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V.

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

A. Concept: Art. 247

ART. 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and

procedure for prosecution thereof. - Unfair
labor practices violate the constitutional right
of
workers
and
employees
to
selforganization, are inimical to the legitimate
interests of both labor and management,
including their right to bargain collectively
and otherwise deal with each other in an
atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect,
disrupt industrial peace and hinder the
promotion of healthy and stable labormanagement relations.
Consequently, unfair labor practices are not
only violations of the civil rights of both labor
and management but are also criminal
offenses against the State which shall be
subject to prosecution and punishment as
herein provided.
Subject to the exercise by the President or by
the Secretary of Labor and Employment of the
powers vested in them by Articles 263 and
264 of this Code, the civil aspects of all cases
involving unfair labor practices, which may
include claims for actual, moral, exemplary
and other forms of damages, attorneys fees
and other affirmative relief, shall be under the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters. The Labor
Arbiters shall give utmost priority to the
hearing and resolution of all cases involving
unfair labor practices. They shall resolve such
cases within thirty (30) calendar days from
the time they are submitted for decision.
Recovery of civil liability in the administrative
proceedings shall bar recovery under the Civil
Code.
No criminal prosecution under this Title may
be instituted without a final judgment finding
that an unfair labor practice was committed,
having been first obtained in the preceding
paragraph. During the pendency of such
administrative proceeding, the running of the
period of prescription of the criminal offense
herein
penalized
shall
be
considered
interrupted: Provided, however, that the final
judgment in the administrative proceedings
shall not be binding in the criminal case nor
be considered as evidence of guilt but merely
as proof of compliance of the requirements
therein set forth. (As amended by Batas
Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980 and later
further amended by Section 19, Republic Act
No. 6715, March 21, 1989).

Reviewer Labor 2: ULP, Relevant Laws and Cases

B. Unfair
Labor
Practices
Employers: Art. 248, 261

of

Chapter II
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers.
- It shall be unlawful for an employer to
commit any of the following unfair labor
practice:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization;
-very
broad, the examples what is the er
thinking hr nec carries unnec wt these
questions are innocent, but wld have to
depend on the tenor, history
At the same time it could really be an
innocent thing, what if the ee really
knows that the hr is just trying to avoid
that
(b) To require as a condition of employment
that a person or an employee shall not join a
labor organization or shall withdraw from one
to which he belongs;
(c) To contract out services or functions
being performed by union members
when such will interfere with, restrain
or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights to self-organization;
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise
interfere with the formation or administration
of any labor organization, including the
giving of financial or other support to it or its
organizers or supporters; note even if you initiated it as the er you
cannot do this (the er cant be allowed to
meddle it
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages,
hours of work and other terms and conditions
of employment in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor
organization. Nothing in this Code or in any
other law shall stop the parties from
requiring membership in a recognized
collective bargaining agent as a condition for
employment, except those employees who
are already members of another union at the
time of the signing of the collective
bargaining agreement. Employees of an
appropriate bargaining unit who are not
members of the recognized collective
bargaining agent may be assessed a
reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and

Ms. Rina Diaz-Samson

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other fees paid by members of the
recognized collective bargaining agent, if
such non-union members accept the benefits
under the collective bargaining agreement:
Provided, that the individual authorization
required under Article 242, paragraph (o) of
this Code shall not apply to the nonmembers of the recognized collective
bargaining agent;

Agreement, except those which are gross in

character, shall no longer be treated as
unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as
grievances under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross
violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement
shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal
to comply with the economic provisions of
such agreement.

(f) To dismiss, discharge or otherwise

prejudice
or
discriminate
against
an
employee for having given or being about to
give testimony under this Code;

The Commission, its Regional Offices and the

Regional Directors of the Department of Labor
and Employment shall not entertain disputes,
grievances or matters under the exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator
or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall
immediately dispose and refer the same to
the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary
Arbitration
provided
in
the
Collective
Bargaining Agreement

(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively

as prescribed by this Code;
(h) To pay negotiation or attorneys fees to
the union or its officers or agents as part of
the settlement of any issue in collective
bargaining or any other dispute; or
Sir: feather bedding like lagay
(i) To violate a collective bargaining
agreement. not anymore true under
labor practice, if only they are blatant,
flagrant, gross and if the nature is for
economic cause
Note: in relation to no strike, no lockout
- also for economic cause but (I) it
must be gross, blatant and flagrant
Economic cause for the rules of the ers
for the use of the pecuniary benefits
given to the ees
The provisions of the preceding paragraph
notwithstanding, only the officers and agents
of corporations, associations or partnerships
who have actually participated in, authorized
or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held
criminally liable. (As amended by Batas
Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981).
ART. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators
or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. - The
Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved
grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies referred to in the
immediately preceding article. Accordingly,
violations
of
a
Collective
Bargaining

Reviewer Labor 2: ULP, Relevant Laws and Cases

CASES:
Insular Life Assurance Co.
Employees Association v.
Insular Life Assurance Co., 37
SCRA 244 (Azucena pg 287)
The co president sent individual letters
to the striking ees urging them to
abandon their strike with a promise of
free coffee and movies and paid ot. He
also warned them that if they failed to
return to work by a certain date, they
might be repalaced in their jobs. Aside
from this, company-hired men broke into
the picket line, resulting in violence and
filing criminal charges against some
union officers and members. When the
strike was over, the co refuse to readmit
the unionists facing criminal charges.
Held:
Letter to ind ees is an act of
interference for the er to send letters to
all ees notifying them to return to work
at a time specified therein, otherwise
new ees wld be engaged to perform their
jobs. Ind solicitation of the ees or
visiting their homes, w/the er or his rep
urgint he ees to cease union activity
Steam and Navigation v.
Philippine Marine Officers
Guild, 15 SCRA 174

Ms. Rina Diaz-Samson

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Interrogating an ee as to his union
affiliation is not per se ULP but
circumstances may make it such.
EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE; RIGHT OF EMPLOYER TO
INTERROGATE ITS EMPLOYEES AS TO THEIR
UNION AFFILIATION. The rule in this
jurisdiction is that subjection by the company
of its employees to a series of questioning
regarding their membership in the union or
their union activities, in such a way as to
hamper the exercise of free choice on their
part, constitutes unfair labor practice (Scoty's
Department Store vs. Micaller; 52 Off. Gaz.,
5119).
STRIKES; REINSTATEMENT OF STRIKING
EMPLOYEES. The striking employees are
entitled to reinstatement, whether or not, the
strike was the consequence of the employer's
unfair labor practice, unless, where the strike
was not the consequence of any unfair labor
practice, the employer has hired others to
take the place of the strikers and has
promised them continued employment
(Cromwell Commercial Employees and
Laborers Union (PTUC) vs. C.I.R., et el., L19778, September 30, 1964, citing 2 Teller,
LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING, Sec. 371, pp. 996-997).
WHEN EMPLOYER BOUND TO REINSTATE
STRIKERS. Even if the employer hires
others to replace the strikers, thereby
avoiding paralysis of his business, if the strike
is against an unfair labor practice on its part,
the employer is bound to reinstate the
strikers.
VOLUNTARY OFFER: TO RETURN TO WORK
WITHOUT ANY CONDITION, WHEN RELEVANT.
A voluntary offer to return to work without
any condition is relevant only to the question
of payment of back wages in addition to
reinstatement. Since in these cases no back
wages were awarded, and the union has not
appealed, said

Visayan Bicyle Manufacturing

Co. v. National Labor Union, 14
SCRA 5 (pg 286 Azucena)
2 ees were dismissed for a violation of a
companys rule against fights in the
premises or during working hours. It
appears, however that said ees , who

Reviewer Labor 2: ULP, Relevant Laws and Cases

were union officers, were provoked into

a fight by 2 recently hired ees. It was
shown that they were provoked to fight
because the company wanted to create
an apparently lawful for their dismissal.
The dismissed ees, in fact, had not
figured in similar incidents before or
violated company rules in their many
years w/the company. This strategy of
the company the court ruled, is ULP
DENIAL OF MOTION TO EXTEND PERIOD TO
FILE ARGUMENTS NOT ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The denial by the Court of Industrial
Relations of a motion to extend the 10-day
period to file arguments in support of a
motion for reconsideration, pursuant to its
standing rule against such extension, does
not constitute abuse of discretion.
LABOR PRACTICE; DISMISSAL BECAUSE OF
UNION ACTIVITIES Facts: Two employees
were dismissed for violation of a company
rule against fights in the premises or during
working hours. It appears, however, that said
employees, who were union officers, were
provoked into a prearranged fight by two
recently hired employees pursuant to a
strategy of the company designed to provide
an apparently lawful cause for their dismissal,
and said dismissed employees bad not figured
in similar incidents before or violated
company rules in their many years with the
company.
Judric Canning Corp. v. Inciong,
115 SCRA 887
First ULP: Interference (Art. 248 (A))
Interference with employee organizational
rights were found where the superintendent of
the employer threatened the employees with
cutting their pay increasing rent of the
company houses, or closing the plant if they
supported the union and where the employer
encouraged the employees to sign a petition
repudiating the union
ULP Even Before Union is Registered
Judric Canning Corporation v. Inciong,
GR No. L-51494, 19 August 1982
Petitioner er claimed that it could not have
committed unfair labor practice in dismissing
some of its ees allegedly due to their union
activities because the dismissal took place
more than four months before the unions
organizational meeting and more than a year

Ms. Rina Diaz-Samson

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before its registration. In short, mgt
contended that it could not commit ULP while
there was no union yet.

jobs but were dismissed because of their

union activities, is a finding of fact which
may not be disturbed by the Supreme Court.

Held: the contention is w/o merit.

Under Art. 248 (a) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in their exercise of their
right to self organization is an unfair labor
practice on the part of the employer.
Paragraph (d) of said Article also considers it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to
initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise
interfere the formation or administration of
any labor organization, including the giving of
financial or other support to it. In this
particular case, the private respondents were
dismissed, or their services were terminated,
because they were soliciting signatures in
order to form a union within the plant.

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE; ARBITRARY

DISMISSAL; OFFER TO PAY SEVERANCE PAY
DESPITE POSITION THAT EMPLOYEE
ABANDONED WORK, AN ADMISSION OF.
The petitioner-employer stated that in spite
of its position that the private respondents
had abandoned their jobs, it "offered to pay
respondent union members severance pay of
one (1) month." This is a clear admission of
the charge of arbitrary dismissal, for why
should the petitioner offer to pay what it calls
"severance pay'' if the private respondents
were not, indeed, dismissed, or if the
petitioner sincerely believed in the
righteousness of his stance?

Facts: Individual private respondents are

employees of petitioner corporation and are
members of respondent union. Said private
respondents were allegedly not allowed to
report for work due to their union activities in
soliciting membership in a union yet to be
organized. As a result, they and respondent
union filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice against the petitioner with the
Ministry of Labor. The petitioner denied
having locked out the respondents and
claimed that respondents abandoned their
positions. After hearing, the Labor Regional
Director found respondent employees'
dismissal without valid cause and ordered
petitioner to reinstate them with full
backwages. Petitioner's appeal to the Ministry
of Labor was dismissed for lack of merit and a
writ of execution was issued. In a petition for
certiorari filed with the Supreme Court,
petitioner corporation prayed for issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enforce the
writ of execution.
The Supreme Court DISMISSED the petition
and lifted the temporary restraining order. It
held that the Regional Director had found
dismissal to be due to respondent's union
activities amounting to unfair labor practice, a
finding of fact which may not be disturbed
and this finding is the basis for the Regional
Director's conclusion that respondents were
dismissed without valid cause.
PETITION FOR REVIEW; DECISIONS OF
MINISTRY OF LABOR; FINDINGS OF FACT MAY
NOT BE DISTURBED ON REVIEW. The
finding of the respondent Regional Director,
after the parties had submitted their
respective position papers and a hearing was
held, that respondents did not abandon their

Reviewer Labor 2: ULP, Relevant Laws and Cases

INTERFERING WITH FORMATION OF UNION.

Under Article 248(a) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, "to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in their exercise of the
right to self-organization" is an unfair labor
practice on the pan of the employer.
Paragraph (d) of said Article also considers it
an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise
interfere with the formation or administration
of any labor organization, including the
giving of financial or other support to it. In
this particular case, the private respondents
were dismissed, or their services were
terminated, because they were soliciting
signatures in order to form a union within the
plant. For sure, the petitioner corporation is
guilty of unfair labor practice in interfering
with the formation of a labor union and
retaliating against the employee's exercise of
their right to self-organization.
DISMISSAL WITHOUT JUST CAUSE, NOT A
CASE OF WHERE PRIOR CLEARANCE NOT
REQUIRED BY LABOR CODE IMPLEMENTING
RULES; CASE AT BAR. Under Section 1,
Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Labor Code, prior
clearance with the Ministry of Labor is not
necessary in this case since private
respondents have been employed with the
petitioner corporation for less than one (1)
year. However, the questioned order finding
the dismissal of the private respondents to
be without just cause is not based upon such
absence of prior clearance alone. The error of
the Regional Director in stating that the
dismissal of private respondents was without
just cause in view of the absence of prior
clearance from the Ministry of Labor is, thus

Ms. Rina Diaz-Samson

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not sufficient to warrant a reversal of the
questioned order.
Manila Hotel Co. v. Pines Hotel
Employees Association, 47
SCRA 88
Discrimination in Bonus Allocation or
Salary Adjustments
There is unfair and unjust discrimination in
the granting of salary adjustments where
the evidence shows that (a) the
management paid the employees of the
unionized branch; (b) where salary
adjustments were granted to employees of
one of its non - unionized branches although
it was losing in its operations; and (c) the
total salary adjustments given every ten of
its unionize employees would not even
equal the salary adjustments given one
employee in the non unionized branch.
(Manila Hotel Company v. Pines Hotel
Employees Assn. (CUGCO) and CIR, G.R.
No. L-30818, 28 September 1972)
Discrimination in Layoff or Dismissal
Even where business conditions justified a
layoff of employees, unfair labor practices in
the form of discriminatory dismissal were
found where only unionists were
permanently dismissed while non unionists
were not.
Test of Discrimination
For the purpose of determining whether or
not a discharge is discriminatory, it is
necessary that the underlying reason for the
discharge be established.
The fact that a lawful cause for discharge
is available is not a defense where the
employee is actually discharged because of
his union activities. If the discharge is
actually motivated by a lawful reason, the
fact that the employee is engaged in union
activities at the time will not lie against the
employer and prevent him from the exercise
of his business judgment to discharge an
employee for cause. (NLRB v. Ace Comb Co.,
342 F. 2 841)
INDUSTRIAL PEACE ACT; UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE; DISCRIMINATORY DISTRIBUTION
OF CHRISTMAS BONUS; RELIEF GRANTED IN
INSTANT CASE. Where petitioner was
found guilty of discrimination amounting to
unfair labor practice in the granting of the
1965 Christmas bonus to the employees of
the Manila Hotel the Taal Vista and the Pines
Hotel, and such exercise of discretion had
no factual basis, the Court of Industrial

Reviewer Labor 2: ULP, Relevant Laws and Cases

Relations' order that petitioner distribute the

bonus pro rota among all its employees
regardless of their place of work, was
proper, and was but a proper exercise of its
power under Section 5 of the Industrial
Peace Act to grant affirmative relief
whenever it has adjudged the existence of
an unfair labor practice.
DISCRIMINATORY GRANTING OF SALARY
ADJUSTMENTS; RELIEF GRANTED IN INSTANT
CASE. Where petitioner granted 8
employees at the Manila office a total of
P18,000 in salary adjustments for the fiscal
year July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966, whereas
80 regular employees of Pines Hotel were
granted only an aggregate salary
adjustment of P15,000 for the same period,
the CIR's finding petitioner guilty of unfair
and unjust discrimination in the granting of
salary adjustments, was correct. Hence,
without in any way turning down or
modifying the increases and high salary
adjustments which petitioner saw fit to
grant to its Manila office employees,
respondent court correctly removed the
unfair discrimination by granting the
corresponding affirmative relief to the Pines
Hotel employees through ordering the
payment to them by petitioner of the new
minimum monthly salary of P180.00 for
monthly-paid employees to which they were
entitled under Republic Act 4180.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE; CLAIM NOT
EXTINGUISHED BY AGREEMENT IN INSTANT
CASE. The agreement as to the payment
of gratuity and/or termination pay to the
employees and the resolution to deposit
P200,000.00 for the purpose of said
settlement and by virtue of which cases
pending against MHCo., NDA and Resort
Hotels Corporation and its officials shall be
withdrawn by the Pines Hotel Employees
Ass'n. and the lifting of picket lines at the
Pines Hotel did not extinguish the claim in
instant case. The union did withdraw its
complaint for continued employment of its
members despite the sale of the Pines Hotel
and it did lift the picket line, leaving the new
owner to go freely about its business. The
case itself had to remain for implementation
in turn of petitioner's undertaking to pay
retirement gratuity to all the 86 Pines Hotel
employees who had lost their jobs, and this
is exactly what respondent court has done
through its December 5, 1968 payment
order.
CLAIM FOR REINSTATEMENT EVIDENCED BY
FILING OF INJUNCTION. It is obvious that

Ms. Rina Diaz-Samson

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its claim that the union members sought no
reinstatement has no factual basis in the
record. The union precisely sought an
injunction against the abrupt termination of
its members and claimed that they were
entitled to continued employment as
guaranteed by their collective bargaining
agreement.
ISSUE THAT ONLY UNION COUNSEL "FILED
UNFAIR" LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE
IRRELEVANT WHERE THERE IS SETTLEMENT.
Where no prejudice could be said to have
been caused to petitioner by the filing of the
unfair labor practice charge by the union
counsel with respondent court, for the very
merit of the union complaint is borne out by
the fact that the parties promptly arrived at
a satisfactory settlement thereof upon
petitioner's undertaking to pay retirement
gratuity to all 86 affected employees,
petitioner's claim that the union counsel
could not file such unfair labor practice
charge directly with the CIR, loses
relevance.
PAYMENT OF GRATUITY DIRECTLY BY THE
COURT, IMPROPER. Payment of the
retirement gratuity to the employees
directly through the respondent court from
the amount therein deposited by petitioner
(and not through the GSIS in accordance
with the usual practice) might disregard and
not take into account "some
accountabilities" and "outstanding
obligation" of said employees.
PAYMENT ORDER BY CIR TO EMPLOYEES
WITH LESS THAN 20 YEARS OF SERVICE IN L30818. Respondent court in issuing the
appealed payment order to employees with
less than 20 years of service was but acting
within its jurisdiction properly assumed of
implementing the very agreement and
settlement for payment of retirement
gratuity arrived at by the parties in the case
before it.
Wise and Co., Inc. v. Wise and
Co., Inc. Employees Union, Oct.
13, 1989 (pg 279. Azucena)
Issue: Whether the grant by mgt of profitsharing benefits to its ees who are nonunion members is discriminatory against the
union members. Is the act of discrimination
amounting to ULP?
Held: There can be no discrimination
committed by the employer as the situation

Reviewer Labor 2: ULP, Relevant Laws and Cases

of the union employees is different from that

of the non-union employees. Discrimination
per se is not unlawful. There can be no
discrimination where the employees
concerned are not similarly situated.
The grant by the employer of profit
sharing benefits to the employees outside
the bargaining unit falls under the ambit of
its managerial prerogative. It appears to
have been done in good faith and without
ulterior motive.
; CBA; PROFIT SHARING PRIVILEGE;
CONFERMENT OF BENEFIT TO NON-UNION
MEMBERS, NOT AN ACT OF DISCRIMINATION.
Under the CBA between the parties that
was in force and effect from May 1, 1985 to
April 30, 1988 it was agreed that the
"bargaining unit" covered by the CBA
"consists of all regular or permanent
employees, below the rank of assistant
supervisor." Also expressly excluded from
the term "appropriate bargaining unit" are
all regular rank and file employees in the
office of the president, vice-president, and
the other offices of the company
personnel office, security office, corporate
affairs office, accounting and treasury
department. It is to this class of employees
who were excluded in the "bargaining unit"
and who do not derive benefits from the
CBA that the profit sharing privilege was
extended by petitioner. There can be no
discrimination committed by petitioner
thereby as the situation of the union
employees are different and distinct from
the non-union employees.
NO DISCRIMINATION COMMITTED IF THE
EMPLOYEES CONCERNED ARE NOT
SIMILARLY SITUATED. Discrimination per
se is not unlawful. There can be no
discrimination where the employees
concerned are not similarly situated.
Respondent union can not claim that there
is grave abuse of discretion by the petitioner
in extending the benefits of profit sharing to
the non-union employees as they are two
(2) groups not similarly situated. These nonunion employees are not covered by the
CBA. They do not derive and enjoy the
benefits under the CBA.
EMPLOYMENT; PREROGATIVE OF
MANAGEMENT TO REGULATE ALL ASPECTS
OF EMPLOYMENT AND CONDUCT OF ITS
BUSINESS. The Court holds that it is the
prerogative of management to regulate,
according to its discretion and judgment, all
aspects of employment. This flows from the
established rule that labor law does not

Ms. Rina Diaz-Samson

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authorize the substitution of the judgment
of the employer in the conduct of its
business. Such management prerogative
may be availed of without fear of any
liability so long as it is exercised in good
faith for the advancement of the employers'
interest and not for the purpose of defeating
or circumventing the rights of employees
under special laws or valid agreement and
are not exercised in a malicious, harsh,
oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner or
out of malice or spite.
GRANT OF PROFIT SHARING BENEFITS TO
THOSE OUTSIDE THE "BARGAINING UNIT",
WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ITS MANAGERIAL
PREROGATIVE. The grant by petitioner of
profit sharing benefits to the employees
outside the "bargaining unit" falls under the
ambit of its managerial prerogative. It
appears to have been done in good faith
and without ulterior motive. More so when
as in this case there is a clause in the CBA
where the employees are classified into
those who are members of the union and
those who are not. In the case of the union
members, they derive their benefits from
the terms and conditions of the CBA
contract which constitute the law between
the contracting parties. Both the employer
and the union members are bound by such
agreement.
Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. v.
NLRC, 289 SCRA 86 (1998)
The employer may change the meal
break from 30 mins. fully paid to 60
mins. without pay. For a full one hour
undisturbed lunch break, the employees
can freely and effectively use this hour
not only for eating but also for their
rest and comfort. Since the employees
are no longer required to work during
this 1-hour lunch break, there is no
more
Facts:
Petitioner Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc. is
engaged in the manufacture of automotive
tires, tubes and other rubber products, while
private respondent Sime Darby Salaried
Employees Association is an association of
monthly salaried employees of petitioner at
its Marikina factory, All company workers in
Marikina including members of the private
respondent union worked from 7:45 a.m. to
3:45 p.m. with a 30-minute paid "on call"
lunch break. On August 14, 1992, petitioner
issued a memorandum advising all its

Reviewer Labor 2: ULP, Relevant Laws and Cases

monthly salaried employees in its Marikina

Tire Plant of a change in work schedule. The
new prescribed schedule will be 7:45 A.M.4:45 P.M. (Monday to Friday) and 7:45 A.M.11:45 A.M. (Saturday). Their Coffee
Breaktime was shortened to 10 minutes only
and the company discontinued the 30-minute
paid "on call" lunch break. Aggrieved by the
change, the union filed on behalf of its
members a complaint with the Labor Arbiter
for unfair labor practice, discrimination and
evasion of liability. The Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the change constituted a valid exercise of
management prerogative and did not have
the effect of diminishing the benefits granted
to the workers. On appeal, the NLRC
sustained the Labor Arbiter and dismissed
the appeal. However, upon motion for
reconsideration, the NLRC reversed its own
decision and declared that the new work
schedule deprived the employees a 30minute paid lunch break resulting in an
unjust diminution of company privileges
prohibited by Article 100 of the Labor Code,
as amended. Hence, the present petition.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the NLRC. The Court held that the right to fix
the work schedules of the employees rests
principally on their employer. The new work
schedule fully complies with the daily work
schedule of eight hours without violating the
Labor Code. With the new work schedule, the
employees are now given a one-hour
undisturbed lunch break, the employees can
freely and effectively use this hour not only
for eating but also for their rest and comfort
which are conducive to more efficiency and
better performance in their work. Since the
employees are no longer required to work
during this one-hour break, there is no more
need for them to be compensated for this
period.
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT; WORKING
CONDITIONS AND REST PERIODS; RIGHT TO
FIX WORK SCHEDULE OF EMPLOYEES IS
PREROGATIVE OF EMPLOYER. The right to
fix the work schedules of the employees
rests principally on their employer. In the
instant case petitioner, as the employer,
cites as reason for the adjustment the
efficient conduct of its business operations
and its improved production. It rationalizes
that while the old work schedule included a
30-minute paid lunch break, the employees
could be called upon to do jobs during that
period as they were "on call." Even if
denominated as lunch break, this period
could very well be considered as working

Ms. Rina Diaz-Samson

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time because the factory employees were
required to work if necessary and were paid
accordingly for working. With the new work
schedule, the employees are now given a
one-hour lunch break without interruption
from their employer. For a full one-hour
undisturbed lunch break, the employees can
freely and effectively use this hour not only
for eating but also for their rest and comfort
which are conducive to more efficiency and
better performance in their work. Since the
employees are no longer required to work
during this one-hour break, there is no more
need for them to be compensated for this
period. We agree with the Labor Arbiter that
the new work schedule fully complies with
the daily work period of eight (8) hours
without violating the Labor Code. Besides,
the new schedule applies to all employees in
the factory similarly situated whether they
are union members or not.

Alhambra Industries v. CIR, 35

SCRA 550
INDUSTRIAL PEACE ACT; COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING; EMPLOYER'S DENIAL OF
PRIVILEGES AND BENEFITS OF BARGAINING
COLLECTIVELY CONSTITUTES UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE. Failure on petitioner's part to
live up in good faith to the terms of its
collective bargaining agreement by denying
the privileges and benefits thereof to the
fifteen drivers and helpers through its device
of trying to pass them off as "employees" of
its salesmen and propagandists was a
serious violation of petitioner's duty to
bargain collectively and constituted unfair
labor practice in any language.
DENOMINATION OF ACT IN COMPLAINT
IMMATERIAL. In unfair labor practice cases,
the question is whether the respondent
committed the act charged in the complaint.
If it did, it is of no consequence, either as a
matter of procedure or of substantive law,
what the act is denominated whether as a
restraint, interference or coercion, as some
members of the Court believe it to be, or as a
discriminatory discharge as other members
think it is, or as refusal to bargain as some
other members view it, or even as a
combination of any or all of these.
Balmar Farms v. NLRC, 202
SCRA 648
CERTIFICATION ELECTION; PURPOSE. The
purpose of certification election is to give the
employees true representation in their

Reviewer Labor 2: ULP, Relevant Laws and Cases

collective bargaining with an employer

(Confederation of Citizens Labor Union (CCLU)
v. Noriel 116 SCRA 649 [1982]), because
certification election is the most democratic
and expeditious method by which the laborers
can freely determine the union that shall act
as their representative in their dealing with
the establishment where they are working
(National Association of Free Trade Union v.
Bureau of Labor Relations, 161 SCRA 246
[1988]). It is the most effective way of
determining which labor organization can
truly represent the working force (PLUM
Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers,
v. Noriel, 119 SCRA 299 [1982]). Employees
(like the employees in the case at bar) have a
constitutional right to choose their own
bargaining representative (Phil. Airlines
Employees' Association (PALEA) v. FerrerCalleja, 162 SCRA 246 [1988]) and it is only
through certification election that they can
obtain this purpose.
EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE;
HAS THE DUTY TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
WITH THE EMPLOYER. In the bargaining
process, the workers and employer shall be
represented by their exclusive bargaining
representatives. The labor organization
designated or selected by the majority of
employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit, shall be the exclusive
representative of the employees in such unit
for the purpose of collective bargaining. In the
case at bar, it is the ALU which is the
exclusive bargaining representative of
BALMAR employees and as such it has the
right and duty to bargain collectively with
BALMAR. The duty to bargain collectively
means the performance of a mutual obligation
to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement with respect to
wages, hours of work and all other terms and
conditions or employment including proposals
for adjusting any grievance or questions
arising under such agreement if requested by
either party but such duty does not compel
any party to agree to a proposal or to make
any concession (Art. 252, Labor Code, as
amended).
EMPLOYER'S REFUSAL TO BARGAIN
COLLECTIVELY; CONSTITUTES AN UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE, CASE AT BAR. BALMAR,
cannot also invoke good faith in refusing to
negotiate with ALU, considering that the latter
has been certified as the exclusive bargaining
representative of BALMAR rank and file
employees. As observed by the Solicitor
General, BALMAR's pretense that majority of

Ms. Rina Diaz-Samson

ulp9
its rank and file employees disaffiliated simply
because of a letter it received to that effect,
all the more sustains the finding of bad faith
for it is not for the petitioner BALMAR to
question which group is the collective
bargaining representative of its rank and file
employees. Balmar's taking side with the rank
and file employee who allegedly disaffiliated,
renders its stand on the matter highly
suspicious. It can, therefore, be inferred that
BALMAR's refusal to bargain collectively with
ALU is a clear act of unfair labor practice.
Article 248 (Labor Code, as amended),
enumerates unfair labor practices committed
by employers.
Mabeza v. NLRC, 271 SCRA 670
(1997)

who has to sign out for linen and other hotel

property from the property custodian each
day and who has to account for each and
every towel or bedsheet utilized by the hotel's
guests at the end of her shift would not fall
under any of these two classes of employees
for which loss of confidence, if ably supported
by evidence, would normally apply. Loss of
confidence should not be simulated in order
to justify what would otherwise be, under the
provisions of law an illegal dismissal. "It
should not be used as a subterfuge for causes
which are illegal, improper and unjustified. It
must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to
justify, an earlier action taken in bad faith.

ABANDONMENT; REQUISITES; CASE AT BAR.

For abandonment to arise, there must be
concurrence of two things: 1) lack of intention
to work., and 2) the presence of overt acts
signifying the employee's intention not to
work. While absence from work for a
prolonged period may suggest abandonment
in certain instances, mere absence of one or
two days would not be enough to sustain such
a claim. The over act (absence) ought to
unerringly point to the fact that the employee
has no intention to return to work, which is
patently not the case here.

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES; CASE AT BAR.

The pivotal question in any case where unfair
labor practice on the part of the employer is
alleged is whether or not the employer has
exerted pressure, in the form of restraint,
interference or coercion, against his
employee's right to institute concerted action
for better terms and conditions of
employment. Without doubt, the act of
compelling employees to sign an instrument
indicating that the employer observed labor
standards provisions of law when he might
have not, together with the act of terminating
or coercing those who refuse to cooperate
with the employer's scheme constitutes unfair
labor practice. The first act clearly preempts
the right of the hotel's workers to seek better
terms and conditions of employment through
concerted action. We agree with the Solicitor
General's observation in his manifestation
that "[t]his actuation . . . is analogous to the
situation envisaged in paragraph (f) of Article
248 of the Labor Code" which distinctly makes
it an unfair labor practice "to dismiss,
discharge or otherwise prejudice or
discriminate against an employee for having
given or being about to give testimony" under
the Labor Code. For in not giving positive
testimony in favor of her employer, petitioner
had reserved not only her right to dispute the
claim and proffer evidence in support thereof
but also to work for better terms and
conditions of employment.

LOSS OF CONFIDENCE; NOT APPLICABLE IN

CASE AT BAR. Loss of confidence as a just
cause for dismissal was never intended to
provide employers with a blank check for
terminating their employees. Loss of
confidence should ideally apply only to cases
involving employees occupying positions to
trust and confidence or to those situations
where the employee is routinely charged with
the care and custody of the employer's
money or property. An ordinary chambermaid

WAGES; SALARY LESS THAN MINIMUM

BECAUSE OF OTHER FACILITIES PROVIDED
NOT JUSTIFIED. Labor Arbiter Pati accepted
hook, line and sinker the private respondent's
bare claim that the reason the monetary
benefits received by petitioner between 1981
to 1987 were less than minimum wage was
because petitioner did not factor in the meals,
lodging, electric consumption and water she
received during the period in her
computations. Granting that meals and

Requirements for deducting value of facilities:

1. Proof must be shown that such
facilities are customarily furnished by
the trade
2. The provision of deductible facilities
must be voluntarily accepted in writing
by the employee
3. The facilities must be charged at fair
and reasonable value
DISMISSAL; JUST CAUSE, BURDEN OF PROOF.
In termination cases the employer bears
the burden of proof to show that the dismissal
is for just cause, the failure of which would
mean that the dismissal is not justified and
the employee is entitled to reinstatement.

Reviewer Labor 2: ULP, Relevant Laws and Cases

Ms. Rina Diaz-Samson

ulp10
lodging were provided and indeed constituted
facilities, such facilities could not be deducted
without the employer complying first with
certain legal requirements. Without satisfying
these requirements, the employer simply
cannot deduct the value from the employee's
wages. First, proof must be shown that such
facilities are customarily furnished by the
trade. Second, the provision of deductible
facilities must be voluntarily accepted in
writing by the employee. Finally, facilities
must be charged at fair and reasonable value.
These requirements were not met in the
instant case. More significantly, the food and
lodging, or the electricity and water
consumed by the petitioner were not facilities
but supplements. A benefit or privilege
granted to an employee for the convenience
of the employer is not a facility. The criterion
in making a distinction between the two not
so much lies in the kind (food, lodging) but
the purpose. Considering., therefore, that
hotel workers are required to work different
shifts and are expected to be available at
various odd hours. their ready availability is a
necessary matter in the operations of a small
hotel, such as the private respondent's hotel.
MONEY CLAIMS; PROPER MONETARY AWARD
IN CASE AT BAR. Petitioner is entitled to the
payment of the deficiency in her wages
equivalent to the full wage applicable from
May 13, 1988 up to the date of her illegal
dismissal. Additionally, petitioner is entitled to
payment of service incentive leave pay,
emergency cost of living allowance, night
differential pay, and 13th month pay for the
periods alleged by the petitioner as the
private respondent has never been able to
adduce proof that petitioner was paid the
aforestated benefits. However, the claims
covering the period of October 1987 up to the
time of filing the case on May 13, 1988 are
barred by prescription as P.D. 442 (as
amended) and its implementing rules limit all
money claims arising out of employeremployee relationship to three (3) years from
the time the cause of action accrues.
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL; SEPARATION PAY IN LIEU
OF REINSTATEMENT PROPER IN VIEW OF
STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
We depart from the settled rule that an
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
normally should be reinstated without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges. Owing to
the strained relations between petitioner and
private respondent, allowing the former to
return to her job would only subject her to
possible harassment and future
embarrassment. In the instant case,

Reviewer Labor 2: ULP, Relevant Laws and Cases

separation pay equivalent to one month's

salary for every year of continuous service
with the private respondent would be proper,
starting with her job at the Belfront Hotel.
BACKWAGES. In addition to separation pay,
backwages are in order. Pursuant to R.A. 6715
and our decision in Osmalik Bustamante, et al
vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
petitioner is entitled to full backwages from
the time of her illegal dismissal up to the date
of promulgation of this decision without
qualification or deduction. Also, the dismissal
of petitioner without the benefit of notice and
hearing prior to her termination violated her
constitutional right to due process. Under the
circumstances, an award of One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000.00) on top of payment of the
deficiency in wages and benefits for the
period aforestated would be proper.
De Leon v. NLRC, May 30, 2001
An examination of the facts of this case
reveals that there is sufficient ground to
conclude that respondents were guilty of
interfering with the right of petitioners to selforganization which constitutes unfair labor
practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
8 Petitioners have been employed with FISI
since the 1980s and have since been posted
at the premises of FTC its main factory
plant, its tobacco redrying plant and
warehouse. It appears from the records that
FISI, while having its own corporate identity,
was a mere instrumentality of FTC, tasked to
provide protection and security in the
company premises. The records show that the
two corporations had identical stockholders
and the same business address. FISI also had
no other clients except FTC and other
companies belonging to the Lucio Tan group
of companies. Moreover, the early payslips of
petitioners show that their salaries were
initially paid by FTC. 9 To enforce their rightful
benefits under the laws on Labor Standards,
petitioners formed a union which was later
certified as bargaining agent of all the
security guards. On February 1, 1991, the
stockholders of FISI sold all their participation
in the corporation to a new set of stockholders
which renamed the corporation Magnum
Integrated Services, Inc. On October 15, 1991,
FTC, without any reason, preterminated its
contract of security services with MISI and
contracted two other agencies to provide
security services for its premises. This
resulted in the displacement of petitioners. As
MISI had no other clients, it failed to give new
assignments to petitioners. Petitioners have
remained unemployed since then. All these

Ms. Rina Diaz-Samson

ulp11
facts indicate a concerted effort on the part of
respondents to remove petitioners from the
company and thus abate the growth of the
union and block its actions to enforce their
demands in accordance with the Labor
Standards laws. The Court held in Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees AssociationNATU vs. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.: 10
"The test of whether an employer has
interfered with and coerced employees within
the meaning of section (a) (1) is whether the
employer has engaged in conduct which it
may reasonably be said tends to interfere
with the free exercise of employees' rights
under section 3 of the Act, and it is not
necessary that there be direct evidence that
any employee was in fact intimidated or
coerced by statements of threats of the
employer if there is a reasonable inference
that anti-union conduct of the employer does
have an adverse effect on self-organization
and collective bargaining." 11
We are not persuaded by the argument of
respondent FTC denying the presence of an
employer-employee relationship. We find that
the Labor Arbiter correctly applied the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to hold
all respondents liable for unfair labor practice
and illegal termination of petitioners'
employment. It is a fundamental principle in
corporation law that a corporation is an entity
separate and distinct from its stockholders
and from other corporations to which it is
connected. However, when the concept of
separate legal entity is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or
defend crime, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons, or in
case of two corporations, merge them into
one. The separate juridical personality of a
corporation may also be disregarded when
such corporation is a mere alter ego or
business conduit of another person. 12 In the
case at bar, it was shown that FISI was a mere
adjunct of FTC. FISI, by virtue of a contract for
security services, provided FTC with security
guards to safeguard its premises. However,
records show that FISI and FTC have the same
owners and business address, and FISI
provided security services only to FTC and
other companies belonging to the Lucio Tan
group of companies. The purported sale of the
shares of the former stockholders to a new set
of stockholders who changed the name of the
corporation to Magnum Integrated Services,
Inc. appears to be part of a scheme to
terminate the services of FISI's security
guards posted at the premises of FTC and
bust their newly-organized union which was
then beginning to become active in

Reviewer Labor 2: ULP, Relevant Laws and Cases

demanding the company's compliance with

Labor Standards laws. Under these
circumstances, the Court cannot allow FTC to
use its separate corporate personality to
shield itself from liability for illegal acts
committed against its employees.
B. Unfair Labor Practices of Labor
Organizations: Art. 249
ART. 249. Unfair labor practices of labor
organizations. - It shall be unfair labor
practice for a labor organization, its
officers, agents or representatives:
(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to self-organization.
However, a labor organization shall have
the right to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership;
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an
employer to discriminate against an
employee,
including
discrimination
against an employee with respect to
whom membership in such organization
has been denied or to terminate an
employee on any ground other than the
usual terms and conditions under which
membership
or
continuation
of
membership is made available to other
members;
(c) To violate the duty, or refuse to
bargain collectively with the employer,
provided it is the representative of the
employees;
(d) To cause or attempt to cause an
employer to pay or deliver or agree to
pay or deliver any money or other things
of value, in the nature of an exaction, for
services which are not performed or not
to be performed, including the demand
for fee for union negotiations;
(e) To ask for or accept negotiation or
attorneys fees from employers as part of
the settlement of any issue in collective
bargaining or any other dispute; or
(f) To violate a collective bargaining
agreement.
The
provisions
of
the
preceding
paragraph notwithstanding, only the
officers, members of governing boards,
representatives or agents or members of
labor associations or organizations who
have actually participated in, authorized

Ms. Rina Diaz-Samson

ulp12
or ratified unfair labor practices shall be
held criminally liable. (As amended by
Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21,
1981).

Salunga v. CIR, 21 SCRA 216

(1967)
Employee resigned from the union. The
union requested the company to enforce
the closed shop provision of the CBA.
Company deferred action and informed
the employee of the possible effects of his
resignation from the union. Employee tried
to revoke his resignation from the union
but this denied by the union. Company
finally granted the request of the union
and terminated the employee. Employee
complained of illegal dismissal.
Held:
Labor unions are not entitled to arbitrarily
exclude qualified applicants for
membership and a closed shop provision
will not justify the employer in
discharging, or a union in insisting upon
the discharge of, an employee whom the
union thus refuses to admit to
membership, without any reasonable
ground thereof. Having been dismissed
from service owing to unfair labor practice
on the part on the part of the union,
petitioner is entitled to reinstatement as
member of the union and to his former or
substantially equivalent position in the
company, without prejudice to his
seniority and/or rights and privileges, and
with back pay
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS, STATE MAY NOT
COMPEL THEM TO ADMIT ANY INDIVIDUAL AS
MEMBER; EXCEPTION. Although, generally,
a state may not compel ordinary voluntary
associations to admit thereto any given
individual, because membership therein may
be accorded or withheld as a matter of
privilege (4 Am. Jur. 462; 31 Am. Jur. 426), the
rule is qualified in respect of labor unions
holding a monopoly in the supply of labor,
either in a given locality, or as regards a
particular employer with which it has a
closed-shop agreement (31 Am. Jur. 432).
FOR THE RULE. The reason is that "the
closed shop and the union shop cause the
admission requirements of trade unions to
become affected with public interest. Likewise
a closed shop, a union shop, or maintenance
of membership clauses cause the
administration of discipline by unions to be

Reviewer Labor 2: ULP, Relevant Laws and Cases

affected with public interest (Labor Law Cases

and Materials, Archibal Cox, pp. 1009-1011;
Williams vs. International Brotherhood of
Boiler-Makers, 27 Cal. 2d. 586, 165 P. 2d. 903;
James vs. Marineship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d; 721,
155 P. 2d. 329).
UNIONS MAY NOT ARBITRARILY EXCLUDE
QUALIFIED APPLICANTS FOR MEMBERSHIP.
It is well settled that such unions are not
entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified
applicants for membership, and a closed
-shop provision would not justify the employer
in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the
discharge of; an employee whom the union
thus refuses to admit to membership, without
any reasonable ground therefor (31 Am. Jur.
432). Needless to say, if said unions may be
compelled to admit new members, who have
the requisite qualifications, with more reason
may the law and the courts exercise the
coercive power when the employee involved
is a long standing union member who, owing
to provocations of union officers, was impelled
to tender his resignation, which he forthwith
withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may at least,
invoke the rights of those who seek admission
for the first time, and cannot arbitrarily be
denied readmission.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE; WHERE COMPANY
WAS NOT GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.
In the case at bar, the company was not
guilty of unfair labor practice. It was reluctantif not unwilling-to discharge petitioner. when
the union first informed it of petitioner's
resignation and urged implementation of
Section 3 of the bargaining contract, the
company advised petitioner of its provisions,
thereby intimating that he had to withdraw his
resignation in order to keep his employment.
Besides, the company notified the union that
it would not take any action on the case and
would consider petitioner still a member of
the union. When the latter, thereafter, insisted
on petitioner's discharge, the company still
demurred and explained it was not taking
sides and that its stand was prompted merely
by "humane" considerations, springing from
the belief that petitioner had resigned from
the union without realizing its effect upon his
employment. And, as the union reiterated its
demand, the company notified petitioner that
it had no other alternative but to terminate
his employment, and dismissed him from the
service, although with "regret". Under the
circumstances, the company was not "unfair"
to petitioner.
RIGHT OF EMPLOYEE DISMISSED FROM
SERVICE DUE TO UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.

Ms. Rina Diaz-Samson

ulp13
Having been dismissed from the service
owing to an unfair labor practice on the part
of the union, petitioner is entitled to
reinstatement as member of the union and to
his former or substantially equivalent position
in the company, without prejudice to his
seniority and/or rights and privileges and with
back pay, which back pay shall be borne
exclusively by the union. In the exercise of its
sound judgment and discretion, the lower
court may, however, take such measures as it
may deem best, including the power to
authorize the company to make deductions
for petitioner's benefit, from the sums due to
the union by way of check off or otherwise.
United Restaurors Employees
and Labor Union v. Torres, 26
SCRA 435
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING; ISSUE AS TO THE
PROPRIETY OF INJUNCTION TO RESTRAIN
PICKETING IS MOOT AND ACADEMIC. When
the Union struck and picketed on January 16,
1965, it might have been true that the Union
commanded a majority of Sulo's employees.
Without need of certification, it could, under
such circumstances, conclude a collective
bargaining agreement with Sulo. But it is not
disputed that on, October 4, 1965, i.e., shortly
after this case was filed on September 18,
1965, a consent election was held. Not
controverted, too, is the fact that, in that
consent election, SELU defeated the Union,
petitioner herein. Because of this SELU was
certified to the Sulo management as the
"collective bargaining representative of the
employees . . . for collective bargaining
purposes as regards wages, hours of work,
rates of pay and/or such other terms and
conditions of employment allowed them by
law." Under the circumstances, the issue as to
the propriety of the injunction issued to
restrain picketing has become moot and
academic.

a minority union can no longer demand

collective bargaining. Said right properly
belongs to SELU, which commands the
majority. By law, the right to be exclusive
representative of all the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit is
vested in the labor union "designated or
selected" for such purpose "by the majority of
the employees" in the unit concerned. SELU
has the right as well as the obligation to hear,
voice out and seek remedies for the
grievances of all Sulo employees, including
employees who are members of petitioner
Union, regarding the "rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment or other conditions of
employment."
MINORITY GROUP BOUND BY RESULTS OF
CERTIFICATION ELECTION. The outcome of
a consent election cannot be rendered
meaningless by a minority group of
employees who had themselves invoked the
procedure to settle the dispute. Those who
voted in the consent election against the
labor union that was eventually certified are
hidebound to the results thereof. Logic is with
this view. By their very act of participating in
the election, they are deemed to have
acquiesced to whatever is the consequence of
the election. As to those who did not
participate in the election, the accepted
theory is that they "are presumed to assent to
the expressed will of the majority of those
voting."
UNION LOST ITS RIGHT TO STRIKE AND PICKET
BY ITS DEFEAT IN CONSENT ELECTION. The
Union's right to strike and consequently to
picket ceased by its defeat in the consent
election. That election occurred during the
pendency before this Court of this original
petition for certiorari lodged by the Union the
thrust of which is to challenge the power of
the Court of First Instance to enjoin its
picketing activities. The Union may not
continue to picket.

MINOR UNION MAY NOT DEMAND COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING. The Union which has become

Reviewer Labor 2: ULP, Relevant Laws and Cases

Ms. Rina Diaz-Samson