b. PLANAS VS GIL, 67 PHIL.

62
67 Phil. 62 Political Law Separation of Powers Rule of Non-Interference
In November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal board member of Manila, published a statement criticizing the
acts of certain government officials including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a newspaper. The following morning, she
received a letter from Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the president directing her to report before
the Civil Service Commission (CSC). She was directed to explain and prove her allegations.
She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter. She said that as an
elective official, she is accountable for her political acts to her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute offenses
punishable under our penal laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which petitioner
is affiliated. Further, she contends that her statement in the newspaper was made by her as a private citizen and in
the exercise of her right to discuss freely political questions and cannot properly be the subject of an administrative
investigation; that the issue is only cognizable by courts of justice in case the contents of said statement infringe any
provision of the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil, however took cognizance of the case
hence Planas appealed to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General replied for the CSC arguing that under the
separation of powers marked by the Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction to review the orders of the Chief
Executive which are of purely administrative in character.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the President.
HELD: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will
neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal premise, it
does not necessarily follow that the SC is precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his
acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of governmental
powers viewed in the light of political philosophy is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and actuality
in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor restrained to act in a
particular way. The CSC is the party respondent and the theory is advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an
investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction
over the present proceedings instituted by Planas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer
of the government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important averment, but is neither
decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive
from judicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate official and employees of
the executive Department to the extent that at the mere invocation of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction of
this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily abated or suspended.
Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was not denied the right to voice out her
opinion but since she made allegations against the administration it is but right for her to prove those allegations. The
CSC has the right to elicit the truth.

c. LUZON STEVEDORING VS. SSS, 34 SCRA 178

16 SCRA 6 Labor Law Labor Standards Coverage of the Social Security Act
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC) is engaged in the business of stevedoring, lightering and towing in the cities of
Iloilo and Bacolod. It owns, maintains and operates towboats, barges and a drydock. In 1959, it carried in its payrolls
temporary employees of 1,752 and 2,552 stevedores in the cities of Iloilo and Bacolod, respectively, who were hired on
rotation and on vessel-by- vessel basis. They were paid daily with the understanding of being laid off at the end of
each day. On the average, each stevedore worked for 14 days during the year. In October 1960, LSC petitioned to the
SSS that the temporary employees be exempt from SSS contributions on the ground that they work only
intermittently and are not in a position to maintain membership in the Social Security System long enough to be fully
entitled to the laws sickness, disability, death and retirement benefits. And that the law could not have intended
them to be covered without enjoying the benefits of the program. SSS however denied LSCs petition and it ordered
LSC to pay back premiums. LSC countered stating that the compulsory coverage of the SSS contributions only covers
permanent employees. LSC invoked Section 9 of the Social Security Act as amended by Republic Act No. 1792 which
states that an employee must at least have been with the company for six months to be covered by the compulsory
coverage. LSC also invoked Sec. 8 of the same law which defines employment covered by the Social Security Act and
also provides exemption therefrom. Paragraph 10 of that section would state that services by temporary employees
may be excluded by regulations of the Social Security Commission. This is interpreted by LSC as a provision that
Congress has delegated to the Social Security Commission the issuance of regulations bearing on the exemption of
services performed by temporary employees from social security coverage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the temporary employees are exempt from the compulsory coverage.

HELD: No. The Social Security Act was amended by Republic Act No. 2658 on June 18, 1960. The amendment
broadened the coverage of the Social Security System, increased its benefits and liberalized the terms and conditions
for their enjoyment. Sections 9 and 10 were made to read as follows:
SEC. 9. Compulsory Coverage. Coverage in the System shall be compulsory upon all employees between the ages
of sixteen and sixty, inclusive, and their employers: . . .
SEC. 10.
Effective date of coverage. Compulsory coverage of the employer shall take effect on the first
day of his operation, and that of the employee on the date of his employment.
Eliminated was the six months service requirement. Without such requirement, all employees regardless of tenure,
such as the employees in question, would qualify for compulsory membership in the SSS; except of course those
classes of employees contemplated in Section 8(j) of the Social Security Act. With such removal, it is the intent of
Congress to broaden and include temporary workers to the compulsory coverage. On the other hand, in regards
section 8, paragraph 10 being invoked by LSC, no such regulation has been cited to buttress the claim for exemption.
Perforce, no exemption could be granted as there is no way of telling whether or not the employees in question belong
to a group or class designated by regulation of the Social Security Commission as exempt.

d. GARCIA VS MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106

39 SCRA 106 Political Law Separation of Powers
Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court,
being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28,
1971, Macaraig was not able to assume the duties and functions of a judge due to the fact that his Court Room can not
be properly established due to problems as to location and as to appropriations to make his Court up and running.
When Macaraig realized that it would be some time before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an
extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of Justice, he had, due to pressure of duties,
never gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten
months allowed by the law). The Secretary of Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to forego his leave and instead to
assist the Secretary, without being extended a formal detail, whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his
court.
Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is incompetent, dishonest and has acted in
violation of his oath as a judge. Garcia said that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as required by
law. And that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that he has not been performing the
duties of a judge. Also questioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a department of
the executive oi charge of prosecution of cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macaraig has acted with incompetence and dishonesty as Judge.
HELD: No. Macaraigs inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above does not
constitute incompetence. Macaraig was, like every lawyer who gets his first appointment to the bench, eager to
assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being a judge without a sala, but forces and circumstances
beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial duties.
On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court looks with favor at the practice of long
standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with
his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he
may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the
government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our
government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly
motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.
The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other,
limited only by the specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been
acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental conveniences or
exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that
no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position where his actuations on matters
submitted to him for action or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before
they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may
be. Needless to say, the Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.

e. Bondoc vs HRET, Sept. 6, 1991

Facts: Petitioner belongs to Nationalista party while respondent was with Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino. After
respondent was proclaimed winner, petitioner filed protest before electoral tribunal. The tribunal decided in favour of

petitioner. Congressman Camasura, an LDP member voted also for petitioner. On the eve of promulgation he was
replaced.
Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives may replace representative in the tribunal before the
promulgation?
Decision: Petition granted. Withdrawing nomination of Camasura on the tribunal was null and void. The expulsion of
Camasura was not for a lawful and valid cause but to unjustly interfere with the tribunals disposition of the Bondoc
case and clearly in violation of Article 6 and Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.

f. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS COMELEC,270 SCRA 106

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)
Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms,Modernization and Action (PIRMA),
filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to liftthe term limits of elective officials, through Peoples
Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the
people to exercise the power todirectly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued
an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At
the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, PublicInterest Law Center, and Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin
petition on the ground that one which is cognizableby the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpinfiled this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against
COMELEC and theDelfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision
onpeoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed byCongress. No such law
has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to theConstitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting
of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it isoutside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court
granted the Motions for Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.(2) Whether or not COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative onamendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions onthe conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of
elective officials would constitute a revision or anamendment of the Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementinglegislation the same cannot
operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right,the people cannot exercise it if Congress does
not provide for its implementation.The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations
on theconduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule thatwhat has
been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). Thedelegation of the power to the
COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rulesand regulations to implement the exercise of the
right to peoples initiative.The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other
provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guaranteeof equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revisioncannot be done by initiative. However,
considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issueof whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment
has become academic

b. Nature of legislative power

c. what are the limitations to the grant of legislative powers to legislature?
The limitations are:1. it cannot pass irrepealable laws2. principle of separation of powers3. non-delegability of
legislative powers

d. explain the doctrine of non-delegation of power

The Congress cannot further delegate the power delegated to it by the people. This is in keeping with the principle of
non-delegation of powers which is applicable to all the three branches of the government. The rule states that what
has been delegated cannot further be delegated potestas delegata non delegari potest. A delegated power must be
discharged directly by the delegate and not through the delegates agent. It is basically an ethical principle which
requires direct performance by the delegate of an entrusted power. Further delegation therefore constitutes violation
of the trust reposed by the delegator on the delegate. The people, through the Constitution, delegated lawmaking
powers to the Congress, and as such, it cannot as a rule delegate further the same to another.

e. permissive delegation of legislative power

The permissible delegation of legislative power are.
1) Sec. 23 (2) of Article VI
(Emergency powers to the President in case of war or other national emergency, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as Congress may provide, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national
policy. Unlesssooner withdrawn by Resolution of Congress, such powers shall cease upon the nextadjournment thereof.

2) Sec. 28 (2) of Article VI.

The Congress may by law, authorize the President to fixwithin specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts withinthe framework of the national development program of the government.

- Other exceptions : traditional

3) Delegation to local governments
The reason behind this delegation is because the local government is deemed to know better the
needs of the people therein.
(e) Delegation to the local governments. This delegation is based on the principle that the local government is in
better position than the national government to act on purely local concerns. Legislative power is therefore given to
them for effective local legislation.

a. See section 5 of Art. X

Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes,
fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic
policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.

b. Read:
aa. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 39 PHIL. 660
39 Phil. 660 Political Law Delegation of Powers Liberty and due process
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of
Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao,
still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had
been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The
Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of very low culture.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison
at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by
Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro
creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of
the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by
the provincial board.was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the
Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative
Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the
law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may
arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions
of fact.

II. No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification,
but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term non-Christian it was said, refers not to religious
belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest
their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class
legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it
is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

bb. PEOPLE VS VERA, 65 PHIL 56

65 Phil. 56 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill of Rights Equal Protection Probation Law
Separation of Powers Undue Delegation of Powers Power to Pardon
Constitutionality of Laws May the State Question Its Own Laws
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation. The matter was referred to the Insular Probation Office which
recommended the denial of Cu Unjiengs petition for probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the
petition for probation. The Prosecution opposed the petition. Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the Prosecution
filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance of Manila (which
is presided over by Judge Vera) have no jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation because under
the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law), probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with probation officers;
that the City of Manila is not a province, and that Manila, even if construed as a province, has no designated probation
officer hence, a Manila court cannot grant probation.
Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it violates the
constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws. HSBC averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of
provinces whether or nor to apply the probation law if a province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will
appoint a probation officer, but if it will not, then no probation officer will be appointed hence, that makes it violative
of the equal protection clause.
Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue delegation of power because it gave the option to the
provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation law however, the legislature did not provide guidelines to
be followed by the provincial board.
Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an encroachment of the executives power to grant pardon. They
say that the legislature, by providing for a probation law, had in effect encroached upon the executives power to grant
pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with the issues raised by HSBC ironic because their main stance was the
non-applicability of the probation law only in Manila while recognizing its application in provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that, the Prosecution, representing the State as well as the
People of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like Act 4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu
Unjieng also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had used the Probation Law in the past without question but is
now questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).
ISSUE:
1. May the State question its own laws?
2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly authorized representative, from questioning the validity of
a law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had been using an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221 or the [old] Probation Law is unconstitutional.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on this note. There is violation of the equal protection clause.
Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply the law by simply providing for a probation officer. So if a

province decides not to install a probation officer, then the accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the
provisions of the Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to provinces where the
respective provincial boards have provided for a probation officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as to what
standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial boards follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation
law in their province. This only creates a roving commission which will act arbitrarily according to its whims.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to provide for probation.
Probation does not encroach upon the Presidents power to grant pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within
the power of Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a power of the president to commute penalties.

A law delegating to the local government units the power to fund the salary of probation officers
in their area is unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection of the laws. In areas where
there is a probation officer because the local government unit appropriated an amount for his
salaries, convicts may avail of probation while in places where no funds were set aside for
probation officers, convicts therein could not apply for probation.
c. Reason for the delegation
4) Delegation of rule-making power to administrative bodies
(d) Delegation to administrative bodies. The Congress delegates the so called power of subordinate legislation to
administrative bodies. Due to the growing complexity of modern society, it has become necessary to allow specialized
administrative bodies to promulgate supplementary rules, so that they can deal with technical problems with more
expertise and dispatch than the Congress or the courts. Regulations or supplementary rules passed by the
administrative bodies are intended to fill-in the gaps and provide details to what is otherwise a broad statute passed
by Congress. For the rules and regulations to be valid and binding, they must be in accordance with the statute on
which they are based, complete in themselves, and fix sufficient standards. If any of the requirements is not satisfied,
the regulation will not be allowed to affect private rights; and

5) Delegation to the people

(Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution and Section 32,Article VI---The Congress shall, as early as
possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum,and the exceptions therefrom,
whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or
part thereof passed by the Congress of local legislative body after the registrationof a petition
thereof signed by at least 10% of the total number of registered voters, of which everylegislative
district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof.
f. delegation of rule-making power to administrative bodies
1) what is the completeness test? The sufficiency standard test?
As held in PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569:
(a) Completeness Test simply means that the law must be complete in itself when it leftCongress. It must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegatewhich is not given any discretion;
and
(b) Sufficiency of Standards Test simply requires Congress to fix a standard, the limits of whichare sufficiently
determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Some of the
standards to guide the delegate are general welfare, public interest, etc.

Read: 1. PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569

15 SCRA 569 Political Law Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this was purportedly pursuant
to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general
from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional.
He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios
may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues:
If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed
of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from being created by the
President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He
further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities to the
President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the
RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the
power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In
this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in
effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard,
there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond
the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which would mean that
the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require is present, still, such will not replace the
standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase as the public welfare may
require qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the President may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require. Only
the seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of
municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative (not executive).
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating
thirty-three (33) municipalities.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this
Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of an existing
one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality
or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council shall be
embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided,
however, That no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board
upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. Petitioner argues, accordingly: If the
President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several
barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are based,
provides:

The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any
province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or
diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any
political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or
portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine
Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince
is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (GovernorGeneral) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the
jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with
the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict
the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not amount to an
undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan (36 Phil.
547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new
municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality
(Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer (See Govt of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of
Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binagonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant
to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the
adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
Although 1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate and
(b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is
the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could
thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by
adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle
of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation
of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of
the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above
referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section
68, the President:
may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
require.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed that the
phrase as the public welfare may require, in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that in
Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld public welfare and
public interest, respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But,
the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial pronouncements must be construed in relation to the specific
facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect. The
law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transit upon national
roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under
Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved
grants to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the
determination of questions of fact.

2. TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108 (most representative)

137 SCRA 117 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies Manner of Election and Selection of
Representatives
The Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) and the National Federation of Labor Unions (NFLU) are
unions representing the agricultural and industrial sectors. They alleged they represent over a million workers all over
the country. On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 is the implementing law of the constitutional provision which
states that 3 sectors are to be represented (youth, agricultural labor, industrial labor).
Each sector must have four representatives, 2 from Luzon, one each from Visayas and Mindanao respectively. These
sectors can submit their nominees to the President for approval/appointment through the Minister of Labor. TUPAS
however questions the constitutionality of the said BP because it allegedly lacks duly published rules on accreditation,
nomination and appointment of industrial labor representatives. Being so, TUPAS questioned the acts of BlasOple, then
Minister of Labor, in accrediting certain nominations provided by other industrial labor groups. TUPAS claims that since
there are no rules clearly stated in the BP on how the nominations must be handled, the said law has provided undue
delegation to the Minister of Labor and has left him with absolute discretion in carrying out the duty of accrediting such
nominations. TUPAS did not submit their nomination within the given 20 day period of nominating their
representation; they instead proceeded to question the constitutionality of the said BP and the legality of the acts of
Ople. Because of their failure to submit their nominees, Ople did not accredit them.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the Minister of Labor by BP 697.
HELD: No. The lack of merit of the contention that there is an unlawful delegation of legislative power is quite obvious.
Appointment to office is intrinsically an executive act involving the exercise of discretion. What is involved then is not a
legislative power but the exercise of competence intrinsically executive. What is more, the official who could make the
recommendation is the Minister of Labor, an alter ego of the President. The argument, therefore, that there is an
unlawful delegation of legislative power is bereft of any persuasive force.
To further test the validity of the said BP, and to avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard,
which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental
policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. The standard does not even have
to be spelled out. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. Such standard is
set forth with clarity in Article III, Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 which provides in full the limits and scope of
the functions of the Minister of Labor in carrying out the said provisions.
TUPAS and NFLU were free to submit their nominations to the President by merely writing a letter coursed through
respondent, and their nominees should have been submitted to the President. They did not do so. In fact, as of May 30,
1984, which was still within the 20-day period, they wrote a letter to Ople which in effect stated that they were not
submitting any nomination and informing him that they were questioning the validity of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of BP 697.
Hence, if petitioners were not able to submit any nominee they had no one to blame but themselves. And the law
cannot be declared unconstitutional on such ground.

4. US VS ANG TANG HO, 43 PHIL. 1

43 Phil. 1 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies
In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act
Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances,
authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of
such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on
August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice
dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than
that prescribed by the EO. The sale was done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for
violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00
fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act prior to the publication of the
EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or
of an order issued pursuant to the law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the
determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion
that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in

all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the
judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in
all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any
prescribed fact or event.
At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled An Act penalizing the monopoly
and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution
and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the
necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose, the material provisions of
which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State,
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an
excessive price as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the
Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Ang Tang Ho,
voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which
is a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of
August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,
from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to
be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the
Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th
of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the GovernorGeneral to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General,
with the consent of the Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or
corn, to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By
its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the GovernorGeneral. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued for any cause, and leaves the question
as to what is any cause to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says: For any cause, conditions arise
resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn. The Legislature does not specify or define what is
an extraordinary rise. That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Act also says that the GovernorGeneral, with the consent of the Council of State, is authorized to issue and promulgate temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act. It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule
or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect,
or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any
basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to say what is or what
is not a cause, and what is or what is not an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, and as to what is a temporary
rule or an emergency measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid
and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer
who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been any cause, and the
price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General
found the existence of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a
crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers are vested in the
Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the
law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the
Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law.
Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the
Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the
Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if

so, was that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the
Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred
upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature
cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does
nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then
the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act
within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a
crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is
unconstitutional and void.
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that
it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others, without the determination of the
insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be
delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act in conformity to which all fire
insurance policies were required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves
the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or other appointee
or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be
left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

4. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208

151 SCRA 208 Political Law The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill
Delegation of Power Delegation to Administrative Bodies
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board was enacted which
gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the
economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie
industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie
industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax
on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter
of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed the
VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tios arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a
statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry
through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject
and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the
PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was
conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and
implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a fixed and limited period with the deputized agencies concerned being subject to the direction
and control of the [VRB].

5. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, 108 SCRA 757 (affecting national interest)
108 SCRA 757 Political Law Delegation of Power Completeness Test
In 1981, there was an ongoing labor dispute between the Free Telephone Workers Union (the Union) and the Philippine
Long Distance Company. Eventually, the Minister of Labor (Blas Ople) assumed jurisdiction over the issue pursuant to
Article 264 of the Labor Code. The Union assailed the provisions of Article 264 as it averred that it is an undue
delegation of power by Congress to the Minister of Labor. They averred that by granting discretion to the Minister of

Labor to whether or not refer a labor dispute for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations Commission, it
also effectively granted the Minister to make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining.
ISSUE: Whether or not such provision is an undue delegation of power.
HELD: No. In the first place, this issue is not yet ripe for adjudication as the Minister of Labor was yet to take on the
entirety of the case. There is still no ground to rule that there is an unconstitutional application of the law.

The Union failed to make out a case of undue delegation of legislative power. There could be, however, an
unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the
exercise of such competence cannot ignore the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should
afford protection to labor. But as to whether or not there is an unconstitutional application of the law, that is yet to be
determined since the Minister of Labor has not yet made a factual determination of the labor dispute in issue.
There is no undue delegation in this case. The law in issue is complete and it set a sufficient standard. The law cannot
be any clearer, the coverage being limited to strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest.

6. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ, DEC. 18, 1989

Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis
Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain
specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National
Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive
Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner
was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC
Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.
Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that although the rulemaking power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a
given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all
the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and
to no other
The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however,
insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings
and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While respondents may fix a temporary rate
pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not
exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing
The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order
without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC
didnt scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner

Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the
delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when
the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act
must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the
legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the
rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC
and the manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof.

Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among others,
to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications
which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection
therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be
guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of
maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting
facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is
specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire network or components of
the communications systems contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates.
II.
On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural due
process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit
of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on an initial evaluation,
which is a unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side
before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the
consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown and demonstrated to
respondents. Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is
adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are
necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of due process.
Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the function of
the administrative agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not required, but where an order
applies to a named person, as in the instant case, the function involved is adjudicatory.
Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining the order in question need not be
preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to respondent NTCs legislative
function but because the assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in the
ongoing proceedings on petitioners application for a certificate of public convenience; and that
petitioner is not the only primary source of data or information since respondent is currently
engaged in a continuing review of the rates charged.
We find merit in petitioners contention.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, we made a categorical
classification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when
it is legislative, thus:
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules
and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may
partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the
same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of
fact-based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a
profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter
is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the
contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion
drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent
performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands
previous notice and hearing.
This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs.
Cloribel, et al. to wit:
It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is
legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer,
Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: If the nature of the
administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not

necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty
or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the
case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public
Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: Aside from statute, the
necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the
proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the
great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and
hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body
acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public
administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and
immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be
affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing.
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes
of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently
superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial
evaluation of petitioners financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an
explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a
corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending
contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen
percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better
position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it
charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies
attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore,
inclined to lend greater credence to petitioners ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its
rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public considering
the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay
involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the
inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its questioned order.
At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the
questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that
notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire
proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit.
g. May the rules and regulations promulgated by administrative bodies/ agencies have the force
of law? Penal law? In order to be considered as one with the force and effect of a penal law, what
conditions must concur?
See: U.S VS GRIMMAUD,220 US 506 (1911) or the 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION a reviewer
Primer by FR. JOAQUIN BERNAS, 1987 Edition
5. PEOPLE VS. ROSENTHAL, 68 PHIL 328

6. US VS BARRIAS, 11 PHIL 327

11 Phil. 327 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies
In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136), authorized the Collector of Customs to regulate the business of
lighterage. Lighterage is a business involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or cascos (small ships/boats).
The said law also provides that the Collector may promulgate such rules to implement Act No. 1136. Further, Act No.
1136 provides that in case a fine is to be imposed, it should not exceed one hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the
Collector promulgated Circular No. 397.
Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught navigating the Pasig River using a lighter which is manually powered by
bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a violation of Circular No. 397 because under said Circular, only steam powered ships
should be allowed to navigate the Pasig River. However, in the information against Barrias, it was alleged that the
imposable penalty against him should be a fine not exceeding P500.00 at the discretion of the court this was
pursuant to Circular No. 397 which provides:
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than
P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.
Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular as it is entirely different from the penal provision of
Act. No. 1136 which only provided a penalty of not exceeding $100.00 (Note at that time the peso-dollar exchange was
more or less equal).
ISSUE: Whether or not the penal provision in the Circular is valid.
HELD: No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different range of penalty different from that specified by Congress. If
the Collector is allowed to do so, then in effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power to legislate penalties. One of
the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to anybody or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the
authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution
itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can
not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its

substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other body for those to which alone the people have seen
fit to confide this sovereign trust.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of
legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. The Collector cannot exercise a power exclusively lodged
in Congress. Hence, Barrias should be penalized in accordance to the penalty being imposed by Act No. 1136. In this
case, the Supreme Court determined that the proper fine is $25.00.

7. VILLEGAS VS HUI CHONG TSAI PAO HO, 86 SCRA 270

Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the
diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance programs of the government and another
country, and members of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayors permit so as to be
employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of the
ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both.
Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax.
Held: The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who
have been cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails to consider difference
in situation among aliens required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-file or executive.
[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who
are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the
Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ]

h. delegation to the people. See Section 2(1) of Art. VXII and section 32, Art. VI
i. classify the membership of the legislative department
j. manner of election and selection
1) read again TUPAS VS.OPLE, 137 SCRA 108
Sections 2 to 4
Qualifications, terms of office, etc. of a senator or member of the house of representatives

Read: AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. Vsa. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. NO. 161658, November
3, 2008
Section 5.
Re-appointment of a single legislative district to make it two
Read: ROGELIO BAGABUYO VS COMELEC, G.R. NO. 176970, December 8, 2008
Formula in determining the party-list representatives is the 20% ceiling mandatory? (Veterans vs.
COMELEC Formula abandoned)
Read republic act no. 7941, the party-list law
Read also:
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) VS
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. NO. 179271, May 2009
POWER OF THE COMELEC TO RESOLVE LEADERSHIP DISPUTES OF PARTY-LIST
Read:
ATONG PAGLAUM VS. COMELEC, February 26, 2013
DAYAO VS. COMELEC, FR NO. 193704, January 29, 2013
Lico vs Comelec, September 29, 2015
DR. HANS CHRISTIAN M. SENERIS VS. COMELEC, GR. NO 178678, APRIL 16,2009
ANG LADLAD VS COMELEC, GR. NO. 190582, APRIL 8, 2010
PHILIPPINE GUARDIAN AND BROTHERHOOD, INC. VS COMELEC, GR NO. 188078 Jan. 25, 2010
BENIGNO AQUINO III VS. COMELEC, GR. NO. 189793, April 7, 2010