5. Smart Communications Inc. v.

City of Davao
Topic: Taxation
Petitioner-Smart Communications, Inc.
-They filed a special civil action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court for the ascertainment of its rights and obligations under the Tax Code of
the City of Davao, particularly Section 10:
Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, there is
hereby imposed a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise, at a rate of seventyfive percent (75%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the
preceding calendar year based on the income or receipts realized within the
territorial jurisdiction of Davao City.
they contend that they are exempted in paying the franchise tax on the following
grounds: (a) the issuance of its franchise under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7294
subsequent to R.A. No. 7160 shows the clear legislative intent to exempt it from
the provisions of R.A. 7160; (b) Section 137 of R.A. No. 7160 can only apply to
exemptions already existing at the time of its effectivity and not to future
exemptions; (c) the power of the City of Davao to impose a franchise tax is
subject to statutory limitations such as the in lieu of all taxes clause found in
Section 9 of R.A. No. 7294; and (d) the imposition of franchise tax by the City of
Davao would amount to a violation of the constitutional provision against
impairment of contracts.
Respondent-City of Davao, represented by Mayor Hon. Rodrigo Duterte
- In their answer, they invoked the power grated by the Constitution to local
government units to create their own sources of revenue
Issue:
MAIN ISSUE: Whether Smart is liable to pay the franchise tax imposed by the
City of Davao
Ruling:
Yes, Smart is liable to pay the franchise tax imposed by the City of Davao, thus,
petitioners petition is DENIED.
The in lieu of all taxes clause in Smarts franchise is put in issue before the
Court. In order to ascertain its meaning, consistent with fundamentals of statutory
construction, all the words in the statute must be considered. The grant of tax
exemption by R.A. No. 7294 is not to be interpreted from a consideration of a

single portion or of isolated words or clauses, but from a general view of the
act as a whole.
Tax exemptions are never presumed and are strictly construed against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. They can only be
given force when the grant is clear and categorical. The surrender of the
power to tax, when claimed, must be clearly shown by a language that will admit
of no reasonable construction consistent with the reservation of the power. If the
intention of the legislature is open to doubt, then the intention of the legislature
must be resolved in favor of the State.
In this case, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the City of Davao. The in lieu
of all taxes clause applies only to national internal revenue taxes and not to local
taxes.
Concept of Tax Exemptions and Tax Exclusion:
A tax exemption means that the taxpayer does not pay any tax at all. Smart
pays VAT, income tax, and real property tax. Thus, what it enjoys is more
accurately a tax exclusion.
However, as previously held by the Court, both in their nature and effect, there is
no essential difference between a tax exemption and a tax exclusion. An
exemption is an immunity or a privilege; it is the freedom from a charge or
burden to which others are subjected. An exclusion, on the other hand, is
the removal of otherwise taxable items from the reach of taxation, e.g.,
exclusions from gross income and allowable deductions.
An exclusion is, thus, also an immunity or privilege which frees a taxpayer
from a charge to which others are subjected. Consequently, the rule that a
tax exemption should be applied in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer
and liberally in favor of the government applies equally to tax exclusions

7. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc. (CEPALCO) v. City of

Cagayan de Oro
Topic: Taxation
January 10, 2005, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro (City
Council) passed Ordinance No. 9503-2005 imposing a tax on the lease or rental
of electric and/or telecommunications posts, poles or towers by pole owners to
other pole users at 10% of annual rental income derived from such lease or
rental.
The City Council informed appellant CEPALCO in a written letter
Petitioner- CEPALCO
CEPALCO then filed a petition for declaratory relief assailing the validity of the
ordinance. It was raised on pure question of law.
Moreover they assert that the disputed ordinance is in reality of a tax on income
which appellle of City of Cagayan de Oro may not impose, the same being
expressly prohibited by Section 133 (a) of RA No. 7160 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991.
Lastly, they contend that assuming that the City Council can enact said
ordinance, they are then exempt form the imposition by virtue of RA 9284
providing for its franchise.
Respondent- City of Cagayan de Oro
In its answer, appellee raised the following affirmative defenses: (a) the
enactment and implementation of the subject ordinance was a valid and lawful
exercise of its powers pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, the Local Government
Code, other applicable provisions of law, and pertinent jurisprudence;
(b) non exemption of CEPALCO because of the express withdrawal of the
exemption provided by Section 193 of the LGC;
(c) the subject ordinance is legally presumed valid and constitutional;
(d) prescription of respondentappellees action pursuant to Section 187 of the
LGC; (e) failure of respondentappellee to exhaust administrative remedies under
the Local Government Code;
(f) CEPALCOs action for declaratory relief cannot prosper since no breach or
violation of the subject ordinance was yet committed by the City.

RTC- ruled in favor of City of Cagayan de Oro

CA- assailed the decision of the RTC
Issue
Whether the City of Cagayan de Oro can enact such ordinance
Ruling
No, the City of Cagayan de Oro cannot enact such ordinance. The Court
reversed the decision of the CA and declared said ordinance to be declared void.
The Court declared the ordinance void due to its violation to the Value-added tax
imposed to CEPALOC.
ValueAdded Tax; Any person, who in the course of trade or business leases
goods or properties shall be subject to the valueadded tax, the imposable tax
rate should not exceed two percent of gross receipts of the lease of poles of the
preceding calendar year.More importantly, because any person, who in the
course of trade or business x x x leases goods or properties x x x shall be subject
to the valueadded tax, the imposable tax rate should not exceed two percent of
gross receipts of the lease of poles of the preceding calendar year. Section
143(h) states that on any business subject to x x x valueadded x x x tax
under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, the rate of tax shall
not exceed two percent (2%) of gross sales or receipts of the preceding
calendar year from the lease of goods or properties. Hence, the 10% tax
rate imposed by Ordinance No. 95032005 clearly violates Section 143(h) of
the Local Government Code.

Other important matters:

-It is hornbook doctrine that tax exemptions are strictly construed against the
claimant. For this reason, tax exemptions must be based on clear legal
provisions.
-Tax Ordinance; The law requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions
the validity or legality of a tax ordinance must file his appeal to the Secretary of
Justice, within 30 days from effectivity thereof. In case the Secretary decides the
appeal, a period also of 30 days is allowed for an aggrieved party to go to court.
But if the Secretary does not act thereon, after the lapse of 60 days, a party could
already proceed to seek relief in court.

8. Commission of Internal Revenue (CIR) v. Petron Corporation

Topic: Taxation
Petron, a Board of Investment (BOI) registered enterprise was an assignee of
several Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs) from various BOI-registered enterprises for
the taxable years 1995-1998. Petron subsequently utilized said TCCs to pay its
excise taxes for said taxable years.
The TCCs had a Liability Clause which provided: Both the TRANSFEROR and
the TRANSFEREE shall be jointly and severally liable for any fraudulent act or
violation of the pertinent laws, rules and regulations relating to the transfer of this
TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE.
Sometime in 1999, a post-audit of said TCCs was conducted by the DOF. The
TCCs and the TDMs were cancelled by reason of fraud. The DOF found that said
TCCs were fraudulently obtained by the transferors and subsequently the same
was fraudulently transferred to Petron.
Petitioner-CIR
January 30, 2002, The CIR issued an assessment against Petron for deficiency
excise taxes for the taxable years1995 to 1998 based on the ground that the
TCCs utilized by petitioner in its payment of excise taxes have been cancelled by
the DOFfor having been fraudulently issued and transferred.
Respondent-Petron Corporation
Subsequently, Petron filed a protest letter regarding said assessment. In 2002,
the CIR served a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy on petitioner to enforce
payment of the tax deficiencies. Construing the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy
as the final adverse decision of the BIR on its protest of the assessment, Petron
filed a petition before the CTA contending that the assignment/transfer of the
TCCs to petitioner by the TCC holders was submitted to, examined and
approved by the concerned government agencies which processed the
assignment in accordance with law and revenue regulations and that the
assessment and collection of alleged excise tax deficiencies sought to be
collected by the BIR against petitioner through the January 30, 2002 letter are
already barred by prescription. The CTA Second Division ruled for the CIR.
Petron appealed the decision to the CTA En banc which, in turn, reversed the
CTA 2ndDivision decision, based on the following on the ground that Petron was
considered an innocent transferee of the subject TCCs and may not be
prejudiced by a re-assessment of excise tax liabilities that respondent has
already settled, when due, with the use of the TCCs

Court of Tax Appeal (CTA), denied the respondents motion.

However, CTA en banc reversed the first decision. It absolved Petron from
any deficiency excise tax liability for taxable years 1995-1998. It invoked its
ruling in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.

Issue
Whether CIR is estopped in collecting the tax liability of Petron?
Ruling Petition denied for lack of merit
We are not persuaded by the CIRs argument.
We recognize the wellentrenched principle that estoppel does not apply to
the government, especially on matters of taxation. Taxes are the nations
lifeblood through which government agencies continue to operate and with
which the State discharges its functions for the welfare of its
constituents.56 As an exception, however, this general rule cannot be
applied if it would work injustice against an innocent party.
Petron, in this case, was not proven to have had any participation in or
knowledge of the CIRs allegation of the fraudulent transfer and utilization of the
subject TCCs. Respondents status as a transferee in good faith and for value of
these TCCs has been established and even stipulated upon by petitioner.58
Respondent was thereby provided ample protection from the adverse findings
subsequently made by the Center.59 Given the circumstances, the CIRs
invocation of the nonapplicability of estoppel in this case is misplaced.

On the final issue it raised, the CIR contends that a 25% surcharge and a 20%
interest per annum must be imposed upon Petron for respondents excise tax
liabilities as mandated under Sections 248 and 249 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC).60 Petitioner considers the tax returns filed by respondent
for the years 1995 to 1998 as fraudulent on the basis of the post audit finding that
the TCCs were void. It argues that the prescriptive period within which to lawfully
assess Petron for its tax liabilities has not prescribed under Section 222 (a) 61 of
the Tax Code. The CIR explains that respondents assessment on 30 January
2002 of respondents deficiency excise tax for the years 1995 to 1998 was well
within the tenyear prescription period.

9. China Banking Corporation v. City Treasurer of Manila

Topic: Taxation
Petitioner/Respondent
Petitioner, China Banking Corporation is asking for the City Treasurer of Manila
to refund 154, 398.50 collected by the latter. Petitioners alleged that, on January
2007, on the basis of the reported income of respondent CBC's Sto. Cristo
Branch, Binondo, Manila, amounting to P34,310,777.34 for the year ending
December 31, 2006, respondent CBC was assessed the amount of P267,128.70
by petitioner City Treasurer of Manila, consisting of local business tax.
On January 15, 2007, respondent CBC paid the amount of P267,128.70 and
protested, thru a Letter dated January 12, 2007, the imposition of business tax
under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code in the amount of P154,398.50, on
the ground that it is not liable of said additional business tax and the same
constitutes double taxation.
Respondent acknowledged the letter but no action was taken thus, the petition
was raised in RTC. The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition filed by
CBC and ordered the City Treasurer to refund the said amount in dispute.
Court of Tax Appeal (CTA) reversed the decision of the RTC. Moreover, it ruled
that RTC did not have jurisdiction over the said petition because it was filed out
of time
CTA en banc, affirmed the decision of the CTA and reiterated the petition for
review was filed out of time.
Issue:
Whether the RTC has the original jurisdiction over the case
Ruling:
The RTC does not have the original jurisdiction over the said petition. Thus,
petition was DENIED.
Under the current state of law, there can be no doubt that the law does not
prescribe any formal requirement to constitute a valid protest. To constitute a
valid protest, it is sufficient if what has been filed contains the
spontaneous declaration made to acquire or keep some right or to prevent
an impending damage. Accordingly, a protest is valid so long as it states the

taxpayers objection to the assessment and the reasons therefor.

At any rate, even if the Court considers CBCs appeal from the denial due to
inaction by the City Treasurer to have been timely filed, the same must be
dismissed because it was not filed with a court of competent jurisdiction.
Original jurisdiction is the power of the Court to take judicial cognizance
of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions
provided by law. Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a Court higher in
rank to reexamine the final order or judgment of a lower Court which tried
the case now elevated for judicial review.
Yet significantly, the Local Government Code, or any other statute for that matter,
does not expressly confer appellate jurisdiction on the part of regional trial courts
from the denial of a tax protest by a local treasurer. On the other hand, Section
22 of B.P. 129 expressly delineates the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Courts, confining as it does said appellate jurisdiction to cases decided by
Metropolitan, Municipal, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Unlike in the case of
the Court of Appeals, B.P. 129 does not confer appellate jurisdiction on Regional
Trial Courts over rulings made by nonjudicial entities.
RTC would exercise appellate jurisdiction. The Court cannot consider the City
Treasurer as the entity that exercises original jurisdiction not only because it is
not a court within the context of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, but also
because, as explained above, B.P. 129 expressly delineates the appellate
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, confining as it does said appellate
jurisdiction to cases decided by Metropolitan, Municipal, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts. Verily, unlike in the case of the CA, B.P. 129 does not confer
appellate jurisdiction on the RTC over rulings made by non judicial entities.
The RTC exercises appellate jurisdiction only from cases decided by the
Metropolitan, Municipal, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the proper
cases. The nature of the jurisdiction exercised by these courts is original,
considering it will be the first time that a court will take judicial cognizance
of a case instituted for judicial action.

Indeed, in cases where the amount sought to be refunded is below the

jurisdictional amount of the RTC, the Metropolitan, Municipal, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts are clothed with ample authority to rule on
such claims.
*MTC- amount 200,000-400,000, thus, the case should have been filed in the
MTC not RTC

10. Ferrer v. Bautista

Topic: Taxation
The City of Quezon City passed two ordinace regarding garbage collection and
the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City.
Petitioner: Ferrer, property owner in QC
Petitioner, a Quezon City property owner assails the Constitutionality of two QC
Ordinances, namely, Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011 or the Socialized Housing
Tax of Quezon City and Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2012 on garbage collecting
fees.
The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the two
ordinance.
Petitioner asserts that the protection of real properties from informal settlers and
the collection of garbage are basic and essential duties and functions of the
Quezon City Government. By imposing the SHT and the garbage fee, the latter
has shown a penchant and pattern to collect taxes to pay for public services that
could be covered by its revenues from taxes imposed on property, idle land,
business, transfer, amusement, etc., as well as the Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA) from the National Government. For petitioner, it is noteworthy that
respondents did not raise the issue that the Quezon City Government is in dire
financial state and desperately needs money to fund housing for informal settlers
and to pay for garbage collection. In fact, it has not denied that its revenue
collection in 2012 is in the sum of P13.69 billion.
Moreover, the imposition of the SHT and the garbage fee cannot be justified by
the Quezon City Government as an exercise of its power to create sources of
income under Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.47 According to
petitioner, the constitutional provision is not a carte blanche for the LGU to tax
everything under its territorial and political jurisdiction as the provision itself
admits of guidelines and limitations.
Petitioner further claims that the annual property tax is an ad valorem tax, a
percentage of the assessed value of the property, which is subject to revision
every three (3) years in order to reflect an increase in the market value of the
property. The SHT and the garbage fee are actually increases in the property tax
which are not based on the assessed value of the property or its reassessment
every three years; hence, in violation of Sections 232 and 233 of the LGC.48
Respondent: Quezon City represented by Mayor Herbert Bautista

Filed an instant motion to dissolve the TRO.

Respondents are of the view that this petition for certiorari is improper since they
are not tribunals, boards or officers exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions.
For their part, respondents relied on the presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of Ordinance Nos. SP2095 and SP2235, invoking
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc.,49 People v. Siton, et
al.,50 and Hon. Ermita v. Hon. AldecoaDelorino.51 They argue that the burden of
establishing the invalidity of an ordinance rests heavily upon the party
challenging its constitutionality. They insist that the questioned ordinances are
proper exercises of police power similar to Telecom. & Broadcast Attys. of the
Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC52 and Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon.
Atienza, Jr.53 and that their enactment finds basis in the social justice principle
enshrined in Section 9,54 Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether the two ordinances in question is constitutional
Ruling: Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED
-The Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) is valid. It is within the power of Quezon City
to enact such ordinance. Cities are allowed to exercise such powers and
discharge such functions and responsibilities, as along as it is necessary,
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services
and facilities which include programs and projects for low-cost housing and mass
dwelling. The tax is not pure exercise of taxing power, it merely raise the revenue
of the city. It is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the
exercise of police power for the general welfare of the entire city. Thus, it is valid
LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might
be delegated to them either by the basic law or by the statute.87 Under the now
prevailing Constitution , where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by
statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide
statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for the current rule is
to safeguard the viability and selfsufficiency of local government units by
directly granting them general and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the
fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional;
the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government
units are being strengthened and made more autonomous, the legislature must
still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be overburdened or saddled with
multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit will
have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of the national

government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair,
uniform, and just.
Subject to the provisions of the LGC and consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy, every LGU is now empowered and authorized to create its own
sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue
exclusively to the local government unit as well as to apply its resources and
assets for productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or
furtherance of their governmental or proprietary powers and functions.

-However, the Garbage collection tax is invalid. It violates equal protection clause
since it sets forth a distinction between owners of properties who should be
regarded as the same. (will be discussed further in EPC). Thus, this is invalid.

Cudia v. The Superintended of the Philippine Military Academy

Topic: Due Process of Law

Aldrin Cudia is a graduating student of PMA. However, he was not allowed to

graduate due to his alleged violation to the first Code of PMA.
Cadet 1CL Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA, the
countrys premiere military academy located at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio
City. He belonged to the A Company and was the Deputy Baron of his class. As
claimed by petitioners and petitionerintervenor (hereinafter collectively called
petitioners, unless otherwise indicated), he was supposed to graduate with
honors as the class salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top
Navy cadet graduate, and be commissioned as an ensign of the Philippine Navy.
On November 14, 2013, he took his lesson examination, after the exams he
talked to his professor regarding the last exams they took, thus causing him to be
late in his class. He then received a notice of demerit. As a reply, Cadet 1CL
Cudia reasoned out that: I came directly from OR432 Class. We were dismissed
a bit late by our instructor Sir.
Several days passed, and on January 7, 2014, Cadet 1CL Cudia was informed
that Maj. Hindang reported him to the HC21 for violation of the Honor Code.
Upon asking the HC Chairman, Cadet 1CL Mike Anthony P. Mogol (Cadet 1CL
Mogol), as to what Maj. Hindang meant in his Report, Cadet 1CL Cudia learned
that it was based on Maj. Hindangs conversations with their instructors and
classmates as well as his statement in the request for reconsideration to Maj.
Leander. He then verbally applied for and was granted an extension of time to
answer the charge against him because Dr. Costales, who could shed light on
the matter, was on emergency leave.
On January 15, 2014, the HC constituted a team to conduct a preliminary
investigation on the reported honor violation of Cadet 1CL Cudia. It resulted to
Cudia being declared to have violated the Honor Code

Petition:
Vladimir Gracilla (Maj Gracilla) alleged violated Cadet 1CL Cudias rights to due
process, education, and privacy of communication.
Respondents:

No violation since they asked Cudia to explain his side however, he wrote false
statements which is a violation of the first honor code of PMA
Issue:
Whether due process was rendered in favor of Cudia
Ruling:
Yes, there was due process.
In Guzman v. National University, 142 SCRA 699 (1986), the Court held that
there are minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of
procedural due process, to wit: (1) the students must be informed in writing
of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have
the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5)
the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
All these were followed in the proceedings of Cudia. (MOST IMPORTANTTHE REASON WHY THERES DUE PROCESS IN CUDIAs CASE)
It worth emphasizing, that Cudia commited quibbling. In this case, the Supreme
Court (SC) agrees with respondents that Cadet First Class (1CL) Cudia
committed quibbling; hence, he lied in violation of the Honor Code.In this case,
the Court agrees with respondents that Cadet 1CL Cudia committed quibbling;
hence, he lied in violation of the Honor Code. Following an Honor Reference
Handbook, the term Quibbling has been defined in one U.S. case as follows: A
person can easily create a false impression in the mind of his listener by cleverly
wording what he says, omitting relevant facts, or telling a partial truth. When he
knowingly does so with the intent to deceive or mislead, he is quibbling. Because
it is an intentional deception, quibbling is a form of lying. The above definition can
be applied in the instant case. Here, instead of directly and completely telling the
cause of his being late in the ENG412 class of Prof. Berong, Cadet 1CL Cudia
chose to omit relevant facts, thereby, telling a halftruth.
To be part of the Cadet Corps requires the surrender of some basic rights and
liberties for the good of the group.Of course, a student at a military academy
must be prepared to subordinate his private interests for the proper functioning of
the educational institution he attends to, one that is with a greater degree than a
student at a civilian public school. In fact, the Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook of the PMA expresses that, [as] a training environment, the Cadet
Corps is a society which has its own norms. Each member binds himself to what
is good for him, his subordinates, and his peers. To be part of the Cadet Corps
requires the surrender of some basic rights and liberties for the good of the
group.

CLT Realty Development Corporation v. Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation

Topic: Meaning of Due Process
The properties in dispute were formerly part of the notorious Maysilo Estate left
by Gonzalo Tuason, the vastness of which measures 1,660.26 hectares,
stretching across Caloocan City, Valenzuela, and Malabon, covered by five titles
(5) mother or Original Certificate of Title (OCT).
In 1947, the Government expropriated the seven lots. 6 By virtue of the
expropriation, TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374 were cancelled and replaced by TCTs
No. 12836 to No. 12842. Afterwards, by virtue of Consolidated Subdivision Plan
Psd (LRC) Pcd1828, the Government consolidated the titles and then further
subdivided the property into 77 lots.
One of the 77 lots was registered in the name of Benito Villanueva under TCTs
No. 23027 to No. 23028, which was further subdivided into LotA and 17B,
pursuant to subdivision plan Psd276839. One of the properties in dispute is Lot
17B, which was later on registered in the name of Jose Madulid, Sr. (Madulid,
Sr.), under TCT No. C32979, which was later on sold to HiGrade.
Petitioner: CLT
CLT is a registered owner of one of TCT, executed by former registered owner,
Estrelita Hipolito. CLT arged that Hi-Grades title is null and void for being fake
and spurious based on the facts presented.
Furthermore, they presented witnesses to strengthen their claim. Accordingly,
they contend that there was an overlap between CLTs and Hi-Grades titles.
Moreover, CLT avers that taking judicial notice of the Senate Report is a violation
of the Rules of Court and CLT's right to due process.
Respondent: Hi-Grade
On the other hand, HiGrade presented its sole witness, Atty. Jose Madulid,
counsel for and stockholder of HiGrade, and son of HiGrade's predecessor, Jose
Madulid, Sr., who testified that his family has been occupying the subject
properties under the concept of an owner for more than twentyseven (27) years,
until the properties were transferred to HiGrade.
RTC- ruled in favor of CLT. According to the RTC, HiGrade's title, the older title,

cannot prevail over CLT's title because it suffers from patent defects and
infirmities.
CA- reversed the decision contending that the RTC erred in basing its decision to
CLTs witnesses.
Issue:
Is there a violation to CLTs right to due process?

Ruling:
CLT avers that taking judicial notice of the Senate Report is a violation of the
Rules of Court and CLT's right to due process. First, the Senate Report is
inadmissible and should not be given any probative value because it was
obtained in violation of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, considering that the
Senate Report is unauthenticated and is thus deemed hearsay evidence.
Contrary to the mandatory procedure under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
which requires examination of documentary and testimonial evidence, the Senate
Report was not put to proof and CL T was deprived of the opportunity to conduct
a crossexamination on the Senate Report. And it is also contended that the right
of CL T to due process was violated because the proceedings in the Senate were
conducted without notice to CLT. Finally, the admission in evidence of the Senate
Report violated the timehonored principle of separation of powers as it is an
encroachment into the jurisdiction exclusive to the courts.
CL T misses the point. Taking judicial notice of acts of the Senate is well within
the ambit of the law. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial
extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of
nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the
world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time,
and the geographical divisions. (la) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The contention is wrong since The Senate Report, an official act of the legislative
department, may be taken judicial notice of. They were afforded due process
contrary to the belief of CLT.
Thus, the petition was dismissed.

Carolino v. Senga
Topic: Substantive Due Process
On December 1, 1976, Jeremias A. Carolino, petitioners husband retired from
the Armed Forces of the Philippines with the rank of Colonel. He then started
receiving his monthly retirement pay worth 18, 315 in December 1976 until the
same was withheld by respondents in March 2005.
Jeremias then wrote a letter addressing to the AFP Chief of Staff for the reasons
of the withholding of his retirement pay. In reply, the contend that his loss of
Filipino citizenship caused the deletion of his name in the alpha list of the AFP
Pensioners Payroll and he could avail re-entitlement to his retirement benefits
and restoration in the AFP master list payroll once he complied with RA 9225 or
the Dual Citizenship Act. Moreover, PD 16388 which provides that the name of
the retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list
and his retirement benefit terminated upon such loss.
RTC: Sided the petitioners. They instructed that the name of the petitioner be
immediately reinstated in the list
CA: Revoked RTCs decision.
Issue:
Whether the name of Jeremias Carolino should be included again in the list of of
AFP Pensioners Payroll.
Ruling:
Yes, his name should be immediately reinstated.
Jeremias had complied with the conditions of eligibility to retirement benefits as
he was then receiving his retirement benefits on a monthly basis until it was
terminated. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements,
he acquires vested right to the benefits that is protected by the due process
clause. It is only upon retirement that military personel acquire a vested right to
retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they
acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law.
In the case of Balboa v. Farralas, the court held that the due process clause
prohibits the annihilation of vested rights.
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. A state

may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or

by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the
constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police
power"
Yinlu Bicol Mining Corp. v. Trans-Asia Oil and EDC
Topic: Substantive Due Process
The case involves 13 mining claims over the area located in Bariio Larap in
Camarines Norte.
Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corporation (Trans-Asia) then explored
the area from 1986 onwards. In 1996, it entered into an operating agreement with
Philex Mining Corporation over the area, their agreement being duly registered
by the Mining Recorder Section of Regional Office No. V of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). In 1997, Trans-Asia filed an
application for the approval of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement. Trans-Asia
was then given the exclusive right to explore, develop, and utilize the mineral
deposits in the portion of the mineral lands.
On August 31, 2007, Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation (Yinlu) informed the DENR
by letter that it had acquired the mining patents of PIMI from MBC/BDO by way of
a deed of absolute sale, stating that the areas covered by its mining patents were
within the areas of Trans-Asias MPSA. Based on the documents submitted by
Yinlu, four of the six transfer certificates of title (TCTs) it held covered four mining
claims under Patent Nos. 15, 16, 17 and 18 respectively named as Busser,
Superior, Bussamer and Rescue Placer Claims, with an aggregate area of 192
hectares. The areas covered occupied more than half of the MPSA area of
Trans-Asia.
On September 14, 20017, Trans-Asia informed Yinlu that it would commence
exploration works in Yinlus areas pursuant to MPSA and requested Yinlu to allow
its personnel to access the areas for the works to be taken. However, Yinlu
replied that they can explore its own private areas in Calambayugan but not in
the areas covered by Yinlus mining patents. Thus, Trans-Asia asked the helped
of DENR.
Then DENR Secretary Jose Atienza resolved the issue in favor of Yinlu, finding
the patents to be issued to PIMI in 1930s. It was then raised in the Office of the
President (OP), who rendered its decision still in favor of Yinlu. Howerver, when
the case was raised in the CA, the court reversed the decisions of DENR and
OP.
Now, Yinlu raised a petition in the Court. One of its contention is that Yinlus
mining patents constituted vested rights that could not be disregarded in its
claims in the said mining area.

Issue:
Whether Yinlus mining patents constituted vested rights

Ruling:
Yes, the mining patents were constituted to be vested rights of Yinlu, which could
not be disregarded.
Yinlu claims that its mining patents, being evidenced by its TCTs that were
registered pursuant to Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act of 1902) in relation to
the Philippine Bill of 1902 (Act of Congress of July 1, 1902), the governing law on
the registration of mineral patents, were valid, existing and indefeasible; that it
was the absolute owner of the lands the TCTs covered.
Pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902, therefore, once a mining claim was
made or a mining patent was issued over a parcel of land in accordance
with the relative provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, such land was
considered private property and no longer part of the public domain. The
claimant or patent holder was the owner of both the surface of the land and of the
minerals found underneath.
It was said by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, The Government
itself cannot abridge the rights of the miner to a perfected valid location of
public mineral land. The Government may not destroy the locators right by
withdrawing the land from entry or placing it in a state of reservation.
(Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.S., 279;; Sullivan v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U.S.,
431)
Thus, Yinlu was the owner and holder of the mining patents entitled not
only to whatever was on the surface but also to the minerals found
underneath the surface.
The lands and minerals covered by Yinlus mining patents are private
properties. The Government, whether through the DENR or the MGB, could
not alienate or dispose of the lands or mineral through the MPSA granted
to Trans-Asia or any other person or entity. Yinlu had the exclusive right to
explore, develop and utilize the minerals therein, and it could legally
transfer or assign such exclusive right.

Bilbao v. People
Topic: Impartial and Competent Court
Judge Fernando Elumba of Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City rendered a
decision affirming the conviction of Nelson Lai Bilbao for the crime of homicide.
On its appeal, the counsel of Bilbao raised several issues and one of which is:
ERRED as accused was deprived of due process when this case was
decided by the honorable presiding judge who acted as the public
prosecutor in this case before he was appointed to the bench
However, the CA assailed the decision of Judge Elumba.
Thus, the case was raised in the SC.
Issue:
Whether Bilbao was deprived of due process
Ruling:
Yes, Bilbao was deprived of due process since Judge Elumba cannot be
considered a judge who rendered its decision with fairness.
Under the circumstances, Judge Elumba, despite his protestations to the
contrary, could not be expected to render impartial, independent and objective
judgment on the criminal case of the petitioner. His non-disqualification resulted
in the denial of the petitioners right to due process as the accused. To restore
the right to the petitioner, the proceedings held against him before Judge Elumba
and his ensuing conviction have to be nullified and set aside, and Criminal Case
No. 17446 should be remanded to the RTC for a partial new trial to remove any
of the prejudicial consequences of the violation of the right to due process
A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of
doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and
as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot
objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits
him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of
written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the
peoples faith and confidence in the courts of justice.

It is not disputed that the constitutional right to due process of law cannot
be denied to any accused. The Constitution has expressly ordained that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
An essential part of the right is to be afforded a just and fair trial before his
conviction for any crime. Any violation of the right cannot be condoned, for
the impartiality of the judge who sits on and hears a case, and decides it is
an indispensable requisite of procedural due process.
Thus, the Court annulled the decision rendered by Judge Elumba.

St. Raphael Montessori School v. BPI

Topic: Impartial and Competent Court
Spouses Rolando and Josefina Andaya (Sps. Andaya) are the President and
Vice-President, respectively, of St. Raphael Montessori, Inc. (St. Raphael). From
1994 to 1998, the Spouses Andaya obtained a loan for themselves and on behalf
of St. Raphael, from the Far East Bank and Trust company, now Bank of
Philippine Islands (BPI). As security for the loan, they executed real estate
mortgages- over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-45006.4 They, however, defaulted on their obligation and thus, BPI
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged property.
A Certificate of Sale was then issued and annotated at the back of TCT No.
45006. When the mortgagors failed to redeem the subject property, BPI executed
an Affidavit of Consolidation. Sps Andaya asked for deferment and promised
several undertakings, one of which is they will vacate said subject property,
which, they failed to do. They now contend that said property belongs to them
since BPI no longer possesses the property because the writ of possession was
already implemented.
Thus, it prompted BPI to ask the sheriff of the court for implementation of the writ
of possession that was earlier deferred. St. Raphael issued a motion to cite in
contempt the sheriff and BPI.
On June 25, 2007, the court a quo appointed a special sheriff who implemented
the status quo order. St. Raphael was then placed in possession of the said
subject land. However, upon raising the petition in the CA, it reversed the
decision.
Ruling: (the SC only reminded judge, Im putting the essential paragraph onlyparang side comment lang siya)

On a final note, it must be stressed that when certain actuations of judges

cast doubts as to their motives, the Court deems it imperative to remind
judges of their respective duties of impartiality. The court a quo's judgment,
which not only granted petitioner's Motion to Quash and Third- Party Claim but
went as far as installing petitioner in actual possession of the subject properties
in sheer disregard of established legal pronouncements and on obvious baseless
grounds, raise serious suspicions on the court a quo's intentions. Let this,

therefore, serve as a stern reminder that lower court judges are, at all times,
dutybound to render just, correct and impartial decisions in a manner free
of any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality or integrity.

Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston

Topic: Jurisdiction
On June 15, 1987, Romeo Teston purchased on installment basis from
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) two parcels of land situated in
Mandaon, Masbate. Teston the defaulted in payment of his amortization, thus
DBP rescinded the contract.
DPB soon transferred the two parcels of the land to the government through the
CARP and EO 407. Meanwhile, it turned out that Teston, had voluntarily offered
the two parcels of land for inclusion in the CARP.
Respondent- Teston
On September 18, 1995, respondent filed before the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Regional Office in Legazpi City a Petition
against DBP and the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), alleging that
under Republic Act No. 6657, his obligation to DBP was assumed by the
government through the Land after the two parcels of land became covered by
CARP, and that operation of said law extinguished DBPs right to rescind sale.
Petitioner- DBP
DBP alleged that, among other things, since respondent had not acquired title to
the two parcels of land, he had no right to voluntarily offer them to the CARP.
The DARAB Regional Adjudicator contended that DBP is still the owner of the
land. On appeal, DARAB affirmed the regional adjudicators decision. In the CAs
it reversed the decision of DARAB and asked DBP to return to Teston the alleged
down payment.
Issue:
Whether, the CA erred in rendering its decision in favor of Teston and asking DBP
to return the down payment Teston paid
Ruling:
Yes, CA erred in rendering the decision.
In Jose Clavano, Inc. v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, this Court

held:
x x x It is elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by,
both
pleadings and evidence, and must be in accordance with theory of
action on which the pleadings are framed and the case was tried. The judgment
must be secudum allegata et probata.
Due process considerations justify the requirement laid down in the case of
Clavano. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief
sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords opposing party an
opportunity to be heard with respect to proposed relief. The fundamental
purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide
the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant
Thus, it is improper for the CA to ask DBP to return the down payment that
Teston paid to the said bank since it was not stated in the pleading.

Bucal v. Bucal
Topic: Jurisdiction
Petitioner Cherith Bucal and Manny Bucal were married on July 29, 2005 and
have a daughter Francheska who was born in November. On May 7, 2010,
Cherith filed a Petition for Issuance of a Protection Order (TPO) based on RA
9262 (VAWC). She alleged that Manny never showed love and care of a
husband, nor supported their family due to Mannys alcoholism.
RTC in her favor issued TPO. Moreover, Manny was given visitation rights every
Saturday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., with instruction that Francheska be brought
to his residence by Cheriths relatives.
Anticipating the expiration of the TPO, Cherith filed an Ex- Parte Motion for
Extension and/or Renewal of the Temporary Restraining Order14 (Motion) on
June 10, 2010, which further sought a clarification of the visitation rights granted
to Manny. RTC then granted Cheriths motion and made the clarification
regarding the visitation rights of Manny. Cherith then filed an Ex-Parte Motion to
amend the visitation rights of Manny, contending that it defeats the purpose of
the TRO. RTC then made new terms regarding the visitation rights of Manny.
Dissatisfied Cherith raised the case in the CA; the court then dismissed the
petition.
Issue:
The essential issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
dismissing Cheriths certiorari petition, thus, affirming the June 22, 2010 and
November 23, 2010 RTC Orders granting visitation rights to Manny.
Ruling:
Yes, the CA erred in dismissing the petition.
It is well -settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings
or in excess of what is being sought by a party to a case. 46 The rationale for the
rule was explained in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter

an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent
notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with
respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement
that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to
prevent surprise to the defendant
The records do not show that Manny prayed for visitation rights. While he was
present during the hearing for the issuance of the TPO and PPO, he neither
manifested nor filed any pleading which would indicate that he was seeking for
such relief.
Thus, the Court granted Cheriths petition.

Republic of the Philippines v. Mupas

Topic: Hearing
(hello, I didnt read the case kasi 148 pages siya + I have Cudia with 126 pages, I
took the important part na lang sa concept. Sorry)

IMPORTANT CONCEPTS RELATED TO HEARING:

Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

xxxx
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence, and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials
or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be
continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless
extended by the Chief Justice.
Since Takenaka and Asahikosan filed an ordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 41 in
relation to Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, the CA could only have admitted newly
discovered evidence. Contrary to Takenaka and Asahikosans claim, the
attachments to the motions are not newly discovered evidence. Newly
discovered evidence is evidence that could not, with reasonable diligence, have
been discovered and produced at the trial, and which, if presented, would
probably alter the result.

SEC v. Universal Rightfield Property Holdings Inc.

Topic: Hearing
Respondent Universal Rightfield Property Holdings, Inc. (URPHI) is a corporation
duly registered and existing under the Philippine Laws, and is engaged in the
business of providing residential and leisure-related needs and wants of the
middle and upper middle-income market.
May 29, 2003, petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), through
its Corporate Finance Department, issued an Order revoking URPHI's
Registration of Securities and Permit to Sell Securities to the Public for its failure
to timely file its Year 2001 Annual Report and Year 2002 1st, 2nd and 3rd
Quarterly Reports pursuant to Section 173 of the Securities Regulation Code
(SRC), Republic Act No. 8799.
URPHI filed a motion, which was granted by SEC. However petitioner failed to
accomplish such. In a notice of hearing on June 25, 2004, SEC directed URPHI
to show cause why SEC should not cancel its registration. During the scheduled
hearing on July 6, 2004, URPHI, through its Chief Accountant, Rhodora
Lahaylahay, informed the SEC why it failed to submit the reportorial
requirements.
SEC then suspended URPHIs registration, petitioners appealed however SEC
denied the petition.
The issue was raised in the CA; it then granted URPHIs petition and set asides
SECs decision after finding that URPHI was not afforded due process because
no due notice was given and no hearing was conducted before its registration of
securities and permit to sell them to the public was revoked.
The CA noted that the hearing conducted on July 6, 2004 was only for the
purpose of determining whether URPHI's registration and permit to sell should be
suspended and not whether said registration should be revoked.
Issue:
Whether a hearing was conducted in favor of petitioner

Ruling:
Yes, a hearing was conducted.
SEC points out that URPHI was duly notified of its violations and the
corresponding penalty that may be imposed should it fail to submit the required
reports, and was given more than enough time to comply before the Order of
Revocation was issued. The SEC adds that a hearing was conducted on July 6,
2004 as to URPHI's repeated failure to submit the reportorial requirements as
mandated by the SRC and its implementing rules and regulations, which was the
basis in issuing the said Order.
The Court has consistently held that the essence of due process is simply
an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Any seeming defect
in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration, and
denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has
had the opportunity to be heard on such motion. What the law prohibits is
not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and
the lack of opportunity to be heard.
In the said petition, URPHI had the opportunity to be heard. It is their own act of
negligence that led to the revocation of their registration.
Note:
In A.Z. Arnaiz, Realty, Inc. v. Office of the President,
The Court held that due process, as a constitutional precept, does not
always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may
be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers,
memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due process that must be
met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long
as fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for
being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a
case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence
submitted by the parties.

Acampado v. Sps. Comilla

Topic: Hearing
The present petition stems from the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of
Document filed by respondents against petitioners before the RTC of Kalibo,
Aklan, Branch 6. In their Amended Complaint6 docketed as SPL. Civil Case No.
6644, respondents Spouses Cosmilla alleged that the sale of their share on the
subject property was effected thru a forged Special Power of Attorney (SPA) and
is therefore null and void. RTC then dismissed the complaint.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 on 6 May 2005
seeking for the reversal of the earlier RTC Decision.
For failure of the respondents, however, to comply with the requirement of notice
of hearing as required under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the court a quo denied the Motion for Reconsideration
CA then dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition
Ruling:
Petition granted.
The Motion for Reconsideration is a contentious motion that needs to
comply with the required notice and hearing and service to the adverse
party as mandated by the following provisions of the Revised Rules of Court:
RULE 15. SEC. 4. Hearing ofmotion. - Except for motions which the court may
act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion
shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
The foregoing requirements -- that the notice shall be directed to the parties
concerned, and shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion -- are
mandatory, and if not religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro forma. A
motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has

no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon. The logic for
such requirement is simple: a motion invariably contains a prayer which the
movant makes to the court which is usually in the interest of the adverse party to
oppose. The notice of hearing to the adverse party is therefore a form of
due process; it gives the other party the opportunity to properly vent his
opposition to the prayer of
the movant. In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a
motion which not afford the adverse party a chance to oppose should
simply be disregarded. Principles of natural justice demand that a right of a
party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.
In this case, the petitioners were not give an ample time to explain their side.
Thus, they were deprived of their right to due process.

Manila Mining Coporation v. Amor

Topic: Appeal
Respondents Lowito Amor, Rollybie Ceredon, Julius Cesar, Ronito Martinez and
Fermin Tabili, Jr. were regular employees of petitioner Manila Mining Corporation,
a domestic corporation which operated a mining claim in Placer, Surigao del
Norte, in pursuit of its business of large-scale open-pit mining for gold and copper
ore. A tailing pond was entrusted to the petitioners in compliance with existing
laws. They were required to secure a permit, which they failed to acquire, thus,
operations were stopped. Petitioners, informing its employees and the
Department of Labor and Employment Regional Office No. XII (DOLE) of the
temporary suspension of its operations for six months and the temporary lay-off
of two-thirds of its employees. Adversely affected by petitioners continued failure
to resume its operations, respondents filed the complaint for constructive
dismissal and monetary claims.
The NLRC ruled in favor of petitioners, taking into consideration that the
constructive dismissal in view of the suspension od its operations beyond the
sex-month period allowed under the Labor Code.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed its memorandum of appeal before the NLRC and
moved for the reduction of the appeal bond to P100,000.00, on the ground that
its financial losses in the preceding years had rendered it unable to put up one in
cash and/or surety equivalent to the monetary award. In opposition, respondents
moved for the dismissal of the appeal in view of the fact that, despite receipt of
the appealed decision on 24 November 2004, petitioner mailed their copy of the
memorandum of appeal only on 7 February 2005. Respondents also argued that
the appeal bond tendered by petitioner was so grossly disproportionate to
monetary award for the same to be considered substantial compliance with the
requirements for the perfection of an appeal from a Labor Arbiters decision.
Without addressing the procedural issue, the fifth division of NLRC reversed the
decision of the labor arbiter.
In the CA, it granted the petition of the respondents, contending that the
petitioners did not perfect the appeal.
Issue:

Whether the CA erred in rendering the decision in favor of respondents.

Ruling:
No, the CA did not err in rendering such decision.
The petitioners contention is untenable. Time and again, it has been held that
the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and
in accordance with the provisions of law. A party who seeks to avail of the
right must, therefore, comply with the requirements of the rules, failing
which the right to appeal is invariably lost. Insofar as appeals from decisions
of the Labor Arbiter are concerned,
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, the same provision
mandates that, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company
duly accredited by the [NLRC] in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from.
Viewed in the light of the foregoing considerations, the CA cannot be faulted for
no longer discussing the merits of petitioners case. Although appeal is an
essential part of our judicial process, it has been held, time and again, that the
right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a
statutory privilege. Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure
of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final
and executory. Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case
and can no longer be revised, reviewed, changed or altered. The basic rule of
finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and
sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the
award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by
law.

Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan
Topic: Appeal

Petitioners Reynaldo Jaylo (Jaylo), William Valenzona (Valenzona) and Antonio

Habalo (Habalo), together with Edgardo Castro (Castro),4 were officers of the
Philippine National Police Western Police District placed on special detail with
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
In June of 1990, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (US DEA)
approached the NBI with information on the sale of a considerable amount of
heroin in the Philippines. Jaylo was assigned by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim to
head the team that would conduct a buy-bust operation with the aid of US DEA
undercover agent Philip Needham (Needham).
Two versions of the incident were given by the prosecution and the defense.
Then President Aquino, issued an order forming the Elma Committee to
investigate.
After the completion of the investigation, the committee
recommended the prosecution of Jaylo.
In the Sandiganbayan, Jaylo etal where convicted of the crime of homicide.
The counsel of Jaylo filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision of
the Sandiganbayan. However, he Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion
and ordered the implementation of the warrants for the arrest of the convicted
accused. The court ruled that the 15-day period from the promulgation of the
judgment had long lapsed without any of the accused giving any justifiable cause
for their absence during the promulgation. Under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court, Jaylo, Valenzona and Habalo have lost the remedies available
under the Rules against the Sandiganbayans judgment of conviction, including
the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
Thus, this petition.
Issue:

Whether the petitioners were not afforded with their right to due process due to
the dismissal of the Sandiganbayan in their MR.

Ruling:

Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory

grant or privilege. As a statutory right, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with and in the manner
provided by law. Thus, a party filing a motion for reconsideration must
strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
It bears stressing that the provision on which petitioners base their claim states
that [a] petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed
within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or
judgment. In Social Security Commission v. Court of Appeals, we enunciated
that the term may denotes a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option.
Those granted this opportunity may choose to exercise it or not. If they do, they
must comply with the conditions attached thereto.
Aside from the condition that a motion for reconsideration must be filed within 15
days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment, the movant must also
comply with the conditions laid down in the Rules of Court, which applies to all
cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners did not surrender within 15 days from the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction. Neither did they ask for leave of court to avail themselves
of the remedies, and state the reasons for their absence. Even if we were to
assume that the failure of Jaylo to appear at the promulgation was due to failure
to receive notice thereof, it is not a justifiable reason. He should have filed a
notice of change of address before the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking cognizance of the Motion for Partial
Reconsideration filed by counsel for petitioners. While the motion was filed on 30
April 2007, it did not operate to regain the standing of petitioners in court.

Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan

Topic: Nuisance
Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building
permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in
Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism
Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioners
application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the no
build zone demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131.
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow
up, no action was ever taken by the respondent mayor.
A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining
the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of
Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of
Boracay West Coves hotel.
EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more
instances followed wherein respondents demolished the improvements
introduced by Boracay West Cove.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA
Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion

Contentions of West Cove:

1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se,
given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture.
2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before
proceeding with the demolition.

Contention of the Mayor: The demolition needed no court order because the
municipal mayor has the express power under the Local Government Code
(LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed buildings
The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ
of certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in
the exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions,
certiorari will not lie.

ISSUE:
Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the LGU can
order the closure and demolition of the property in question.

HELD:
The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance per
se which can therefore be summarily abated. Here, it is merely the hotels
particular incident, its location and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a
nuisance. Otherwise stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone,
Boracay West Cove could have secured the necessary permits without issue. As
such, even if the hotel is not a nuisance per se, it is still a nuisance per accidens
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance
unless such a thing is a nuisance per se. Despite the hotels classification
as a nuisance per accidens, however, the LGU may nevertheless properly
order the hotels demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police
power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be
subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government. Moreover, the Local Government Code authorizes city and
municipal governments, acting through their local chief executives, to
issue demolition orders. The office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers
to order the closing and demolition of establishments.

Brown Madonna Press Inc. v. Casas

Topic: Administrative Due Process

On May 1, 1984, Casas was hired as an accounting clerk at Fortune General

Insurance, a member of the ALC Group of Companies. She eventually rose from
the ranks; on December 1, 2003, she was transferred to Brown Madonna Press
Inc. (BMPI), another ALC member company, as its Vice President for Finance
and Administration.
On January 5, 2007, Casas met with Cabangon, BMPIs company president, and
Victoria Nava (Nava), the Vice President for the Central Human Resource
Department of the ALC Group of Companies. During the meeting, Casas was
allegedly told not to report to work anymore starting January 8, 2007, upon the
instructions of Cabangon-Chua, ALCs Chairman Emeritus. Casas claims that the
reason for her abrupt dismissal was not disclosed to her, but she was promised a
separation pay. She thus packed her things and left.
Petitioner:
They asserted that it was Casas who gracefully exit from the company. The
meeting was supposedly held to confront Casas about certain complaints against
her, and about the growing rift between her and another company officer. BMPI
asserts that Casas opted to leave the company to avoid an administrative
investigation against her and to give her the chance to jumpstart her career
outside the company. She succeeded in convincing Cabangon to grant her some
form of financial assistance as they were friends.
Respondent:
However, Casas asserts that it was BMPI who fired her. Thus, she filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of separation pay, back wages,
retirement benefits and attys fees.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed Casas petition for lack of merit.
However, the NLRC reversed the decision of the labor arbiter. The NLRC
asserted the dismissal of Casas is without just cause and did not have the
benefits of due process.

The CA affirmed NLRCs decision.

Issue:
Whether the dismissal of Casas was without just cause and violated the
procedural due process.
Ruling:
There is no doubt that the procedural requirement had not been complied.
According to the NLRC, despite the serious allegations that the BMPI lodged
against Casas, it never asked her to explain her acts, and instead opted to sever
its employment relations with her. On this basis alone, the NLRC concluded that
Casas dismissal had been illegal and non-compliant with procedural due
process.
The CA affirmed this conclusion by pointing out that Casas had been dismissed
prior to any probe on her reported violation of company rules and regulations
In determining whether an employees dismissal had been legal, the inquiry
focuses on whether the dismissal violated his right to substantial and
procedural due process. An employees right not to be dismissed without
just or authorized cause as provided by law, is covered by his right to
substantial due process. Compliance with procedure provided in the Labor
Code, on the other hand, constitutes the procedural due process right of an
employee
The violation of either the substantial due process right or the procedural
due process right of an employee produces different results. Termination
without a just or authorized cause renders the dismissal invalid, and
entitles the employee to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the
compensation was not paid up to the time of actual reinstatement.
An employees removal for just or authorized cause but without complying
with the proper procedure, on the other hand, does not invalidate the
dismissal. It obligates the erring employer to pay nominal damages to the
employee, as penalty for not complying with the procedural requirements
of due process