SEPARATION OF POWERS

In Re: Manzano
Facts:
RTC Judge Manzano was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee onJustice pursuant to EO 856 as amended by EO 326 by then Governor.
Rodolfo Farinas. He sent a letter tothe SC stating that before he accepts the
appointment, he would like to request for the issuance of aResolution (1) authorizing
him to accept his appointment and assume and discharge the powers and
dutiesattached to it (2) that his membership to the said Committee is not violative of
the Independence of the Judiciary or may be considered as an abandonment of his
position in the RTC (3) to consider that hismembership in the committee is a part of
the primary function of an Executive Judge. However, onexamination of the EOs,
it was revealed that among the functions
of the Committee is to reviewcomplaints
against any apprehending officer xx who may be found to have committed abuses in
thedischarge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for the appropriate
action.
Another
function
isto recommend the revision of any
law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the
proper administration
of
criminal justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the acceptance of Judge Manzano of his appointment in the
Committee will violatethe doctrine of separation of powers
Held:
It is evident from the stated functions of the Committee that it performs
functions that areadministrative in nature
which are defined as those involving the regulation and control over the conductand
affairs of individuals fore their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature xxx. Under Art.8, Sec12 of
the Constitution, the members of the xxxcourts xxx shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
While the doctrine of separation of powers is xxx not to be enforced with pedantic
rigor, xxx it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume
position xxx which are non judiciary incharacter xx if he is expected to be confined
to the task of adjudication. Xxx He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative
official.
This does not mean that the RTS judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility. An RTC judge should render assistance to said Committees xxx but
only when itmay be reasonably incidental to the fulfilment of their judicial duties.
Hence, the request was denied.

Angara v. Electoral Commission (Supremacy of the Constitution enforced

through judicial review)
NATURE: Original action in teh Supreme Court for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition torestrainand prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents
from taking further cognizanceof the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent against the election of said petitioner asmember of the National Assembly
for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
FACTS: IN the elections of September 17, 1935, Jose Angara and respondents, Pedro
Ynsua,Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of
member of theNational Assembly for the first district of the Province of Taybas.. On
October 7, 1935 petitioner Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the National
Assembly and he later took his oath of office on November 15, 1935. On December
3, 1935, the National Assembly passed ResolutionNo. 8 which declared with finality
the victory of petitioner. On December 8, respondent Ynsuafiled before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara praying that said theformer be
declared elected member of the National Assembly or that the election of the
saidposition be nullified. On December 20, Angara filed a "Motion to Dismiss
the Protest" arguingthat a) Resolution 8 was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative toprescribe the period during which protests against the
election of its member should bepresented; b) that aforesaid resolution has for its
object and is the accepted formula for, thelimitation of said period; and c) protest
was filed out of the prescribed period. The ElectoralCommission denied petitioner's
motion. Thus, this action in the present case.
ISSUE:1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of thecontroversy upon the foregoing facts;
2.WON the Electoral Commission committed a grave abuse of its discretion having
entertained aprotest after the National Assembly passed Resolution 8 which declared
the deadline of filing of protests.
HELD:1. The nature of the present case shows the necessity of a final arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution.
NOt taking cognizance of saidcontroversy would create a void in our constitutional
system which may in the long run provedestructive of the entire framework.In cases
of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutitonl organ which can be
calledupon to determine the proper allocation of powers between teh several
departments andamongteh ingral or constituent units thereof.
2. The Electoral Commission did not exceed its jurisdiction. It has been created by
thewConstitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department invested with
the jurisdiction todecide "all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of theNational Assembly". Thus, entertaining the
protest of Ynsua must conform to their ownprescribedrules and the National
Assembly cannot divest them of any such powers.Wherefore, petition DENIED.

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC vs POEA

Held:
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive
Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas
employment of Filipinos and to protecttheir rights. It replaced the National Seamen
Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in1974. Under Section 4(a)
of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving
employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen."

HELD:
No
political question has
ever been interwoven into this case.
Nor is there
any act of theincumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly
reviewed or interfered with if therespondent Judge decides the election protest. The
term "political question" connotes what it means inordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution,are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which
full discretionary authorityhas been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government. It is concerned with issuesdependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure" The only issue in the electoral protestcase dismissed
by respondent Judge on the ground of political question is who between protestant
herein petitioner and protestee herein respondent Yu was the duly elected
mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan,and legally entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges and
emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge thefunctions, duties and obligations
of the position. If the protestee's election is upheld by the respondentJudge, then he
continues in office; otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner. That is the
onlyconsequence of a resolution of the issue therein involved a purely justiciable
question or controversy asit implies a given right, legally demandable and
enforceable, an act or ommission violative of said right,and a remedy, granted or
sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. Any judgment to be made on thatissue
will not in any way collide or interfere with the mandate of Section 9 of Article
XVII. Neither doesSection 2 of Article XI stigmatize the issue in that electoral
protest case with a political color. For simply,that section allocated unto the National
Assembly the power to enact a local government code.

Casibang vs Aquino

TAADA vs.CUENCO

FACTS:Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the

elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections. Herein petitioner
filed on November 24, 1971 a protestagainst the election of the former with the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds of As the proceedings
continued, the 1973 Constitution was ratified. Yu moved to dismiss the election
protestof petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the
same in view of the effectivityof the 1973 Constitution by reason of which Section
9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] andSection 2 of Article XI a political
question has intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that "...the provisions
in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local governments have been superseded by
the 1973Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to
our parliamentary form of government. Thisis clear in the New Constitution under its
Article XI." He further submitted that local elective officials haveno more four-year
term of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power
embodiedin the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII. CFI ruled in
favor of Yu.

FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo Taada and Diosdado Macapagal sought to oust

respondent senators MarianoJ. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the
same Electoral Tribunal, alleging that theCommittee on Rules for the Senate, and
the Senate itself, in nominating then choosing the respondents,respectively, had acted
absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation of Article
VI,Section 11 of the Constitution (1935):
Section 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall bethe sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respectiveMembers. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
theSenate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
by each House, threeupon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes
and three of the party having the second largest numbers of votes therein. The
senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Respondents allege that: (a) the Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to
direct or control the

Facts:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in
an accident in Tokyo,Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under
Executive Order No. 797 and MemorandumCircular No. 2 of the POEA. The
petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint wascognizable not by the
POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the
StateInsurance Fund.The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties ruledin favor of the complainant.The
decision is challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA
had no jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas worker.
Issue:
Whether or not POEA has jurisdiction

ISSUE:WON the protest case is a political question

action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b)
that the petition states nocause of action, because "petitioner Taada has exhausted
his right to nominate after he nominated himself and refused to nominate two
(2) more Senators."
ISSUE:1.Are the allegations by the respondents correct?
2.Is this case a mere political question?
RULING:We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the
foregoing facts. This case is not anaction against the Senate and it does not seek
to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow the petitioners to perform
their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that
theSenate shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, the latter is partneither of Congress nor of the Senate.Secondly, although
the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators
whoshall form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has
prescribed the manner in whichthe authority shall be exercised. Under the
Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in theCongress of the
Philippines. Yet, it does not detract from the power of the courts to pass
upon theconstitutionality of acts of Congress. And, since judicial power includes the
authority to inquire into thelegality of statutes enacted by the two Houses
of Congress, and approved by the Executive, there can be noreason why the validity
of an act of one of said Houses, like that of any other branch of the Government,may
not be determined in the proper actions.The Court is also called upon to decide
whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by theSenate, as members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias a member and
spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate on behalf
of its Committeeon Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party
having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, andhence, is null and void.
This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full
discretionaryauthority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
The exercise of its power thereon issubject to constitutional limitations which are
claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within thelegitimate prove of the
judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in
connectiontherewith.Whether an election of public officers has been in accordance
with law is for the judiciary. Moreover,where the legislative department has by
statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may
determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute,
and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or
transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights."The court does not only have
jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issueraised by
the parties herein.

Sanidad vs COMELEC
FACTS:On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national referendum on
16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (barangays) to resolve, among other
things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of
such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise
by the President of his present powers. 20 days after, the President issued another
related decree, PD 1031, amending the previous PD 991, by declaring the provisions
of PD 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in barangays
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16, 1976. Quite relevantly,
PD 1031 repealed inter alia, Sec 4, of PD. 991. On the same date of 22 Sept 1976,
Marcos issued PD. 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on Oct 16, 1976. The PD recites in its whereas clauses that
the peoples continued opposition to the convening of the interim NA evinces their
desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment,
providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the
people in the referendum-plebiscite of Oct 16.
On Sep 27, 1976, Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to
enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on
Oct 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they
propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as PD 1031, insofar as it directs the
COMELEC to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on Oct 16, 1976.Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent
power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on Oct 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. The Sol-Gen
contended that the question is political in nature hence the court cannot take
cognizance of it. The Sol-Gen principally maintains that petitioners have no standing
to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of the SC; at
this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to
exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards
normalization.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: The SC ruled that the issue is not a political question but rather a justiciable
one. This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the
amending process by proposals of amendments, a function normally exercised by the
legislature, is seriously doubted. Political questions are neatly associated with the
wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy
refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is confronting the SC is not the wisdom of the act
of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his
constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent
assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to
propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the
contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely he a brutum fulmen.

If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter
of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority
assumed was valid or not.
This petition is however dismissed. The President can propose amendments to the
Constitution and he was able to present those proposals to the people in sufficient
time.

ent politicalrealignment because LDP is not a duly registered political party and has
not yet attained political stability.Cong. Singson, on the other hand, contends that the
question raised was political in nature and beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the issue raised is political in nature, thus beyond the jurisdiction of
the Court

Daza v. Singson
Facts:
Cong. Daza, a member of the Liberal Party, was one of the representatives who was
chosen torepresent the said party in the Commission of Appointments. When the
party Laban ng DemokratikongPilipino was reorganized, it resulted to the swelling of
its members to 159 and thereby reducing themembers of the LP to only 17. Because
of this, the House of Representatives revise its operation in theCOA withdrawing the
seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP.
Thechamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members
except
the
petitioner
andincluding therein respondent Luis Singson. Cong. Daza challenges his removal al
leging that the
reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a perman

Held:
The issue at bar does not involve the discretionary act of the HR that may not
be reviewed becauseit is political in nature. The issue involved here is the legality
and not the wisdom of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the
COA. Consequently, the issued presented is justiciable rather than political, for it
involves the manner of filling the COA as prescribed in the Constitution ( legality)
and notthe discretion of the HR in the choice of its representatives (wisdom).
Moreover, even if the question is political in nature, it would still come in the powers
of the Sc to review under the expanded jurisdictionconferred upon it by Article
8, Section 1 of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determinewhether
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been
committed by any branch on instrumentality of the government.