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1
of Rule 110.

Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,"
the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such
courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not
more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed
twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this
provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced
only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to
conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326
which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred
to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission
of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His
contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As
a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a
conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of
its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify

substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.

Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.30
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office
of the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this already has the
effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent People v.
Pangilinan31categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far
as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld
this principle as well. However, the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to
violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
There is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in
the Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure.
When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the
Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It
continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file
the Information and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information
with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary investigation,
the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of
the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the Information.
Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months
from the discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed within
which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on
October 5, 2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge
Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case
against respondents. According to the Department of Justice National
Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under
Part I, Section 5 as:
SEC. 5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed with the
court. The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor
signing the same.
The prosecutor must, however, certify under oath that
a) he has examined the complainant and his witnesses;
b) there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof;

c) the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence

submitted against him; and
d) the accused was given an opportunity to submit controverting
evidence.
As for the place of the filing of the Information, the Manual also provides that:
SEC. 12. Place of the commission of offense. - The complaint or information
is sufficient if it states that the crime charged was committed or some of the
ingredients thereof occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court,
unless the particular place in which the crime was committed is an essential
element of the crime, e.g. in a prosecution for violation of the provision of the
Election Code which punishes the carrying of a deadly weapon in a "polling
place," or if it is necessary to identify the offense charged, e.g., the domicile
in the offense of "violation of domicile."
Finally, as for the prescription period, the Manual provides that:
SEC. 20. How Period of Prescription Computed and Interrupted. - For an
offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription
commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted:
a) by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City/Provincial
Prosecutor; or with the Office of the Ombudsman; or
b) by the filing of the complaint or information with the court even if it
is merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, or
even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try
the case on its merits.
However, for an offense covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the
period of prescription is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or
information in court.
xxxx
For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day of the commission of the violation, and if the
same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription

shall be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court

and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).1wphi1
Presidential Decree No. 127532 reorganized the Department of Justices
Prosecution Staff and established Regional State Prosecution Offices. These
Regional State Prosecution Offices were assigned centers for particular
regions where the Informations will be filed. Section 6 provides that the area
of responsibility of the Region 1 Center located in San Fernando, La Union
includes Abra, Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mt. Province,
Pangasinan, and the cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laoag, and San Carlos.
The Regional Prosecutor for Region 1 or his/her duly assigned prosecutor
was designated to file the Information within the two-month period provided
for in Act No. 3326, as amended.1wphi1
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate
as it resulted in the dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It
stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is applicable to ordinances and their
prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the Information in
court in order to toll the period. Zaldivia also has this to say concerning the
effects of its ruling:
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe
even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if,
intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
deduced from their plain language.
The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording
thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected. 33
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176970

December 8, 2008

ROGELIO
Z.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Puerto, Bugo, and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1
to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.5
BAGABUYO, petitioner,

DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,1 with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction, filed by Rogelio Bagabuyo (petitioner) to prevent the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing Resolution No.
7837 on the ground that Republic Act No. 9371 2 - the law that Resolution No.
7837 implements - is unconstitutional.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G.
Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the
Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De
Oro."3 This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. 4 It
increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two. For the
election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as
belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of
residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9371 apportioned the City's barangays as follows:
Legislative Districts - The lone legislative district of the City of
Cagayan De Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the next
national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua,
Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang,
Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an,
Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and
Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan,
Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macasandig,
Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan,

On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No.

78376 implementing R.A. No. 9371.
Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC
on March 27, 2007.7 On 10 April 2008, the petitioner amended the petition to
include the following as respondents: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita;
the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; the Chairman
of the Commission on Audit; the Mayor and the members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro City; and its Board of Canvassers. 8
In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on
constitutional grounds, the petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot
implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and
guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the
division or conversion of a local government unit. He prayed for the issuance
of an order directing the respondents to cease and desist from implementing
R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to
COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative
district for Cagayan de Oro.
Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and
Local Elections proceeded according to R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No.
7837.
The respondent's Comment on the petition, filed through the Office of the
Solicitor General, argued that: 1) the petitioner did not respect the hierarchy
of courts, as the Regional Trial Court (RTC) is vested with concurrent
jurisdiction over cases assailing the constitutionality of a statute; 2) R.A. No.
9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the
House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; 3) the criteria established under
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government
unit took place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and income classification; hence, no
plebiscite is required.

The petitioner argued in his reply that: 1) pursuant to the Court's ruling in Del
Mar v. PAGCOR,9 the Court may take cognizance of this petition if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the
immediate exercise of its jurisdiction; 2) Cagayan de Oro City's
reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities
under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 3) the creation, division,
merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units involve a common denominator - the material change in the political
and economic rights of the local government units directly affected, as well
as of the people therein; 4) a voter's sovereign power to decide on who
should be elected as the entire city's Congressman was arbitrarily reduced
by at least one half because the questioned law and resolution only allowed
him to vote and be voted for in the district designated by the COMELEC; 5) a
voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the Congressman and the
members of the city council for the other legislative district, and 6)
government funds were illegally disbursed without prior approval by the
sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro City.10
THE ISSUES
The core issues, based on the petition and the parties' memoranda, can be
limited to the following contentious points:
1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so, should
the instant petition be dismissed on this ground?
2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative
reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the
division and conversion of a local government unit?
3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation
doctrine?
OUR RULING
Except for the issue of the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the petition
totally without merit.
The hierarchy of courts principle.

The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, andhabeas corpus.11 It was pursuant
to this original jurisdiction that the petitioner filed the present petition.
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals 12 and the RTCs,13 a
direct invocation of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set
out in the petition. Reasons of practicality, dictated by an increasingly
overcrowded docket and the need to prioritize in favor of matters within our
exclusive jurisdiction, justify the existence of this rule otherwise known as the
"principle of hierarchy of courts." More generally stated, the principle requires
that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising
concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.14
Among the cases we have considered sufficiently special and important to be
exceptions
to
the
rule,
are
petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto against our nation's
lawmakers when the validity of their enactments is assailed. 15 The present
petition is of this nature; its subject matter and the nature of the issues raised
- among them, whether legislative reapportionment involves a division of
Cagayan de Oro City as a local government unit - are reasons enough for
considering it an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Additionally,
the petition assails as well a resolution of the COMELEC en banc issued to
implement the legislative apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As an
action against a COMELEC en banc resolution, the case falls under Rule 64
of the Rules of Court that in turn requires a review by this Court via a Rule 65
petition for certiorari.16For these reasons, we do not see the principle of
hierarchy of courts to be a stumbling block in our consideration of the present
case.
The Plebiscite Requirement.
The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of
Cagayan de Oro as a local government unit, and does not merely provide for
the City's legislative apportionment. This argument essentially proceeds from
a misunderstanding of the constitutional concepts of apportionment of
legislative districts and division of local government units.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the
determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or
other subdivision may send to a legislative body.17It is the allocation of seats
in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting

district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the

districts.18 Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or
change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population and
mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.19
Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays
down the rules on legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which
provides:
Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred fifty members unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
continuous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standards provided in this section.
Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or
reapportionment speaks of, are the local government units (historically and
generically referred to as "municipal corporations") that the Constitution itself
classified into provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.20 In its strict
and proper sense, a municipality has been defined as "a body politic and
corporate constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town
for the purpose of local government thereof." 21 The creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on
Local Government (Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in

accordance with the criteria established in the local government code

and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political unit directly affected.
Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution,
the authority to act has been vested in the Legislature. The Legislature
undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of legislative
districts,22and likewise acts on local government units by setting the
standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of
boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local
government units and altering their boundaries through legislation. Other
than this, not much commonality exists between the two provisions since
they are inherently different although they interface and relate with one
another.
The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5 is political
representation and the means to make a legislative district sufficiently
represented so that the people can be effectively heard. As above stated, the
aim of legislative apportionment is "to equalize population and voting power
among districts."23 Hence, emphasis is given to the number of people
represented; the uniform and progressive ratio to be observed among the
representative districts; and accessibility and commonality of interests in
terms of each district being, as far as practicable, continuous, compact and
adjacent territory. In terms of the people represented, every city with at least
250,000 people and every province (irrespective of population) is entitled to
one representative. In this sense, legislative districts, on the one hand, and
provinces and cities, on the other, relate and interface with each other. To
ensure continued adherence to the required standards of apportionment,
Section 5(4) specifically mandates reapportionment as soon as the given
standards are met.
In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5,
Article X, Section 10 expressly speaks of how local government units may be
"created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered."
Its concern is the commencement, the termination, and the modification of
local government units' corporate existence and territorial coverage; and it
speaks of two specific standards that must be observed in implementing this
concern, namely, the criteria established in the local government code and
the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. Under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) passed
in 1991, the criteria of income, population and land area are specified as
verifiable indicators of viability and capacity to provide services. 24 The
division or merger of existing units must comply with the same requirements

(since a new local government unit will come into being), provided that a
division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the unit
affected to less than the minimum requirement prescribed in the Code. 25
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section
10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local
Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government
unit.26 In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment
or reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos,27 a case that arose from
the division of the congressional district formerly covering San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate districts, we confirmed this distinction and the
fact that no plebiscite is needed in a legislative reapportionment. The
plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered and held for
Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion into a highly urbanized city,
while none was held for San Juan. In explaining why this happened, the
Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan because the
objective of the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city as required by Article X, Section 10 the Local Government
Code; the creation of a new legislative district only followed as a
consequence. In other words, the apportionment alone and by itself did not
call for a plebiscite, so that none was needed for San Juan where only a
reapportionment took place.
The need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section 10 and the lack of
requirement for one under Article VI, Section 5 can best be appreciated by a
consideration of the historical roots of these two provisions, the nature of the
concepts they embody as heretofore discussed, and their areas of
application.
A Bit of History.
In Macias v. COMELEC,28 we first jurisprudentially acknowledged the
American roots of our apportionment provision, noting its roots from the
Fourteenth Amendment29 of the U.S. Constitution and from the constitutions
of some American states. The Philippine Organic Act of 1902 created the
Philippine Assembly,30 the body that acted as the lower house of the
bicameral legislature under the Americans, with the Philippine Commission
acting as the upper house. While the members of the Philippine Commission
were appointed by the U.S. President with the conformity of the U.S. Senate,
the members of the Philippine Assembly were elected by representative
districts previously delineated under the Philippine Organic Act of 1902
pursuant to the mandate to apportion the seats of the Philippine Assembly

among the provinces as nearly as practicable according to population. Thus,

legislative apportionment first started in our country.
The Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 maintained the
apportionment provision, dividing the country into 12 senate districts and 90
representative districts electing one delegate each to the House of
Representatives. Section 16 of the Act specifically vested the Philippine
Legislature with the authority to redistrict the Philippine Islands.
Under the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 5 retained the concept of
legislative apportionment together with "district" as the basic unit of
apportionment; the concern was "equality of representation . . . as an
essential feature of republican institutions" as expressed in the leading case
of Macias v. COMELEC.31 The case ruled that inequality of representation is
a justiciable, not a political issue, which ruling was reiterated in Montejo v.
COMELEC.32 Notably, no issue regarding the holding of a plebiscite ever
came up in these cases and the others that followed, as no plebiscite was
required.
Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution retained the concept of equal
representation "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" with each district being,
as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. This
formulation was essentially carried over to the 1987 Constitution,
distinguished only from the previous one by the presence of party-list
representatives. In neither Constitution was a plebiscite required.
The need for a plebiscite in the creation, division, merger, or abolition of local
government units was not constitutionally enshrined until the 1973
Constitution. However, as early as 1959, R.A. No. 2264 33 required, in the
creation of barrios by Provincial Boards, that the creation and definition of
boundaries be "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected."
In 1961, the Charter of the City of Caloocan (R.A. No. 3278) carried this
further by requiring that the "Act shall take effect after a majority of voters of
the Municipality of Caloocan vote in favor of the conversion of their
municipality into a city in a plebiscite." This was followed up to 1972 by other
legislative enactments requiring a plebiscite as a condition for the creation
and conversion of local government units as well as the transfer of sitios from
one legislative unit to another.34 In 1973, the plebiscite requirement was
accorded constitutional status.

Under these separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the holding of a
plebiscite was never a requirement in legislative apportionment or
reapportionment. After it became constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite
was also always identified with the creation, division, merger, abolition and
alteration of boundaries of local government units, never with the concept of
legislative apportionment.
Nature and Areas of Application.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense,
be called a political unit because it is the basis for the election of a member
of the House of Representatives and members of the local legislative body. It
is not, however, a political subdivision through which functions of government
are carried out. It can more appropriately be described as
a representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a
province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a corporate
unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the
district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will
choose a representative in their national affairs. Unlike a province, which has
a governor; a city or a municipality, which has a mayor; and a barangay,
which has a punong barangay, a district does not have its own chief
executive. The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the
voice of the people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the
affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it
has no legal personality that must be created or dissolved and has no
capacity to act. Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation,
dissolution or any other similar action on a legislative district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political
and corporate units. They are the territorial and political subdivisions of the
state.35 They possess legal personality on the authority of the Constitution
and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities
that Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose
boundaries can be altered based on standards again established by both the
Constitution and the Legislature.36 A local government unit's corporate
existence begins upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and
a majority of the members of its Sanggunian.37
As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of the
state in carrying out the functions of government." 38 As a corporate entity with
a distinct and separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises
special functions for the sole benefit of its constituents. It acts as "an agency
of the community in the administration of local affairs" 39 and the mediums

through which the people act in their corporate capacity on local

concerns.40 In light of these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to expressly
secure the consent of the people affected by the creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units through a
plebiscite.
These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative
apportionment or reapportionment and the division of a local government
unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does
not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a local government unit
where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement that
applies to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay under the
Local Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity
of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Res. No. 7837
R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation
passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article
VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core provision - Section 1 - provides:
SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. - The lone legislative district of the
City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the
next national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth,
barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua,
Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang,
Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an,
Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and
Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan,
Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig,
Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan,
Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1
to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.
Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and
corporate entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically
remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial
lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the
addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two
districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives.
Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play and

no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two

districts.
Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the
creation of another congressional district in the city by providing, as reflected
in COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, for additional Sangguniang Panglunsod
seats to be voted for along the lines of the congressional apportionment
made. The effect on the Sangguniang Panglunsod, however, is not directly
traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to another law - R.A. No. 6636 41 - whose
Section 3 provides:
SECTION 3. Other Cities. - The provision of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding the City of Cebu, City of Davao, and any other city
with more than one representative district shall have eight (8)
councilors for each district who shall be residents thereof to be
elected by the qualified voters therein, provided that the cities of
Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod, Iloilo and other cities
comprising a representative district shall have twelve (12) councilors
each and all other cities shall have ten (10) councilors each to be
elected at large by the qualified voters of the said cities: Provided,
That in no case shall the present number of councilors according to
their charters be reduced.
However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of
Cagayan de Oro into two political and corporate units and territories. Rather
than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is
merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and
greater say, both in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
To illustrate this effect, before the reapportionment, Cagayan de Oro had only
one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000.42 By having two legislative districts, each of them
with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two
congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the city's population. In
terms of services for city residents, this easily means better access to their
congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as
against the 500,000 he used to represent. The same goes true for
the Sangguniang Panglungsod with its ranks increased from 12 to 16 since
each legislative district now has 8 councilors. In representation terms, the
fewer constituents represented translate to a greater voice for each individual
city resident in Congress and in the Sanggunian; each congressman and
each councilor represents both a smaller area and fewer constituents whose
fewer numbers are now concentrated in each representative. The City, for its

part, now has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in
the halls of Congress. Since the total number of congressmen in the country
has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence of two
congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a
quantitative and proportional improvement in the representation of Cagayan
de Oro City in Congress.
Equality of representation.
The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is
unequal. District 1 has only 93,719 registered voters while District 2 has
127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of rural barangays while District 2 is
composed mostly of urban barangays.43 Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the
principle of equality of representation.
A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that the basis for
districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not
the number of registered voters therein. We settled this very same question
in Herrera v. COMELEC44 when we interpreted a provision in R.A. No. 7166
and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313 that applied to the Province of
Guimaras. We categorically ruled that the basis for districting is the number
of inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality based on the
official 1995 Census of Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa,
Administrator of the National Statistics Office.
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual
population of Cagayan de Oro City. However, we take judicial notice of the
August 2007 census of the National Statistics Office which shows
thatbarangays comprising Cagayan de Oro's first district have a total
population of 254,644, while the second district has 299,322 residents.
Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the
districts.45 The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical
exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation.46 In fact, for cities, all it asks is that "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one
representative," while ensuring representation for every province regardless
of the size of its population. To ensure quality representation through
commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the
constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district
should comprise,as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves the local government units as they are
found and does not require their division, merger or transfer to satisfy the
numerical standard it imposes. Its requirements are satisfied despite some

numerical disparity if the units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far
as practicable.
The petitioner's contention that there is a resulting inequality in the division of
Cagayan de Oro City into two districts because the barangays in the first
district are mostly rural barangays while the second district is mostly urban, is
largely unsubstantiated. But even if backed up by proper proof, we cannot
question the division on the basis of the difference in the barangays' levels of
development or developmental focus as these are not part of the
constitutional standards for legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
What the components of the two districts of Cagayan de Oro would be is a
matter for the lawmakers to determine as a matter of policy. In the absence
of any grave abuse of discretion or violation of the established legal
parameters, this Court cannot intrude into the wisdom of these policies. 47
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R No. 188078

March 15, 2010

VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G.

MORADA,
and
MINERVA
ALDABA
MORADA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) of the Decision dated 25 January 2010. 1
The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason, already
considered and rejected in the Decision, that Congress reliance on the
Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda), Region III Director, National
Statistics Office (NSO), projecting Malolos Citys population in 2010, is nonjusticiable. The COMELEC also calls attention to the other sources of
Malolos Citys population indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of Population
PMS 3 Progress Enumeration Report 2) and as of 2008 (Certification of the
City of Malolos Water District, dated 31 July 2008, 3 and Certification of the
Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 20084) which Congress allegedly used in
enacting Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC extends its nonjusticiability argument to these materials.
We find no reason to grant the motion.
First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and
authoritativeness of the population indicators Congress used in enacting RA
9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating legislative districts are
unquestionably within the ambit of this Courts judicial review power, 5 then
there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on
their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific constitutional
limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only
cities with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in
Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of necessity, must inquire into
the authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators Congress
used to comply with the constitutional limitation. Thus, nearly five decades
ago, we already rejected claims of non-justiciability of an apportionment law
alleged to violate the constitutional requirement of proportional
representation:

It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040

improves existing conditions, this Court could perhaps, in the exercise of
judicial statesmanship, consider the question involved as purely political and
therefore non-justiciable. The overwhelming weight of authority is that district
apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts[:]
The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question,
and not one which the court cannot consider on the ground that it is a
political question.
It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively
within the political power of the legislature as to preclude a court from
inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is properly brought
before it.
It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the
political situation does not render it political instead of judicial.
The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up
constitutes no excuse for approving a transgression of constitutional
limitations, because the end does not justify the means. Furthermore, there is
no reason to doubt that, aware of the existing inequality of representation,
and impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will opportunely approve
remedial
legislation
in
accord
with
the
precepts
of
the
Constitution.6 (Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted)
To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591 is to
contend that this Court has no power "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government," a duty
mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Indeed, if we
subscribe to the COMELECs theory, this Court would be reduced to
rubberstamping laws creating legislative districts no matter how unreliable
and non-authoritative the population indicators Congress used to justify their
creation. There can be no surer way to render meaningless the limitation in
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. 7
Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators
Congress used to measure Malolos Citys compliance with the constitutional
limitation are unreliable and non-authoritative. On Mirandas Certification,
(that the "projected population of the [City] of Malolos will be 254,030 by the
year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and

2000"), this fell short of EO 135s requirements that (a) for intercensal years,
the certification should be based on a set of demographic projections and
estimates declared official by the National Statistical and Coordination Board
(NSCB); (b) certifications on intercensal population estimates will be as of the
middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on projections or estimates
must be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer.
Further, using Mirandas own growth rate assumption of 3.78%, Malolos
Citys population as of 1 August 2010 will only be 249,333, below the
constitutional threshold of 250,000 (using as base Malolos Citys population
as of 1 August 2007 which is 223,069). That Miranda issued his Certification
"by authority of the NSO administrator" does not make the document reliable
as it neither makes Miranda the NSO Administrators designated certifying
officer nor cures the Certification of its fatal defects for failing to use
demographic projections and estimates declared official by the NSCB or
make the projection as of the middle of 2010.1avvphi1
Nor are the 2007 Census of Population PMS 3 Progress Enumeration
Report, the Certification of the City of Malolos Water District, dated 31 July
2008 and the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008,
reliable because none of them qualifies as authoritative population indicator
under EO 135. The 2007 Census of Population PMS 3 Progress
Enumeration Report merely contains preliminary data on the population
census of Bulacan which were subsequently adjusted to reflect actual
population as indicated in the 2007 Census results (showing Malolos Citys
population at 223,069). The COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), adopts Malolos Citys claim that the 2007 census for Malolos
City was "sloped to make it appear that come Year 2010, the population
count for Malolos would still fall short of the constitutional requirement." 8 This
unbecoming attack by the governments chief counsel on the integrity of the
processes of the governments census authority has no place in our judicial
system. The OSG ought to know that absent convincing proof of so-called
data "sloping," the NSO enjoys the presumption of the regularity in the
performance of its functions.
The Certification of the City of Malolos Water District fares no better. EO 135
excludes from its ambit certifications from a public utility gathered incidentally
in the course of pursuing its business. To elevate the water districts so-called
population census to the level of credibility NSO certifications enjoy is to
render useless the existence of NSO. This will allow population data
incidentally gathered by electric, telephone, sewage, and other utilities to
enter into legislative processes even though these private entities are not in
the business of generating statistical data and thus lack the scientific training,
experience and competence to handle, collate and process them.

Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay is not authoritative

because much like the Malolos City Water District, the Liga ng Barangay is
not authorized to conduct population census, much less during off-census
years. The non-NSO entities EO 135 authorizes to conduct population
census are local government units (that is, province, city, municipality or
barangay) subject to the prior approval of the NSCB and
under the technical supervision of the NSO from planning to data
processing.9
By presenting these alternative population indicators with their widely
divergent population figures,10 the COMELEC unwittingly highlighted the
danger of relying on non-NSO authorized certifications. EO 135s stringent
standards ensuring reliability of population census cannot be diluted as these
data lie at the core of crucial government decisions and, in this case, the
legislative function of enforcing the constitutional mandate of creating
congressional districts in cities with at least 250,000 constituents.
There can be no doubt on the applicability of EO 135 to test the
constitutionality of RA 9591. The COMELEC invoked EO 135 to convince the
Court of the credibility and authoritativeness of Mirandas certificate. 11 It is
hardly alien for the Court to adopt standards contained in a parallel statute to
fill gaps in the law in the absence of an express prohibition. 12 Indeed, one is
hard-pressed to find any distinction, statistically speaking, on the reliability of
an NSO certification of a citys population for purposes of creating its
legislative district and for purposes of converting it to a highly-urbanized or
an independent component city.13 Congress itself confirms the wisdom and
relevance of EO 135s paradigm of privileging NSO certifications by
mandating that compliance with the population requirement in the creation
and conversion of local government units shall be proved exclusively by an
NSO certification.14 Unquestionably, representation in Congress is no less
important than the creation of local government units in enhancing our
democratic institutions, thus both processes should be subject to the same
stringent standards.
Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before the
10 May 2010 elections, it breaches the 250,000 population mark following
the mandate in Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution that "any city whose population may hereafter increase to more
than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member." COMELEC neither alleged nor proved that
Malolos City is in compliance with Section 3 of the Ordinance.

Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution on the population requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a
legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from the former First
Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the
geographic mass of that district.15 This contravenes the requirement in
Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall "comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory." It is no argument to
say, as the OSG does, that it was impracticable for Congress to create a
district with contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory because Malolos city
lies at the center of the First Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of
the First Legislative District is not an insuperable condition making
compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to the constitutional
mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient
representation, the practicable alternative for Congress was to include the
municipality of Bulacan in Malolos Citys legislative district. Although
unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the
constitutional requirements of geographic unity and population floor, ensuring
efficient representation of the minimum mass of constituents.
WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of respondent
Commission on Elections dated 22 February 2010 is DENIED WITH
FINALITY. Let no further pleadings be allowed.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189793

April 7, 2010

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE

ROBREDO, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R.
MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T.
FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R.
YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.

2nd District

3rd District

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action,
petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo,
as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in
the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the
respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any
issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of
Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed
into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took
effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. 1 In substance, the said
law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines
Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the
province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was
estimated to have a population of 1,693,821, 2distributed among four (4)
legislative districts in this wise:
District

Municipalities/Cities

Population

1st District

Del
Ragay
Lupi

417,304

Gallego Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona

4th District

Sipocot
Cabusao

Pasacao
San Fernando

Gainza
Milaor
Naga
Pili
Ocampo

Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

Caramoan
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion

Sangay
San
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato

Buhi
Bula
Nabua

474,899

Jose 372,548

429,070

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form
a new second legislative district. The following table 3 illustrates the
reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
District

Municipalities/Cities

1st District

Del
Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao

2nd District

Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao

3rd District (formerly 2nd Naga

District)
Pili
Ocampo
Canaman

Population
176,383

San Fernando
Gainza
276,777
Milaor
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

439,043

4th District (formerly 3rd Caramoan

District)
Garchitorena
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentacion

Sangay
372,548
San
Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

5th District (formerly 4th Iriga

District)
Baao
Balatan
Bato

Buhi
Bula
Nabua

429,070

Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both
parties of the origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing
of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen
(13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by step,
marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local
officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as
well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning
the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is
required by the Constitution for such new district. 4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval
of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga
City, which was a part of the former second district from which the
municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new
second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the
representatives of the former third and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No.
9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation
of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis
for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. 6 The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,

contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited
provision is the minimum population requirement for the creation of a
legislative district.7 The petitioners theorize that, save in the case of a newly
created province, each legislative district created by Congress must be
supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be
valid.8 Under this view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and
severed to form new districts, provided each resulting district will represent a
population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment
would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of
less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as
invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent
of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of
250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats. 9 The petitioners argue
that when the Constitutional Commission fixed the original number of district
seats in the House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into
account the projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for
the year 1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented
by 200 district representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every
one (1) representative.11 Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the
population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing the
initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts
independently from the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe
a 250,000 population threshold, in the same manner that the Constitutional
Commission did in the original apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly
apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the
population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as
explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of
the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto;
and

2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional

representation as provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3)
and (4) of the Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, seek the dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and
substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty
of two (2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in
choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 via the
remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and
second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent
distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence of a 250,000
population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of the
questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect
to the creation of legislative districts in provinces. 13 Rather, the 250,000

minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative

district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement
for the reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No.
9716, which only creates an additional legislative district within the province
of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment
law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies
of Certiorari and Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal
procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents
had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against
a tribunal, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasijudicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in
implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a
judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the
performance of a ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition is the
declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same
could have been ventilated through a petition for declaratory relief,
over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original
jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that
they had sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a
result of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents,
therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal standing to
question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when
confronted with issues that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a
direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance.

The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the
application of procedural rules,14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus
standi whenever confronted with an important issue of overreaching
significance to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17this Court sanctioned momentary
deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original
cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance. The
Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved
in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being
of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination
is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched
principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
(Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in
Kilosbayan v. Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to
name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part of the party seeking
judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of
transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held
that in cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled
promptly and definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed.
This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on Chavez
v. Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing
principles must apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the
determination of whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a
province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the
presumption of constitutionality.24Before a law may be declared

unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific

provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed. When
there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any
proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of
constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to
sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to
be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a minimum
population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly
provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a
city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on
the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with
nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase
"or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities
was, in turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v.
COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
7854, which was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a
Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an
additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was a lone district.
The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district
would violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the
resulting districts would be supported by a population of less than 250,000,

considering that Makati had a total population of only 450,000. The Supreme
Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly
created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as
of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only
four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall
have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati
as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact,
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city
whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall
be
entitled
to at
least
one
congressional
representative.28(Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population
requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while
Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to
increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional
district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an
additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in
provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is
not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid,
neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province,
considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere
fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the
creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at
least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code
states:
Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square

kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement,
but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income
requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran
through the deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article
VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least
two hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the
Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of
Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the
final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN
PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA."
Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used
for
the
1986
nationwide apportionment of
legislative
districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the
population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city,
or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for
the purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum
for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the
determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the
use of the population benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned,
population as a factor was not the sole,though it was among, several
determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally
divided the entire country into two hundred (200) districts, which
corresponded to the original number of district representatives. The 200
seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this manner: first,
one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten
(10) cities with a population of at least 250,000; 30 second, the remaining
seats were then redistributed among the provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." 31 Commissioner Davide, who later
became a Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his

sponsorship remark32 for the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987

Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative
seats which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a
population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the
1980 official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates
that our population is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the
mandate that each city with at least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province
shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat for each of
the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250,
000, which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo,
Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then
proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the
provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city.
Differentiated from this, the determination of the districts within the province
had to consider "all protests and complaints formally received" which, the
records show, dealt with determinants other than population as already
mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission
narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the
northern towns when it was more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan,
Batarasa, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the
First District has a greater area than the Second District. He then queried
whether population was the only factor considered by the Committee in
redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account
the standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department,
namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces
and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the
legislative district must be compact, adjacent and contiguous.

Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto
Princesa was included with the northern towns. He then inquired what is the
distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of
75,480 and based on the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns
would result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for
the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the
northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan
before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are
more potential candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City
and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there would be less
candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested in
politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or
the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of
amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal. 33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in
the interpellations that District I has a total population of 265,358 including
the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total population
of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the
Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the
Constitution considering that said City is nearer the southern towns
comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed
transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would
only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District would have
262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City
before the Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved
by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN

There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no

objection, the apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was
approved by the Body.34

On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the
reconsideration of the earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of
Region I, particularly Benguet.

The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was

decided by the importance of the towns and the city that eventually
composed the districts.

Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the

amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in
favor and none against, the amendment was approved by the Body.

Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further
narrates:

Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet
with Baguio City will have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the
municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod,
Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second
District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.

At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a
reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of
Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City
and Tuba are placed in one district. He stated that he was toying with the
idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the
summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City
so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be
transferred to the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however,
pointed out that the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower
during certain times of the year, but the transient population would increase
the population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and
professional transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio
would more than qualify, not to speak of the official business matters,
transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and
Baguio City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the
place can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that the
Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr.
Regalado stated that the Body should have a say on the matter and that the
considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the
fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many
government offices and functions.

There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and

districting of Region I.35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into
districts based on the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a
city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit
area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such consideration "fosters
common interests in line with the standard of compactness." 36 In the
districting of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political
stability and common interest among the people in the area" and the
possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the "accepted regional,
political, traditional and sectoral leaders." 37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that
municipalities in the highland should not be grouped with the towns in the
lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should
"balance the area and population."38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district
apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the
districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical
exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through commonality
of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all
that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise,
as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis
supplied).

This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising

stand of petitioner that an additional provincial legislative district, which does
not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.

(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of

the discussion from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting
from the redistricting of Districts One and Two.41

The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.

Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution can, the petition find support. And the formulation of the
Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance
itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional
sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative district in a
province, whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of
1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the formula and constant number of
250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally
apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities
entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given
in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes
this point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly
written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the
Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act
No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on
the protests and complaints against strict conformity with the
population standard, and more importantly based on the final
districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population,
the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second
legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in
the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the population
of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by
the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No.
4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the
regrouped municipalities;

Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with
the increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the
utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of
discretion,42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of
the first and second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of
inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our
ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other
factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in
accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very
clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented
by this petition.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716
entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second
(2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID
LAW.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 203974

April 22, 2014

component city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of

Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.

AURELIO
M.
UMALI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE
CITY GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204371
J.V.
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

BAUTISTA, Petitioner,

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before the Court is the consolidated case for Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief, docket as G.R. No. 203974,
assailing Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 1 and Minute Resolution No. 1209252 dated September 11, 2012 and October 16, 2012, respectively, both
promulgated by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
and Petition for Mandamus, docketed G.R. No. 204371, seeking to compel
public respondent to implement the same.
The Facts
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed
Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion
of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into
a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued
Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of
Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified
voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code
of 1991."
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed
Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that
for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from

The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (LGC), citing conversion cases involving Puerto Princesa City
in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte, and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu,
where only the residents of the city proposed to be converted were allowed
to vote in the corresponding plebiscite.
In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a
Verified Motion for Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed
conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect the mother province
of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be
interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues
that while the conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new
or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision
calls for the people of the local government unit (LGU) directly affected to
vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the
LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units
directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city
proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by
enumerating the various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan Citys conversion
and how it will cause material change not only in the political and economic
rights of the city and its residents but also of the province as a whole.
To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar
Vergara, city mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground
that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to conversions, which is the meat of the
matter. He likewise argues that a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as
couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the
plebiscite. Lastly, private respondent pointed out that when Santiago City
was converted in 1994 from a municipality to an independent component city
pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the plebiscite held was limited to the
registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago.
Following a hearing conducted on October 4, 2012, 3 the COMELEC En Banc
on October 16, 2012, in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB), by a vote of 5-2 4 ruled in
favor of respondent Vergara through the assailed Minute Resolution 12-0925.
The dispositive portion reads:
The Commission, taking into consideration the arguments of counsels
including the Reply-memorandum of Oppositor, after due deliberation,
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:

1) To DENY the Motion for Reconsideration of oppositor Governor

Aurelio M. Umali; and

to give way to the May 13, 2013 national, local and ARMM regional elections
as per Resolution No. 9563.

2) To SCHEDULE the conduct of Plebiscite for the conversion of

Cabanatuan City from component city into highly-urbanized city with
registered residents only of Cabanatuan City to participate in said
plebiscite.

After this development, petitioner J.V. Bautista, on December 3, 2012, filed a

case before this Court for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 204371, praying
that public respondent be ordered to schedule the plebiscite either on
December 15 or 22, 2012. Petitioner Bautista argued that since the TRO
issued by the RTC has already expired, the duty of the public respondent to
hold the plebiscite has become mandatory and ministerial. Petitioner Bautista
also alleged that the delay in holding the plebiscite is inexcusable given the
requirement that it should be held within a period of 120 days form the date
of the Presidents declaration.

Let the Deputy Executive Director for Operations implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed as
G.R. No. 203974, on substantially the same arguments earlier taken by
petitioner Umali before the poll body. On the other hand, public respondent
COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintained in its
Comment that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a component
city into an HUC and that the political unit directly affected by the conversion
will only be the city itself. It argues that in this instance, no political unit will be
created, merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU, and that
no boundaries will be altered. The conversion would merely reinforce the
powers and prerogatives already being exercised by the city, with the political
units probable elevation to that of an HUC as demanded by its compliance
with the criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the participation of the
voters of the entire province in the plebiscite will not be necessary.
Private respondent will later manifest that it is adopting the Comment of the
COMELEC.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 2012, respondent COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 9543, which adopted a calendar of activities and periods of
prohibited acts in connection with the conversion of Cabanatuan City into an
HUC. The Resolution set the conduct of the plebiscite on December 1, 2012.
Thereafter, a certain Dr. Rodolfo B. Punzalan filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief which was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40 in
Palayan City. In the said case, Punzalan prayed that Minute Resolution No.
12-0797 be declared unconstitutional, that the trial court decree that all
qualified voters of the province of Nueva Ecija be included in the plebiscite,
and that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining public
respondent from implementing the questioned resolution. On October 19,
2012, the RTC granted the prayer for a TRO.
On November 6, 2012, public respondent through Minute Resolution No. 120989 suspended the preparations for the event in view of the TRO issued by
the RTC. On November 27, 2012, the plebiscite was once again rescheduled

In its Comment to the Bautista petition, public respondent justified its position
by arguing that mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute. With all the legal conflicts surrounding the case, it cannot
be said that there is a clear showing of petitioner Bautistas entitlement to the
relief sought. Respondent COMELEC likewise relied on Sec. 5 of the
Omnibus Election Code to justify the postponements, citing incidents of
violence that ensued in the locality during the plebiscite period.
After the conclusion of the 2013 elections, public respondent issued
Resolution No. 1353 scheduling the plebiscite to January 25, 2014. However,
a TRO was issued by this Court on January 15, 2014 in G.R. No. 203974 to
suspend the conduct of the plebiscite for Cabanatuan Citys conversion.
Given the intertwining factual milieu of the two petitions before the Court,
both cases were consolidated on March 18, 2014.
The Issue
The bone of contention in the present controversy boils down to whether the
qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those
in Cabanatuan City can participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion
of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.
Resolving the Petition for Certiorari either way will necessarily render the
Petition for Mandamus moot and academic for ultimately, the public
respondent will be ordered to hold the plebiscite. The only variation will be as
regards its participants.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition for Certiorari is meritorious.

Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in accordance with Sec. 10, Art. X
of the Constitution
Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should
be the basis for determining the qualified voters who will participate in the
plebiscite to resolve the issue. Sec. 10, Art. X reads:
Section 10, Article X. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units directly affected"
necessarily encompasses not only Cabanatuan City but the entire province
of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in the province are qualified
to cast their votes in resolving the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan City.
On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to support their
claim that only the City of Cabanatuan should be allowed to take part in the
voting. Sec. 453 states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. It shall be the duty
of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days
after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the
immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. (emphasis supplied)
Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 as
referring only to the registered voters in the city being converted, excluding in
the process the voters in the remaining towns and cities of Nueva Ecija.
Before proceeding to unravel the seeming conflict between the two
provisions, it is but proper that we ascertain first the relationship between
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec. 453 of the LGC.
First of all, we have to restate the general principle that legislative power
cannot be delegated. Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation is
subject to certain exceptions allowed in the Constitution, namely:
(1) Delegation by Congress to the President of the power to fix "tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government" under Section 28(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution; and

(2) Delegation of emergency powers by Congress to the President

"to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy" in times of war and other national emergency under
Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries
of provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, which is pertinent in the
case at bar, is essentially legislative in nature. 5 The framers of the
Constitution have, however, allowed for the delegation of such power in Sec.
10, Art. X of the Constitution as long as (1) the criteria prescribed in the LGC
is met and (2) the creation, division, merger, abolition or the substantial
alteration of the boundaries is subject to the approval by a majority vote in a
plebiscite.
True enough, Congress delegated such power to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod to create barangays pursuant to
Sec. 6 of the LGC, which provides:
Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government
unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries
substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a
province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by ordinance
passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod
concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction,
subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code."
(emphasis supplied)
The guidelines for the exercise of this authority have sufficiently been
outlined by the various LGC provisions detailing the requirements for the
creation of barangays6, municipalities7, cities8, and provinces9. Moreover,
compliance with the plebiscite requirement under the Constitution has also
been directed by the LGC under its Sec. 10, which reads:
Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition,
or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take
effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected." (emphasis
supplied)
With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite satisfied, the delegation to
LGUs of the power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter
boundaries has become a recognized exception to the doctrine of nondelegation of legislative powers.

Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the President under Sec. 453 of
the LGC quoted earlier, which states:

In Miranda, the rationale behind the afore-quoted constitutional provision and

its application to cases of conversion were discussed thusly:

Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. It shall be the duty
of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days
after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the
immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.

A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of
local government units involve a common denominator - - - material change
in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly
affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the
Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly
affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional
requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous
Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was
borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10,
Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local
government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of
the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the
consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was
required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative
power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of
local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign
capacity decide on a matter that affects them - - - direct democracy of the
people as opposed to democracy thru peoples representatives. This
plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the
Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units. 12

In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a

determination on whether or not the requirements under Sec. 452 10 of the
LGC are complied with. The provision makes it ministerial for the President,
upon proper application, to declare a component city as highly urbanized
once the minimum requirements, which are based on certifiable and
measurable indices under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatory language
"shall" used in the provision leaves the President with no room for discretion.
In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a
plebiscite for purposes of conversions once the requirements are met. No
further legislation is necessary before the city proposed to be converted
becomes eligible to become an HUC through ratification, as the basis for the
delegation of the legislative authority is the very LGC.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the source
of the delegation of power to the LGUs under Sec. 6 of the LGC and to the
President under Sec. 453 of the same code is none other than Sec. 10, Art. X
of the Constitution.
Respondents, however, posit that Sec. 453 of the LGC is actually outside the
ambit of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, considering that the conversion of
a component city to an HUC is not "creation, division, merge, abolition or
substantial alternation of boundaries" encompassed by the said constitutional
provision.
This proposition is bereft of merit.
First, the Courts pronouncement in Miranda vs. Aguirre 11 is apropos and may
be applied by analogy. While Miranda involves the downgrading, instead of
upgrading, as here, of an independent component city into a component city,
its application to the case at bar is nonetheless material in ascertaining the
proper treatment of conversions. In that seminal case, the Court held that the
downgrading of an independent component city into a component city comes
within the purview of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.

It was determined in the case that the changes that will result from the
conversion are too substantial that there is a necessity for the plurality of
those that will be affected to approve it. Similar to the enumerated acts in the
constitutional provision, conversions were found to result in material changes
in the economic and political rights of the people and LGUs affected. Given
the far-reaching ramifications of converting the status of a city, we held that
the plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision should equally
apply to conversions as well. Thus, RA 8528 13 was declared unconstitutional
in Miranda on the ground that the law downgraded Santiago City in Isabela
without submitting it for ratification in a plebiscite, in contravention of Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution.
Second, while conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a
component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of boundaries.
As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of boundaries" involves and
necessarily entails a change in the geographical configuration of a local
government unit or units. However, the phrase "boundaries" should not be
limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of the
LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the

demarcation lines between political subdivisions, where the LGUs exercise

of corporate power ends and that of the other begins. And as a qualifier, the
alteration must be "substantial" for it to be within the ambit of the
constitutional provision.
Pertinent is Art. 12(c) of the LGCs Implementing Rules and Regulations,
which reads:
Art. 12. Conversion of a Component City into a Highly Urbanized City.
xxxx
(c) Effect of Conversion The conversion of a component city into a highlyurbanized city shall make it independent of the province where it is
geographically located. (emphasis added)
Verily, the upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan
City, into an HUC will come at a steep price. It can be gleaned from the
above-cited rule that the province will inevitably suffer a corresponding
decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan Citys gain of
independence. With the citys newfound autonomy, it will be free from the
oversight powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial
jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer
be subject to supervision by the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva
Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with
Cabanatuan Citys severance from its mother province. This is equivalent to
carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecijas 5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently
satisfies the requirement that the alteration be "substantial."
Needless to stress, the alteration of boundaries would necessarily follow
Cabanatuan Citys conversion in the same way that creations, divisions,
mergers, and abolitions generally cannot take place without entailing the
alteration. The enumerated acts, after all, are not mutually exclusive, and
more often than not, a combination of these acts attends the reconfiguration
of LGUs.
In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion to an
HUC is substantial alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X and
resultantly, said provision applies, governs and prevails over Sec. 453 of the
LGC.
Moreover, the rules of statutory construction dictate that a particular provision
should be interpreted with the other relevant provisions in the law The Court
finds that it is actually Sec. 10 of the LGC which is undeniably the applicable
provision on the conduct of plebiscites. The title of the provision itself,

"Plebiscite Requirement", makes this obvious. It requires a majority of the

votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units
directly affected. On the other hand, Sec. 453 of the LGC, entitled "Duty to
Declare Highly Urbanized Status", is only on the duty to declare a city as
highly urbanized. It mandates the Office of the President to make the
declaration after the city has met the requirements under Sec. 452, and upon
proper application and ratification in a plebiscite. The conduct of a plebiscite
is then a requirement before a declaration can be made. Thus, the Court
finds that Sec. 10 of the LGC prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC on the
plebiscite requirement.
We now take the bull by the horns and resolve the issue whether Sec. 453 of
the LGC trenches on Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Hornbook doctrine is that neither the legislative, the executive, nor the
judiciary has the power to act beyond the Constitutions mandate. The
Constitution is supreme; any exercise of power beyond what is circumscribed
by the Constitution is ultra vires and a nullity. As elucidated by former Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando in Fernandez v. Cuerva:14
Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be
contrary to the Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it:
"When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern." Administrative or executive
acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to
the laws or the Constitution. The above provision of the civil Code reflects the
orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is
not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. x x
x
Applying this orthodox view, a law should be construed in harmony with and
not in violation of the Constitution.15 In a long line of cases, the cardinal
principle of construction established is that a statute should be interpreted to
assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any
constitutional command or prescription.16 If there is doubt or uncertainty as to
the meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure or if the
enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more constitution, that interpretation
which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality will be adopted, even though
it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or
apparent import of the language used.17
Pursuant to established jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified voters
therein" in Sec. 453 should be construed in a manner that will avoid conflict
with the Constitution. If one takes the plain meaning of the phrase in relation
to the declaration by the President that a city is an HUC, then, Sec. 453 of

the LGC will clash with the explicit provision under Sec. 10, Art. X that the
voters in the "political units directly affected" shall participate in the plebiscite.
Such construction should be avoided in view of the supremacy of the
Constitution. Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters
therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed
to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly
affected by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution.
The Court finds that respondents are mistaken in construing Sec. 453 in a
vacuum. Their interpretation of Sec. 453 of the LGC runs afoul of Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution which explicitly requires that all residents in the
"political units directly affected" should be made to vote.
Respondents make much of the plebiscites conducted in connection with the
conversion of Puerto Princesa City, Tacloban City and Lapu-Lapu City where
the ratification was made by the registered voters in said cities alone. It is
clear, however, that the issue of who are entitled to vote in said plebiscites
was not properly raised or brought up in an actual controversy. The issue on
who will vote in a plebiscite involving a conversion into an HUC is a novel
issue, and this is the first time that the Court is asked to resolve the question.
As such, the past plebiscites in the aforementioned cities have no materiality
or relevance to the instant petition. Suffice it to say that conversion of said
cities prior to this judicial declaration will not be affected or prejudiced in any
manner following the operative fact doctrinethat the actual existence of a
statute prior to such a determination is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.18

We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the
creation of the new province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose
boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be affected are
entitled to participate in the plebiscite. As held:
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it
imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in
the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created,
divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is
thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of
Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division
of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed
new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate
than that two political units would be affected.
The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its
boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be
composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to
constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. 21
xxxx

After the Court has resolved the seeming irreconcilability of Sec. 10, Art. X of
the Constitution and Sec. 453 of the LGC, it is now time to elucidate the
meaning of the phrase "political units directly affected" under Sec. 10, Art. X.

To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and
eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent province of Negros
Occidental. This will result in the removal of approximately 2,768.4 square
kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose boundaries will
be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the
consequent effects of the division of the parent province necessarily will
affect all the people living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the
proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province
as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the
better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political
groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in
Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which must be included in the
plebiscite contemplated therein.22 (emphasis added)

a. "Political units directly affected" defined

Sec. 3, Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution, as invoked in Tan, states:

In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the
plebiscite, what should primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or
units that desire to participate will be "directly affected" by the change. To
interpret the phrase, Tan v. COMELEC19 and Padilla v. COMELEC20 are worth
revisiting.

SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided,

merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and
subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected. (emphasis added)

The
entire
province
of
Nueva
affected by Cabanatuan Citys conversion

Ecija

will

be

directly

Despite the change in phraseology compared to what is now Sec. 10, Art. X,
we affirmed our ruling in Tan in the latter case of Padilla. As held, the removal
of the phrase "unit or" only served to sustain the earlier finding that what is
contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected" is the plurality of
political units which would participate in the plebiscite. As reflected in the
journal of the Constitutional Commission:23

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President, because the municipality is affected

directly by the merger of two of its barangay.

Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I
would like to inform the Committee that under the formulation in the present
Local Government Code, the words used are actually "political unit or units."
However, I do not know the implication of the use of these words. Maybe
there will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the Committee
about this.

Senator Pimentel. Do all the 51 barangay that the Gentleman mentioned, Mr.
President, belong to one municipality?

Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be
no objection on the part of the two Gentlemen from the floor?
Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words
"unit or" because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the
units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay plebiscite because it is
affected. It would mean a loss of a territory. (emphasis added)

Senator Guingona. And, if, out of 100 barangay, 51 are being merged,
abolished, whatever, would the rest of the municipality not participate in the
plebiscite?

Senator Guingona. Yes.

Senator Pimentel. Then it will only involve the municipality where the 51
barangays belong.
Senator Guingona. Yes. So, the entire municipality will now have to undergo
a plebiscite.
Senator Pimentel. That is correct, Mr. President.

The same sentiment was shared by the Senate during its deliberations on
Senate Bill No. 155the predecessor of the LGCthus:

Senator Guingona. In the earlier example, if it is only a merger of two

municipalities, let us say, in a province with 10 municipalities the entire
province will the other municipalities although not affected also have to
participate in the plebiscite?

Senator Guingona. Can we make that clearer by example? Let us assume

that a province has municipalities and there is a merger of two municipalities.
Would this therefore mean that the plebiscite will be conducted within the two
merged municipalities and not in the eight other municipalities?

Senator Pimentel. Yes. The reason is that the municipalities are within the
territorial boundaries of the province itself, it will have to be altered as a result
of the two municipalities that the Gentleman mentioned. 24

Senator Pimentel. The whole province, Mr. President, will be affected, and
that is the reason we probably have to involve the entire province.
Senator Guingona. So the plebiscite will not be held only in the two
municipalities which are being merged, but the entire province will now have
to undergo.
Senator Pimentel. I suppose that was the ruling in the Negros del Norte case.
Senator Guingona. Supposing it refers to barangays, will the entire
municipality have to vote? There are two barangays being merged, say, out
of 100 barangays. Would the entire municipality have to participate in the
plebiscite?

In the more recent case of Miranda, the interpretation in Tan and Padilla was
modified to include not only changes in economic but also political rights in
the criteria for determining whether or not an LGU shall be considered
"directly affected." Nevertheless, the requirement that the plebiscite be
participated in by the plurality of political units directly affected remained.
b. Impact on Economic Rights
To recall, it was held in Miranda that the changes that will result in the
downgrading of an LGU from an independent component city to a component
city cannot be categorized as insubstantial, thereby necessitating the
conduct of a plebiscite for its ratification. In a similar fashion, herein petitioner
Umali itemized the adverse effects of Cabanatuan Citys conversion to the
province of Nueva Ecija to justify the provinces participation in the plebiscite
to be conducted.

Often raised is that Cabanatuan Citys conversion into an HUC and its
severance from Nueva Ecija will result in the reduction of the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the province based on Sec. 285 of the LGC. The
law states:
Section 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. - The share of local
government units in the internal revenue allotment shall be collected in the
following manner:

IRA Share of
Nueva Ecija

Actual IRA
Share

Estimated IRA
share excluding
Cabanatuan
City

Reduction

Based on
Population

P800,772,618.45

P688,174,751.66

P112,597,866.79

Based on Land
Area

P263,470,472.62

P250,517,594.56

P 12,952,878.06

Total

(a) Provinces - Twenty-three percent (23%);

(b) Cities - Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities - Thirty-four percent (34%); and
(d) Barangays - Twenty percent (20%)
Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality
shall be determined on the basis of the following formula:
(a) Population - Fifty percent (50%);
(b) Land Area - Twenty-five percent (25%); and
(c) Equal sharing - Twenty-five percent (25%)
In our earlier disquisitions, we have explained that the conversion into an
HUC carries the accessory of substantial alteration of boundaries and that
the province of Nueva Ecija will, without a doubt, suffer a reduction in territory
because of the severance of Cabanatuan City. The residents of the city will
cease to be political constituencies of the province, effectively reducing the
latters population. Taking this decrease in territory and population in
connection with the above formula, it is conceded that Nueva Ecija will
indeed suffer a reduction in IRA given the decrease of its multipliers values.
As assessed by the Regional Director of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) for Region III:25

Clear as crystal is that the province of Nueva Ecija will suffer a substantial
reduction of its share in IRA once Cabanatuan City attains autonomy. In view
of the economic impact of Cabanatuan Citys conversion, petitioner Umalis
contention, that its effect on the province is not only direct but also adverse,
deserves merit.

P125,550,744.85

Moreover, his claim that the province will lose shares in provincial taxes
imposed in Cabanatuan City is well-founded. This is based on Sec. 151 of
the LGC, which states:
SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. Except as otherwise provided in
this Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province
or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and
charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent
component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the
provisions of this Code. (emphasis added)
Once converted, the taxes imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself. Prior to
this, the province enjoys the prerogative to impose and collect taxes such as
those on sand, gravel and other quarry resources, 26 professional taxes,27 and
amusement taxes28 over the component city. While, it may be argued that this
is not a derogation of the provinces taxing power because it is in no way
deprived of its right to collect the mentioned taxes from the rest of its territory,
the conversion will still reduce the provinces taxing jurisdiction, and corollary
to this, it will experience a corresponding decrease in shares in local tax
collections. This reduction in both taxing jurisdiction and shares poses a
material and substantial change to the provinces economic rights, warranting
its participation in the plebiscite.
To further exemplify the impact of these changes, a perusal of Secs. 452(a)
and 461(a) of the LGC is in order, viz:

Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities.

(a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office, and within the latest
annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices, as certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as
highly urbanized cities.
Section 461. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
Basis for IRA
Computation

Province of
Nueva Ecija

Cabanatuan
City

Province of
Nueva Ecija Net
of Cabanatuan
City

1,843,853

259,267

259,267

No. of Population
CY 2007 Census
Land Area
(sq. km.)

5,751.33

282.75

5,468.58

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation
to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
A component citys conversion into an HUC and its resultant autonomy from
the province is a threat to the latters economic viability. Noteworthy is that
the income criterion for a component city to be converted into an HUC is
higher than the income requirement for the creation of a province. The
ensuing reduction in income upon separation would clearly leave a crippling
effect on the provinces operations as there would be less funding to finance
infrastructure projects and to defray overhead costs. Moreover, the quality of
services being offered by the province may suffer because of looming
austerity measures. These are but a few of the social costs of the decline in

the provinces economic performance, which Nueva Ecija is bound to

experience once its most progressive city of Cabanatuan attains
independence.
c. Impact on Political Rights
Aside from the alteration of economic rights, the political rights of Nueva
Ecija and those of its residents will also be affected by Cabanatuans
conversion into an HUC. Notably, the administrative supervision of the
province over the city will effectively be revoked upon conversion. Secs. 4
and 12, Art. X of the Constitution read:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Sec 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters
of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such
prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial
officials.
Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to
Cabanatuan City if it is converted into an HUC. This includes the right to be
outside the general supervision of the province and be under the direct
supervision of the President. An HUC is not subject to provincial oversight
because the complex and varied problems in an HUC due to a bigger
population and greater economic activity require greater autonomy. 29 The
provincial government stands to lose the power to ensure that the local
government officials of Cabanatuan City act within the scope of its prescribed
powers and functions,30 to review executive orders issued by the city mayor,
and to approve resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council. 31 The
province will also be divested of jurisdiction over disciplinary cases
concerning the elected city officials of the new HUC, and the appeal process
for administrative case decisions against barangay officials of the city will
also be modified accordingly.32 Likewise, the registered voters of the city will
no longer be entitled to vote for and be voted upon as provincial officials. 33
In cutting the umbilical cord between Cabanatuan City and the province of
Nueva Ecija, the city will be separated from the territorial jurisdiction of the
province, as earlier explained. The provincial government will no longer be
responsible for delivering basic services for the city residents benefit.

Ordinances and resolutions passed by the provincial council will no longer

cover the city. Projects queued by the provincial government to be executed
in the city will also be suspended if not scrapped to prevent the LGU from
performing functions outside the bounds of its territorial jurisdiction, and from
expending its limited resources for ventures that do not cater to its
constituents.1wphi1
In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the province
of Nueva Ecija and its residents, the entire province certainly stands to be
directly affected by the conversion of Cabanatuan City into an HUC.
Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the qualified registered voters
of Nueva Ecija should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called
for that purpose.
Respondents apprehension that requiring the entire province to participate in
the plebiscite will set a dangerous precedent leading to the failure of cities to
convert is unfounded. Their fear that provinces will always be expected to
oppose the conversion in order to retain the citys dependence is speculative
at best. In any event, any vote of disapproval cast by those directly affected
by the conversion is a valid exercise of their right to suffrage, and our
democratic processes are designed to uphold the decision of the majority,
regardless of the motive behind the vote. It is unfathomable how the province
can be deprived of the opportunity to exercise the right of suffrage in a matter
that is potentially deleterious to its economic viability and could diminish the
rights of its constituents. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas
to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as
allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded
against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority
rule.34
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 203974, is hereby GRANTED. COMELEC Minute Resolution No.
12-0797 dated September 11, 2012 and Minute Resolution No. 12-0925
dated October 16, 2012 are hereby declared NULL and VOID. Public
respondent COMELEC is hereby enjoined from implementing the said
Resolutions. Additionally, COMELEC is hereby ordered to conduct a
plebiscite for the purpose of converting Cabanatuan City into a Highly
Urbanized City to be participated in by the qualified registered voters of
Nueva Ecij a within 120 days from the finality of this Decision. The Petition
for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 204371, is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182867

November 25, 2008

ROBERTO
LACEDA,
SR., petitioner,
vs.
RANDY L. LIMENA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
From this Court's June 10, 2008 Resolution 1 dismissing his petition for
certiorari, petitioner Roberto Laceda, Sr. filed the instant motion for
reconsideration,2 insisting that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Resolutions dated
January 15, 20083and May 7, 20084 in SPA No. 07-028 (BRGY).
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Roberto Laceda, Sr., and private respondent Randy L. Limena
were candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, West District,
Sorsogon City, during the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections. On October 23, 2007, Limena filed a petition for
disqualification and/or declaration as an ineligible candidate 5 against Laceda
before the COMELEC, contending that Laceda had already served as
Punong Barangay for Brgy. Panlayaan for three consecutive terms since
1994, and was thus prohibited from running for the fourth time under Section
2 of Republic Act No. 91646 which provides:
SEC. 2. Term of Office.-The term of office of all barangay and
sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be
three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, That the
term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections.
Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official was elected.
Limena likewise attached the following certification from the Department of
the Interior and Local Government:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that per records in this office HON. ROBERTO

LACEDA, SR., incumbent Punong Barangay of Panlayaan, West
District, Sorsogon City. was elected as Punong Barangay during
the May 9, 1994, May 12, 1997 and July 15, 2002 Barangay
Elections. He resigned from office on March 20, 1995 to run as
Municipal Councilor. Hence, he is covered by the three-term rule of
paragraph 2, Section 2 of RA 9164 which provides that: "No
barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position: Provided, however, that the
term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay
elections.Voluntary renunciation of office [for] any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official was elected."7
xxxx
In his Answer,8 Laceda admitted having served as Punong Barangay of
Panlayaan for three consecutive terms. However, he asserted that when he
was elected for his first two terms, Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that
when he served his third term, the Municipality of Sorsogon had already
been merged with the Municipality of Bacon to form a new political unit, the
City of Sorsogon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8806. 9 Thus, he argued that
his third term was actually just his first in the new political unit and that he
was accordingly entitled to run for two more terms.
Laceda likewise argued that assuming he had already served three
consecutive terms, Rep. Act No. 9164 which imposes the three-term limit,
cannot be made to apply to him as it would violate his vested right to office.
He alleged that when he was elected in 1994 the prohibition did not exist.
Had he known that there will be a law preventing him to run for the fourth
time, he would not have run for office in 1994 as he was looking forward to
the election in 2007.10
On January 15, 2008, the COMELEC declared Laceda disqualified and
cancelled his certificate of candidacy:
WHEREFORE, this
Commission RESOLVED,
as
it
hereby RESOLVED, to declare Respondent Roberto Laceda,
Sr. DISQUALIFIED from running as Punong Barangay of Panlayaan,
West District, Sorsogon City and consequently denies due course
and cancels his Certificate of Candidacy.

SO ORDERED.11
Laceda moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the
COMELEC in a Resolution dated May 7, 2008. Aggrieved, Laceda filed a
petition for certiorari before this Court.
On June 10, 2008, this Court dismissed the petition for failure to sufficiently
show that any grave abuse of discretion was committed by the COMELEC in
rendering the assailed Resolutions of January 15, 2008 and May 7, 2008.
Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
Laceda insists that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
basing its decision on the requisites enunciated in Lonzanida v. Commission
on Elections12 for the application of the three-term prohibition in Section
4313 of the Local Government Code.14 Laceda argues that said case is
inapplicable since it involved the position of municipal mayor while the instant
case concerned the position of Punong Barangay. He likewise insists that he
served his third term in a new political unit and therefore he should not be
deemed already to have served a third term as Punong Barangay for
purposes of applying the three-term limit.15
For reasons hereafter discussed, the motion for reconsideration cannot
prosper.

inhabitants of the barangay are the same. They are the same group of voters
who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three consecutive
terms and over whom Laceda held power and authority as their Punong
Barangay. Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt Laceda's term.
In Latasa v. Commission on Elections,17 which involved a similar question,
this Court held that where a person has been elected for three consecutive
terms as a municipal mayor and prior to the end or termination of such threeyear term the municipality has been converted by law into a city, without the
city charter interrupting his term until the end of the three-year term, the
prohibition applies to prevent him from running for the fourth time as city
mayor thereof, there being no break in the continuity of the terms.
Thus, conformably with the democratic intent of Rep. Act No. 9164 and this
Court's ruling in Latasa v. Commission on Elections, we hold that the
prohibition in Section 2 of said statute applies to Laceda. The COMELEC did
not err nor commit any abuse of discretion when it declared him disqualified
and cancelled his certificate of candidacy.
WHEREFORE, petitioner
Roberto
Laceda,
Sr.'s
Motion
for
Reconsideration18 dated July 25, 2008 assailing this Court's Resolution dated
June 10, 2008 is DENIED with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.

Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, like Section 43 of the Local Government
Code from which it was taken, is primarily intended to broaden the choices of
the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new
blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same
office after a term of nine years. This Court has held that for the prohibition to
apply, two requisites must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and
(2) that he or she has fully served three consecutive terms. 16
In this case, while it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of
Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and converted into a city thereby
abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it
cannot be said that for the purpose of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of
Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Panlayaan, Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different
local government post as that of the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Panlayaan, Sorsogon City. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan,
Sorsogon City, is the same as before the conversion. Consequently, the

G.R. Nos. 152151-52

January 22, 2003

SAADUDDIN
M.
ALAUYA,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SHALIMAR H. TAMANO and USMAN T.
SARANGANI, respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to
nullify the Orders of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC" for
brevity) en banc dated January 2, 2002 and February 19, 2002 in SPA Nos.
01454 and 01455 (ARMM). The January 2, 2002 Order directed the
Provincial Board of Canvassers not to proclaim the winning candidates for
regional assemblyman in the 2nd District of Lanao del Sur, while the
February 19, 2002 Order denied the motion to dismiss SPA Nos. 01454 and
01455 (ARMM).

municipalities. Tamano also claimed that in almost all of the precincts in

these 5 municipalities, either petitioner Saaddudin M. Alauya, Jr. ("Alauya" for
brevity) or private respondent Usman T. Sarangani ("Sarangani" for brevity)
obtained 100% of the votes such that their votes equalled the total number of
registered voters. Tamano prayed for the suspension of proclamation of the
winning candidates. Alauya filed his Answer with Motion to Dismiss.
Sarangani filed his Answer and Opposition to the Suspension of
Proclamation.
The special elections in Lumbatan proceeded as scheduled on January 7,
2002. The Provincial Board of Canvassers canvassed the election returns.
The results of the canvass of Lumbatan and of the other 20 municipalities
showed Menor as the No. 1 winning candidate followed by Sarangani in the
No. 2 spot and Alauya in the No. 3 spot, as follows:

1. MENOR

47,729

2. SARANGANI

47,603

3. ALAUYA

46,737

4. BALINDONG

41,773

5. TAMANO

40,849

The Facts
Regular elections for regional governor, regional vice-governor, and
members of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao ("ARMM" for brevity) were held on November 26, 2001.
The first three (3) candidates for assemblyman of the ARMM receiving the
highest number of votes in each legislative district of the province were to be
proclaimed winners.
The 2nd District of the province of Lanao del Sur is composed of 21
municipalities. There was a failure of election in the municipality of Lumbatan
necessitating the holding of special elections in Lumbatan on January 7,
2002. Nevertheless, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Alexander Menor ("Menor" for brevity), who garnered the highest number of
votes based on the results of the 20 other municipalities. Considering the
number of registered voters in Lumbatan, the special elections would not
affect Menor's election as regional assemblyman.
On December 21, 2001, private respondent Shalimar H. Tamano ("Tamano"
for brevity) filed two (2) petitions, docketed as SPA Nos. 01454 and 01455,
to declare a failure of election in the 5 municipalities of Madalum, Madamba,
Sultan Gumander, Bacolod Kalawi, and Bayang of the province of Lanao del
Sur. Tamano claimed there was massive substitute voting in these 5

On January 7, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued the order directing "the
Provincial Board of Canvassers NOT to proclaim the alleged or supposed
winners and to continue and complete the canvass of election results in the
Second District of Lanao del Sur."
On January 9, 2002, Alauya filed a Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation
with the COMELEC. Sarangani followed suit with a similar motion on January
28, 2002. Alauya filed three (3) motions on January 24, 31, and February 6,

2002, praying for the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss and the Motions to
Lift the Suspension of Proclamation.
In its order dated February 19, 2002, the COMELEC resolved to assume
jurisdiction and to continue hearing SPA Nos. 01454 and 01455. The
COMELEC also considered the motion to lift suspension of proclamation
submitted for resolution.
Alauya filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order on March 1,
2002. On March 5, 2002, the Court required the respondents to comment on
the petition.
On March 12, 2002, Alauya filed a motion reiterating the prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order. On March 19, 2002, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order directing the COMELEC "to CEASE and
DESIST from implementing the order of January 7, 2002 in SPA No. 01454
and SPA No. 01455 which suspended the proclamation insofar only as the
petitioner (Alauya) is concerned."

ELECTION CODE PROVIDES THAT THE COMELEC COULD ONLY

SUSPEND PROCLAMATION "AFTER DUE NOTICE AND
HEARING." x x x;
3. THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER SPA NOS. 01
454 AND 01455 SEEKING TO ANNUL THE ELECTIONS OF THE 5
MUNICIPALITIES BECAUSE SEC. 3 OF R.A. 7647 PROHIBITS
"PRE-PROCLAMATION CASES" IN THE ELECTIONS OF
REGIONAL ASSEMBLYMAN OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION OF
MUSLIM MINDANAO.
Simply put, the issues posed for resolution by this Court are: (1) whether the
Order dated January 7, 2002 was issued in violation of due process of law;
(2) whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over SPA Nos. 01454 and 01
455; and (3) whether the order suspending proclamation of the "alleged"
winning candidates is void because the results of the 5 municipalities do not
affect Alauya's election as No. 3 Regional Assemblyman of the ARMM.

Meanwhile, Sarangani filed his comment joining Alauya in his petition praying
for the setting, aside of the subject COMELEC orders. Specifically, Sarangani
prays that the order suspending proclamation be extended to him so he may
also take his oath and assume office as regional assembly member.

The Solicitor General, for his part, maintains that the petition should be
dismissed for lack of merit for the following reasons: (1) there was no
violation of due process since Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code
empowers the COMELEC to motu proprio suspend the proclamation or annul
the proclamation if one has already been made as the evidence shall
warrant; (2) Alauya confuses a pre-proclamation controversy with a petition
to declare a failure of election or to annul election results; and that (3) the
COMELEC has the constitutional authority to declare a failure of election
pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution and in
accordance with Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4 of
R.A. 7166.

The Issues

The Court's Ruling

Alauya attributes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess

of jurisdiction to the COMELEC for the following reasons:

First issue: whether the order dated January 7, 2002 was issued in violation
of due process of law.

1. THE RESULTS OF THE 5 MUNICIPALITIES SOUGHT TO BE

ANNULLED DO NOT AFFECT THE ELECTION OF THE
PETITIONER AS THE NO. 3 WINNING REGIONAL ASSEMBLYMAN
OF THE 2ND DISTRICT OF LANAO DEL SUR. SEC. 20 (i) AND
SEC. 21, OF R.A. 7166 SPECIFICALLY PROVIDE THAT A
WINNING CANDIDATE SHALL BE PROCLAIMED IF THE ISSUES
RAISED DO NOT AFFECT THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTION;

Alauya claims that the COMELEC did not notify him of any hearing
conducted prior to the issuance of the order dated January 7, 2002 in
violation of Section 242 1 which requires notice and hearing prior to the
suspension of proclamation.

Based on the restraining order of the Court, the Provincial Board of

Canvassers proclaimed Alauya who took his oath and has already assumed
the position of Regional Assemblyman of the Regional Legislative Assembly
of the ARMM.

2. THE ORDER OF JANUARY 7, 2002 WAS ISSUED IN VIOLATION

OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW. SEC. 242 OF THE OMNIBUS

A party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due process if he was

accorded the opportunity of a hearing, through either oral arguments or
pleadings. 2 There is no denial of due process when a party is given an
opportunity through his pleadings. 3

We find no breach of Alauya's right to due process. Contrary to Alauya's

claim, it appears that notices dated December 21, 2001 were given to all
concerned parties requiring them to file their answer to the petition and
setting the case for hearing, on January 4, 2002. In an Order dated January
4, 2002, the COMELEC noted that Alauya did not appear during the hearing.
Subsequently, Alauya filed his Answer with Motion to Dismiss to the petitions.
Verily, Alauya was given an opportunity to be heard during the hearing held
on January 4, 2002 which he failed to attend and was in fact heard through
the pleadings he filed with the COMELEC.
Second issue: whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over SPA Nos. 01
454 and 01455.
Alauya questions the power and authority of the COMELEC to take
cognizance and act on SPA Nos. 01454 and 01455 on the ground that
"pre-proclamation cases" in the election of regional assemblyman in the
ARMM are not allowed by Section 3 of R.A. 7647 4 and Section 15 of R.A.
7166. 5
Alauya erroneously considers SPA Nos. 01454 and 01455 as preproclamation controversies. These petitions were filed under Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code 6 for a declaration of failure of election. The petitions
clearly state their nature, as they are denominated "IN THE MATTER OF
THE PETITION TO DECLARE A FAILURE OF ELECTIONS OR TO ANNUL
THE RESULTS OF ELECTIONS IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF SULTAN
GUMANDER, MADAMBA, BACOLOD KALAWI AND BAYANG, ALL IN THE
2ND DISTRICT OF THE PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR, AUTONOMOUS
REGION OF MUSLIM MINDANAO" on account of the "widespread, massive
and rampant substitute voting and other electoral fraud, anomalies and
irregularities which prevented duly registered voters from actually voting in
the regional elections."
Dagloc v. Commission on Election 7 reiterates the well-settled rule that an
action for declaration of failure of election cannot be confused with a preproclamation controversy, thus:
"In Matalam vs. COMELEC, it was held that an action for a
declaration of the failure of election is not in the nature of a preproclamation controversy. The distinction between the two actions
was discussed by the Court in Loong vs. COMELEC in this wise:
While, however, the COMELEC, is restricted in preproclamation cases, to an examination of the election returns
on their face and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or
behind them and investigate election irregularities, the

COMELEC is duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud,

terrorism, violence and other analogous causes in actions for
annulment of election results or for declaration of failure of
elections, as the Omnibus Election Code denominates the
same. Thus, the COMELEC, in the case of actions for
annulment of election results or declaration of failure of
elections, may conduct technical examination of election
documents and compare and analyze voters' signatures and
fingerprints in order to determine whether or not the
elections had indeed been free, honest and clean. Needless
to say, a pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an
action for annulment of election results or declaration of
failure of elections."
Hence, we find that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in assuming jurisdiction over said petitions.
Third issue: whether the suspension of proclamation is void because the
results
of the 5 municipalities do not affect Alauya's election.
According to Alauya, the results of the canvassing of the election returns
from the 21 municipalities of the 2nd District of Lanao del Sur show that he is
the No. 3 winning regional assemblyman as follows:

1. MENOR

47,729

2. SARANGANI

47,603

3. ALAUYA

46,737

4. BALINDONG

41,773

5. TAMANO

40,849

The results of the canvassing of the election returns of the 5 municipalities

sought to be annulled by Tamano are as follows:

Alauya argues that the above results of the 5 municipalities do not affect his
election as the No. 3 winning Regional Assemblyman of the ARMM. Without
the 5 municipalities, the results are:

not be determined from the figures submitted by Alauya as some registered

voters may have voted for three, two or only one candidate. There is no
certainty that the election results in the 5 municipalities, before or after the
special elections, will not affect the results in the 16 other municipalities
absent any allegation on the total number of registered voters in the
contested municipalities.

MUNICIPALI
TY

MENOR

SARANGANI

ALAUYA

BALINDONG

TAMANO

1. MENOR

42,548

2. TAMANO

37,959

MADALUM

301

4,970

691

1,931

465

3. ALAUYA

36,680

S.
GUMANDE
R

470

4,197

871

6,358

533

4. SARANGANI

30,915
MADAMBA

968

6,106

515

1,384

598

B. KALAWI

406

252

2,428

1,352

196

BAYANG

3,036

1,163

5,552

1,022

1,098

TOTAL

5,181

16,668

10,057

12,047

2,890

5. BALINDONG

29,726

Alauya invokes Section 20 (i) 8 and Section 21 9 of R.A. 7166 which provide
that a winning candidate must be proclaimed if the issues raised do not affect
the results of the election. Moreover, he contends that the proclamation of
the winning candidates will not deprive the COMELEC of its authority to
continue hearing the petitions to declare a failure of election in the 5
municipalities.
These figures are not controverted by Tamano or the Solicitor General acting
on behalf of the COMELEC. However, simply deducting the election results
of the 5 municipalities from the election results of the other 16 municipalities
does not necessarily establish Alauya's theory that the over-all election
results will not change. In case the COMELEC declares a failure of election
in the 5 municipalities, special elections will have to be conducted. We
cannot discount the possibility that the results of the special elections may
still change the standing of the candidates. There is no allegation as to how
many registered voters there are in the 5 municipalities. The number could

Nevertheless, the COMELEC has already proclaimed Alexander Menor as

the No. 1 winning candidate. The court issued a temporary restraining order
directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the
suspension of proclamation insofar as Alauya is concerned. Thus, Alauya
has since been proclaimed, took his oath and assumed office. This Court has
emphasized that public policy frowns on attempts to "grab-the-proclamation

and prolong-the protest." 10 However, this policy has to be balanced against

the clear and present dangers created by a lengthy period of nonproclamation of winners, a period commonly fraught with tension and danger
for the public at large. 11
Impleaded as private respondent in this petition, Sarangani, in his comment
to the petition, seeks, affirmative reliefs similar to those prayed for by Alauya,
including the nullification of the order suspending proclamation. The Court
cannot grant Sarangani any affirmative relief as he did not file a petition
questioning the orders of the COMELEC. As Sarangani did not contest the
orders of the COMELEC before this Court through a petition for certiorari, no
affirmative relief can be sought by him. 12 It is axiomatic that a party who does
not ordinarily appeal, or as in this case file a petition for certiorari, from the
orders of the COMELEC, is not entitled to any affirmative relief. 13
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, The COMELEC is directed to act
with deliberate speed in resolving the petitions to annul the elections or
declare a failure of elections in the 5 municipalities. If the COMELEC does
not declare a failure of election, the proclamation of the winning candidates
should be done with utmost dispatch based on the canvassed election
returns from the 21 municipalities of the 2nd District of Lanao del Sur.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 132603

September 18, 2000

ELPIDIO M. SALVA, VILMA B. DE LEON, CLEMENTE M. MATIRA,

REGION P. DE LEON, MARILOU C. DE LEON, JAIME RELEVO, JOEY S.
VERGARA, CARMENCITA A. SALVA, DIONISIO B. DE LEON, JORGE S.
VERGARA, GORGONIO B. DE LEON, AND OTHERS TOO NUMEROUS
TO
ENUMERATE
AS
A
CLASS
SUIT,petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Br. XI, Balayan, Batangas; HON. SANGGUNIANG PANGLALA
WIGAN OF BATANGAS, BATANGAS CITY; HON. SANGGUNIANG
PANGBAYAN, CALACA, BATANGAS; and HON. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
the reversal of the Order dated February 25, 1998, 1 of the Regional Trial
Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, 2 in Civil Case No. 3442, denying the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to
enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from holding the plebiscite
scheduled on February 28, 1998, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The facts are undisputed.
On February 23, 1998, petitioners, as officials and residents of barangay San
Rafael, Calaca, Batangas, filed a class suit against the Sangguniang
Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas,
and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), docketed as Civil Case No.
3442, before the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, for
annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, series of 1997, both
enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987, series of 199S, with prayer for preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining order. Ordinance No. 05 3 declared the
abolition ofbarangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao,
municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC
to conduct the required plebiscite as provided under Sections 9 and 10 of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991.4 On the other hand, Resolution No. 345 5affirmed the effectivity of
Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto 6 exercised by the governor of
Batangas.7Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the governor of Batangas for
being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the essential

requirements under Section 9, in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No.

7160, referring to the attestations or certifications of the Department of
Finance (DOF), National Statistics Office (NSO) and the Land Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
were obtained. Pursuant to the foregoing ordinance and resolution, on
February 10, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987,
providing for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required
plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of the
abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangayDacanlao,
Calaca, Batangas.8 Simultaneous with the filing of the action before the trial
court, petitioners also filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enjoin respondents from enforcing Ordinance
No. 05, Resolution No. 345, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.
In an Order dated February 25, 1998, the trial court denied the ex
parte motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction. According to the trial court, the
temporary restraining order/injunction sought by petitioners is directed only to
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. The trial court ruled that any petition or
action questioning an act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be
brought before the Supreme Court.9
On February 27, 1998, petitioners filed the instant petition with prayer for a
temporary restraining order, without filing a motion for reconsideration of the
trial court's Order dated February 25, 1998, claiming the urgency or
immediate necessity to enjoin the conduct of the plebiscite scheduled on
February 28, 1998.10
In a Resolution dated March 10, 1998, the Court directed the parties to
maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition. 11
On August 28, 1998, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion
in lieu of Comment, declaring that he concurs with petitioners' cause and
recommending that the instant petition be given due course. 12 Consequently,
the Court further resolved on September 29, 1998 to require the COMELEC
and the Sangguniang Panglalawiganof Batangas to submit their own
Comment on the petition.
In a Resolution dated June 15, 1999, the Court resolved to give due course
to the petition and require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.13

In their Memorandum filed on October 26, 1999, petitioners submitted the

following issue for the resolution of this Court:
"WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS
JURISDICTION
TO
ENJOIN
THE
COMELEC
FROM
IMPLEMENTING ITS RESOLUTION NO. 2987, SERIES OF 1998,
WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR
THE CONDUCT OF THE PLEBISCITE SCHEDULED ON
FEBRUARY 28, 1998 TO DECIDE ON THE ABOLITION OF
BARANGAY SAN RAFAEL AND ITS MERGER WITH BARANGAY
DACANLAO,
CALACA,
BATANGAS,
PENDING
THE
DETERMINATION OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3442 FOR THE
ANNULMENT OF ORDINANCE NO. 05, RESOLUTION NO. 345
AND COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2987."14
First, petitioners contend that the assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, of
the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, encourages
multiplicity of suit[s] and splitting a single cause of action," contrary to Section
3, Rule 2, of the Rules of Court.15 Petitioners maintain that since COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 was only issued pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and
Resolution No. 345 of the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, the
propriety of the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is dependent
upon the validity of the Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345. 16 And
considering that the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear and determine the
validity of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 is not disputed, the
assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, directing petitioners to seek the
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before this Court,
advances multiplicity of suits and splitting a single cause of action.
Second, petitioners assert that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi
judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881), its acts are subject to the exclusive review by this
Court; but when the COMELEC performs a purely ministerial but, such act is
subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court, 17 citing Filipinas Engineering
and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), thus:
"It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested by the Constitution and
the law on the Commission on Elections may either be classified as
those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or
those which are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial
in character."'18

Corollary thereto, petitioners submit that "[t]he conduct of [a] plebiscite,

pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory [or
quasi judicial] in nature but simply ministerial or administrative in nature [and
only] in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution," citing Garces
vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99 (1996), thus:
". . . To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial
administrative questions that are best ventilated before the RTC
[Regional Trial Court], a court which the law vests with the power to
exercise original jurisdiction over 'all cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi judicial functions'."19
Lastly, petitioners allege that while the plebiscite sought to be enjoined has
already been conducted on February 28, 1998, the instant petition is far from
being moot and academic, claiming that the actual holding of the said
plebiscite could not validate an otherwise invalid ordinance and
resolution;20 that
there
are
still
substantial
matters
to
be
resolved;21 assuming arguendo that this petition has become moot and
academic, ". . . courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if
it is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review"'; 22 and finally, petitioners
maintain that this Court has resolved to require the parties to maintain the
status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition, that is, a day
before the plebiscite was scheduled to be conducted. 23
Concurring with petitioners' arguments, the Solicitor General, in his
Memorandum filed on September 7, 1999, asserts that ". . . [I]t is already
settled in this jurisdiction that what is contemplated by the terms 'any
decision, order or ruling' of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari to this
Honorable Court, as provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the [1987]
Constitution, are those that relate to the COMELEC's exercise of
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving elective regional, provincial
and city officials." (Citations omitted.)24 The Solicitor General further argues
that the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is a ministerial duty of
the COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative functions, hence, it is
submitted that the aforecited constitutional provision is inapplicable.
Public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on the other hand,
submits that the power to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987
solely belongs to this Court, citing the earlier cases of Zaldivar vs.
Estenzo (23 SCRA 533, 540-541[1968]); Luison vs. Garcia (L-10916, May
20, 1957); Macud vs. COMELEC (23 SCRA 224 [1968]); and Aratuc vs.
COMELEC (88 SCRA 251, 272 [1979]);25 thus:

". . . For even without the express constitutional prescription that only
this Court may review the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission on Elections, it is easy to understand why no
interference whatsoever with the performance of the Commission on
Elections of its functions should be allowed unless emanating from
this Court. The observation of Acting Chief Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
Albano v. Arranz while not precisely in point, indicates the proper
approach. Thus: 'It is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if
the Court of First Instance of each and every province were to
arrogate unto itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict
any order of the Commission on Elections; that constitutional body
would be speedily reduced to impotence."26
The COMELEC further argues that ". . . if a Regional Trial Court does not
have jurisdiction to issue writs against statutory agencies of government like
the ones cited above [referring to the former Court of Industrial Relations,
Philippine Patent Office, Public Service Commission, Social Security
Commission, National Electrification Administration and Presidential
Commission on Good Government], a fortiori it can not have any such
jurisdiction over the Commission on Elections, a constitutional independent
body expressly clothed by the 1987 Constitution with, among others, quasijudicial functions and tasked with one of the most paramount aspects of a
democratic government. . . ."27 Finally, the COMELEC contends that the
temporary restraining order sought by petitioners has been rendered moot
and academic by the actual holding of the plebiscite sought to be enjoined. 28
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that:
"SECTION 7. . . . . Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or
by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within this days from receipt of a copy thereof."
In Garces vs. Court of Appeals (259 SCRA 99 [1996]) and Filipinas
Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer(135 SCRA 25 [1985]), we found
occasion to interpret the foregoing provision in this wise:
". . . What is contemplated by the term 'final orders, rulings and
decisions' of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or

proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the

said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers."29
In Filipinas, we have likewise affirmed that powers vested by the Constitution
and the law on the Commission on Elections may either be classified as
those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which
are inherently administrative and sometimes ministerial in character.30
As aptly explained by the Solicitor General, in the instant case, after the
COMELEC ascertained the issuance of the ordinance and resolution
declaring the abolition of barangay San Rafael, it issued COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 calling for a plebiscite to be held in the
affected barangays, pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 7160. We agree with the Solicitor General that ". . . . [t]he issuance of
[COMELEC] Resolution No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC
that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of itsadministrative functions. It
involves no exercise of discretionary authority on the part of respondent
COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to
hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of partylitigants, relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and the
enforcement of the election laws." (Citation omitted.) 31 Briefly, COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing
the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the
COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said
resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by
this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be
well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
Even the cases cited by the public respondent in support of its contention
that the power to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely
belongs to this Court are simply not in point. Zaldivar vs. Estenzo32 speaks of
the power of the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections to the exclusion of the judiciary. In the present case,
petitioners are not contesting the exclusive authority of the COMELEC to
enforce and administer election laws. Luison vs. Garcia33 refers to this
Court's power to review "administrative decisions," particularly referring to a
COMELEC resolution declaring a certain certificate of candidacy null and
void, based on Article X, Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution. In Macud vs.
COMELEC,34 we reiterated that when a board of canvassers rejects an
election return on the ground that it is spurious or has been tampered with,
the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to the COMELEC for appropriate

relief, and if the COMELEC sustains the action of the board, the aggrieved
party may appeal to this Court. In both Luison and Macud, the assailed
COMELEC resolutions fall within the purview of "final orders, rulings and
decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by this Court.
In view of the foregoing, public respondent's other contentions deserve scant
consideration.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed
Order dated February 25, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan,
Batangas, Branch XI is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. The Regional
Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI is ordered to proceed with
dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. 3442. The execution of the result of the
plebiscite held on February 28, 1998 shall be deferred depending on the
outcome of Civil Case No. 3442.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131499 November 17, 1999

Hermie M. Herrera, Donabella T. Sorongon, Julio T. Tamayor, Edeljulio
R.
Romero, petitioners,
vs.
The Commission on Elections, respondent.

PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside Resolution No. 2950
promulgated on November 3, 1997 by respondent Commission on Elections,
which amended its Resolution Nos. 2379, 2396 and 2778 on the districting
and adjustment of Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Panglungsod seats in
connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, on the alleged ground of grave
abuse of discretion tainting the same. In particular, petitioners, as taxpayers,
assail the portion of subject Resolution dividing the Province of Guimaras
into two provincial districts and apportioning eight (8) elective Sangguniang
Panlalawigan seats therefor.

2. The Second District shall be composed of

the Municipalities of Jordan, Nueva Valencia
and Sibunag with three (3) Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Members.
On October 3, 1996, guided by the result of the consultative meetings, the
Provincial Election Supervisor issued a Memorandum recommending the
division of the Province of Guimaras into two (2) provincial districts.
On April 30, 1997, the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the
Department of Finance issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-1 reclassifying
several provinces including the Province of Guimaras, which was reclassified
from fifth class to fourth class province.
In line with such reclassification, the Commission on Elections issued, on
November 3, 1997, the Resolution No. 2950 under attack, which allotted
eight (8) Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to the Province of Guimaras,
dividing it into two provincial districts in the following manner:
Region VI

The facts that matter are as follows:

1. GUIMARAS 126,470 (8 seats)

In view of the addition of the two (2) new municipalities, San Lorenzo and
Sibunag, to the Province of Guimaras, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Guimaras decided to have the province subdivided into two provincial
districts. Conformably, on March 25, 1996, it passed Resolution No. 68
requesting the Commission on Elections to bring about the desired division.

1st District 56,218 2nd District 70,252

Acting upon the said Resolution, the Provincial Election Supervisor in the
Province of Guimaras conducted two consultative meetings on August 21,
1996 and on October 2 of the same year, with due notice to all elected
provincial and municipal officials, barangay captains, barangay kagawads,
representatives of all political parties, and other interested parties. Through
secret balloting, a consensus was reached unanimously in favor of a division
as follows:

2. San Lorenzo 18,537 2. Nueva Valencia

27,158

1. First District shall be composed of the

Municipalities of Jordan Buenavista and San
Diego
with
three
(3) Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Members, and

(3 seats) (5 seats)
1. Buenavista 37,681 1. Jordan 25,321

3. Sibunag 17,773
Resolution No. 2950 of the Commission on Elections is the subject of the
present Petition for Certiorari brought by the petitioners, as taxpayers and
residents of the Province of Guimaras.
Petitioners question the manner in which the province was so divided into
districts, pointing out that: 1) the districts do not comprise a compact,
contiguous and adjacent area; 2) the "consultative meeting" upon which the
districting was based did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the

province; 3) the apportionment of the province into two districts is not

equitable, and 4) there is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a
Board Member represents. Petitioners propose that the province be
redistricted as follows:

All other municipalities shall have the same number of

elective members as provided in existing laws.
Thus, a fourth class province under R.A. 6636 shall have eight Sangguniang
Panlalawigan members.

FIRST DISTRICT 63,002 voters

In relation thereto, Republic Act No. 7166 2 reads:
(4 seats)
Buenavista 37,681
Jordan 25,321
resulting in a ratio of one (1) Board member per 15,000 voters
SECOND DISTRICT 63,468 VOTERS
(4 seats)
Nueva Valencia 27,158
Sibunag 17,773
San Lorenzo 18,537
resulting in a ratio of one (1) Board member per 15,696 voters,
pointing out that such redistricting is more in accordance with
provisions of law and the Constitution.
The division of provinces into districts and the corresponding apportionment,
by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan are provided for by law. Under Republic Act No.
6636, 1 allotment of elective members to provinces and municipalities must
be made on the basis of its classification as a province and/or municipality.
Section 4 of R.A. 6636 provides:
Sec. 4 Provinces and Municipalities First and second
class provinces shall each have ten (10) elective members;
third and fourth class provinces, eight; and fifth and sixth
class provinces, six to be elected at large by the qualified
voters therein.

Sec. 3 (b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district,
the Commission shall divide them into two (2) districts for
purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, as nearly as practicable according to the
number of inhabitants, each district comprising a compact,
contiguous and adjacent territory, and the number of seats of
elective members of their respective sanggunian shall be
equitably apportioned between the districts in accordance
with the immediately preceding paragraph;
xxx xxx xxx
A province with only one legislative district, such as Guimaras, should
therefore be divided into two provincial districts.
It must be noted that on April 30, 1997, the Province of Guimaras was reclassified from a fifth class to a fourth class province under Memorandum
Circular No. 97-1 issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the
Department of Finance. Hence, the Province of Guimaras, having only one
legislative district, has to be divided into two provincial districts with an
allotment of eight elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by
virtue of its reclassification into a fourth class province.
The rules and guidelines to be followed by the Commission on Elections in
the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district is
provided for by law. Under the above cited R.A. 7166, division of provinces
into districts shall be done in a manner: (1) as nearly as practicable, (2)
according to the number of inhabitants, (3) each district comprising a
compact, contiguous and adjacent territory, and (4) the number of seats of
elective members of the respective Sanggunian equitably apportioned
between the districts.

Corollarily, COMELEC also promulgated Resolution No. 2131 which provides

the rules and guidelines for the apportionment by district of members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one legislative district and
Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila area. The said
Resolution provides, among others, that for provinces with only one (1)
legislative district:
a) The province shall be divided into two (2) Sanggunian
districts for provincial representation, as nearly as
practicable according to the number of inhabitants based on
the 1990 census of population.
b) Each district shall comprise a compact, contiguous and
adjacent territory;
c) A municipality shall belong to one (1) district ONLY, in no
case shall a part thereof be apportioned to another provincial
Sanggunian district.
The same Resolution requires that (1) the 1990 census of population be
secured from the provincial or municipal representative of the National
Statistics Office concerned; (2) consultations, hearings and meetings be
conducted with elective local officials, representatives of political parties,
non-government organizations, civic and religious groups and other sectors
of the community for their suggestions and proposals for possible
incorporation into the project of apportionment, and (3) the project of
apportionment and the map of the province indicating the districts, the
population of each district and showing the delineation of boundaries be
submitted to the COMELEC for study and evaluation.
Petitioners aver that the apportionment of the Province of Guimaras into two
districts is not equitable due to disproportionate representation. It is claimed
that the districting embodied in Resolution No. 2950 results in a disparity of
representation in that, in the first district, there is a ratio of one board member
per 18,739 voters while in the second district, the ratio is one board member
per 14,050 voters.
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Under R.A. 7166 and Comelec
Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division into districts shall be the number
of inhabitants of the province concerned and not the number of listed or
registered voters as theorized upon by petitioners. Thus, Comelec did not act
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution because

clearly, the basis for the districting is the number of inhabitants of the
Province of Guimaras by municipality based on the official 1995 Census of
Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the National
Statistics Office.
Petitioners' next contention is that the consultative meetings upon which the
districting was based did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the
province as the inhabitants were not properly represented during the said
meetings.
Again, this contention of petitioners is bereft of any basis. As duly certified to
by Mr. Romulo L. Lequisia, Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of
Guimaras, two consultative meetings were held by the Office of the
Provincial Election Supervisor, one on August 21 and another on October 2,
1996, in order to arrive at a consensus on the matter of the proposed
districting of Guimaras into two Sangguniang Panlalawigan districts. And, as
shown by the documentary exhibits, all interested parties were duly notified
and represented during the two consultative meetings as required by
Comelec Resolution No. 2313. Appended to respondent Comelec's
Comment are the attendance sheets where the names and signatures of
those who attended the consultative meetings and the corresponding
barangay and/or group which they represented appear and which belie
petitioners' allegation that there was no valid representation.
Finally, petitioners maintain that the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion when it issued Resolution No. 2950 because thereunder, the
municipalities which comprise each district do not embrace a compact,
contiguous and adjacent area.
Petitioners' asseveration is equally erroneous. Under Comelec Resolution
No. 2950, the towns of Buenavista and San Lorenzo were grouped together
to form the first district and the second district is composed of the
municipalities of Jordan, Nueva Valencia and Sibunag. R.A. 7166 requires
that each district must cover a compact, contiguous and adjacent territory.
"Contiguous" and/or "adjacent" means "adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a
common border, connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for
considerable distances." 3 Not even a close perusal of the map of the
Province of Guimaras is necessary to defeat petitioners' stance. On its face,
the map of Guimaras indicates that the municipalities of Buenavista and San
Lorenzo are "adjacent" or "contiguous". They touch along boundaries and are
connected throughout by a common border. Buenavista is at the northern
part of Guimaras while San Lorenzo is at the east portion of the province. It
would be different if the towns grouped together to form one district were

Buenavista and Nueva Valencia or Buenavista and Sibunag. In that case, the
districting would clearly be without any basis because these towns are not
contiguous or adjacent. Buenavista is at the north while Nueva Valencia and
Sibunag are at the southern and southeastern part of the province,
respectively.
Premises studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court is of the
irresistible conclusion, and so finds, that the respondent Comelec did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it issued Resolution No. 2950.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit the petition under consideration is hereby
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125646 September 10, 1999

CITY
OF
PASIG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and THE
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 128663 September 10, 1999
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CITY OF PASIG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the
suspension of plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of
boundary disputes between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig.
G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R. No.
128663 involves the proposed Barangay Napico. The City of Pasig claims
these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while the Municipality of Cainta
claims that these proposed barangays encroached upon areas within its own
jurisdiction/territory.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that
they be segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz,
City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to
be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed and
approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Karangalan
in Pasig City. 1 Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set
for June 22, 1996.
Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued
Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig
City. 2 Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.

Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta

moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed
Petitions with the Commission on Elections (hereinafter referred to as
COMELEC) on June 19, 1996 (UND No. 96-016) 3 and March 12, 1997 (UND
No. 97-002), respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called
the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary
dispute. 4 According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays
involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case;
hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until
after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court.
In UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality
of Cainta and ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan
to be held in abeyance until after the court has settled with finality the
boundary dispute involving the two municipalities. 5 Hence, the filing of G.R.
No. 125646 by the City of Pasig.
The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002, dismissing
the Petition for being moot in view of the holding of the plebiscite as
scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the creation of Barangay Napico was
ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast therein. 6 Hence, the
filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the Municipality of Cainta.
The issue before us is whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the
creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or
cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local
governments.
To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case
No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of
Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first
be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays
may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same
contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where
both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this may be the general
rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, 7 that, in
the interest of good order, we can very well suspend action on one case
pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the
first.

In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas
covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its
territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the
boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo.
Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has
material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and
Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial
jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less
permanent natural boundaries. 8 Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an
issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved
with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays
would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the
way for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays. Indeed,
in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 9 we held that
The importance of drawing, with precise strokes the
territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they
define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of
government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to
state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government
units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental
powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare.
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is
far more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final
determination of whether or not the entire area of the proposed barangays
are truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig.
Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held
in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality
of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised
by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the
holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are still pending
determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.
In Tan v. Commission on Elections, 10 we struck down the moot and
academic argument as follows

Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is

challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites,
the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new
province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case
before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and
academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly
proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to
have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this
Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation,
the commission of that error should not provide the very
excuse for perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield
to the respondents' urging that, as there has been fait
accompli, then this Court should passively accept and
accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable
suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents
so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief.
Respondents' submission will create a dangerous precedent.
Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of
interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this
might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of
power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge,
divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions,
either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will
abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if
they manage to bring about a fait accompli.
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be
held in abeyance pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between
the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify
the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set
aside.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No.
125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R.
No. 128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC Order in
UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET
ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to
ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the City of

Pasig is declared null and void. Plebiscite on the

same is ordered held in abeyance until after the
courts settle with finality the boundary dispute
between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of
Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-3006.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of

the Constitution.

JUANITO
MARIANO,
JR.
et
al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,
HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of
Makati only by special law (the Charter in
violation of the constitutional provision
requiring a general reapportionment law to
be passed by Congress within three (3)
years following the return of every census;

G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995

JOHN
R.
OSMEA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,
HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

(b) the increase in legislative district was not

expressed in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district
in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census), the population
of Makati stands at only 450,000.

PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No.
7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is
entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It
was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita
Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang,
Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the
petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents
of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as
unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following
grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the
land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and
450 of the Local Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the
"three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in

G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator,
taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No.
7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the
proposed city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati
shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known
as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the
City, which shall comprise the present territory of the
Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over
which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig
River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities
of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay

and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the

City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the
resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing
boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial
jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining
local government units. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7
and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the area of a local
government unit should be made by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions. 2
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a
local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must
be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only
within the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in
the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's
welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in
requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can
be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854,
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the
proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note
that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously
covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide,
or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be
any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise
the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason
why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of
R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and
Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming
sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that
the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to

foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could

decide the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the
proposed city by its exact metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions. 3 We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also
refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other
local government units with unsettled boundary disputes. 4
We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an
insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with
reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. In
the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the
proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the
ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances,
we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is
unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this
regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government
Code, it is beyond cavil that the requirement stated
therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or
converted cities should be described by meted and bounds,
with technical descriptions" was made in order to provide
a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably
ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and
bounds was meant merely as tool in the establishment of
local government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so long
as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably
ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with
neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be
concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been
sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new
cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions
similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners
seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a
condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the
very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks to
serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local
government units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks
to make local governments more responsive to the needs of
their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital
cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on

the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was

used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of
the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the
slave, instead of the other way around. This could not be the
intendment of the law.

three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict
letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of the
statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent
with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56
Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument
of government, which, for purposes of interpretation, means
that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and
purposes (Bocolbo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same
rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.

xxx xxx xxx

II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51,
Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent
elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue
as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their
powers and functions until such time that a new election is
held and the duly elected officials shall have already
qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city
will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive
officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues
exercising their functions and duties and they shall be
automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of
Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7,
Article VI of the Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall

be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials,
including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of
three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than
three (3)consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city
shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts
the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards
the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that
section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay,
who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue
that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the
coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek
another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year
consecutive term asmunicipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners
conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the
political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The
requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are
well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2)
the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity;
and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. 5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor
Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be reelected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same
position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or
may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet
to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract
issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief
over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of
section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a
highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at
least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond
to the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of
Republic Act. No. 7166 as implemented by the Commission
on Elections to commence at the next national elections to
be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays
Magallanes, Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first
district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form
part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law, (2)
the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of the bill 7 and
(3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias
v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts
may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The
Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more
than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus
worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its
membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the
law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854
and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold

that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law,

with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government
unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the
people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty
cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever
whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as
of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only
four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that
a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall
have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati
as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact,
section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city
whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an
additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly stated in
the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated
the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-one
subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution
does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or
completely catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it should be
sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:

The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component.

Section 12 of Article X thereof provides:

I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish,
however, to add a few observations.

Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by

law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be
independent of the province. The voters of component cities
within a province, whose charters contain no such
prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for
elective provincial officials.

I.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city,
municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
These criteria are now set forth in Section 7 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that the territorial jurisdiction of the
local government unit to be created or converted should be properly
identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.
The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
Into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Makati) to describe
the territorial boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not make
R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The Constitution does not provide
for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua non for the
creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to
another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not
absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause " as a
general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is
unavailing Said section only applies to the conversion of a municipality or a
cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a highly urbanized city. It
pertinently reads as follows:
Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. (a) A municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city
if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds. . . .

And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:

Sec. 451. Cities Classified. A city may either be
component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, That the
criteria established in this Code shall not affect the
classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials. Independent component cities shall be
independent of the province.
II.
Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City
of Makati provided for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the
clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution. That clause contemplates of the reapportionment mentioned
in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in full as
follows:
Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section.
In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.
The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1
and 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which reads:

Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the

House of Representatives of the First Congress of the
Philippines under the Constitution proposed by the 1986
Constitutional Commissionand subsequent elections, and
until otherwise provided by law, the Members thereof shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Areaas
follows:
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA

I.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city,
municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
These criteria are now set forth in Section 7 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is that the territorial jurisdiction of the
local government unit to be created or converted should be properly
identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.

xxx xxx xxx

MAKATI one (1)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any
city whose population may hereafter increase to more than
two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member or
such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the
basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of
the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the
province out of which such new province was created, or
where the city, whose population has so increased, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by
the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not
be made within one hundred and twenty days before the
election. (Emphases supplied)

The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
Into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of Makati) to describe
the territorial boundaries of the city by metes and bounds does not make
R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The Constitution does not provide
for a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua non for the
creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to
another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854 are not
absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause " as a
general rule." The petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is
unavailing Said section only applies to the conversion of a municipality or a
cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a highly urbanized city. It
pertinently reads as follows:
Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. (a) A municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city
if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:
xxx xxx xxx

Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish,
however, to add a few observations.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be

properly identified by metes and bounds. . . .
The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component.
Section 12 of Article X thereof provides:

Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by

law, and component cities whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be
independent of the province. The voters of component cities
within a province, whose charters contain no such
prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for
elective provincial officials.
And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:
Sec. 451. Cities Classified. A city may either be
component or highly urbanized: Provided, however, That the
criteria established in this Code shall not affect the
classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials. Independent component cities shall be
independent of the province.
II.
Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City
of Makati provided for in R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the
clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1, Section 5, Article VI of
the Constitution. That clause contemplates of the reapportionment mentioned
in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in full as
follows:
Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section.
In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.
The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1
and 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the
House of Representatives of the First Congress of the
Philippines under the Constitution proposed by the 1986
Constitutional Commissionand subsequent elections, and

until otherwise provided by law, the Members thereof shall

be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Areaas
follows:
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA
xxx xxx xxx
MAKATI one (1)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any
city whose population may hereafter increase to more than
two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member or
such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the
basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of
the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the
province out of which such new province was created, or
where the city, whose population has so increased, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by
the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not
be made within one hundred and twenty days before the
election. (Emphases supplied)

G.R. No. 141375

April 30, 2003

MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, Represented by its Mayor, Hon.

GIOVANNI
M.
NAPARI, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court
of Ormoc City (Branch 35); and the CITY OF ORMOC, Represented by
its Mayor, Hon. EUFROCINO M. CODILLA SR., respondents.

"x x x IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED x x x to pass a resolution certifying

that both the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the
Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga, Leyte have failed to settle amicably
their boundary dispute and have agreed to elevate the same to the
proper court for settlement by any of the interested party (sic)." 4
To settle the boundary dispute, the City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of
Ormoc City (Branch 35) on September 2, 1999, a Complaint docketed as
Civil Case No. 3722-O.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over
boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component
city, it follows that regional trial courts have the power and the authority to
hear and determine such controversy.

On September 24, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following

grounds:
"(1) That the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the claim;

The Case

"(2) That there is no cause of action; and

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

seeking to annul the October 29, 1999 Order2 issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Civil Case No. 3722-O. The
decretal portion of the assailed Order reads as follows:

"(3) That a condition precedent for filing the complaint has not been
complied with[.]"5

"For the foregoing considerations, this Court is not inclined to

approve and grant the motion to dismiss[,] although the municipality
has all the right to bring the matter or issue to the Supreme Court by
way of certiorari purely on question of law."3
The Facts
A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City
of Ormoc. By agreement, the parties submitted the issue to amicable
settlement by a joint session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City
and the Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga on October 31, 1997.
No amicable settlement was reached. Instead, the members of the joint
session issued Resolution No. 97-01, which in part reads:

Ruling of the Trial Court

In denying the Municipality of Kanangas Motion to Dismiss, the RTC held
that it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. It
further ruled that Section 118 of the Local Government Code had been
substantially complied with, because both parties already had the occasion to
meet and thresh out their differences. In fact, both agreed to elevate the
matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that Section 118
governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it under
Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Not satisfied with the denial of its Motion, the Municipality of Kananga filed
this Petition.6
Issue
In their respective Memoranda, both parties raise the lone issue of whether
respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a
boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component
city.

The Courts Ruling

referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter,

the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned
which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of
the certification referred to above."

The Petition has no merit.

Sole
Jurisdiction

Issue:

Jurisdiction is the right to act on a case or the power and the authority to hear
and determine a cause.7 It is a question of law.8 As consistently ruled by this
Court, jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by law. 9Because it is "a
matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at
the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the
court."10

Under this provision, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a

component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city
on the other -- or between two or more highly urbanized cities -- shall be
jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local
government units involved.
There is no question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under
Republic Act No. 542.12 By virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC, it continued
to exist and operate as such.

Both parties aver that the governing law at the time of the filing of the
Complaint is Section 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code (LGC), 11 which
provides:

However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent component,

city created under Republic Act No. 179.13 Section 89 thereof reads:

"Sec. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary

Disputes. Boundary disputes between and among local
government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To
this end:

"Sec. 89. Election of provincial governor and members of the

Provincial Board of the Province of Leyte. The qualified voters of
Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election
of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of
the Province of Leyte."

"(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the

same city or municipality shall be referred for settlement to
the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
"(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within
the same province shall be referred for settlement to
the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
"(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of
different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to
the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
"(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on
the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or
more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to
the respective sanggunians of the parties.
"(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable
settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was

Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly
urbanized. Ormoc is deemed an independent component city, because its
charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It is a
city independent of the province. In fact, it is considered a component, not a
highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region VIII by both Batas Pambansa Blg.
643,14 which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election Code, 15which
apportions representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is
neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by
the parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in
its Motion to Dismiss that Ormoc was an independent chartered city.16
Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a
municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city,
not with an independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality,
Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure
referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them.

Nevertheless, a joint session was indeed held, but no amicable settlement

was reached. A resolution to that effect was issued, and the sanggunians of
both local government units mutually agreed to bring the dispute to the RTC
for adjudication. The question now is: Does the regional trial court have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim?
We rule in the affirmative.
As previously stated, "jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or
waived by the parties."17 It must exist as a matter of law and cannot be
conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel. 18 It should not be
confused with venue.
Inasmuch as Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant case,
the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be used. The applicable
provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, 19 otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691.20 Section 19(6) of this law provides:
"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx

xxx

xxx

"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions[."
Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or
agency over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and
an independent component city of the same province, respondent court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss.
RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those
expressly withheld from their plenary powers. 21 They have the power not only
to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first
time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage.
Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.
In Mariano Jr. v. Commission on Elections,22 we held that boundary disputes
should be resolved with fairness and certainty. We ruled as follows:

"The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial

boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized.
The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the
territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately
exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to
state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will
sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which
ultimately will prejudice the peoples welfare. x x x."
Indeed, unresolved boundary disputes have sown costly conflicts in the
exercise of governmental powers and prejudiced the peoples welfare.
Precisely because of these disputes, the Philippine National Oil Company
has withheld the share in the proceeds from the development and the
utilization of natural wealth, as provided for in Section 289 of the LGC. 23
WHEREFORE,
the
Petition
is DENIED and
Order AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

the

challenged

G.R. No. 140474

September 21, 2007

MUNICIPALITY
OF
STA.
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF ARITAO, Respondent.

FE, Petitioner,

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court of the September 30, 1999 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirming in toto the August 27, 1992 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 28, which dismissed Civil
Case No. 2821 for lack of jurisdiction.
On October 16, 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, in the Province of
Nueva Vizcaya, filed before the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch
28, Civil Case No. 2821 for the Determination of Boundary Dispute involving
the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan. As the parties failed to amicably
settle during the pre-trial stage, trial on the merits ensued.
The trial was almost over, with petitioners rebuttal witness already under
cross-examination, when the court, realizing its oversight under existing law,
ordered on December 9, 1988, the suspension of the proceedings and the
referral of the case to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Vizcaya. 3 In
turn, the Sanggunian concerned passed on the matter to its Committee on
Legal Affairs, Ordinances and Resolutions, which recommended adopting
Resolution No. 64 dated September 14, 1979 of the former members of its
Provincial Board.4 Said resolution previously resolved to adjudicate the
barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan as parts of respondents territorial
jurisdiction and enjoin petitioner from exercising its governmental functions
within the same. Subsequently, as per Resolution No. 357 dated November
13, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved the Committees
recommendation but endorsed the boundary dispute to the RTC for further
proceedings and preservation of the status quo pending finality of the case.
Back in the RTC, respondent moved to consider Resolution No. 64 as final
and executory. In its Order dated February 12, 1991, 5 the trial court, however,
resolved to deny the motion ruling that since there was no amicable
settlement reached at the time the Provincial Board had exceeded its
authority in issuing a "decision" favoring a party. The court held that, under

the law in force, the purpose of such referral was only to afford the parties an
opportunity to amicably settle with the intervention and assistance of the
Provincial Board and that in case no such settlement is reached, the court
proceedings shall be resumed.
Subsequently, respondent again filed a motion on June 23, 1992, 6 this time
praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. The ground relied
upon was that under the prevailing law at the time of the filing of the motion,
the power to try and decide municipal boundary disputes already belonged to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and no longer with the trial court, primarily
citing the doctrine laid down by this Court in Municipality of Sogod v. Rosal.7
On August 27, 1992, the trial court resolved to grant the motion, thus:
A close study of the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the
Municipality of Sogod case in relation to this case palpably shows that,
contrary to the claim of respondent Municipality of Sta. Fe, through counsel,
it involves boundary dispute as in this case.
As to the applicable law on the question of which agency of the Government
can take cognizance of this case or whether or not this Court should proceed
in exercising jurisdiction over this case, the same [had] been squarely
resolved by the [Honorable] Supreme Court in the Municipality of Sogod case
in this wise: "It is worthy to note, however, that up to this time, the
controversy between these two Municipalities has not been settled. However,
the dispute has already been overtaken by events, namely, the enactment of
the 1987 Constitution and the New Local Government Code x x x which
imposed new mandatory requirements and procedures on the fixing of
boundaries between municipalities. The 1987 Constitution now mandates
that []no province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.[] x x x Hence, any alteration or modification of the
boundaries of the municipalities shall only be by a law to be enacted by
Congress subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the barrios affected (Section 134, Local Government Code).
Thus, under present laws, the function of the provincial board to fix the
municipal boundaries are now strictly limited to the factual determination of
the boundary lines between municipalities, to be specified by natural
boundaries or by metes and bounds in accordance with laws creating said
municipalities."

In view of the above ruling, this Court can do no less but to declare that this
case has been overtaken by events, namely, the enactment of the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. The Constitution
requires a plebiscite, whereas the Local Government Code of 1991 provides,
as follows: "Sec. 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. A local
government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the
case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by
ordinance passed by the [s]angguniang [p]anlalawigan, or sangguniang
panglungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its territorial
jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this
Code."8
The motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been
denied,9 an appeal was elevated by petitioner to the CA. The CA, however,
affirmed in toto the assailed Order, holding that:
We are not unmindful of the rule that where a court has already obtained and
is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the
final determination of the case is not affected by new legislation placing
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal or body. This rule,
however, is not without exception. It is not applicable when the change in
jurisdiction is curative in character. As far as boundary disputes are
concerned, the 1987 Constitution is the latest will of the people, therefore,
the same should be given retroactive effect on cases pending before courts
after its ratification. It mandates that "no province, city, municipality or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
On the other hand, the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that "[a]
local government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the
case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by
ordinance passed by the [s]angguniang [p]anlalawigan or [s]angguniang
[p]anglungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within its
territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed
in this Code (Book I, Title One, Chapter 2, Section 6, Local Government
Code).
Section 118, Title Nine, Book I of the same Code likewise provides:

"SEC 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute.

Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as
much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
xxx
a.) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the
same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned;
x x x"
Since the Local Government Code of 1991 is the latest will of the people
expressed through Congress on how boundary disputes should be resolved,
the same must prevail over previous ones. It must be emphasized that the
laws on the creation of local government units as well as settling boundary
disputes are political in character, hence, can be changed from time to time
and the latest will of the people should always prevail. In the instant case,
there is nothing wrong in holding that Regional Trial Courts no longer have
jurisdiction over boundary disputes.10
Before this Court, petitioner submits that the CA erred when it affirmed the
dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction by upholding the RTCs
application of the doctrine enunciated in the Municipality of
Sogod, namely,that being political in character, this case has been overtaken
by different laws which should now prevail. Petitioner also claims that the CA
erred in relying on the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991 on the creation, division, merger, abolition,
and alteration of boundaries of political units instead of the specific provisions
on the settlement of boundary disputes.11
The petition fails.
As early as October 1, 1917, the procedure for the settlement of municipal
boundary disputes was already set forth when Act No. 2711 or the Revised
Administrative Code (RAC) took into effect. 12 At that time, Section 2167 of the
law provided:
"SEC. 2167. Municipal boundary disputes How settled. Disputes as to
jurisdiction of municipal governments over places or barrios shall be decided
by the provincial boards of the provinces in which such municipalities are
situated, after an investigation at which the municipalities concerned shall be

duly heard. From the decision of the provincial board appeal may be taken by
the municipality aggrieved to the Secretary of the Interior, whose decision
shall be final x x x."13
On June 17, 1970,14 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 612815 was approved amending
the afore-quoted section of the RAC, Sec. 1 thereof stated:
SECTION 1. Section Two thousand one hundred sixty-seven of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 2167. Municipal Boundary Disputes. How Settled. Disputes as to
jurisdiction of municipal governments over places, or barrios shall be heard
and decided by the Court of First Instance of the Province where the
municipalities concerned are situated x x x: Provided, That after joinder of
issues, the Court shall suspend proceedings and shall refer the dispute to the
Provincial Board x x x concerned for the purpose of affording the parties an
opportunity to reach an amicable settlement with the intervention and
assistance of the said Provincial Board x x x; Provided, further, That in case
no amicable settlement is reached within sixty days from the date the dispute
was referred to the Provincial Board x x x concerned, the court proceedings
shall be resumed. The case shall be decided by the said Court of First
Instance within one year from resumption of the court proceedings, and
appeal may be taken from the said decision within the time and in the
manner prescribed in Rule 41 or Rule 42, as the case may be, of the Rules
of Court x x x"
Subsequently, however, with the approval of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 337
(otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1983) on February 10,
1983,16 Sec. 2167, as amended, was repealed. 17 In particular, Sec. 79 of the
Code read:
SEC. 79. Municipal Boundary Disputes. Disputes as to the jurisdiction of
municipal governments over areas or barangays shall be heard and decided
by the sangguniang panlalawigan of the province where the municipalities
concerned are situated x x x in case no settlement is reached within sixty
days from the date the dispute was referred to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned, said dispute shall be elevated to the Regional Trial
Court of the province which first took cognizance of the dispute. The case
shall be decided by the said court within one year from the start of
proceedings and appeal may be taken from the decision within the time and
in the manner prescribed by the Rules of Court.18

Almost a decade passed and R.A. No. 7160 or the LGC of 1991 was signed
into law on October 10, 1991 and took effect on January 1, 1992. 19 As the
latest law governing jurisdiction over the settlement of boundary disputes,
Sections 118 and 119 of the Code now mandate:
SEC. 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute.
Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as
much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
xxx
(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the
same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned.
xxx
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within
sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a
certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the
sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days
from the date of the certification referred to above.
SEC. 119. Appeal. Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of
Court, any party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian concerned to
the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute.
The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the
filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute
shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes. 20
This Court agrees with petitioners contention that the trial court had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint when it was filed on October
16, 1980 since the prevailing law then was Section 2167 of the RAC, as
amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6128, which granted the Court of First
Instance (now RTC) the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of municipal
boundary disputes. The antecedents of the Municipality of Sogod case reveal
that it dealt with the trial courts dismissal of cases filed for lack of jurisdiction
because at the time of the institution of the civil actions, the law in force was
the old provision of Sec. 2167 of the RAC, which empowered the provincial
boards, not the trial courts, to hear and resolve such cases.

The main point of inquiry, however, is whether the CA erred in affirming the
trial courts dismissal of the instant case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground
that at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss the original jurisdiction to
hear and decide, the case had been vested on the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and no longer on the RTC.

(2) Provincial, city, municipal or barangay map, as the case

may be, duly certified by the LMB;

The Court rules that the appellate court did not err. The difference in the
factual setting notwithstanding,Municipality of Sogod still applies in the sense
that similar thereto the pendency of the present case has also been
overtaken by events the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the
enactment of the LGC of 1991.

(4) Written certification of the provincial, city, or municipal

assessor, as the case may be, as to territorial jurisdiction
over the disputed area according records in custody;

As shown above, since the effectivity of R.A. No. 6128, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan has been the primary tribunal responsible in the amicable
settlement of boundary disputes between or among two or more
municipalities located in the same province. With the LGC of 1991, however,
a major change has been introduced that in the event the Sanggunian fails
to effect a settlement, it shall not only issue a certification
to that effect but must also formally hear and decide the case within the
reglementary period. Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
LGC of 199121 outlines the procedure for the settlement of boundary disputes
as follows:
ART. 17. Procedures for Settling Boundary Disputes. - The following
procedures shall govern the settlement of boundary disputes:
(a.) Filing of petition The sanggunian concerned may initiate action
by filing a petition, in the form of a resolution, with the sanggunian
having jurisdiction over the dispute.
(b.) Contents of petition The petition shall state the grounds,
reasons or justifications therefore.
(c.) Documents attached to petition The petition shall be
accompanied by:
(1) Duly authenticated copy of the law or statute creating the
LGU or any other documents showing proof of creation of
the LGU;

(3) Technical description of the boundaries of the LGUs

concerned;

(5) Written declarations or sworn statements of the people

residing in the disputed area; and
(6) Such other documents or information as may be required
by the sanggunian hearing the dispute.
(d.) Answer of adverse party Upon receipt by the sanggunian
concerned of the petition together with the required documents, the
LGU or LGUs complained against shall be furnished copies thereof
and shall be given fifteen (15) working days within which to file their
answers.
(e.) Hearing Within five (5) working days after receipt of the answer
of the adverse party, the sanggunian shall hear the case and allow
the parties concerned to present their respective evidences.
(f.) Joint hearing When two or more sanggunians jointly hear a
case, they may sit en banc or designate their respective
representatives. Where representatives are designated, there shall
be an equal number of representatives from each sanggunian. They
shall elect from among themselves a presiding officer and a
secretary. In case of disagreement, selection shall be by drawing lot.
(g.) Failure to settle In the event the sanggunian fails to amicably
settle the dispute within sixty (60) days from the date such dispute
was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect and
copies thereof shall be furnished the parties concerned.
(h.) Decision Within sixty (60) days from the date the certification
was issued, the dispute shall be formally tried and decided by the
sanggunian concerned. Copies of the decision shall, within fifteen
(15) days from the promulgation thereof, be furnished the parties

concerned, DILG, local assessor, Comelec, NSO, and other NGAs

concerned.
(i.) Appeal Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of
Court, any party may elevate the decision of the sanggunian
concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over
the dispute by filing therewith the appropriate pleading, stating
among others, the nature of the dispute, the decision of the
sanggunian concerned and the reasons for appealing therefrom. The
Regional Trial Court shall decide the case within one (1) year from
the filing thereof. Decisions on boundary disputes promulgated jointly
by two (2) or more sangguniang panlalawigan shall be heard by the
Regional Trial Court of the province which first took cognizance of
the dispute.
ART. 18. Maintenance of Status Quo. Pending final resolution of the
dispute, the status of the affected area prior to the dispute shall be
maintained and continued for all purposes.
ART. 19. Official Custodian. The DILG shall be the official custodian of
copies of all documents on boundary disputes of the LGUs.
Notably, unlike R.A. No. 6128 and B.P. 337, the LGC of 1991 grants an
expanded role on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned in resolving
cases of municipal boundary disputes. Aside from having the function of
bringing the contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the
amicable settlement of the case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is now
specifically vested with original jurisdiction to actually hear and decide the
dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its
implementing rules and regulations. This situation, in effect, reverts to the old
rule under the RAC, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 6128, under which
the provincial boards were empowered to investigate, hear the parties and
eventually decide the case on the basis thereof. On the other hand, under
the LGC of 1991, the trial court loses its power to try, at the first instance,
cases of municipal boundary disputes. Only in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction can the proper RTC decide the case, on appeal, should any party
aggrieved by the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan elevate the
same.
Considering the foregoing, the RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.1wphi1 Under the rules, it was the responsibility of the court to
dismiss an action "whenever it appears that [it] has no jurisdiction over the

subject matter."22 Indeed, the RTC acted accordingly because at the time of
the filing of the motion to dismiss its want of jurisdiction was evident. It was
duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction as the
choice of the proper forum was crucial for the decision of a court or tribunal
without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time by
this Court as it would never become final and executory. 23 Likewise, the
standing rule is that dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings since jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack
of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render
judgment on the action;24 otherwise, the inevitable consequence would make
the courts decision a "lawless" thing.25 As correctly pointed out by the RTC:
x x x It will be a futile act for the Court to rule on the case concerning a
boundary dispute if its decision will not after all be followed by the people
concerned because the decision is totally unacceptable to them. How then
can the Court enforce its decision? x x x. 26
Petitioner, however, contends that the provisions of the 1987 Constitution
and the LGC of 1991 on the settlement of municipal boundary disputes
should be applied prospectively. The Court is not unmindful of the rule that
where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the case is
not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in
another tribunal.27 An exception to this rule, however, lies where the statute
either expressly provides or is construed to the effect that it is intended to
operate on actions pending before its enactment. 28 Hence, this Court has
held that a law may be given retroactive effect if it so provided expressly or if
retroactivity is necessarily implied therefrom and no vested right or obligation
of contract is impaired and it does not deprive a person of property without
due process of law.29
It is readily apparent from the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the
LGC of 1991 that their new provisions and requirements regarding changes
in the constitution of political units are intended to apply to all existing political
subsidiaries immediately, i.e., including those with pending cases filed under
the previous regime, since the overarching consideration of these new
provisions is the need to empower the local government units without further
delay.
Furthermore, the RTC can still review the decision of the Sanguniang
Panlalawigan under the new set-up, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, so no substantial prejudice is caused by allowing retroactivity.

The Court, therefore, sees no error, much less grave abuse of discretion, on
the part of the CA in affirming the trial courts dismissal of petitioners
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 169435

February 27, 2008

MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its

Municipal
Mayor,
CAROLINE
ARZADON-GARVIDA, petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its
Municipal Mayor, SALVADOR PILLOS, and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AS the law creating a municipality fixes its boundaries, settlement of
boundary disputes between municipalities is facilitated by carrying into effect
the law that created them.
Any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a
municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its amendment,
which only the Congress can do.1
2

For Our review on certiorari is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversing to a certain extent that3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
12, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, in a case that originated from the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan (SP) of Ilocos Norte about the boundary dispute between the
Municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era in Ilocos Norte.
The CA declared that Marcos is entitled to have its eastern boundary
extended up "to the boundary line between the province of Ilocos Norte and
Kalinga-Apayao."4 By this extension of Marcos' eastern boundary, the CA
allocated to Marcos a portion of Nueva Era's territory.
The Facts
The Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of
Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc,
Tibangran, and Uguis which were previously organized as rancherias, each
of which was under the independent control of a chief. Governor General
Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial
government of Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and created the
township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 5 dated
September 30, 1916.

The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22,
1963 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte." Section 1 of R.A. No.
3753 provides:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao,
Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province
of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality and
constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the
Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going
down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot
path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is
the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East,
by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the
Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary between the
municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by
the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government in the
barrio of Biding.
Based on the first paragraph of the said Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753, it is clear
that Marcos shall be derived from the listed barangays of Dingras, namely:
Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit. The
Municipality of Nueva Era or any of its barangays was not mentioned. Hence,
if based only on said paragraph, it is clear that Nueva Era may not be
considered as a source of territory of Marcos.
There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named
only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however,
lies in the description of Marcos' boundaries as stated in the second
paragraph, particularly in the phrase: "on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt.
Province boundary."
It must be noted that the term "Mt. Province" stated in the above phrase
refers to the present adjoining provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, Kalinga and Apayao, which were then a single province.
Mt. Province was divided into the four provinces of Benguet, Mountain
Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao by virtue of R.A. No. 4695 which was

enacted on June 18, 1966. On February 14, 1995, the province of KalingaApayao, which comprises the sub-provinces of Kalinga and Apayao, was
further converted into the regular provinces of Kalinga and Apayao pursuant
to R.A. No. 7878.
The part of then Mt. Province which was at the east of Marcos is now the
province of Apayao. Hence, the eastern boundary referred to by the second
paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. No. 3753 is the present Ilocos Norte-Apayao
boundary.
On the basis of the said phrase, which described Marcos' eastern boundary,
Marcos claimed that the middle portion of Nueva Era, which adjoins its
eastern side, formed part of its territory. Its reasoning was founded upon the
fact that Nueva Era was between Marcos and the Ilocos Norte-Apayao
boundary such that if Marcos was to be bounded on the east by the Ilocos
Norte-Apayao boundary, part of Nueva Era would consequently be obtained
by it.6
Marcos did not claim any part of Nueva Era as its own territory until after
almost 30 years,7 or only on March 8, 1993, when its Sangguniang Bayan
passed Resolution No. 93-015.8 Said resolution was entitled: "Resolution
Claiming an Area which is an Original Part of Nueva Era, But Now Separated
Due to the Creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte."
Marcos submitted its claim to the SP of Ilocos Norte for its consideration and
approval. The SP, on the other hand, required Marcos to submit its position
paper.9
In its position paper, Marcos alleged that since its northeastern and eastern
boundaries under R.A. No. 3753 were the Burnay River and the Ilocos NorteMountain Province boundary, respectively, its eastern boundary should not
be limited to the former Dingras-Nueva Era boundary, which was
coterminous and aligned with the eastern boundary of Dingras. According to
Marcos, its eastern boundary should extend further to the east or up to the
Ilocos-Norte-Mt. Province boundary pursuant to the description of its eastern
boundary under R.A. No. 3753.10
In view of its claim over the middle portion of Nueva Era, Marcos posited that
Nueva Era was cut into two parts. And since the law required that the land
area of a municipality must be compact and contiguous, Nueva Era's
northern isolated portion could no longer be considered as its territory but
that of Marcos'. Thus, Marcos claimed that it was entitled not only to the

middle portion11 of Nueva Era but also to Nueva Era's isolated northern
portion. These areas claimed by Marcos were within Barangay Sto. Nio,
Nueva Era.
Nueva Era reacted to the claim of Marcos through its Resolution No. 1,
Series of 1993. It alleged that since time immemorial, its entire land area was
an ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an indigenous cultural community. It
argued to the effect that since the land being claimed by Marcos must be
protected for the tinguians, it must be preserved as part of Nueva Era.12
According to Nueva Era, Marcos was created out of the territory of Dingras
only. And since R.A. No. 3753 specifically mentioned seven (7) barrios of
Dingras to become Marcos, the area which should comprise Marcos should
not go beyond the territory of said barrios.13
From the time Marcos was created in 1963, its eastern boundary had been
considered to be aligned and coterminous with the eastern boundary of the
adjacent municipality of Dingras. However, based on a re-survey in 1992,
supposedly done to conform to the second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A.
No. 3753, an area of 15,400 hectares of Nueva Era was alleged to form part
of Marcos.14 This was the area of Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era that
Marcos claimed in its position paper.
On March 29, 2000, the SP of Ilocos Norte ruled in favor of Nueva Era.
The fallo of its decision15 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Body has no
alternative but to dismiss, as it hereby DISMISSES said petition for
lack of merit. The disputed area consisting of 15,400 hectares, more
or less, is hereby declared as part and portion of the territorial
jurisdiction of respondent Nueva Era.16
R.A. No. 3753 expressly named the barangays that would comprise Marcos,
but none of Nueva Era's barangayswere mentioned. The SP thus construed,
applying the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that no part of
Nueva Era was included by R.A. No. 3753 in creating Marcos. 17
The SP ratiocinated that if Marcos was to be bounded by Mt. Province, it
would encroach upon a portion, not only of Nueva Era but also of Abra. Thus:
x x x Even granting, for the sake of argument, that the eastern
boundary of Marcos is indeed Mountain Province, Marcos will then

be claiming a portion of Abra because the province, specifically

Barangay Sto. Nio, Nueva Era, is actually bounded on the East by
the Province of Abra. Abra is situated between and separates the
Provinces of Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province.
This is precisely what this body would like to avoid. Statutes should
be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or
mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such
construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief and
secure the benefits intended.18 (Citations omitted)
The SP further explained:
Invariably, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the law and the intent of
the legislature that is important. When the interpretation of the
statute according to the exact and literal import of its words would
lead to absurdity, it should be construed according to the spirit and
reason, disregarding if necessary the letters of the law. It is believed
that congress did not intend to have this absurd situation to be
created when it created the Municipality of Marcos. This body, by the
mandate given to it by the RA 7160 otherwise known Local
Government Code, so believes that respondent Nueva Era or any
portion thereof has been excluded from the ambit of RA 3753. Under
the principle of "espressio (sic) unios (sic) est exclusio alterius," by
expressly naming the barangays that will comprise the town of
Marcos, those not mentioned are deemed excluded. In Republic Act
4354, where Section 2 thereof enumerated the barrios comprising
the City of Davao excluding the petitioner Barrio Central as part of
the said City, the court held that there arose a prima facie conclusion
that the said law abolished Barrio Central as part of Davao City.
Historically, the hinterlands of Nueva Era have been known to be the
home of our brothers and sisters belonging to peculiar groups of
non-(C)hristian inhabitants with their own rich customs and traditions
and this body takes judicial notice that the inhabitants of Nueva Era
have proudly claimed to be a part of this rich culture. With this
common ancestral heritage which unfortunately is absent with
Marcos, let it not be disturbed.19 (Emphasis ours and citations
omitted)
RTC Decision

On appeal by Marcos, the RTC affirmed the decision of the SP in its

decision20 of March 19, 2001. The dispositive part of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The
questioned decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos
Norte is hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC reasoned out in this wise:
The position of the Municipality of Marcos is that the provision of
R.A. 3753 as regards its boundary on the East which is the "Ilocos
Norte-Mt. Province" should prevail.
On the other hand, the Municipality of Nueva Era posits the theory
that only the barrios of the Municipality of Dingras as stated in R.A.
3753 should be included in the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Marcos. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan agreed with
the position of Nueva Era.
xxxx
An examination of the Congressional Records during the
deliberations of the R.A. 3753 (House Bill No. 3721) shows the
Explanatory Note of Congressman Simeon M. Valdez, 2 nd District,
Ilocos Norte, to wit:
EXPLANATORY NOTE
This bill seeks to create in the Province of Ilocos Norte a
new municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos,
to be comprised by the present barrios of Capariaan, Biding
Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit, all in the
Municipality of Dingras of the same province. The seat of
government will be in the sitio of San Magro in the present
barrio of Ragas.
xxxx

On the other hand, the Municipality of Dingras will not be

adversely affected too much because its finances will still be
sound and stable. Its capacity to comply with its obligations,
especially to its employees and personnel, will not be
diminished nor its operations paralyzed. On the contrary,
economic development in both the mother and the proposed
municipalities will be accelerated.
In view of the foregoing, approval of this bill is earnestly
requested.
(Sgd.)
Congressman,
Ilocos Norte22

SIMEON

M.

VALDEZ
2nd District

Parenthetically, the legislative intent was for the creation of

the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte from the barrios
(barangays) of the Municipality of Dingras, Ilocos Norte only.
Hence, the Municipality of Marcos cannot add any area
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Dingras, Ilocos Norte. This conclusion might have been
different only if the area being claimed by the Municipality of
Marcos is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality
of Dingras and not the Municipality of Nueva Era. In such
case, the two conflicting provisions may be harmonized by
including such area within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Dingras as within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Municipality of Marcos.23 (Emphasis ours)
CA Disposition
Still determined to have a more extensive eastern boundary, Marcos filed a
petition for review24 of the RTC decision before the CA. The issues raised by
Marcos before the CA were:
1. Whether or not the site of Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. which is
within a Government Forest Reservation in Barangay Sto. Nio,
formerly of Nueva Era, is a part of the newly created Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
2. Whether or not the portion of Barangay Sto. Nio on the East
which is separated from Nueva Era as a result of the full

implementation of the boundaries of the new Municipality of Marcos

belongs also to Marcos or to Nueva Era.25
The twin issues involved two portions of Nueva Era, viz.: (1) middle portion,
where Hercules Minerals and Oil, Inc. is located; and (2) northern portion of
Nueva Era, which, according to Marcos, was isolated from Nueva Era in view
of the integration to Marcos of said middle portion.
Marcos prayed before the CA that the above two portions of Nueva Era be
declared as part of its own territory. It alleged that it was entitled to the middle
portion of Nueva Era in view of the description of Marcos' eastern boundary
under R.A. No. 3753. Marcos likewise contended that it was entitled to the
northern portion of Nueva Era which was allegedly isolated from Nueva Era
when Marcos was created. It posited that such isolation of territory was
contrary to law because the law required that a municipality must have a
compact and contiguous territory.26
In a Decision27 dated June 6, 2005, the CA partly reversed the RTC decision
with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition treated as one
for certiorari. The Decisions
of
both
the
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan
and
Regional
Trial
Court
of
Ilocos
Norte are REVERSED and SET ASIDEinsofar as they made the
eastern boundary of the municipality of Marcos co-terminous with the
eastern boundary of Dingras town, and another is rendered
extending the said boundary of Marcos to the boundary line between
the province of Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, but the same
Decisions are AFFIRMEDwith respect to the denial of the claim of
Marcos to the detached northern portion of barangay Sto. Nio which
should, as it is hereby ordered to, remain with the municipality of
Nueva Era. No costs.
SO ORDERED.28
In concluding that the eastern boundary of Marcos was the boundary line
between Ilocos Norte and Kalinga-Apayao, the CA gave the following
explanation:
Clearly then, both the SP and the RTC erred when they ruled that the eastern
boundary of Marcos is only coterminous with the eastern boundary of the
adjacent municipality of Dingras and refused to extend it up to the boundary

line between the provinces of Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province (KalingaApayao). R.A. No. 3753, the law creating Marcos, is very explicit and leaves
no room for equivocation that the boundaries of Marcos town are:
"On the Northwest by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary
going down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary
consisting of foot path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by
the Burnay River which is the common boundary of barrios
Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East, by the Ilocos NorteMt. Province boundary; on the South by the Padsan River,
which is at the same time the boundary between the
municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and
Southwest by the boundary between the municipalities of
Batac and Dingras."
To stop short at the eastern boundary of Dingras as the eastern
boundary also of Marcos and refusing to go farther to the boundary
line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province (Kalinga-Apayao)
is tantamount to amending the law which Congress alone can do.
Both the SP and RTC have no competence to undo a valid act of
Congress.
It is not correct to say that Congress did not intend to take away any
part of Nueva Era and merge it with Marcos for it is chargeable with
conclusive knowledge that when it provided that the eastern
boundary of Marcos is the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and
Mountain Province, (by the time of both the SB and RTC Decision
was already Kalinga-Apayao), it would be cutting through a portion of
Nueva Era. As the law is written so must it be applied. Dura lex sed
lex!29
The CA likewise held that the province Abra was not located between Marcos
and Kalinga-Apayao; and that Marcos would not encroach upon a portion of
Abra for it to be bounded by Kalinga-Apayao, to wit:
Nueva Era's contention that to lay out the eastern jurisdiction of
Marcos to the boundary line between Ilocos Norte and Mountain
Province (Kalinga-Apayao) would mean annexing part of the
municipality of Itnig, province of Abra to Marcos as Abra is between
Ilocos Norte and Mountain Province is geographically erroneous.
From Nueva Era's own map of Region 1, which also depicts the
locations of Kalinga-Apayao, Abra, Mountain Province, Benguet and

Nueva Vizcaya after the partition of the old Mountain Province into
the provinces of Kalinga-Apayao, Ifugao, Mountain Province and
Benguet, the province of Abra is situated far to the south of Kalinga
Apayao and is between the latter and the present Mountain
Province, which is farther south of Abra. Abra is part of the eastern
boundary of Ilocos Sur while Kalinga-Apayao is the eastern
boundary of Ilocos Norte. Hence, in no way will the eastern boundary
of the municipality of Marcos encroach upon a portion of Abra. 30
However, Marcos' claim over the alleged isolated northern portion of Nueva
Era was denied. The CA ruled:
Going now to the other area involved, i.e., the portion of Sto. Nio
that is separated from its mother town Nueva Era and now lies east
of the municipalities of Solsona and Dingras and north of Marcos, it
bears stressing that it is not included within the area of Marcos as
defined by law. But since it is already detached from Sto. Nio,
Marcos is laying claim to it to be integrated into its territory by the SP
because it is contiguous to a portion of said municipality.
We hold that the SP has no jurisdiction or authority to act on the
claim, for it will necessarily substantially alter the north eastern and
southern boundaries of Marcos from that defined by law and unduly
enlarge its area. Only Congress can do that. True, the SP may
substantially alter the boundary of a barangay within its jurisdiction.
But this means the alteration of the boundary of a barangay in
relation to another barangaywithin the same municipality for as
long as that will not result in any change in the boundary of that
municipality. The area in dispute therefore remains to be a part of
Sto. Nio, a barangay of Nueva Era although separated by the newly
created Marcos town pursuant to Section 7(c) of the 1991 Local
Government Code which states:
SEC. 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the
creation of a local government unit or its conversion from
one level to another shall be based on verifiable indicators of
viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
xxxx
(c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises
two or more islands or is separated by a local government

unit independent of the others; properly identified by

metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient
to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace.31
The CA also expressed the view that Marcos adopted the wrong mode of
appeal in bringing the case to it. The case, according to the CA, was
appealable only to the RTC. Nonetheless, despite its pronouncement that the
case was dismissible, the CA took cognizance of the same by treating it as
one for certiorari, to wit:
A final word. At the outset, we agonized over the dilemma of
choosing between dismissing outright the petition at bar or
entertaining it. This is for the simple reason that a petition for review
is a mode of appeal and is not appropriate as the Local Government
Code provides for the remedy of appeal in boundary disputes only to
the Regional Trial Court but not any further appeal to this Court.
Appeal is a purely statutory right. It cannot be exercised unless it is
expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the citation of
supporting authority.

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is exclusively vested to the Regional

Trial Court, without further Appeal to the Court of Appeals";
b) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion,
in treating the Petition for Review On Appeal, filed under Rule 45,
Revised Rules of Court, as a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court;
c) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals erred in its appreciation of
facts, in declaring that MARCOS East is not coterminous with the
Eastern boundary of its mother town-Dingras. That it has no factual
and legal basis to extend MARCOS territory beyond Brgys. Agunit
(Ferdinand) and Culao (Elizabeth) of Marcos, and to go further East,
by traversing and disintegrating Brgy. Sto. Nio, and drawing parallel
lines from Sto. Nio, there lies Abra, not Mt. Province or KalingaApayao.33
Basically, there are two (2) issues to resolve here: (1) whether or not the
mode of appeal adopted by Marcos in bringing the case to the CA is proper;
and (2) whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and
covers a portion of Nueva Era.

xxxx
Our Ruling
By the same token, since the Local Government Code does not
explicitly grant the right of further appeal from decisions of the RTCs
in boundary disputes between or among local government units,
Marcos town cannot exercise that right from the adverse decision of
the RTC of Ilocos Norte. Nonetheless, because of the transcendental
legal and jurisdictional issues involved, we solved our inceptive
dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a special civil action
for certiorari.32
Nueva Era was not pleased with the decision of the CA. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issues

Marcos correctly appealed the RTC judgment via petition for review
under Rule 42.
Under Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, "(b)oundary disputes
involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be
referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned." The
dispute shall be formally tried by the said sanggunian in case the disputing
municipalities fail to effect an amicable settlement.34
The SP of Ilocos validly took cognizance of the dispute between the parties.
The appeal of the SP judgment to the RTC was likewise properly filed by
Marcos before the RTC. The problem, however, lies in whether the RTC
judgment may still be further appealed to the CA.

Nueva Era now raises the following issues:

a) Whether or not, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on the
Petition for Review on Appeal, since Sec. 119 of the Local
Government Code, which provides that "An appeal to the Decision of

The CA pronounced that the RTC decision on the boundary dispute was not
appealable to it. It ruled that no further appeal of the RTC decision may be
made pursuant to Section 119 of the Local Government Code 35 which
provides:

SECTION 119. Appeal. - Within the time and manner prescribed by

the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision of
the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall
decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing thereof. Pending
final resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute shall be
maintained and continued for all legal purposes.
The CA concluded that since only the RTC was mentioned as appellate
court, the case may no longer be further appealed to it. The CA stated that
"(a)ppeal is a purely statutory right. It cannot be exercised unless it is
expressly granted by law. This is too basic to require the citation of
supporting authority."36
The CA, however, justified its taking cognizance of the case by declaring
that: "because of the transcendental legal and jurisdictional issues involved,
we solved our inceptive dilemma by treating the petition at bar as a special
civil action for certiorari."37
The CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over
the judgment of the SP.
True, appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot be exercised unless it is
expressly granted by law. Nevertheless, the CA can pass upon the petition
for review precisely because the law allows it.
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
as amended by R.A. No. 7902, 38vests in the CA the appellate jurisdiction
over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional
Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, among others.39 B.P. Blg. 129 has been further supplemented
by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides for the
remedy of appeal via petition for review under Rule 42 to the CA in cases
decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Thus, the CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed by Marcos
as a petition for certiorari to be able to pass upon the same. B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such judgments and final
orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

At the time of creation of Marcos, approval in a plebiscite of the

creation of a local government unit is not required.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected.40
The purpose of the above constitutional provision was acknowledged by the
Court through Justice Reynato S. Puno in Miranda v. Aguirre,41 where it was
held that:
The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions,
gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne
out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10,
Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby
local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided
on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the
people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit
directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to
any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing,
merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It is
one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on
a matter that affects them - direct democracy of the people as
opposed to democracy thru people's representatives. This plebiscite
requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution
granting more autonomy to local government units. 42
Nueva Era contends that the constitutional and statutory 43 plebiscite
requirement for the creation of a local government unit is applicable to this
case. It posits that the claim of Marcos to its territory should be denied due to
lack of the required plebiscite.
We agree with Nueva Era's contention that Marcos' claim over parts of its
territory is not tenable. However, the reason is not the lack of the required
plebiscite under the 1987 and 1973 constitutions and the Local Government
Code of 1991 but other reasons as will be discussed below.

At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to
create a local government unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created without
conducting a plebiscite. As a matter of fact, no plebiscite was conducted in
Dingras, where it was derived.
Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward. 44 It is the
basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be given
prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive
application is so provided.45
In the comparable case of Ceniza v. Commission on Elections46 involving the
City of Mandaue, the Court has this to say:
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as
unconstitutional for not having been ratified by the residents of the
city in a plebiscite. This contention is untenable. The Constitutional
requirement that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration
of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio should be
subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new
requirement that came into being only with the 1973 Constitution. It
is prospective in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of
the City of Mandaue which came into existence on June 21,
1969.47 (Citations omitted and underlining supplied).
Moreover, by deciding this case, We are not creating Marcos but merely
interpreting the law that created it. Its creation was already a fait
accompli. Therefore, there is no reason for Us to further require a plebiscite.
As pointed out by Justice Isagani Cruz, to wit:
Finally, it should be observed that the provisions of the Constitution
should be given only a prospective application unless the contrary is
clearly intended. Were the rule otherwise, rights already acquired or
vested might be unduly disturbed or withdrawn even in the absence
of an unmistakable intention to place them within the scope of the
Constitution.48
No part of Nueva Era's territory was taken for the creation of Marcos
under R.A. No. 3753.

Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its
territory are named in R.A. No. 3753. To wit:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao,
Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the Municipality of Dingras, Province
of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality and
constituted into a new and separate municipality to be known as the
Municipality of Marcos, with the following boundaries:
Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of
territory, Nueva Era's territory is, therefore, excluded.
Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one
thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute
enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must
necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and
effect.49 This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the
rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind.50
Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part
of Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.
Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by
interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. 51 The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its
meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 52
Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the
enumeration of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set,
their omission must be held to have been done intentionally. This conclusion
finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, which
states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be
held to have been omitted intentionally.53
Furthermore, this conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by
the explanatory note of the bill which paved the way for the creation of
Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned only Dingras as the mother
municipality of Marcos.
Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the
explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent
of the statute.54

Despite the omission of Nueva Era as a mother territory in the law creating
Marcos, the latter still contends that said law included Nueva Era. It alleges
that based on the description of its boundaries, a portion of Nueva Era is
within its territory.
The boundaries of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 read:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going
down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot
path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which is
the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the East,
by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the South, by the
Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary between the
municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and Southwest, by
the boundary between the municipalities of Batac and Dingras.
Marcos contends that since it is "bounded on the East, by the Ilocos NorteMt. Province boundary," a portion of Nueva Era formed part of its territory
because, according to it, Nueva Era is between the Marcos and Ilocos NorteMt. Province boundary. Marcos posits that in order for its eastern side to
reach the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary, it will necessarily traverse the
middle portion of Nueva Era.
Marcos further claims that it is entitled not only to the middle portion of Nueva
Era but also to its northern portion which, as a consequence, was isolated
from the major part of Nueva Era.

Courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be
discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and in
order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular
provision thereof, should be considered. 56 Every section, provision or clause
of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to
arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law, and every part
of the act is to be taken into view.57
It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one
which defeats the very purpose for which they were passed. This Court has
in many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned
against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the
legislature and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe
statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity) and
that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or
lead to absurd results."58
Statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and
the evils sought to be remedied. Thus, in construing a statute, the reason for
its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed
with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider
the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers.59

We cannot accept the contentions of Marcos.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals is partly REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court in
Ilocos Norte is Reinstated.

Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos.

Hence, the said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the
listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory.

SO ORDERED.

Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under

R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the
legislative intent.
The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in
its application.55 We thus uphold the legislative intent to create Marcos out of
the territory of Dingras only.

G.R. No. 166838

June 15, 2011

(Antipolo RTC). This case, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-3006, is still
pending up to this date.

STA.
LUCIA
REALTY
&
DEVELOPMENT,
Inc., Petitioner,
vs.
CITY
OF
PASIG, Respondent,
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, Intervenor.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For review is the June 30, 2004 Decision 1 and the January 27, 2005
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69603, which affirmed
with modification the August 10, 1998 Decision 3 and October 9, 1998
Order4of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 157, in Civil
Case No. 65420.

On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint, 9 docketed as Civil Case No.
65420, against Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes, including
penalties and interests, on the lots covered by TCT Nos. 532250, 598424,
599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457, including the improvements thereon (the
subject properties).
Sta. Lucia, in its Answer, alleged that it had been religiously paying its real
estate taxes to Cainta, just like what its predecessors-in-interest did, by virtue
of the demands and assessments made and the Tax Declarations issued by
Cainta on the claim that the subject properties were within its territorial
jurisdiction. Sta. Lucia further argued that since 1913, the real estate taxes
for the lots covered by the above TCTs had been paid to Cainta. 10

Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is the registered
owner of several parcels of land with Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.
39112, 39110 and 38457, all of which indicated that the lots were located in
Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig5 (Pasig).

Cainta was allowed to file its own Answer-in-Intervention when it moved to

intervene on the ground that its interest would be greatly affected by the
outcome of the case. It averred that it had been collecting the real property
taxes on the subject properties even before Sta. Lucia acquired them. Cainta
further asseverated that the establishment of the boundary monuments
would show that the subject properties are within its metes and bounds. 11

The parcel of land covered by TCT No. 39112 was consolidated with that
covered by TCT No. 518403, which was situated in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan,
Municipality of Cainta, Province of Rizal (Cainta). The two combined lots
were subsequently partitioned into three, for which TCT Nos. 532250,
598424, and 599131, now all bearing the Cainta address, were issued.

Sta. Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the suspension of the
proceedings, and claimed that the pending petition in the Antipolo RTC, for
the settlement of boundary dispute between Cainta and Pasig, presented a
"prejudicial question" to the resolution of the case. 12

TCT No. 39110 was also divided into two lots, becoming TCT Nos. 92869
and 92870.
The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a commercial
building owned by Sta. Lucia East Commercial Center, Inc., a separate
corporation, was built on it.6
Upon Pasigs petition to correct the location stated in TCT Nos. 532250,
598424, and 599131, the Land Registration Court, on June 9, 1995, ordered
the amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with respect to TCT No.
39112 were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig City.7

The RTC denied this in an Order dated December 4, 1996 for lack of merit.
Holding that the TCTs were conclusive evidence as to its ownership and
location,13 the RTC, on August 10, 1998, rendered a Decision in favor of
Pasig:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of [Pasig], ordering Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. to pay [Pasig]:
1) P273,349.14 representing unpaid real estate taxes and penalties
as of 1996, plus interest of 2% per month until fully paid;
2) P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and

On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition for the settlement of its land
boundary dispute with Pasig before the RTC, Branch 74 of Antipolo City

3) The costs of suit.

Judgment is likewise rendered against the intervenor Municipality of Cainta,

Rizal, ordering it to refund to Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. the
realty tax payments improperly collected and received by the former from the
latter in the aggregate amount of P358, 403.68.14
After Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed their Notices of Appeal, Pasig, on
September 11, 1998, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTCs August
10, 1998 Decision.
15

The RTC, on October 9, 1998, granted Pasigs motion in an Order and

modified its earlier decision to include the realty taxes due on the
improvements on the subject lots:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the plaintiffs motion for
reconsideration is hereby granted. Accordingly, the Decision, dated August
10, 1998 is hereby modified in that the defendant is hereby ordered to pay
plaintiff the amount of P5,627,757.07 representing the unpaid taxes and
penalties on the improvements on the subject parcels of land whereon real
estate taxes are adjudged as due for the year 1996. 16
Accordingly, Sta. Lucia filed an Amended Notice of Appeal to include the
RTCs October 9, 1998 Order in its protest.
On October 16, 1998, Pasig filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, to
which both Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed several oppositions, on the assertion
that there were no good reasons to warrant the execution pending appeal. 17
On April 15, 1999, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution
against Sta. Lucia.
On May 21, 1999, Sta. Lucia filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals to assail the RTCs order
granting the execution. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52874, the petition was
raffled to the First Division of the Court of Appeals, which on September 22,
2000, ruled in favor of Sta. Lucia, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN
DUE COURSE and GRANTED by this Court. The assailed Order dated April
15, 1999 in Civil Case No. 65420 granting the motion for execution pending
appeal and ordering the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal is
hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID.18

The Court of Appeals added that the boundary dispute case presented a
"prejudicial question which must be decided before x x x Pasig can collect
the realty taxes due over the subject properties." 19
Pasig sought to have this decision reversed in a Petition for Certiorari filed
before this Court on November 29, 2000, but this was denied on June 25,
2001 for being filed out of time.20
Meanwhile, the appeal filed by Sta. Lucia and Cainta was raffled to the
(former) Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 69603. On June 30, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision, wherein it agreed with the RTCs judgment:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the award of P50,000.00 attorneys fees is DELETED. 21
In affirming the RTC, the Court of Appeals declared that there was no proper
legal basis to suspend the proceedings.22 Elucidating on the legal meaning of
a "prejudicial question," it held that "there can be no prejudicial question
when the cases involved are both civil." 23 The Court of Appeals further held
that the elements of litis pendentia and forum shopping, as alleged by Cainta
to be present, were not met.
Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Motions for Reconsideration, which the
Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated January 27, 2005.
Undaunted, Sta. Lucia and Cainta filed separate Petitions for Certiorari with
this Court. Caintas petition, docketed as G.R. No. 166856 was denied on
April 13, 2005 for Caintas failure to show any reversible error. Sta. Lucias
own petition is the one subject of this decision.24
In praying for the reversal of the June 30, 2004 judgment of the Court of
Appeals, Sta. Lucia assigned the following errors:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING [WITH
MODIFICATION] THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN
PASIG CITY

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSPENDING
THE CASE IN VIEW OF THE PENDENCY OF THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE
WHICH WILL FINALLY DETERMINE THE SITUS OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE PAYMENT OF REALTY TAXES THROUGH THE MUNICIPALITY OF
CAINTA WAS VALID PAYMENT OF REALTY TAXES
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
IN THE MEANTIME THAT THE BOUNDARY DISPUTE CASE IN ANTIPOLO
CITY REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS BEING FINALLY RESOLVED, THE
PETITIONER STA. LUCIA SHOULD BE PAYING THE REALTY TAXES ON
THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES THROUGH THE INTERVENOR CAINTA TO
PRESERVE THE STATUS QUO.25
Pasig, countering each error, claims that the lower courts correctly decided
the case considering that the TCTs are clear on their faces that the subject
properties are situated in its territorial jurisdiction. Pasig contends that the
principles of litis pendentia, forum shopping, and res judicata are all
inapplicable, due to the absence of their requisite elements. Pasig maintains
that the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC is independent of the
complaint for collection of realty taxes which was filed before the Pasig RTC.
It avers that the doctrine of "prejudicial question," which has a definite
meaning in law, cannot be invoked where the two cases involved are both
civil. Thus, Pasig argues, since there is no legal ground to preclude the
simultaneous hearing of both cases, the suspension of the proceedings in
the Pasig RTC is baseless.

Cainta also filed its own comment reiterating its legal authority over the
subject properties, which fall within its territorial jurisdiction. Cainta claims
that while it has been collecting the realty taxes over the subject properties
since way back 1913, Pasig only covered the same for real property tax
purposes in 1990, 1992, and 1993. Cainta also insists that there is a
discrepancy between the locational entries and the technical descriptions in
the TCTs, which further supports the need to await the settlement of the
boundary dispute case it initiated.
The errors presented before this Court can be narrowed down into two basic
issues:
1) Whether the RTC and the CA were correct in deciding Pasigs
Complaint without waiting for the resolution of the boundary dispute
case between Pasig and Cainta; and
2) Whether Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real property taxes
to Cainta, as it alleged to have always done, or to Pasig, as the
location stated in Sta. Lucias TCTs.
We agree with the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
52874 that the resolution of the boundary dispute between Pasig and Cainta
would determine which local government unit is entitled to collect realty taxes
from Sta. Lucia.26
The
Local
Government
To Collect Real Property Taxes

Unit

entitled

The Former Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals held that the resolution
of the complaint lodged before the Pasig RTC did not necessitate the
assessment of the parties evidence on the metes and bounds of their
respective territories. It cited our ruling in Odsigue v. Court of
Appeals27 wherein we said that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of
both its ownership and location.28 The Court of Appeals even referred to
specific provisions of the 1991 Local Government Code and Act. No. 496 to
support its ruling that Pasig had the right to collect the realty taxes on the
subject properties as the titles of the subject properties show on their faces
that they are situated in Pasig.29
Under Presidential Decree No. 464 or the "Real Property Tax Code," the
authority to collect real property taxes is vested in the locality where the
property is situated:

Sec. 5. Appraisal of Real Property. All real property, whether taxable or

exempt, shall be appraised at the current and fair market value prevailing in
the locality where the property is situated.

sought to be avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the

land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and
bounds, with technical descriptions.31 (Emphasis ours.)

xxxx

The significance of accurately defining a local government units boundaries

was stressed in City of Pasig v. Commission on Elections, 32 which involved
the consolidated petitions filed by the parties herein, Pasig and Cainta,
against two decisions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) with
respect to the plebiscites scheduled by Pasig for the ratification of its creation
of two new Barangays. Ruling on the contradictory reliefs sought by Pasig
and Cainta, this Court affirmed the COMELEC decision to hold in abeyance
the plebiscite to ratify the creation of Barangay Karangalan; but set aside the
COMELECs other decision, and nullified the plebiscite that ratified the
creation of Barangay Napico in Pasig, until the boundary dispute before the
Antipolo RTC had been resolved. The aforementioned case held as follows:

Sec. 57. Collection of tax to be the responsibility of treasurers. The

collection of the real property tax and all penalties accruing thereto, and the
enforcement of the remedies provided for in this Code or any applicable
laws, shall be the responsibility of the treasurer of the province, city or
municipality where the property is situated. (Emphases ours.)
This requisite was reiterated in Republic Act No. 7160, also known as the
1991 the Local Government Code, to wit:
Section 201. Appraisal of Real Property. All real property, whether taxable
or exempt, shall be appraised at the current and fair market value prevailing
in the locality where the property is situated. The Department of Finance
shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the classification,
appraisal, and assessment of real property pursuant to the provisions of this
Code.
Section 233. Rates of Levy. A province or city or a municipality within the
Metropolitan Manila Area shall fix a uniform rate of basic real property tax
applicable to their respective localities as follows: x x x. (Emphases ours.)
The only import of these provisions is that, while a local government unit is
authorized under several laws to collect real estate tax on properties falling
under its territorial jurisdiction, it is imperative to first show that these
properties are unquestionably within its geographical boundaries.
Accentuating on the importance of delineating territorial boundaries, this
Court, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections30 said:
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a
local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must
be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only
within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts
are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental
powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil

1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is

DISMISSED for lack of merit; while
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is
GRANTED. The COMELEC Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March
21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to
ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is declared
null and void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance
until after the courts settle with finality the boundary dispute between
the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No. 943006.33
Clearly therefore, the local government unit entitled to collect real property
taxes from Sta. Lucia must undoubtedly show that the subject properties are
situated within its territorial jurisdiction; otherwise, it would be acting beyond
the powers vested to it by law.
Certificates
of
Conclusive Evidence of Location

Title

as

While we fully agree that a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership

and location, this does not preclude the filing of an action for the very
purpose of attacking the statements therein. In De Pedro v. Romasan
Development Corporation,34 we proclaimed that:

We agree with the petitioners that, generally, a certificate of title shall be

conclusive as to all matters contained therein and conclusive evidence of the
ownership of the land referred to therein. However, it bears stressing that
while certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable and binding against
the whole world, including the government itself, they do not create or vest
title. They merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They
cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be
used as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither do they permit one to
enrich himself at the expense of other.35

jurisdictions. The resolution of this dispute would necessarily ascertain the

extent and reach of each local governments authority, a prerequisite in the
proper exercise of their powers, one of which is the power of taxation. This
was the conclusion reached by this Court in City of Pasig v. Commission on
Elections,41 and by the First Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 52874. We do not see any reason why we cannot adhere to the same
logic and reasoning in this case.

In Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Heirs of Vicente

Coronado,36 we set aside the lower courts ruling that the property subject of
the case was not situated in the location stated and described in the TCT, for
lack of adequate basis. Our decision was in line with the doctrine that the
TCT is conclusive evidence of ownership and location. However, we refused
to simply uphold the veracity of the disputed TCT, and instead, we remanded
the case back to the trial court for the determination of the exact location of
the property seeing that it was the issue in the complaint filed before it. 37

It would be unfair to hold Sta. Lucia liable again for real property taxes it
already paid simply because Pasig cannot wait for its boundary dispute with
Cainta to be decided. Pasig has consistently argued that the boundary
dispute case is not a prejudicial question that would entail the suspension of
its collection case against Sta. Lucia. This was also its argument in City of
Pasig v. Commission on Elections,42 when it sought to nullify the COMELECs
ruling to hold in abeyance (until the settlement of the boundary dispute case),
the plebiscite that will ratify its creation of Barangay Karangalan. We agreed
with the COMELEC therein that the boundary dispute case presented a
prejudicial question and explained our statement in this wise:

In City Government of Tagaytay v. Guerrero, 38 this Court reprimanded the

City of Tagaytay for levying taxes on a property that was outside its territorial
jurisdiction, viz:
In this case, it is basic that before the City of Tagaytay may levy a certain
property for sale due to tax delinquency, the subject property should be
under its territorial jurisdiction. The city officials are expected to know such
basic principle of law. The failure of the city officials of Tagaytay to verify if the
property is within its jurisdiction before levying taxes on the same constitutes
gross negligence.39 (Emphasis ours.)
Although it is true that "Pasig" is the locality stated in the TCTs of the subject
properties, both Sta. Lucia and Cainta aver that the metes and bounds of the
subject properties, as they are described in the TCTs, reveal that they are
within Caintas boundaries.40 This only means that there may be a conflict
between the location as stated and the location as technically described in
the TCTs. Mere reliance therefore on the face of the TCTs will not suffice as
they can only be conclusive evidence of the subject properties locations if
both the stated and described locations point to the same area.
The Antipolo RTC, wherein the boundary dispute case between Pasig and
Cainta is pending, would be able to best determine once and for all the
precise metes and bounds of both Pasigs and Caintas respective territorial

The "Prejudicial Question" Debate

To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case
No. 94-3006 involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of
Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first
be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays
may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same
contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where
both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this may be the general
rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, that, in
the interest of good order, we can very well suspend action on one case
pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the
first.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas
covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its
territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the
boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo.
Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has
material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and

Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial
jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less
permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an
issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved
with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays
would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the
way for potentially ultra viresacts of such barangays. x x x. 43 (Emphases
ours.)

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every

court to control the disposition of the cases on its dockets, considering its
time and effort, that of counsel and the litigants. But if proceedings must be
stayed, it must be done in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and prevent
vexatious litigations, conflicting judgments, confusion between litigants and
courts. It bears stressing that whether or not the RTC would suspend the
proceedings in the SECOND CASE is submitted to its sound
discretion.451avvphil

It is obvious from the foregoing, that the term "prejudicial question," as

appearing in the cases involving the parties herein, had been used loosely.
Its usage had been more in reference to its ordinary meaning, than to its
strict legal meaning under the Rules of Court. 44 Nevertheless, even without
the impact of the connotation derived from the term, our own Rules of Court
state that a trial court may control its own proceedings according to its sound
discretion:

In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Pasig RTC should have held in
abeyance the proceedings in Civil Case No. 65420, in view of the fact that
the outcome of the boundary dispute case before the Antipolo RTC will
undeniably affect both Pasigs and Caintas rights. In fact, the only reason
Pasig had to file a tax collection case against Sta. Lucia was not that Sta.
Lucia refused to pay, but that Sta. Lucia had already paid, albeit to another
local government unit. Evidently, had the territorial boundaries of the
contending local government units herein been delineated with accuracy,
then there would be no controversy at all.

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS

Rule 135
SEC. 5. Inherent powers of courts. Every court shall have power:
xxxx
(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
comformable to law and justice.
Furthermore, we have acknowledged and affirmed this inherent power in our
own decisions, to wit:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in
abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another court,
especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes (sic) on its dockets
with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where
the rights of parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until
the questions raised in the first action are settled the second action should be
stayed.

In the meantime, to avoid further animosity, Sta. Lucia is directed to deposit

the succeeding real property taxes due on the subject properties, in an
escrow account with the Land Bank of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The June 30, 2004
Decision and the January 27, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 69603 are SET ASIDE. The City of Pasig and the Municipality of
Cainta are both directed to await the judgment in their boundary dispute case
(Civil Case No. 94-3006), pending before Branch 74 of the Regional Trial
Court in Antipolo City, to determine which local government unit is entitled to
exercise its powers, including the collection of real property taxes, on the
properties subject of the dispute. In the meantime, Sta. Lucia Realty and
Development, Inc. is directed to deposit the succeeding real property taxes
due on the lots and improvements covered by TCT Nos. 532250, 598424,
599131, 92869, 92870 and 38457 in an escrow account with the Land Bank
of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.