NAMA

NIM
KELAS

: ANDINI UTARI PUTRI

: 01022681519002
: BKU AKUNTANSI REGULER PAGI

PROGRAM STUDI
MATERI

: ILMU EKONOMI S2
: EKONOMI MIKRO

1. Jelaskan apa yang dimaksud dengan diskriminasi harga ?

Price discrimination, which is the monopolist neet not always sell her entire output in a
single market for a uniform price. In some cases she can incrase her pofit by selling at
more than one price. Two such cases are presented here. In the first she is able to
x 1 F q 1
=
=
Let F(q, x1, x2) = q h (x1, x2) and
q
F x 1 h1

And by further differentiation,

x1 q

hii
=2 x 1
=
q2

hii
3

hi

The last equality of (7-14) is derived using the composve-function rule :

2
2
2
C x 1 2 C x 1 r i hii
+
= 3
2
Cii (q) = x 2 q

q
hi
i
i

( )

Set a different price in each pof two distrinct markets. In the secon she is able to set a
continuum of prices.
If a monopolist practice price discrimination in two distinct markets, her profits is the
difference between her total revenue from both markets and her total cos of production :
= R1(q1) + R2(q2) C(q1+q2)
(7-15)
dimana

: q1 dan q2

= kuantitas yang dijual dalam dua pasar

R1(q1) dan R2(q2)

= fungsi pendapatan

C(q1+q2)

= fungsi biaya

Setting the partial deriavatives of (7-15) equal to zero,

=R'1 (q 1)C ' ( q1 +q 2 )=0

q1


=R'2 (q 2)C ' ( q1 + q2 )=0
q2
R'1 (q 1)=R'2(q2 )=C ' ( q1 +q 2)

The MR in each maret must equal the MC of the output as a whole. If the MRs were not
equal, the monopolist could increase total revenue without affecting total cost by shifting
sales from the low MR market to the high one. The equality of the MRs does not
necessarily imply the equality of prices in the two markets. Denoting the prices and the
demand elasticities in the two the two markets. Denoting the prices and the demand
elasticities in the two markets by p1, p2, e1, and e2 utilizing (7-6), the equality of the MRs
implies. Second order conditions require that the principal minors of the relevant Hessian
determinant,
-C #
- C R 2 C |
|R1 C
These imply that R2-C < 0 the MR in each market must be increasing less rapidly that
the MC for the output as a whole.

2. Jelaskan perbedaan antara multiple plan monopoli dan multiple produk monopoli ?
Multiple plant monopolist
Consider a monopolist selling in a single market, who can produce her output in two
separate plants. Her profit is the diffrence between her total revenue and her total
production costs for both plants :
=R ( q 1+ q2 ) C 1 ( q1 )C 2 ( q2 )
Dimana

: q1 dan q2
R ( q1 +q 2 )
C 1 ( q 1)

dan

= kuantitas yang dihasilkan dari kedua plants,

= fungsi dari revenue, dan
C2 ( q 2 )

= fungsi dari biaya.

Setting the partial derivatives of (7-16) equal to zero,

=R' (q1 +q 2) C 1 ' ( q1 )=0

q1

'
=R (q1 +q 2) C 2 ' ( q2 ) =0
q2

R' ( q1 +q 2) =C 1 ' ( q 1 )=C 2 ' ( q2 )

The MC in each plant must equal the mR of the output as a whole. Secpnd-order
conditions require that the principlas minors o the relevant Hessian determinant

R - C1 R
R - C2 } right rline

Alternate in sign beginning with the negative sign. The reader can verify that (7-17)
requires that the MC in each plant must be ncerasing more rapidly than the MR of the
output as a whole.
Multiple product monopolist
Consider a producer who acts as a monopolist for two distinct but interrelated products
with the demang funcions
q1 =f 1 ( p1, p 2 ) q2=f 2 ( p 1, p 2)

If the cross derivatves the

qi
(i j)
qj

are positive the goods are gross subtitutes.

Assume that single-vaued inverse demand functions exist.

p1=F 1 ( q 1, q2 ) p2=F 2 ( q1, q 2)
Here positive cross derivatives denote complements and negative derivatives denote
subtitutes. Finally define revenue functions,
R1= p1, q 1=R1 (q 1, q2 ) R2= p 2, q2=R2 ( q1, q 2)
Here

Ri
(i j) is positive for complements and negative for subtitutes.
qj

The monopoliss profit is

=R1 ( q1 , q2 ) + R 2 ( q 1 ,q 2 )C 1 ( q1 )C 2 ( q2 )
Setting the partial derivatives equal to zero
R1 R2
=
+
C1 ' ( q 1 )=0
q1 q1 q1
R1 R 2
=
+
C 2 ' ( q 2 )=0
q2 q2 q2

 R1 R 2
R 1 R2
+
C 1' (q1)
+
C2 ' ( q2 )
q1 q1
q 2 q 2
The monopolist again equates MC and MR. In (7-18) MR explicity accounts for the
deman interrelation.
Ri
Consider a case in which the goods ae subtitutes with q j <0(i j) an
example is a local brewer who produces both premium and ordniary beer. The MC for a
beer will be lower than the MR for that beer consideered apart from te other beer. An
ncrease in the output of the premium beer is achieved through a reduction of its pricce
which causes a reduction in the sales of the ordinary beer. The first order conditions (718) dictate an optimal price differential for the two beers.
Ri
If the goods are complements with q j >0(i j) the Mcfor each good will
be higher tan the MR for that food considered alone. Let one good be razor blades and
the other razors. An espansion in the output of razors through a reduction in their price
will cause an expansion in the revenue from the sale of blades at a given price. An
optimal solution might require the sale of razors at a loss becas of the favorable effects of
their sale on razor-bade profits.

NAMA
NIM
KELAS

: ANDINI UTARI PUTRI

: 01022681519002
: BKU AKUNTANSI REGULER PAGI

PROGRAM STUDI
MATERI

: ILMU EKONOMI S2
: EKONOMI MIKRO

1. Jelaskan perbedaan antara kompetitif solution, collution solution, cournot solution,

stackelberg solution ?
Competitive Solution
Consider a market in which two firms produce a homogeneous product the inverwse
demand function states price as a function of the aggregate quantity sold :
p = F (q1+q2)
(8-1)
where q1 and q2 are the levels of the duopolist outputs. The total revenue of each
duopolist depends upon his own output level and that o his level :
R1 = q1F(q1+q2) = R1 (q1,q2)
R2 = q2F(q1+q2) = R2 (q1,q2)
The profit of each equals his total revenue less his cost, which depends upon his output
level alone :
1 = R1(q1,q2) C1(q1)
2 = R2(q1,q2) C2(q2)

(8-2)

the perfectly competitive solution is characterized by the equality of pirces and MC. The
quasi-competitive solution for a market with a small number of sellers is defined as the
solution that would be achieved if each seller followed the competitive rule ; it is
determined by solving the equations
p = F (q1 + q2) = C1(q1)
p = F (q1 + q2) = C2(q2)

(8-3)

for p, q1 and q2, the equasi-competitive solution may or may not be axhieved in any
particular market. In either it provides a standard ith which various small-number
solutions may be compared. Such comparisons are particularly important in welfare
economics.
The Collusion Solution
Dupolist (or oligopolist) may recognize their mutual interdependence and agree to act in
unison in order to maximize the total profit of the industry. Both output levels are then
under a single controlm and the industry is in effect a monopoly, let :
R1 (q1+q2) = R1 (q1,q2) + R2 (q1+q2) = (q1 + q2)F(q1 + q2)

Aggregate profit is
= 1 + 2 = R(q1 + q2) C1(q1) C2(q2)
which is the same (7-16) the profit function for the two plant monopolist. Thusm the first
order conditions require that the MC of each producer be equated to MR for output as a
whole.
The Cournut Solution
The basic behaviour assumption of the Cournut Solution is that each dupolist maximizes
his profit on the assumption that the quantity produced by his rival is invariants with
respect to his own quantity decision, the first dupolist (I for short),
Setting the appropriate partial derivatives of (8-2) equal to zero,
1 R 1 d C 1
R1 d C 1
=
+
=0
=
q 1 q1 d q1
q1 d q 1
2 R 2 d C 2
R2 d C2
=
+
=0
=
q 2 q2 d q 2
q2 d q 2 value of q2 which maximizes
Reaction function which express the output of each duopolist as a function of his rivals
output are determined by solving the first equation of (8-7) for q1 and the second for q2 :
q1 = 1 (q2)
q2 = 2 (q2)

(8-9)

Is reaction function gives a relationship between q1, and q2 with the property that for any
specfied value of q1 the corresponding value of q2 which maximizes 1. IIs rection
function gives the 2 for any specified value of q1. An equilibirium solution is a pair of
values for q1 and q2 which satisfy both reaction functions.
If the demand and cost functions are :
p = A-B(q1 + q2)
C1 = a1q1 + b1q12
C2 = a2q2 + b2q22
the corresponding reaction function are :
Aa1
Aa2
B
B
q1 =

q2 q2=

q ( 810 )
2 ( B+b1 ) 2 ( B+ b1 )
2 ( B+ b2 ) 2 ( B+b 2 ) 1
Since B, b1, and b2 are all positive a rise of either duopolists output will cause a
reduciton of the others opinion output.

q2
q1= 1(q2)

q2 = 2(q1)
0

q1

An equilibirium is provided by a solution of (8-10) or equivalently, by an intersection point for

the reaction curves, such as E in fih 8-1.
Comparison with the quasi-competitive solution (8-5) shows that the Counrut dupolists produce a
smaller total output at a higher price and for larger profits. Comparison with the collusion
solution (8-6) shows a larger total output at a lower price for a smaller total profit. It follows that
wiht an appropriate aggrement on how to distribute insdustry profit, both duopolist would be
better off with the collusion solution that with the Cournut solution. Its easy to showm hwever,
that Colluision solution isnt the only one that dominates the Cournut Solution.

The Stackelberg Solution

Is profit is now a function of q 1 and can be maximixed with respect to this single variable. II can
also determine his maximum profit from leadership on th assumption that I obeys his reaction
function and acts as a follower. Is maximum profit from follwership is determined by
substitusing IIs optimum leadersship output level in Is reaction function, and IIs maximum
profit from followership is dtermined by substitusing Is optimum leadership output level in IIs
reaction function.
Each duopolist determines his maximum profit levels from both leader-ship and followershp and
desires to play the role which yields the larger maximum. Four outcomes are possible :
a.
b.
c.
d.

I desires to be a leadeer and II a follower

II desires to be a leader, and II a follower
Both diesire to be leaders
Both desire to be followers

Outcome,
a. Results in consistent behavior patterns and therefore a determinate equilibirium. I assumes
that II will act as a follower and he does; II assumes that I will act as a leader and he does.
b. Likewise, results in a determinate equilibirium, if both desire to be followers, their
expectations are not realixed, since each assumes that the other woll act as a leader.

The duopolist must revise their expectations. Undr the Stackelberg assumptions, the Cournut
solution is achieved if each desires to as a follower, knowing that the other will also act as a
follower.
If both desire to be leaders, each assumes that the others behaviour is governed by his reaction
function, but in fct neither of the reaction functions is obeyed and a Stackelberg disequilbirium is
encountered. Stackelberg believed that this disequilibirium is the most frequent outcome.