Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 183409

June 18, 2010

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC.

(CREBA), petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by herein petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Associations, Inc. (CREBA) seeking to nullify and prohibit the enforcement of Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as amended by DAR AO No.
05-07,1 and DAR Memorandum No. 88,2 for having been issued by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as some
provisions of the aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.
Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is the umbrella organization of some
3,500 private corporations, partnerships, single proprietorships and individuals directly or
indirectly involved in land and housing development, building and infrastructure
construction, materials production and supply, and services in the various related fields of
engineering, architecture, community planning and development financing. The Secretary
of Agrarian Reform is named respondent as he is the duly appointive head of the DAR
whose administrative issuances are the subject of this petition.
The Antecedent Facts
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97,3 entitled
"Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to NonAgricultural Uses," which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land
use conversion. The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and
agricultural lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses
after 15 June 1988.

Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 0199,4 entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to
Non-agricultural Uses," amending and updating the previous rules on land use conversion.
Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands, to wit: (1) those to be converted to
residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2)
those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and
fishpond the efect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other
than that previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial,
industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the efectivity of Republic Act No.
66575 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 206 of Republic Act No. 71607 and other
pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such uses.
On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative
Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use
Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and
repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another
agricultural use.
Thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform amended certain
provisions8 of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly addressing
land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.
To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development,
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008,
which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion
applications.
By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing projects,
which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting
problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more
so of the whole nation.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner posits the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS THAT HAVE BEEN
RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NONAGRICULTURAL USES.

II.
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION AND
GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY ISSUING AND ENFORCING [DAR AO NO. 01-02,
AS AMENDED] WHICH SEEK TO REGULATE RECLASSIFIED LANDS.
III.
WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE LOCAL AUTONOMY OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS.
IV.
WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE[S] OF THE CONSTITUTION.
V.
WHETHER MEMORANDUM NO. 88 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER.9
The subject of the submission that the DAR Secretary gravely abused his discretion is AO
No. 01-02, as amended, which states:
Section 3. Applicability of Rules. These guidelines shall apply to all applications for
conversion, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use, such
as:
xxxx
3.4 Conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGU or by
way of a Presidential Proclamation, to residential, commercial, industrial, or other nonagricultural uses on or after the effectivity of RA 6657 on 15 June 1988, x x x.
[Emphasis supplied].
Petitioner holds that under Republic Act No. 6657 and Republic Act No. 8435,10 the term
agricultural lands refers to "lands devoted to or suitable for the cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the
harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a
farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by a person whether natural or
juridical, and not classified by the law as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land." When the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, however, issued DAR AO No. 0102, as amended, he included in the definition of agricultural lands "lands not reclassified
as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988."
In efect, lands reclassified from agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other
non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for
purposes of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. In so doing, petitioner avows that the

Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdiction as he has no authority to expand

or enlarge the legal signification of the term agricultural lands through DAR AO No. 01-02.
Being a mere administrative issuance, it must conform to the statute it seeks to implement,
i.e., Republic Act No. 6657, or to the Constitution, otherwise, its validity or constitutionality
may be questioned.
In the same breath, petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in
violation of Section 6511 of Republic Act No. 6657 because it covers all applications for
conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to other agricultural uses, such as
the conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGUs or by
way of Presidential Proclamations, to residential, commercial, industrial or other nonagricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988. According to petitioner, there is nothing in
Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR
the jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be
submitted to its conversion authority. Thus, in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner further asseverates that Section 2.19,12 Article I of DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, making reclassification of agricultural lands subject to the requirements and
procedure for land use conversion, violates Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, because it
was not provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion
procedures or requirements, or that the DARs approval or clearance must be secured to
efect reclassification. The said Section 2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, also
contravenes the constitutional mandate on local autonomy under Section 25,13 Article II
and Section 2,14 Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Petitioner similarly avers that the promulgation and enforcement of DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, constitute deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law. There is
deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law because under DAR AO No.
01-02, as amended, lands that are not within DARs jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily
and oppressively prohibited or restricted from legitimate use on pain of administrative and
criminal penalties. More so, there is discrimination and violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because the aforesaid administrative order is patently biased in
favor of the peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of society.
As its final argument, petitioner avows that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is not a valid exercise
of police power for it is the prerogative of the legislature and that it is unconstitutional
because it suspended the land use conversion without any basis.
The Courts Ruling
This petition must be dismissed.

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.15 In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v.
Melicor,16 citing People v. Cuaresma,17 this Court made the following pronouncements:
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by
this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the
venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a
policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which
are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Courts docket.18 (Emphasis supplied.)
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time
of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or
referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts. 19
This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional
and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling
for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.20
Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases: (a)
Chavez v. Romulo,21 on citizens right to bear arms; (b) Government of [the] United States of
America v. Hon. Purganan,22 on bail in extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections
v. Judge Quijano-Padilla,23 on government contract involving modernization and
computerization of voters registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Sec.
Zamora,24 on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Hon. Fortich v. Hon.
Corona,25 on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office of the President which
modified the approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area.26
In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth special and
important reasons to justify direct recourse to this Court and why this Court should give

due course to this petition in the first instance, hereby failing to fulfill the conditions set
forth in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor.27 The present petition should have been initially
filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.
Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this petition.
Moreover, although the instant petition is styled as a Petition for Certiorari, in essence, it
seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. It, thus, partakes of the nature
of a Petition for Declaratory Relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction.28 Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases afecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. (Emphasis supplied.)
With that, this Petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory Relief even if only questions of law are involved.
Even if the petitioner has properly observed the doctrine of judicial hierarchy, this Petition
is still dismissible.
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal
office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent
it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.29
The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is
directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there
is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.30
Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an act,
though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer, is not authorized and
invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone
authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting.31Without

jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a
cause or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It
means lack of power to exercise authority.32 Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in
other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.33
In the case before this Court, the petitioner fails to meet the above-mentioned requisites for
the proper invocation of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The Secretary of Agrarian
Reform in issuing the assailed DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, as well as Memorandum
No. 88 did so in accordance with his mandate to implement the land use conversion
provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. In the process, he neither acted in any judicial or
quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto himself any performance of judicial or quasijudicial prerogative. A Petition for Certiorari is a special civil action that may be invoked
only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit on this matter, viz.:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment must be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer.1avvphi1
A tribunal, board, or officer is said to be exercising judicial function where it has the power
to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then
undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies to the actions,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies x x x required to investigate facts
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature." 34
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property
under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing
therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to
determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties. 35
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance and enforcement by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and
Memorandum No. 88 were done in the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrative

functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In issuing the aforesaid

administrative issuances, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform never made any adjudication of
rights of the parties. As such, it can never be said that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he
never exercised any judicial or quasi-judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and
administrative functions.
Furthermore, as this Court has previously discussed, the instant petition in essence seeks
the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned DAR
AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88. Thus, the adequate and proper
remedy for the petitioner therefor is to file a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which this Court
has only appellate and not original jurisdiction. It is beyond the province of certiorari to
declare the aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal because
certiorari is confined only to the determination of the existence of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner cannot simply allege grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and then invoke certiorari to declare
the aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal. Emphasis must be
given to the fact that the writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, "never
issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion."36
At any rate, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition
should still be dismissed.
Executive Order No. 129-A37 vested upon the DAR the responsibility of implementing the
CARP. Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure the successful implementation of the
CARP, Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorized the DAR to establish and
promulgate operational policies, rules and regulations and priorities for agrarian reform
implementation. Section 4(k) thereof authorized the DAR to approve or disapprove the
conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses.
Similarly, Section 5(l) of the same executive order has given the DAR the exclusive authority
to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial,
industrial, and other land uses as may be provided for by law. Section 7 of the aforesaid
executive order clearly provides that "the authority and responsibility for the exercise of the
mandate of the [DAR] and the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform x x x."
Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" have been included in the
definition of agricultural lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted
within the scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No.
129-A, which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform implementation
and that includes the authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use
conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as

amended, merely refers to the category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for
conversion to non-agricultural uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in
the context of land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.
More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which Opinion has been
recognized in many cases decided by this Court, clarified that after the efectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR has been given the authority to approve
land conversion.38 Concomitant to such authority, therefore, is the authority to include in
the definition of agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use
conversion.
In the same vein, the authority of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to include "lands not
reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15
June 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands finds basis in jurisprudence. In Ros v.
Department of Agrarian Reform,39 this Court has enunciated that after the passage of
Republic Act No. 6657, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the
process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural
lands, which are already reclassified before the efectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 which is
15 June 1988, are exempted from conversion.40 It bears stressing that the said date of
efectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 served as the cut-of period for automatic
reclassifications or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR
conversion clearance or authority.41 It necessarily follows that any reclassification made
thereafter can be the subject of DARs conversion authority. Having recognized the DARs
conversion authority over lands reclassified after 15 June 1988, it can no longer be argued
that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform was wrongfully given the authority and power to
include "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other nonagricultural uses before 15 June 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands. Such
inclusion does not unduly expand or enlarge the definition of agricultural lands; instead, it
made clear what are the lands that can be the subject of DARs conversion authority, thus,
serving the very purpose of the land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.
The argument of the petitioner that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in violation
of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers even those non-awarded lands and
reclassified lands by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations on or after 15 June
1988 is specious. As explained in Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, it
is true that the DARs express power over land use conversion provided for under Section
65 of Republic Act No. 6657 is limited to cases in which agricultural lands already awarded
have, after five years, ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic
value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. To suggest, however, that these are
the only instances that the DAR can require conversion clearances would open a loophole
in Republic Act No. 6657 which every landowner may use to evade compliance with the
agrarian reform program. It should logically follow, therefore, from the said departments
express duty and function to execute and enforce the said statute that any reclassification

of a private land as a residential, commercial or industrial property, on or after the

efectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 should first be cleared by the DAR.42
This Court held in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals43 that reclassification of lands does not
suffice. Conversion and reclassification difer from each other. Conversion is the act of
changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by
the DAR while reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and commercial, as
embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures for land use
conversion. In view thereof, a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not
automatically allow a landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the process of
conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.44
It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and conversion that
agricultural lands though reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial or other nonagricultural uses must still undergo the process of conversion before they can be used for
the purpose to which they are intended.
Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DARs conversion authority can only
be exercised after the efectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988.45 The said date
served as the cut-of period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands
that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance or authority.46 Thereafter,
reclassification of agricultural lands is already subject to DARs conversion authority.
Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the agricultural lands for other purposes.
Conversion is needed to change the current use of reclassified agricultural lands.
It is of no moment whether the reclassification of agricultural lands to residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses was done by the LGUs or by way of
Presidential Proclamations because either way they must still undergo conversion process.
It bears stressing that the act of reclassifying agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses
simply specifies how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses and does
not automatically convert agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses or for other purposes.
As explained in DAR Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 1994, cited in the 2009 case of
Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW and the Department of Agrarian
Reform,47 reclassification of lands denotes their allocation into some specific use and
providing for the manner of their utilization and disposition or the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial,
or commercial, as embodied in the land use plan. For reclassified agricultural lands,
therefore, to be used for the purpose to which they are intended there is still a need to
change the current use thereof through the process of conversion. The authority to do so is
vested in the DAR, which is mandated to preserve and maintain agricultural lands with
increased productivity. Thus, notwithstanding the reclassification of agricultural lands to
non-agricultural uses, they must still undergo conversion before they can be used for other
purposes.

Even reclassification of agricultural lands by way of Presidential Proclamations to nonagricultural uses, such as school sites, needs conversion clearance from the DAR. We
reiterate that reclassification is diferent from conversion. Reclassification alone will not
suffice and does not automatically allow the landowner to change its use. It must still
undergo conversion process before the landowner can use such agricultural lands for such
purpose.48 Reclassification of agricultural lands is one thing, conversion is another.
Agricultural lands that are reclassified to non-agricultural uses do not ipso facto allow the
landowner thereof to use the same for such purpose. Stated diferently, despite having
reclassified into school sites, the landowner of such reclassified agricultural lands must
apply for conversion before the DAR in order to use the same for the said purpose.
Any reclassification, therefore, of agricultural lands to residential, commercial, industrial or
other non-agricultural uses either by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations
enacted on or after 15 June 1988 must undergo the process of conversion, despite having
undergone reclassification, before agricultural lands may be used for other purposes.
It is diferent, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public agricultural lands
have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or purpose, i.e., public school, etc.,
because in such a case, conversion is no longer necessary. As held in Republic v.
Estonilo,49 only a positive act of the President is needed to segregate or reserve a piece of
land of the public domain for a public purpose. As such, reservation of public agricultural
lands for public use or purpose in efect converted the same to such use without
undergoing any conversion process and that they must be actually, directly and exclusively
used for such public purpose for which they have been reserved, otherwise, they will be
segregated from the reservations and transferred to the DAR for distribution to qualified
beneficiaries under the CARP.50 More so, public agricultural lands already reserved for
public use or purpose no longer form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain suitable for agriculture.51Hence, they are outside the coverage of the CARP
and it logically follows that they are also beyond the conversion authority of the DAR.
Clearly from the foregoing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not act without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in (1) including lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or
other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 in the definition of agricultural lands
under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and; (2) issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02,
as amended, subjecting to DARs jurisdiction for conversion lands which had already been
reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or for other non-agricultural uses on or
after 15 June 1988.
Similarly, DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the reclassification of agricultural
lands by LGUs shall be subject to the requirements of land use conversion procedure or
that DARs approval or clearance must be secured to efect reclassification, did not violate
the autonomy of the LGUs.
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 states that:

SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. (a) A city or municipality may, through an

ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose,
authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their
utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be economically
feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of
Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for
residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian
concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage
of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
xxxx
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That
agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as "The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law," shall not be afected by the said reclassification and
the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said
Act.
xxxx
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying in any
manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
The aforequoted provisions of law show that the power of the LGUs to reclassify agricultural
lands is not absolute. The authority of the DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands
covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has been validly recognized by
said Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 by explicitly providing therein that, "nothing in
this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6657."
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, does not also violate the due process clause, as well as the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. In providing administrative and criminal
penalties in the said administrative order, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform simply
implements the provisions of Sections 73 and 74 of Republic Act No. 6657, thus:
Sec. 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. The following are prohibited:
xxxx
(c) The conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into any non-agricultural use
with intent to avoid the application of this Act to his landholdings and to disposes his
tenant farmers of the land tilled by them;
xxxx

(f) The sale, transfer or conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to use or any other
usufructuary right over the land he acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to
circumvent the provisions of this Act.
xxxx
Sec. 74. Penalties. Any person who knowingly or willfully violates the provisions of this
Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month to not more than
three (3) years or a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) and not more than
fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court.
If the ofender is a corporation or association, the officer responsible therefor shall be
criminally liable.
And Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8435, which specifically provides:
Sec. 11. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature Conversion. x x x.
Any person found guilty of premature or illegal conversion shall be penalized with
imprisonment of two (2) to six (6) years, or a fine equivalent to one hundred percent (100%)
of the government's investment cost, or both, at the discretion of the court, and an
accessory penalty of forfeiture of the land and any improvement thereon.
In addition, the DAR may impose the following penalties, after determining, in an
administrative proceedings, that violation of this law has been committed:
a. Consolation or withdrawal of the authorization for land use conversion; and
b. Blacklisting, or automatic disapproval of pending and subsequent conversion
applications that they may file with the DAR.
Contrary to petitioners assertions, the administrative and criminal penalties provided for
under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, are imposed upon the illegal or premature
conversion of lands within DARs jurisdiction, i.e., "lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or for other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1998."
The petitioners argument that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is unconstitutional, as it
suspends the land use conversion without any basis, stands on hollow ground.
It bears emphasis that said Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the instruction of the
President in order to address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real
estate development because of the worsening rice shortage in the country at that time.
Such measure was made in order to ensure that there are enough agricultural lands in
which rice cultivation and production may be carried into. The issuance of said
Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general welfare of the public, thus, it
cannot be argued that it was made without any basis.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo, pp. 182-183.

Id. at 185.

Id. at 42-59.

Id. at 77-110.

Otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988."

SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. (a) A city or municipality may, through an

ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the

purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the
manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land
ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined
by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have substantially
greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as
determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall
be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of
the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen
percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten
percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided,
further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform
beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred fiftyseven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law," shall not be afected by the said reclassification and the
conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by
Section 65 of said Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon
recommendation of the National Economic and Development Authority,
authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in
the next preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws, continue
to prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through
zoning ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases for the
future use of land resources: Provided, That the requirements for food
production, human settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into
consideration in the preparation of such plans.
(d) Where approval by a national agency is required for reclassification, such
approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and
complete application for reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of
the same shall be deemed as approval thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or
modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
7

Otherwise known as "The Local Government Code of 1991."

Particularly Sections 3.1 and 6.2 of DAR AO No. 01-02.

Rollo, p. 272.

10

Otherwise known as "The Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997."

11

SEC. 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award,
when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater
economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon
application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the afected
parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or conversion
of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his
obligation.
12

Section 2.19. Reclassification of Agricultural Lands refers to the act of specifying

how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as, residential,
industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the
requirements and procedure for land use conversion, undertaken by a Local
Government Unit (LGU) in accordance with Section 20 of RA 7160 and Joint Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), DAR, DA, and Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) MC-54-1995. It also includes the reversion of nonagricultural lands to agricultural use.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 147146. July 29, 2005]
JOSE, JULIO and FEDERICO, All Surnamed JUNIO, petitioners, vs. ERNESTO D.
GARILAO, in His Capacity as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lands already classified and identified as commercial, industrial or residential before
June 15, 1988 -- the date of efectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
-- are outside the coverage of this law. Therefore, they no longer need any conversion
clearance from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to set aside the February 24, 2000 Decision [2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-GR SP No.
37217. The Decision denied petitioners Petition for Certiorari [3] for its failure to show that
the DAR had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it issued its Exemption Order dated September 13, 1994. The Order,
issued by then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, had excluded Lot 835-B from the
coverage of Republic Act 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL).
In its Resolution dated April 4, 2001, this Court (through the Second Division)
immediately denied the Petition for failure of petitioners (1) to attach the duplicate
original/certified true copy of the CA Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration of

the CA Decision; and (2) to state the dates of their receipt and filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration of that Decision.
In their Motion for Reconsideration [4] of the April 4, 2001 Resolution, petitioners alleged
that they had received the assailed CA Decision on March 8, 2000 and filed their Motion for
Reconsideration on March 22, 2000. They likewise submitted a duplicate original of the
February 2, 2001 CA Resolution,[5] which had denied that Motion.
On January 22, 2002, petitioners filed a Manifestation. [6] It stated that in a clarificatory
letter dated July 30, 1997,[7] Salvador S. Malibong, the deputized zoning administrator of
Bacolod City, completely reversed the false Certification he had issued earlier. That
Certification had been the basis of the DAR secretarys assailed Exemption Order.
On February 18, 2002, public respondent submitted its Comment on the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioners. They in turn submitted their Reply to the Comment on
June 14, 2002, in compliance with the Courts Resolution dated April 10, 2002. In its
Resolution dated August 13, 2003, the Court (Second Division) resolved to grant their
Motion for Reconsideration and to require the solicitor general to comment on the Petition
within ten days from notice.
On October 9, 2003, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted a Manifestation
in Lieu of Comment. The OSG stated that its Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioners on February 18, 2002, had fully addressed the issues presented in their
Petition for Review. On November 12, 2003, the Court resolved to give due course to the
Petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty days
from notice. Thereafter, the case was transferred to the First Division, and finally to the
Third, which will now resolve the controversy.
The Facts
The CA summarized the antecedents of the case as follows:
In a Complaint dated February 12, 1994, filed with the [Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB)] by complainants (some of whom are herein petitioners),
identified as Potential CARP Beneficiaries per Certification of OIC [Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO)] dated November 21, 1991 x x x, it is prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued against the registered owners of a certain parcel of
agricultural land consisting of 71 hectares, more or less, known as Lot No. 835-B of
Bacolod Cadastre, Brgy. Pahanocoy, Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-79622. Petitioners claim that x x x Sta. Lucia Realty Corporation and the Estate of

Guillermo Villasor, represented by Irving Villasor, are bulldozing and leveling the subject
property for the purpose of converting it into a residential subdivision; that as prospective
CARP beneficiaries of the land in question, being former laborers, actual occupants and
permanent residents of Barangay Pahanocoy, their rights will be prejudiced by the illegal
conversion of the land into a residential subdivision x x x.
On April 13, 1994, the DARAB OIC Executive Director forwarded the complaint to
[Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)], DAR, Region VI, Bacolod City for
appropriate action x x x. Before any hearing could be conducted thereon, the Secretary of
the Department of Agrarian Reform issued an Order dated September 13, 1994 in RE:
PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM CARP COVERAGE PURSUANT TO DOJ OPINION NO.
44, SERIES OF 1990, IRVING P. VILLASOR, et al., Rep. by Atty. Angel Lobaton, Jr.,
Petitioners, portions of which read as follows:
After a careful study of the facts of the case and the evidences presented by the parties,
this Office finds the petition for exemption to be well founded. Under DOJ Opinion No. 44,
Series of 1990, it provides that lands which has already been classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial and industrial areas, prior to June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from
CARP coverage. To this, it is an [i]nescapable conclusion that the subject property is
exempted from CARP coverage considering the fact that the same was classified as
residential as evidenced by the Resolution No. 5153-A, Series of 1976 of the City Council of
Bacolod and as approved by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (now HLURB)
in its Resolution dated September 24, 1980 as per Certification dated June 22, 1994 issued
by the said Commission. The Certification of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
dated June 9, 1994 stated that the subject land is not irrigable or is outside the service
area of the irrigation system in the locality. In efect the said application had conformed to
the requirements of the law on exemption. In accord thereto, the stand of Mr. Espanola that
the portion, which he planted to trees and developed into mini-forest should be covered by
CARP[,] is beyond recognition as the program does not apply to those which are already
classified as residential lands prior to the efectivity of CARL on June 15, 1988. Instead, it
is confined only to agricultural lands, which under R.A. 6657, Sec. 3(c), it defines
agricultural lands as lands devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential or industrial land. With the above stated definition,
it is beyond reason that the placing of the said portion under CARP coverage (1.5 hectare) is
devoid of legal and factual basis.[8]
As earlier said, the Exemption Order was challenged before the appellate court via a
Petition for Certiorari.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals sustained the Exemption Order issued by public respondent. It
found that prior to June 15, 1988, Lot 835-B had been reclassified from agricultural to
residential land. It relied on the Courts pronouncement in Natalia Realty v. Department of
Agrarian Reform[9] that lands were outside the coverage of the CARL if they had been
converted to non-agricultural uses by government agencies, other than the DAR, prior to
the efectivity of that law.
Further, the CA ruled that neither the CARL nor the Local Government Code of 1991
had nullified the reclassification of Lot 835-B. The appellate court noted that the land had
been validly reclassified from agricultural to residential in 1976, prior to the efective date
of both laws. It added that neither of those two laws could be applied retroactively, since
they contained no provision authorizing their retroactivity.
Hence, this Petition.[10]
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit this lone issue for our consideration:
Whether the respondent DAR secretary had the inherent authority or power to exclude or
exempt at will from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
the subject agricultural land which was already automatically covered by the CARL (RA
6657) upon its efectivity on June 15, 1988 without afording due process to herein
petitioners and without the necessity of Congress having first to amend Section 4 of the
said law authorizing such exemption or exclusion from CARP coverage.[11]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Sole Issue:
Coverage
Section 4 of RA 6657 sets forth the coverage of the CARL as follows:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the
public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program:
xxxxxxxxx
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural
products raised or that can be raised thereon.
Section 3(c) of the CARL defines agricultural land as that which is devoted to
agricultural activity x x x and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land.
The meaning of agricultural lands covered by the CARL was explained further by the
DAR in its Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, [12]entitled Revised Rules and
Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Land to Non-Agricultural Uses,
issued pursuant to Section 49 of CARL, which we quote:
x x x. Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in R.A.
6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and
zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for
residential, commercial or industrial use.(Emphasis supplied)
Prior to this Order, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44 dated March 16, 1990, which
was addressed to then DAR Secretary Florencio Abad, recognized the fact that before the
date of the laws efectivity on June 15, 1988, the reclassification or conversion of lands was
not exclusively done by the DAR.[13] Rather, it was a coordinated efort of all concerned
agencies; namely, the Department of Local Governments and Community Development, the
Human Settlements Commission and the DAR.[14] Then Justice Secretary Franklin M.
Drilon explained the coordination in this wise:
x x x. Under R.A. No. 3844,[15] as amended by R.A. No. 6389,[16] an agricultural lessee may,
by order of the court, be dispossessed of his landholding if after due hearing, it is shown
that the landholding is declared by the [DAR] upon the recommendation of the National
Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other
urban purposes.[17]
Likewise, under various Presidential Decrees (P.D. Nos. 583, 815 and 946) which were
issued to give teeth to the implementation of the agrarian reform program decreed in P.D.

No. 27, the DAR was empowered to authorize conversions of tenanted agricultural lands,
specifically those planted to rice and/or corn, to other agricultural or to non-agricultural
uses, subject to studies on zoning of the Human Settlements Commissions (HSC).
This non-exclusive authority of the DAR under the aforesaid laws was, x x x recognized and
reaffirmed by other concerned agencies, such as the Department of Local Government and
Community Development (DLGCD) and the then Human Settlements Commission (HSC) in
a Memorandum of Agreement executed by the DAR and these two agencies on May 13,
1977, which is an admission that with respect to land use planning and conversions, the
authority is not exclusive to any particular agency but is a coordinated efort of all
concerned agencies.
It is significant to mention that in 1978, the then Ministry of Human Settlements was
granted authority to review and ratify land use plans and zoning ordinance of local
governments and to approve development proposals which include land use conversions
(see LOI No. 729 [1978]). This was followed by [E.O.] No. 648 (1981) which conferred upon
the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (the predecessors of the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board [HLURB] the authority to promulgate zoning and other land use
control standards and guidelines which shall govern land use plans and zoning ordinances
of local governments, subdivision or estate development projects of both the public and
private sector and urban renewal plans, programs and projects; as well as to review,
evaluate and approve or disapprove comprehensive land use development plans and zoning
components of civil works and infrastructure projects, of national, regional and local
governments, subdivisions, condominiums or estate development projects including
industrial estates.
Hence, the justice secretary opined that the authority of the DAR to approve
conversions of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses could be exercised only from the
date of the laws efectivity on June 15, 1988.
Following the opinion of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the DAR issued
Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994, [18] stating that conversion clearances were
no longer needed for lands already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of
Republic Act 6657. Designed to streamline the issuance of exemption clearances, based on
DOJ Opinion No. 44, the AO provided guidelines and procedures for the issuance of
exemption clearances.
Thereafter, DAR issued AO 12,[19] Series of 1994, entitled Consolidated and Revised
Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural
Uses. It provided that the guidelines on how to secure an exemption clearance under DAR
AO No. 6, Series of 1994, shall apply to agricultural lands classified or zoned for non-

agricultural uses by local government units (LGUs); and approved by the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before June 15, 1988. Under this AO, the DAR secretary
had the ultimate authority to issue orders granting or denying applications for exemption
filed by landowners whose lands were covered by DOJ Opinion No. 44.
Contrary to petitioners stance, the CA properly applied Natalia Realty v. Department of
Agrarian Reform,[20] which had earlier held that lands previously converted by government
agencies, other than DAR, to non-agricultural uses prior to the efectivity of the CARL were
outside the coverage of that law. Our ruling in Natalia was not confined solely to
agricultural lands located within townsite reservations, but applied also to real estate
converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the efectivity of the CARL, [21] provided the
conversion was made by government agencies other than the DAR -- like the HLURB and its
predecessor, the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC).[22]
The Courts ruling in Natalia was reiterated in Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association v.
Court of Appeals,[23] which affirmed the authority of the Municipal Council of Carmona to
issue a zoning classification and to reclassify the property in question from agricultural to
residential, as approved by the HSRC (now the HLURB). The Court held that Section 3 of
RA 2264,[24] amending the Local Government Code, specifically empowered municipal
and/or city councils, in consultation with the National Planning Commission, to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations. Hence, the power of the local government
to convert or reclassify lands to residential or non-agricultural was not subject to the
approval of the DAR.[25]
It is thus settled that with respect to areas classified and identified as zonal areas not
for agricultural uses, like those approved by the HSRC before the efectivity of RA 6657 on
June 15, 1988, the DARs clearance is no longer necessary for conversion.
The next question before us is whether the subject landholding was in fact reclassified
as residential before June 15, 1988, the date of efectivity of the CARL. The Exemption
Order of the DAR secretary pointed out that the parcel had indeed been reclassified as
residential under Resolution No. 5153-A of the City Council of Bacolod. This reclassification
was later affirmed by the HSRC.
The courts generally accord great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of
administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters
falling under their jurisdiction.[26] It must be stressed at this point that with the DAR lies
the power to determine whether Lot 835-B is non-agricultural and, hence, exempt from the
coverage of the CARL.

According to DAR AO 6-94, an application for exemption from the coverage of the CARP
must be accompanied by a certification from the HLURB that the pertinent zoning
ordinance has been approved by the Board prior to June 15, 1988 (the date of efectivity of
the CARL). In the instant case, the landowner did file an accompanying Certification from
the HLURB.
The Certification issued by the Board expressly mentioned that the property x x x, Lot
835-B located at Brgy. Tangub, Bacolod City, covered by TCT T-79622, x x x was identified
for residential use under the 1976 Framework Plan of the City of Bacolod prepared
pursuant to the Program of the then Ministry of Local Government and approved by the
City Council in its Resolution No. 5153-A, Series of 1976. [27] It also certified that the area
where the aforecited property is located was likewise identified for residential use under the
Town Planning, Housing Zoning Program of the National Coordinating Council of the then
Ministry of Human Settlements as approved under the City Council Resolution No. 5792,
Series of 1977. x x x.[28]
These Certifications carried the presumption of regularity in their issuance. Petitioners
did not present any evidence to overcome that presumption. [29] The letter of the deputized
zoning administrator of Bacolod City -- cited by petitioners to contradict the Certifications
-- did not touch on, much less corroborate, their claim that the subject landholding
remained classified as agricultural. It merely restated what was already provided in the law
-- that only the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Bacolod City could reclassify lands.
Petitioners next assert that, for tax purposes, the subject property was declared by its
owners as agricultural land since time immemorial until at least 1994. [30] It is settled,
however, that a tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning
purposes.[31] It may have been declared by its owner as residential for real estate taxation
purposes, but it may well be within a commercial zone. [32] In the determination of the
nature of a piece of property, a discrepancy would thus exist between its classification for
real estate taxation purposes vis--vis that for zoning purposes.
Under the Real Property Tax Code, a tax declaration serves only to enable the assessor
to identify a property for assessment levels,[33] not to bind a provincial/city assessor. Under
Section 220 of the Real Estate Tax Code, appraisal and assessment are based on the actual
use, regardless of any previous assessment or taxpayers valuation thereon which, in turn,
is based on a taxpayer's declaration.
Republic v. Court of Appeals[34] ruled thus:

There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the tax
declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further inquiry. Furthermore,
the tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a land. In fact, DAR
Administrative Order No. 6 lists other documents, aside from tax declarations, that must be
submitted when applying for exemption from CARP. In Halili v. Court of Appeals, we
sustained the trial court when it ruled that the classification made by the Land Regulatory
Board of the land in question outweighed the classification stated in the tax declaration.
Consequently, even if the subject landholding has been declared as agricultural for
taxation purposes, once a local government has reclassified it as residential, that
determination must prevail for zoning purposes.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Province of Cam Sur v CA, 222 SCRA 137, GR 103125 (1993)

Facts: On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines
Sur passed a Resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate
property contiguous to the provincial Capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for nonfood and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government
employees
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, filed two
separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin,
at the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the
price ofered for their property. In an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and
authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the
deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer
for damages that private respondents may sufer in the event that the expropriation cases
do not prosper.

The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended
motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated February 26, 1990.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for
expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss and
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject of the
expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the
amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to
restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ
of injunction.

Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General
stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no
need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the
view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department
of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing
project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the
admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings until after the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted
the requisite approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of
the property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.

Issue: WON the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.

HELD: To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no
longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools,
hospitals, etc., without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the
Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would naturally involve a

change in the land use. In efect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to
scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.

Ratio: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial
court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines
Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify
private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the
trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

FORTICH vs. CORONA

289 SCRA 624, April 24, 1998

TOPIC: Finality of Judgement; Administrative Law

DOCTRINE: The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgements/resolutions
of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and
regulations; a resolution which substantially modifies a decision after it has attained
finality is utterly void. When an administrative agency's decision becomes final and
executory and no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said
agency has lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its decision.
FACTS:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision converting a large
parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of this,
a group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated
a lot of publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998
elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers.
Because of this blackmail, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, politically motivated, win-win
resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had
become final and executory.
ISSUE: WON the win-win resolution, issued after the original decision had become final
and executory, had any legal efect.
HELD:
No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29,
1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration
thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its
Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to
entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which
second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate

that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of
March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed
in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO
18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion
for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29,
1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the
case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become
final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that
accord finality to administrative determinations.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or
quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The
noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all

Fortich vs. Corona (AJG)

G.R. No. 131457 | August 19, 1999 | Ynares-Santiago, J.

Petitioners: Carlos Fortich (Governor of Bukidnon), Rey Baula (Mayor of Sumilao,

Bukidnon), NQSR Management and Development Corporation
Respondents: Deputy Executive Secretary Renato Corona, Agrarian Reform Secretary
Ernesto Garilao

Summary:The subject of the controversy is an agricultural land in Sumilao, Bukidnon,

measuring 144 hectares. The municipality of Sumilao wanted to convert this into an agroindustrial land. In its Order dated March 29, 1996, Office of the President acceded to this
conversion, and converted the whole 144 hectares to agro-industrial land in order to attract
investors. This order became final and executory. Feeling aggrieve, farmers commenced a
hunger-strike in protest of this ruling. The OP wanted to appease the farmers, hence, they
issued a new resolution. They said that only 44 hectares will be converted into agroindustrial land and that the remaining 100 hectares will be distributed to the farmers. The
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but there was no result because the
justices voted 2-2 in resolving such MR. Now, the respondents wanted to refer the case to
the Supreme Court en banc. The Supreme Court said that the resolution of the MR cannot
be referred to the Court en banc. It based its reasoning on Article 8, Sec. 4 (3) of the
Constitution. From that certain paragraph, the Court diferentiated CASES from MATTERS.
CASES are to be DECIDED, while MATTERS are to be RESOLVED. An example of a
MATTER is a motion for reconsideration, such as the one in this case. Only CASES which
do not obtain the required number of votes are required to be elevated en banc. On the
other hand, as regards MATTERS, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because
of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. If there is a tie in resolving a
matter, the earlier decision of the Court is upheld.

RESOLUTION

(We will learn the difference between Decision and Resolution in this case. This case is a
Resolution, just in case sir asks :D )

Facts:

Background facts: On October 1997, alleged farmer-beneficiaries commenced a

hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon
City. They protested the decision of the Office of the President (OP) dated March 29,
1996which approved the conversion of a 144-hectare land from agricultural to agroindustrial/institutional area. Note that this decision already became final and
executory.
o The land is located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by NQSRMDC
(Norberto Quisumbing Sr. Management and Development Corp). It was leased
as a pineapple plantation to Del Monte.
o The Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon became interested in the
property, and enacted an ordinance converting the said land to
industrial/institutional with a view to attract investors in order to achieve
economic vitality.
o Apparently, land conversion issues need to go through the Department of
Agrarian Reform. The DAR rejected the land conversion and instead opted to
put the same under CARP and ordered the distribution of the property to the
farmers.
o The case reached the OP. The OP rendered a decisionreversing the DAR and
converting the land to agro-indusrial area, which became the subject of the
strike of the farmers.
o The hunger strike was dramatic and well-publicized which commanded
nationwide attention that even church leaders and some presidential
candidates tried to intervene for their cause.
These events led the OP, through then Deputy Exec. Sec.Corona, to issue the socalled Win-Win Resolution, substantially modifying its earlier Decision (see decision
dated March 29, 1996) after it had already become final and executory.
o It modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to
the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred
(100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
The Supreme Court, in their decision dated April 24, 1998, ruled for Fortich and
company and declared that the Win-Win Resolution is VOID and of no legal efect
considering that the March 29, 1996 resolution of the OP already became final and
executory.
ALERT This is where the issue relevant to our topic arose: Aggrieved, respondents
Corona and Garilaofiled [separate] motions for reconsideration for the said ruling
(separate MRs perorinesolveng Court through one resolution).

o The Court, in their Resolution dated Nov. 17, 1998, voted TWO-TWO on the
separate MRs filed by Corona and Garilao assailing the April 24, 1998
Decision.
Hence, this motion. The respondents pray that this case be referred to the Court en
banc.They contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the
Decision dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the required
number to carry a decision, i.e., three, was not met. Consequently, the case should
be referred to and be decided by this Court en banc, relying on the following
constitutional provision:
o Art. 8, Sec. 4 (3) - Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or
resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no
case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided,
that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the
Court sitting en banc.
Issue/Held: Whether or not the aforementioned resolution of the Court (the resolution
addressing the MR, wherein the justices voted 2-2) should be referred to the Court en banc
NO.

Ratio:

A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the intention
of the framers to draw a distinction between CASES and MATTERS.
o CASES are decided.
o MATTERS, which include motions, are resolved.
Otherwise put, the word decided must refer to cases; while the word resolved
must refer to matters, applying the rule of reddendosingulasingulis.
o This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII,
Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these
words appear.
With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are
referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is
not obtained.
Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is
not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second
sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of case and not matter.
The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the
disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision.
The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc.

o On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the
losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to
resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case
undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of
the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its
reconsideration.
Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is
lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed
affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17,
1998.
Respondents further argue that the issues submitted in their separate motions for
reconsideration are of first impression. They are arguing that the local government
unit concerned still needs to obtain the approval of DAR when converting land.
However, this was rebutted in the resolution dated November 17, wherein it was
expressed that:
o Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no
extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc. In the case of
Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein we held that
local government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or
reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
o The Court voted uninamously in that case, hence, the argument of the
petitioners that their MRs are motions involving first impression is flawed.
Moreover, a second motion for reconsideration is generally prohibited, unless there is
a showing of extraordinary persuasive reasons and a leave of court is filed. In this
case, there was none.
Remember that the Court, in its Decision, upheld the March 29, 1996 ruling of the
OP because it was already final and executory thus the Win-Win resolution cannot
be implemented anymore? Well, because of this, there was a litany of protestations
on the part of respondents and intervenors including entreaties for a liberal
interpretation of the rules. The sentiment was that notwithstanding its importance
and far-reaching efects, the case was disposed of on a mere technicality.
o The Court however said that it was not a mere technicality because the
finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested appurtenant
rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of
Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to be benefited by the
development of the property.
Lastly, the Court determines whether or not the farmer-intervenors have standing to
intervene in this case. The Court said there was none, because the source of their
standing to file is the Win-Win Resolution (note that in that resolution,
pinamigayngayunglupasamga farmers, ngayon, meronsilang Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA). Dahil dun, nag intervene sila).
o Why was there no standing on the part of the farmer-intervenors who derived
their rights from the Win-Win resolution? The issuance of the CLOA to them
does not grant them the requisite standing in view of the nullity of the Win-

Win Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null
and void.

[G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998]

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B.
BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA,
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
DECISION

MARTINEZ, J.:
The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged farmerbeneficiaries in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City on
October 9, 1997 commanded nationwide attention that even church leaders and some
presidential candidates tried to intervene for the strikers cause.
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision [1] of the Office of the President (OP),
issued through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which
approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from agricultural to
agro-industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called Win-Win Resolution [2] on
November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already
become final and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land
conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered
the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmerbeneficiaries.
But, did the Win-Win Resolution culminate in victory for all the contending parties?
The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this Court urging us to
annul and set aside the Win-Win Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D.
Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform from implementing the said Resolution.
Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal efect of the WinWin Resolution issued by the Office of the President on its earlier Decision involving the
same subject matter, which had already become final and executory?
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings, may be stated as
follows:
1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon,
owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation
(NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 14371[3] of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing
Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a
period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in
the certificate of title.The lease expired in April, 1994.

3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and
assessed the land value at P2.38 million.[4]
4. NQSRMDC resisted the DARs action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted
by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary
injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon,
the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives to
desist from pursuing any activity or activities concerning the subject land until further
orders.[5]
5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a
memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, directing the Land Bank to open a trust account
for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to
determine the just compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC objected to these
moves and filed on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order of March
31, 1992 and to nullify the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director
and Land Bank on the valuation of the subject property.
6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a)
ordering the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank to seriously comply with the terms of
the order dated March 31, 1992; (b) nullifying the DAR Regional Directors memorandum,
dated May 21, 1992, and the summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c)
directing the Land Bank to return the claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDCs subject
property to the DAR until further orders.[6]
7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it
opened in the name of petitioner NQSRMDC.[7]
8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by
Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6, [8] dated January 7, 1993, designating
certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial
Zones where the subject property is situated.
9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of March 29,
1996, pertinent portions of which we quote:

Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No.
24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality,
from agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to
attract investors who can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the
income of its people.
Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may authorize the
classification of five percent (5%) of their agricultural land area and provide for the manner
of their utilization or disposition.
On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the said
Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the instant application for conversion was
filed by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial
Development Association).
Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial Board, on the basis
of a Joint Committee Report submitted by its Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian
Reform and Socio-Economic Committee approved, on 1 February 1994, the said Ordinance
now docketed as Resolution No. 94-95. The said industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC
(project proponent) is supposed to have the following components:
1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the following: Institute for
Continuing Higher Education; Institute for Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical
School); Institute for Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and
Mindanao Sports Development Complex which covers an area of 24 hectares;
2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn oil, corn
starch, various corn products; rice processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice;
cassava processing for starch, alcohol and food delicacies; processing plants, fruits and
fruit products such as juices; processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared for
market; cold storage and ice plant; cannery system; commercial stores; public market; and
abattoir needing about 67 hectares;
3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation, horse-back
riding, memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover 33 hectares; and
4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel, restaurants,
dormitories and a housing project covering an area of 20 hectares.

The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995, adopted by the
Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its flagship
projects. The same was likewise favorably recommended by the Provincial Development
Council of Bukidnon; the municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the Regional
Office (Region X) of the DENR (which issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate on
June 5, 1995); the Executive Director, signing By Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ, Office
of the President Mindanao; the Secretary of DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D.
Clemente.
In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office,
Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation
Office, interposed NO OBJECTION to the proposed conversion as long as the development
cost of the irrigation systems thereat which is P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the
developer x x x. Also, the Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San
Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no objection to the proposed conversion of the land
in question as it will provide more economic benefits to the community in terms of outside
investments that will come and employment opportunities that will be generated by the
projects to be put up x x x.
On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at the Kisolan
Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose Macalindong of DAR Central
Office and DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the afected barangay rallied
behind their respective officials in endorsing the project.
Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on November 14, 1994,
the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the
conversion of the subject land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the
same under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all
qualified beneficiaries on the following grounds:
1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility;
2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA);
3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable;
4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries;

5. The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified for agro-industrial project
has no reference to Memo Circular No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and
E.O. No. 124, Series of 1993.
A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on January 9, 1995 by
applicant but the same was denied (in an Order dated June 7, 1995).[9]
10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director to proceed with the
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the property.[10]
11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed [11] the order of denial to the Office
of the President and prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the
same would be more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.
12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretarys order, NQSRMDC, on June 29,
1995, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary
injunction,[12] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.
13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then Presidential
Assistant for Mindanao, after conducting an evaluation of the proposed project, sent a
memorandum[13] to the President favorably endorsing the project with a recommendation
that the DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in denying the application of the province
for the conversion of the land.
14. Also, in a memorandum [14] to the President dated August 23, 1995, the Honorable
Rafael Alunan III, then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG), recommended the conversion of the subject land to industrial/institutional use with
a request that the President hold the implementation of the DAR order to distribute the
land in question.
15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, issued a
Resolution[15] ordering the parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the
petition. At the hearing held in said case on October 5, 1995, the DAR, through the
Solicitor General, manifested before the said court that the DAR was merely in the
processing stage of the applications of farmers-claimants and has agreed to respect status
quo pending the resolution of the petition.[16]
16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29,
1996, reversing the DAR Secretarys decision, the pertinent portions of which read:

After a careful evaluation of the petition vis--vis the grounds upon which the denial thereof
by Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the instant application for conversion by the
Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land
in question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for
employment and bring about real development in the area towards a sustained economic
growth of the municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be
beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such
benefits.
Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with
irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is
true that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru the
property (as a right of way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the lower portion
thereof. The land itself, subject of the instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for
several years, planted with pineapple by the Philippine Packing Corporation.
On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition
(NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not
applicable, suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared null and void by the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early as March 1,
1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section
8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject property could not validly be the subject of compulsory
acquisition until after the expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a
Multi-National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office and the
Land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to `desist from pursuing any activity or
activities covering petitioners land.
On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has already
contributed substantially to the land reform program of the government, as follows: 300
hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70s and another 400 hectares in the nearby
Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which they have not received
just compensation up to this time.
Neither can the assertion that there is no clear and tangible compensation package
arrangements for the beneficiaries hold water as, in the first place, there are no
beneficiaries to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.
Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property
for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting
autonomy to local government units in the management of their local afairs. Stated more

simply, the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and afords no room for
any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units
autonomy in their local afairs including the power to convert portions of their agricultural
lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities.
WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate and in view
of the favorable recommendations of the various government agencies abovementioned, the
subject Order, dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian
Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE and the instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby
APPROVED.[17]
17.On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.
18 On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March 29, 1996,
NQSRMDC and the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a
Memorandum of Agreement whereby the former donated four (4) hectares from the subject
land to DECS for the establishment of the NQSR High School.[18]
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it
discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found
out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with
Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the
President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation,
caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 [19] of the Registry of
Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the
name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 [20] of the Registry of Deeds of
Bukidnon.
19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint [21] with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for
annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141
others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining Order on April 30, 1997 [22] and a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997,[23] restraining the DAR and 141 others from
entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order [24] was issued by then Executive Secretary
Ruben D. Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the

reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29,
1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.
21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23,
1997 Order of the President.
22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was
challenged by some alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the lifting of the
injunction and for the issuance of a writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC case.
23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in
front of the DAR Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29,
1996. On October 10, 1997, some persons claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the
NQSRMDC property filed a motion for intervention (styled as Memorandum In Intervention)
in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion of the
entire 144-hectare property be set aside.[25]
24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to
resolve their grievance within the framework of the law.He created an eight (8)-man Fact
Finding Task Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into
the controversy and recommend possible solutions to the problem.[26]
25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers protest by
issuing the so-called Win/Win Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the President, through
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. NQSRMDCs application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect to the
approximately forty-four (44) hectare portion of the land adjacent to the
highway, as recommended by the Department of Agriculture.
2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed by an
irrigation canal and found to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to
qualified farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way to said portion from
the highway provided in the portion fronting the highway. For this purpose,
the DAR and other concerned government agencies are directed to

immediately conduct the segregation survey of the area, valuation of the

property and generation of titles in the name of the identified farmerbeneficiaries.
3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and
meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified farmerbeneficiaries.
4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed to expedite
payment of just compensation to NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to be
covered by the CARP, including other lands previously surrendered by
NQSRMDC for CARP coverage.
5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full assistance to
the Department of Agrarian Reform in the implementation of this Order.
We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on October 10, 1997
without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is unnecessary to pass upon it at
this time.
SO ORDERED.[27]
A copy of the Win-Win Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of
Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24,
1997[28] and, on December 4, 1997, they filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition
(under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (under Rule 58,ibid.),
against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D.
Garilao.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene[29] was filed by alleged farmerbeneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were
previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144hectare property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed[30] by the
petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the
Office of the President was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-managed
hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or
politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely political
decision to appease the farmers, by reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March

1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997.
[31]

Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C.

Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction when he
issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. [32] They availed of this extraordinary
writ of certiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[33] They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject
Resolution because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise
to seek a reconsideration .[34]
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that it
be dismissed outright on the following grounds:
(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly
with the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win
Resolution before filing the present petition; and
(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved, including the incident on
the motion for intervention filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper
or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of
jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. [35] On the other hand, an error
of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a
quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.[36] This error is correctable only by
the extraordinary writ of certiorari.[37]
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, [38] including
the Office of the President,[39] may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified
petition for review[40] within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or
resolution,[41] whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of
fact and law.[42]

However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is
inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged
resolution is patently illegal[43] and was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond
his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction [44] when said resolution
substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become
final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of
jurisdiction, not an error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule
43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an
original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have
correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
x x x x x x x x x.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases cases in which the
act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.[45]
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the
assailed illegal act may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court. The proper
court where the petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which
reads:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if
it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not
the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only
by the Court of Appeals. (4a)

Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional
Trial
[46]

Court

have

original

concurrent

jurisdiction

to

issue

writ

of

certiorari,

prohibition[47] and mandamus.[48] But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also

delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial
Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be
filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law or the Rules of
Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs.
Cuaresma, et. al.,[49] through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
x x x. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is
shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which
may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by
this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly,
Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the efectivity of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latters competence to issue the extraordinary writs was
restricted to those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed.There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue
of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
(inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. (Citations omitted)
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been
reiterated in subsequent cases, namely:[50] Uy vs. Contreras, et. al.,[51] Torres vs. Arranz,
[52]

Bercero vs. De Guzman,[53] and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al.[54] As we have further stated

in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary
to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted

to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of
the Courts docket.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present
petition in the interest of speedy justice [55] and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly
put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has
sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance
of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed
resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court
of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice
is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of
Appeals:[56]
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular
case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant
petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been
taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case."
As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse
when they failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking
judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is not necessary when the
questioned resolution is a patent nullity,[57] as will be taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the petitioners
of: (a) a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No.
37614) with the Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title,
damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others (Civil Case No. 2687-97) with the
Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition, constitute forum
shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle

applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with
litigation commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in
this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable
administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where
the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction (citations omitted).
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has been
laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), x x x and that is, forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, as follows:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity
of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well
as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts, and the identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter
action pendant.'[58]
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum
shopping. The test for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum
shopping is where a final judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action
under consideration. A cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not
show that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretarys order to proceed with the
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the
civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title issued
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following
grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs title, used
documents which were earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of
NQSRMDCs title was made without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice
to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely diferent from the
said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed Win-Win Resolution of the Office
of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after the
previous two cases were instituted.
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention filed
by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their motion,
movants contend that they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are

real parties in interest.To prove this, they attached as Annex I in their motion a Master List
of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was made pursuant to the
directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed Win-Win Resolution which directs the
DAR to carefully and meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified
farmer-beneficiaries. However, a perusal of the said document reveals that movants are
those purportedly Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval. In other words,
movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real
interest means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. [59] Undoubtedly, movants interest
over the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as
intimated earlier, null and void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on.
Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated March
29,1996 can still be substantially modified by the Win-Win Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the
Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as
otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration
thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and
entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases. (Emphasis ours)
It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the
Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so
modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more

authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution.
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the
Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted
to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second paragraph of
Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that
the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision
of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in reopening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had
already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal
precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[60] we held:
Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President
had long become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It
is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the
force and binding efect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata [Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdijna Merchandizing Co., Inc. v.
Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res
judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent
authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or
administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of
courts having general judicial powers [Brillantes v. Castro, supra at 503].
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court
or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and
regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. [61] This is a
fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to
litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by
those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must
immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of
March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly
stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street[62] in a 1918 case,[63] is a lawless thing, which can be

treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its
head.[64]
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution
dated November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To Intervene filed by alleged
farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Melo, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 131457. November 17, 1998]

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B.
BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA,
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
OPINION
MARTINEZ, J.:

This pertains to the two (2) separate motions for reconsideration filed by herein
respondents and the applicants for intervention, seeking a reversal of our April 24, 1998
Decision nullifying the so-called "win-win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997, issued by
the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, and denying the applicants' Motion
For Leave To Intervene.
Respondents' motion is based on the following grounds:
"I.
THE SO-CALLED WIN-WIN RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 7, 1997 IS NOT A VOID
RESOLUTION AS IT SEEKS TO CORRECT AN ERRONEOUS RULING. THE MARCH 29,
1996 DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COULD NOT AS YET BECOME
FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS TO BE BEYOND MODIFICATION.
"II.
THE PROPER REMEDY OF PETITIONERS IS A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 43
AND NOT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
"III.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A CONDITION SINE QUA
NON BEFORE A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI MAY BE FILED BECAUSE THE QUESTIONED
RESOLUTION IS NOT PATENTLY ILLEGAL.
"IV.
PETITIONERS ARE GUILTY OF FORUM-SHOPPING BECAUSE ULTIMATELY PETITIONERS
SEEK THE SAME RELIEF, WHICH IS TO RESTRAIN THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM FROM PLACING THE SUBJECT 144-HECTARE PROPERTY UNDER THE
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW (CARL)."[1]
For their part, the grounds relied upon by the applicants for intervention are as follows:
"I.
THE INTERVENORS POSSESS A RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THESE PROCEEDINGS.
"II.

THE MODIFICATION BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (OP) OF ITS 29 MARCH 1996
DECISION, THROUGH THE 7 NOVEMBER 1997 'WIN-WIN' RESOLUTION, WAS NOT
ERRONEOUS BUT WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF ITS POWERS AND PREROGATIVES.
"III.
THE 'WIN-WIN' RESOLUTION PROPERLY ADDRESSES THE SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES
RELATIVE TO THIS CASE."[2]
Both movants also ask that their respective motions be resolved by this Court en banc
since the issues they raise are, described by the respondents, "novel," [3] or, as characterized
by the applicants for intervention, of "transcendental significance." [4] Most specifically,
movants are presenting the issue of whether or not the power of the local government units
to reclassify lands is subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
The instant motions are being opposed vehemently by herein petitioners.
The grounds raised here were extensively covered and resolved in our challenged
Decision. A minute resolution denying the instant motions with finality would have been
sufficient, considering that the same follows as a matter of course if warranted under the
circumstances as in other equally important cases.However, in view of the wide publicity
and media coverage that this case has generated, in addition to the demonstrations staged
at the perimeter of this Court, as well as the many letters coming from diferent sectors of
society (the religious and the NGOs) and even letters from abroad, we deem it necessary to
write an extended resolution to again reiterate the basis for our April 24, 1998 Decision,
and hopefully write finis to this controversy.
To support their request that their motions be referred to the Court en banc, the
movants cited the Resolutions of this Court dated February 9, 1993, in Bar Matter No. 209,
which enumerates the cases that may be resolved en banc, among which are the following:
"x x x x x x x x x
3. Cases raising novel questions of law;
xxxxxxxxx
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof
merit the attention of the Court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual
membership of the Court en banc; and

x x x x x x x x x"
Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no
extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc. Specifically, the issue of
whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the
approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having been decided by this Court in the case
of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals [5] wherein we held that local
government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands
from agricultural to non-agricultural use. The dispositive portion of the Decision in the
aforecited case states:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province
of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondent's property; (b) orders the trial
court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of
Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to
convert or reclassify private respondent's property from agricultural to nonagricultural use.
"x x x x x x x x x" (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by a unanimous vote of
all five (5) members of the Second Division of this Court. Stated otherwise, this Second
Division is of the opinion that the matters raised by movants are nothing new and do not
deserve the consideration of the Court en banc.Thus, the participation of the full Court in
the resolution of movants' motions for reconsideration would be inappropriate.
We shall now resolve the respondents' motion for reconsideration.
In our Decision in question, we struck down as void the act of the Office of the
President (OP) in reopening the case in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424 through the issuance of
the November 7, 1997 "win-win" Resolution which substantially modified its March 29,
1996 Decision that had long become final and executory, being in gross disregard of the
rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. It will
be recalled that the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared by the same office as final
and executory in its Order dated June 23, 1997 after the respondents DAR's motion for
reconsideration of the said decision was denied in the same order for having been filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period.

In their instant motion, the respondents contend that the "win-win" Resolution of
November 7, 1997 "is not a void resolution as it seeks to correct an erroneous ruling,"
hence, "(t)he March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President could not as yet
become final and executory as to be beyond modification."[6]
The respondents explained that the DAR's failure to file on time the motion for
reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was "excusable:"
"The manner of service of the copy of the March 29, 1996 decision also made it
impossible for DAR to file its motion for reconsideration on time. The copy was
received by the Records Section of the DAR, then referred to the Office of the
Secretary and then to the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance.By the time it was
forwarded to the litigation office of the DAR, the period to file the motion for
reconsideration had already lapsed. Instead of resolving the motion for reconsideration
on the merits in the interest of substantial justice, the Office of the President denied the
same for having been filed late."[7](Emphasis supplied)
We cannot agree with the respondents' contention that the June 23, 1997 OP Order
which denied the DAR's motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision for
having been filed late was "an erroneous ruling" which had to be corrected by the November
7, 1997 "win-win" Resolution. The said denial of the DAR's motion for reconsideration was
in accordance with Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987,
which mandates that "decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall,
except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen
(15)

days

from

receipt

of

copy

thereof

x,

unless a motion

for

reconsideration thereof is filed within such period."[8]

Contrary to the respondents' submission, the late filing by the DAR of its motion for
reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision is not excusable.The respondents'
explanation that the DAR's office procedure after receiving the copy of the March 29, 1996
OP Decision "made it impossible foe DAR to file its motion for reconsideration on
time" since the said decision had to be referred to the different departments of the
DAR, cannot be considered a valid justification. There is nothing wrong with referring the
decision

to

the

departments

concerned

for

the

preparation

of

the

motion

for

reconsideration, but in doing so, the DAR must not disregard the reglementary period
fixed by law, rule or regulation. In other words, the DAR must develop a system of
procedure that would enable it to comply with the reglementary period for filing said
motion. For, the rules relating to reglementary period should not be made subservient

to the internal office procedure of an administrative body. Otherwise, the noble

purpose of the rules prescribing a definite period for filing a motion for
reconsideration of a decision can easily be circumvented by the mere expediency of
claiming a long and arduous process of preparing the said motion involving several
departments of the administrative agency.
The respondents then faulted the Office of the President when they further stressed
that it should have resolved "the (DAR's) motion for reconsideration on the merits in the
interest of substantial justice," instead of simply denying the same for having been filed
late,[9] adding that "technicalities and procedural lapses" should be "subordinated to the
established merits of the case."[10] Respondents thus plead for a relaxation in the
application of the rules by overlooking procedural lapses committed by the DAR.
We are persuaded.
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due regard
since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the worsening
problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of justice. The
requirement is in pursuance to the bill of rights inscribed in the Constitution which
guarantees that "all persons shall have a right to the speedy disposition of their before all
judicial, quasi-judicial andadministrative bodies,"[11] the adjudicatory bodies and the
parties to a case are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. [12] While it is true that a
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.[13] There have been some instances wherein this Court allowed a
relaxation in the application of the rules, but this flexibility was "never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity." [14] A liberal interpretation and
application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances.
In the instant case, we cannot grant respondents the relief prayed for since they have
not shown a justifiable for a relaxation of the rules. As we have discussed earlier, the DAR/s
late filing of its motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was not
justified. Hence, the final and executory character of the said OP Decision can no longer be
disturbed, much less substantially modified. Res judicata has set in and the adjudicated
thing or afair should forever be put to rest. It is in this sense that we, in our decision
under reconsideration, declared as void and of no binding efect the "win-win" Resolution of
November 7, 1997 which substantially modified the March 29, 1996 Decision, the said

resolution having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and in arrant violation of the
fundamental and time-honored principle of finality to administrative determinations.
The movants, however, complain that the case was decided by us on the basis of a
"technicality," and, this has been the rallying cry of some newspaper columnists who insists
that we resolve this case not on mere "technical" grounds.
We do not think so.
It must be emphasized that a decision/resolution/order of an administrative body,
court

or

tribunal

which

is

declared

void

on

the

ground

that

the

same

was

rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, is by no

means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is elementary thatjurisdiction of a body,
court or tribunal is an essential and mandatory requirement before it can act on a case or
controversy. And even if said body, court or tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, but has
acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, such act is still
invalid. The decision nullifying the questioned act is an adjudication on the merits.
In the instant case, several fatal violations of the law were committed, namely: (1) the
DAR filed its motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision way beyond
reglementary period; (2) after the said motion for reconsideration was denied for having
been filed late, the March 29, 1996 Decision was declared final and executory, but the DAR
still filed a second motion for reconsideration which is prohibited by the rules;[15] (3)
despite this, the second motion for reconsideration was entertained by herein respondent,
then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, and on the basis thereof, issued the
"win-win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997, substantially modifying the March 29, 1996
Decision which had long become final and executory; and (4) the reopening of the same
case through the issuance of the November 7, 1997 "win-win" resolution was in flagrant
infringement of the doctrine of res judicata. These gravebreaches of the law, rules and
settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical nature.
It should be stressed that when the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and
executory, vested rights were acquired by the herein petitioners, namely, the province of
Bukidnon, the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and the NQSR Management and
Development Corporation, and all others who should be benefited by the said
decision. Thus, we repeat, the issue here is not a question of technicality but that of
substance and merit. In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in the case
of Videogram Regulatory Board vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[16] "(j)ust as a losing party

has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has
the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case."
Another matter which the movants bring to our attention is that when the DAR's Order
denying petitioners' application for conversion was first brought by petitioner Carlos O.
Fortich to the Office of the President, the appropriate administrative rules were not
complied with. We wish to point out that, apparently, movants had the opportunity to
questions this alleged lapsed in procedure but chose not to avail of the same. For the "winwin" Resolution itself never mentioned this supposed procedural lapse as an issue. Here,
the issue which has been brought to the fore is the validity of the "win-win" Resolution of
November 7, 1997, not that of any other previous proceedings. The movants cannot now
question the supposed procedural lapse for the first time before us. it should have been
raised and resolved at the first opportunity, that is, at the administrative level.
The other grounds raised by respondents in their instant motion for reconsideration
concerning the propriety of petitioners' remedy, the absence of a motion for reconsideration
of the "win-win" Resolution before resorting to the present petition for certiorari, and forum
shopping have already been extensively dealt with in our challenged decision. We need not
further elaborate on these grounds except to state that the same lacks merit.
With respect to the motion for reconsideration filed by the applicants for intervention,
we likewise find the same unmeritorious. The issue of the applicants' right to intervene in
this proceedings should be laid to rest. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who
wishes to intervene must have a "certain right" or "legal interest" in the subject matter of
the litigation.[17] Such interest must be "actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate,
and not simply contingent and expectant."[18]
Here, the applicants for intervention categorically admitted that they were not tenants
of

petitioner

NQSR

Management

and

Development

Corporation,

but

were

merely seasonal farmworkers in a pineapple plantation on the subject land which was
under lease for ten (10) years to the Philippine Packing Corporation. [19] Respondent, then
DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao, also admitted in his Order of June 7, 1995 that "the
subject land is neither tenanted nor validity covered for compulsory acquisition xxx." [20]
Under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, the right to own directly or
collectively the land they till belongs to the farmers and regularfarmworkers who are
landless, and in the case of other farmworkers, the latter are entitled "to receive a just
share of the fruits" of the land. The pertinent portion of the aforecited constitutional
provision mandates:

"Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on
the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof. x x x" (Emphasis supplied)
Commenting on the above-quoted provision, the eminent constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J., one of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, declares that under the
agrarian reform program the equitable distribution of the land is a right given to
landless farmers and regular farmworkers

to

own

the

land

they

till,

while

the other or seasonal farmworkers are only entitled to a just share of the fruits of the land.
[21]

Being merely seasonal farmerworkers without a right to own, the applicants' motion for

intervention must necessarily fail as they have no legal or actual and substantial interest
over the subject land.
It is noteworthy that even the "win-win" Resolution of November 7, 1997 which the
herein respondents and the applicants for intervention seek to uphold did not recognize the
latter as proper parties to intervene in the case simply because the qualified farmerbeneficiaries have yet to be meticulously determined as ordered in the said
resolution. The dispositive portion of the "win-win" Resolution reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the President, through
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
"(3) The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and
meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified beneficiaries.
xxxxxxxxx
"We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on October 10,
1997 without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is unnecessary to pass
upon it at this time.
"SO ORDERED."[22] (Emphasis supplied)
These are all that are necessary to dispose of the instant separate motions for
reconsideration considering that the crucial issue in the present petitioner forcertiorari is
simply the validity of the "win-win" resolution.

But even if we tackle the other issues which the movants describe as "substantial,"
namely: (1) whether the subject land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation
facility; (2) whether the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition
(NCA); (3) whether the land is tenanted, and if not, whether the applicants for intervention
are qualified to become beneficiaries thereof; and (4) whether the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sumilao has the legal authority to reclassify the land into industrial/institutional use, to
our mind, the March 29, 1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and properly disposed of the
aforementioned issues. We quote the pertinent portions of the said Decision:
"After a careful evaluation of the petition vis-avis the grounds upon which the denial thereof
by Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the instant application for conversion by the
Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the
land in question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities
for employment and bring real development in the area towards a sustained economic
growth of the municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to would-be
beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee such
benefits.
"Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with
irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is
true that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes
thru the property (as a right of way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the
lower portion thereof. the land itself, subject of the instant petition, is not irrigated
as the same was, for several years, planted with pineapple by the Philippine-Packing
Corporation.
"On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory
Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas
covered by NCA is not applicable, suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared
null and void by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as
early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed
out that under Section 8 R.A. No. 6657, the subject property could not validly be the
subject of compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease contract with
Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered
the DAR Regional Office and the land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to
desist from pursuing any activity or activities covering petitioner's land.

"On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has
already contributed substantially to the land reform program of the government, as
follows: 300 hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70's and another 100 hectares
in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which
they have not received 'just compensation' up to this time.
"Neither can the assertion that 'there is no clear and tangible compensation package
arrangements for the beneficiaries' hold water as, in the first place, there are no
beneficiaries to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.
"Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property
for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting
autonomy to local government units in the management of their local affairs. Stated
more simply, the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords
no room for any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local
government units autonomy in their affairs including the power to convert portions
of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and
disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.
"WHEREFORE, in pursuant of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate and in
view of the favorable recommendations of the various government
agencies abovementioned, the subject Order, dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon.
Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE and the instant
application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED."[23] (Emphasis supplied)
It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies which have acquired
expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court, [24]considering that the
Office of the President is presumed to be most competent in matters falling within its
domain.
The interest of justice is invoked by movants. We are aware of that famous adage of the
late President Ramon Magsaysay that "those who have less in life should have more in
law." Our affirmation of the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision is precisely pro-poor
considering that more of the impoverished of society will be benefited by the agroeconomical development of the disputed land which the province of Bukidnon and the
municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to undertake. To our mind, the OP Decision of
March 29, 1996 was for the eventual benefit of the many, not just of the few. This is clearly

shown from the development plan on the subject land as conceived by the petitioners. The
said plan is supposed to have the following components as indicated in the OP Decision of
March 29, 1996:
"1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the following: Institute for
Continuing Higher Education; Institute for Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical
School); Institute for Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and
Mindanao Sports Developments Complex which covers an area of 24 hectares;
"2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn oil, corn
starch, various corn products; rice processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice;
cassava processing for starch, alcohol and food delicacies; processing plants, fruits and
fruit products such as juices; processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared for
market; cold storage and ice plant; cannery system; commercial stores; public market; and
abattoir needing about 67 hectares;
"3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation, horse-back
riding, memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover 33 hectares; and
"4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel, restaurants,
dormitories and a housing covering an area of 20 hectares."[25]
Expressing full support for the proposed project, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao,
Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying the
subject 144-hectare land from agricultural to industrial/institutional use with a view of
providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new economic vitality,
provide more jobs and raise the income of its people. The said project was also
supported by the Bukidnon Provincial Board which, on the basis of a Joint Committee
Report submitted by its Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian Reform and SocioEconomic Committee, approved the said ordinance on February 1, 1994, now docketed as
Resolution No. 94-95.
Impressed with the proposed project, several government agencies and a private
cooperative, including the people of the afected barangay, recommended the same. Again,
we quote the pertinent portion of the OP Decision of March 29, 1996:
"The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995, adopted by
the Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its
flagship projects. The same was likewise favorably recommended by the Provincial
Development Council of Bukidnon; the municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR;

the Regional Office (Region X) of the DENR (which issued an Environmental Compliance
Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive Director, signing 'By Authority of PAUL G.
DOMINGUEZ,' Office of the President - Mindanao; the Secretary of DILG; and
Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.
"In the same vein, the Natioal Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office,
Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Juluis S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation
Office, interposed NO OBJECTION to the proposed conversion x x x. Also, the Kisolom-San
Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon,
interposed no objection to the proposed conversion of the land in question 'as it will
provide more economic benefits to the community in terms of outside investments
that will come and employment opportunities that will be generated by the projects
to be put up x x x.'
"On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at the
Kisolan Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose Macalindong of DAR
Central Office and DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the affected barangay
rallied behind their respective officials in endorsing the project." [26] (Emphasis
supplied)
In this regard, the petitioners gave this assurance: "The proposed project is petitioners'
way of helping insure food, shelter and lifetime security of the greater majority of Sumilao's
22,000 people. It is capable of employing thousands of residents, enabling them to earn
good income ranging about P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 for each."[27]
We express our grave concern with the manner some sectors of society have been trying
to influence this Court into resolving this case on the basis of considerations other than the
applicable law, rules and settled jurisprudence and the evidence on record. We wish to
emphasize that withstanding the previous adverse comments by some columnists in the
print media, the assailed Decision was arrived at in the pursuit of justice and the rule of
law.
Finally, for those who refuse to understand, no explanation is possible, but for those
who understand, no explanation is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the separate motions for reconsideration of the April 24, 1998 Decision
of this Court, filed by the respondents and the applicants for intervention, are
hereby DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.

Ros, et al. vs DAR, et al.

G.R. No. 132477, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land. By virtue of a
Municipal Ordinance, these lands were reclassified as industrial lands. As part of their
preparation for the development of the subject lands as an industrial park, petitioners
secured all the necessary permits and appropriate government certifications.
However, the DAR disallowed the conversion of the subject lands for industrial use
and directed the petitioners to cease and desist from further developments on the land.
Petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Injunction with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. However, the RTC,
ruling that it is the DAR which has jurisdiction, dismissed the complaint.
When the case was brought to the SC, it was referred to the CA. However, the CA
affirmed the dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DAR has the primary jurisdiction over the case.
After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the
process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to approve or disapprove
applications for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into nonagricultural uses, pursuant to Section 4(i) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize under certain conditions, the
reclassification or conversion of agricultural lands.

It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the
complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and appellate courts under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts
from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested
in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
2. Whether or not the RTC can issue a writ of injunction against the DAR.
Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. No injunction,
restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their
implementation of the program.