A SELECTION OF 2007

JURISPRUDENCE IN PERSONS &

FAMILY RELATIONS AND OTHER
CIVIL LAW SUBJECTS
Compiled by:

Bar Academics Committee 2008

LIBERTAS ET IUSTICIA

www.libertas.ph
A Selection of 2007 Jurisprudence in Persons & Family Relations and Other Civil Subjects

PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS

Q: What is the so-called “fixed symbol of individualization”?

The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for individualization which serves to distinguish
him from all others; this symbol is his name. Understandably, therefore, no person can change
his name or surname without judicial authority. This is a reasonable requirement for those
seeking such change because a person's name necessarily affects his identity, interests and
interactions. The State must be involved in the process and decision to change the name of any
of its citizens. (Republic v. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, 02 February 2007)

Q: Whose surname and middle name does an illegitimate child bear?

An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and
his mother' surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized
illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents OR acknowledged by the father in a
public document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother's surname as
his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated
child or an acknowledged child. (Ibid citing In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, G.R. No. 159966,
30 March 2005,)

ON PETTY QUARRELS AND

NOT LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE
The evidence adduced by petitioner merely showed that he and respondent had difficulty
getting along with each other as they constantly fought over petty things. However, there was
no showing of the gravity and incurability of the psychological disorder supposedly inherent in
petitioner (to bring about his disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage), except
for the mere statement or conclusion to that effect in the psychological report.
Petitioner also made much of the fact that he and respondent never lived together as
husband and wife. This, however, fails to move us considering that there may be instances
when, for economic and practical reasons, a married couple might have to live separately
though the marital bond between them remains. In fact, both parties were college students
when they got married and were obviously without the financial means to live on their own.
Thus, their not having lived together under one roof did not necessarily give rise to the
conclusion that one of them was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. It is worth noting that petitioner himself admitted that he and respondent
continued the relationship after the marriage ceremony. It was only when they started fighting
constantly a year later that he decided to file a petition to have the marriage annulled. It
appears that petitioner just chose to give up on the marriage too soon and too easily. (Halili v.
Santos-Halili, G.R. No. 165424, 16 April 2008)
The spouses’ frequent squabbles and respondent’s refusal to sleep with petitioner and
be supportive to him do not constitute psychological incapacity. The records show that
petitioner and respondent were living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which

Page 2 of 9
A Selection of 2007 Jurisprudence in Persons & Family Relations and Other Civil Subjects

bore them four children. Psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” “refusal”
or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illnessexisting at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. (Navarro v. Cecilia-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, 13 April 2007)

Q: As a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties
have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. TRUE OR FALSE.
False. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage
license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore,
the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for
a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the
law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential
matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and
effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all. (NOTE: The marriage in this case was
declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license when it was proved that the affidavit relating
to the period of 5-year cohabitation was merely fabricated. Republic v. Dayot, G.R. No. 175581,
28 March 2008)

Q: Is it required that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be

personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at
such declaration? There is no such requirement. If it can be proven by independent means that
one is psychologically incapacitated, there is no reason why the same should not be credited.
(Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. 168328, 28 February 2007)

Q: Manolito is said to be jobless and a drug user. Hence, not only that he is unable to support
his family but also refuses or is unwilling to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Will
this constitute psychological incapacity? NO. Manolito's state or condition or attitude has not
been shown to be a malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating
psychological condition. These are more of a "difficulty" if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in
the performance of some marital obligations. (Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. 168328, 28
February 2007)

Q: The psychiatrist’s report states that: “This extremely egocentric attitude manifest a person
suffering Narcissistic Personality Disorder that is considered to be severe, incurable and deeply
rooted with her functioning. Thus, making herself psychologically incapacitated so as to
comply with the essential marital functions.” Is this sufficient?
No. The report failed to identify the root cause of respondent's narcissistic personality disorder
and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. (Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, 27
February 2008)

Page 3 of 9
A Selection of 2007 Jurisprudence in Persons & Family Relations and Other Civil Subjects

ON THE NEED TO PRESENT EXPERT OPINION

Presentation of expert opinion is not a vital and mandatory requirement in filing a petition for
the declaration of nullity of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity referred to under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Examination of the person by a physician in order for the former
to be declared psychologically incapacitated is likewise not considered a requirement. What is
important, however, is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s
psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
Likewise, Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15,
2003, states:
“(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time
of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.”
The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered in
totality, should be sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party
concerned. (Zamora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141917, 07 February 2007)

Q: During the pendency of a case for the declaration of nullity of marriage, a compromise
agreement regarding distribution of the conjugal property was reached by the parties and
approved by the court. Is the compromise agreement valid?
YES. Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or
for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which
was judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This
conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still
pending. However, the Court must stress that this voluntary separation of property is subject to
the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary
interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code. (Maquilan v. Maquilan, G.R. No. 155409, 08
June 2007)

ONE’S UNFITNESS AS A LAWYER DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY MEAN

ONE’S UNFITNESS AS A HUSBAND AND VICE VERSA.
The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is why the disposition in a disbarment
case cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosa’s
charges sufficiently proved Justo’s unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish that
he is psychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case,
“the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the public from
the misconduct of officers of the court." On the other hand, in an action for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity, the question for

Page 4 of 9
A Selection of 2007 Jurisprudence in Persons & Family Relations and Other Civil Subjects

determination is whether the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental
incapacity that renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its purpose is to
free the innocent party from a meaningless marriage. In this case, as will be seen in the
following discussion, Justo’s acts are not sufficient to conclude that he is psychologically
incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected from a lawyer. (Paras v.
Paras, G.R. No. 147824, 02 August 2007)

Betty had always felt rejected, especially by her mother; that she never got rid of those
feelings of rejection even when she became an adult and got married; that her fits of jealousy
and temper tantrums, every time she sees her husband having a good interaction with their
employees, are ways of coping up with her feelings of rejection. This personality disorder led
Dr. Villegas to conclude that Betty is psychologically incapacitated. Rule.
The Court cannot see how respondent's personality disorder which, according to Dr. Villegas, is
inextricably linked to her feelings of rejection, would render her unaware of the essential
marital obligations. Second, Dr. Villegas also failed to fully and satisfactorily explain if the
personality disorder of respondent is grave enough to bring about her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Third, there is no evidence that such incapacity is incurable.
Fourth, the psychological incapacity considered under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant
to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. Fifth, marital obligation includes not only a
spouse's obligation to the other spouse but also one's obligation toward their children. In the
present case, no evidence was presented to show that respondent had been remiss in
performing her obligations toward their children as enumerated in Article 220 of the Family
Code.
In sum, it is not disputed that respondent is suffering from a psychological disorder.
However, the totality of the evidence presented in the present case does not show that her
personality disorder is of the kind contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code as well as
jurisprudence as to render her psychologically incapacitated or incapable of complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. (Tongol v. Tongol, G.R. No. 157610, 19 October 2007)

ON WHO MAY ASSAIL THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were
married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate “proper interest”
can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of
action. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the
petition to declare the nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it
affects their successional rights.

Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically
provides:

SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —

Page 5 of 9
A Selection of 2007 Jurisprudence in Persons & Family Relations and Other Civil Subjects

(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

While it is true that Niñal in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for
the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason that the impugned marriage therein
was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court in Niñal recognized that
the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil
Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. What we have before us
belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner’s marriage
to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope, to wit:

Section 1. Scope. – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines.

[If the marriage was celebrated during the effectivity of the Family Code,] Only an
aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or
intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate
rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of
the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
(Enrico v. Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173694, 28 September 2007; Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 167109, 06 February 2007)

ARTICLE 159, FAMILY CODE

The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of
its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love, security
and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extra-
judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing
therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods

Page 6 of 9
A Selection of 2007 Jurisprudence in Persons & Family Relations and Other Civil Subjects

unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged by
the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family
home, either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as
suggested by the parties.
More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of
the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has
passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them,
this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the
protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family
home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family
home.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot
on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership
of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from
said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary
residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no
compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the
partition of the property. (Arriola v. Arriola, G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008)

SALES

Q: Who stands next to the interest of a buyer who died before paying the rest of the purchase
price in a Contract to Sell?
When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as
the next “person” likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase price.
To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go
to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to
her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs—in
accordance with a will or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property.
Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita
Herrera’s demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell
was an obligation on both parties—Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible.
Margarita Herrera’s obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by
will or by operation of law. (NHA v. Almeida, G.R. No. 162784, 22 June 2007)

RECEIPT FOR PARTIAL PAYMENT

In this case, the “Receipt for Partial Payment” shows that the true agreement between the
parties is a contract to sell.
First, ownership over the property was retained by petitioners and was not to pass to
respondent until full payment of the purchase price. Thus, petitioners need not push through
with the sale should respondent fail to remit the balance of the purchase price before the

Page 7 of 9
A Selection of 2007 Jurisprudence in Persons & Family Relations and Other Civil Subjects

deadline on March 23, 1990. In effect, petitioners have the right to rescind unilaterally the
contract the moment respondent fails to pay within the fixed period.
Second, the agreement between the parties was not embodied in a deed of sale. The
absence of a formal deed of conveyance is a strong indication that the parties did not intend
immediate transfer of ownership, but only a transfer after full payment of the purchase price.
Third, petitioners retained possession of the certificate of title of the lot. This is an
additional indication that the agreement did not transfer to respondent, either by actual or
constructive delivery, ownership of the property.
It is true that Article 1482 of the Civil Code provides that “Whenever earnest money is given in a
contract of sale, it shall be considered as part of the price and proof of the perfection of the
contract.” However, this article speaks of earnest money given in a contract of sale. In this
case, the earnest money was given in a contract to sell. The earnest money forms part of the
consideration only if the sale is consummated upon full payment of the purchase price. Now,
since the earnest money was given in a contract to sell, Article 1482, which speaks of a contract
of sale, does not apply. (Sps. Serrano v. Caguiat, G.R. No. 139173, 28 February 2007)

WILLS & SUCCESSION

Q: What are the elements considered in determining whether a document contains

testamentary dispositions?
We affirm the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an element
of testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved and transferred property; and (2) the effect of
which shall transpire upon the death of the instrument maker. (NHA v. Almeida, G.R. No.
162784, 22 June 2007)

Q: A Notary Public acknowledged a notarial will outside the place of his commission. What is
its effect on the will?
The will is void. Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in Quezon
City, he lacked the authority to take the acknowledgment of the testatrix and the instrumental
witnesses. In the same vein, the testatrix and her witnesses could not have validly
acknowledged the will before him. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura's last will and testament
was, in effect, not acknowledged as required by law.
Article 5 of the Civil Code provides that [a]cts executed against the provisions of
mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
The violation of a mandatory or a prohibitory statute renders the act illegal and void unless the
law itself declares its continuing validity. Here, mandatory and prohibitory statutes were
transgressed in the execution of the alleged "acknowledgment." The compulsory language of
Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the
Notarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her witnesses and Atty.
Directo were all completely void. (Guerrero v. Bihis, G.R. No. 174144, 17 April 2007)

Page 8 of 9
A Selection of 2007 Jurisprudence in Persons & Family Relations and Other Civil Subjects

PROPERTY & CO-OWNERSHIP

POSSESSION
Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the
fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right. In short, possession can be either actual or merely
constructive.
Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over property of
such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own – as when respondent himself is
physically in occupation of the property, or even when another person who recognizes the
former’s rights as owner is in occupancy. Constructive possession on the other hand, may be
had through succession, donation, execution of public instruments, or the possession by a
sheriff by virtue of a court order. (Remington Industrial Sales Corp. v. Chinese Young Men’s
Christian Assoc. of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 171858, 22 January 2007)

EFFECT OF A CO-OWNER’S ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION AGAINST A CO-OWNER

A co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a co-owner who takes exclusive
possession of the entire co-owned property. However, the only effect of such action is
recognition of the co-ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the
co-owned property. In fine, judicial or extrajudicial partition is necessary to effect physical
division of the subject 120-square meter property. (Sps. Coja v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
151153, 10 December 2007)

Q: Can co-owners agree to keep the thing owned in common undivided?

Petitioners argue that the co-ownership was already extinguished because the Civil Code
provides that an agreement to keep a thing undivided shall not exceed ten years. Indeed, the
law limits the term of a co-ownership to ten years, but this term limit may nevertheless be
extended by a new agreement. (Ungab-Valeroso v. Ungab-Grado, G.R. No. 163081, 15 June
2007)

DECLARATION OF HEIRSHIP AND WAIVER OF RIGHTS

The “declaration of heirship and waiver of rights” relates to an abdication of a right in favor of
other persons who are co-heirs in the succession. A stranger to a succession cannot conclusively
claim ownership over the property on the sole basis thereof. A stranger to succession cannot
conclusively claim ownership over a lot on the sole basis of a waiver document which does not
cite the elements of any of the derivative modes of acquiring ownership. We also held that a
notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of claim adverse to the registered owner, the
validity of which is yet to be established in court. Hence, the “declaration of heirship and waiver
of rights” and a notice of adverse claim did not sufficiently show how a stranger to the
succession acquired ownership of the property. In the present case, the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment and the compromise agreement were presented not to show how
respondents acquired their rights over the property but as proof that their rights therein exist.
(Ungab-Valeroso v. Ungab-Grado, G.R. No. 163081, 15 June 2007)

###

Page 9 of 9