JURISDICTION

CASE 1: SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R.

BAUTISTA V. LINDO, MARCH 10, 2014, G.R. No. 208232
FACTS: Alfredo Bautista, petitioners predecessor, inherited in
1983 a free patent land located in Davao covered by OTC. A
few years later, he subdivided the property and sold it to
several vendees, including the respondent Lindo via deed of
absolute sale. Two months later the OCT was canceled and the
TCTs was issued in favor of the vendees. On 1994, Bautista
filed a complaint for repurchase against respondent before the
RTC. During the pendency of the action Bautista died and
substituted by the petitioner, Efipania. Lindo entered into a
compromise agreement with the petitioners, whereby they
agree to cede to Efipania 3,230 sq.m. portion of the property as
well as to waive, abandon, surrender, and withdraw all claims
and counterclaims against each other. RTC approved the
compromise agreement.
Other respondents filed a motion to dismiss alleging the lack of
jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground that the complaint was
failed to state the value of the property sought to be recovered
and alleges that the total value of the properties is only P
16,500. RTC dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject
matter?
RULING: The petition is meritorious. Jurisdiction of the RTCs
is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129, which reads:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil cases. RTCs shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction:
1 In all civil actions which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;

In civil actions which involve the title to, or possession

of, real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds 20,000
or for civil actions in Metro Manila where the value
exceeds 50,000 except actions for forcible entry into
and unlawful detainer.

Settled Jurisprudence considers some civil actions as incapable

of pecuniary estimation:
1 Action for specific performance.
2 Actions for support which require the determination of
the civil status
3 The right to support of the plaintiff
4 Those for the annulment of decision of the lower courts
5 Those for rescission or performance of contracts
6 Interpretation of a contractual stipulation.
In determining if the subject matter is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action must be sought. If
it is primarily for recovery of summed of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in RTC would depend
on the amount of the claim.
In this case, since the total selling price is less than 20,000 it
appears that MTC has jurisdiction over the case, however it is
incorrect since the reacquisition of the lot is but incidental to
and offshoot of the exercise of the right to repurchase the lot in
question and is not the principal or main relief or remedy
sought.

CASE 2: INOCENCIA
TAGALOG, Petitioner,
vs. MARIA LIM VDA. DE GONZALEZ, GAUDENCIA L.
BUAGAS, RANULFO Y. LIM, DON L. CALVO, SUSAN
C. SANTIAGO, DINA C. ARANAS, and RUFINA C.
RAMIREZ, Respondents.
Facts: On 5 February 2003, respondents Maria Lim Vda. de
Gonzalez, Gaudencia L. Buagas, Ranulfo Y. Lim, Don L.
Calvo, Susan C. Santiago, Dina C. Aranas, and Rufina C.
Ramirezfiled with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Toledo
City, Cebu, Branch 29, a Complaint 4 for Recovery of
Possession, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction with a Prayer
for a Temporary Restraining Order with Damages and
Attorneys Fees was filed against petitioner Inocencia Tagalog
(Tagalog). Respondents alleged that Tagalog occupied a portion
of the land as lessee and paid rent on a month to month basis
by virtue of a verbal contract. Tagalog built a house with light
materials on the land and when a strong typhoon hit Cebu,
Tagalogs house was damaged. Thereafter, respondents alleged
that Tagalog discontinued payingthe rent and stopped
inhabiting the house. Respondents informed Tagalog to vacate
the premises asserting that the verbal contract of lease was
deemed terminated upon the expiration of the monthly
contract. However, Tagalog refused to vacate claiming that she
was still a lessee.The RTC ruled that, in the complaint,
respondents prayed for the recovery of possession of the leased
property as owners. Thus, the issue of ownership, which was
within the original jurisdiction of the court was primordial and
the prayer for eviction was merely incidental there being no
written contract of lease between the parties.Petitioner
contends that the subject of the action is for unlawful detainer,
thus cognizable by a first level court or the Municipal Trial

Court (MTC). Since the case was filed with the RTC, a second
level court, the RTCs decision should be rendered void for
lack
of
jurisdiction
over
the
case.
Issue: The main issue for our resolution iswhether the Regional
Trial Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action.
Ruling: The jurisdiction of a particular court is determined by
the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. In order to determine whether the
lower court had jurisdiction, it is necessary to first ascertain the
nature of the complaint filed before it.It is clear that the case
involves only the issue of physical possession or unlawful
detainer as defined in Section 1 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
In De Leon v. CA, we held that unlawful detainer is the
withholding by a person from another of the possession of a
land or building to which the latter is entitled after the
expiration or termination of the formers right to hold
possession by virtue of a contract, express or implied. An
ejectment suit is brought before the MTC to recover not
possession de jure but physical possession only or possession
de facto, where dispossession has lasted for not more than one
year. Clearly, the RTC erred in not dismissing the case before
it.1wphi1 Under the Rules of Court, it is the duty of the court
to dismiss an action whenever it appears that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter. In sum, since respondents'
complaint should have been filed with the MTC, the RTC
seriously erred in proceeding with the case. The proceedings
before a court without jurisdiction, including its decision, are
null and void. It then follows that the appeal brought before the
appellate court, as well as the decisions or resolutions
promulgated in accordance with said appeal, is without force
and effect.

CASE 3: EDUARDO D. MONSANTO, DECOROSO D.

MONSANTO, SR., and REV. FR. PASCUAL D.
MONSANTO, JR., Petitioners,
vs. LEONCIO LIM and LORENZO DE GUZMAN,
Respondents. September 17, 2014, G.R. No. 178911
Facts:
Flordelis Menzon, Regional Director of the Home
Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG), requested the
intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto of the Regional
Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar on the alleged anomalous
auction sale conducted by Sheriff IV Lorenzo De Guzman.
According to Pag-IBIG, De Guzman previously acceded to its
request to move the date of the auction sale to January 20,
2004; however, to its surprise, the sale proceeded as originally
scheduled on January 15, 2004. Pag-IBIG also claimed that the
winning bid ofLeoncio Lim in the amount of P500,000.00 was
grossly disadvantageous to the government considering that the
outstanding loan obligations of the mortgagor, Eduardo
Monsanto, was more than the bid amount. Executive Judge
Monsanto refrained from acting on the letter considering that
Eduardo is his relative; instead he re-assigned the same to
Judge Usman. RTC conducted a hearing; Atty. Cesar Lee
argued on behalf of Pag-IBIG; and Pascual Monsanto appeared
on behalf of Eduardo. Judge Usman noted that no formal
petition or complaint was actually filed which presents a
judicial issue; moreover, the acts complained of partake of
administrative matter. Consequently, Judge Usman referred the
matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for further
action. Pascual filed with the OCA a Motion to Lift Writ of
Execution and Notice to Vacate. The OCA directed Judge
Usman to conduct an investigation and take action on he
Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate. PagIBIG informed the trial court that the loan of Eduardo had been

restructured and that Eduardo had commenced paying monthly

amortizations; that as a result of the restructuring, Pag-IBIG is
withdrawing its Petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure; and that
it is no longer interested in pursuing an administrative action
against De Guzman. Leoncio opposed Pag-IBIGs
manifestation. Leoncio filed a Manifestation with Ex-Parte
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession claiming that the
reglementary period had elapsed without Eduardo redeeming
the subject property; as such, he is already entitled to the
issuance of a writ of possession. RTC finds that the instant
motion to lift writ of execution and notice to vacate the
[premises] is devoid of merit, hence denied. The motion for
issuance of writ of possession filed by Leoncio Lim through
counsel Atty. Labid being meritorious is hereby ordered
GRANTED, hence let a writ of possession be issued
immediately in favor of Mr. Leoncio Lim purchaser in good
faith. CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC.
Ruling:
The Petition is dismissed. Filing the appropriate initiatory
pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Section 5,
Rule 1 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that [a] civil
action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in
court. Moreover, [e]very ordinary civil action must be based
on a cause of action. In this case, records show that no formal
complaint or petition was filed in court. There being no proper
initiatory pleading filed, then the RTC Branch 28 did not
acquire jurisdiction over the matter/case. We have also noted
that no docket fees were paid before the trial court. Section 1,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court mandates that [u]pon the filing
of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or
proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in full.

It is hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over a case

only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.Since no
docket or filing fees were paid, then the RTC Branch 28 did not
acquire jurisdiction over the matter/case. It therefore erred in
taking cognizance of the same. Consequently, all the
proceedings undertaken by the trial court are null and void, and
without force and effect. All proceedings, processes and writs
emanating therefrom are likewise NULLIFIED and VOIDED
for lack of jurisdiction.
CASE 5: Spouses De Pedro vs Romasan Development
Corp and Manuel Ko, G.R. No. 158002
FACTS:Spouses de Pedro filed a complaint
against the respondents Romasan Development Corporation
and Manuel Ko for damages with prayer for preliminary
injunction. The complaint averred that the spouses were the
registered owner of a parcel of land, that the respondents
started putting up a barbed wire fence on the perimeter of the
adjacent property.

The respondents alleged that they were owners of the

land as evidenced by a TCT. Then the trial court issued
an order to have a relocation survey of the property to
verify its location. The respondent also filed a
manifestation motion to dismiss stating that there was
no legal or factual basis for the complaint as shown on
the survey reports conducted by the survey team. Hence
the petitioners had no cause of action against them. The
trial court granted the motion to dismiss.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order, alleging it was premature for the court to dismiss

the complaint without affording them the right to

adduce their evidence on their claim of damages.
Petition was denied, the CA affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeal has no jurisdiction

to resolve the issue being raised by the petitioners?
RULING:

The Court of Appeal ruled that the petitioners had every

opportunity to question and object the composition of
the survey team before the trial court, since they failed
to do so, they cannot now allowed to do the same on
appeal and according to the CA, it could not take
judicial noticed of the alleged cases filed against the
chairman of the survey team since this was not one of
the matters which the court could take judicial notice of
whether mandatory or directory.
The Supreme Court in denying the petition held that a
Certificate of Title once registered should not thereafter
be impugned, altered, change, modified, enlarged or
diminished, except in a direct proceeding permitted by
law. The resolution of the issue is thus not dependent on
the report of the survey team filed in the trial court.
The action of the petitioners against the respondents
based on the material allegations of the complaints is
one for recovery of possession of the subject property
and damages. However such action is not a direct but a
collateral attack of the TCT. Neither did the respondents
directly attack the TCT in their answer to the complaint.
Although the respondents stated in said answer by way
of special and affirmative defenses that the subject

property is covered by a TCT issued in the name of the

respondent corporation and as such the said respondent
is entitled to the possession thereof to the exclusion of
the petitioners such allegation does not constitute a
direct attack on the TCT but is likewise a collateral
attack thereon. Thus the court a quo had no jurisdiction
to resolve the decisive issue raised by the parties in the
trial court.
CASE 6: DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
v. TRINIDAD VALLEY REALTY
FACTS:
Trinidad Valley Realty and Development Corporation,
Frannie Greenmeadows Pastures, Inc., Isabel Greenland Agribased Resources, Inc., Isabel Evergreen Plantations, Inc.,
Michelle Farms, Inc., Isabel Greenmeadows Quality Products,
Inc., Ernesto Baricuatro, Claudio Villo, and Efren Nuevo
(hereinafter, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et. al.) are the registered owners of a parcel of
land in Vallehermoso, Negros Oriental. The landholding
consists of a total area of 641.7895 about 200 hectares
thereof are devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed 479.8905
hectares of the said landholding under the coverage of RA 6657
between March 1995 and July 2000. Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Transfer Certificates of Titles
(TCTs) were subsequently issued in favor of the agrarian
reform beneficiaries.

On June 10, 2004, Trinidad Valley Realty Development

Corporation, et. al. filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 64, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, a
Petition for Declaration of Unconstitutionality Through
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Restraining Order
against the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the DAR, and
the beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). The DAR filed its Answer and one of their
assertions is that the RTC has no jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in agrarian reform cases,
which is vested by Section 54 of RA 6657, in the Court of
Appeals (CA).
Subsequently, Trinidad Valley Realty and Development
Corporation, et. al. filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Petition
and for Admission of the Amended Petition in order to change
the nature of the action from a special civil action of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus to an ordinary action of annulment
of land titles. The DAR, et. al. opposed the motion in its
Opposition. The RTC conducted a hearing and held that it had
jurisdiction over the case. LRA and DAR filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but both
motions were denied by the RTC. In petition for certiorari filed
with the CA, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Solicitor General and the LRA sought to annul the subject
Order of the RTC. The CA reversed and set aside the Order of
the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the

original and amended petitions filed by the Trinidad Valley
Realty and Development Corporation, et. al.
RULING: The RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: It is a cardinal principle in remedial law that the
jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action is
determined by the law in force at the time of the filing of the
complaint and the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction is
determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law and
cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the
parties. It cannot also be acquired through or waived, enlarged
or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the
acquiescence of the court. It is neither for the court nor the
parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being
legislative in character. The nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined
based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the
plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the
allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.

CASE 7: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL

REVENUE, Petitioner, v. SILICON PHILIPPINES, INC.
(FORMERLY INTEL PHILIPPINES
MANUFACTURING, INC.), Respondent.
G.R. No. 169778, March 12, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner is the duly appointed Commissioner of Internal
Revenue empowered to perform the duties of said office
including, among others, the power to decide, approve and
grant refunds or tax credits of erroneously or excessively paid
taxes. Respondent Silicon Philippines, Inc., on the other hand,
is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the Philippines, engaged primarily in the
business of designing, developing, manufacturing, and
exporting advance and largescale integrated circuits
components (ICs).
6 May 1999, respondent filed with the OneStop Shop Inter
Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the
Department of Finance (DOF) an application for Tax
Credit/Refund of VAT paid for the second quarter of 1998 in
the aggregate amount of P29,559,050.44, representing its
alleged
unutilized
input
tax.
Thereafter, since no final action has been taken by petitioner on
respondents administrative claim for
refund, respondent filed a Petition for Review before the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA) on 30 June 2000 docketed as CTA Case
No. 6129.

CTA denied respondents claim for refund of input VAT on

domestic purchases of goods and services attributable to zero
rated sales on the ground that the export sales invoices
presented in support thereto do not have Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) permit to print, while the sales invoices do not
show that the sale was zerorated, all in violation of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997.
RULING:
It should be recalled that the CTA is a court of special
jurisdiction. As such, it can only take cognizance of such
matters as are clearly within its jurisdiction.22 In view thereof,
although the parties have not raised the issue of jurisdiction,
nevertheless, this Court may motu proprio determine whether
or not the CTA has jurisdiction over respondents judicial claim
for refund taking into consideration, the factual and legal
allegations contained in the pleadings filed by both parties and
found by the court a quo.
Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 1125,23 which was
thereafter amended by RA No. 9282,24 defines the appellate
jurisdiction of the CTA. The said provision, in part,
reads:chanRoblesvirtualL
Section 7. Jurisdiction. The Court of Tax Appeals shall
exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as
herein provided.
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases
involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation
thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal
Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue;

CASE 9: CITY OF LAPU-LAPU, Petitioner, v.

PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY, G.R. No.
184203
JURISDICTION OVER SUBJECT MATTER
FACTS: The City of Lapu-Lapu demanded from the PEZA
P32,912,350.08 in real property taxes for the period from 1992
to 1998 on the PEZAs properties located in the Mactan
Economic Zone. PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, praying that the
trial court declare it exempt from payment of real property
taxes. The trial court held that all privileges, benefits,
advantages, or exemptions granted to special economic zones
created under the Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992 apply to special economic zones created under the
Special Economic Zone Act of 1995. Since these benefits
include exemption from payment of national or local taxes,
these benefits apply to special economic zones owned by the
PEZA.
ISSUES: I. Whether the Regional Trial Court of Pasay had
jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the City of Lapu-Lapus
petition for declaratory relief.
HELD: Yes, The RTC of Pasay had no jurisdiction to hear, try,
and decide the City of Lapu-Lapus petition for declaratory
relief. The City was objecting to the venue of the action, not to
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay. In
essence, the City was contending that the PEZAs petition is a
real action as it affects title to or possession of real property,

and, therefore, the PEZA should have filed the petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City where the real

properties are located. The venue of an action depends on

whether the action is a real or personal action. Should the
action affect title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein, it is a real action. The action should be filed in the
proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. If the
action is a personal action, the action shall be filed with the
proper court where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
However, whatever objections the City has against the venue of
the PEZAs action for declaratory relief are already deemed
waived. Objections to venue must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity. The City did not file a motion to dismiss
the petition on the ground that the venue was improperly laid.
Neither did the City raise this objection in its answer. In any
event, the law sought to be judicially interpreted in this case
had already been breached. The Regional Trial Court of Pasay,
therefore, had no jurisdiction over the PEZAs petition for
declaratory relief against the City.

CASE 10: Villagracia v. 5th Sharia District Court (GR. No.

188832; April 23, 2014)

FACTS:
February 15, 1996 the respondent (Roldan E. Mala), who is a
Muslim, bought a parcel of land from Ceres Canete. March 3,
1996 A Transfer Certificate of Title was issued to the
respondent but the petitioner (Villagracia), who is a Christian,
occupied the land. The respondent filed an action against the
petitioner to recover the possession of the parcel of land before
the 5th Sharia District Court, which took cognizance of the case
and ruled in favor of the respondent (Roldan E. Mala).
ISSUE:
Did the 5th Sharia District Court have jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner (Villagracia), who is a Christian?
RULING: No, the 5th Sharia Distrit Court did not have the
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner (Villagracia), who
is a Christian. The Court ruled that jurisdiction over the person
is the power of the court to render a personal judgment or to
subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and
other rulings rendered in the action. A court acquires the
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by voluntary
appearance or valid service of summons. The law (Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines) which confers
jurisdiction to the Sharia District Court, provides that the same
has concurrent original jurisdiction with existing civil actions
over real actions not arising from customary contracts wherein

the parties involved are Muslims. In this case, the 5 th Sharia

District Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of

the petitioner (Villagracia) because he is not a Muslim who can

participate in the proceedings as provided by the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
CASE 14: LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
ATLANTA INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No. 193796, July 2,
2014
FACTS: Petitioner Land Bank, entered into a Subsidiary Loan
Agreement and with the City Government of Iligan to finance
the development and expansion of the city's water supply
system.
Accordingly, the City Government of Iligan, through its Bids
and Awards Committee (BAC), conducted a public bidding
wherein respondent Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta)
participated, however was disqualified. Atlanta decided to have
its disqualification reconsidered by the BAC, however opted,
instead, to participate in the re-bidding of the project.

Apprehensive of the BAC's use of bidding documents that

appeared to be in contravention of RA 9184 and its IRR,
Atlanta filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with an
urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the rebidding of the project against the City Government of Iligan,
the BAC, and Land Bank before the Manila RTC.
1. Manila RTC rendered a decision in favor of Atlanta and
declared the subject bidding null and void.

2. Hence, Land Bank's petition, asserting among others,

that the case is dismissible for improper venue.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over
the instant prohibition case and
eventually issue the writ prayed for.
RULING: No. While the Court, Court of Appeals and
Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, if what is
assailed relates to "acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person," the petition must be filed
"in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Court."
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court corresponds to Section
21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as "The
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980" (BP 129), which gives
Regional Trial Courts original jurisdiction over cases of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus, and injunction but lays down the limitation that the
writs issued therein are enforceable only within their respective
territorial jurisdictions.
Undoubtedly, the writ of prohibition issued by the Manila RTC
in order to restrain acts beyond the bounds of the territorial
limits of its jurisdiction (i.e., in Iligan City) is null and void.
Moreover, the necessity for the complaining bid participant to
complete the protest process before resorting to court action
cannot be overemphasized. It is a condition precedent to the
court's taking cognizance of an action that assails a bid process.

When precipitately taken prior to the completion of the protest

process, such case shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
CASE 16: Rubio vs Alabata
(G.R. No. 203947; February 26, 2014)
Parties:
Rufa A. Rubio, Bartolome Bantoto, Leon Alagadmo,
Rodrigo Delicta, and Adriano Alabata (Petitioners)
Lourdes Alabata (Respondent)
Nature of Action:
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 for
annulment of the November 16, 2011 Decision and the
September 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 02497.
The CA decision affirmed the February 28, 2008 resolution
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Dumaguete City
denying the petitioners plead for revival of judgment.
Facts:
The parties in this case were involved earlier case for
annulment of declaration of heirship and sale, reconveyance
and damages before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,
Dumaguete City.
The case was decided in favor of petitioner.
In its October 31, 1995 Decision, the trial court declared the
Declaration of Heirship and Sale" void and ordered the
respondent to reconvey the entire subject property to
petitioners.
As a matter of course, the respondent appealed to the CA.
She, however, later withdrew her appeal.

The Decision of the trial court eventually lapsed into finality

which paved the way for the RTC-43 Decision to lapse into
finality.
The respondents motion to withdraw was granted by the
CA and eventually became final and executory on June 20,
1997.
Judgment was later on issued and recorded in CA Book of
Entries of Judgments.
Unfortunately, the judgment was not executed within five
(5) years from the date of its entry.
A copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to their SACPAO (Special Appealed Cases Division of PAO) counsel, Atty.
Lourdes Naz. However, they were never informed about the
entry of judgment.
Atty Naz failed to inform PAO-Dumaguete of the said
development. When petitioners followed up with PAODumaguete, it was of the belief that the appeal of respondent
was still pending.
It was only in November 2007 (or more than 10 years after
the RTC-43 became final), when petitioners actually learned
that the favorable decision became final after their nephew
secured a copy of the entry of judgment from the trial court.
Petitioners eventually filed for an action for revival of
judgment through PAO-Dumaguete.
Respondent filed for an Answer with Affirmative Defense
and Motion to Dismiss.
RTC Branch 42 granted her Motion to dismiss.
Petitioners appealed before the CA. The appeal and the
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

Is the RTC correct in strictly applying the procedural rules on

prescription and dismissing the action for revival of judgment
filed by the petitioners?

and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no fault could be

attributed to petitioners. The Public Attorneys Office,
specifically the Special Appealed Cases Division, failed to

Legal Principles:
Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC.6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A
final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is
barred by the statute of limitations.
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues:
xxxx
(3) Upon a judgment
Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand
the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment
commences from the time the judgment became final.

informed them of the abandonment by respondent of her appeal

or of the entry of judgment. They went to PAO-Dumaguete and
they were told that the case was still pending on appeal.
Furthermore, the respondents withdrawal of her appeal means
that she respected RTC Branch 43s Decision, which declared
void the "Declaration of Heirship and Sale and ordered to
reconvey the entire subject property to petitioners. Since the
decision became final and executory, she has been in
possession of the property which rightfully belongs to
petitioners. She will continue to hold on to the property just
because of a technicality.

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November
16, 2011 Decision and the September 26, 2012 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02497 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court for appropriate action.
The lower court erred in strictly applying the procedural rules
on prescription. To allow a strict application of the rules,
however, would result in an injustice to petitioners considering
(1) that respondent decided not to contest the RTC-43 decision

Due to the peculiarities of this case, the Court deems it proper

to exercise its equity jurisdiction. The Court decided to relax
the rules and allow the action for the revival of judgment filed
by petitioners. The strict enforcement of the rules on
prescription will not serve the ends of justice in this case as the
petitioners stands to lose property which they rightfully own.
The Court also added that, the rule stating that the mistakes of
counsel bind the client, may not be strictly followed where
observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the
client's liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so
requires.

CASE 17: INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES,

INC., vs. VICTOR M. CREER III, G.R. No. 18192,
September 17, 2014
FACTS:
InterOrient hired Victor as Galley Boy on board the vessel M/V
MYRTO owned by Calidero Shipping Company, Ltd.
(Calidero) for a period of nine months, which may be extended
for three more months upon mutual consent of the parties. As
2nd Cook, Victor was tasked to get provisions from the cold
storage which is kept at its coldest temperature to maintain
freshness of the food stored therein. Victor alleged that when
he was about to get provisions from the cold storage, he felt a
sudden pain in his chest that radiated to his back. Since then, he
experienced incessant cough, nasal congestion, difficulty in
breathing, physical weakness, chills and extreme apprehension.
Dr. Fernando G. Ayuyao (Dr. Ayuyao), found Victor to be
suffering from Community-Acquired Pneumonia 1 and
Bronchial Asthma. After conducting a medical examination and
evaluation, Dr. Vicaldo issued a medical certificate indicating
that Victor was diagnosed with Hypertension, Stage II, and
Pulmonary Tuberculosis. Victor contended that during the
course of his treatment, he regularly informed InterOrient of
his sickness. However, he was neither apprised of his rights to
nor paid sickness allowance amounting to US$940. InterOrient
negated Victors claim for disability benefits averring that the
same has no factual, contractual or legal basis. It argued that
his discharge from the vessel was not occasioned by any illness
or injury sustained or contracted on board but was simply due
to completion or expiration of his contract; that he voluntarily
executed a Receipt and Release document wherein he
acknowledged that he had not contracted any illness while on
board. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of

merit. Victor appealed to the NLRC but was denied. The CA

granted the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Victor Creer IIIs illness is compensable under
the POEA contract?
RULING:
NO, Victors illness is not compensable. For an illness to be
compensable, Section 20(B)(6) of the 2000 Amended Standard
Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (2000 Amended
Standard Terms and Conditions), deemed incorporated in the
POEA Contract, requires the concurrence of two elements:
first, that the illness must be work-related; and second, that the
work- related illness must have existed during the term of the
seafarers employment contract. He failed to comply with both.
Victor
submitted no proof that his illness was contracted during the
term of his contract with InterOrient. As this Court has
reiterated in a number of cases, it is well aware of the principle
that, consistent with the purposes underlying the formulation of
the POEA Contract, its provisions must be applied fairly,
reasonably and liberally in favor of the seafarers, for it is only
then that its beneficent provisions can be fully carried into
effect. This exhortation cannot, however, be taken to sanction
the award of disability benefits and sickness allowance based
on flimsy evidence and/ or even in the face of an unjustified
non-compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement
under the POEA Contract. "Liberal construction is not a license
to disregard the evidence, or lack thereof on record; or to
misapply the laws." While we sympathize with Victor's plight,

the Court is constrained to deny his claims for disability

benefits absent substantial evidence on record to justify such
grant.
CASE 18: Paranaque Kings vs. CA
Facts: Catalina L. Santos is the owner of parcels of land
located at Paraaque. Frederick Chua leased the subject
property from defendant Catalina L. Santos, the said lease was
registered in the Register of Deeds. On 1979, Chua assigned all
his rights and interest and participation in the leased property to
Lee Ching Bing, by virtue of a deed of assignment and with the
conformity of defendant Santos, the said assignment was also
registered. On August 6, 1979 Bing also assigned all his rights
and interest in the leased property to Paraaque Kings
Enterprises, Incorporated by virtue of a deed of assignment and
with the conformity of defendant Santos. Sometime in 1988
Catalina Santos sold the eight parcels of land subject of the
lease to defendant David Raymundo for a consideration of 5M.
Upon learning of this fact, the representative of PKE wrote a
letter to defendant Santos, requesting her to rectify the error
and consequently realizing the error, she had it reconveyed to
her for the same consideration of P5M.Only 2 days after
Catalina Santos sold her properties did she reply to PKEs letter
saying period has lapsed. The counsel for defendant Santos
informed the petitioners PKE that the new owner is
RAYMUNDO. From the preceding facts, it is clear that the sale
was simulated and that there was collusion between the
respondents Santos and Raymundo in the sales of the leased

properties. Petitioner Paranaque demanded from the defendants

to rectify their unlawful acts that they committed, but
defendants refused and failed to comply with plaintiffs just and
valid demands. RTC issued the order dismissing the complaint
for lack of a valid cause of action. CA affirmed in toto.
Issue: Is such right of first refusal enforceable by an
action for specific performance?YES(WON the complaint filed
by Paranaque Kings states a valid cause of action. YES)
Ruling: The basis of the right of first refusal must be
the current offer to sell of the seller or offer to purchase of any
prospective buyer. Only after the optionee fails to exercise its
right of first priority under the same terms and within the
period contemplated, could the owner validly offer to sell the
property to a third person, again, under the same terms as
offered to the optionee.With respect to the contention of
respondent Raymundo that he is not privy to the lease contract,
not being the lessor nor the lessee referred to therein, he could
thus not have violated its provisions, but he is nevertheless a
proper party. Clearly, he stepped into the shoes of the ownerlessor of the land as, by virtue of his purchase, he assumed all
the obligations of the lessor under the lease contract. Moreover,
he received benefits in the form of rental payments.
Furthermore, the complaint, as well as the petition, prayed for
the annulment of the sale of the properties to him. Both
pleadings also alleged collusion between him and respondent
Santos which defeated the exercise by petitioner of its right of
first refusal. In order then to accord complete relief to
petitioner, respondent Raymundo was a necessary, if not
indispensable, party to the case. A favorable judgment for the

petitioner will necessarily affect the rights of respondent

Raymundo as the buyer of the property over which petitioner
would like to assert its right of first option to buy.
CASE 20: JAMES IMBONG v OCHOA
GR NO. 204819
ACTIONS: CLASS SUIT
FACTS: RA No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and productive health Act of 2012 (RH law) was
enacted by congress on Dec. 12, 2012. Shortly after the
passage of the law, challengers from various sectors of society
filed 14 petitions and 2 petitions in intervention assailing the
constitutionality of the RH law. The OSG attacks the legal
personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions.
The petitioners invariably invoke the transcendental
importance doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers
in establishing the requisite of locus standi
ISSUE: whether the petitioners have locus standi?
RULING: Locus standi is defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental
act.in relation to locus standi, the as applied challenge
embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality
of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own right.
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents,
not only to the public but also to the bench and bar, the
issuance raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After
all, RH law drastically affects the constitutional provisions of
the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and

expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these

and fact that the issues of contraception and reproduction
health have already caused deep division among a broad
spectrum of society, the court entertains no doubt that the
petitions raised issues of transcendental importance warranting
immediate court adjudication, more importantly, considering
that it its the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is
primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for life to be taken
away before taking action.
The Court cannot and should not exercise judicial restraint at
this time when the rights enshrined in the Constitution are
being imperiled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either
mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable
consequences.
CASE 21: ARIGO v. SWIFT
FACTS A petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan
involving violations of environmental laws and regulations in
relation to the grounding of the US military ship USS Guardian
over the Tubbataha Reefs on January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m.
while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the
northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs,
On April 17, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf
and in representation of their respective sector/organization and
others, including minors or generations yet unborn, filed the
present petition against the respondents on their corresponding
capacities.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has locus standi?

Ruling:

FACTS:

Yes. On the novel element in the class suit filed by the

petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do
ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement
of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of
their own and future generations. Xxx. The liberalization of
standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors
and generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules
which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases.
The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the
traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle
that humans are stewards of nature."

On October 19, 1998, RTC-Br. 8, Davao City rendered its

decision in favor of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff in a
collection case, against defendants Robert Limso, So Keng
Koc, et al. The defendants were directed to transfer the subject
properties in favor of Sy Sen Ben. The latter subsequently sold
the subject properties to one Nilda Lam who, in turn, sold the
same to JEWM on June 1, 2000. TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676
were then eventually issued in the name of JEWM, both of
which still bearing the same annotations as well as the notice of
lis pendens in connection with the other pending cases filed
against So Keng Kok. A year thereafter, Spouses Jesus G.
Crisologo and Nannette B. Crisologo prevailed in the separate
collection case filed before RTC-Br. 15, Davao City against the
same defendants. Thus, on July 1, 1999, the said defendants
were ordered to solidarily pay the Spouses Crisologo. After the
issuance of writ of execution, the Branch Sheriff issued a
notice of sale scheduling an auction the properties covered by
TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676, now, in the name of JEWM. To
protect its interest, JEWM filed a separate action before RTCBr. 14 for cancellation of lien with prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, cancellation of all the annotations on
the back of the pertinent TCTs; and the issuance of a

CASE 22: JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B.

CRISOLOGO,
Petitioners,
vs.
JEWM
AGROINDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION,
respondent.
G. R. No. 196894, March 3, 2014

permanent injunction order after trial on the merits. The

counsel then of spouses Crisologo questioned the authority of
the said court to restrain the execution proceedings in RTC-Br.
15. But JEWM opposed it on the ground that Spouses
Crisologo were not parties in the case. No motion to intervene

was, however, filed as the Spouses Crisologo believed that it

was unnecessary since they were already the John and Jane
Does named in the complaint of JEWM.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Spouses Crisologo are considered as
indispensable parties in the case for cancellation of lien.
RULING:
In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at
the back of a certificate of title, the persons considered as
indispensable include those whose liens appear as annotations
pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529. In Southwestern
University v. Laurente, the Court held that the cancellation of
the annotation of an encumbrance cannot be ordered without
giving notice to the parties annotated in the certificate of title
itself. It would, thus, be an error for a judge to contend that no
notice is required to be given to all the persons whose liens
were annotated at the back of a certificate of title. Here,
undisputed is the fact that Spouses Crisologos liens were
indeed annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 325675 and 325676.
Thus, as persons with their liens annotated, they stand to be
benefited or injured by any order relative to the cancellation of
annotations in the pertinent TCTs. In other words, they are as
indispensable as JEWM itself in the final disposition of the
case for cancellation, being one of the many lien holders. As
indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been
joined as defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court. The reason behind this compulsory

joinder of indispensable parties is the complete determination

of all possible issues, not only between the parties themselves
but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the
judgment. In this case, RTC-Br. 14, despite repeated pleas by
Spouses Crisologo to be recognized as indispensable parties,
failed to implement the mandatory import of the aforecited
rule.
CASE 25: MAGALLANES VS PALMER ASIA
FACTS:
Gerve was a Sales Agent of Andrews International, a
corporation engaged in manufacture and sale of fire
extinguishers. When three prospective buyers who issued
checks to Gerve cancelled their purchase, Angel, the president
of Andrews, returned to Gerve the bum checks. Because he
wants to get his commission, Gerve agreed to sign Sales
Invoices and to issue several checks as payment for the fire
extinguishers. However, the checks he issued when presented
to the drawee bank were dishonoured.
In 1995, Andrews International and Palmer Asia Inc.
merged whereby all the business of Andrews were to be
handled by Palmer Asia. The purpose according to Angel was
to appeal to a larger market. Being a family corporation, the
legal niceties were dispensed with. Andrews remained existing,
though not operational. It was neither dissolved nor liquidated.
Palmer Asia simply took over the business of Andrews
International. Andrews then sent demand letters to Gerve to
pay the face value of the checks, but the same were all
unheeded. Thus, Andrews filed several cases for violation of
BP 22 against Gerve, which Informations were filed before the
MTC of Makati City. The counsel of Palmer then filed an entry
of appearance in the case; however, the docket numbers were

for a different case and a different court, Branch 67; no copy of

the motion was furnished Gerve. Angel, the president of
Andrews explained that Andrews transferred all its business to
Palmer. Thus Gerve filed an Omnibus Motion To Disqualify
Private Prosecutor And Strike Out Testimony of Angel.
According to him, since all the business of Andrews were taken
over by Palmer it should be the latter who is the real party in
interest and must file the case, not Andrews. In its opposition,
Angel averred that the two corporations share the same set of
officers, same offices, had the same set of customers and had
the same products, thus for all intents and purposes, Palmer
should be regarded as an agent of Andrews.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palmer Asia is the real party in interest
and must be the one who should file the case.
RULING: Palmer Asia is not the real party in interest; it was
never a party to the proceedings at the trial court.
Under our procedural rules, a case is
dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon
proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-ininterest, hence grounded on failure to state a
cause of action. In the instant case, Magallanes
filed a motion to dismiss in accordance with the
Rules of Court, wherein he claimed that:
x x x the obvious and only real party in
interest in the filing and prosecution of the civil
aspect impliedly instituted with x x x the filing of
the foregoing Criminal Cases for B.P. 22 is
Andrews International Products, Inc.

The alleged bounced checks issued by x x x

Magallanes were issued payable in the name of
Andrews
International
Products,
Inc.
The
[n]arration of [facts] in the several Informations
for violation of B.P. 22 filed against Magallanes
solely mentioned the name of Andrews
International Products, Inc.The real party in this
case is Andrews, not Palmer.

CASE 26: ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS and

JAIME
AGUILAR
HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALAY BUHAY
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC.,
and WESLIE TING GATCHALIAN, Respondents. G.R. No.
203775
August 5, 2014

FACTS:
On 28 August 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed COMELEC
Resolution SPP 10-013, dated 11 October 2011, cancelling the
certificate of registration of the Alliance of Barangay Concerns

(ABC) Party-List which won in the party-list elections in the

2010 national elections. The disqualification of the ABC PartyList resulted in the re-computation of the party-list allocations
in the House of Representatives, in which the COMELEC
followed the formula outlined in the case of Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) v. Commission on Elections.
The COMELEC then issued Minute Resolution No. 12-0859,
in which it resolved:

xxx
On 25 October 2012, petitioners Association of Flood Victims
and Jaime Aguilar Hernandez (Hernandez) filed with this Court
a special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners assert that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
issued Minute Resolution No. 12-0859. Furthermore,
petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to
compel publication of the COMELEC Minute Resolution No.
12-0859.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners Association of Flood Victims and
Jaime Aguilar Hernandez, are a real party in interest.
RULING:
We dismiss the petition. Petitioners do not have legal capacity
to sue. Under Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, which must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in

interest. In their petition, it is stated that petitioner Association

of Flood Victims "is a non-profit and non-partisan organization
in the process of formal incorporation, the primary purpose of
which is for the benefit of the common or general interest of
many flood victims who are so numerous that it is
impracticable to join all as parties," and that petitioner
Hernandez "is a Tax Payer and the Lead Convenor of the
Association of Flood Victims." Clearly, petitioner Association
of Flood Victims, which is still in the process of incorporation,
cannot be considered a juridical person or an entity authorized
by law, which can be a party to a civil action. An
unincorporated association, in the absence of an enabling law,
has no juridical personality and thus, cannot sue in the name of

the association.5 Such unincorporated association is not a legal

entity distinct from its members. If an association, like
petitioner Association of Flood Victims, has no juridical
personality, then all members of the association must be made
parties in the civil action
CASE 28 : RODOLFO V. FRANCISCO, Petitioner,
vs. EMILIANA M. ROJAS, and the legitimate heirs of
JOSE A. ROJAS, namely: JOSE FERDINAND M. ROJAS
II, ROLANDO M. ROJAS, JOSE M. ROJAS, JR.,
CARMELITA ROJAS-JOSE, VICTOR M. ROJAS, and
LOURDES M. ROJAS, all represented by JOSE

FERDINAND M. ROJAS II, Respondents.

G.R. No. 167120,
April 23, 2014
FACTS: Alfredo Guido Jr. applied before the Land
Registration Authority for Reconstitution of Title of a huge
parcel of land that he inherited in Morong, Rizal. Five months
after he received the approval of his for Reconstitution of Title,
petitioner Rodolfo Francisco applied for Application of
Registration of Title of the same parcel of land which
overlapped with the property of respondent Emiliana Rojas etc.
The Court of First Instance of Rizal, acting on the land
registration court decision, declared petitioner as true and
absolute owner of the said property. Thereafter petitioner filed
with the same court petition for the issuance of decree of
registration. Then herein respondents - the Rojases filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA] claiming
that they came to know of the existence of petitioners
application for registration only "sometime in June 2000" when
a real estate agent by the name of Florentina Rivera who
discovered the same and brought it to their knowledge.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners land title was valid?
HELD: NO. On the assumption that what is being applied for
formed part of a bigger parcel of land belonging to the Guidos

and Rojases, then, as registered owners thereof, they (Guidos

and Rojases) should have been mentioned in the Application
for Registration as adjoining owners conformably with Section
15 of PD 1529, which requires in the application for
registration the inclusion of the full names and addresses of the
adjoining owners. Contrary to the mandatory requirement of
the law, there is nothing in the application for registration
alleging that the Rojases and Guidos are adjoining owners. As
adjoining owners, respondents are indispensable parties
entitled to actual and personal notice of the application for
registration. A valid judgment cannot be rendered where there
is want of indispensable parties like respondents who hold
subsisting Torrens title to the property in question.

CASE 29: NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS

ASSOCIATION
v.
THE
NATIONAL
POWER
CORPORATION (NPC), G.R. No. 156208
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
FACTS: Pursuant to Section 63[4] of the EPIRA Law and
Rule 33[5] of the IRR, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No.
2002-124 which provided for the Guidelines on the Separation
Program of the NPC and the Selection and Placement of
Personnel in the NPC Table of Organization.

Petitioners maintain that said Resolutions were not passed and

issued by a majority of the members of the duly constituted
Board of Directors since only three of its members, as provided
under Section 48[6] of the EPIRA Law, were present.

This, to our mind, violates the duty imposed upon the

specifically enumerated department heads to employ their own
sound discretion in exercising the corporate powers of the
NPC.

Petitioners claim that the acts of these representatives are

violative of the well-settled principle that delegated power
cannot be further delegated. Thus, petitioners conclude that the
questioned Resolutions have been illegally issued as it were not
issued by a duly constituted board since no quorum existed
because only three of the nine members, as provided under
Section 48 of the EPIRA Law, were present and qualified to sit
and vote.

Evidently, the votes cast by these mere representatives in favor

of the adoption of the said Resolutions must not be considered
in determining whether or not the necessary number of votes
was garnered in order that the assailed Resolutions may be
validly enacted.

ISSUES: 1. whether or not there is undue delegation of

delegated power when only the representatives of certain
members of the NPB attended the board meetings and passed
and signed the questioned Resolutions.
HELD: Yes, there is undue delegation of delegated powers.
According to the Court, the rule that requires an administrative
officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not
preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates, so long as it
is the legally authorized official who makes the final decision
through the use of his own personal judgment.
In the case at bar, it is not difficult to comprehend that in
approving NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125,
it is the representatives of the secretaries of the different
executive departments and not the secretaries themselves who
exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution.

Hence, there being only three valid votes cast out of the nine
board member, the NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No.
2002-125 are void and are of no legal effect.

CASE 30: NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V.

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF BATAAN, G.R. NO.
180654; APRIL 21, 2014
FACTS: March 28, 2003 the petitioner (NPC) received a
notice from the respondent to pay the unpaid taxes for the years
2001, 2002 and 2003. But the petitioner assails the
computation of taxes since there was a pending case between

the petitioner and City of Cabanatuan. May 12 and 14, 2003

the respondent sent notices of tax to the petitioner but the latter
argued that there was a law passed which transfers the function
(such as generating and supplying electricity), its properties
and all its existing liabilities to PSALM (Powers Sector Assets
and Liabilities Management Corporation) and TRANSCO
(National Transmission Company) so they (petitioner) are not
liable to the taxes demanded by the respondent since its
effectivity (June 26, 2001).
ISSUE: Is the petitioner the indispensable party in this case?
RULING: No, the petitioner is not the indispensable in this
case.The Court ruled that an indispensable party is one who has
an interest in the controversy or subject matter and in whose
absence there cannot be a determination between the parties
already before the court which is effective, complete or

equitable. In this case, the subject properties were transferred

to PSALM Corp. and TRANSCO by operation of law so they
are the indispensable parties that must be included before it
may properly go forward.