ALFREDO

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE
INC., Respondents.

C.

MENDOZA, Petitioner,

PHILIPPINES

AND

JUNO

February 4, 2009, the parties agreed to submit all pending

incidents, including the clarificatory hearing, for resolution. 14

CARS,

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS:
January 14, 2011 CA reversed the decision of the trial court in
which the latter dismissed the complaint against Alfredo
Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa.
January 8, 2008 Juno Cars through its representative, Raul
Evangelista, filed a complaint-affidavit for qualified theft and
estafa against petitioner.
June 2, 2007, - In the complaint-affidavit, Juno Cars alleged
that on June 2, 2007, it hired Alfredo as Trade-In/Used Car
Supervisor.
November 19, 2007 - its Dealer/Operator, Rolando Garcia,
conducted a partial audit of the used cars and discovered that
five (5) cars had been sold and released by Alfredo without
Rolandos or the finance managers permission.
The partial audit showed that the buyers of the five cars made
payments, but Alfredo failed to remit the payments
totalling P886,000.00.
It was further alleged that while there were 20 cars under
Alfredos custody, only 18 were accounted for. Further
investigation revealed that Alfredo failed to turn over the files of
a 2001 Hyundai Starex and a Honda City 1.5 LXI.
Juno Cars alleged that taking into account the unremitted
amounts and the acquisition cost of the Honda City, Alfredo
pilfered a total amount of P1,046,000.00 to its prejudice and
damage.5
MENDOZA: In his counter-affidavit, Alfredo raised, among
others, Juno Cars supposed failure to prove ownership over the
five (5) cars or its right to possess them with the purported
unremitted payments. Hence, it could not have suffered
damage.6
March 4, 2008, - Provincial Prosecutor Rey F. Delgado issued a
Resolution7 finding probable cause and recommending the filing
of an information against Alfredo for qualified theft and estafa.
Alfredo moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. 8
May 16, 2008 - He then filed a petition for review with the
Department of Justice.
While Alfredos motion for reconsideration was still pending
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong, two
informations for qualified theft 10 and estafa11 were filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City.
March 31, 2008, Alfredo filed a motion for determination of
probable cause before the trial court. On April 28, 2008, he also
filed a motion to defer arraignment.

March 3, 2009, the trial court, through Presiding Judge Rizalina

Capco-Umali, issued an order15 dismissing the complaint, stating
that:
After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence on
record which includes the assailed Resolution dated 04 March
2008, the court holds that the evidence adduced does not
support a finding of probable cause for the offenses of qualified
theft and estafa. x x x.
Juno Cars filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court
denied on July 3, 2009.
Juno Cars then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, arguing that the trial court acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the complaint. It argued that "the determination of
probable cause and the decision whether or not to file a criminal
case in court, rightfully belongs to the public prosecutor."
January 14, 2011 - the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision, reversed the trial court, and reinstated the case. In its
decision, the appellate court ruled that the trial court acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction "in supplanting the public
prosecutors findings of probable cause with her own findings of
insufficiency of evidence and lack of probable cause."
MENDOZA - filed a petition for review under Rule 45 before this
court. In essence, he argued that the trial court was correct in
finding that there was no probable cause as shown by the
evidence on record. He argued that "judicial determination of
probable cause is broader than [the] executive determination of
probable cause"21 and that "[i]t is not correct to say that the
determination of probable cause is exclusively vested on the
prosecutor x x x."22
Juno Cars, in its comment, argued that Alfredo presented
questions, issues, and arguments that were a mere rehash of
those already considered and passed upon by the appellate
court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, arguing for public
respondent, stated in its comment 24 that the appellate court
correctly sustained the public prosecutor in his findings of
probable cause against Alfredo. Since there was no showing of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Prosecutor Rey F.
Delgado, the trial court should respect his determination of
probable cause.
MENDOZA, in its reply, reiterated that "judicial determination of
probable cause[,] while not a superior faculty[,] covers a broader
encompassing perspective in the disposition of the issue on the
existence of probable cause."26 He argued that the findings of
the trial court should be accorded greater weight than the
appellate courts. It merely reviewed the findings of the trial
court.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the
prosecutor on the basis of its own independent finding of lack of
probable cause.

Several clarificatory hearings were scheduled but were not

conducted.
HELD:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated

January 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No.
110774 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal case against
Alfredo C. Mendoza are DISMISSED.
The conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent
determination of the existence of probable cause lie solely within
the discretion of the public prosecutor.29 If upon evaluation of the
evidence, the prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable
cause, he or she shall then cause the filing of the information
with the court.
Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then
"personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence"30 to determine whether there is probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial
determination of probable cause exists.
People v. Castillo and Mejia: There are two kinds of
determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
difference is clear: The executive determination of probable
cause concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to
support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of
probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued.
People vs Inting: The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary
investigation properwhether or not there is reasonable ground
to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and,
therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense,
rigors and embarrassment of trialis the function of the
Prosecutor.
While it is within the trial courts discretion to make an
independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for
the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should
be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the
prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutors
determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a
determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutors
finding.
People v. Court of Appeals and Jonathan Cerbo:
as a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there
is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or
prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not
dismiss it for want of evidence, because evidentiary matters
should be presented and heard during the trial. The functions
and duties of both the trial court and the public prosecutor in "the
proper scheme of things" in our criminal justice system should
be clearly understood.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion in the public prosecutors finding of probable cause,
the accused can appeal such finding to the justice secretary and
move for the deferment or suspension of the proceedings until
such appeal is resolved.
In this case, the resolution dated March 4, 2008 of Prosecutor
Rey F. Delgado found that the facts and evidence were
"sufficient to warrant the indictment of [petitioner] x x x." 37 There
was nothing in his resolution which showed that he issued it
beyond the discretion granted to him by law and jurisprudence.
While the information filed by Prosecutor Delgado was valid,
Judge Capco-Umali still had the discretion to make her own
finding of whether probable cause existed to order the arrest of
the accused and proceed with trial.

Jurisdiction over an accused is acquired when the warrant of

arrest is served. Absent this, the court cannot hold the accused
for arraignment and trial.
People v. Hon. Yadao: Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the
criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a
warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the
prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt
as to the existence of probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence is not mandatory.1wphi1 The courts first option under
the above is for it to "immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause."
That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause against the respondents. 39 (Emphasis
supplied)
It is also settled that "once a complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or
the conviction or the acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound
discretion of the court."40
In this case, Judge Capco-Umali made an independent
assessment of the evidence on record and concluded that "the
evidence adduced does not support a finding of probable cause
for the offenses of qualified theft and estafa." 41Specifically, she
found that Juno Cars "failed to prove by competent
evidence"42 that the vehicles alleged to have been pilfered by
Alfredo were lawfully possessed or owned by them, or that these
vehicles were received by Alfredo, to be able to substantiate the
charge of qualified theft. She also found that the complaint "[did]
not state with particularity the exact value of the alleged office
files or their valuation purportedly have been removed,
concealed or destroyed by the accused," 43 which she found
crucial to the prosecution of the crime of estafa under Article
315, fourth paragraph, no. 3(c) of the Revised Penal Code.
Accordingly, with the present laws and jurisprudence on the
matter, Judge Capco-Umali correctly dismissed the case against
Alfredo.
Although jurisprudence and procedural rules allow it, a judge
must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to
lack of probable cause, considering the preliminary nature of the
evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the
evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of
probable cause that he or she can dismiss the case. On the
other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not
hesitate to proceed with arraignment and trial in order that
justice may be served.

Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in

the prosecutors exercise of discretion requires the courts to
leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of
what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause[3]. Courts can neither override their determination nor
substitute their own judgment for that of the latter. They cannot
likewise order the prosecution of the accused when the
prosecutor has not found a prima facie case[4].
Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without
exception.
The Constitution itself allows (and even directs) court action
where executive discretion has been gravely abused[5]. In other
words, the court may intervene in the executive determination of
probable cause, review the findings and conclusions, and
ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable
cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation
when necessary for the orderly administration of justice[6].
The Facts:
January 17, 2002,- Unilever filed a complaint. NBI agents
applied for and was granted Search Warrant Nos. 02-2606 and
02-2607, against a warehouse located at Camia St., Marikina
City allegedly owned by Michael Tan, a.k.a. Paul Tan, for alleged
possession of counterfeit shampoo products in violation of
Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act 8293. The
search of the establishment yielded a sizeable amount of
Unilever products, thus the NBI filed charges for violation of
Republic Act 8293 (unfair competition) against Michael Tan,
a.k.a. Paul Tan. In his counter-affidavit, Paul alleged that he is
not Michael as alluded to in the complaint; he is in the business
of selling leather goods and raw materials for making leather
products, and registered under the name Probest International
Trading; he is not engaged in the sale of counterfeit shampoo
products and the Unilever products seized in his office were
merely for personal consumption; and lastly, that he does not
own the warehouse located at Camia St.
The DOJ State Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of
probable cause, citing that the evidence presented does not
show that he is the registered owner of the warehouse; that he is
engaged in the selling of counterfeit shampoos other than the
self-serving testimony of Unilevers representatives; and that the
pieces of evidence (counterfeit shampoo) found in the
warehouse are not in themselves sufficient evidence that Paul I
engaged in unfair competition. The Secretary of Justice affirmed
the Resolution, and Unilevers petition for certiorari was denied
by the Court of Appeals, hence Unilver elevated the case to the
Supreme Court, on the issue of whether or not there is probable
cause to indict Paul for unfair competition on the basis of the
evidence submitted by Unilever and the NBI.
The Courts ruling:
We find merit in the petition.
Determination
Lies
Within
Public Prosecutor

of
the

Probable
Competence

of

Cause
the

The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of

information in court is essentially an executive function that is
lodged, at the first instance, with the public prosecutor and,
ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice[1]. The prosecutor and the
Secretary of Justice have wide latitude of discretion in the
conduct of preliminary investigation[2]; and their findings with
respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause are
generally not subject to review by the Court.

Courts
Cannot
Reverse
of
Justices
Findings
Clear Cases of Grave Abuse of Discretion

the
Secretary
Except
in

The term grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or

whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. To justify judicial intervention, the abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility[7]. In Elma v. Jacobi[8], we said that:
This error or abuse alone, however, does not render his act
amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari. To justify judicial intrusion into what is
fundamentally the domain of the Executive, the petitioner must
clearly show that the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his
determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This
requires the petitioner to establish that the prosecutor exercised
his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, before judicial
relief from a discretionary prosecutorial action may be obtained.
[emphasis supplied]
An examination of the decisions of the State Prosecutor and of
the DOJ shows that the complaints dismissal was anchored on
the insufficiency of evidence to establish the respondents direct,
personal or actual participation in the offense charged. As the
State Prosecutor found (and affirmed by the DOJ), the petitioner
failed to prove the ownership of the warehouse where
counterfeit shampoo products were found. This finding led to the
conclusion that there was insufficient basis for an indictment for
unfair competition as the petitioner failed to sufficiently prove
that the respondent was the owner or manufacturer of the
counterfeit shampoo products found in the warehouse.
A careful analysis of the lower courts rulings and the records,
however, reveals that substantial facts and circumstances that
could affect the result of the case have been overlooked. While
the ownership of the warehouse on Camia Street, Marikina City,
was not proven, sufficient evidence to prove the existence of
probable cause nevertheless exists. These pieces of evidence
consist of: (1) the result of the NBI agents search of the office
and of the warehouse; (2) Elmer Cadanos complaint-affidavit;
(3) Rene Baltazars affidavit; (4) Unilevers representatives claim
that all the laborers present at the warehouse confirmed that it
was operated by Probest International Trading; (5) other object

evidence found and seized at the respondents office and

warehouse; (6) the NBI operatives Joint Affidavit; (7) the
subsequent seizure of counterfeit Unilever products from the
respondents warehouse in Antipolo City; and (8) other
photographs and documents relative to the counterfeit products.
These pieces of evidence, to our mind, are sufficient to form a
reasonable ground to believe that the crime of unfair competition
was committed and that the respondent was its author.
First, a total of 1,238 assorted counterfeit Unilever products
were found at, and seized from, the respondents office located
on the 3rd floor of Probest International Trading Building,
Katipunan Street, Concepcion, Marikina City. The huge volume
and the location where these shampoos were found (inside a
box under a pile of other boxes located inside the respondents
office) belie the respondents claim of personal consumption.
Human experience and common sense dictate that shampoo
products (intended for personal consumption) will ordinarily and
logically be found inside the house, specifically, inside the
bathroom or in a private room, not in the consumers office.
Second, the failure to prove that the respondent is the owner of
the warehouse located on Camia St., Marikina City, does not
automatically free him from liability. Proof of the warehouses
ownership is not crucial to the finding of probable cause. In fact,
ownership of the establishment where the counterfeit products
were found is not even an element of unfair competition. While
the respondent may not be its owner, this does not foreclose the
possibility that he was the manufacturer or distributor of the
counterfeit shampoo products. Needless to say, what is material
to a finding of probable cause is the commission of acts
constituting unfair competition, the presence of all its elements
and the reasonable belief, based on evidence, that the
respondent had committed it.
Third, the result of the NBIs search conducted on January 17,
2002 (yielding to several boxes of counterfeit shampoo sachets)
and the NBIs Joint Affidavits in support of the application for
search warrants serve as corroborating evidence. The striking
similarities[9] between the genuine Unilever shampoo sachets
and the counterfeit sachets seized by the NBI support the belief
that the respondent had been engaged in dealing,
manufacturing, selling and distributing counterfeit Unilever
shampoo products.
Fourth, there were also allegations that the respondents
laborers and warehousemen who were present during the
search had confirmed that the warehouse was being maintained
and operated by Probest International Trading. The NBI
investigators who served the search warrant also claimed that
several persons, introducing themselves as the respondents
relatives and friends, had requested them to seize only a portion
of the counterfeit shampoo products. Whether these claims are
admissible in evidence or whether they should be excluded as
hearsay are matters that should be determined not in a
preliminary investigation, but in a full-blown trial.
In Lee v. KBC Bank N.V[10]. citing Andres v. Justice Secretary
Cuevas[11] we held that:
[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of [the prosecutions] evidence. The presence
or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature
and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a fullblown trial on the merits.
We also emphasized in that case that:

In fine, the validity and merits of a partys defense or accusation,

as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level[12].
Finally, the subsequent events that occurred after the filing of
the petitioners complaint and the institution of its appeal to the
CA are too significant to be ignored.
In its motion to reconsider the CAs decision[13], the petitioner
pointed to the reports it received sometime in October 2005 that
the respondent had resumed its operations involving counterfeit
Unilever products. Notably, these significant reports, albeit
supported by the subsequent seizure of large quantity of
counterfeit Unilever shampoos[14] in the respondents
warehouse[15] (located at No. 13 First Street Corner Sevilla
Avenue,
Virginia
Summerville
Subdivision,
Barangay
Mambugan, Antipolo City), were ignored by the CA. We,
however, find that this development is significant, although they
were not part of the mass of evidence considered below. Even
without them and based solely on the evidentiary materials
available below, we conclude that sufficient grounds exist to
indict the respondent for unfair competition.
Determination
of
Probable
Merely
Requires
Probability
or Reasonable Ground for Belief

of

Cause
Guilt

The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on

evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was
committed by the accused[16]. It need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt[17]. What is merely
required is probability of guilt. Its determination, too, does not
call for the application of rules or standards of proof that a
judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits[18].
Thus, in concluding that there is probable cause, it suffices that it
is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
very offense charged.
It is also important to stress that the determination of probable
cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a partys
accusation or defense, or on the admissibility or veracity of
testimonies presented. As previously discussed, these matters
are better ventilated during the trial proper of the case[19]. As
held in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Gonzales[20]:
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. xxx The term does not mean actual or positive
cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based
on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient
evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence
of the prosecution in support of the charge.
Guided by this ruling, we find that the CA gravely erred in
sustaining the Acting Secretary of Justices finding that there
was no probable cause to indict the respondent for unfair
competition. The dismissal of the complaint, despite ample
evidence to support a finding of probable cause, clearly
constitutes grave error that warrants judicial intervention and
correction.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered GRANTING the petition filed by Unilever Philippines,
Inc. The appealed decision dated June 18, 2007 and the
resolution dated August 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
The State Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to file the
appropriate Information against Michael Tan a.k.a. Paul D. Tan.
SO ORDERED.

then held AAAs right cheek, pulled her face towards him, and
kissed her left cheek.
Upon her return to the office, BBB saw AAA crying, and the latter
told her mother what had happened. Fearing that Roallos would
do something to harm them, BBB and AAA went to the police
station where a report regarding the incident was prepared. They
then referred the report to the provost marshal for proper
coordination and to effect the arrest of the accused. Thereafter,
the police and the provost marshal brought Roallos to the police
station for investigation.
In his defense, Roallos denied that he molested AAA. He
claimed that, on the date of the incident, he merely stayed with
AAA in the AVACC office while the latter waited for her mother;
that he went out of the office twice to meet clients of AVACC.
Roallos further claimed that his arrest was illegal since the same
was effected sans any warrant of arrest. He likewise averred that
he was not informed of his rights when he was arrested nor was
he made to undergo any preliminary investigation.
July 26, 2007, - the RTC rendered a Decision 10 finding Roallos
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610
June 30, 2008 Roallos Amended
Reconsideration12 was denied by the RTC

Motion

for

April 29, 2011 - On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision which

affirmed the RTC Decision dated July 26, 2007, albeit with the
modification that the awards of moral damages and civil
indemnity were both increased toP50,000.00.

Raollos vs. People

That on or about April 15, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, with lewd design, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of
one [AAA]6, a minor, 15 years of age, by then and there mashing
her breast and kissing her cheek, against her will which act
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
said [AAA] as a human being.
On April 15, 2002, at around 1:00 p.m., AAA went to BBBs office
at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City; BBB, however, was then out
running office errands. AAA decided to stay in her mothers office
and wait for the latter to return. At that time, two women were
talking to Roallos inside the AVACC office.
AAA alleged that, after the two women left, Roallos went by the
door of the office, looked outside to see if anybody was around,
and then locked it. He then approached AAA and asked her if
there was any pain bothering her; the latter replied that her tooth
ached. Roallos then placed his left hand on the table while his
right hand was on AAAs right shoulder. Roallos then slid his
hand towards AAAs right breast and mashed itHe then mashed
AAAs left breast. He slid his hand towards AAAs abdomen.
AAA then stomped her feet and pushed her chair towards
Roallos. Roallos then left the office.
After about ten minutes, Roallos returned to the office and
approached AAA. He then asked AAA if she was hungry, the
latter told him that she would just wait for BBB to return. Roallos
then offered to give money to AAA for her to buy food, but the
latter refused the offer. AAA then felt Roallos body pressing
against her back. Thereafter, Roallos attempted to kiss AAA. He

August 19, 2011 - Roallos sought a reconsideration of the CA

Decision dated April 29, 2011,14 but it was likewise denied by the
CA in its Resolution.
Roallos claims that the CA erred in affirming his conviction
considering that the Information filed against him was defective
since it charged two crimes, i.e., acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. He further argues
that he was denied due process as he was not made to undergo
a preliminary investigation. Roallos also asserts that his arrest
was illegal considering that the same was effected sans any
warrant of arrest. Moreover, he alleges that the charge against
him should have been dismissed considering the unreasonable
delay in the prosecution of the case.
Further, Roallos avers that the charge against him was defective
since neither AAA nor BBB signed the Information that was filed
against him and, thus, Roallos claims that the prosecutor had no
authority to file the said Information and, accordingly, the charge
against him was defective.
In any case, he avers that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution is not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
ISSUE:
WON Raollos was denied of due process for having been
arrested without warrant, and for not having been afforded a
preliminary investigation.
HELD:
In Miclat, Jr. v. People,20 the Court emphasized that the accused
is estopped from assailing any irregularity attending his arrest

should he fail to move for the quashal of the information against

him on this ground prior to arraignment, viz:
At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection
to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
Considering this and his active participation in the trial of
the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby
curing any defect in his arrest. An accused is estopped from
assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue
or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this
ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of
arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be made before he enters
his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 21 (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)
Similarly, in Villarin v. People,22 the Court stressed that the
absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely
raised. The accused is deemed to have waived his right to a
preliminary investigation by entering his plea and actively
participating in the trial without raising the lack of a preliminary
investigation. Thus:
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation
must be timely raised and must not have been waived. This
is to allow the trial court to hold the case in abeyance and
conduct its own investigation or require the prosecutor to hold a
reinvestigation, which, necessarily "involves a re-examination
and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the
complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of
probable cause which led to the filing of the Informations after
the requisite preliminary investigation."
Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a
preliminary investigation in his Motion for Reinvestigation.
However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never
raised this issue again. He accepted the Ombudsmans verdict,
entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment and actively
participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled
hearings, conducting cross-examinations and testifying on his
own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment
against him that he once again assailed the conduct of the
preliminary investigation in the Motion for Reconsideration.
Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged
absence of a preliminary investigation has therefore been
mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in
the trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to
preliminary investigation.23 (Citations omitted and emphases
ours)
It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment, Roallos did
not raise any objection to the supposed illegality of his arrest
and the lack of a proper preliminary investigation. Indeed, he
actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Thus,
he is deemed to have waived any perceived irregularity in his
arrest and has effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have waived his right to
preliminary investigation.

Senior State Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack of

probable cause. Giron filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ
and her subsequent motion for reconsideration were likewise
denied. She filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals.
The CA reversed and set aside the resolution of the
DOJ.
CONTENTION OF HASEGAWA: The prosecutors findings on
the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the
courts.
CONTENTION OF GIRON: The CA did no err in finding that the
prosecutor usurped the duties belonging to the court when she
overstretched her duties and applied the standards, not of
ordinary prudence and cautiousness, nor of mere reasonable
belief and probability, but of a full-blown trial on the merits,
where rules on admissibility of testimonies and other evidence
strictly apply.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutor had overstretched her
duties that would amount to grave abuse of discretion warranting
the review of the court

MASAYUKI HASEGAWA, petitioner, vs. LEILA F. GIRON,

respondent.
G.R. No. 184536. August 14, 2013
NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS: Giron, an office worker, claimed that she and her friend
were taken at gunpoint by two men and forcibly boarded into a
vehicle. They were detained for more than 24-hours. They were
taunted and repeatedly threatened by their abductors into
withdrawing the case against Hasegawa.
Hasegawa claimed that he has no knowledge of the
crime and doesnt know the abductors. He asserted that
respondent and Marcos were extorting money from him because
the instant case was filed right after the negotiations to settle the
civil aspect of the three cases they filed with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID), National Labor Relations
Commission, (NLRC) and MeTC Pasay failed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: Giron filed a Complaint- Affidavit
for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against Hasegawa.

HELD: Yes. The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal

complaint against the accused depends on the sound discretion
of the prosecutor. Courts will not interfere with the conduct of
preliminary investigations, or reinvestigations, or in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient probable cause for
the filing of the corresponding information against an offender.
Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for
that of the executive branch. Differently stated, as the matter of
whether to prosecute or not is purely discretionary on his part,
courts cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the
corresponding information, upon a complaint, where he finds the
evidence before him insufficient to warrant the filing of an action
in court. In sum, the prosecutors findings on the existence of
probable cause are not subject to review by the courts, unless
these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse
of discretion. We find such reason for judicial review here
present. We sustain the appellate courts reversal of the ruling of
the Secretary of the DOJ.
The Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of
probable cause too high. Her findings dealt mostly with what
respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was
committed. She delved into evidentiary matters that could only
be passed upon in a fullblown trial where testimonies and
documents could be fairly evaluated in according with the rules
of evidence. The issues upon which the charges are built pertain
to factual matters that cannot be threshed out conclusively
during the preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial
for the presentation of prosecutions evidence in support of the
charge. The validity and merits of a partys defense or
accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence,
are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level. By taking into consideration the defenses
raised by petitioner, the Investigating Prosecutor already went
into the strict merits of the case.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Masayuki was charged with Kidnapping and Serious Illegal

Detention by her former employee, Leila. According to her, a
person who introsuced himself as her lawyers messenger called
him up and instructed her to meet her lawyer at Harrison Plaza
Mall. Thereat, she was tailed by a Black Pajero parked in fornt of
the LRTA building. At the mall, they proceeded to the SM
Department Store, where they notice two men following them.
They went out of the department store and went to the food
stalls, where a man with a pistol ordered them at gun point
inside a Black Pajero. While inside the vehicle, they were bound
and gagged and repeatedly told to withdraw the cases they filed
against Masayuki. Before they weree deleased, they were told
again n to withdraw the cases they filed against Masayuki and to
not report the incident to the authorities. They were releaseed in
Susana Heights somewhere in Muntinlupa City. Her companion,
Leonarda Marcos, corroborated the story.
After the preliminary investigation, the investigating fiscal
dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence, which the
Department of Justice affirmed when Leila filed a petition for
review of the Resolution. She then filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals questioning the dismissal of her case
by the DOJ.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for
certiorari filed by Leila by saying that the Secretary of Justice
arrogated unto himself the powers of a judge by demanding
more than a sampling, but for pieces of evidence to constitute
the crime charged. The motion for reconsideration filed by
Masayuki was denied by the CA, hence, he elevated his case to
the Supreme Court.
In his petition before the Supreme Court, Masayuki held on to
the belief that there was nothing wrong with the decision of the
Secretary of Justice dismissing the case. In fact, it was the CA
who deliberately went to stress the evidence required for his
case to proceed.
Supreme Court:
The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint
against the accused depends on the sound discretion of the
prosecutor. Courts will not interfere with the conduct of
preliminary investigations, or reinvestigations, or in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient probable cause for
the filing of the corresponding information against an offender.
Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for
that of the executive branch. Differently stated, as the matter of
whether to prosecute or not is purely discretionary on his part,
courts cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the
corresponding information, upon a complaint, where he finds the
evidence before him insufficient to warrant the filing of an action
in court. In sum, the prosecutors findings on the existence of
probable cause are not subject to review by the courts, unless
these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse
of discretion. We find such reason for judicial review here
present. We sustain the appellate courts reversal of the ruling of
the Secretary of the DOJ.
Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. It is a reasonable ground of presumption that a
matter is, or may be, well-founded on such a state of facts in the
mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary
caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or

strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean
actual or positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It
is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed
by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the
average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting
to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no
technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is
determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
It must be mentioned, though, that in order to arrive at probable
cause, the elements of the crime charged should be present.
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1.
the
offender
is
a
private
individual;
2. he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner
deprives
the
latter
of
his
liberty;
3. the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
4. in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts
for more than 3 days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public
authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made;
or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a
public
officer.
All elements were sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavit
were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
may have been committed and petitioner may have committed it.
Respondent, an office worker, claimed that she and her friend
were taken at gunpoint by two men and forcibly boarded into a
vehicle. They were detained for more than 24-hours. Whether or
not the accusations would result in a conviction is another
matter. It is enough, for purposes of the preliminary investigation
that the acts complained of constitute the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention.
The findings of the Investigating Prosecutor rest on lack of prima
facie evidence against petitioner. That the kidnapping and
serious illegal detention charge is a mere fabrication was based
on the Investigating Prosecutors observations, as follows: First,
no law enforcement agency has investigated the complaint and
indorsed the same to the prosecution office for preliminary
investigation as is the usual procedure for grave offenses.
Second, the other victim, Marcos, did not file a case against
petitioner. Third, respondent continued to report to work at the
LRTA compound where the supposed mastermind also works.
Fourth, there was the unexplained absence of report of the
alleged incident to any police or law enforcement agencies
which taints the trustworthiness of respondents allegations.
Fifth, respondents theory on the motive for her kidnapping has
been shown to be fallacious. Sixth, respondents propensity to
file a string of cases against petitioner supports the contention
that all these are part of her corrupt scheme to extort money

from petitioner. And seventh, vital witnesses for the respondent

such as the NBI agent assigned to her complaint and her other
officemates who could have corroborated her story were not
presented.
The Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable
cause too high. Her findings dealt mostly with what respondent
had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was committed.
She delved into evidentiary matters that could only be passed
upon in a full-blown trial where testimonies and documents could
be fairly evaluated in according with the rules of evidence. The
issues upon which the charges are built pertain to factual
matters that cannot be threshed out conclusively during the
preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the
presentation of prosecutions evidence in support of the charge.
The validity and merits of a partys defense or accusation, as
well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation
level. By taking into consideration the defenses raised by
petitioner, the Investigating Prosecutor already went into the
strict merits of the case. As aptly stated by the appellate court:
That the NBI or other prosecutor agencies of the government
neglected to act on the petitioners complaint can hardly
constitute evidence that the incident did not in fact happen, or
was merely fabricated or invented to extort money from the
private respondent. Instead of faulting the complainants and
questioning their motivations, the strong arm of the State might
be better off investigating non-feasance in public office.
In any event, the perceived inconsistencies are more imaginary
than real, delving as it does on minor, ambiguous and
inconsequential matters that may yet be properly addressed in a
full-dress court hearing. We thus agree with the petitioners
assertion on the lack of any legal or factual basis for the public
respondents refusal to apply the rule that a positive declaration
is superior to a negative averment. It is well to recall that the
nullity of a resolution may be shown not only by what patently
appears on its face, but also by the documentary and the
testimonial evidence found in the records of the case, upon
which such ruling is based.
True, discretion lies with the investigator to believe more the
respondents alibi, or to shoot down the credibility of the
complainant as well as the testimony of her witnesses. Still, she
may not, as here, turn a blind eye to evidence upon formidable
evidence mounting to show the acts complained of. Such
cavalier disregard of the complainants documents and
attestations may otherwise be the arbitrary, whimsical and
capricious emotion described in the term, grave abuse[.]
It may not even matter that the respondent presented his own
counter-arguments in avoidance of the complaints, assuming he
also did so adeptly, convincingly; far crucial is discerning that the
task transcended mere discovery of the likelihood or the
probability that a crime was committed, but ventured into
weighing evidence beyond any reasonable doubt. Indeed, the
respondent Secretary arrogated upon himself the functions of
the judge by demanding more than a sampling, but for pieces of
evidence that were understandably not there yet, being suited to
a trial proper.
Petition denied.
G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013, MASAYUKI HASEGAWA,
PETITIONER, VS. LEILA F. GIRON, RESPONDENT.

attaches to a crime. Hence, Paul Lee went right up to the

Supreme Court to question the propriety of allowing a private
prosecutor to intervene in a case for perjury, a crime against
public interest.
The Supreme Court:
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate of our law that [e]very person criminally
liable x x x is also civilly liable. Underlying this legal principle is
the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he
offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or
the political entity, called the State, whose law he has violated;
and (2) the individual member of that society whose person,
right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured
or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 181658, August 07, 2013, LEE PUE
LIONG A.K.A. PAUL LEE, PETITIONER, VS. CHUA PUE CHIN
LEE, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, President of Centillion Holdings,
Inc. by virtue of a Secretarys Certificate issued by Virginia Lee,
for and in behalf of CHI, filed a petition for issuance of an
owners duplicate certificate of title of TCT No. 232238, covering
a property owned by CHI. Despite opposition by Chua Pue Chin
Lee, her sister, who alleged that as Corporate Treasurer of Chi,
she has possession of important documents of the Corporation,
including the duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238, the RTC of
Manila granted the petition and directed the Registrar of Deeds
of Manila to issue a new TCT. Chula filed an Omnibus motion to
recall the order granting the petition, alleging that she has
possession of TCT No. 232238; because of this the RTC
recalled the order. Chua Lee also filed a case for perjury against
Paul Lee because of the alleged perjurious statements made in
the Petition as well as his testimony in court regarding the loss
of TCT 232238, which she alleged Paul Lee did to mortgage the
property to Planters Bank, even though there is an intracorporate controversy between him and his siblings, including
Chua. The Office of the City Prosecutor then filed an Information
for perjury against Paul Lee before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila. After Atty. Augusto Macam, private prosecutor under
the control of the public prosecutor, presented the first witness,
Atty. Roland Viesca Jr of the Registry of Deeds, Manila, the
accused thru counsel, moved in open court that Atty. Macam be
excluded from participating in the case since perjury is a public
offence, to which Atty. Macam vehemently objected. After
allowing the parties to file their respective written memoranda in
support of their positions, the MeTC denied the Omnibus Motion
filed by the accused, where he principally raised his objection on
the appearance of the private prosecutor on the ground that
perjury is a crime against public interest; since there being no
allegation of damage to private interest, hence on private
prosecutor is needed. According to the MeTC, citing that the
rules do not distinguish between public and private crimes when
it comes to participation of private prosecutors; since the private
offended party did not waive her civil action or reserved her right
to institute a separate civil action, then the private prosecutor
may participate, under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor. His motion for reconsideration denied, Paul Lee
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which also denied it,
citing such right to intervene exists even when no civil liability

Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,

as amended, provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.(a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the
appearance of a private prosecutor is allowed under Section 16
of Rule 110:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.
Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in
the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may
intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, defines an offended party as the
person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals, this Court rejected
petitioners theory that it is only the State which is the offended
party in public offenses like bigamy. We explained that from the
language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is
reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission
of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is
civilly liable, and therefore the private individual to whom the
offender is civilly liable is the offended party.
In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, we also held that
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual
whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or
directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the
accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by
the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who
has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of
the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive
law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the
legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by
the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a
mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of
the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to

vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated

party. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of
TCT No. 232238 covering CHIs property and its loss through
inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious
to respondents personal credibility and reputation insofar as her
faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board
Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the
corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the court-ordered
issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was
only averted by respondents timely discovery of the case filed
by petitioner in the RTC.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the
perjury case being tried in the MeTC, this Court declared in the
early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, cited by both MeTC and
CA, that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is
erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the
offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus,
where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene
in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right
reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening
for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the
criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused.
Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction
and control of the public prosecutor.
In Chua v. Court of Appeals, as a result of the complaint-affidavit
filed by private respondent who is also the corporations
Treasurer, four counts of falsification of public documents
(Minutes of Annual Stockholders Meeting) was instituted by the
City Prosecutor against petitioner and his wife. After private
respondents testimony was heard during the trial, petitioner
moved to exclude her counsels as private prosecutors on the
ground that she failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the
case. The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the exclusion
of said private prosecutors. On certiorari to the RTC, said court
reversed the MeTC and ordered the latter to allow the private
prosecutors in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal
case. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA which
dismissed his petition and affirmed the assailed RTC ruling.
When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA
in allowing the private prosecutors to actively participate in the
trial of the criminal case. Thus:
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that
where from the nature of the offense or where the law defining
and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an
indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the
prosecution of the offense.
Petitioners contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil
liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that
every man criminally liable is also civilly liable. When a person
commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law
he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society
whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been
actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable
act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is
punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much
because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the

obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make

whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act
or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The
indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral
part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the
crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the
offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the
damage caused, and indemnification for consequential
damages.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil
liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111,
the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution
of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that, [w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately,
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she
reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil
action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we
find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the
criminal action.
Petitioner avers, however, that respondents testimony in the
inferior court did not establish nor prove any damages
personally sustained by her as a result of petitioners alleged
acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal
damages were proven therein, then the participation of her
counsel as private prosecutors, who were supposed to pursue
the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is
without basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action,
evidence should be taken of the damages claimed and the court
should determine who are the persons entitled to such
indemnity. The civil liability arising from the crime may be
determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party
does not waive to have it adjudged or does not reserve the right
to institute a separate civil action against the defendant.
Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability,
evidence should be allowed to establish the extent of injuries
suffered.
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a
reservation made; nor did the offended party institute a separate
civil action. It follows that evidence should be allowed in the
criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the
offense committed, and the private offended party has the right
to intervene through the private prosecutors. (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted.)
In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in
holding that the MeTC committed no grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioners motion to exclude Atty. Macam as
private prosecutor in Crim. Case Nos. 352270-71 CR.

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 160739, July 17, 2013, ANITA

MANGILA, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE HERIBERTO M.
PANGILINAN, ASST.CITY PROSECUTOR II LUCIA JUDY
SOLINAP, AND NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(DIRECTOR REYNALDO WYCOCO), RESPONDENTS.

The Case:
Anita Mangila and four other persons were charged with
syndicated estafa as well as violations of Republic Act 8042 with
respect to the recruiting and promising of overseas employment
to several complainants, before the Presiding Judge, Heriberto
Pangilinan, of the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in
Puerto Princesa City. After conducting a preliminary
examination of one of the complainants, the judge ordered the
arrest of Mangila and others without bail, and the records
transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa for further
proceedings in accordance with law. As a consequence,
Mangila was arrested on June 18, 2003 and detained at the NBI
headquarters in Manila. Averring that Judge Pangilinan had no
authority to conduct preliminary investigation, and the issuance
of the warrant was without any justification or probable cause,
Mangila filed a petition for habeas corpus. She argues that
habeas corpus is available to her as she had no adequate
remedy in law since the records of the case were already
forwarded to the Office of the City Prosecutor who had no
authority to recall the warrant of arrest. The CA denied the
petition for habeas corpus, holding that if the petitioner believes
she is being restrained on an invalid warrant of arrest, the
remedy is not habeas corpus but a motion to quash the warrant
or reinvestigation by the municipal judge or city or provincial
prosecutor. In this case, she could have filed with the Provincial
Prosecutor a motion to be released from detention on the
grounds raised in the petition. Anita appealed to the Supreme
Court.
The Issue:
Whether or not habeas corpus is available to Anita.
The Ruling:
The petition for review lacks merit.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as
a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint. In Caballes v. Court of Appeals,1 the
Court discoursed on the nature of the special proceeding
of habeas corpus in the following manner:
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special
proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. In Ex Parte Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is
that of a civil proceeding in character. It seeks the enforcement
of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the
criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the right of
liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be
served is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when
instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and secure freedom.
When a prisoner petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, he
thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that court.
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended
as substitute for the trial courts function. It cannot take the place

of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to

investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised
relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas
corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether
the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason,
null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the
law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and
in
the
absence
of
exceptional
circumstances.
Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance
of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the
usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ
where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another
case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a
writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and
irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction
occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the
caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and
liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also
been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere
errors and irregularities, which do not render the
proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas
corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a
proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole purpose of having
the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that
the cause of his detention may be inquired into and his
statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon
the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds
him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the
only parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the
person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to
be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the
petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner
fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a palladium of
liberty, is a prerogative writ which does not issue as a matter of
right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It is,
however, a writ of right on proper formalities being made by
proof. Resort to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of
which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty,
notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be
served is relief from illegal restraint.The primary, if not the only
object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, is to
determine the legality of the restraint under which a person is
held2. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
The object of the writ of habeas corpusis to inquire into the
legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be
illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled
however, is that the writ will not issue where the person in whose
behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction
or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. 3
There is no question that when the criminal complaints were
lodged against Mangila and her cohorts on June 16, 2003,
Judge Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was
empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving all
crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. His authority was expressly provided in
Section 2, Rule 112 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to wit:

Section 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary

investigations. The following may conduct preliminary
investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall
include all crimes cognizable by the proper court in their
respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a)
Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a warrant of
arrest during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting
its conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and
under oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers that a probable cause existed,
and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.In
the context of this rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of
arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA
properly denied Mangilas petition for habeas corpus because
she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant
issued for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer
undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so.
It is relevant to point out at this juncture that the authority of the
MTC and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations
was removed only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M.
No. 05-8-26-SC.
With Mangilas arrestand ensuing detention being by virtue of
the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas
corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the
restraint on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being
lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired into
through habeas corpus. To quote the dictum enunciated by
Justice Malcolm inQuintos v. Director of Prisons:4
The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have
the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court
of justice, and to have ascertained if he is held under lawful
authority. The function of habeas corpus, where the party
who has appealed to its aid is in custody under process,
does not extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of
the court by which it was issued and the validity of the
process upon its face. It is not a writ of error. xxx (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Accordingly, Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court explicitly
states:
Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it
appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the

process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be

held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Still, Mangila harps on the procedural flaws supposedly
committed by Judge Pangilinan in her attempt to convince the
Court on her entitlement to the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. She insists that the illegality and invalidity of the warrant
of arrest because of its having been issued without an
exhaustive examination of the complainants and the witnesses
in writing and under oath; without a prior finding of probable
cause; and without consideration of the necessity for its
issuance in order not to frustrate the ends of justice were
enough reasons for granting the writ of habeas corpus.5
Mangila fails to persuade.
To begin with, Judge Pangilinan issued the order of arrest after
examining Palayon, one of the complainants against Mangila
and her cohorts. If he, as the investigating judge, considered
Palayons evidence sufficient for finding probable cause against
her and her cohorts, which finding the Court justifiably presumes
from his act of referring the case and its records to the Office of
the City Prosecutor on the day immediately following the
preliminary investigation he conducted, her petition for habeas
corpus could not be the proper remedy by which she could
assail the adequacy of the adverse finding. Even granting that
there was a failure to adhere to the law or rule, such failure
would not be the equivalent of a violation of her constitutional
rights.6
Secondly, it was not procedurally correct for her to impugn the
issuance of the warrant of arrest by hinting that the investigating
judge did not at all consider the necessity of determining the
existence of probable cause for its issuance due to time
constraints and in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, for
that consideration was presumed.
And, lastly, it was clear that under Section 5, 7 Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the resolution of the
investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the
review by the public prosecutor who had the power to order the
release of the detainee if no probable cause should be ultimately
found against her. In the context of the rule, Mangila had no
need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure
her release from detention. Her proper recourse was to bring the
supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary
investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the
attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given
the most direct access to the entire records of the case,
including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinans
transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate
action.8 We agree with the CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas
corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available
remedy.9
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated
on October 14, 2003 and November 19, 2003 in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 79745; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
BERSAMIN, J.:

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Villarama, Jr, and Reyes, JJ.,

concur.

Mario appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals to the

Supreme Court.

G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987, MARIO FL. CRESPO,

petitioner, vs.HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding
Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th
Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO
BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.

ISSUE:
Is the trial court bound by the Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice withdrawing the Information filed against the
accused? May the judge insist on the arraignment and trial
on the merits of the accused even after the motion to
dismiss was filed by the prosecutor?
HELD:

This is the core issue for resolution in the case of Mario. An

information for Estafa was filed against him by the
prosecutor in the lower court in Lucena City. During the
scheduled arraignment, he moved to defer his arraignment
on the ground that there was a pending Petition for Review
before the Secretary of Justice of his case. The lower court
denied the motion, as well as the motion for
reconsideration, but deferred the arraignment so the
accused can elevate his quandary to the appellate court.
He elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, to which the
Office of the Solicitor General sided with him. The Court of
Appeals restrained the lower court from proceeding with
the arraignment of the accused until such time that the
Secretary of Justice acted on the accuseds petition.
The then Undersecretaty of Justice reversed the Resolution
filed by the Provincial Prosecutor, thus the provincial fiscal
filed a motion to dismiss the information attaching thereto
the letter of the Undersecretary of Justice. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss the information, citing among
others that the motion seeks to dismiss the case based on
evidence not before it, and the motion erodes the
independence and integrity of the court.
The Court of Appeals initially restrained the lower court
from proceeding with the arraignment but later dismissed
the petition of Mario and lifted the restraining order.

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a

complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the
accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already
in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court
who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation
or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action
of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain
from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court. The matter should be left
entirely for the determination of the Court.