EN BANC

G.R. No. 191002 : March 17, 2010

ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191032
JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191057
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL
(JBC),Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC
IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF
THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE
JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191149
JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent.
PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM;
ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.; NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S
LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE

PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR CHAPTER, represented by

its Immediate Past President, ATTY. ISRAELITO P.
TORREON, and the latter in his own personal capacity as a
MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L.
BOISER; BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN
DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL
RENATO M. REYES, JR.; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCE-MENT OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE;
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY)
SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG
NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA
KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN LEONARD
RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS;
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN JAMES
MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF
STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP) CHAIRMAN
EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE
PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE ALQUISOLA; and
STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
(SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA;
WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES; WOMEN
TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by YOLANDA QUISUMBING-JAVELLANA;
BELLEZA ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA GANDIONCOOLEDAN; MA. VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; MARILYN
STA. ROMANA; LEONILA DE JESUS; and GUINEVERE DE
LEON.Intervenors.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191342
ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP GovernorSouthern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING
(IBPGovernor-Eastern Visayas), Petitioners, v. JUDICIAL AND
BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 191420
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION,
INC., Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER
EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents.
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
SEPARATE OPINION:
NACHURA, J.:
BRION, J.:
DISSENTING OPINION:
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
CONCURRING OPINION:
ABAD, J.:
"Although the Chief Justice is primus inter pares, he cannot
legally decide a case on his own because of the Courts nature as
a collegial body. Neither can the Chief Justice, by himself,
overturn the decision of the Court, whether of a division or theen
banc.cra|aw"
Associate Justice Renato C. Corona in
Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda
against Justice Puno, 499 Phil. 1, 14 (2005)
cralawPrimus Inter pares. First among equals. The Latin maxim
indicates that a person is the most senior of a group of people
sharing the same rank or office. The phrase has been used to
describe the status, condition or role of the prime minister in

most parliamentary nations, the high-ranking prelate in several

religious orders, and the chief justice in many supreme courts
around the world.1ca
The inclination to focus on the inter pares without due emphasis
on the primus/prima2ca has spawned contemporary discourse
that revives the original tug-of-war between domination and
parity, which impasse the conceived maxim precisely intended to
resolve.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
In the present case, several arguments attempt to depict a
mirage of doomsday scenarios arising from the impending
vacancy of the primus in the Court as a springboard for their plea
to avert a supposed undermining of the independence of the
judiciary. In reality, the essential question boils down to the
limitation on the appointing power of the
President.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
The ponencia of Justice Bersamin holds that the incumbent
President can appoint the next Chief Justice upon the retirement
of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno on May 17, 2010 since the
prohibition during election period3ca does not extend to
appointments in the judiciary, thereby reversing In re
appointments of Hon. Valenzuela & Hon. Vallarta.4ca
The ponencia additionally holds that the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which to
submit to the President the list of nominees for the position of
Chief Justice.
I DISSENT.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
Constitutional draftsmanship style is the weakest aid in arriving
at a constitutional construction
The first ratiocination adverts to the "organization and
arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution" that was, as
the ponencia declares, purposely made by the framers of the

Constitution to "reflect their intention and manifest their vision"

of the charters contents.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
It is unfortunate that the ponencia chiefly relies on the trivialities
of draftsmanship style in arriving at a constitutional construction.
The petitioner in Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The
Executive Secretary5ca raised a similar argument, but the Court
held:
AMIN goes on to proffer the concept of "ordering the law" which,
so it alleges, can be said of the Constitutions distinct treatment of
these three areas, as reflected in separate provisions in different
parts of the Constitution. It argues that the Constitution did not
intend an over-arching concept of agrarian reform to encompass
the two other areas, and that how the law is ordered in a certain
way should not be undermined by mere executive orders in the
guise of administrative efficiency.
The Court is not persuaded.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
The interplay of various areas of reform in the promotion of social
justice is not something implausible or unlikely. Their interlocking
nature cuts across labels and works against a rigid pigeonholing
of executive tasks among the members of the Presidents official
family. Notably, the Constitution inhibited from identifying and
compartmentalizing the composition of the Cabinet. In vesting
executive power in one person rather than in a plural executive,
the evident intention was to invest the power holder with
energy.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
AMIN takes premium on the severed treatment of these reform
areas in marked provisions of the Constitution. It is a precept,
however, that inferences drawn from title, chapter or
section headings are entitled to very little weight. And so
must reliance on sub-headings, or the lack thereof, to
support a strained deduction be given the weight of
helium.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to create doubt.

AMINs thesis unsettles, more than settles the order of things in
construing the Constitution. Its interpretation fails to clearly
establish that the so-called "ordering" or arrangement of
provisions in the Constitution was consciously adopted to
imply a signification in terms of government hierarchy
from where a constitutional mandate can per se be derived
or asserted. It fails to demonstrate that the "ordering" or
layout was not simply a matter of style in constitutional
drafting but one of intention in government
structuring. With its inherent ambiguity, the proposed
interpretation cannot be made a basis for declaring a law or
governmental act unconstitutional.6ca (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Concededly, the allocation of three Articles in the Constitution
devoted to the respective dynamics of the three Departments was
deliberately adopted by the framers to allocate the vast powers of
government among the three Departments in recognition of the
principle of separation of powers.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
The equation, however, does not end there. Such kind of
formulation detaches itself from the concomitant system of
checks and balances. Section sequencing alone of Sections 14, 15
and 16 of Article VII, as explained in the fourth ratiocination,
does not suffice to signify functional
structuring.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
That the power of judicial appointment was lodged in the
President is a recognized measure of limitation on the power of
the judiciary, which measure, however, is counterbalanced by the
election ban due to the need to insulate the judiciary from the
political climate of presidential elections. To abandon this
interplay of checks and balances on the mere inference that the
establishment of the JBC could de-politicize the process of judicial
appointments lacks constitutional mooring.

The establishment of the JBC is not sufficient to curtail the evils

of midnight appointments in the judiciary
The constitutional prohibition in Section 15 found its roots in the
case of Aytona v. Castillo,7ca where among the "midnight" or
"last minute" appointments voided to abort the abuse of
presidential prerogatives or partisan efforts to fill vacant positions
were one in the Supreme Court and two in the Court of
Appeals.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
Heeding Aytonas admonition, the Constitutional Commission
(ConCom) saw it fit to provide for a comprehensive ban on
midnight appointments, finding that the establishment of the JBC
is not enough to safeguard or insulate judicial appointments from
politicization. The ConCom deliberations reveal:
MR. GUINGONA: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Guingona is
recognized.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
MR. GUINGONA: Would the distinguished proponent accept an
amendment to his amendment to limit this prohibition to
members of collegiate courts? The judges of the lower courts
perhaps would not have the same category or the same standing
as the others mentioned here.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
MR. DAVIDE: Pursuant to the post amendment, we already
included here government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries which are not even very sensitive positions. So
with more reason that the prohibition should apply to
appointments in these bodies.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Committee accept?
FR. BERNAS: What is common among these people Ministers,
Deputy Ministers, heads of bureaus or offices is that they are
under the control of the President.

MR. GUINGONA: That is correct.

FR. BERNAS: Whereas, the other offices the Commissioner
mentioned are independent offices.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
MR. DAVIDE: The idea of the proposal is that about the end of the
term of the President, he may prolong his rule indirectly by
appointing people to these sensitive positions, like the
commissions, the Ombudsman, the JUDICIARY, so he could
perpetuate himself in power even beyond his term of office;
therefore foreclosing the right of his successor to make
appointments to these positions. We should realize that the term
of the President is six years and under what we had voted on,
there is no reelection for him. Yet he can continue to rule the
country through appointments made about the end of his term to
these sensitive positions.
FR. BERNAS: At any rate, there are other checks as far as the
appointment of those officers is
concerned.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
MR. DAVIDE: Only insofar as the Commission on Appointments is
concerned for offices which would require consent, and the
Judicial Bar Council insofar as the judiciary is
concerned.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
FR. BERNAS: We leave the matter to the body for a
vote.8ca (capitalization and emphasis supplied)
cralawThe clear intent of the framers is thus for the ban on
midnight appointments to apply to the judiciary. The succeeding
interpellations9ca suggest no departure from this
intent.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
For almost half a century, the seeds of Aytona, as nurtured and
broadened by the Constitution, have grown into an established
doctrine that has weathered legal storms like
Valenzuela.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

The second ratiocination in the ponencia could thus not remove

an added constitutional safeguard by pretending to have
examined and concluded that the establishment of the JBC had
eliminated all encompassing forms of political maneuverings
during elections. Otherwise, reading into the Constitution such
conclusion so crucial to the scheme of checks and balances, which
is neither written nor tackled, undermines the noticeable silence
or restraint exercised by the framers themselves from making a
definitive analysis.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
To illustrate, the instance given in the fifth ratiocination that
having the new President appoint the next Chief Justice cannot
ensure judicial independence because the appointee can also
become beholden to the appointing authority bears an
inconsistent stance. It does not admit or recognize that the
mechanism of removal by impeachment eliminates the evils of
political indebtedness. In any event, that level of reasoning
overlooks the risk of compromising judicial independence when
the outgoing President faces the Court in the charges that may be
subsequently filed against her/him, and when the appointing
President is up for re-election in the peculiar situation
contemplated by Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
All rules of statutory construction revolt against the interpretation
arrived at by the ponencia
It is simplistic and unreliable for the ponencia to contend that had
the framers intended to extend the ban in Article VII to
appointments in the judiciary, they would have easily and surely
written so in Article VIII, for it backlashes the question that had
the framers intended to exclude judicial appointments in Article
VIII from the prohibition in Article VII, they would have easily
and surely written so in the excepting proviso in Article
VII.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
Taking into account how the framers painstakingly rummaged
through various sections of the Constitution and came up with
only one exception with the need to specify the executive

department, it insults the collective intelligence and diligence of

the ConCom to postulate that it intended to exclude the judiciary
but missed out on that one.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
To hold that the ban on midnight appointments applies only to
executive positions, and not to vacancies in the judiciary and
independent constitutional bodies, is to make the prohibition
practically useless. It bears noting that Section 15, Article VII of
the Constitution already allows the President, by way of
exception, to make temporary appointments in the Executive
Department during the prohibited period. Under this view, there
is virtually no restriction on the Presidents power of appointment
during the prohibited period.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
The general rule is clear since the prohibition applies to ALL kinds
of midnight appointments. The Constitution made no
distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
The exception is likewise clear. Expressio unius et exclusio
alterius. The express mention of one person, thing or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others.10ca There is no
clear circumstance that would indicate that the enumeration in
the exception was not intended to be exclusive. Moreover, the
fact that Section 15 was couched in negative language reinforces
the exclusivity of the exception.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a
general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all
doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions
rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by
statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former nor
add to the latter by implication.11ca (italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
The proclivity to innovate legal concepts is enticing. Lest the basic
rule be forgotten, it helps to once more recite that when the law

is clear, it is not susceptible to interpretation and must be applied

regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh
or onerous.12ca
In its third ratiocination, the ponencia faults Valenzuela for not
according weight and due consideration to the opinion of Justice
Florenz Regalado. It accords high regard to the opinion expressed
by Justice Regalado as a former ConCom Member, to the
exception of the opinion of all others similarly
situated.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
It bears noting that the Court had spoken in one voice
in Valenzuela. The ponencia should not hastily reverse, on the
sole basis of Justice Regalados opinion, the Courts unanimous en
banc decision penned by Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, and
concurred in by, inter alia, Associate Justices who later became
Chief Justices Hilario Davide, Jr., Artemio Panganiban and
Reynato Puno.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
The line of reasoning is specious. If that is the case and for
accuracys sake, we might as well reconvene all ConCom
members and put the matter to a vote among
them.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
Providentially, jurisprudence is replete with guiding principles to
ascertain the true meaning of the Constitution when the
provisions as written appear unclear and the proceedings as
recorded provide little help:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates
and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive
at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort
thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution
when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional
convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not

talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon
its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framers' understanding thereof.13ca (underscoring supplied)
The clear import of Section 15 of Article VII is readily apparent.
The people may not be of the same caliber as Justice Regalado,
but they simply could not read into Section 15 something that is
not there. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus
est.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
What complicates the ponencia is its great preoccupation with
Section 15 of Article VII, particularly its fixation with sentences or
phrases that are neither written nor referred to therein. Verba
legis non est recedendum, index animi sermo est. There should
be no departure from the words of the statute, for speech is the
index of intention.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
IN FINE, all rules of statutory construction virtually revolt against
the interpretation arrived at by the ponencia.
The 90-day period to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court is
suspended during the ban on midnight appointments
Although practically there is no constitutional crisis or conflict
involved upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice,
the ponencia illustrates the inapplicability of the 90-day mandate
to every situation of vacancy in the Supreme Court (i.e., the 19day vacuum articulated in the sixth ratiocination) if only to
buttress its thesis that judicial appointment is an exception to the
midnight appointments ban. The contemplated situation,
however, supports the idea that the 90-day period is suspended
during the effectivity of the ban.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
I submit that the more important and less complicated question is
whether the 90-day period in Section 4(1) of Article

VIII14ca runs during the period of prohibition in Section 15 of

Article VII.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
In response to that question, the ponencia declares that it is the
Presidents "imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member
of the Supreme Court within 90
days from the occurrence of the vacancyand that t]he failure by
the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the
Constitution."15ca
The ponencia quotes certain records of the ConCom deliberations
which, however, only support the view that the number of
Justices should "not be reduced for any appreciable length of
time" and it is a "mandate to the executive to fill the vacancy".
Notably, there is no citation of any debate on how the framers
reckoned or determined an appreciable length of time of 90 days,
in which case a delay of one day could already bring about the
evils it purports to avoid and spell a culpable violation of the
Constitution. On the contrary, that the addition of one month to
the original proposal of 60 days was approved without
controversy16ca ineluctably shows that the intent was not to
strictly impose an inflexible timeframe.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
Respecting the rationale for suspending the 90-day period, in
cases where there is physical or legal impossibility of compliance
with the duty to fill the vacancy within the said period, the
fulfillment of the obligation is released because the law cannot
exact compliance with what is
impossible.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
In the present case, there can only arise a legal impossibility
when the JBC list is submitted or the vacancy occurred during the
appointments ban and the 90-day period would expire before the
end of the appointments ban, in which case the fresh 90-day
period should start to run at noon of June 30. This was the factual
antecedent respecting the trial court judges involved in
Valenzuela. There also arises a legal impossibility when the list is
submitted or the vacancy occurred prior to the ban and no

appointment was made before the ban starts, rendering the lapse
of the 90-day period within the period of the ban, in which case
the remaining period should resume to run at noon of June 30.
The outgoing President would be released from non-fulfillment of
the constitutional obligation, and the duty devolves upon the new
President.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
Considering also that Section 15 of Article VII is an express
limitation on the Presidents power of appointment, the running of
the 90-day period is deemed suspended during the period of the
ban which takes effect only once every six
years.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
This view differs from Valenzuela in that it does not implement
Section 15 of Article VII so as to breach Section 4(1) of Article
VIII. Instead of disregarding the 90-day period in the observance
of the ban on midnight appointments, the more logical
reconciliation of the two subject provisions is to consider the ban
as having the effect of suspending the duty to make the
appointment within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Otherwise stated, since there is a ban, then there is no duty to
appoint as the power to appoint does not even exist. Accordingly,
the 90-day period is suspended once the ban sets in and begins
or continues to run only upon the expiration of the
ban.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
One situation which could result in physical impossibility is the
inability of the JBC to constitute a quorum for some reasons
beyond their control, as that depicted by Justice Arturo Brion in
his Separate Opinion, in which case the 90-day period could lapse
without fulfilling the constitutional
obligation.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
Another such circumstance which could frustrate the ponencias
depiction of the inflexibility of the period is a "no-takers" situation
where, for some reason, there are no willing qualified nominees
to become a Member of the Court.17ca Some might find this
possibility remote, but then again, the situation at hand or the

"absurdity"18ca of a 19-day overlapping vacuum may have also

been perceived to be rare.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
The seventh ratiocination is admittedly a non-issue. Suffice it
to state that the Constitution is clear that the appointment must
come "from a list x x x prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council.cra|aw"
The Supreme Court can function effectively during the midnight
appointments ban without an appointed Chief Justice
The ponencia also holds that the JBC has until May 17, 2010, at
the latest, within which to submit to the President the list of
nominees for the position of Chief Justice. It declares that the JBC
should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the
vacancy, explaining that the 90-day period in the proviso, "Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof," is addressed to the President, not to the
JBC.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
Such interpretation is absurd as it takes the application and
nomination stages in isolation from the whole appointment
process. For the ponencia, the filling of the vacancy only involves
the President, and the JBC was not considered when the period
was increased from 60 days to 90 days. The sense of the Concom
is the exact opposite.19ca
The flaw in the reasoning is made more evident when the
vacancy occurs by virtue of death of a member of the Court. In
that instance, the JBC could never anticipate the vacancy, and
could never submit a list to the President before the 90-day
period.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
Sustaining the view means20ca that in case the President
appoints as Chief Justice a sitting member of the Court, from a
JBC list which includes, for instance, incumbent justices and
"outsiders," the JBC must forthwith submit a list of nominees for
the post left vacant by the sitting member-now new Chief Justice.

This thus calls for the JBC, in anticipation, to also commence and
conclude another nomination process to fill the vacancy, and
simultaneously submit a list of nominees for such vacancy,
together with the list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice.
If the President appoints an "outsider" like Sandiganbayan Justice
Edilberto Sandoval as Chief Justice, however, the JBCs toil and
time in the second nomination process are put to
waste.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
It is ironic for the ponencia to state on the one hand that the
President would be deprived of ample time to reflect on the
qualifications of the nominees, and to show on the other hand
that the President has, in recent history, filled the vacancy in the
position of Chief Justice in one or two
days.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
It is ironic for the ponencia to recognize that the President may
need as much as 90 days of reflection in appointing a member of
the Court, and yet abhor the idea of an acting Chief Justice in the
interregnum as provided for by law,21caconfirmed by
tradition,22ca and settled by jurisprudence23ca to be an internal
matter.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
The express allowance of a 90-day period of vacancy rebuts any
policy argument on the necessity to avoid a vacuum of even a
single day in the position of an appointed Chief
Justice.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
As a member of the Court, I strongly take exception to
the ponencias implication that the Court cannot function without
a sitting Chief Justice.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
To begin with, judicial power is vested in one Supreme
Court24ca and not in its individual members, much less in the
Chief Justice alone. Notably, after Chief Justice Puno retires, the
Court will have 14 members left, which is more than sufficient to
constitute a quorum.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary

The fundamental principle in the system of laws recognizes that

there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other
courts are required to take their bearings. While most of the
Courts work is performed by its three divisions, the Court remains
one court single, unitary, complete and supreme. Flowing from
this is the fact that, while individual justices may dissent or only
partially concur, when the Court states what the law is, it speaks
with only one voice.25ca
The Court, as a collegial body, operates on a "one member, one
vote" basis, whether it sits en banc or in divisions. The
competence, probity and independence of the Court en banc, or
those of the Courts Division to which the Chief Justice belongs,
have never depended on whether the member voting as Chief
Justice is merely an acting Chief Justice or a duly appointed
one.chanroblesvirtua|awlibary
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to hold, for the guidance of
the Judicial and Bar Council, that the incumbent President is
constitutionally proscribed from appointing the successor of Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010
until the ban ends at 12:00 noon of June 30, 2010.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice