1. LACSON v. EXEC. SEC, et al.

,
GR. No. 128096

FACTS:
- a petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by petitioner Panfilo M. Lacson and others
questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act 8249 an Act which further defines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
-They also seek to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the trial of Criminal
Cases Nos. 23047-23057 against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
-They further argued that if the case is tried before the Sandiganbayan, their right to
procedural due process would violate as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to
the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under RA 7975, before recourse to the Supreme
Court.
- It was contended that RA 8249 is an ex post facto law, thus, it violated their constitutional
right.
*nevermind the facts haha definition lang ng penal law pinapahanap :D*
ISSUE:
What is a PENAL LAW?
RULING:
The Court defined penal law as referring to those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature and
provide for their punishment.
R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Thus, it cannot be contended that the prohibition against ex post facto law would apply
since the application of such principle essentially pertains to PENAL LAWS.

2. US v. SERAPIO
23 Phil. 584
FACTS:
- Serapio was charged with a violation of the Libel Law (Act 277).
- His defense was that by virtue of the provisions of article 131 of the Penal Code said action
had been prescribed.
ISSUE:
Define Special Penal Law.
RULING:
The Court defined a Special Penal Law as that which makes a crime punishable by a law
other than by the provisions of the Penal Code.

3. US V. TAYLOR
28 PHIL. 599

FACTS:
- A criminal action for libel was filed against Taylor.

- He was then arrested, arraigned, pleaded not guilty and was later on convicted with the crime
of libel.
ISSUE:
What is a COMMON LAW CRIME?
RULING:
The Court declared in this case that In the Philippines there exist no crimes such as are
known in the United States and England as common law crimes.
No act constitutes a crime here unless it is made so by law.
Hence, COMMON LAW CRIMES refers to those crimes contemplated under the laws of US
and England which makes an act or omission unlawful DESPITE the absence of a WRITTEN LAW
punishing such an act or omission.

4. PEOPLE VS CABURAL
[G.R. NO. L-34105. FEBRUARY 4, 1983.]

FACTS:
- The petitioners in this case were convicted of the crime of Robbery with rape.
ISSUE:
Principle of NULLUM CRIMEN NULLA POENA SINE LEGE
RULING:
From a concurring opinion:
The maxim Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege has its roots in history. It is in accordance
with both centuries of civil law and common law tradition. Moreover, it is an indispensable corollary to
a regime of liberty enshrined in our Constitution.
It is of the essence then that while anti-social acts should be penalized, (A) there must be a
clear definition of the punishable offense as well as (B) the penalty that may be imposed - a
penalty, to repeat, that can be fixed by the legislative body, and the legislative body alone.

5. ORIEL MAGNO, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents
[G.R. No. 96132. June 26, 1992.]

FACTS:

Oriel Magno approached Corazon Teng, VP of Mancor Industries for the reason that he was
lacking funds in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop operational.
VP Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice
President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if
LS Finance could accommodate Magno and and provide him credit facilities.

The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as
warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP Gomez to look for third
party who could lend him that amount.

Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon was the one who provided that amount.

As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of them were cleared and the rest
had no sufficient fund.

Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out
the equipment.

Magno was charged of violation of BP Blg. 22 and found guilty.

ISSUE:
State the Utilitarian theory as one of the philosophies underlying the criminal law justice
system.
RULING:
The Court discussed that under the utilitarian theory or the "protective theory" in criminal
law, the primary function of punishment is to protect the society against actual and potential
wrongdoers."

6. THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
POMAR, Defendant-Appellant.
[G.R. No. L-22008. November 3, 1924. ] 046 Phil 440

v.

JULIO

FACTS:
- A complaint was filed accusing POMAR of a violation of section 13 in connection with section
15 of Act No. 3071 of the Philippines Legislature.
- POMAR filed a demurrer, alleging that the facts therein contained did not constitute an
offense BUT the demurrer was overruled, Thus, POMAR answered and admitted at the trial all of the
allegations contained in the complaint, and contended that the provisions of said Act No. 3071, upon
which the complaint was based, were illegal, unconstitutional and void.
- The court found him guilty of the crime.

RULING:
The Court found that the provisions of said sections had not been adopted within the
reasonable and lawful exercise of the police power of the state, and were therefore unconstitutional
and illegal
Furthermore, The Court in this case discussed the Police Power of the State and defined
the same as the power vested in the legislature of the State to make, ordain, and establish all manner
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, which
are not repugnant to the constitution as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the subjects
of the state.
The Court also discussed the subjects of such power can be the following for the restraint and
punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the public peace, health, and morals.
Thus, ang naisip ko legal basis ang Police Power jajaja.

7. People v. De la Cruz
G.R. No. L-52
8. People vs. Young
83 Phil. 702
9. People vs. Carillo
85 Phil. 611

NOTA BENE: Guys, regarding these cases, hnd ko talaga mahanap ung pinapahanap haha
makapasakit ulo ken mata haha. Inpabasak pay ken mg vonn han na met magets haha. Agrefer tayo
jay Estrada bka ada idjay jeje

10. ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR. NO. 148560
FACTS:
- Petitioner Joseph Estrada was charged with violations of RA 7080 (the Plunder Law), as
amended.
- He then filed for the quashal of the information but the same was denied.
- As a result, he filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and raised, among others, that the
law is unconstitutional for being vague in that it fails to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts"
found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4.
Issue:
W/N the law is unconstitutional.
RULING:
The Court upheld its constitutionality.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every
word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of
expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily
result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can
be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that
the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. The intention of the
lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary
contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process
combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.

of

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial
and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular
meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became
RA 7080 or the Plunder Law.

11. PEOPLE V. NAZARIO

[G.R. NO. L-44143. AUGUST 31, 1988.]
FACTS:
-The petitioner was charged with violation of certain municipal ordinances of the municipal
council of Pagbilao, in Quezon province.
-By way of confession and avoidance, the petitioner would admit having committed the acts
charged but would claim that the ordinances are unconstitutional, or, assuming their constitutionality,
that they do not apply to him in any event.

ISSUE:
When may a statute be considered vague?
HELD:
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application."
It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a
saving clause or by construction.

12. ADIONG V. COMELEC

[G.R. NO. 103956. MARCH 31, 1992.]

FACTS:
- The COMELEC issued a Resolution pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution and
the Omnibus Election Code.
-The Resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or
private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
-Petitioner Adiong, a senatorial candidate, is assailing the validity of the said resolution insofar
as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their
location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.
ISSUE:
-When may a statute be considered overbreadth or overboard?
RULING:
The questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is void for
overbreadth.
A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional principle
that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms." (Zwickler v. Koota, 19 L ed 2d 444 [1967]).
"In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.

13. PEOPLE VS. QUIJADA

[G.R. NOS. 115008-09. JULY 24, 1996.]
FACTS:
- A benefit-dance/disco was held in Bohol.
- A fight broke out between Daniel Quijada and Diosdado Iroy due to the constant pestering by
Daniel of Diosdados sister.
- 5 days later, the same event was once again held and the same was attended by Diosdado
- While Diosdado was sitting, he was approached from behind by Daniel and shot him in the
head which caused his death.

-The firearm was found to be unlicensed

-As a result, Daniel was charged in two separate informations with Murder and Illegal
possession of firearms under PD 1866
- the trail court found him guilty of both crimes.

ISSUE:
"An act is not criminal unless the mind is criminal."
RULING:
As found in a concurring opinion:
Every law enacted by the legislature for the restraint and punishment of crimes and for the
preservation of the public peace, health and morals comes within the police power of the State.
In the exercise of its right, duty and power to determine and define crimes and their
corresponding penalties, the lawmaking body is initially and usually guided by the general
condition of penal liability under the legal maxim, "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea," which,
if freely translated, means that "an act is not criminal unless the mind is criminal."
On the basis of this, which is commonly known as the mens rea doctrine, our Revised Penal
Code was enacted to largely penalize unlawful acts accompanied by evil intent which are
denominated en masse as crimes mala in se. The paramount consideration here is the existence of a
malicious intention borne out by the concurrence of freedom, intelligence and intent which altogether
make
up
the
"criminal
mind"
behind
the
resultant
"criminal
act."
14. RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, Petitioner, vs. MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First
Instance of Manila, Respondent.
G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936
FACTS:
- petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay.
- He was subsequently charged in the RTC of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private
document.

ISSUE:
W/N the case involves diplomatic immunity.
RULING:
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity.
It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an
ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is
accredited.
A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country
where he resides.
The substantial question raised in this case is one of jurisdiction.
15. JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000.]
FACTS:
- Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
- for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal,

-he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court with two counts of grave oral
defamation.
- Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC.
- thereafter, After fixing petitioners bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security
Officer of ADB.
-Subsequently, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under
Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country.
- Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC
judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases.
- the (RTC) ,however, set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the
warrant of arrest it earlier issued.
- petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered
by immunity under the Agreement
ISSUE:
W/N Petitoner is immuned from suit under the agreement between the ADB and the
government.
RULING:
Petition is not impressed with merit.
It has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto
result in the dropping of the charges.
Section 45 of the Agreement provides that: j
"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official
capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity."cralaw virtua1aw library
The immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the act
was done in "official capacity."
It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit of Section
45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it
must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Moreover, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions.
It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Furthermore, It appears that even the governments chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General,
does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.

15. SOLIVEN VS.MAKASIAR

FACTS:

Luis Beltran, among others, was charged for libel by President Cory Aquino. Aquino herself
filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Beltran averred that Aquino cannot file a complaintaffidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the
principle that the president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue, then the president
would allow herself to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely, she would be
consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a president, the president may not be
able to appear as a witness for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the president, under the constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against
petitioners though the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Whether the presidential privilege from immunity from suit may be invoked only by the
president and not by any other person in his behalf.
HELD:
YES. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of
the
office-holders
time,
also
demands
undivided
attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents
behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise
the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such
accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege.
Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the
courts jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

16. ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

FACTS:
In the 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. In 2000, Estrada was accused with corruption,
culminating in Ilocos Sur Governor Singsons accusations that the president received millions of
pesos from jueteng lords.
Thereafter, Estrada was tried in an impeachment proceedings under 21 senator judges presided by
Chief Justice Hilario Davide. 11 senators, symphathetic to Estrada, succeeded in suppressing
damaging evidence against Estrada (envelope). As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an
uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after
casting his vote against Estrada.
PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA shrine.
Estrada called for a snap election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections. He
stated that he will not run in the election. Thereafter, SC declared that the seat of presidency was
vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post.
The office of the ombudsman proceeded to file a series of corruption cases. Estrada filed a motion
compelling the ombudsman to refrain from further proceedings until his term as president was over.
He also filed a petition to be confirmed as the lawful and incumbent president, temporarily unable to
fulfill his duties, thus making Arroyo an acting president only.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President enjoys immunity from suit in the case at bar.

HELD:
The SC rejected his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first
be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was
aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the
presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing
that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.
Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand
that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if
granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to
commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been
subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be
sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment
proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil
cases may already be filed against him.
Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of
their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the
impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency,
petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a conditionsine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a
non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to
commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability.
It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful
acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser. Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial
disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs
the vindication of a right.
17. FORBES VS. CHOUCO TIACO
FACTS:
The case is about an original action commenced in this court to secure a writ of prohibition
against the Hon. A.S. Crossfield, as one of the judges of the Court of first Instance of the city of
Manila, to prohibit him from taking or continuing jurisdiction in a certain case commenced and
pending before him, in which Chuoco Tiaco (alias Choa Tea) is plaintiff, and W. Cameron forbes, et al.
are defendants.
. The plaintiff Forbes is the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and that J.E. Harding
and C.R. Trowbridge are, respectively, chief of police and chief of the secret service of the city of
Manila. Defendant A.S. Crossfield is one of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila.
Defendant Chuoco Tiaco, a foreigner of Chinese nationality and a resident of the Philippines
for the last 35 years, filed a case for damages alleging that defendant forcibly deported the plaintiff to
China and forcibly prevented his return for some months ion violation of the right of the plaintiff to be
and to remain in the Philippines as established by law.
Defendant Crossfield, CFI Judge, issued an Inhibition against Forbes et al. from deporting or
threathening to expel or deport Chuoco Tiaco. Forbes et al. sued for writs of prohibition against the
judge and plaintiffs, alleging that that the expulsion was carried out in public interest and at the
request of the proper representative of the Chinese government in the Philippines, and was
immediately reported to the Secretary of War. The complaint were demurred to, but the SC overruled
the demurrers, granted the prohibition, and order the actions dismissed. The judge, having declined

to join in the writs of error, was made a respondent, and the plaintiffs alleged that they have been
deprived of liberty without due process of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the GG, as Chief Executive, can be sued in a civil action.
HELD:
The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to
touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will,
unimpeded and unrestrained. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the Governor-General, like
the judges of the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in
civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official
duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly presented to it and
the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and
place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived of his liberty or
his property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever
country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the
state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is to mulct the Governor-General personally in
damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can a member of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at
all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears
from the discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the liability of judges and
drew an analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when
he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have
exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to act. What is held here is that he
will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but
also when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the
judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he is entitled to
protection in determining the question of his authority. If he decides wrongly, he is still protected
provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that
position, might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two
such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, he acts, not as GovernorGeneral, but as a private individual, and, as such, must answer for the consequences of his act.
18. CLINTON VS JONES 520 US 681 (1997)
FACTS:
Paula Corbin Jones sued President Bill Clinton. She alleged that while she was an Arkansas state
employee, she suffered several "abhorrent" sexual advances from then Arkansas Governor Clinton.
Following a District Court's grant of Clinton's request that all matters relating to the suit be
suspended, pending a ruling on his prior request to have the suit dismissed on grounds of presidential
immunity, Clinton sought to invoke his immunity to completely dismiss the Jones suit against him.
While the District Judge denied Clinton's immunity request, the judge ordered the stay of any trial in
the matter until after Clinton's Presidency. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial
but reversed the trial deferment ruling since it would be a "functional equivalent" to an unlawful grant
of temporary presidential immunity.
Question
Whether or not aserving President entitled to absolute immunity from civil litigation arising out of
events which transpired prior to his taking office?

Conclusion
No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does not grant a sitting
President immunity from civil litigation except under highly unusual circumstances. After noting the
great respect and dignity owed to the Executive office, the Court held that neither separation of
powers nor the need for confidentiality of high-level information can justify an unqualified Presidential
immunity from judicial process. While the independence of our government's branches must be
protected under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Constitution does not prohibit these
branches from exercising any control over one another. This, the Court added, is true despite the
procedural burdens which Article III jurisdiction may impose on the time, attention, and resources of
the Chief Executive.
19. REAGAN VS CIR
FACTS:
Petitioner William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American corporation providing
technical assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines disputed the payment of the
income tax assessed on him by respondent CIR on an amount realized by him on a sale of his
automobile to a member of the United States Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the
Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his contention, seriously and earnestly pressed, that in legal
contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional
power to tax.
ISSUE:
Whether the sale done in a foreign soil (Clark Field Air Base) is subject to Philippine Income tax.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner was liable for the income tax arising from a sale of his car in the Clark Field Air
Base, which clearly is and cannot otherwise be other than, within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines to tax. The Military Bases agreement does not lend support to the assertion that
said base has become a foreign soil or territory.
The Clark Air Force Base is not a foreign soil or territory for purposes of income tax
legislation. There is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to such
assertion. It has not become a foreign soil or territory. The Philippines jurisdictional rights
therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved.
The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over
its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its
decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial
and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of
its sovereignty.
Any state may by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights.
There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the
concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property
of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and selfrestriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable
competence. Its laws may as to some person found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the
matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of

jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such
areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still
subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the
bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947.
They are not and cannot be foreign territory.

20. PEOPLE VS WONG CHENG

FACTS:
The appellant, Wong Cheng, in representation of the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to
the information that initiated this case and in which the appellant is accused of having illegally
smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was
anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. In the said demurrer, the
defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of the said crime, which resulted to the
dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved,
committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.
HELD:
Yes.
(English rule is based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States.Crimes perpetrated
under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were
committed. This rule is followed in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence
prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of
the United States.)
The mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by
the courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the
Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such
a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that
our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of
the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.
The demurrer was revoked and the case was remanded to the court of origin.
21. US VS LOOK CHAW
FACTS:
Several persons, among them, chief of the department of the port of Cebu and internalrevenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went abroad the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its
cargo, and found 2 sacks of opium. The second sack was found was under the defendant's control,
who moreover, freely and of his own will and accord admitted that this sacks belonged to him. The
said defendant also stated, freely and voluntarily, that he had bought these sacks of opium, in
Hongkong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his
hold had already been searched several times for opium, he ordered two other Chinamen to keep the
sack.
The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court had no
jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at
the conclusion of his argument, asked that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed upon the
defendant, in view of the considerable amount of opium seized. The court ruled that it did not lack
jurisdiction, in as much as the crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.
The court ruled in favour of the government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not courts of local state can exercise jurisdiction over foreign vessels stationed in
its port.
HELD:
Yes. Although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard
a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime
triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is
prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel
upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which,
as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court
established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under
an international treaty.
22. US VS. AH SING
FACTS:
Ah Sing is as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. The defendant bought eight cans of opium in
Saigon, brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and had them in his possession during
the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on, the authorities on
making a search found the eight cans of opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler
of the steamers engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that he
had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He
did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands. No other
evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to import illegally this opium
into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of Illegal Importaion of Opium into the Philippines is criminally liable in the
Philippines.
HELD:
Yes. It is to be noted that section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or
bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The
Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere act of going into a port, without breaking
bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation. (The Mary [U.S. ], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again,
the importation is not the making entry of goods at the custom house, but merely the bringing them
into port; and the importation is complete before entry of the Custom House. (U.S. v. Lyman [U.S. ],
26 Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots v. U.S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.)
As applied to the Opium Law, the court held that any person unlawfully imports or brings any
prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this persons
control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits
of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless
contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise.
Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurd to think that the accused was merely carrying
opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It would likewise
be impossible to conceive that the accused needed so large an amount of opium for his personal use.
No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this opium
to be brought into the Philippine Islands.
To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it be said that these statements do not relate
to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present.
23. US VS FOWLER
FACTS:
The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of champagne of the value of
$20, while on board the transport Lawton, then navigating the high seas, which said bottles of

champagne formed part of the cargo of the said vessel and were the property of Julian Lindsay, and
which were taken lucri causa, and with the intent to appropriate the same, without violence or
intimidation, and without the consent of the owner, against the statute in the case made and
provided.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI has jurisdiction over crimes committed on the high seas on board of transport
not registered in the Philippines.
HELD:
No. Courts of First Instance of the Philippines have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of crimes
committed on the high seas on board of a transport or other vessel not registered or licensed in the
Philippines. The transport Lawton not being a vessel of this class, our courts are without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of such crime.

24. US VS BULL
FACTS:
In 1908, Bull was then and there master of a steam sailing vessel Standard, which vessel was
then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a
foreign port and city of Manila. Bull, while master of said vessel, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the
port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without
providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to the said animals.
The said cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts. No. 55 and 275. It is however
contended that cases cannot be filed because neither was it said that the court ruling where the
animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships
not licensed under Philippine laws.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, an offense
continuing when the ship was within territorial waters.
HELD:
Yes. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on
the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of
a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial
waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. The ship and her crew were then subject to
the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper political agency. This offense was
committed within territorial waters. From the line which determines these waters the Standard must
have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the
violation of the statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is
immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The
offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and
every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters. The
completed forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction
over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender.

25. US VS. CASTRO

FACTS:
Basilio Castro and Ramon Matic, alias Roman de La Cruz, were charged with the crime of robbery
while on board the launch Bolinao, which at the aforesaid time place was anchored between the
slaughterhouse and the lighthouse, and within two and one-half miles from the shore of Manila Bay

Basilio Castro and Ramon Matic, alias Roman de la Cruz, conspiring between themselves and
helping each other, together with one Arsenio Salvacion, against its owners will and with intent of
gain a trunk locked with a key, steal and carry away different articles and money.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
The Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over a crime of robbery committed upon a
steamboat at a point in the Bay of manila two and a half miles beyond the city limits.

29.PEOPLE VS. JULMAIN

Facts: Salip Julmain, Alimponos Hadja and Insan-in Hadja is charged with the crime of murder. While
they are navigating the seas between Zamboanga and Sulu Provinces while on a vinta the said
accused killed Moro Aye and threw him overboard.
According to the affidavits upon which the prosecution was initiated, that the alleged crime of murder
was committed in the seas between Zamboanga City and Basilan Island while both the deceased and
the accused were enroute to the Island of Jolo on an unlicensed or unregistered vinta.
Issue: Whether or not the CFI of Zamboanga has jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling: Under Section 14, paragraph 3, Rule 106;
Where an offense is committed on board a vessel registered or license in accordance with the
laws of the Philippines, in the course of its voyages, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in
the proper court of the first port of entry or any municipality or province through which the vessel
passed during such voyage.
The above quoted provisions are not applicable to the present case because the vinta in question
was unregistered or unlicensed and, therefore, the scene of the crime must be considered as an
ordinary place.
The vinta in question was unregistered or unlicensed and, therefore, is not within the purview of
section 14, paragraph c, of Rule 106, which contemplates a vessel registered or licensed in
accordance with law. It appearing that the crime was committed in waters within the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, the latter is the proper court to try the case.

30. US VS. FOWLER

Facts: The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles of champagne of the
value of $20, on the 12th August, 1901, while on board the transport Lawton, then navigating the high
seas.
Counsel for the defendants presented a demurrer, alleging that the Court of First Instance was
without jurisdiction to try the crime charged, inasmuch as it appeared from the information that the
crime was committed on the high seas, and not in the city of Manila, or within the territory comprising
the Bay of Manila, or upon the seas within the 3-mile limit to which the jurisdiction of the court extends
and asked, upon these grounds, that the case be dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not the court can exercise jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling: Courts of First Instance of the Philippines have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of crimes
committed on the high seas on board of a transport or other vessel not registered or licensed in the
Philippines

31. PEOPLE VS. FERNANDO PUGAY

Facts: For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN
SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER. The deceased Miranda, a 25year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris
wheel and reading a comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with
several companions arrived. As the group saw the deceased walking nearby, they started making fun
of him.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of
gasoline and poured its contents on the body of the former causing it to burn and ultimately lead to
his death.
The trial court rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in
favor of the accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong.
Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of Murder or Homicide?
Ruling: They are guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Pugay: Having taken the can from under the engine of the ferris wheel this accused knew that the can
contained gasoline. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who at the
time were making fun of the deceased.
Samson: There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on
the body of the deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed
the act of setting the latter on fire if it were otherwise.
His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim
would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the
Revised Penal Code.
If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held
responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.

32. IVLER VS. MODESTO SAN PEDRO

Facts: Petitioner Ivler was charged before the MTC for two separate offenses: Reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) and reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage of property (Criminal Case No. 82366). The first offense for the injuries
suffered by herein respondent and the second offense for the death of her husband and damage to
the spouses vehicle.
Ivler pleaded guilty on the first offense and meted public censure as penalty. He invokes this
conviction as a ground in his motion to quash the information for the second offense contending it
places him in double jeopardy for the same offense of reckless imprudence. MTC refused quashal of
the information thus petitioners motion for certiorari was elevated before the RTC while moving for
the suspension of the criminal case before the MTC pending resolution of the prejudicial question as
subject of his motion for reconsideration at the RTC. MTC however proceeded with the criminal
proceeding.
The non-appearance of Ivler to the proceeding resulted to the cancellation of his bail and order of his
arrest was issued. By virtue of this arrest order, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the motion for
certiorari filed by Ivler on ground that he loss standing to maintain suit. RTC dismissed said petition
on this ground thus this petition to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366?

Ruling: The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense"13protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material
Only to determine the Penalty
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act
which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted
a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period
shall be imposed.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same
Quasi-offense.
That once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under
article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless
act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

33. QUIZON VS. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE

Facts: Respondents Chief of Police of Bacolor, Pampanga, filed a criminal complaint against the
herein petitioner, Francisco Quizon, charging Quizon with the crime of damage to property through
reckless imprudence.
Quizon filed a motion to quash on the ground that, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty which might be imposed on the accused would be a fine or from P125.00 to P375.00, which is
in excess of the fine that may be imposed by the justice of the peace court.
Issue: Whether or not negligence a felony or a modality in the commission of the crime?
Ruling: The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is
not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of
criminal liability" is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure
can not be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief.
In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt
with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In
intenational crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally
penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight.
Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrases as "homicide
through reckless imprudence," and the like; when the strict technical offense is, more accurately,
"reckless imprudence resulting in homicide"; or "simple imprudence causing damages to property".
A criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in but a distinct crime in
itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code,

34. SAMSON VS.CA

Facts: Rufino T. Samson was jointly charged with Amado L. Cruz and Bonifacio Vergara and two
others whose names are unknown in two separate informations with the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of two checks they were tried and found guilty as charged.
The trio appealed from the decision and the Court of Appeals affirmed the same but with a reduced
penalty with regard to appellants Cruz and Vergara. Appellant Samson was only found guilty of
committing the crime through gross imprudence and was accordingly sentenced to 4 months of
arresto mayor in each of the two cases.
Dissatisfied with his conviction, Samson sued out the present petition for review contending (1) that
the acts done by him, as found by the Court of Appeals, do not constitute gross imprudence; (2) that
there is no such offense as estafa through (falsification by) negligence.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the accused is tenable?
Ruling: In the crime of falsification by imprudence of public or mercantile documents the element of
intent to cause damages is not required because what the law seeks to repress is the prejudice to the
public confidence in these documents.
A criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime but a distinct crime in itself,
designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code.
Acts of endorsing checks by way of identification of the signatures of the payees entitled to said
checks and their proceeds constitute the crime of estafa through falsification of mercantile document
by reckless imprudence because such endorsement constituted a written representation that the true
payees participated in the indorsement and cashing of the checks, when in truth and in fact the true
payees had no direct intervention in the proceedings.

35. MADEJA VS. CASTRO

Facts: DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of
Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased,
Carmen L. Madeja. The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for
damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the same court. The respondent judge granted the defendants
motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the
defendants motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 141.
Issue: Whether or not the order of the judge granting the motion to dismiss is correct?
Ruling: Under "Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence."
The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined
in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries by consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide.
Corpus v. Paje L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless imprudenoe or
criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven
justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely concurred in the result. In the light
of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of
the criminal action against her.

36. US VS. CATANGAY

Facts: Joaquin Catangay was charged with the crime of homicide through reckless negligence.
Joaquin Catangay did, without any precaution whatever, fire his shotgun hitting Mauricio Ramos
killing him. On the night of the accident Catangay, Ramos and others went to hunt, Ramos placed a
flashlight on his forehead. As they hunt Catangay stumbled into a canal causing him to fall, as he fell
the gun that he was holding went off hitting Ramos in the head.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant is guilty of homicide through reckless negligence?
Ruling: The discharge of a firearm that caused the victims death having been purely accidental and
wholly involuntary on the part of the accused, his action lacks the element essential for holding that it
was performed with reckless negligence under article 568 of the Penal Code, which requires that the
damage be inflicted without malice but through a voluntary act.
Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care
and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree
of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.
The diligence with which the law required the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with
the nature of the situation in which he is placed and with the importance of the act which he is to
perform.
It cannot be held that the defendant is guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless negligence.

37. FAJARDO VS. PEOPLE

Facts: Petitioner, Elenita Fajardo, and one Zaldy Valerio (Valerio) were charged with violation of P.D.
No. 1866. They have in their possession a number of long and short firearms including and receivers
of 2 caliber 45 guns.
At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio Nava
(SPO2 Nava), who was posted at the back portion of the house, saw Valerio emerge twice on top of
the house and throw something. The discarded objects landed near the wall of petitioners house and
inside the compound of a neighboring residence. SPO2 Nava, together with SPO1 Teodoro Neron
and Jerome T. Vega (Vega), radio announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as witness, recovered the
discarded objects, which turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol, model no. M1911A1
US, with serial number (SN) 763025, and model no. M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number. The
recovered items were then surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1 Tan), Group Investigator,
who utilized them in applying for and obtaining a search warrant.
Petitioner insists on an acquittal and avers that the discovery of the two (2) receivers does not come
within the purview of the plain view doctrine. She argues that no valid intrusion was attendant and
that no evidence was adduced to prove that she was with Valerio when he threw the receivers.
Likewise absent is a positive showing that any of the two receivers recovered by the policemen
matched the .45 caliber pistol allegedly seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts when the police
elements arrived. Neither is there any proof that petitioner had knowledge of or consented to the
alleged throwing the receivers.
Issue: Is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for
unlawful possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the
law?
Ruling: Illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm, is committed when the holder
thereof:
(1)

possesses a firearm or a part thereof

(2)

lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm.

We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject receivers.
The testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the house when the
receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the receivers, before or during
their disposal.

At the very least, petitioners possession of the receivers was merely incidental because Valerio, the
one in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioners house. Absent any evidence
pointing to petitioners participation, knowledge or consent in Valerios actions, she cannot be held
liable for illegal possession of the receivers.
While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession
of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the
part of the accused.
Hence, , a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be
considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as long
as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed

38. JACINTO VS. PEOPLE

Facts: Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and
Jacqueline Capitle, was charged before RTC with the crime of Qualified Theft. Above-named accused
all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC stole and deposited in their bank accounts the
payment of Aquino a customer of the establishment.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same
was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on
whether the crime of qualified theftwas actually produced.
Issue: Whether or not the accused convicted of the crime of theft or committed an impossible crime?
Ruling: Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTYof an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME.
The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against
persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was
inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one
impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a
crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking
the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the
fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully
hers.
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took
possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate
the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case.

39. PEOPLE VS. ORITA

Facts: The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape.
In the early morning of March 20,1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house. Her classmates
had just brought her home from a party. Shortly after her classmates had left, she knocked at the door
of her boarding house. All of a sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She was
then forced inside the buiding, upon entering a room on the second floor she was forcibly raped by
the accused.
He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He asked her to hold his penis and
insert it in her vagina, while still poking the knife to her. She followed, but the appellant could not fully
penetrate her in such a position. Next, he laid down on his back and commanded her to mount him,
but he cannot fully penetrate her.

RTC found him guilty of frustrated rape.

CA: The judgement was modified and he was found guilty of the crime of rape.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of frustrated rape.
Ruling: The accused is guilty of the crime of rape. The decision in the Erinia case convicting the
accused of the crime of frustrated rape is a stray decision and not applicable in the present setting.
The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution
which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of
the perpetrators will.
The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there
is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the
commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should
result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender does
not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped
short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.
We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential.
Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the
female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not
all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts.

40. PEOPLE VS. ERINIA STRAY DECISION

Facts: The victim of the crime was a child of 3 years and 11 months old and the evidence is
conclusive that the defendant endeavored to have carnal intercourse with her, but there may be some
doubt whether he succeeded in penetrating the vagina before being disturbed by the timely
intervention of the mother and the sister of the child.
The physician who examined the genital organ of the child a few hours after the commission of the
crime found a slight inflammation of the exterior parts of the organ but expressed doubts as to
whether the entry had been effected.
There being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party, the
defendant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and can only be found guilty of frustrated rape.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of committing the crime of frustrated rape?
Ruling: The judgment appealed from is modified and the defendant-appellant is hereby found guilty of
the crime of frustrated rape and is sentenced to suffer twelve years of prision mayor, with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and with the costs in both instances.
MALCOLM, J., dissenting
The accused is guilty of raping a child 3 years and 11 months of age. It is consummated rape
according to the evidence of record, the findings of the trial judge, and our decisions.
The crime of rape may be committed upon a child of the age of 3 years and 11 months.

41. PEOPLE VS. CHAVEZ

Facts: Complainant Jessica Castro charged appellant with raping her four times between January
1994 and November 1996. She was only 9 years old when she was raped by appellant who was the
partner of her mother. The lascivious acts did not stop and was repeated over 4 times in the span on
5 years. It was only stopped when one of her teacher notice something different from the victim and
she confronted her and Jessica confessed of the lascivious acts being done to her.

RTC convicted Orande two counts of simple rape, one statutory and one frustrated. The accused
appealed that the court had a grave error on convicting him of frustrated rape despite the fact that
there is no such crime.
Issue: Whether or not there is a crime of frustrated rape?
Ruling:
The Court sustains appellants contention that there is no such crime as frustrated rape. Clearly, in the
crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains
his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is
not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient
Thus, it was error for the trial court to convict appellant of frustrated rape. Besides, after a careful
review of the records, we find that the rape was in fact consummated. Jessica initially testified that,
although appellant did not succeed in inserting his penis in her vagina, she felt his sex organ touch
hers and she saw and felt semen come out of his penis and smear her vagina.
In the present case, the victim testified that she felt pain and her vagina bled, indisputable indications
of slight penetration or, at the very least, that the penis indeed touched the labia and not merely
stroked the external surface thereof. Thus, the appellant should be found guilty of (consummated)
rape and not merely frustrated or attempted rape.

42. PEOPLE VS. CAMPUHAN

Facts: Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court a quo
to the extreme penalty of death.
Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four (4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the
second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the ground
floor she met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen
into ice in the freezer located at the second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of
Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko,
ayo'ko!"prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her
childrens room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already
removed, while his short pants were down to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthels vagina. Physical examination of the
victim yielded negative results.
He maintained his innocence and assailed the charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who
allegedly harbored ill will against him for his refusal to run an errand for her. He asserted that in truth
Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down
causing both of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this fallen position that Corazon chanced upon
them and became hysterical.
He claims that it was truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that Crysthels
younger sister was also in the room playing while Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo drinks
for her daughters. . Besides, the door of the room was wide open for anybody to see what could be
taking place inside.
Issue: Whether or not accused committed consummated statutory rape?
Ruling: The records reviewed failed to show the proof whether Primos penis was able to penetrate
Chrystels vagina. Failure to prove such penetration, even the slightest one, cannot be considered
consummated rape, however, only attempted rape.
The possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the child's own
assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close together and that she did not
feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted
"Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!

Furthermore, Corazon was not in the position to accurately see what the accused was doing and her
testimony was sometimes incredible. As shown by her testimony that the accused did not desists
from doing the lascivious acts even if she is already in the room and repeatedly punching him.
The crucial doctrinal bottom line is that touching must be inextricably viewed in light of, in relation to,
or as an essential part of, the process of penile penetration, and not just mere touching in the ordinary
sense. In other words, the touching must be tacked to the penetration itself. The importance of the
requirement of penetration, however slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry into the labia or
the lips of the female genitalia has not been established, the crime committed amounts merely to
attempted rape.
43. G.R. Nos. 135201-02
PEOPLE vs. FRANCISCO

March 15, 2001

FACTS:
Florencio Francisco allegedly raped her 11-year old daughter Ma. Coralyn J. Francisco.
Medico-legal explanation provided that there were no extragenital physical injuries noted on Coralyn's
body at the time of examination, that her hymen was intact, that its orifice was small, thus precluding
complete penetration by an average sized Filipino adult male organ in full erection without producing
any genital injury.8
Florencio was charged with rape and acts of lasciviousness which was tried jointly.
TC convicted the accused for the two crimes imposing death penalty
Thus an automatic review to SC
Florencio challenges his conviction contending that based on the forensic examination of Coralyn she
remained a physical virgin, her hymen being intact with no extragenital injury detected.
ISSUE: WON FLORENCIO IS GUILTY OF CONSUMMATED RAPE?
HELD: NO. HE IS ONLY GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED RAPE.
Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of The Revised Penal Code, rape is merely attempted when the
offender commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but does not perform all the
acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or
grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina or
her mons pubis, as in this case.
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the
female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of
consummated rape.
As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs beneath the
mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of
penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia
minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape. But in the absence of any showing of the
slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching either labia of the pudendum by the penis,
there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.
IN THE INSTANT CASE:
What Coralyn merely described, and clearly so, was the "hit and miss" character of accusedappellant's pumping motions, wherein his wayward phallus blindly and aimlessly hammered the
victim's genitalia, likewise hitting the anus in the process. There is indeed serious doubt on the extent
of the accused-appellant's penis assaulting as to touch, if at all, the labia majora. Her testimony that
"Hindi po sa butas pero sa aking pepe lang," is inconclusive as it is shrouded in ambiguity. What does
pepe mean to an 11-year old child? Does it pertain to the externalpudenda, the mons pubis and its
environs, as distinguished from her other term butas, which would then logically refer to labia
majora and labia minora, collectively? To be sure, the prosecution evidence provided no explanation,
much less an answer to enlighten the Court on what crime indeed was perpetrated.

The medico-legal report is likewise unavailing to confirm the commission of rape. On the contrary, it
seems to support the absence of penile-labial contact - no extragenital physical injuries were noted
on the body of the subject and that the hymen is intact and its orifice small, as to preclude complete
penetration by an averaged sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection.
44. G.R. No. 202060
PEOPLE VS BANZUELA

December 11, 2013

FACTS:
Banzuela was charged with Rape and Attempted Rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
Rape AAA, 6-year old
Banzuela approached AAA and BBB and asked them to go with him to the nearby cemetery.
AAA and BBB refused, but Banzuela carried AAA away prompting BBB to follow suit.
Banzuela blindfolded BBB, who thereafter removed the blindfold and looked for AAA and
Banzuela.
Meanwhile, Banzuela laid AAA on a dirty tomb, pulled up her dress, and removed her
underwear. He thereafter removed his shorts and briefs, mounted AAA, kissed her, inserted
his penis in her vagina, and moved his body up and down against the crying AAA.
Banzuela left. BBB saw AAA lying on a tomb. They wipe the blood with banana leaf and went
homr.
Attempted Rape BBB, 7-year old
Banzuela used the same method on BBB, the daughter of his mothers half-brother.
Banzuela asked BBB to go with him to the cemetery. When BBB refused, Banzuela carriedher
out of the house and broughther to the cemetery.
BBB cried, but Banzuela proceeded to layher down on the ground, pulled her dress up,
removed her underwear, and kissed her.
However, before Banzuela could do anything more, a man passed by causing Banzuela to
flee the scene.
The man thereafter instructed BBB to go home.
The Initial Medico-Legal Report stated that AAA was physically in a virgin state, and her hymen
"intact."
RTC - Convicted Banzuela of Rape (AAA) and Attempted Rape (BBB)
CA Convicted of Rape (AAA) and Acts of Lasciviousness (BBB)
CA said that "[a]ttempted rape is committed when the touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled
with the intent to penetrate; otherwise, there can only be acts of lasciviousness."Thus, the Court of
Appeals declared, that because Banzuelas intent to rape BBB was not clearly established, he
couldonly be convicted of acts of lasciviousness.23
ISSUES: WON BANZUELA IS GUILTY OF RAPE AND ATTEMPTED RAPE
HELD:
1. RAPE (AAA) YES.
In order to successfully convict an accused of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove the
following:
1.The age of the complainant; 2.The identity of the accused; and
3.The carnal knowledge between the accused and the complainant.
The first element was established. The second element was clearly satisfied when AAA positively and
consistently identified Banzuela as her offender.
THE THIRD ELEMENT,it is instructive to define "carnal knowledge" in the context it is used in the
Revised Penal Code:
[C]arnal knowledge, unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily
require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. The crime of rape is deemed
consummated even when the mans penis merely enters the labia or lips of the female organ or, as
once so said in a case, by the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of
consummating the sexual act.
This element was proven when AAA detailed in open court how Banzuela forcefully inserted his sex
organ into her genitalia in February 2003 and how she felt pain during her ordeal.

Banzuela makes much of the fact that the medico-legal examination yielded negative results, i.e.,that
AAA remained a virgin.
Proof of hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. An intact hymen does not negate a finding that
the victim was raped.To sustain a conviction for rape, full penetration of the female genital organ is
not necessary.It is enough that there is proof of entry of the male organ into thelabiaof
thepudendumof the female organ. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even
without laceration of the hymen, is enough to constitute rape,and even the briefest of contact is
deemed rape.As long as the attempt to insert the penis results in contact with the lips of the vagina,
even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, the rape is consummated.
2. ATTEMPTED RAPE (BBB) NO. ONLY ACTS OF LACIVIOUSNESS
An attempt to commit a felony, the offender commences the commission of such felony directly by
overt acts, but does not perform all the acts of execution, which should produce the felony by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. 46 In other words, a crime is in
its attempted stage when the offender has already performed the acts preliminary to the
consummation of the crime. However, because of some reason besides his own spontaneous
desistance, he is not able to perform all the acts necessary to consummate the crime.
In the crime of rape, penetration, however slight, is an essential act of execution that produces such
felony.
Thus, for Banzuela to be convicted of the crime of attempted rape, he must have already commenced
the act of inserting his sexual organ in the vagina of BBB, but due to some cause or accident,
excluding his own spontaneous desistance, he wasnt able to even slightly penetrate BBB.
"Attempted rape is committed when the touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent
to penetrate; otherwise, there can only be acts of lasciviousness."
In this case, Banzuelas acts of laying BBB on the ground, undressing her, and kissing her, do not
constitute the crime of attempted rape, absent any showing that [Banzuela] actually commenced to
force his penis into [BBBs] sexual organ."
45. G.R. No. 165483
September 12, 2006
RUJJERIC Z. PALAGANAS vs. PEOPLE (MY WAY CASE)
FACTS:
Three brother (Servillano, Melton and Michael) went to Tidbits Videoke bar located at the corner of
Malvar and Rizal Streets, Poblacion, Manaoag. They were having a good time, singing and drinking
beer. Jaime Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas and a person named Virgilio
Bautista. At that time, only the Ferrer brothers were the customers in the bar. Jaime was singing the
song My Way. Melton sang along but Jaime resented this. A fist fight ensued.
The fight was pacified. The Ferrer brothers went outside to find the wrist watch of Servillano.
They saw Ferdinand about eight (8) meters away standing at Rizal Street. Ferdinand was pointing at
them and said to his companion, later identified as petitioner [Rujjeric] Palaganas, " Oraratan paltog
mo lara", meaning "They are the ones, shoot them." Petitioner then shot them hitting Servillano first at
the left side of the abdomen, causing him to fall on the ground, and followed by [Melton] who also fell
to the ground. When Servillano noticed that [Melton] was no longer moving, he told Michael
"Bato, bato." Michael picked up some stones and threw them at petitioner and Ferdinand.The
petitioner and Ferdinand then left the place. Melton died. Servillano and Michael sustained wounds.
Petitioner and his older brother, Ferdinand were charged under four (4) separate Informations6 for
two (2) counts of Frustrated Murder, one (1) count of Murder , and one (1) count for Violation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 29587
RTC- finding petitioner guilty only of the crime of Homicide and two (2) counts of Frustrated
Homicide. On the other hand, Ferdinand was acquitted of all the charges against him. 17
CA- affirmed with modifications the assailed RTC Decision with respect to penalty
Petitioner lodged the instant Petition for Review to SC
ISSUE: WON PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF FRUSTRATED MURDER AS REGARDS TO MICHAEL
FERRER?

SC agreed that petitioner is guilty of the crime of Homicide for the death of Melton and Frustrated
Homicide for the serious injuries sustained by Servillano .
HELD:
NO. Petitioner is guilty only of the crime of Attempted Homicide.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states and defines the stages of a felony in the following manner:
ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated felonies, as well
as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for the for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason or causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance (italics
supplied).
Based on the foregoing provision, the distinctions between frustrated and attempted felony are
summarized as follows:
1.) In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the
acts of execution.
2.) In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for
the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender's own
spontaneous desistance.
Addition based on a case: 3.) When the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by
his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but
did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime committed is frustrated murder or
frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present. However, if the wound/s sustained by the
victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only attempted
murder or attempted homicide.
Going back to the facts, it is clear that the gunshot wound sustained by Michael in his right shoulder
was not fatal or mortal since the treatment period for his wound was short and he was discharged
from the hospital on the same day he was admitted therein. Therefore, petitioner is liable only for the
crime of attempted homicide as regards Michael.
46. G.R. No. 140206
June 21, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MATYAONG
(THE IMPORTANCE OF ASCERTAINING THE DEGREE OF INJURY SUSTAINED)
FACTS:
Accused appellant Rodolfo Matyaong was charged with the crime of parricide before the Regional
Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, for hitting his wife Rufina Matyaong with a piece of
wood.
Four witnesses were presented.
Rodolfo Matyaong Jr, their son. Wilfredo Tablazon, brgy. Kagawad. Roberta Paz, mother of victim.
Sgt. Almirante Caburnay, a first aider assigned in their barangay.
Rodolfo, Jr. testified that his father beat her mother of a piece of bakawan wood because his father
suspected that latter was reading a letter from another man. Rufina fled her house and ran towards
the forest.
Tablazan declared that he rescued Rufina in a grassy area. She was in a very weak condition. Rufina
was brought to the barangay health center.
Two days after the alleged assault Rufina died.

The witnesses narrated that prior to attack Rufina was suffering from diarrhea and vomiting and in the
health center, they saw that Rufina have bruises all over her body.
Defense - his wife died from dehydration caused by diarrhea and vomiting
RTC - Accused-appellant guilty of parricide, and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua,
Petition to SC
OSG - the prosecution failed to establish the nexus between the beatings and her death
ISSUE: WON RODOLFO, SR. IS GUILTY OF PARRICIDE.
HELD: NO.
In order to hold a person liable for the death of another, the evidence must establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that accuseds criminal act was the proximate cause of such death. Such proof is
especially crucial when there are several possible causes of death.
The examination of a wound, from the legal point of view, should lead to the determination as to when
the wound was inflicted, what the degree of danger of the wound is, with its dangers to life or function,
whether the wound was given by the injured man himself, or by some one else, and with what
manner of instrument the wound was produced. (Wharton and Stilles)(also cited in the next case)
The fact that the victim was suffering from severe diarrhea and vomitting, a condition prevalent in the
locality at the time, both prior to and after the assault, according to the testimony of both
prosecution and defense witnesses, 20 and that she did not die immediately after the beating, but
almost two days later, makes evidence on the exact cause of her death even more imperative. It is
very possible that Rufina died due to food poisoning, of which vomitting and diarrhea are classic
symptoms.
There being no evidence on the injuries sustained by Rufina Matyaong and the cause of her death,
accused-appellant is entitled to an acquittal for the Court entertains a reasonable doubt that his
actions have in fact caused the death of his wife.
47. G.R. NO. 157057
June 26, 2007
LEONIDAS EPIFANIO Y LAZARO vs. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Allan and Crisaldo were walking to their respective homes. Allan walked ahead of Crisaldo at a
distance of 3 meters. Suddenly, Crisaldo felt the piercing thrust of a bladed weapon on his back,
which caused him to cry out in pain. He made a quick turnaround and saw his attacker, petitioner.
Petitioner stabbed Crisaldo again but only hit the latter's left arm. 5 When Allan heard Crisaldo's outcry,
he rushed to Crisaldo's side and said, "Iyo Kingkoy (Uncle Kingkoy), why did you stab Saldo?" which
caused petitioner to run away.6 Allan then brought Crisaldo to his father's house where Crisaldo's
wounds were wrapped in a blanket. Crisaldo was brought to the Peaplata Hospital where he was
given first aid and then transferred to the Davao Medical Center where he stayed for three weeks to
recuperate from his wounds.
Petitioner was charged with Frustrated Murder
Petitioner's defense consisted mainly of denial.
RTC Convicted petitioner
CA affirmed in toto
Petitioner does not seek the reversal of his conviction but only that it be for the lesser offense of
attempted murder.
He contends that there is no evidence that the injuries sustained by Crisaldo were life-threatening or
would have caused his death had it not been for timely medical intervention since the medical
certificate only stated that the healing time of the wounds sustained by Crisaldo was "15-30 days
barring complication", with no notation or testimony of the attending physician that any of the injuries
was life-threatening.
ISSUE: WON PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF FRUSTRATED MURDER.

HELD: NO. HE IS GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED MURDER. It must be stressed that it is not the gravity of
the wounds alone which determines whether a felony is attempted or frustrated, but whether the
assailant had passed the subjective phase in the commission of the offense.
The subjective phase in the commission of a crime is that portion of the acts constituting the crime
included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the
offender which, with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. Thereafter, the phase is
objective.
To be an attempted crime, the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency
which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all the acts
which should produce the crime as a consequence, which act it is his intention to perform.( United
States v. Eduave,)
In case of an attempted crime, the offender never passes the subjective phase in the commission of
the crime. The offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts of execution which
should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary
desistance.23
A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should result in
the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the subjective phase in the commission of
the crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while passing through
the subjective phase. He did all that was necessary to consummate the crime; however, the crime is
not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender.
In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound
inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical intervention or
attendance.
In the present case, petitioner failed to perform all the acts of execution, because Allan came to the
aid of Crisaldo and petitioner was forced to scamper away. He did not voluntarily desist from stabbing
Crisaldo, but he had to stop stabbing when Allan rushed to help Crisaldo and recognized petitioner.
Thus, the subjective phase of the crime had not been completed.
---------------------------------------------------------Moreover, the prosecution failed to present testimonial evidence on the nature of the wounds
sustained by Crisaldo. The Court has discussed the importance of ascertaining the degree of injury
sustained by a victim in People v. Matyaong (No. 46 case),29 thus:
In considering the extent of injury done, account must be taken of the injury to the function of the
various organs, and also the danger to life. A division into mortal and nonmortal wounds, if it could be
made, would be very desirable; but the unexpected complications and the various extraneous causes
which give gravity to the simplest cases, and, on the other hand, the favorable termination of some
injuries apparently the most dangerous, render any such classification impracticable. The general
classification into slight, severe, dangerous, and mortal wounds may be used, but the possibility of
the slight wound terminating with the loss of the persons life, and the apparently mortal ending with
only a slight impairment of some function, must always be kept in mind. x x x
The danger to life of any wound is dependent upon a number of factors: the extent of the injury, the
form of the wound, the region of the body affected, the blood vessels, nerves, or organs involved, the
entrance of disease-producing bacteria or other organisms into the wound, the age and constitution of
the person injured, and the opportunities for administering proper surgical treatment. x x x 30
No evidence in this case was introduced to prove that Crisaldo would have died from his wound
without timely medical attendance. It is well-settled that where there is nothing in the evidence to
show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is
doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime committed by
him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated, murder.31
48. G.R. No. 8217
September 5, 1913
THE UNITED STATES vs. GO FOO SUY and GO JANCH
FACTS:

Appellants conducted a dry goods store in No. 26 on Calle Norte America, Cebu City and used the
upper portions as living quarters.
A fire broke out in House No. 30 which was only separated to No. 26 by a pathway.
While the fire was in progress, fire also broke out in house No. 26. Three parts of No. 26 caught fire.
Prosecution posited that appellants had been conducting their business at a loss for nearly eighteen
months. The success of their crime meant that they would receive about twice the value of their stock
of goods and thus convert a losing investment into a profitable one.
The court found the appellants guilty of frustrated arson and sentenced them under article 549 of the
Penal Code for setting fire to a building which they knew at the time to be occupied by one or more
persons.
It is urged by the defense that the court erred because the evidence shows that all the inmates had
left No. 26 when the fires occurred, and, accepting the theory of the prosecution that the appellants
started the fire in order to collect the insurance on the merchandise which belonged to them, the
offense would fall under article 561 of the Penal Code.
ISSUE: WON APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY OF FRUSTRATED ARSON
HELD: YES.
In its decision of December 31, 1988, the supreme court of Spain laid down the doctrine that setting
fire to the contents of a building constitutes the consummated crime of setting fire to the building. We
agree with this doctrine, and it is therefore immaterial that the contents of the building in the case at
bar belonged to the defendants themselves while the building belonged to a third person.
We think, however, the court erred in applying article 549. An essential element of the crime punished
by this article is knowledge on the part of the wrongdoer that the building was "occupied at the time
by one or more persons." That all the essential elements of a crime must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt does not require elaboration. The facts of the present case do not justify the
assertion that the defendants knew the building to be occupied at the time.
Article 561 provides that if the burned things shall be the exclusive property of the incendiary, he shall
suffer a penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correccional in its minimum
degree, if the arson shall have been committed with intent to defraud or cause damage to another.
49. G.R. No. L-7819
November 21, 1912
THE UNITED STATES, vs.PO CHENGCO
.
FACTS:
A fire occurred in the upper part of a building, in a place used as a kitchen. A sleeping mat, a pillow
and some empty rice sacks were found burning. The fire occurred in the common kitchen of Jao
Chiaoco, Yo Senging and Po Chengco. This kitchen communicates with the other for the exclusive
use of Sy Japco by a door. Valeriano, an 18 years old servant testified that he saw a gray-haired
Chinaman leaving precipitately from the burning kitchen. Po Chengco, defendant, was the only one
with gray hair among the occupants. The Court of First Instance of Cebu classified the crime as
frustrated arson. The Attorney-General, in this instance, classifies the crime as consummated arson.
ISSUE: WON THE DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF FRUSTRATED ARSON
HELD: NO. HE WAS ACQUITTED.
The grounds for the classification as a frustrated crime are:
(1) "Because the real reason that the fire was not spread was the intervention of disinterested
parties;"
(2) "because the defendant believed that this fire, started by him, would be put out by the intervention
of the passersby and other persons, an account of the time it took place but it is no less true, that he
left to others the frustration of the crime begun by him" (p. 28).
The time it took place was "at 5 p.m., the time of the greatest crowds in the most frequented portions
of the town" (page 25) ". . . and it is impossible to believe that a fire could have occurred in the whole
house or any part thereof because of the frequented place in which the house is situated and the
crowded hour when the incident occurred.
We have not found even the slightest proof fact that the defendant placed those objects, soaked them
in kerosene and lighted them, in said kitchen.

The statement of Valeriano Bejia cannot support any conclusion regarding the guilt of the accused. In
saying that when he rushed to put out the fire he saw a man with gray hair descend the stairway, the
inference does not necessarily follow that man had been in the kitchen, and less that if he had been
in the kitchen when the fire was started it was he who had caused it, and that the man with gray hair
might be the accused and nobody else. Testimony of this kind is not sufficient to base a conviction
upon.
50. G.R. No. L-14128 December 10, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, vs. VALDES
FACTS:
The neighbor of Mrs. Lewin told her that much smoke was issuing from the lower floor of the latters
house.
One servant, Paulino look for the fire and found a piece of a jute sack and a rag burning between a
post of the house and a partition of the entresol (low story between the first floor and the second floor
of a building)
At the moment Valdes, another servant, was in the entresol engaged in his work of cleaning.
While, the other defendant Hugo Labarro was cleaning the horses kept at the place.
Police arrested the two defendants.
Valdes on his statement admitted before several policemen that it was he who had set the fire to the
sack and the rag and he also who had started the several other fires which had occurred in said
house on previous days; that he had performed such acts.
Valdes alleged that, on being arraigned, he stated that he had set fire to a pile of dry mango leaves
that he had gathered together, which is contrary to the statement he made in the police station, to wit,
that he had set the fire to the said rag and piece of sack under the house.
The case was dismissed with respect to the other defendant Hugo Labarro. For lack of evidence and
on his counsel's petition,
ISSUE: WON DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF FRUSTRATED ARSON
HELD: YES.
The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the acts
conceive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless., owing to causes independent of his will, the
criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense committed cannot be classified as
consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited house, for the reason that no part of the building
had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and the rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had
been placed near partition of the entresol, the partition might have started to burn, had the fire not
been put out on time.
The fact of setting fire to a jute sack and a rag, soaked with kerosene oil and placed beside an upright
of the house and a partition of the entresol of the building, thus endangering the burning of the latter,
constitutes the crime of frustrated arson of an inhabited house, on an occasion when some of its
inmates were inside of it.. This crime of provided for and punished by article 549, in connection with
articles 3, paragraph 2, and 65 of the Penal Code

51. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs GUTIERREZ

G.R. No. 100699 July 5, 1996
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Gutierrez had a commotion with a son of one Mario Alano. He was bloody and
being embraced by his mother. Later that evening appellant throw a bag containing what seemed to
be gasoline at the house of Mario Alano and then lit it. Forthwith Mario Alano poured water on the
ablaze portion of the house. Neighbors rushed in to help put the fire under control.
A complaint was lodged against accused-appellant. Accused-appellant interposed alibi. TC:
Convicted accused Instant petition to SC. Accused-appellant contends that the proof of bare
occurrence of the fire and of its having been intentionally caused was not proved.
ISSUE: WON ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF CONSUMMATED ARSON

HELD: YES.
Although the whole 2-storey wood and galvanized iron house has not been completely gutted by the
fire, the crime committed is still consummated arson. 22 It is enough that a portion thereof is shown to
have been destroyed. 23
The Court feels that the trial court should not have appreciated the "special" aggravating
circumstance, under Section 4(3) of the decree, of the offender having been "motivated by spite or
hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned." The prosecution does not dispute the
mauling of appellant by a son of Mario Alano just a few hours before the incident. It would appear to
us to be more of impulse, heat of anger or risen temper, rather than real spite or hatred, that has
impelled appellant to give vent to his wounded ego.
The evidence against appellant is simply too overwhelming for it to be easily overcome by an
invocation of alibi.
52. PEOPLE VS HERNANDEZ
GR 31770; Dec 5, 1929
FACTS:
Offended party Miguel Dayrit. A little past midnight he noticed that the thatched roof of his house
was on fire, He got up to fetch some water with which to extinguish the fire, when, looking out of the
window, he saw the appellant beside the house, carrying a stick. Miguel Dayrit shouted for help, and
started to put out the fire, which he succeeded in doing, after a small part of the roof had burned.
Tanglao, a witness, testified that he saw defendant running away when he was helping Dayrit to put
out the fire. The stick which Miguel Dayrit saw in the appellant's possession on that night was found
leaning against the house with the end burnt and a rag soaked with petroleum dangling from it.
Daniel Mallari recognized it as the stick which the appellant used in getting guava fruits. It should be
noted, moreover, that prior to the crime, the appellant and the offended party, Miguel Dayrit, had
some disagreements because the offended party suspected that the appellant was stealing his paddy
piled up behind his house. TC crime committed was only frustrated arson
ISSUE: WON THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS FRUSTRATED ARSON
HELD:
NO. CONSUMMATED ARSON.
The appellant did in fact, set fire to the roof of the house, and said house was in fact partially burned.
With this, the crime of arson was consummated, notwithstanding the fact that the fire was afterwards
extinguished, for, once the fire has been started, the consummation of the crime of arson does not
depend upon the extent of the damage cause.
53. G. R. No. 160188
June 21, 2007
VALENZUELA VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
Petitioner and Calderon were sighted by Guard Lago outside the Super Sale club supermarket.
Petitioner was wearing an ID card with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU) hauling a push
cart with cases of detergent of the well-known "Tide" brand.
Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting.
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it
towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide
Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle.
All these acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking
area.
When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by
fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident.
Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered.
Petitioner and Calderon were charged with theft.

RTC convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Only petitioner filed
a brief with the CA. CA affirmed petitioners conviction. Present Petition for Review - petitioners
conviction "be modified to only of Frustrated Theft" considering the Dino and Flores case
ISSUE: WON the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely frustrated?
HELD: CONSUMMATED.
ARTICLE 6 DISCUSSED
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies.
Consummated - "when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present."
Frustrated - "when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as
a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will
of the perpetrator."
Attempted - "when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance."
It has been held that if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is
merely attempted.33 On the other hand, the subjective phase is completely passed in case of
frustrated crimes, for in such instances, "[s]ubjectively the crime is complete." 34
ART 308 THEFT DISCUSSED
We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, its
elements are spelled out as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property
of another without the latters consent.xxx
We have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent
of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. 42
WHEN THEFT IS CONSUMMATED/FRUSTRATED
In order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire as to
how exactly is the felony of theft "produced." Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under
Article 308, there is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law that theft is already
"produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latters consent."
The Court of Appeals held that the accused were guilty of consummated theft, as the accused "were
able to take or get hold of the hospital linen and that the only thing that was frustrated, which does not
constitute any element of theft, is the use or benefit that the thieves expected from the commission of
the offense." (People vs Expiritu)
The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the
crime of theft. It finds no support or extension in Article 308, whether as a descriptive or operative
element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the felony.
The statutory definition of theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the part of the
offender, compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim.
UNDER RPC THERE CAN BE NO FRUSTRATED STAGE IN THE CRIME OF THEFT
Theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to
gain.
Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once
having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property
stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution.

Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
Insofar as we consider the present question, "unlawful taking" is most material in this respect.
Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property, is the element which produces
the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution,
the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.
With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.
APPLYING IN THE INSTANT CASE:
Petitioner is guilty of consummated theft.
The theft was already produced when petitioner and Calderon were able to get hold of the detergent
irrespective of the fact that they were not able to disposed the items.
54. PEOPLE VS LIAD
355 SCRA 11
FACTS:
Lydia Cuenca was driving her Tamaraw FX along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. Her
husband Manuel and Larry, the latters employee had just come from the store and were on a convoy
with Lydia on their way home.
Upon reaching the corner of Don Enrique Subdivision and Commonwealth Avenue, Lydia made a
full stop to make a U-turn.
Three (3) men then approached her vehicle, banging on the door to force it to open. Baeng,
Valderama and Liad.
Unsuccessful, the man on the left of the vehicle pulled out a gun and pulled the trigger, hitting one
of the windows as well as Lydias left shoulder.
One of the men also shot the other side of the vehicle but it hit Manuels car instead. Still unable
to open the FXs door, one of the men broke the window of the right door using the butt of a gun.
Finally succeeding, the men boarded the vehicle.
The men sped off aboard the FX, heading north with Lydia.
Lydia was found lying on the front door of her Tamaraw FX in Ilang-Ilang St.
Security guards informed the police that the suspects were hiding in Trans-World Compound. 400
m away from the street.
Gun fight ensued. Bareng, one of the suspects were killed.
Accused-appellants, Valderama and Liad, who were hiding behind the banana plants, then
surrendered to the police. They were arrested and victims items were recovered from them.
Accused-appellants Edgar Liad and Jun Valderama were subsequently charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City with Robbery with Homicide.
RTC rendered a decision convicting accused-appellants as principals by direct participation of the
crime of robbery with homicide
Petition to SC
ISSUES: WON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
WERE CO-CONSPIRATORS TO THE CRIME
HELD: NO. DECISION WAS PROPER
In conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be
deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts
of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.[19] Conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during
or after the commission of the crime.
The following circumstances immediately before, during and after the robbery indubitably show
that the perpetrators were one in their purpose to rob Lydia Cuenca:
(1) Three (3) men blocked the Tamaraw FX and banged on the door; [21]

(2) One of the men shot the door of the vehicle, hitting Lydia Cuenca; [22]
(3) Another also fired his gun but hit Manuel Cuencas car instead; [23]
(4) One man smashed the FXs window to gain entry to the FX; [24]
(5) The three men then rode the vehicle to Ilang-Ilang Street; [25] and
(6) Thereafter, all of them alighted the FX and fled in the same direction to the Trans-World
Compound.[26]
It is true that neither Manuel Cuenca nor Larry Buseron specified each individual perpetrators
location in reference to the vehicle or their particular acts. Nevertheless, where conspiracy is shown,
the precise extent of participation of each accused in the crime is secondary and the act of one may
be imputed to all the conspirators. [37]
Whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, all
those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals for the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the homicide. [38]
55. PEOPLE VS LUZ GONZALES-FLORES
FACTS:
Accused-Appellant made an offer to the three complainants, Leongson, Malgapo and Bumatay to
work as seaman in a luxury cruise ship.
She introduced the three to
Engr. Domingo who is an alleged representative of the luxury liner in recruiting crew for the
vessel.
Baloran, who is an employee of the National Bureau of Investigation and he would take
care of processing the applications for employment.
The complainants paid P45,000.00, to accused-appellant, as a processing fee. No receipt was
issued.
After three months of follow-ups, they realized that they were defrauded.
The complainants filed an illegal recruitment case and estafa against the three.
Defense of Accused-appellant:
- She herself paid P46,5000 processing fee for her son to Domingo and Baloran. They were not
able to make good their promises so she filed a case of illegal recruitment against the two.
The case was filed days before she was detained.
- She simply told complainants about job opportunities abroad.
- all she did was to refer complainants to Domingo, Baloran,
But the cased filed by accused-appellant was dismissed for lack of merit.
TC held accused-appellant guilty of three counts of estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE: WON THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT A CO-CONSPIRATOR IN
THE CASE?
HELD: NO.
Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it may be deduced from the
mode in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused which point to a
joint purpose and design.[35]
In these cases, the fact is that there was conspiracy among accused-appellant, Domingo, and
Baloran in recruiting complainants for employment overseas. The evidence shows that each had a
role in that conspiracy. Domingo posed as a representative of the luxury liner in recruiting crew for the
vessel. Baloran represented himself as the person who would actually process complainants travel
documents, while accused-appellant acted as a scout for job applicants and a collector of their
payments.
In these cases, accused-appellant did more than just make referrals. She actively and directly
enlisted complainants for supposed employment abroad, even promising them jobs as seamen, and
collected moneys from them.

56. PEOPLE VS DE LEON

GR. No. 129057
FACTS:
While Ignacio Jimenez (victim) was watching a game of pool, Billy (accused1) struck him with a cap.
Ignacios son, Chito, saw the incident and called the attention of Billy to the fact was already old.
Fist fight ensued between Chito and Billy. The fight was pacified. Billy and Ignacio left while Chito
remained in the place. Billy returned and immediately boxed Chito several time and drew a 10-inch
long bolo.
Chito ran and met his father. Chito saw Billy accosting and stabbing his father on the stomach several
times
Leopoldo (accused2) and Dominador (accused3), brothers of Billy arrived. Thereupon, Leopoldo held
the arms of Ignacio Dominador stabbed the back portion of Ignacios head. Thereafter, the three (3)
brothers ran away.
Ignacio died. An information was filed against the three brothers for murder, alleging that they
conspire in killing Ignacio. Billy evaded arrest. Trial upon the merits ensued. TC holds the accused,
Dominador de Leon and Leopoldo de Leon, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
ISSUE: WON THERE WAS CONSPIRACY IN THE KILLING
HELD: YES.
On the matter of conspiracy, we have consistently held that conspiracy need not be shown by direct
proof of an agreement by the parties to commit the crime. It is sufficient that there is a common
purpose and design, concerted action and concurrence of interests and the minds of the parties meet
understandingly so as to bring about a deliberate agreement to commit the offense charged,
notwithstanding the absence of a formal agreement. The credible testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Annaluz and Chito disclosed that after Billy accosted Ignacio, the former stabbed the latter
on the stomach one or two (2) times, then Leopoldo held the arms of Ignacio; and then Dominador
took his turn in stabbing the victim at the back of the head. Billy continued stabbing the victim, and
then the three (3) accused-brothers left and ran away at the same time. These concurrent actions of
accused Billy and accused-appellants Leopoldo and Dominador which revealed a mutual intention
and determination to kill the victim, Ignacio, indicated conspiracy.
Article 8-Conspiracy
57 PEOPLE VS VALDEZ 159 SCRA 366 (1988)- THE ACT OF ONE IS THE ACT OF ALL
Facts: -Accused Valdez and Ordonio were charge with Murder for killing Maquiling. Prosecution
witnesses told that they heard gunshots but did not saw the actual killing of Maquiling. They however
saw the accused Ordonio running with Valdez who carries a shotgun after the shooting. -Based from
circumstantial evidences, trial court convicted both accused as co-conspirator for murder.
-Accused appealed. The Solicitor General prayed that Ordonio be acquitted as the only evidence of
alleged conspiracy between Valdez and Orodio is the fact that Orodio was present at he crime scene
when he was seen running together with Valdez
Issue: Is Orodio a co-conspirator in the crime?
Ruling: YES. Orodio was present with Valdez at the time Eleno Maquiling was killed by a shotgun
blast at his back. He was in the company of a man running with a shotgun, immediately after the fatal
shooting, just outside the Maquilings house where he had no business being if he were not acting in
concert with Danilo Valdez, the accused-appellant who carried the shotgun. He was a close friend
(barkada) of the accused Danilo Valdez, both of whom the deceased victim had identified as probably
responsible should any untoward event befall the victim. Simplicio Orodio completely failed to
explain what he was doing with Danilo Valdez the night of the killing, on the one hand.
Conspiracy being present, it does not matter that the prosecution had failed to show who as between
the two actually pulled the trigger of the shotgun that killed Eleno Maquiling. Both Danilo Valdez and

Simplicio Orodio are liable as co-conspirators since any act of a co-conspirator becomes the act of
the other regardless of the precise degree of participation in the act.
58 PEOPLE VS PANGALASAN 404 SCRA 275 (2003)-CONSPIRACY AS DARLING OF MODERN
PROSECUTOR'S NURSERY
Facts:-Accused Pangalasan, Cabalo and others entered house of victims George and son
Christopher Neal Lim, ransacked their house and got valuable cash and valuables. Right after that,
the three masked men tied them and kidnap the victims. A fourth sat on passengers.
-Police authorities apprehended them. Pangalasan, in his confession, admitted that Cabalo and three
other men ordered him to kidnap the victims.
-In his confession, Pangalasan admitted that upon orders of Ronnie Cabalo, he and three other men,
Aladin (Ronnies brother), a Muslim known as Ferdinand, and Bong (a resident of Purok Islam), had
kidnapped George and his son Christopher.
-During trial however,Pangalasan retract his confession and testified that as security guard, he was
maltreated by the other accused and forced him to join them in the kidnapping.
- George however rebutted the testimony Pangalasan and positively identified the accused as the one
who tied and kidnap them.
Issue: Is Pangalasan guilty as co-conspirator of the crime of kidnapping?
Ruling: YES. Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy the darling of the modern prosecutors
nursery. There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proven separately from and
with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct
evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful
conspiracy. Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a
common purpose and design.
-In this case, the evidence shows that the appellant and his three cohorts were armed with
handguns; and all of them had masks over their faces. They gained entry into the Lim residence after
overpowering the security guard Ferdinand and the housemaid Julita, and tying their hands behind
their backs. One of the masked men remained in the sala, while the three others barged into the
bedroom and kidnapped George and Christopher. The appellant and his cohorts forced father and
son to board Georges car. The appellant drove the car, dropped off Christopher and his cohorts at
Sitio Tupi, and drove on with George in the car towards the direction of Maasim.
-The collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the appellant and his cohorts before,
during and after the kidnapping constitute indubitable proof that the appellant and his three
companions conspired with each other to attain a common objective: to kidnap George and
Christopher and detain them illegally. The appellant was a principal by direct participation in the
kidnapping of the two victims.
59 PEOPLE VS HILARIO 354 SCRA 354 (2001)- EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY DECISIVE OF
LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION (PRINCIPAL, ACCOMPLICE OR EXEMP)
Facts:-Prosecution witness Danilo overheard the accused Hilario and others conversing and planning
to kill Berong.
-Later that evening, he saw the accused Rodrigo Hilario gave Rodolfo Hilario a bolo to kill Berong.
However, it was Carlos, the companion of Berong whowas stabbed by Rodolfo (mistaken identity).
-Since Danilo knew the accused, he kept mum but ultimately he filed the said cases.
Issue: Are the accused liable as co-conspirator?
Ruling: YES.
Although as a rule, conspiracy is not a crime, the existence of a conspiracy is decisive in
determining whether two or more persons who participated in the commission of an offense are liable
as co-principals or accomplices or are exempt from criminal liability. If an express or implied
conspiracy is proven, then all the conspirators may be regarded as co-principals regardless of the
extent of their participation in the execution of the crime. Their liability is collective or joint.

The series of acts performed by each one of the accused shows their unity of purpose and
common design. observed and analyzed by the lower court:
All three accused were present at the scene of the commission of the crime; accused Rodrigo
Hilario was the one who furnished the weapons, a bolo and a foot-long ice pick and acted as a lookout; their cumpadre suddenly stabbed Carlos Reyes with the ice pick, simultaneously saying, Ito
ba?, revealing a previous agreement to stab the victim. Rodolfo Hilario, standing one-arm length
from the victim, acted as a back-up man, and uttered, Walang makikialam! After the stabbing, all of
them ran away together.
Thus, all their acts tend to manifest a common purpose and devise. The familiar rule in
conspiracy is that when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible, when the conspiracy is proven, for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
60 PEOPLE VS BIONG 372 SCRA 34-ESSENCE OF CONSPIRACY
Facts: -Seven men including accused Biong (at large) and Diola raped Carol Epis, a minor. Trial court
convicted only Diola as the 6 others were at large.
-Diola, in his defense, interposed alibi. Defense also contend that Epis was the sweetheart of Biong.
They appealed, assailing the finding of trial court that there has been lack of proof given of a prior
agreement to commit the crime by all the accused.
Issue: Is proof of prior agreeement by accused to commit crime needed to establish conspiracy?
Ruling: NO. The argument is without merit.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of the felony and decide to commit it. The agreement to commit the crime is, more
frequently than not, made by the malefactors, not within a considerable interval preceding the
commission of the act, but close to, or contemporaneous with, the actual commission thereof,when by
their collective acts, it becomes implicit that they have spontaneously agreed and decided to commit
the felony. The existence of conspiracy, in fact, is often inferred from the actuations of the
accused during the commission of the crime, which point to a joint purpose, concert of action and
community of interest.
-On the witness stand, the victim poignantly recounted the individual participation of the seven
malefactors.Biong held her hands, Leyson pulled her T-shirt, and Morales held her by the
neck. Then, Leyson released her T-shirt and pulled down her short pants and underwear. Alex
forthwith touched her breasts and vagina while the others continued to hold her hands and
feet. During all the time that the six of his co-accused took turns in ravishing their hapless victim,
appellant Antonio Diola kept on poking his knife at her. It should be obvious that the malefactors acted
in concert and synchrony, with evident unity in their criminal intent, in accomplishing their sinister
design. The cooperative acts of each towards the criminal purpose of taking on their victim should
prove that they were all parties to the dastardly deed. While appellant Diola concededly did not
actually penetrate private complainant, his act of holding a knife against her to effectively
silence any protest, was an overt act in furtherance and facilitation of the conspiracy.
61 PEOPLE VS GARCIA JR 400 SCRA 229 (2003)-WHEN IS CONSPIRACY IS PRESENT
Facts: Trial court convicted Garcia and Bernabe for Carnapping with Homicide for taking a Tamaraw
FX and killing its driver Ellis. They appealed arguing there was no conspiracy to commit the crime.
Issue: Is conspiracy present in this case?
Ruling: YES. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence
and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime, which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. In
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the criminal

design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed. It may
be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.
-In the case at bar, it was sufficiently proved that Garcia and Bernabe, through Joselito Cortez, hired
tToyota Tamaraw FX belonging to Ignacio for their trip to Bicol; that at 8:00 a.m. of December 18,
1996, they left for Bicol on board the Tamaraw FX driven by Elis; that on December 23, 1996, SPO2
Emmanuel Lapurga of Moncada, Tarlac reported to the Chief of Police that two suspiciously looking
persons, who turned out to be Garcia and Bernabe were offering to sell a brand new Toyota Tamaraw
FX for a mere P50,000.00 in Anao, Tarlac; and that the two were finally apprehended with the subject
vehicle at Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija by elements of the Tarlac and Nueva Ecija Police.
62 PEOPLE VS REYES 399 SCRA 528 (2003)-HOW IS CONSPIRACY IS PROVEN
Facts: -Danilo Reyes and an unidentified person robbed and killed Salmorin. Only Reyes was
arrested and charge with crime of Robbery with Homicide. Reyes appealed contending tht
prosecution failed to prove conspiracy.
Issue: Is conspiracy in the case proven?
Ruling: YES. Likewise unavailing is the contention of accused-appellant that the prosecution failed to
prove conspiracy.
In conspiracy, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a condition
precedent. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was committed or
inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest.
In the case at bar, conspiracy was clearly manifested in the concerted efforts of the accusedappellant and his cohort. They were seen together by PO1 Molato at the unholy hour of 2:50 a.m.
forcibly taking the wristwatch of the victim and thereafter stabbing him at the back. Their
simultaneous acts indicate a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. Where
the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the
perpetrators will be liable as principals.
63 PEOPLE VS CABALLERO 400 SCRA 424 (2003)- WHO ARE LIABLE WHEN THERE IS
CONSPIRACY
Facts: - Accused Caballero brothers (Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. ,Armando and Robito) conspired ONLY
to kill Eugune Tayactac and Arnold Barcuma. They executed their plan and they ganged up and
stabbed Eugene with a knife. The latter died.
-Barcuma also saw the commotion but when the accused saw him, they accosted and stabbed him.
He survived the killing.
-Leonilo Broce, A MERE BYSTANDER and not part of the plan to be killed, rushed from his house to
where the commotion was. He was, however, met by Robito who stabbed him on the chest. He too
died.
-Accused were charged and convicted for the Murder for the death of Tayactac, Broce and Frustrated
Murder of Barcuma.
Issue: Are the accused Ricardo, Marciao and Armano guilty for death of Broce even if he was not
part of the conspircay to kill him?
Ruling: YES. Only Robito was held to be responsible for the death as the killing of Broce was not
part of the conspiracy.
-However, for the death of Leonilo, the Court believes that the appellants are not criminally liable. The
prosecution failed to adduce evidence that the appellants and the accused Robito conspired to kill
Leonilo. The appellants did not actually see Leonilo rushing out from his house to the situs criminis.
They had no foreknowledge that the accused Robito would stab Leonilo.There was no evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove that all the appellants assisted the accused Robito in killing
Leonilo.

The rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the
conspiracy. For other acts done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the
necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable.
64 PEOPLE VS PATANO 399 SCRA 90 (2003) -CONSPIRACY TRANSCEND COMPANIONSHIP
Facts: -Accused James Patano and Ramil and Rosendo Madriaga were charged and convicted of
rime of Kidnapping for Ransom for their act of kidnapping Vicente Chua.
-Prosecution merely relied the testimony of Dimal who implicated the said accused whom he see in a
resort where they brough the victim.
Issue: Is there a conspiracy in this case?
Ruling: NO. Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the
crime, with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy transcends
companionship.[ Neither can the Court rely on the uncorroborated testimony of Dimal whose
testimony at the outset had been found not to be credible. The failure of appellant Patano to present
the friends he was with is not sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. An
accused should be found guilty on the basis of the strength of prosecution evidence and not on the
weakness of the defense.
-In the case of appellant James Patano, he was condemned to death for his presence in the
resort. The trial court held that since appellant Patano failed to corroborate his excuse that he was
just there for a swim with friends, then, the same must be ignored. The Court disagrees. If at all, what
the prosecution was able to establish is that appellant Patano knocked on the door of cottage no. 2,
and Maj. Quidato heard him say: (P)are kaibigan ninyo ito, dala ko ang pera. Such alleged statement
by Patano, even if true, is equivocal and ambiguous. He did not state for what purpose the money is
to be used. No probative weight may be given to the testimony of Maj. Quidato that the amount of one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) is for the payment of the cottage because it is a mere conclusion on his
part based on his bare claim that the security guard and the official of the resort were preventing the
victim from leaving because the cottage has not been paid yet. Quidato did not testify that he heard
appellant Patano say that the alleged money he had with him was for the rental of the cottage. In
other words, even if appellant Patano really brought money to the cottage, the prosecution failed to
connect the participation of Patano in the commission of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom.Absent any other proof of overt act necessary or essential to the perpetration of the
kidnapping, Patanos alleged presence and utterance cannot be a valid basis for his conviction.
-All accused were acquitted.
65 PEOPLE VS GONZALES 357 SCRA 460 (2000)-MERE PRESENCE AT THE CRIME SCENE IS
NOT EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY
N.B. I don't know if there is conspiracy here since there is only principal.
Facts: -Victim LeolitoPaquelet was asleep on a bench but he was found to have been stabbed to
death with a dagger.
--There were no eyewitnesses to the actual stabbing. The prosecution thus had the task of knitting
the pieces of evidence together into a thriving whole. An accusing finger was pointed at Gonzales, as
he was the last person seen with Leolito before he was stabbed dead.
- Relying on testimony of Habla who heard the confession of Gonzales that he killed Leolito and the
fact she saw the accused has a bloodied T-shirt, RTC convicted accused of MURDER.
Issue: Is mere presence tantamount to guilt?
Ruling: As a general rule NO. True, mere presence at the scene of the crime is not tantamount to
guilt.However, this is not the only circumstance availing here.
In People s Santos, we affirmed the conviction of the accused on the basis of circumstantial
evidence. There, two of the four compelling links were that: (1) the accused were the last persons
seen with the victim, as it is so in the case at bar and (2) there were police officers who testified on

the conditions of the accused at the time of arrest, conditions which indicated their guilt, again, a
circumstance present in this case. Habla testified she saw accused with a bloodied T-Shirt and he
heard him say he killed the victim.
66 PEOPLE VS VICENTE 372 SCRA 765 (2001)- NO CONSPIRACY
Facts: -One evening, the VICTIM Melvyn Matibag, a resident of Pinagsama Village, Western
Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, invited Jerry Fajardo, a neighbor, to ride with him in his tricycle and
cruise around the neighborhood.
- Everything went smoothly for a couple of minutes until they reached a bend when a group of five (5)
men apparently inebriated suddenly blocked their way, prompting Melvyn to remark, "Pare,
nakakarami na yata kayo, ah."
-Piqued by the remark, accused-appellant Carmelito Vicente, one of the five, sarcastically replied,
"Wala kaming pakialam sa humaharang sa amin," afterwhich he punched Melvyn on the nape.
Melvyn retaliated and the rest of the group joined in the fray.
-Rey Ballera pull out a balisong from his pocket. Sensing danger, Jerry retreated and scampered
away. He ran towards his house but as he looked back he saw Rey following him with Melvyn, now
wounded, trailing farther behind.
-Tanod Eddie Andrada responded but was confronted by the aggressors one of whom struck him with
a bolo. Eddie parried off the attacks with his bare arms. He remembers accused Carlos Bersabal
menacingly moving towards him with two (2) lead pipes chained together.
-An Information for the murder of Melvyn Matibag qualified by abuse of superior strength was
accordingly filed on 16 September 1998 against Rey Ballera, Carmelito Vicente and Carlos Bersabal.
-the trial court rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant Rey Ballera guilty of murder qualified
by treachery. But accused-appellants Carmelito Vicente and Carlos Bersabal were convicted
only of slight physical injuries purportedly for mauling Melvyn in the course of a scuffle.
-The court a quo likewise rejected the prosecution theory that there was conspiracy since there was
no proof that the three (3) accused conspired with each other in killing Melvyn.
-According to the trial court, Carmelito and Carlos had no foreknowledge of Rey's plan to stab
Melvyn. As such, only accused-appellant Rey was held responsible for the murder of Melvyn qualified
not by abuse of superior strength but by treachery.
Issue: Is there a conspiracy among Carlos, Carmelito and Rey to kill Melvyn?
Ruling: NO. The Court agreed with the trial court that there was no conspiracy among accusedappellants. Conspiracy transcends companionship and the fact alone that Carlos and Carmelito
fought against the deceased moments before the fatal stabbing cannot support a conclusion that they
shared in the criminal intent of Rey. Beyond cavil, in the absence of any previous plan or
agreement to commit a crime, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against
one and the same person is individual and not collective. It is clear from the evidence presented that
neither Carmelito nor Carlos knew that Rey would purposedly run after their victims with the intent of
slaying Melvyn. Only a conspiracy would qualify Carmelito's and Carlos' act of boxing the deceased
to homicide but such a conspiracy was not proved as indubitably as the killing itself.
67 ARIAS VS SANDIGANBAYAN 180 SCRA 309 (1989)- THE ARIAS DOCTRINE
Facts: (from dissenting opinion since it is clearer)
-In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial
floods affecting the towns of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila.
- Project implementation entrusted to the Pasig Engineering District headed by the District Engineer,
Cresencio Data. Some lands were bought to implement project.
-Among the lots affected was owned by Benjamin Agleham. Initially, tax declaration stated the land as
ricefiled valued property at market value of of P301,690 (P10 per square meter).
- Part of the lot was sold to accused Natividad Gutierrez, who was armed with a Special Power of
Attorney allegedly executed on February 24, 1978 by Benjamin Agleham in her favor. She submitted
a falsified xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B) bearing a false date: December 15,
1973 (instead of February 27, 1978) and describing Aglehams 30,169-square-meter property as
"residential" (instead of riceland), with a fair market value of P2,413,520 or P80 per square meter
(instead of P150,845 at P5 per square meter).
- Accused Amado C. Arias, as auditor of the Engineering District, pre-audited he voucher and its
supporting documents nd approved for payment to Gutierrez.

-An investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense on the gross overpricing of
Aglehams property. Arias and others were implicated for conspiring to steal money from government.
-All accused were convicted by Sandiganbayan of of the violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,.
-Accused appealed the conviction.
Issue: Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and perpetration of the alleged
conspiracy to defraud the government?
Ruling: No. We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected
documents, received procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized
office could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would
be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their
subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily
expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was
present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served, and otherwise
personally look into the reimbursement vouchers accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be
some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of
even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must
be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers
that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more
appalling.
-Under the Sandiganbayans decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission
chairman, agency head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from
disbursements which they have approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of
conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon
or affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal, and
deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.
68 ALVIZO VS SANDIGANBAYAN 406 SCRA 311- CONTRARY RULING TO ARIAS
Facts: -Accused Rogelio Alvizo, Florito Montecillo, Pompeyo Almagro, Catalino Magno, Jr., Efren
Coyoca, Oscar Belcina, Harvey Ruiz, Edgar Osmea, Guilberto Hermosa, Aniceto Arriola, Santos
Cabusas, Sofronio Mag-uyon, Rafael Rabaya, Jr., Nestor Rabaya and Joselito Genson were
convicted by Sandiganbayan on different counts of violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
-A COA Audit team found out that fake LAAs and SACDCs were issued in the year 1977 leading to
irregular disbursements of public funds for the payment of "ghost" projects.
-The investigations resulted in the filing of 397 criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan charging
certain officials and employees of the government as well as private contractors with violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Issue: Is there a conspiracy among the accused in this case?
Ruling: YES.
-Under paragraph (e) of the said law, the requisite elements to constitute corrupt practices are (1) the
accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) said public officers
commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public
position; (3) they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4)
such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and
(5) the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.
As aptly found by the Sandiganbayan, all these elements are present, thus:
In the cases at bar, all the above-cited requisites elements are present. When accused Fernandez,
Faelnar and Mangubat, as Asst. Regional Directors and Regional Accountant, respectively, issued the
fake LAAs and corresponding SACDCs to the Cebu 2nd HED knowing fully well that the allotments
and/or allocation thereunder were not properly authorized by the Ministries of the Budget and the

Public Highways and neither have they been programmed for release in accordance with standard
operating procedure, they thus acted with evident bad faith. Accused District Engineer Jose Genson,
Assistant District Engineers Rafael Rabaya, Jr. and Godofredo Lagura and District Accountant
Sofronio Mag-uyon likewise acted with evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence and manifest
partiality in receiving and implementing the fake LAAs and SACDCs since they should have known
and noticed that all the allotments released thereunder were not for regular maintenance, especially
so when the district had been receiving its regular maintenance allocations for 1977; that they had not
requested formally for such extra allocations; that the LAAs and SACDCs were fake or spurious on
their faces and signed
Article 9-Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies
69 PEOPLE VS YU HAI G.R. NO. L-9598 AUGUST 15, 1956
Facts: -Yu Hai alias "Haya" was accused in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan of a violation
of Article 195, sub-paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, for having allegedly permitted the game
of panchong or paikiu, a game of hazard
-Justice of the Peace of Court, in its order of December 24, 1954, sustained the motion to quash
on the theory that the offense charged was a light offense which, under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code, prescribed in two months.
Issue: Is the crime charged a light or less grave felony?
Ruling: It is a less grave felony.
-Under Article 90, "light offenses prescribe in two months". The definition of "light offenses" is in turn
to be found in Article 9, which classifies felonies into grave, less grave, and light, and defines "light
felonies" as "those infraction of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine
not exceeding 200 pesos or both is provided ".
-The offense charged in punishable by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos (Article
195). Hence, it is a "light offense" under Article 9 and prescribes in two months under Article 90.

70. G.R. Nos. L-8848-58

May 23, 1957

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOHN CANSON, JR., ET AL., defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
In eleven separate informations defendany appellees were charged for the violation of Article

195 of the Revised Penal Code

In each said cases counsel for the accused filed a motion to quash on the ground of

prescription. The Justice of the Peace Courts dismissed all said cases.

The Provincial Fiscal appealed said orders however the lower court affirmed the appealed
orders of dismissal. The lower court ruled that the offense charged in each case was a light
felony under paragraph 3 of article 9 Revised Penal Code, and under our law, Light offenses
prescribe in two months.

In the present appeal, the Solicitor General cites Article 26 and contends that inasmuch as the

penalty imposable under Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto menor, or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos, then a fine of 200 pesos, imposable as a single or as an alternative
penalty, may be considered as a correctional penalty, and so under Article 90 of the same
Code Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the
exception of the punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years. Hence, the
offense charged prescribes in ten years and not two months.
ISSUE:

Whether or not light offenses prescribe in two months.

HELD:
The court held that the informations in all these cases had to be quashed, not because them

persons accused were not guilty, but simply because the prosecuting attorneys filed the
information's beyond the relatively short two month period.
In deciding the present case, the court cited the recent cases decided by it, in which, as it he;d

in the case of the People of the Philippines vs. Yu Hai alias "Haya" the court, through Mr.
Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that a violation of Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code,
punishable with arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, is a light felony under Article 9
of said Code and prescribes in two months, according to Article 90, paragraph 6, of the same
Code. Said ruling was reiterated and applied in our decision through Mr. Justice Bautista
Angelo, in the more recent case of The People of the Philippines vs. Pedro Aquino, which
involved the same violation of Article 195 of the Revised Penal Code, particularly the
exploitation or use of slot machines (jackpots).

71. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. TIMOTEO ESCARLOS, alias Tomy, appellant.
[G.R. No. 148912. September 10, 2003
FACTS:
On the night of July 1, 2000 the accused was watching a benefit dance.
While thereat, Kgd. Antonio Balisacan who was then drunk, passed in front of accused and told
him, You are here again to create trouble. Accused was offended so he answered back
saying Why do you say that to me when I am not doing any trouble here. Antonio Balisacan
told him, OKINNAM KETDI (vulva of your Mother) and without warning boxed the accused. He
was hit on the forehead, He intended to box back but he noticed that the victim was pulling out
a kitchen knife, so for fear of his life, the accused grabbed the weapon from Antonio Balisacan
and used the knife in stabbing the latter who was hit at the side below the left armpit. He
stabbed him twice and when the victim was about to fall down, he was able to hit him for the
third time.
The trial court believed that the prosecutions evidence was sufficient to convict appellant of
murder qualified by treachery. It rejected the accused plea of self-defense, because there had
been no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
In pleading self-defense, appellant asserts that it was the victim who initially approached and
assaulted him. Allegedly, the former had no choice but to defend himself under the
circumstances.
appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when the latter
unceremoniously boxed him on the forehead in the heat of their argument. Appellant insists
that under the circumstances, he was legally justified in using the knife to ward off the unlawful
aggression. For him to wait for the knife to be raised and to fall on him before acting to defend
himself would be asking too much, he argues.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, justifying the act of the
accused in stabbing the former.
HELD :

 The court held that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim even if the victim

may be said to have initiated the confrontation to sustain the contention of the accused that he
acted in self-defence.
The alleged assault did not come as a surprise, as it was preceded by a heated exchange of

words between the two parties who had a history of animosity. Moreover, the alleged drawing
of a knife by the victim could not have placed the life of appellant in imminent danger. The
former might have done it only to threaten or intimidate the latter.
Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger -- not

merely threatening and intimidating action. Uncertain, premature and speculative was the
assertion of appellant that the victim was about to stab him, when the latter had merely drawn
out his knife. There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat
to ones life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just speculative
Even assuming arguendo that there was an altercation before the stabbing incident and that

some dangedid in fact exist, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment
appellant disarmed the victim by wresting the knife from the latter. After the former had
successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would
have necessitated the need to kill the latter. Hence, appellant became the unlawful aggressor
when he stabbed the victim.
When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-

defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor. To be sure, when the
present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his
attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal
self-defense on the part of appellant. Undoubtedly, the latter went beyond the call of selfpreservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on the latter,
even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased.
Unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of self-

defense. Unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there can be
no self-defense, complete or incomplete, on the part of the latter. If there is nothing to prevent
or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis.
Despite his failure to prove self-defense, the appellant may be convicted only of homicide, not

murder, because of the inability of the prosecution to establish any qualifying

circumstance. Here, treachery is negated by the victims awareness of the impending attack.

73. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ALOG, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 128871. March 18, 2003]

JIMMY

RUBISO,

alias

FACTS:
Appellant Rubiso has been working as a welder at the Jaspe Light and Steel Industries.
On November 6, 1992, according to Rubiso, while he was welding a tiller, Serafin Hubines, Jr.

passed by and kicked it. When he confronted Hubines the latter boxed the appellant on his
chest. He fell down on a sitting position and thereafter Hubines pulled his gun.
Appellant immediately stood up and held Hubines hands. They grappled for its possession and

both fell on the ground. Then the gun exploded.

According to appellant, he was not sure who caused the shot. Appellant lied down on his

stomach and covered his ears. That was the time he heard three or more shots. He stood up
and saw Hubines lying on the ground full of blood.
Upon arrest, appellant told PO3 Danilo Opong the t he was only defending himself.
The trial court rendered a decision convicting appellant of the crime charged (Murder).
In the present appeal, appellant insists that when the victim pulled out his gun, both grappled

for its possession. They fell and there were bursts of gunfire. He must have killed the victim but
he was only defending himself.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of the victim in pulling out his gun constitutes unlawful aggression
justifying the act of the accused in killing the former.
HELD:
The court held that the act of the victim in pulling out his gun does not constitute unlawful

aggression which threatens the life and limb of the accused. There can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the
person defending himself.
To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must prove the existence of the following: (1)

unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed
by the person being attacked to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of selfdefense. It contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger
thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The person defending himself
must have been attacked with actual physical force or with actual use of weapon. Of all the
elements, unlawful aggression, i.e., the sudden unprovoked attack on the person defending
himself, is indispensable.

Assuming that Hubines had a gun and pulled it, however, records show that he did not

manifest any aggressive act which may have imperiled the life and limb of herein appellant.
It is axiomatic that the mere thrusting of ones hand into his pocket as if for the purpose of

drawing a weapon is not unlawful aggression. Even the cocking of a rifle without aiming the
firearm at any particular target is not sufficient to conclude that ones life was in imminent
danger. Hence, a threat, even if made with a weapon, or the belief that a person was about to
be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of
aggression or by some external acts showing the commencement of actual and material
unlawful aggression.
The location and presence of gunshot wounds on the body of the victim eloquently refute

appellants allegation of self-defense. It is an oft repeated rule that the presence of a large
number of wounds, their location and their seriousness would negate self-defense. Instead,
they indicate a determined effort to kill.
The prosecution was able to establish that appellant suddenly and unexpectedly shot the

victim at the back without any provocation on his part.

Hence, in killing the victim, the appellant did not act in self-defense.

74. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SERGIO A. CARATAO, appellant.

[G.R. No. 126281. June 10, 2003]

FACTS:
On July 21, 1992, appellant was charged with Article 248 of RPC for killing Edgardo Bulawin.

In arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.

In admitting the crime charge the appellant, claimed self-defense to exculpate himself.
In

his
testimony,
appellant
alleged
that
he
was
with
his
wife
the NALCO Commissary Canteen, where the victim was then on duty as rice vale issuer.

at

He requested the victim for his rice vale. The victim told him to wait. Appellant thereafter kept

begging the victim for his turn, but the victim made no reply. Despite repeated pleas, he was
not given any rice.

 On his way out, the appellant saw the victim getting his motorbike. He approached the victim,

who at that point was already mounted on his motorcycle, holding the handle bars, with the
engine already running. As appellant stood one meter away from the victim, along the right
side of the motorcycle, the appellant asked, for his rice, however the victim told him That is no
longer my problem. Why are you forcing me?
Allegedly, the victim punched appellants face with his right fist. Appellant was thrown

backward, and the victim moved his motorbike forward, hitting appellants left thigh near the
groin.
Appellant then held the victims right hand, and when the victim tried to break free, he twisted

it.Thereafter, with a knife on his right hand, he stabbed the right portion of the victims belly.
Appellant went home to get his tricycle and immediately drove to the municipal hall, where he

voluntarily surrendered.[16]
The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions version of the incident. It found that the

victims indifference to appellants repeated pleas for rice must have angered appellant to the
point of attacking the victim upon seeing the latter about to leave without heeding his request.
It rejected the plea of self-defense for appellants failure to prove unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim. It upheld the presence of treachery, but ruled out the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and cruelty, for lack of evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim justifying the act of the
accused in killing the former.
HELD:
The court sustained the findings of the trial court and held that appellants contention of self-

defense is untenable since there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
To prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the

victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and
limb of the person claiming self-defense; (2) that there was reasonable necessity in the means
employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense or, at least, that any provocation
executed by the person claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of
the victims aggression.
At the heart of the claim for self-defense is the presence of an unlawful aggression committed

against appellant. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on
and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements
are present.
Unlawful aggression refers to an attack amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and

limb of the person claiming self-defense. The admission of appellant in his testimony that he
stabbed the victim makes it incumbent upon him convincingly to prove that there was unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim which necessitated the use of deadly force.

In the case at bar, appellant tried to prove that the unlawful aggression emanated from the
victim, who punched him in the face and hit him in the thigh with his motorbike, without
provocation on his part, however, as the trial courts findings the same is unconvincing upon
the court. The court made the following conclusions :

Under the situation where Tado Bulawin was in a riding position on his motorcycle,
holding its handle bars, ready to start the engine, the court finds it incredible for him
to be the unlawful aggressor. Instead, Sergio Carataos being made to wait and make
repeated requests or pleas for his vale of rice must have moved him to be the
unlawful aggressor thereby inflicting stab wounds on the victim Tado Bulawin. For
the circumstance of self-defense to be appreciated, it must be shown that the
compulsion is of such character that the accused is left with no opportunity to
escape or self-defense [sic] in equal combat (People v. Fronda, 222 SCRA 71).

Appellants account of the circumstances of the attack does not inspire belief.

The court believes with the trial courts observation that the circumstances of the
victims alleged assault on appellant is not credible, because accused Sergio
Caratao was positioned at the right side of the motorcycle, not in front, and if at all
Tado Bulawin boxed him in that riding position, the motorcycle could have probably
fallen down. But [there was] no proof that it did fall.

As between appellant and the victim, appellant had more hatred to harbor arising
from the fact that the victim refused to give him his rice vale. He thus had more
motive to do harm than the victim. On the witness stand, he reasoned that he
stabbed the victim, not to repel the victims attack, nor out of fear for his life, but
specifically because he lost his temper.

The unlawful aggression was convincingly established to have emanated from appellant, and

not from the victim.

In the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed is Homicide,
not Murder.

75. OSCAR SANTOS y PANGANIBAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. [G.R. No. 126624. November 11, 2003]
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged of two counts of frustrated homicide commited against Roy de Borja

and Loreto Hernandez.

For his defense, petitioner alleged that on that day, a group of men were shouting outside their

house who were Loreto Hernandez, Roy de Borja, Antonio Bonton and Aurelio Dionisio. When
he was seen peeping thru that window, the accused heard Aurelio Dionisio remark Ayan si
Oscar, barilin mo na. .
Allegedly the group of Hernandez and De Borja started pelting the house with stones, causing

some window panes to break and the plaster finish of the walls to chip off.Rather than be
taunted into a likely violent encounter, the accused sneaked out of his house thru a backdoor
to seek outside help.
On his way home, he met the group of Loreto Hernandez, who, allegedly drew a gun (which

turned out to be a toy gun )from his waist and from a distance of some 2 meters aimed the
weapon at the head of the accused.

Realizing that his life was in imminent danger and because it was all but impossible for him to
run away by then, the accused, with the use of the bolo with which he armed himself when he
stepped out of his house to seek assistance from his neighbors, hacked Hernandezs
outstretched arm gripping the gun.

Petitioner also alleged that the others, are armed with a piece of 2"x 2" wood, and holding a

fanknife hence kept flailing his bolo aimlessly in order to keep his attackers at bay. Thereafter
the accused ran away and proceeded directly to the municipal hall to report the incident. He
did not surrender his bolo to the police authorities because, in his confusion, he must have
thrown the weapon away somewhere along his route.
During the trial, the petitioner interposed self-defense. He claimed that he hacked Hernandez

and De Borja only as an act of self-defense.

The trial court however convictied the petitioner of two counts of the crime of frustrated

homicide and gave scant consideration to the petitioners plea of self-defense.

Upon appeal, CA found the prosecutions version of the incident more credible, characterizing

the petitioners claim of self-defense as unsubstantiated by evidence.

The petitioner asserts that as fortified by his evidence, Loreto Hernandez and Roy de Borja

were the unlawful aggressors, which impelled him to defend himself.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused acted in self-defense.

HELD:
The court held that the petitioners evidence to support his plea of self-defense, complete or

incomplete is implausible, if not incredible.

Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense which, as experience has demonstrated,

can easily be fabricated. To merit approbation, the accused is burdened to prove with clear and
convincing evidence the confluence of the following essential requisites for self-defense: (a)
there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) that the means employed to prove
or repel such aggression was reasonable; and (c) there was lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden
and unexpected attack on the life and limb of a person or an imminent anger thereof; and not
merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. There can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete, where there is no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
The petitioner wanted the trial court to believe that Hernandez, upon the proddings of Aurelio

Dionisio, threatened to shoot him with a toy gun although the petitioner was armed with a
bolo. It is, indeed, incredible that Hernandez would have the temerity to threaten the petitioner
who was armed with a lethal weapon, such as a bolo, with a mere toy gun.
The petitioner threw away the bolo that he used in hacking Hernandez and De Borja. This

circumstance negates the petitioners plea of self-defense.

Lastly, the court took into consideration the incident occurred prior to the incident in the case at

bar. During the trial, it was revealed that sometime in 1981 Hernandez stabbed the accused
somewhere at the back. The trial court concluded and as sustained by the court in this present
petition, that even as such prior incident had already been amicably settled, it is not difficult to
imagine that herein accused, as the victim of that previous assault, would harbor ill-will against
Hernandez and nurture the hope of eventually getting even. That obsession is but a
manifestation of the known machismo of the Filipino. This sour note in his relationship with
Hernandez is wholly inconsistent with the avowed self-defense of his person invoked by the
accused. Stated differently, Hernandez could not have been the aggressor in the hacking
incident involved in the cases at bar; the accused was.

76. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BENJAMIN GONDAYAO, alias "BEN", ET AL., defendants,
BENJAMIN GONDAYAO, alias "BEN", and ANOY GONDAYAO, defendants-appellants. G.R. No.
L-26240
October 31, 1969
FACTS:
Based on the testimony of Macario Pascua, on November 14, 1965, while he was reading a

newspaper, in front of the house of the Vice-Mayor, he saw Benjamin Gondayao and his codefendants, drinking gin.
After consuming a bottle of gin, Benjamin Gondayao, repeatedly cursed the "Nacionalistas" for

not offering a drink despite their victory in the polls. The victim, Orlando Piol who was nearby,
replied by cursing the losers in the elections, an exchange of unfriendly utterances followed.
Eventually, the group headed by Benjamin picked up stones and threw them at Piol, who was

hit several times on the head the same began to bleed, Piol drew out a dagger and
approached Benjamin. The two grappled with each other and fell down, with Piol on top of
Benjamin.
Thereafter

Anoy Gondayao picked up a stone and hit Piol with it on the head, and then
wrestled the dagger from him. Anoy stabbed Piol on the back and, then, leaving the dagger
imbedded therein. Thereupon Benjamin pulled out the dagger and sank it again on the back of
Piol.

In the trial, defendant claimed self-defense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense.
HELD:
The court did not sustain the defendants claim of self-defense since he is the one who

provoked the incident.

The court made the following conclusions:

That Benjamin stabbed Piol twice from behind, after disarming him.

Considering, that Benjamin had provoked the incident, by hurling uncomplimentary

remarks at his political opponents, one of whom was Piol; that such remarks led to
an altercation with Piol, in consequence of which, stones were thrown at him, hitting
him on the head; that when, owing to the impact of said stone, which could have
rendered him groggy, and the lacerated injuries thus sustained by him, Piol prepared
himself to fight by drawing out his dagger, Benjamin accepted the challenge resulting
from this act, by "rushing" to his encounter and grappling with him; and that,
accordingly, Benjamin cannot be given the benefit of either complete or incomplete
self-defense.

Although Piol was stabbed from behind, Benjamin did not act with treachery, for this
was merely an incident of their struggle, which had begun with both contenders
facing each other, each prepared for the fight that ensued.

The crime committed by Benjamin Gondayao is, therefore, that of homicide.

77. G.R. No. L-162

April 30, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DIOSCORO ALCONGA and ADOLFO BRACAMONTE, defendants. DIOSCORO ALCONGA,
FACTS:
On 1943, the deceased Silverio Barion was the banker in the game of black jack.
Upon invitation of Maria de Raposo, the accused Dioscoro Alconga joined her as a partner,

Maria de Raposo played the game while the said accused posted himself behind the
deceased, acting as a spotter of the cards of the latter and communicating by signs to his
partner The deceased appears to have suffered losses in the game. Upon discovering what
the said accused had been doing, the deceased became indignant and expressed his anger at
the former. In a fit of anger, the deceased left but not before telling the accused Alconga,
"tomorrow morning I will give you a breakfast".
In the next morning, while the said accused was seated on a bench in the guardhouse, the

deceased came along and, addressing the former, said, "Coroy, this is your breakfast,"
followed forthwith by a swing of his "pingahan" The accused avoided the blow by falling to the
ground under the bench. While the deceased was in the act of delivering the third blow, the
accused, while still in a crawling position fired at him with his revolver, causing him to stagger
and to fall to the ground. Thereafter, the deceased drew forth his dagger and directed a blow at
the accused who, however, was able to parry the same with his bolo A hand-to-hand fight
ensued
Having sustained several wounds, the deceased ran away but was followed by the accused.

After running a distance of about 200 meters the deceased was overtaken, and another fight
took place, during which the mortal bolo blow the one which slashed the cranium was
delivered, causing the deceased to fall to the ground.
ISSUE:

Whether or not when the deceased started to run and flee, or thereafter until he died,
there was any provocation given by him for the appellant to pursue and further to attack him.
Whether or not after the cessation of the aggression, the provocation still persisted, and to a
degree sufficient to extenuate appellant's criminal responsibility for his acts during the second stage
of the fight.
HELD:
The court convicted the accused with Homicide.
It will be observed that there were two stages in the fight between appellant and the deceased.

The initial stage commenced when the deceased assaulted appellant without
sufficient provocation on the part of the latter. Resisting the aggression, appellant
managed to have the upper hand in the fight, inflicting several wounds upon the
deceased, on account of which the latter fled in retreat. From that moment there was
no longer any danger to the life of appellant who, being virtually unscathed, could
have chosen to remain where he was. Resolving all doubts in his flavor, and
considering that in the first stage the deceased was the unlawful aggressor and
defendant had not given sufficient provocation, and considering further that when the
deceased was about to deliver the third blow, appellant was still in a crawling
position and, on that account, could not have effectively wielded his bolo and
therefore had to use his "paltik" revolver his only remaining weapon ; the court
hold that said appellant was then acting in self-defense.

But when Alconga pursued the deceased, he was no longer acting in self-defense,
there being then no more aggression to defend against, the same having ceased
from the moment the deceased took to his heels. During the second stage of the
fight appellant inflicted many additional wounds upon the deceased. That the
deceased was not fatally wounded in the first encounter is amply shown by the fact
that he was still able to run a distance of some 200 meters before being overtaken
by appellant. Under such circumstances, appellant's plea of self-defense in
the second stage of the fight cannot be sustained. There can be no defense where
there is no aggression.

Although the defendant was not the aggressor, he is not exempt from criminal liability for the

reason that it is shown that he struck several blows, among them the fatal one, after the
necessity for defending himself had ceased, his assailant being then in retreat. Therefore one
of the essential ingredients of self-defense specified in No. 4, article 8 of the Penal Code is
wanting (now article 11, case No. 1, Revised Penal Code). (United States vs. Dimitillo, 7 Phil.,
475, 476;)
The trial court appreciated in his favor of two mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender

and provocation on the part of the deceased. This court however concluded that the first was
properly appreciated; the second was not, since it is very clear that from the moment he fled
after the first stage of the fight to the moment he died, the deceased did not give any
provocation for appellant to pursue much less further to attack him.The only provocation given
by the deceased was imbibed in, and inseparable from, the aggression with which he started
the first stage of the fight.
Under the doctrine in United States vs. Vitug, supra, when the deceased ran and fled without

having inflicted so much as a scratch upon appellant, but after, upon the other hand, having
been wounded with one revolver shot and several bolo slashes, as aforesaid, the right of
appellant to inflict injury upon him, ceased absolutely appellant "had no right to pursue, no
right to kill or injure" said deceased for the reason that "a fleeing man is not dangerous to
the one from whom he flees." If the law, as interpreted and applied by this Court in the Vitug
case, enjoins the victorious contender from pursuing his opponent on the score of selfdefense, it is because this Court considered that the requisites of self-defense had ceased to
exist, principal and indispensable among these being the unlawful aggression of the opponent
(Rev. Penal Code, article 11, No. 1; 1 Viada, 5th ed., 173).
Further, the Code requires that for provocation to be such a mitigating circumstance, it not only

immediately precede the act but that it also be sufficient.

Sufficient provocation, being a matter of defense, should, like any other, be affirmatively proven

by the accused.

 Aggression deemed to have ceased upon the flight of the deceased upon the end of the first

stage of the fight.. It should always be remembered that "illegal aggression is equivalent to
assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind.
After the flight of the deceased there was clearly neither an assault nor a threatened assault of

the remotest kind.

78. G.R. No. 34283

September 11, 1931

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TELESFORO ALVIAR, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
In 1930, Rufino Usigan, a policeman heard groans coming from an injured person. Upon

stopping to investigate he found Nicolas Alviar lying in or near the way. Upon inquiry, Nicolas
contended that he and Telesforo Alviar had had a fight, and that he was wounded.
The cause of the quarrel appears to have arisen from a reference to certain offenses for which

Nicolas had been prosecuted in the past. The appellant asserts that Nicolas drew his bolo and
attempted to assault the appellant, whereupon the latter snatched the bolo from the deceased
and inflicted the fatal wounds.
Nicolas succumbed from peronitis somewhat less than seventeen days from the time when the

wounds were inflicted, the complications which ensued and subsequently he died.
During the trial, appellant admits having inflicted the wounds that resulted in the death of

Nicolas Alviar, but attempts to exculpate himself on the ground that he acted in self-defense.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense.
HELD:
The court held that it does not appear that the infliction of the wounds which caused the death

of the deceased was a necessary and proper means to the protection of the appellant. In view
of the fact that the deceased was then unarmed, from the loss of his bolo, the use made of the
same weapon by the accused was unjustifiable.
Furthermore, the fact that one of the wounds appearing on the body of the deceased was

evidently inflicted from behind is inconsistent with the idea that the appellant was entirely
justified in the means and measures used by him to repel the alleged attack.
When the perpetration of a homicide is admitted, it is incumbent upon the individual who

inflicted the fatal injuries to prove the facts which serve as his exculpation. In order to establish
this defense the proof submitted should be reasonable in itself and sufficiently convincing at
least to engender a reasonable doubt on the fundamentals of the case. In the present case the
appellant is not entitled to the benefit of the consideration of complete self-defense, because of
the inconsistencies between his confession and his statement as a witness in court, and the
manifest impossibilities and falsehoods contained in the latter statement.
The appellant however is granted of incompete self-defence.

79. SPO2 LOLITO T. NACNAC,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 191913

Present:

- versus -

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 21, 2012

Every circumstance favoring the accuseds innocence must be duly taken into
account. The proof against the accused must survive the test of reason. Strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied
that on the accused could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged. If the
prosecution fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accuseds right to be
freed; it is, even more, the courts constitutional duty to acquit him.[1]
FACTS:

February 20, 2003, accused-appellant, the victim and a number of other police officers
were on duty. Accused-appellant, being the highest ranking officer during the shift, was
designated the officer-of-the-day.
Shortly before 10:00 in the evening, the victim, together with then SPO1 Eduardo
Basilio, took the patrol tricycle from the station grounds. When accused-appellant saw
this, he stopped the victim and his colleague from using the tricycle. The victim told
accused-appellant that he (the victim) needed it to go to Laoag City to settle a previous
disagreement with a security of a local bar.
Accused-appellant still refused. He told the victim that he is needed at the station and,
at any rate, he should stay at the station because he was drunk. This was not received
well by the victim. He told accused-appellant in Ilocano: Iyot ni inam kapi (Coitus of your
mother, cousin!).
The victim alighted from the tricycle. SPO1 Eduardo Basilio did the same, went inside
the office, and left the accused-appellant and the victim alone.
The victim took a few steps and drew his .45 caliber gun which was tucked in a holster
on the right side of his chest. Accused-appellant then fired his M-16 armalite upward as
a warning shot.
Undaunted, the victim still drew his gun. Accused-appellant then shot the victim on the
head, which caused the latters instantaneous death. Accused-appellant later
surrendered to the stations Chief of Police.
The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged. The RTC held that the claim of
self-defense by the accused was unavailing due to the absence of unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim.
According to the trial court, petitioners claim that the victim pointed his gun at petitioner was a
mere afterthought. It ruled that petitioners sworn statement and direct testimony as well as the
testimonies of SPO1 Eduardo Basilio and SPO2 Roosevelt Ballesteros only established that
the victim drew his gun. The trial court went on to differentiate the act of drawing a gun and
pointing it at a target. It held that the mere act of drawing a gun cannot be considered unlawful
aggression. In denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed the trial courts
findings and further held that petitioner had fuller control of his physical and mental faculties in
view of the victims drunken state. It concluded that the likelihood of the victim committing
unlawful aggression in his inebriated state was very slim. [14]

 CA affirmed the findings of the RTC. It held that the essential and primary element of

unlawful aggression was lacking. It gave credence to the finding of the trial court that no
one else saw the victim drawing his weapon and pointing it at accused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of the victim pulling/drawing his gun and pointing the same to the
accused is not sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression to invalidate the accuseds claim of
self-defense.
HELD:
The court acquitted the accused.
The Revised Penal Code provides the requisites for a valid self-defense claim:

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances.The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is an indispensable element of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression,

self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not
be appreciated, even if the other elements are present. It would presuppose an actual, sudden
and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person not a mere
threatening or intimidating attitude but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was
taken against the aggressor. x x x There is aggression in contemplation of the law only when
the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life. The peril sought to be avoided
must be imminent and actual, not just speculative.
The court have held in its previous rulings that even the cocking of a rifle without aiming

the firearm at any particular target is not sufficient to conclude that ones life was in
imminent danger. Hence, a threat, even if made with a weapon, or the belief that a
person was about to be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary that the intent be
ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by some external acts showing the
commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression.
The court however disagree with the trial courts findings and held that the following

circumstances negate a conviction for the killing of the victim:

(1)
The drunken state of the victim;
(2)
The victim was also a police officer who was professionally trained at shooting;
(3)
The warning shot fired by petitioner was ignored by the victim;
(4)
A lawful order by petitioner was ignored by the victim; and
(5)
The victim was known for his combative and drunken behavior.
Ordinarily, as pointed out by the lower court, there is a difference between the act of drawing

ones gun and the act of pointing ones gun at a target. The former cannot be said to be
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.

 The facts surrounding the instant case must, however, be differentiated from current

jurisprudence on unlawful aggression.

The victim here was a trained police officer. He was inebriated and had disobeyed a

lawful order in order to settle a score with someone using a police vehicle. A warning
shot fired by a fellow police officer, his superior, was left unheeded as he reached for
his own firearm and pointed it at petitioner. Petitioner was, therefore, justified in
defending himself from an inebriated and disobedient colleague.
Even if the court will disbelieve the claim that the victim pointed his firearm at
petitioner, there would still be a finding of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim.

As the SG contended, A police officer is trained to shoot quickly and

accurately. A police officer cannot earn his badge unless he can prove to his
trainors that he can shoot out of the holster quickly and accurately x x x.
Given this factual backdrop, there is reasonable basis to presume that the
appellant indeed felt his life was actually threatened. Facing an armed police
officer like himself, who at that time, was standing a mere five meters from the
appellant, the [latter] knew that he has to be quick on the draw. It is worth
emphasizing that the victim, being a policeman himself, is presumed to be
quick in firing.

Hence, it now becomes reasonably certain that in this specific case, it would have been

fatal for the appellant to have waited for SPO1 Espejo to point his gun before the
appellant fires back.

80. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DIONISIO VICENTE y

QUINTO, accused-appellant. [G.R. No. 137296. June 26, 2003]

FACTS:
Retaliation is different from self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the
injured party already ceased to exist when the accused attacked him. In self-defense, the aggression
was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the accused. [1]
The accused alleged that while having supper in his brothers-in-law, Anoy and Sonny,

quarreled. The victim, then Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, responded to Sonnys
unusual cry. He entered appellants house. Appellant pacified the victim, the latter felt insulted
by such remark and said, Is that it? I am insulted. I regret coming here.
Allegedly, the victim went home and got a steel pipe. Upon his return, he hit appellant at his

upper left arm and shouted at him, You are shit, vulva of your mother, I will kill you today.

The accused further allege that While he and Kagawad Elias were talking outside the house,
the victim passed by. Then he tapped appellants right shoulder, the victim pulled out a knife
and tried to stab appellant. The appellant held the victims wrist and they grappled for the
possession of the knife. While the knife was pointed at the victim, appellant accidentally
stabbed him. Appellant surrendered to Kagawad Fernandez who, in turn, brought him to the
police station.

Prosecutions witness on the other hand contends that he and the victim returned to the house

of appellant as the former intended to talk to him. On their way, they saw appellant conversing
with Kagawad Fernandez. Thereafter, as a gesture of reconciliation, the victim extended his
hand to appellant. However, appellant suddenly drew a knife and stabbed the victim in the
chest. The victim uttered, Pare, I was hit. The witness immediately brought him to the hospital
but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
The trial court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder.

 Appellant argues that his claim of self-defense is buttressed by the fact that he immediately

surrendered to the authorities after the incident and that the victim sustained only one stab
wound. Also, he stresses that if a crime was indeed committed, it is only homicide because the
attack was frontal and that a heated altercation preceded the stabbing. Lastly, he contends that
since he sustained an injury in his upper left arm, as confirmed by Dr. Rivera, it follows that he
is not the unlawful aggressor.
The SG counters that appellants claim of self-defense is weak and unfounded because:

as between appellant and the victim, it was the former who had more reason to
harbor ill-feelings;

the victims gesture of tapping appellants shoulder was a sign of goodwill;

the victim was stabbed in the chest indicating an intent to kill on the part of
appellant;

appellant did not claim self-defense when he surrendered to Kagawad Fernandez

and the police; and

he failed to present the knife to the authorities.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused acted in self-defense considering the fact that the victim was
unarmed during the second stage of the incident.
HELD:
The court sustain the trial courts ruling and held that under the circumstances it is convinced

that appellant is the unlawful aggressor.

When the accused interposes self-defense, he must prove that:

(1) he is not the unlawful aggressor;

(2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and

(3) he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression.

Although all these elements must concur, self- defense is perched on proof of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Without it, there can be no selfdefense, complete or incomplete.

As maybe gleaned from the narrations of the witnesses, the incident has two stages:

The first stage took place in appellants house where the victim felt insulted when
rebuked by the appellant for interfering in a family squabble. This prompted the
victim to hit appellants upper left arm with a steel pipe.

The second stage began when the victim met appellant and Kagawad Fernandez
along the road. At this time, the victim wanted to reconcile with the appellant. In fact,
he
offered
appellant
a
handshake,
telling
him
to
forget
what
happened. Unfortunately, appellant, who had not yet shaken off his ire against the
victim, stabbed the latter.

While admittedly, the victim was the unlawful aggressor during the first stage of the incident,

however, he ceased to be in the second stage. The lapse of an appreciable time interval had
cooled off his head as shown by the fact that he was trying to shake appellants hand and
telling him, forget what happened.
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent

danger thereof For one to be considered the unlawful aggressor, he must be shown to have
exhibited external acts clearly showing his intent to cause and commit harm to the other.
In the case at bar, the prosecution witnesses belied any act of aggression on the part of the

victim. The evidence shows he was unarmed and had no idea of the impending attack against
him.
Certainly, the victims act of aggression during the first stage of the incident does not justify

appellants conduct during the second stage. Settled is the rule that when unlawful aggression

ceases, the defender has no longer any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise,
retaliation, and not self-defense is committed.
Further, in affirming the trial courts finding that accuseds claim of self-defense dubious and

unworthy of belief, it made the following conclusions:

the victim suffered a fatal wound at the chest. It lacerated his vital organs. The
location of the wound belies and negates the claim of self-defense. It demonstrates
a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.

appellant failed to inform the authorities that he acted in self-defense.

he failed to surrender the knife to the authorities. The court have ruled that failure to
inform the authorities of the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and to
surrender the knife used in stabbing him militates against the claim of self-defense.

In self-defense, the burden of proof rests upon the accused. His duty is to establish self-

defense by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise conviction would follow from his
admission that he killed the victim. Here, appellant miserably failed to discharge such burden.

81. REYNALDO CRISTE UNIDAD, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF edrAPPEALS and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. [G.R. No. 129201. March 11, 2003]
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Facts:
Allegedly, while petitioner was walking on his way home he was approached by Jojo Herrera

who volunteered to carry his bag, while they were walking he heard a shout coming from his
back.
Petitioner looked back and, at that instance, the victim intercepted them, shouting, and then

poked his gun directly at Jojo. Petitioner advised the man to put down his firearm and said,
Pare, baka naman puwede mong ibaba yan at pag-usapan ninyo na lang and problema
ninyo. However, the man turned his ire at him and aimed the firearm towards him but when
he remained silent and did not move, the man again aimed the gun at Jojo. While holding the
firearm with both hands pointed at Jojo, the man said, Putang Ina mo, Jojo, papatayin kita.
At this juncture, petitioner introduced himself as a policeman, the victim directed the cocked

firearm at him saying, Putang Ina mo, isa ka pa and then, the victim fired the gun.

After the second shot which was directed at the petitioner, thinking that he was hit and that his
life was in actual danger, the petitioner, who is left-handed, fired his gun from the level of his
waist by bending his body at the left side, making a hurried hip shot. After shooting the victim,
the victim slumped at the gate of Mrs. Payawal.

During the trial, the accused was found guilty of the trial court for the crime of homicide and

negated petitioners claim of self-defense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused in claiming self-defense has the burden of proving the same.
HELD:
The court held that since the petitioner claimed self-defense, the burden of proving the same

shifted to him, hence it is incumbent upon him to prove that :

the victim unlawfully attacked him;

he took the necessary means to repel the attack; and he did not provoke said
attack. Petitioner had to prove these by clear and convincing evidence.

 The first element, that of an unlawful aggression upon the petitioner by the deceased, has not

been proved by such required quantum of evidence.There being no clear and convincing
showing that the victim was attacking him when he shot and killed him, the court affirmed the
denial of self-defence.
The rule is established that unlawful aggression is a primordial element in self-defense. Its

absence precludes a reduction of the penalty.

82. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWIN ALCODIA y SIMON, accusedappellant. [G.R. No. 134121. March 6, 2003]
FACTS:
The witness for the prosecution testified that on the day when the offense was committed, he

was selling chicharon inside Victory Liner Bus No. 729. Within his view was accused-appellant
who was seated at the 4th row of the bus.
Thereupon, he noticed Feria (the victim) boarding the bus. While Feria was still at the first rung

of the bus doorsteps, appellent suddenly stood up, held Ferias neck and stabbed him three (3)
times with abalisong. Feria managed to get off the bus and ran towards the parking space
where he fell down. Accused-appellant chased Feria but Sarmiento, a security guard, stopped
him, ordered him to raise his hand and took the balisong.[8]
For his defense, the accused alleged that he was occupying the 2 nd to the last seat of the bus,

together with his live-in partner, and her sister-in-law. When the bus stopped at the Victory
Liner Terminal in Tarlac, he stood up to alight from the vehicle but Feria who was from the front
side of the bus approached him and attempted to stab him.

He evaded the thrust and grappled with Feria for the possession of the knife. After wrestling
the knife from Feria, he stabbed him.
He did not suffer any bruises or injuries.

Accused-appellant further claimed that he did not know the person whom he stabbed. He
averred, however, that while boarding the bus at its terminal in Baguio City, he and the victim
accidentally bumped each other. The latter stared at him with a dagger look.

trial court found the appellant guilty of Murder.

In the present petition, appellant invokes several Decisions of this Court sustaining self-

defense, he concludes that his plea of self-defense is proper, thus, he should be acquitted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant sufficiently proved that he acted in self-defence.
HELD:
The court sustained the conclusions of the trial court and held that the accused failed to

establish that he acted in self-defense.

His conviction necessarily follows on the basis of his admission to the killing
t is a hornbook doctrine that where self-defense is invoked, it is incumbent upon the accused-

appellant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

he is not the unlawful aggressor;

there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and

he employed reasonable means to prevent and repel an aggression.

At the heart of these is the presence of unlawful aggression. Without it, self-defense will not
have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated.

Also, the accused-appellant must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the latter were weak, it would not be
disbelieved after his open admission of the killing.

 Despite accused-appellants assertions that Feria was the aggressor and he (accused-

appellant) engaged in a struggle for possession of the balisong, he did not sustain any
injury. Surely, a plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is extremely
doubtful by itself. Not only this, accused-appellants testimony was uncorroborated by any
separate and competent evidence. The defense failed to present anyone who could confirm
his story, specifically that the victim was the aggressor. This, all the more, renders his story
dubious.
83. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EUSEBIO DUBAN y DOMINGO @ JUN,
appellant.
FACTS:
The prosecution avers that Dionisio Poquiz, a jeepney driver, was outside his house, the

victim, a coconut vendor, passed by, pushing a cart loaded with coconuts. Poquiz bought
coconut juice and repaired to the rear seat of his parked jeepney.
As Poquiz was drinking the coconut juice, appellant approached the victim who was standing

and waiting for a customer beside his cart.

When appellant, a jeepney barker, was about a meter away from the victim, he suddenly

hurled the stone which hit the right rear portion of his head and ear. Appellant then speedily
left, foiling Poquizs attempt to apprehend him.
In claiming self-defense, the appellant alledge that he was walking on his way home, when a

jeepney driver asked him to drink liquor with him. He declined the invitation as he had not yet
eaten. The drunk companion of the driver who turned to be the victim, whom he met for the
first time got a glass of gin, and echoed the offer, but appellant just the same declined it,
prompting the victim to throw the contents of the glass at his face.
Appellant thus shouted invectives at the victim who then took a bolo from the jeepney which he

tried to hit him with, but which he (appellant) was able to evade.
Appellant claimed that as the victim ran after him. Appellant thus took a stone placed under the

tire of the jeep and with his right hand he threw it at the victim while the latter was approaching
him at a distance of about 3 meters. The stone hit the victim on the [r]ight side of his head,
[6]
thus causing him to fall down. Appellant thereafter ran away and went home.
Brushing aside appellants claim of self-defense, the trial court found him guilty of murder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused- appellant when his guilt has not
been proven beyond reasonable boubt.
HELD:
The court sustain the findings of the trial court
Poquiz was not prompted by ill motive to falsely testify against appellant, hence, his testimony

should be entitled to full faith and credit.

For an innocent man under similar circumstances would naturally take it with him to prove his

claim of self-defense. Such course of action is fatal to such claim of appellant. And so is his
running away from the scene of the incident, for a truly innocent person would normally report
the matter to the police But appellant did not. Instead, he immediately fled.
The trial court did not err thus in not crediting appellants claim of self-defense, for the accused

failed to prove the elements of the same.

84. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BONIFACIO ALIBEN, DIOSDADO
NICOLAS and RONNIE NICOLAS, accused-appellants. [G.R. No. 140404. February 27, 2003]
FACTS:

 Appellant Ronnie Nicolas testified while he was watching the people playing tong-its,

somebody threw small stones with soil at the place where the Bernal group was playing, and
Victorio Bernal was hit on the forehead. Then another stone was thrown which landed on top
of the table used by said group.
Ronnie looked for the person who threw the stones in their backyard and found Juanito

Bongon, Sr. hiding behind a coconut tree.

Allegedly, the victim, Bongon, Sr. stabbed Ronnie three (3) times with a balisong, but he was

not hit. Ronnie moved backward, then Bongon, Sr. pursued him. Ronnie was able to get hold
of a piece of wood and hit Bongon, Sr., who was facing him, on the left temple causing
Bongon, Sr. to fall down. Ronnie lost control of himself and did not know if he continued hitting
Bongon, Sr. When Bongon, Sr. was silent, Ronnie left him.
Ronnie proceeded to the house of William Sanchez, barangay captain of Siba-o, to surrender

himself.
The trial court rejected the theory of self-defense of appellant Ronnie Nicolas because the

latter continued hitting the victim after he had immobilized him by hitting him on the
head.Moreover, Dr. Rey Millena found that there was more than one instrument used against
the victim and the numerous injuries sustained by the victim were fatal injuries that negated
self-defense.
Appellant Ronnie Nicolas contends that unlawful aggression came from the victim with no

provocation on his part. He testified that while he was looking in their backyard for the person
who threw the stones into their store, he found the victim Juanito Bongon, Sr. hiding behind a
coconut tree
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused carry the burden of proving that he, in hitting the victim, acted in
self-defense.
HELD:
The court held that, when the accused invokes self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon him

to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself.

Self-defense as a justifying circumstance is present when the following concur:

unlawful aggression;

reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and

lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

The testimony of Ronnie Nicolas shows that the victim, who allegedly attacked him first, was

immobilized when he hit the victim with a piece of wood on the temple causing the victim to fall
down. At that point, the alleged unlawful aggression of the victim ceased. Yet, Ronnie
continued hitting the victim until the latter was silent, which already manifested intent to
kill. The Necropsy Report showed that the victim sustained an incised wound on the right side
of the victims headand several fractures, as well as, three (3) contusions with lacerations and
abrasions on the head and face.
85. PEOPLE VS. HUGO
FACTS:
An information for murder was filed against the accused.
During trial, the prosecution presented a witness that provided serious discrepancies on his
sworn statements and court testimony, particularly as to the participation of Lorenzo and Rudy
in the killing of Remegio.
The trial court found Ernesto, Lorenzo, and Rudy guilty as co-conspirators of the crime of
murder. In ruling that conspiracy existed, the trial court opined that from their concerted acts
Ernesto, Lorenzo, and Rudy were moved by a unanimity of design to kill Remegio. Ernesto

was the first to hack Remegio; thereafter, Lorenzo and Rudy pursued the already-wounded
Remegio to finish up the aggression Ernesto had started.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ernesto Hugo, Lorenzo Hugo, and Rudy Hugo were guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder.
RULING:
Appellants LORENZO HUGO and RUDY HUGO are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable
doubt; and appellant ERNESTO HUGO is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder. The presumption of innocence enjoyed by Lorenzo and Rudy was not overcome by the
prosecution, which has the burden to prove that they conspired with Ernesto in killing
Remegio. Jurisprudence is replete that conspiracy must be proved as clearly as the commission of
the offense itself.
The Court finds that only Ernesto is liable for the death of Remegio. He categorically testified
during his direct examination that he hacked Remegio with his bolo several times, but he claimed that
such was his reaction to the latters unlawful aggression. He is, in effect, invoking self-defense.
When an accused pleads self-defense, he thereby admits authority of the crime. Consequently,
the burden of proving his guilt, which lies upon the prosecution, is shifted to him.[35] He must prove
by clear and convincing evidence the elements of self-defense, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. In doing so, he must rely on
the strength of his own evidence, and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution which, even if
weak, could not be disbelieved on account of his own admission that he assaulted the victim.[36]
The Court cannot give credence to Ernestos version of self-defense, which is self-serving and
uncorroborated. A plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated, especially when
uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful.[37]

86. PEOPLE VS. GONZA

FACTS:

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulan, Sorsogon, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 116,
found appellant Percival Gonza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder for the killing of
Virgilio Mortega, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify the heirs of the victim P50,000 as actual damages, P50,000 as indemnity,
and P50,000 as moral damages.
It was August 16, 1996, and Virgilio Mortega was attending the second day of the wake of
his kin, Ramil Mortega. Singing all night long, Virgilio had no inkling that it would be his
last.
Mercilessly stabbed to death by Percival Gonza, he breathed his last at the age of fortytwo, leaving behind a wife and six children.
The prosecution cries murder; Percival says it was a desperate act of self-preservation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Percival Gonza was guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder.

HELD:
NO. The Court found appellant Percival Gonza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
felony of homicide. The contention of the appellant that he acted in self-defense is bereft of merit.
Where an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove that he
killed the victim to save his life. For this reason, he must rely on his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence for the prosecution, for such can no longer be disbelieved after the
accused admits the killing.[29] He must prove with clear and convincing evidence the presence of all
the requisites of self-defense, namely, (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[30] Of these requisites, the most decisive is
that the victim was guilty of unlawful aggression. This is because the theory of self-defense is based
on the necessity on the part of the person being attacked to prevent or repel the aggression. Hence,

absent evidence of a prior unlawful and unprovoked attack by the victim, the claim of self-defense
whether complete or incomplete cannot prosper.[31]
The appellant failed to corroborate his claim of self-defense with evidence other than his own
testimony, despite the fact that there were other persons in the locus criminis when the stabbing
incident happened and who, therefore, may have witnessed the same. In People v. Calabroso,[33] we
said that self-defense to be successfully invoked must be established with certainty and proved with
sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on
the part of the person invoking it. It may not be justifiably entertained when it is uncorroborated by
separate competent evidence.

87. PEOPLE VS. GUMAYAO

FACTS:

The Regional Trial Court convicted appellant Jerryvie Gumayao of the crime of murder,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of
his victim Concordio Sulogan in the sum of P50,000.
During trial, Gumayao denied the charges against him.
He insisted that he did not intend to kill anyone but when Concordio held him, he had
no choice but to stab the latter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gumayao was guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder.
HELD:
YES. The appellant failed to discharge his burden.
The Court has consistently held that like alibi, self-defense is an inherently weak defense
because it is easy to fabricate.[49] In a case where self-defense is invoked by the accused, the
burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the following
essential requisites: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to repel or prevent it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself. There can be no complete or incomplete self-defense unless the accused proves
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.[50] The accused must rely on the strength of his
evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution. This is so because in pleading
self-defense, the accused thereby admits to the killing and can no longer be exonerated of the crime
charged if he fails to prove the confluence of the essential requisites of self-defense.[51]
88.

RUGAS vs. People

Facts:
At around 9:00 oclock in the evening of September 16, 1997, Herberto (or Gerberto) Rafol
was conversing with Perla Perez in the street fronting the house ofAnda Romano in barangay
Taclobo, San Fernando, Romblon, when the accused Alexander P. Rugas, suddenly stabbed
him at his left thigh.
He faced him to know who stabbed him but the accused stabbed him on his stomach. He ran
and shouted for help.
Somebody helped him in boarding him to a tricycle and he was brought to thehospital where
he was treated.
His medical certificate showed that he had a stab wound which was fatal on the right upper
quadrant of the abdomen.
Rafol could have died of severe hemorrhage if no surgical operation was done. He also had a
second stab wound at the uppermost part of the left lateral thigh but it was not fatal. He spent a
total of P25,390.00 as a result of these injuries he sustained.
Contention of the Accused:
He was just trying to defend himself and that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Rafol when
the latter him on the eyebrow.

ISSUE:
Whether or not self-defense can be invoked by the accused.
Held:
Self-defense cannot be availed of because there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
Rafol. Rugas, not Rafol was the unlawful aggressor. The essential requisites of self- defense are:(a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed and to
prevent or repel it;(c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Rugas
reliance on the Supreme Courts ruling in People v. Sabio, is misplaced. In that case, the Court ruled
that a slap on the face is an unlawful aggression since the face represents a person and his dignity.
Slapping the face of a person is a serious personal attack; it is a physical assault, coupled with
a willful disgrace, nay, a defiance, of an individuals personality; and it may, therefore, be frequently
regarded as placing in real danger a persons dignity, rights and safety.
In this case, there is no evidence that the victim slapped the petitioner. The petitioner merely
claimed that he was hit on his eyebrow which the trial court and the Court of Appeals found to be
baseless. . This reliance on People v. Sabio to sustain the claim that the petitioner intended to defend
his honor, is inconsistent with his testimony that he stabbed the victim to defend himself from an
imminent physical assault when the latter pulled out a knife. This is also inconsistent with the fact that
the victim was stabbed three times. The accused never suffered even a slight injury thus, the physical
facts in the instant case reveals that accused did not act in self-defense.
89. People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)
FACTS:
Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer
and Flaviano Rubia.
On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were
constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill.
The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being
made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they
could talk things over.
Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead."
Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who
was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed.
Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a
legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of
property.
At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted
granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled).
At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending
and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble.
On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay
rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months
after letter.
Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was
guilty.
Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he
acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the walls of the house of the
defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the victim. However, this aggression
was not done on the person of the victim but rather on his rights to property. On the first issue,

the courts did not err. However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts
referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of owners to close and fence their land.
Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to subscribe to the article because
his ownership of the land being awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting
ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defense
of his rights.
Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if
the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
o Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression towards
appellant's property rights. Fleisher had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have
left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's house and putting
up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides that possession may not be acquired
through force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every possessor has the right
to be respected in his possession
o Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the case, killing
was disproportionate to the attack.
o Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here, there was no
provocation at all since he was asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special mitigating circumstance
of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary
surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation) Crime is homicide (2 counts) not
murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also, assault
was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no
direct evidence of planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered three
degrees (Art. 64) to arresto mayor.
90. PEOPLE VS. BATES
FACTS:
Accused Marcelo Bates applealed from the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City
(Branch 35) finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to
suffer imprisonment of forty years of reclusion perpetua. He contended that he acted in self-defense
for killing Jose Boholst.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marcelo Bates acted in self-defense.
HELD:
No. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights do not incur any criminal liability provided
that the following circumstances concur: First, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; second,
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and third, lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[6] It is a settled rule that when an accused
admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense; and as the burden of the evidence is thus shifted
to him, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.
[7]
After scrutiny of the evidence presented, we agree with the trial court that self-defense was not
established by appellant. He testified that he initially inflicted only a single hack wound on the neck of
Jose causing the latter to fall to the ground. He then went to the aid of his brother Carlito but upon
finding that he was already dead, he went back to where Jose fell. Appellant admitted that at that
time, Jose was in a lying position still alive but hardly moving.[8] Under such a situation, Jose could

have hardly put up any defense, much less, make an aggressive move against appellant. Despite
Joses condition, appellant repeatedly hacked Jose. Granting that Jose was the one who first
committed unlawful aggression, appellant was no longer justified in further inflicting wounds upon
Jose because at that time, the latter was already lying helpless on the ground. At that moment,
unlawful aggression on the part of Jose had ceased. It is a settled rule that when unlawful aggression
ceases, the defender has no longer any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise,
retaliation and not self-defense is committed.[9] Hence, the fact that unlawful aggression on the part
of Jose already ceased when Marcelo repeatedly hacked him rules out the possibility of self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete.

91. PEOPLE VS. ESMEDIA (MADIK MAAWATAN UDIAY FACTS GUYS SORRY)
Any person who, in defending his father against an unlawful attack, while he still honestly believes
him to be in great danger, causes the death of the attacking party, is exempt from criminal
responsibility.
When the victim of homicide is a man 80 years of age, and arrives upon the scene of an altercation
after it has terminated, and is thereupon attacked and killed, the aggravating circumstance No. 20 of
article 10 of the Penal Code must be considered in fixing the penalty, because of the disregard of and
lack of respect for age.
In order to justify the application of the mitigating circumstance of loss of reason and self-control
during a dispute, the acts of the person injured must have been the immediate cause of such loss of
reason and self-control on the part of the person making the attack. When the victim arrives on the
scene after the trouble has terminated, and is then attacked by the contestants, the aforesaid
circumstance can not be applied in mitigation of the penalty.

92. BALUNUECO VS. CA

FACTS:
The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City convicted accused RICARDO BALUNUECO of
homicide for the death of Senando Iguico and frustrated homicide for injuries inflicted upon his wife
Amelia Iguico.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defense of relatives can be invoked by the petitioner.
HELD:
NO. In the case at bar, petitioner Ricardo utterly failed to adduce sufficient proof of the existence
of a positively strong act of real aggression on the part of the deceased Senando. With the exception
of his self-serving allegations, there is nothing on record that would justify his killing of Senando.
. The essential elements of this justifying circumstance are the following: (a) unlawful aggression;
(b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and, (c) in case the
provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making the defense had no part therein.
Of the three (3) requisites of defense of relatives, unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, for
without it any defense is not possible or justified. In order to consider that an unlawful aggression was
actually committed, it is necessary that an attack or material aggression, an offensive act positively
determining the intent of the aggressor to cause an injury shall have been made; a mere threatening
or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to justify the commission of an act which is punishable per se,
and allow a claim of exemption from liability on the ground that it was committed in self-defense or
defense of a relative.

93. ALMEDA VS. CA

FACTS:

Petitioner Rudy Almeda was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tandag, Surigao del Sur in an information.
During arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court convicted petitioner
of homicide only and appreciated in his favor two mitigating circumstances.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the modified judgment
Petitioner invoked the defense of stranger.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defense of stranger was properly invoked in the case.
HELD:
No. The petition is not impressed with merit. A party who invokes the justifying circumstance of
defense of strangers has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the exculpatory
cause 7 that would save him from conviction. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution for even if the latters evidence is weak, it
cannot be disbelieved 8 and will not exculpate the former from his categorical admission as the
author of the killing. The Court is convinced upon scrutiny of the evidence that petitioner failed to
discharge this burden.
A party who invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of strangers has the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence the exculpatory cause that would save him from conviction.
He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence for the
prosecution for even if the latters evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved and will not exculpate
the
former
from
his
categorical
admission
as
the
author
of
the
killing.
The circumstance of defense of strangers has three requisites: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending be
not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
The first and crucial requisite for defense of strangers to prosper is absent in this case. Unlawful
aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life or
limb of a person. The mere cocking of the M-14 rifle by the victim (Cbl. Salabao) without aiming the
firearm at any particular target, is not sufficient to conclude that the life of the Vice-Governor, Herrera
or even of Amora was in imminent danger. A threatening or intimidating attitude per se does not
constitute unlawful aggression. Even a mysterious whisper poses no danger. There is nothing from
the act of the victim in trying to stand up, from which the Court may infer that the life of the person
(the Vice Governor) whom petitioner was allegedly protecting was under actual threat or attack from
the victim. Moreover, the number, location and severity of the fatal wounds suffered by the victim belie
the claim of defense of stranger but is indicative of a determined effort to kill. The victim was hit on the
vital parts of his body head, lungs, heart, chest and neck. With the absence of unlawful aggression
that can be attributed to the victim, it becomes unnecessary to determine the remaining requisites for
they obviously have no leg to stand on. Thus, in this case, the defense of stranger will not lie,
complete or incomplete.
94. PEOPLE VS. NARVAEZ
95. PEOPLE VS. TULIN
FACTS:
The said accused, then manning a motor launch and armed with high powered guns,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC
TABANGCO loaded with petroleum products, together with the complement and crew members,
employing violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel to
proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to the Philippines, in
violation of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532) When charged with the crime, the accused
contended that they .were only acing upon the orders of their superior.
ISSUE:

Whether or not obedience to lawful orders can be invoked by the accused.

HELD: It cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders of his
superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior
if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to carry out said
order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of
Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of
international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the
means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration
authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts.

96. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSA

G.R. No. 135981. September 29, 2000
Facts:

On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel,
province of Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and
wound BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which
the accused had provided herself for the purpose, inflicting several wounds which caused his
death.
The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe
beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court failed to appreciate her
self-defense theory. She claimed that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing
her husband was equivalent to self-defense.

Issue: Whether or not the battered woman syndrome as a viable plea within the concept of selfdefense is applicable in this case.
Held:
No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of
violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant
and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer
must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm, from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time
of the killing, the batterer must have posed probablenot necessarily immediate and actualgrave
harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter.
Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing
facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

97. PEOPLE VS. AMBAL

GR NO. L-52688 OCT. 17, 1980
100 SCRA 325
FACTS:
Honorato Ambal was married with Felicula for 15 yrs. She appeared to be a shrew and
neglectful wife. She stayed away from the conjugal home at times. He killed her when the latter
failed to buy a medicine for Ambal who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a
heated altercation. Felicula told her husband that it would be better if he were dead. That
remark infuriated Ambal and impelled him to attack his wife.
He went to the barangay captain and informed that he killed his wife. After making that oral
confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal hall and surrendered to a policeman.
During the trial, he pleaded not guilty and, thru his counsel de oficio, the defense of Ambal was
insanity. Dr. Balbas stated during trial: Before the commission of the crime, he was normal.
After the commission of the crime, normal, but during the commission of the crime, that is what
we call Psychosis due to short frustration tolerance.
The Court of First Instance of Camiguin convicted him of parricide, sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and ordering him to pay an indemnity of Php12,000 to the heirs of his deceased wife,
Felicula Vicente-Ambal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ambal was insane and is not guilty of the crime of parricide.
RULING: Art. 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability an imbecile or an insane
person unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. The law presumes that every person is of
sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary (US vs. Martinez, 34 Phil 305). The law always
presumes all acts to be voluntary. It is improper to presume that acts were executed unconsciously. In
order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete deprivation
of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least discernment.
Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. Ambal is guilty of parricide with
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the authorities. Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code punishes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death. The lesser penalty should be imposed
because of the presence of one mitigating circumstance and that absence of aggravating
circumstance.
98. PEOPLE V. RAFANAN JR, 204 SCRA 65
FACTS: Complainant Estelita Ronaya was only 14 years old when hired as a househelper by the
mother of the accused. The accused Policarpio Rafaran and his family lived with his mother in the
same house. Policarpio was married and has children. One evening, the mother of the accused called
complainant to help him close the door. When the complainant went near him, he pulled her inside
the store and raped her despite her resistance. After that, he warned the complainant not to tell
anyone about it or he will kill her. The next day, the family of the accused knew what happened.
Appellant claimed that he is suffering from schizophrenia when he inflicted violent intentions to
Estelita. Trial court suspended the tria; and ordered his confinement to National Mental Hospital in
Mandaluyong. After 2 years, he was reported to be behaved and in improved condition and in mental
condition to stand court in trial. Trial of case resumed.
ISSUE: W/N the reason of insanity is sufficient to relieve him from criminal liability
HELD: No. The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence
that the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during
the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition.

PEOPLE VS. RAFANAN

DOCTRINE: In order that the exempting circumstance of INSANITY may be taken into account, it is
necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the
accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without

the least discernment; that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a
total deprivation of freedom of the will.
FACTS:

Estelita Ronaya, who was then 14 years old, was hired by Baket Ines, the mother of the
accused (Policarpio Rafanan) as a househelper.

One evening, Baket Ines asked Estelita to help in their store. Attending to the store at that time
was the accused.
At 11PM, the accused asked Estelita to help him close the door of the store. As Estelita
complied and went near him, the accused pulled the complainant inside the store and there he
succeeded having carnal knowledge of her inspite of her struggle and resistance.

After the sexual intercourse, the accused warned Estelita not to tell anybody in the house of
what happened, otherwise he would kill her.
The next morning, upon knowing what happened to her daughter, the mother or Estelita went
to the police station and filed a complaint.
The accused denied the allegation and interposed the defense that he was insane or was
suffering from a mental aberration characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted his violent
intentions upon Estelita. Therefore, he should be exempt from criminal liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not Policarpio Rafanan was insane during the commission of the crimes as would
exempt him from criminal liability
HELD: The Supreme Court of Spain held in the case of People vs. Formigones that in order that this
exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that
there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; that there be a
complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
According to Dr. Jovellano, a private psychiatrist presented by the defense, during the crossexamination, the person (suffering from schizophrenia) may know what is wrong but there is no
inhibition on the individual. The reasoning is weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not]
there, the drive is [not]
there.
The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of
commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is critical if the defense of
insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with
death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court,
that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault. The defense sought to
suggest, through Dr. Jovellano's answers, that person suffering from schizophrenia sustains not only
impairment of the mental faculties but also deprivation of their power self-control. In any case, as
already pointed out, it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting
circumstance of insanity is to be found.
A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his affirmative allegation of insanity. Here,
appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind immediately
before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of
the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the act is
committed.
Accordingly, we must reject the insanity defense of appellant Rafanan.
NOTES:
Two distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition whether there was a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the criminal act and (b) the test of volition whether there was a total
deprivation of freedom of the will. We observed that our case law shows common reliance on
the test of cognition, rather than on the test of volition, and has failed to turn up any case

where an accused is exempted on the sole ground that he was totally deprived of the freedom
of the will, i.e., without an accompanying complete deprivation of intelligence. This is expected,
since a persons volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is represented as
desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy

PEOPLE VS. DANAO

DOCTRINE: When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the
evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very
moment of its execution. If the evidence pointed to insanity subsequent to the commission of the
crime, the accused cannot be acquitted. he is presumed to be sane when he committed it.
FACTS:

In the morning of October 26, 1988, Teotimo Danao allegedly stabbed his wife, Ruby Guintu
Danao, with 2 kitchen knives, inflicting upon the latter no less than 32 stab wounds.
Victorio Sunga, brother-in-law of the deceased, pleaded to Teotimo to surrender himself, which
the latter did, throwing two kitchen knives made of stainless steel. Subsequently, appellant
came down from the house and surrendered himself to the barangay officials
As a result of this incident, appellant Teotimo Danao was charged with the crime of Parricide
before the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga.

As a result of this incident, appellant Teotimo Danao was charged with the crime of Parricide
before the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga.

Accused-appellant interposes as his defense the exempting circumstance of insanity. He

submits that he was insane, with complete absence of power to discern, and totally deprived of
the freedom of will when he committed the crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the crime as would
exempt him from criminal liability
HELD: Insanity under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code means that the accused must be
deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the
crime (People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658, 660).
When insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from criminal responsibility, the evidence on this
point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution. If the evidence pointed to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused
cannot be acquitted. he is presumed to be sane when he committed it.
The testimonies of Doctors Santiago and Jimenez, the 2 doctors who attended to Teotimo, show that
they did not examine the accused before October 26, 1988, the date when he killed his wife, but only
after the incident happened. At the UST Hospital on March. 1986, appellant was merely given
tranquilizers and was treated as an out patient.
During cross-examination, Dr. Jimenez testified that appellant was found to have no record of any
previous admission at the National Center for Mental Health.
In the case at bar, there is no clear and convincing evidence that appellant was insane during the
commission of the crime. The fact is, prior to the commission of the crime, appellant was engaged in
fishing and was a "jueteng" collector for the last two years.
The evidence before Us says that appellant was not insane during the commission of the crime.
Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an accused on the ground of
insanity. In the absence of such proof, it will be presumed that the offender committed the crime when
he was sane. The presumption is in favor of sanity. The defense must prove insanity beyond
reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE VS. CONDINO

DOCTRINE: For the exempting circumstance of insanity to be taken into account, there must be
complete deprivation of intelligence at that time of the commission of the crime. It is incumbent upon
defendants counsel to prove that his client was not in his right mind or that he acted under the
influence of a sudden attack of insanity or that he was generally regarded as insane when he
executed the act attributed to him.
FACTS:

On December 29, 1989 at 1:30 oclock in the afternoon at Barangay Canda, Sariaya, Quezon,
Alejandro Magadia, the herein victim, were playing basketball with his friends.

Accused Alberto Condino, who was then under the influence of liquor, armed with a gulukan,
arrived and challenged Alejandro Magadia in a one on one basketball game which Alejandro
Magadia acceded.

After making a shot, Alejandro Magadia gave the ball to Alberto Condino but instead of
shooting the ball, he threw it to a place, drew his gulukan and chased Alejandro Magadia who
ran away but he was not able to catch up.

At 5:30 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, while the group of Alejandro Magadia was
walking towards the direction of Barangay Limbon, Sariaya, Quezon to attend a dance party,
accused Alberto Condino was seen on the left side of the road, waiting for the said group.
When Alejandro Magadia, who was walking ahead of the group, passed in front of Alberto
Condino, accused suddenly stoned Alejandro Magadia which hit his left head and when he fell
down to the ground, lying flat, accused Alberto Condino stabbed Alejandro Magadia for three
(3) times.

As the attack was sudden, Alejandro Magadia was not able to defend himself. Thereafter,
Alberto Condino left the place of the incident. Alejandro Magadia was boarded on a trolley to
be brought to the hospital and on the way to the hospital, he passed away.

Counsel for the accused-appellant asserts that his client was insane at the time of the
commission of the felony and is, therefore, entitled to exempting circumstance.

ISSUE: Whether or not Condino was insane during the commission of the crime as would exempt him
from criminal liability
HELD: For the exempting circumstance of insanity to be taken into account, there must be complete
deprivation of intelligence at that time of the commission of the crime. It is incumbent upon
defendants counsel to prove that his client was not in his right mind or that he acted under the
influence of a sudden attack of insanity or that he was generally regarded as insane when he
executed the act attributed to him.
The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity has necessarily the consequent burden of proving it. While he was observed
to be out of his mind during the scheduled arraignment on July 5, 1990 and subsequently confined at
the National Center for Mental Health for treatment, it does not necessarily follow that the accusedappellant was already suffering from psychosis at that time of the commission of the crime. Wellsettled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of the accused-appellant should relate to the
period immediately before or at the very moment the act was committed. Unfortunately, no evidence
was presented by the defense to show that the accused-appellant was insane before or at that time
he inflicted the fatal wounds on the victim. The medical records do not even show that the accusedappellant had a history of any aberrant behavior. On the other hand, the prosecution presented
convincing evidence that the accused-appellant treacherously waited for the victim at the dance party
and killed him. He was even sane enough to flee from the scene and go to the police to report the
incident.

PEOPLE VS. FLORENDO

DOCTRINE: Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate
to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed.
FACTS:

Appellant Guillermo Imong Florendo and his wife Erlinda were inside their house engaged in
an animated conversation. Living with them in the same house in Barangay Bulbulala, La Paz,
Abra, was appellants father Agustin Florendo.

After Erlinda was heard to have told Imong to go to sleep, the latter all of a sudden and without
any provocation hacked Erlinda with a bolo in the head and other parts of her body. The victim
could only exclaim, Patayennak met ni Imong ngen (Imong is going to kill me)!

Agustin, who was resting at that time, witnessed the incident. Instead of stopping appellant,
Agustin left the house for fear that his son would also attack him. Agustin sought help from the
Brgy. Captain Godofredo Apuya.

Agustin, restrained by fear and shock, stayed at the barangay captains house and when he
finally returned at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon Erlinda was already dead.

Appellant was committed at the Abra Provincial Jail.

During his confinement, he was observed to be having difficulty in sleeping. He could not eat
during meal times. Most of the time he would stand in his cell without talking to anyone.

Thus on 9 September 1996 he was treated as an outpatient at the Abra Provincial Hospital
(APH).

The trial court held that the crime committed was parricide and that the motive of appellant in
killing his wife was jealousy (nagsuspect sya na may relasyon si Erlinda at Godofredo).

Appellant Florendo now contends that the trial court erred in not acquitting him on the ground
of insanity.

ISSUE: Whether or not Appellant Florendo was insane during the commission of the crime as would
exempt him from criminal liability
HELD: The Court rejects the plea of insanity. Insanity under Art. 12, par. 1, of The Revised Penal
Code exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., appellant
is deprived of reason; he acts without the least discernment because of complete absence of the
power to discern; or, there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will. The onus probandi rests upon
him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance, and he must prove it by clear and
convincing evidence.
A perusal of appellants testimony would show that he was aware of his emotions, bearing and
temperament. Except for his testimony in open court that he had no recollection of what happened on
28 August 1996, he attested that he saw his children a few days before the incident; that he was
brought to the provincial jail by the police authorities; and, that he thumbmarked a form given him in
jail. Since he remembered the vital circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, he must have
been in full control of his mental faculties. His recall of the events that transpired before, during and
after the stabbing incident, as well as the nature and contents of his testimony, does not betray an
aberrant mind. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences
of his act.
In the case at bar, appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was
committed to the BGHMC a few months after he killed his wife. Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry
into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very
moment the felony is committed. The medical findings of the BGHMC, which diagnosed appellants
mental disorder as schizophrenic psychosis, paranoid type, refer to appellants treatment after the

incident happened. It is bereft of any proof that appellant was completely deprived of intelligence or
discernment at the time or at the very moment he killed his wife. It is inconclusive as to whether he
was insane at the time immediately preceding or at the very moment of the killing.
The presence of his reasoning faculties, which enabled him to exercise sound judgment and
satisfactorily articulate certain matters such as his jealousy over the supposed infidelity of his wife,
sufficiently discounts any intimation of insanity when he committed the dastardly crime. While
appellant on many occasions before the commission of the crime did things that would indicate that
he was not of sound mind, such acts only tended to show that he was in an abnormal mental state
and not necessarily of unsound mind that would exempt him from criminal liability. Mere abnormality
of mental faculties will not exclude imputability.

PEOPLE VS. OPURAN

DOCTRINE: It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to
the period immediately before or at the precise moment of the commission of the act which is the
subject of the inquiry. His mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is
inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal liability.
FACTS: Appellant Anacito Opuran was charged with two counts of murder before the Regional Trial
Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, for the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and Allan Dacles
under separate informations.
The facts reveal that on 9 November 1998, prosecution witness Bambi Herrera saw Anacito Opuran
stab Allan on the chest with a knife while the latter appeared to be trying to stand up from the bench.
In another incident on the same day, Tomas Bacsal, Jr.was on his way home when he saw Demetrio
Patrimonio, Jr. He likewise noticed Anacito hiding in a dark place. When Demetrio Jr. reached the
national highway, near the so-called lovers lane, Anacito emerged from his hiding place and stabbed
Demetrio Jr. with a knife about three to four times.
Anacitos siblings, Remedios and Francisco testified that Anacito was brought to the National Center
for Mental Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong, in 1986 because Anacito had difficulty sleeping and was
talking irrelevantly.
Anacito contends that the trial court committed grave error in disregarding the exempting
circumstance of insanity. He contends that he was suffering from a psychotic disorder and was,
therefore, completely deprived of intelligence when he stabbed the victims.
ISSUE: Whether or not Anacito Opuran was insane during the commission of the crime as would
exempt him from criminal liability
HELD: An accused invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims that he is not
guilty because he is insane. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must, however, relate to
the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is
charged. It is, therefore, incumbent upon accuseds counsel to prove that his client was not in his right
mind or was under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity immediately before or at the time he
executed the act attributed to him.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested
in language and conduct. However, not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes
insanity. As consistently held by us, A man may act crazy, but it does not necessarily and conclusively
prove that he is legally so.
Tested against the stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting, such deportment of Anacito
(wearing barong tagalog during the incident), his occasional silence, and his acts of laughing, talking
to himself, staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-minute interval are not sufficient proof
that he was insane immediately before or at the time he committed the crimes. Such unusual
behavior may be considered as mere abnormality of the mental faculties, which will not exclude
imputability.
Anacitos psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent yardstick established by case law.
What it shows is that Anacito was prescribed thorazine and evadyne, and later an injectable medicine

to remedy his lack of sleep and noisiness. As the trial court noted, it was never shown that these
drugs were for a mental illness that deprived Anacito of reason. Further, Anacito was just an outpatient at the NCMH, EVRMC, and Samar Provincial Hospital. While Remedios claimed that she
requested the confinement of Anacito and that the doctors did not refuse her, the fact remains that
Anacito was never confined in a mental institution. Although Dr. Verona testified that there was a
recommendation for Anacitos confinement, there was no indication in the records as to when the
recommendation was made, who made the recommendation, and the reason for the
recommendation.
Records are likewise clear that Anacito was not subjected to treatment from 1991 until 1999. While
Remedios insisted that the medicine prescribed for Anacito ran out of stock allegedly in 1990, there
was no proof that Anacito needed the medicine during that period. In fact, there was no intimation that
he needed the medicine prior to the stabbing incident. It seems that it was only after the stabbing
incident, when he was in jail, that his symptoms reappeared.
It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the precise moment of the commission of the act which is the subject of the
inquiry. His mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes
of determining his criminal liability.

PEOPLE VS. VILLA, JR.

DOCTRINE: It must be stressed, that an inquiry into the mental state of accused-appellant should
relate to the period immediately before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is the subject
of the inquiry, and his mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for
purposes of determining his criminal liability.
FACTS:

While Dionito Fernandez was cutting grass in his yard, accused Rodolfo Villa, Jr., a member of
the CAFGU and neighbor of Dionito, suddenly came out of his house with his M-1 Garand rifle
and shot Dionito from behind killing him instantly.

Ronald Fernandez and Sheila Fernandez, children of Dionito, rushed to their fathers rescue
after hearing the gunshot but the accused also fired at them fatally hitting Ronald who was
embracing his father, and mortally wounding Sheila on the thigh and stomach.

Samuel Eclevia, another neighbor of the Fernandezes, attempted to wrestle the rifle from the
accused but Samuel too was gunned down.

After his rampage, Rodolfo Villa Jr. surrendered to a certain Captain Dolino of S2 OMDC
(Olongapo Metropolitan District Command). Rodolfo was accordingly charged with multiple
murder. He pleaded guilty and invoked self-defense.

Before the defense could present its evidence, however, counsel de oficio Alinea manifested
his inability to confer with the accused but moved that a psychiatric examination of the accused
be made at the National Center for Mental Health to determine his mental condition. The
motion was granted.

Six months later, Rodolfo was discharged from NCMH and was returned to jail. As the trial
resumed, accused now raises the defense of insanity.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant was insane during the commission of the crime as to
exempt him from criminal liability
HELD: Insanity exists when there is complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act, i.e.,
the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is complete
absence of power to discern, or that there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality
of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts.

Examining the evidence on record, we are convinced that accused-appellant was sane at the time he
perpetrated the killings. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably negate a complete
absence of intelligence on his part: (a) Immediately after he killed the victims he thought of
surrendering to the PC Detachment in Olongapo City; (b) He showed remorse during his confinement
at the Mental Hospital; and, (c) He was able to give a Sworn Statement before the Prosecutors Office
in Olongapo City immediately after the commission of the crimes narrating his version of the incident.
These are hardly the acts of a person with a sick mind. In People v. Ambal we held: "The fact that
immediately after the incident (accused) thought of surrendering to the law-enforcement authorities is
incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he was going to be
punished for it." Similarly, a feeling of remorse is inconsistent with insanity, as it is a clear indication
that he was conscious of his acts, he acknowledged his guilt and was sorry for them.
Moreover, if we were to follow accused-appellants narration of the incident in his Sworn Statement, it
will appear that he slaughtered his victims in a fit of rage after Dionito Fernandez, his first victim,
allegedly accused him of stealing chickens and cursed him saying, "p - t - g ina mo," and, "gago."
These negate insanity. There is a vast difference between a genuinely insane person and one who
has worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in
what he does. A man sometimes does crazy things when enraged but it does not necessarily and
conclusively prove that he is insane.
It must be stressed, that an inquiry into the mental state of accused-appellant should relate to the
period immediately before or at the precise moment of doing the act which is the subject of the
inquiry, and his mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for
purposes of determining his criminal liability.

PEOPLE VS. CONDINO (supra)

PEOPLE VS. OCFEMIA
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:

Miriam Reyes, 16, was the maid of Spouses Margie and Accused-Appellant Alberto Ocfemia.

Margie testified that on November 22, 1995, Miriam complained to her that accused Alberto
touched her private part. When confronted, Alberto admitted touching the private part of
Miriam.

When night came, Alberto asked Miriam not to tell the incident to his brothers and the brothers
of Margie.

However, Miriam refused and told him that she was going to tell the truth to their brothers and
to her own siblings.

Later that evening, Alberto told the members of the household to go to sleep. They all
complied. Margie saw her husband drinking coffee, smoking, and roaming around the house.

Miriam was lying on her side and asleep. Margie saw Alberto stabbed Miriam with a knife
several times. She died as a result.

Alberto initially plead guilty to the offense of murder charged against him. However, he later on
filed a motion to change his plea to not guilty. Granted.

He testified that during that night that the crime happened his mind was confused. He cannot
recall how he got to his brothers house, who informed him about the death of Miriam.
Nevertheless, he surrendered himself to the police.

After his testimony, Alberto, through his counsel prayed that he be subjected to psychiatric
examination. Counsel for accused-appellant submits that there were indications of a mental

dysfunction as personally observed and perceived by him, which prompted the accusedappellant to change the plea of guilty to a plea of non-guilty, and that because the accusedappellant continuously showed signs of mental infirmity during his direct examination, he was
prompted to request the court that the accused-appellant be allowed to undergo a psychiatric
examination.

The court denied the motion on the ground that before the arraignment, and during hearing,
there was no slightest insinuation by accused and counsel that he was insane at the time of
the commission of the offense.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alberto was insane at the time of the commission of the offense as to exempt
him from criminal liability
HELD: Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that an insane person is exempt for criminal
liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code, the presumption
is that every man is sane; anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the
burden of proving that he was completely deprived of reason when he committed the crime charged.
Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. It is equally well-settled that
proof of the accused-appellants insanity must relate to the time preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged; the mental illness that could diminish his ill
power should relate to the time immediately preceding or during the commission of the crime.
The fact that the accused-appellant originally pleaded guilty and thereafter changed his plea to not
guilty does not support a claim that there were indications of mental dysfunction. It is not uncommon
for an accused to change his plea.
It has been held that a shift in theory by the defense, from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made
apparently after realizing the futility of his earlier defense, is a clear indication that his defense is a
mere concoction. Moreover, the eyewitness account of the accused-appellants common-law wife of
five (5) years never mentioned any indication that the accused-appellant could not have been in his
right mind when he committed the crime, and renders the theory of insanity doubtful.
His professed inability to recall events before and after the stabbing incident does not necessarily
indicate an aberrant mind but is more indicative of a concocted excuse to exculpate himself.

PEOPLE VS. FORMIGONES

DOCTRINE: In order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into account, it is necessary
that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least
discernment; that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total
deprivation of freedom of the will.
FACTS:

Defendant Abelardo Formigones, together with his wife Julia and their children went to live in
the house of his half-brother Zacarias, in Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay.

After about a months stay, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs when Abelardo took his
bolo and stabbed his wife resulting in her death.

Abelardo admitted that he killed his wife by reason of his jealousy. He said that he often sees
his wife in the company of Zacarias.

During trial, the counsel of Abelardo presented the testimony of 2 jail guards of the provincial
jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather strange and
that he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go

stark naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and
indifferent to his surroundings.

The defense invoked that Abelardo was imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abelardo was imbecile at the time of the commission of the crime as to
exempt him from criminal liability
HELD: In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of
reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime.
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into
account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that
is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he
acts without the least discernment; that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that
there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or
insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or
freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned
to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid
mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According
to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted
himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully
cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his
children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a
man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife
whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his
honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of
little or no import. The fact is that he believed her faithless.

PEOPLE VS. MADARANG

DOCTRINE: For insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation
of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least
discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total
deprivation of the will.
FACTS:

Accused Fernando Madarang and his wife Lilia, together with their 7 children, stayed in the
house of Lilias mother, Avelina Mirador, as the accused could no longer support his family. He
lost his entire fortune due to cockfighting.

On September 3, 1993, the spouses had an argument. Fernando accused Lilia of infidelity.

In the heat of the fight and in the presence of their children, the accused stabbed Lilia, who
was then pregnant with their 8th child, resulting in her untimely demise.

She declared that during the period that the accused and his family stayed in her house, she
did not notice anything peculiar in accused's behavior that would suggest that he was suffering
from any mental illness.

The accused declared that he has absolutely no recollection of the stabbing incident. He could
not remember where he was on that fateful day. He did not know the whereabouts of his wife.
It was only during one of the hearings when his mother-in-law showed him a picture of his wife
in a coffin that he learned about her death. He, however, was not aware of the cause of her

demise. He claimed that he did not know whether he suffered from any mental illness and did
not remember being confined at the NCMH for treatment.

Abelardo insists that at the time he stabbed his wife, he was completely deprived of
intelligence, making his criminal act involuntary. The defense posits that his mental illness may
have been caused by his loss of fortune.

The accused-appellant further contends that the fact that he and his wife never engaged in a
fight prior to that fateful day should be considered. The marked change in his behavior when
he uncharacteristically quarreled with his wife on that day and suddenly turned violent on her
confirms that he was mentally disturbed when he committed the crime.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime
he committed
HELD: The courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is
required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the
accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete
absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality of the
mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was
committed to the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Symptomatically, schizophrenic reactions are
recognizable through odd and bizarre behavior apparent in aloofness or periods of impulsive
destructiveness and immature and exaggerated emotionality, often ambivalently directed. Frequently,
the patient would seem preoccupied and dreamy and may appear "faraway."
None of the witnesses presented by the appellant declared Athat he exhibited any of the myriad
symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with the stabbing
incident. To be sure, the record is bereft of even a single account of abnormal or bizarre behavior on
the part of the appellant prior to that fateful day. Although Dr. Tibayan opined that there is a high
possibility that the appellant was already suffering from schizophrenia at the time of the stabbing, he
also declared that schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are capable of distinguishing
right from wrong.
In the case at bar, we find the evidence adduced by the defense insufficient to establish his claim of
insanity at the time he killed his wife. There is a dearth of evidence on record to show that the
appellant was completely of unsound mind prior to or coetaneous with the commission of the crime.

PEOPLE VS. GODOFREDO ACERO

DOCTRINE: A defense based on the sweetheart theory in rape cases is no defense at all in rape
where the victim is a mental retardate.
FACTS:

Cherry Rose is a mental retardate. She lives in the house of her uncle Jose, together with her
mother Rose and her siblings.

Accused Godofredo Acero was a mere stowaway. He was allowed to sleep in the car garage of
Jose. He cleans the jeepney parked in the garage and drives a tri-sikad for a living.

On April 3, 2000, while Cherry was boiling water in the kitchen, Godofredo called Cherry but
the latter refused. Godofredo went to the comfort room and Cherry followed him as she wanted
to urinate.

He then locked the door and warned Cherry not to make any noise. He removed his pants and
her shorts and panty. There he inserted his penis into her vagina in a standing position.

Momentarily, Rose knocked on the door of the comfort room and called on Cherry. The latter
asked her mother to wait as she puts her shorts and panty back. Cherry then opened the door,
and to her surprise, Rose saw accused Godofredo inside together with Cherry.

Rose confronted Godofredo but the latter denied touching Cherry.

Rose went to the police station and filed a complaint of rape against Godofredo.

Godofredo contends that he cannot be held liable for rape because he and Cherry were
sweethearts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sweetheart theory applies when the victim of rape is a mental retardate or
imbecile
HELD: Anent the other assignments of errors, the appellant contends that because he and Cherry
were sweethearts, he should not be held liable for rape.
The appellants contention does not hold water. A defense based on the sweetheart theory in rape
cases is no defense at all in rape where the victim is a mental retardate. It is settled that sexual
intercourse with a mental retardate constitutes rape. An imbecile has an intellectual function
equivalent to that of an average seven-year-old child. Cherry, an imbecile, cannot give legal consent
to sexual intercourse.

PEOPLE VS. MICHAEL NUEZ

DOCTRINE: Feeblemindedness is not exempting, because the offender could distinguish right from
wrong. An imbecile or an insane cannot.
FACTS:

Inside the compound of Immaculate Concepcion Parochial School, accused Nunez persuaded
the victim, fourteen-year old high school student Joseph Rivera, to go with him on the pretext
that he would turn over the proceeds of the sale of a gun to the latter's father. He was likewise
able to persuade Joseph Rivera to bring along the latter's classmate, another fourteen year-old
student Neil Patrick Quillosa on the pretext that Neil would be Joseph's companion in going
home later.

The two boys were brought to a nipa hut in the middle of a fishpond in Dampalit, Malabon to
await a certain "Ka Tony." Both victims hands and feet were tied with wire and rope.

Accused-appellant Rodolfo Cayetano came and checked if the two victims were tied securely,
after which, accused Nunez played a tape demanding three million pesos in five hundred and
one thousand peso bills from the parents of Rivera in exchange for his release.

Accused Nunez dragged Neil by the neck towards the middle of the river and left him there to
drown while accused-appellant stood guard over Rivera. Quillosa's cries for help and Rivera's
pleas for their captors to save Quillosa went unheeded.

While accused-appellant was busy cutting grass near the river, Rivera escaped and proceeded
to the house of accused Nunez where he called up his grandmother. Thereupon, he was
fetched by his grandmother and with his father, they proceeded to the Malabon Police Station
and reported the kidnapping. The policemen who responded recovered the casette recorder
from the nipa hut but failed to find both accused and accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant claims that he possesses a very low level of intelligence as revealed in his
direct testimony and cross-examination, indicating a mental age of between six (6) to ten (10)
years of age. To prove his imbecility, he cited his act of cutting grass when he should be
guarding his victim.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appelant Rodolfo Cayetano, invoking imbecility, can claim exemption
from liability for the crime committed
HELD: The defense counsel's attribution of imbecility is not supported by evidence. Imbecility, one of
the exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, is defined as

feeblemindedness or a mental condition approaching that of one who is insane. It is analogous to

childishness and dotage. An imbecile, within the meaning of Article 12, is one who must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of committing the crime. He is
one who, while advanced in age, has a mental development comparable to that of children between
two and seven years of age.
Accused-appellant's act of cutting grass rather than guarding his victim could hardly be indicative of
imbecility. Rather, it may be considered as negligence but definitely not childishness or even that of
one completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of the will. In fact, accused-appellant
admitted on cross-examination that he can tell what is right and what is wrong. Assuming arguendo
that accused-appellant is an imbecile or a feebleminded person, in the case of People v. Formigones,
it was held that feeblemindedness is not exempting, because the offender could distinguish right from
wrong. An imbecile or an insane cannot. In any case, Article 800 of the Civil Code provides that "the
law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary." The
allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Moreover, the law presumes all acts to be
voluntary. It is improper to presume that acts were executed unconsciously.
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA VS. HON. IGNACIO ALMODOVAR
DOCTRINE: The terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While both are
products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desired of one's act while
the latter relates to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act.
FACTS:

Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend Teodoro
Almine, Jr. and three other children in their backyard.

They were target-shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20)
meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor.

In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar bone which caused his
unfortunate death.

After conduct a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his
age and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident.

The victim's parents appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a case
against petitioner for Homicide through reckless Imprudence. Petitioner filed for certiorari
raising an issue of whether or not an 11-year old could be charged with a crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence.

ISSUE: Whether the term "discernment", as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is
synonymous with "intent"
HELD: The word "intent" has been defined as
(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim; the purpose of the
mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent;. . .; the design
resolve, or determination with which a person acts.' (46 CJS Intent p. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom
and intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term discernment, as
used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this
wise:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of
a minor under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his
mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong . . .
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct
thoughts. While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the
desired of one's act while the latter relates to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said
act. Hence a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his
negligent act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not

correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below
fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his
friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his
negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to
note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12
of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of
negligence on the part of the accused. 1 In expounding on intelligence as the second element of
dolus, Albert 2 has stated:
The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to
determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no
crime can exist, and because ... the infant 3 (has) no intelligence, the law
exempts (him) from criminal liability. (Emphasis supplied)
lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of
performing a criminal act. On the other hand, minors above nine years of appeal but below fifteen are
not absolutely exempt. However, they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which
presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature
and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with discernment. " 4 The preceding discussion
shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo actually embraces the concept of discernment as
used in Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case of People vs. Doquena, supra. It
could not therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent' for they refer to two
different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a means
of committing an offense.
PEOPLE VS. NIETO
(an unpublished decision quoted in People vs. Wilfredo Jochico)
DOCTRINE: Although an allegation that she acted with discernment does not appear in the
information, if it is properly alleged that the accused committed the act with intentan allegation
that she acted with discernment is deemed amply met.
FACTS:

A minor Gloria Nieto, with the intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously
push one Lolita Padilla, a child eight and one half (8-1/2) years of age, into a deep place of the
Pearanda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right then
and there.

Upon arraignment, the accused, who was assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of
guilty, but the trial judge nevertheless acquitted her of the crime charged on the grounds that
she was a minor "over nine and under fifteen years old" and the information failed to allege
that she acted with discernment.

The prosecution thereafter filed another information for the same offense, the said information
stating that the accused Gloria Nieto was "a child between 9 and 15 years old" and alleging in
express terms that she acted with discernment.

But the defense filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy, and the court, now
presided by another judge, granted the motion. The prosecution appealed but it was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gloria Nieto could be rightly held answerable for the offense charged against
her despite the absence of allegation that she acted with discernment in the information
HELD: Undoubtedly, she could. For the said information avers facts constituting the said offense with
nothing therein to indicate that she, as the perpetrator thereof, was exempt from criminal liability
because of her age, and her plea of guilty to the information is an unqualified admission of all its
material averments.
Although an allegation that she acted with discernment does not appear in the information to which
she pleaded guilty, that requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the
information that she, the accused Gloria Nieto, with the intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,

criminally and feloniously push one Lolita Padilla, a child eight and one half (8-1/2) years of age
The above allegation and her plea of guilty thereto, preclude the existence of any one of the justifying
or exempting circumstances enumerated in Article 11 and 12 of the Revised Penal Code including
Paragraph 3 of Article 12. The said allegation can only mean that the accused, who is over 9 but
below 15 years of age, was not justified in killing the victim nor was she exempted from any criminal
responsibility therefor. Otherwise, the term 'criminal and feloniously would have no meaning at all. To
require the addition of the ritualistic phrase 'that she acted with discernment' would be superfluous.
Under a different view, substances would be sacrificed to the tyranny of form.
... To insist on the necessity of including the phrase 'she acted with discernment in the information for
the purpose of making the information sufficient, is to confess a bankcruptcy in language or
vocabulary and to deny that the same Idea can be expressed in other terms.
113. PEOPLE VS. LEGASPI
G.R. NO. 75256 (January 26, 1989)
On April 22, 2003 at around 4 p.m., an informant approached Police Officer (PO2) San Andres who is
assigned to the Mayors Special Action Team, to report on the rampant incidence of drug abuse at a
Village in Pasig City and about a drug pusher known by the name of Legaspi. After getting more
details, San Andres informed his superior who then instructed him, PO1 Julie, PO1 Al and PO1 Rolly
to conduct a buy-bust operation. San Andres was designated to act as poseur-buyer so he was given
two P100 bills as buy bust money. The rest of the team served as his backup with Al as the team
leader.
At around 5:15 p.m., the team reached the village, where after a briefing on their operations, San
Andres and the informant proceeded to Legaspis house while the others strategically placed
themselves within the vicinity keeping San Andres within their view. Upon seeing Legaspi who was
outside her house, the informant introduced San Andres to her as a scorer. Legaspi asked them
how much they wanted to score, to which San Andres replied P200 paggamit lang. After San
Andres gave Legaspi the buy bust money marked with his initials, Legaspi reached into her pocket
and gave him one heat sealed plastic sachet containing suspected shabu. As soon as San Andres got
the sachet he scratched his head as a signal to his team that the transaction was over. Thereafter he
introduced himself as a police officer, informed Legaspi of her rights and marked the sachet he
received with his initials.
The team then brought Legaspi to the hospital for check up and then to the police station where the
appropriate charges were prepared against her. Meanwhile San Andres sent the sachet to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination and determination of the contents. After receiving the chemistry
report confirming that the sachet contained shabu, a Criminal Information was filed in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) accusing Legaspi of violation of Section 5 Article of R.A. 9165 for selling and
delivering prohibited drugs.
At first Legaspi denied the accusation and claimed that she was merely inside her house taking care
of her grandson when San Andres and Al peeked through the window and asked if she was Legaspi.
When she answered in the affirmative, the two police officers allegedly pushed the door open and told
her to go with them. Because of shock she said she was not able to ask why they were taking her and
when asked about her shabu source, Legaspi claimed she told the officer that she didnt know what
they are talking about. She claimed she had never been arrested before and was never involved in
any illegal activity.
But the RTC was more convinced with the version of the prosecution as narrated by Police Officer
San Andres and Julie against Legaspis negative testimony consisting of mere denial. So Legaspi
was sentenced to life imprisonment and fined P500,000.

On appeal, Legaspi added another defense. She claimed that she was induced into committing the
crime as she was the one approached by San Andres who was then looking to buy shabu. So there
was no entrapment but instigation which is contrary to public policy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Legaspi is correct.
HELD:
No. Entrapment is a method of apprehending criminals by trapping and capturing them in the
execution of the criminal intent. Here, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender without
anybody prodding him to commit it. Mere deception by the police officer will not exculpate the
perpetrator if the offense was committed free from the influence of the police officer.
Instigation, on the other hand involves the inducement of the suspect into the commission of the
offense in which the instigators become co-principals themselves. In instigation, the idea to commit
the crime or the criminal intent originates from the mind of the inducer or instigating person who lures
the accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute him. Instigation is recognized as a valid
defense that can be raised by an accused but it must be proved by sufficient evidence.
In this case Legaspi agreed to sell P200 worth of shabu to San Andres who was then posing as a
buyer. She was never forced, coerced or induced to source the prohibited drug for San Andres. In fact
San Andres did not even have to ask her if she could sell him some shabu. San Andres merely
informed her that he was a scorer then Legaspi immediately asked him how much. Under the
circumstances the police officers were not only authorized but also obligated to arrest Legaspi even
without an arrest warrant as the crime was committed in their presence.
114. RENNIE DECLARADOR VS HON. GUBATON ET. AL.
GR 159208 (August 18, 2006)
FACTS:
Accused Frank Bansales was 17 years old when he stabbed his female teacher in high school,
Yvonne Declarador, 15 times which resulted to the latters death. Based on the evidence and his plea
of guilt, accused was convicted of murder with qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation but
the court considered accuseds minority as a special mitigating circumstance thus his sentence was
lowered. Instead of reclusion perpetua, the maximum term of imprisonment of reclusion temporal was
given in view of the mitigating circumstance. Further, the sentence was suspended and commitment
to youth rehabilitation center was ordered. This is pursuant with PD 603 as amended. Petitioner,
however, claimed that under Art. 192 of PD 603 and AM 02-1-18-SC, the sentence should not have
been suspended since the juvenile convicted committed an offense punishable by death, life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE:
Whether the accuseds sentence should be suspended since the crime committed is punishable by
reclusion perpetua but due to the mitigating circumstance of minority the sentence given was reduced
to reclusion temporal given the fact that RA 9344 took effect.
HELD:
No. The basis of the exclusion of suspension of sentence is the imposable penalty for the crime
regardless of the actual penalty given. Under the RPC, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. RA 9344 superseded PD 603 but retained the provisions regarding disqualifications in the
suspension of sentence such as the case at bar. Case law has it that statutes in pari materia should
be read and construed together because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to
the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the
existing legislations on the subject and to have enacted the new act with reference

thereto. Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed
national policy. Thus, the suspension of sentence was improper.
RELEVANT STATUTES:
Article 192 of P.D. No. 603:
Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. If after hearing the evidence in the
proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged
against him, the court, shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable
against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court, upon application of
the youthful offender and if it finds that the best interest of the public, as well as that of the offender
will be served thereby, may suspend all further proceedings and commit such minor to the custody or
care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any training institution operated by
the government or any other responsible person until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age,
or for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and
recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or the government training
institution or responsible person under whose care he has been committed.
Xxx
The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of
sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted for an offense punishable by death or life
imprisonment or to one who is convicted for an offense by the Military Tribunals.
Sec. 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC:
Automatic Suspension of Sentence and Disposition Orders. The sentence shall be suspended without
need of application by the juvenile in conflict with the law
Xxx
The benefits of suspended sentence shall not apply to a juvenile in conflict with the law who has once
enjoyed suspension of sentence, or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when at the time of promulgation of judgment the juvenile
is already eighteen (18) years of age or over.
Sec. 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 which took effect on May 20, 2006:
Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine
and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However,
instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the
law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of
sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court
shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.
115. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA
G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011
FACTS:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report
from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old at the time, was
selling shabu at Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized.
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money,
proceeded to Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two poseurbuyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1
Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a
sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant.
The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has been
completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he
was leaving the place.
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials searched the
appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the
marked money, two pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is entitled to a suspension of his sentence.

HELD:
In this case the Supreme Court ruled on the determining minority of the child that:
The appellant was seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said
offense was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's
Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision
on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. The RTC did not
suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare
Codeand Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law,the laws
that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable penalty for
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his sentence under
Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:
SEC. 38.Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the
court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided,
however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the
court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court [Rule] on
Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
Sec. 68.Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. Persons who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below
the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were
convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. .
..
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail
of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because
such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA,
when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show
that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became
effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter
should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the
provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors
regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.
116. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO ESPINA
G.R. Nos. 132325-26. July 26, 2001
FACTS:
In the afternoon of September 30, 1992, the members of an association locally known as theriparipa went to the house of Eufornia Pagas in Bohol for their scheduled contribution to a fund intended
for a wedding celebration. Among present thereat were Romeo Bulicatin, Rogelio Espina and
Samsung Abuloc who were having a drinking spree and playing cards. Romeo Bulcatin asked Espina
to buy 3 bottles of Kalafu wine which he acceded. After they have emptied their wines, Bulcatin then
asked Espina to buy another 3 bottles again which then he refused to obey. Romeo Bulcatin
then proceeded to where Espina was playing card and without warning, urinated on the latter and
clipped him under his arms. Espina went home to avoid in any altercation. At around 9:00 p.m. in the

same evening, while they were still having a drinking spree at the store of Eurofina Pagas, accusedappellant was outside saying Borgs, get out because I have something to say. Three of them went
down and when Romeo Bulcatin was still at the stairway, Espina shot him at the back and was
chased after receiving another 2 shots.
In convicting the accused-appellant, the trial court appreciated the special aggravating circumstance
of use of unlicensed firearms, pursuant to R.A. 8294 and contended that accused-appellant should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On the other hand, the contention of the accused is that the amendatory provision cannot be applied
to him, lest it acquires the character of an ex post facto law. Likewise, the court erred in treating
alevosia merely as a generic aggravating circumstance, more so in offsetting the same by the generic
mitigating circumstance of having committed the crime in immediate vindication of grave offense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of having acted in
immediate vindication of grave offense.
HELD:
The accused is GUILTY of the crime of murder, having his sentenced lowered to
an Indeterminate penalty of 8 years to 17 years, four months and one day. The court correctly
appreciated the mitigating circumstance of having acted in immediate vindication of grave offense.
The accused was urinated by the victim in front of the guests. The act of the victim, which
undoubtedly insulted and humiliated the accused, came within the purview of a grave offense. Thus,
this mitigating circumstance should be appreciated in favour of the accused.
117. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FELIX VENTURA Y QUINDOY
G.R. Nos. 148145-46 July 5, 2004
FACTS:
On February 23, 2000, around 2:00am, while the victims were all asleep in their room, appellants
stealthily gained entry through the kitchen door. The two then went to the victims unlocked room and
there killed Aileen Bocateja in defense of his husband, and seriously wounded Jaime Bocateja using
the bladed weapon Arante was carrying. Ventura, on the other hand, was armed with a .38 Caliber
Homemade Revolver. The two then fled from the victims house but was later on apprehended by the
Philippine National Police.
During the interview conducted, it was learned that, according to Ventura, on February 17, 2000, her
wife, Johanna, confessed that she and Jaime Bocateja were having an affair. Five days later, when
Venturas nephew, Flores, came to visit his uncle, appellant Ventura asked Flores to go with him to
Bocatejas residence so he could confront Jaime about his affair with Johanna. The two then went to
the said house and arrived there at 11pm but was not able to get in until 2:00 am.
In its decision, the trial court found both Ventura and Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Attempted Murder with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling, nighttime
and the breaking of door to gain entrance to the house and with no mitigating circumstance, and for
the crime of Murder qualified by abuse of superior strength. The aggravating circumstances of
dwelling, nighttime and by the breaking of a door are present in the commission of the crime. There is
no mitigating circumstance.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not superior strength be considered as a qualifying circumstance.
2. Whether or not evident premeditation be considered as a qualifying circumstance.
3. Whether or not breaking of door and nocturnity be considered as aggravating circumstances.
4. Whether or not Death be the penalty.
HELD:
1. This Court in a very long line of cases has consistently held that an attack made by a man with a
deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of
that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the
woman was unable to defend herself. By deliberately employing a deadly weapon against Aileen,

appellant Flores clearly took advantage of the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave
him over his unarmed victim.
2. The trial court, did not consider evident premeditation as having aggravated the killing of Aileen
since she was not the intended victim of appellants' conspiracy. Upon further scrutiny, however, this
Court finds that this aggravating circumstance should have been appreciated in connection with
Aileen's murder. Jurisprudence is to the effect that evident premeditation may be considered as
present, even if a person other than the intended victim was killed, if it is shown that the conspirators
were determined to kill not only the intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a violent
resistance.
3. In determining appellants' criminal liability, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating
circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and breaking of door in connection with both crimes. Dwelling is
considered aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to human abode.
Thus, it has been said that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity
in the accused and produces greater alarm. Here, dwelling was correctly appreciated since the
crimes were committed in the place of abode of the victims who had not given immediate provocation.
In determining nocturnity, two tests are employed in the alternative: (1) the objective test,
under which nighttime is aggravating because the darkness facilitated the commission of the offense;
and (2) the subjective test, under which nighttime is aggravating because the darkness was purposely
sought by the offender.90 Applying these tests to the established factual circumstances, this Court
concludes that nocturnity was correctly appreciated in connection with both crimes.
4. It is to be noted that the appreciation by the trial court of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling
and nighttime, despite the non-allegation thereof in the Information, resulted in the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death upon accused-appellant. The accused must thence be afforded every
opportunity to present his defense on an aggravating circumstance that would spell the difference
between life and death in order for the Court to properly 'exercise extreme caution in reviewing the
parties' evidence. This, the accused can do only if he is appraised of the aggravating circumstance
raising the penalty imposable upon him to death. Such aggravating circumstance must be alleged in
the information, otherwise the Court cannot appreciate it. Consequently, we hold that due to their nonallegation in the Information for rape filed against accused-appellant, the aggravating circumstances
of nighttime and dwelling cannot be considered in raising the penalty imposable upon accusedappellant from reclusion perpetua to death
118. RODOLFO BELBIS JR. AND ALBERTO BRUCALES VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181052; 14 November 2012
FACTS:
Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano, Barangay Naga, Tiwi, Albay. On
the night of December 9, 1997, Jose left his house to do his rounds. At around 10:00 p.m., Veronica
Dacir, Joses live-in partner, heard Jose shouting and calling her name and went to where Jose was
and saw blood at his back and shorts. It was there that Jose told Veronica that he was held by Boboy
(petitioner Alberto Brucales), while Paul (petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed him. Jose was brought
to Albay Provincial Hospital where he was confined for 6 days. Jose was brought back to the hospital
on January 7, 1998 and it was found out that his kidneys had inflamed due to infection. He died the
next day.
Petitioners claimed that they are entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Their version
of the incident is as follows:
Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside a store in engaged in a
conversation with other people when Jose went to them and told them to go home. While on their way
home, they heard Joses whistle go off as the latter was following them. Rodolfo asked Jose what is
the matter and the latter replied, What about? Suddenly, Jose thrust a nightstick on Rodolfo, but the
latter was able to evade it. The night stick was actually a bolo sheathed on a scabbard. Rodolfo and
Jose grappled for the bolo while Alberto was merely shouting at them to stop. Rodolfo eventually got
hold of the bolo but he suffered a wound in his hand so Alberto took him to the hospital.

The RTC convicted the petitioners of the crime charged against them, but appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense. After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the
petitioners elevated the case to the CA. However, the latter denied their appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision with modification that there was no mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the same does not deserve merit. For voluntary surrender to be
appreciated, the following requisites should be present: (1) the offender has not been actually
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latters agent; and (3) the
surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the
accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his
guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search
and capture. Without these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are
the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and,
therefore, cannot be characterized as voluntary surrender to serve as a mitigating circumstance. In
the present case, when the petitioners reported the incident and allegedly surrendered the bladed
weapon used in the stabbing, such cannot be considered as voluntary surrender within the
contemplation of the law. Besides, there was no spontaneity, because they only surrendered after a
warrant of their arrest had already been issued.
119. CECILIA U. LEGRAMA V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 178626, June 13, 2012.
FACTS:
The office of the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) for the Province of
Zambales directed an Audit Team to conduct an examination of the cash and account of petitioner
Cecilia Legrama, the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales.
After the audit, the COA prepared a Special Cash Examination Report on the Cash and Accounts of
Ms. Cecilia U. Legrama showing a total shortage in the amount of P1,152,900.75. From the total
amount of the shortage, petitioner was able to restitute the initial amount of P60,000.00.
Consequently, petitioner and Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida), the Municipal Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales at the time the audit was conducted, were charged in an Information with the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds.
Both petitioner and Lonzanida voluntarily surrendered and posted their respective cash bonds.
Petitioner and Lonzanida pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
The Sandiganbayan held Legrama guilty of malversation of public funds and ordered Cecilia U.
Legrama to pay a P1.13 million fine.
Legramas co-accused, former Municipal Mayor Romeo D. Lonzanida, was acquitted after the
prosecution failed to establish its allegation of conspiracy between the two defendants. Petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner enjoys the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
restitution.
HELD:
All the elements of the crime are present in the case at bar. First, it is undisputed that petitioner was
the municipal treasurer at the time material to this case. Second, it is the inherent function of
petitioner, being the municipal treasurer, to take custody of and exercise proper management of the
local governments funds. Third, the parties have stipulated during the pre-trial of the case that
petitioner received the subject amount as public funds and that petitioner is accountable for the same.
Fourth, petitioner failed to rebut the prima facie presumption that she has put such missing funds to
her personal use.

All that is necessary for conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received the public funds
and that he failed to account for the said funds upon demand without offering sufficient explanation
why there was a shortage. In fine, petitioners failure to present competent and credible evidence that
would exculpate her and rebut the prima facie presumption of malversation clearly warranted a
verdict of conviction.
As for the appropriate penalty, since the amount involved is more than P22,000.00, pursuant to the
provisions of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
However, as aptly concluded by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner enjoys the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and restitution. Although restitution is akin to voluntary
surrender as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 13, in relation to paragraph 10 of the same Article
of the Revised Penal Code, restitution should be treated as a separate mitigating circumstance
in favor of the accused when the two circumstances are present in a case, which is similar to
instances where voluntary surrender and plea of guilty are both present even though the two
mitigating circumstances are treated in the same paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
Considering that restitution is also tantamount to an admission of guilt on the part of the
accused, it was proper for the Sandiganbayan to have considered it as a separate mitigating
circumstance in favor of petitioner.
Taking into consideration the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of
two mitigating circumstance, prescribed penalty is reduced to prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal in its medium period, which has a range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. In accordance with paragraph 1, Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code and considering that there are no other mitigating circumstance present, the maximum
term should now be the medium period of prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium,
which isreclusion temporal minimum and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
term should be anywhere within the period of prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor medium. Hence, the penalty imposed needs modification. Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
120. RUBEN CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G. R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012
FACTS:
Police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon went to serve a search warrant from the RTC
to Petitioner Ruben Del Castillo in search of illegal drugs. Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid
which prompted the police officers to immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and go
directly to Del Castillos house and cordoned it off. Police men found nothing incriminating in Del
Castillos residence, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the hut several
articles including four (4) plastic packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
An information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with violation of Section 16,
Article III of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). During arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded
not guilty. The RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the information.
The CA affirmed the decision. Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA, insisting that there was a
violation of his constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. the OSG argued
that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against
government authorities. Hence, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not
designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the
one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual.
ISSUE: Whether or not the barangay tanod acted as a private individual or as an agent of a person in
authority to determine whether or not there was an unreasonable search thus the confiscated items
be inadmissible in evidence.
HELD:

The Supreme Court found the contention of the OSG devoid of merit. It was testified to during trial by
the police officers who effected the search warrant that they asked the assistance of the barangay
tanods. The same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of
the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority and agents of persons in authority as:
x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a
member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be
deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also
be deemed a person in authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent
authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and
security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and
barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority,
shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.
The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay
tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads:
SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong
barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong
tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their
jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may be designated
by law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order,
protection and security of life and property, or the maintenance of a desirable
and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of
persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.
By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as
agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was
unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.
121. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. DANILO ESPIDOL y VILLANUEVA (Deceased)
G. R. No. 150033. November 12, 2004
FACTS:
The accused and his malefactors armed with illegally possessed firearms staged a hold-up at the
business establishment of the family (located in Vigan) of Hipolito Bagay amounting to
P1,200,000.00. They shot Hipolito Bagay who inflicted mortal gunshot wounds which caused his
death a few days thereafter.
The case against Virgilio Corpuz was dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence - his name was stricken
out from the information and later became state witness. In the interregnum, accused Danilo Espidol
died in jail while Alfredo Limos fled from prison and has remained at-large. As for Armando Aniasco,
the trial court issued an order for his arrest upon learning that he was detained in the Cabanatuan
City Jail for another offense.
Appellant was arraigned and with the assistance of his counsel, he pleaded not guilty.
At the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented its two witnesses, namely: Virgilio Espiritu Corpuz,
their driver during the hold up and Johanna Go the fianc of Edward Bagay, brother of the victim
Hipolito Bagay.
After the prosecutions third witness was sworn in, appellant changed his tune. Atty. Fatima Vitamog,
appellants new counsel, manifested in open court about appellants desire to change his plea to
guilty. Appellant was re-arraigned, with the information read to him in the local dialect. To the charge
of Robbery with Homicide in a Band, he pleaded guilty.
The trial court set another hearing to assess appellants comprehension of his plea. At said hearing,
he answered in the affirmative. Without much ado, the trial court deemed the case submitted for
decision and found accused SAGRADO DALACAT guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of Robbery in Band with Homicide with no extenuating circumstance hereby sentences him to

suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00 and
the further amount of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P1,200,000.00), with all
the accessory penalties provided for by law and no subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to pay the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plea of guilty by appellant was validly made to convict him of a capital
offense.
HELD:
There are three (3) conditions that the trial court should kowtow to in order to forestall the entry of an
improvident plea of guilty by the accused, namely:
1. The court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness x x x and full
comprehension [by the accused] of the consequences [of his plea];
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and
3. The court must ask the accused [whether] he desires to present evidence on his behalf,
and allow him to do so if he [so] desires. (Emphasis supplied.) [27]
The mandatory nature of these three requisites for a valid plea of guilty to a capital offense is
easily deducible from the letter of the law. Lamentably, the court a quo failed to play the rules of
the game.
In the case at bar, a cursory look at the transcripts easily reveal the fact that appellants plea of
guilty was far from spontaneous and persistent as envisioned by the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. On the FIRST REQUISITE, the trial court not only failed to probe into the
spontaneity of appellants plea, it made no effort to apprise him of the impact of his change of
plea as the accused herein was merely told that he could face the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. A mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is
insufficient, for more often than not, an accused pleads guilty upon bad advice or because he hopes
for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty
On the SECOND and THIRD indispensable requisite. it must be stressed that a plea of guilty is only a
supporting evidence or secondary basis for a finding of culpability, the main proof being the evidence
presented by the prosecution to prove the accused guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The court cannot,
and should not, relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability by the requisite quantum of evidence.
Given the unchanging state of the three-tiered requisites in Section 3, Rule 116, there is, indeed, no
justification for the trial courts failure to observe them which they did.
Thus, we purge the decision under review of its errors and remand the case to the trial court for
further re-arraignment, a more incisive searching inquiry and the reception of evidence for the
prosecution and the defense.
122. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY CARPIO y NATIVIDAD and JULIE MOLINA Y
NATIVIDAD
G.R. No. 150083 May 27, 2004
FACTS:
While Leonila Zabala and her daughter Eldie Grace Michelle Zabala were sleeping in the brightly lit
masters bedroom of their house, Leonila was awakened by the sound of a wallet being opened.
Leonila stood up and saw appellant Henry Carpio sitting on the floor. On seeing Leonila stand up,
Carpio approached her, poked a knife at her neck. Soon Eldie Grace woke up, Carpio also poked a
knife at her and told her not to shout. Carpio thereupon tied Leonilas hands at her back with a
blanket, stuffed her mouth with her husbands silk shorts and blindfolded her. Appellant subsequently
also tied Eldie Graces hands and tried to spread her legs sideways. As Eldie Grace refused to
spread
her
legs,
Carpio
threatened
her.
Carpio
thereafter
removed
Eldie
Gracespajama and panty then inserted his penis into the private part of Eldie Grace. Carpios lust
satisfied, Carpio ransacked the cabinets inside the bedroom after which he exited through the jalousie
window of the bedroom.

After the prosecution rested its case, Carpios co-accused Julie Molina took the witness
stand, appellant moved, through his counsel, that he was withdrawing his earlier plea of not guilty and
was instead entering a plea of guilty which the trial court granted. The trial court found the accused
guilty of robbery with rape as principal, committed with the use of a deadly weapon and with
aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime, unlawful entry and/or breaking of window, without
any mitigating circumstance to offset the same and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Carpios plea of guilty be considered a mitigating circumstance.
HELD:
As to Carpios contention that nighttime and unlawful entry and/or breaking of window were not
alleged in the information as required by the Rules, the same is meritorious. Parenthetically, the crime
was committed at 5:00 a.m., certainly not at nighttime. And so is appellants contention with respect to
dwelling, it not having been duly reflected in the information that, following paragraph 3 of Article 14 of
the RPC, the act be committed . . . in the dwelling of the offended party if the latter has not
given provocation. The earlier quoted information only describes a room of the house where the
victims were sleeping. It did not, however, state that the house-venue of the crime was the dwelling of
the victims.
Though the aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and
not necessarily in the language used in the statute, it should still be in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged and its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances.
As to Carpios plea of guilty, it cannot be considered mitigating, it having been made after
the prosecution had rested its case. Since there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed.
As modified, the judgment is as follows: Appellant Henry Carpio y Natividad is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with rape and is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua; to return to the
offended parties the car stereo, two wristwatches, and two rings, failing which he must pay their value
to be determined by the trial court; to pay the offended parties.
123 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGAR DAWATON
G.R. No. 146247. September 17, 2002
FACTS:
Edgar Dawaton was found guilty by the trial court of murder qualified by treachery and was sentenced
to death. On 20 September 1998, Leonidas Lavares and several companions, including Dawaton
were drinking in the house of the accuseds uncle. Already drunk, Leonidas Lavares decided to sleep
while the accused and his companions continued drinking. Dawaton awakened Lavares by
stabbing him at the base of the neck. Dawaton continued stabbing Lavares until the victim
died. Dawaton then ran away to the house of his other relative, wherehe was later on arrested by the police.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty of death imposed by the trial court upon the accused was correct?
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in not considering the alternative circumstance of
intoxication in favor of the accused.
Under Art. 15 of The Revised Penal Code, intoxication of the offender shall be considered as a
mitigating circumstance when the offender commits a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is
not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony. Otherwise, when habitual or
intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. The allegation that the
accused was drunk when he committed the crime was corroborated by the prosecution witnesses.
The accused and his drinking had consumed four (4) bottles of gin at the house of Esmeraldo Cortez,
each one drinking at least a bottle. It was also attested that while the four (4) shared another bottle of
gin at the house of Amado Dawaton, it was the accused who drank most of its contents.

The Court further stated that Under Art. 63, par. 3, of The Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which
the law prescribes a penalty composed of two (2) indivisible penalties, such as in this case, when the
commission of the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since no aggravating circumstance attended the
killing but there existed the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, the accused should be sentenced
only to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.