1. SAMUEL C. OCCENA, Petitioner, v.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE

NATIONAL
TREASURER,
THE
DIRECTOR
OF
PRINTING, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 56350. April 2, 1981.]
DOCTRINE stated by Nachura sa book and reviewers I saw online but hindi ko nakita sa case but my conclusion is that
inferred ung doctrine na yan sa case:
Occena vs. COMELEC, which is the authority for the principle that the choice of method of proposal, i.e.,
whether made directly by Congress or through a Constitutional Convention, is within the full discretion of the legislature.
FACTS:
- Suits for prohibition were filed assailing the validity of the Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing
constitutional amendments.
ISSUE:
o

What is the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments and how may it be
exercised?
More specifically as to the latter, what is the extent of the changes that may be introduced, the
number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and the standard required for a proper
submission?

Were the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far beyond the limits of the
authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly?
Was there revision rather than amendment?

What is the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission?

The applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit.

RULING:

Insofar as pertinent it reads thus: The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers
and its Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications
as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof.
One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in
its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose
amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be
ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When, therefore, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent
body its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied
in the resolutions now being assailed.
o

Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely
overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign
to the democratic system, is of no moment because the same will be submitted to the people for
ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new
Constitution.

The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one is no
argument against the validity of the law because amendment includes the revision or total
overhaul of the entire Constitution.
At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed
would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.

The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments.
In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed.
It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it
sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which
amendments could be proposed.
That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a
requirement either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent
power to propose amendments.

2. Defensor-Santiago vs COMELEC
[G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997.]

FACTS:
- Atty. Delfin filed with the COMELEC a petition to amend the Constitution BY PEOPLEs INITIATIVE pursuant to
the right granted to the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution under SEC. 2, ARTICLE XVII of the
1978 Constitution.
- The COMELEC made the necessary steps so as to materialize the peoples initiative such as the publication of
the petition.
- Petitioners then filed for prohibition against the conduct of such measure, raising the following arguments:
a. the constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented
by a law passed by the Congress and no law has been passed by the Congress;
b. While it is true that RA 6735 provides for three (3) systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
Constitution, on the statutes, and on local legislation, said law is still inadequate as it does not specifically cover the
system of initiative ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
ISSUE:
W/N an enabling law is necessary for the exercise of the peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.
W/N R.A 6735 covers the system of initiative ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
RULING:
o

PROVISION ON THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO DIRECTLY PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE

CONSTITUTION, NOT SELF-EXECUTORY.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon
a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once
every
five
years
thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

-This provision is NOT SELF-EXECUTORY.

In his book, Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated: Without
implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode
of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress,
for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.

- Moreover, the interpellations on said section DURING the drafting of the constitution SHOWED that the details for
carrying out Section 2 are LEFT TO THE LEGISLATURE.
-Likewise, it was also made clear DURING said period that Sec. 2 is LIMITED to PROPOSAL to AMEND NOT to
REVISE the Constitution.
The conclusion, therefore, is that THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE of the CONSTITUTION under SEC. 2 ART. XVII is NOT
SELF-EXECUTORY.

The Court said that while R.A. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution,
a careful scrutiny of said law revealed that it LACKED FULL COMPLIANCE with the power and duty of the
Congress to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right.
First, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
SEC. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum
to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions
passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized
and
guaranteed.
(Emphasis
supplied).
- The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought.

- That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions.
- That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose,
enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with
respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
Second, it is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the
constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in
the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution.
The foregoing thus suggests that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
3. PIRMA vs COMELEC (unreported)
4. Almario vs Alba
FACTS:
- A plebiscite was to be held to allow the voters to either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution
proposed by the Batasang Pambansa pursuant to B.P Blg. 643.
- The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be answered by simple YES or NO
answers.
- Petitioners seek to enjoin the submission of Questions 3 and 4, concerning grant as an additional mode of
acquiring lands belonging to the public domain and the undertaking by the government of a land reform program and a
social reform program, on the ground that there has been no fair and proper submission.
ISSUE:
W/N Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on a later date.
RULING:

The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

The Court declared that the necessity, expediency(appropriateness), and wisdom of the proposed amendments
are BEYOND the power of the courts to adjudicate.
Whereter or not grant of public land and urban land reform are unwise or improvident or whether or not the
proposed amendments are unnecessary IS A MATTER WHICH ONLY THE PEOPLE CAN DECIDE.
ASSUMING that a member or members of the Court may find undesirable any additional mode of disposing of
public land or an urban land reform program, THE REMEDY is TO VOTE NO in the plebiscite BUT NOT to substitute
his or their dislike to the proposed amendments by denying millions of voters an opportunity to express their own likes or
dislikes.
5. TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
-

The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress approved in its
capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments
to the Constitution.
The Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION
AMENDINGSECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO
18."
Thereafter, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite
together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic Resolution No. 1 and
the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far as
they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the
calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a
legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention.
Furthermore, under Article XV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in question
cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all other amendments to be
drafted and proposed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention violative to the Constitution.
HELD:
NO.
-

All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single
"election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutional amendment may
be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent
appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the present context, where the Convention
has hardly started considering the merits, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing
Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this
requirement.

6. Aquino vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile

FACTS:
-

Minister of National Defense, Enrile, pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number
of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them.

The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General Order No.2 of the President "for being participants or
for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take
over the Government by force.
General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the power he assumed by virtue of
Proclamation 1081 placing the entire country under martial law.
Hence, Aquino and some others filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer contained a
common and special affirmative defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial Law.

ISSUE: Whether or not this Court may inquire into the validity of Proclamation No. 1081. Whether or not the existence of
conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry.
HELD:
-

5 Justices held that the issue is a political question, hence, not subject to judicial inquiry, while 4 Justices held
that the issue is a justiciable one. However, any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into the constitutional
sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and academic. Implicit in
the state of martial law is the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons
arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. The preservation of
society and national survival takes precedence. The proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the
privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to in this case.

7. Bondoc vs. Pineda

Facts:
-

In the elections held in 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for
the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga.
Pineda was proclaimed winner.
Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9
members,3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives
(5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP).
Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.
Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim
Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him
that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo
Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party.
On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal
that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination
and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.

Issue:
Whether or not Congressman Camasura was arbitrarily removed from HRET. Whether or not the Court may take
congnizance of the removal of Congressman Camasura.
Held:
Yes.
-

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines defines judicial power as
both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."

The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and
legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and
the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into
the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is
brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this
case.

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent
and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration. As
judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong.

Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of
the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in favor of
Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the
votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a
violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null
and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates
Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be
terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with
another political party or removal for other valid cause.

8. Ynot vs IAC
FACTS:
-

1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A.
Executive Order No. 626-A prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of
carabaos. Carabao/carabeef transported in violation of E.O. 626-A shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture
by the govt, to be distributed to charitable institutions as Chairman of National Meat Inspection may see fit
(carabeef) and to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit (carabao).
A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the
carabaos.
After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the
constitutionality issue.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC); IAC upheld the TC.
Petitioners arguments:
1. E.O. is unconstitutional. It authorizes outright confiscation of carabao or carabeef being transported across
provincial boundaries.
2. Penalty is invalid. It is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and
impartial court as guaranteed by due process.
3. Improper exercise of legislative power by the former President.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC could decline on the issue of constitutionality.
HELD:
No.
-

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to
review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or

affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower
courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that the
resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive
and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare
them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant
warning. Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the
task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the
bench, especially this Court.

9. MIRASOL VS. CA
DOCTRINE: Constitution vests the power of judicial review not only in the Supreme Court but also in the RTC.
FACTS:

Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. They are engaged in selling sugar both in domestic and export
markets.

Private respondent PNB finances the Mirasols sugar production venture for crop years under a crop loan
financing scheme.
Meanwhile, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 579 directing that whatever
profit that might realize from sales of sugar abroad was to be remitted to a special fund of the national
government, after commissions, liabilities, and expenses are deducted.

Believing that the proceeds of their sugar sales to PNB, if properly accounted for, were more than enough to pay
their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds of the sale of their export sugar.

PNB ignored the request contending that under P.D. No. 579 there was nothing to account since under said law,
all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government and were subject to the
disposition of the President of the Philippines for public purposes.

RTC declared PD 579 unconstitutional being in gross violation of the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the trial court to have exercised judicial review
HELD: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a
statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts. In J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 696 (1961) we
held:
Plainly, the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where
such constitutionality happens to be in issue.
Furthermore, B.P. Blg. 129 grants Regional Trial Courts the authority to rule on the conformity of laws or treaties with
the Constitution.

10. TAN VS. PEOPLE

DOCTRINE: One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is the
existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination.
FACTS:

Forest Guards Panadero and Rabino confiscated narra, white lauan lumber, and tanguile lumber from 2 dump
trucks, owned by Alejandro Tan, because no documents showing legal possession of the lumbers were, upon
demand, presented to them.

Tan, together with his caretaker, drivers of the truck and timekeeper, was charged with violation of Section 68,
PD 705, as amended by EO 277.

The impugned legal provision reads:

Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without License. - Any person who shall
cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers
are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation.
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in
the area where the timber or forest products are found.

Petitioners aver that the above provision is violative of substantive due process, because it requires the
possession of certain legal documents to justify mere possession of forest products which, under Section 3(q) of
PD 705, includes, among others, firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, flowering plant, the
associated water or fish and penalizes failure to present such required documents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may properly inquire into the constitutionality of the questioned law
HELD: One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is the existence of
an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination. As Respondent
Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, petitioners were not charged with the [unlawful] possession of firewood, bark,
honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, the associated water or fish; thus, the inclusion of any of these enumerated
items in EO 277 is absolutely of no concern to petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which they are entitled
to a judicial determination at this time. Besides, they did not present any convincing evidence of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution that would justify the nullification of said provision. A statute is always presumed to be
constitutional, and one who attacks it on the ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its invalidity.
11. GONZALES VS. NARVASA
DOCTRINE: Reliefs prayed for should involve issues or controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable at
the time-being. Prohibition is an inappropriate remedy when the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists.
FACTS:

President Estrada created Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) by virtue of EO 43. The
purpose of which is to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions of the 1987 Constitution,
and the manner of implementing the same.

On December 9, 1999, Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the
positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants.

GROUNDS: First, Petitioner contends that it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a
law. Secondly, petitioner asserts that by creating such a body the President is intervening in a process from
which he is totally excluded by the Constitution the amendment of the fundamental charter.

Furthermore, Petitioner asks the Court to enjoin PCCR and the above-mentioned offices from acting as such.

However, the PCCR has ceased to exist on December 20, 1999 upon submission of its recommendations to the
President. Thus, making the issue as to the constitutionality of PCCR moot and academic.

ISSUE: Whether or not the relief prayed for by Petitioner may still be granted
HELD: The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the
President on the same day. It had likewise spent the funds allotted to it. Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost
its raison detre. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve.
The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by
petitioner. Basically, petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as such. Clearly, prohibition is an
inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It is well established that prohibition is a

preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. At this point, any ruling regarding the
PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial
power.

12. GUINGONA VS. CA

DOCTRINE: Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the following: (1) there must be an
actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person
challenging must have standing; that is, he has personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained
or will sustain direct injury.

FACTS:

Potenciano Roque, claiming to be an eyewitness to the networking of xxx national and local politicians and
gambling lords, was admitted into the Governments Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Program.

On November 30, 1995, Roque executed a sworn statement. On the basis of Roques sworn statement, one
Angelito H. Sanchez and Gen. Lorenzo Mateo also executed sworn statement and supplemental affidavit.

Private respondent contended that Roques admission was illegal for lack of requisite of corroboration in his
testimony, the latter being a condition precedent to admission into the Program.

Thus, Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari raising the lone issue of whether or not admission to the
Program requires prior or simultaneous corroboration of the material points in the witness testimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for review should be granted

HELD: The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue raised by petitioners do not warrant the exercise of judicial
power.
Judicial review, which is merely an aspect of judicial power, demands the following: (1) there must be an actual case
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for adjudication; and (3) the person challenging
must have standing; that is, he has personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will
sustain direct injury.
As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist.
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims,
which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a
decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts.
In the case at bar, it is at once apparent that petitioners are not requesting that this Court reverse the ruling of the
appellate court and disallow the admission in evidence of Respondent Roques testimony, inasmuch as the assailed
Decision does not appear to be in conflict with any of their present claims. Petitioners filed this suit out of fear that the
assailed Decision would frustrate the purpose of said law, which is to encourage witnesses to come out and testify. But
their apprehension is neither justified nor exemplified by this particular case. A mere apprehension does not give rise to a
justiciable controversy.
Manifestly, this petition involves neither any right that was violated nor any claims that conflict. In fact, no affirmative
relief is being sought in this case. Petitioners failed not only to present an actual controversy, but also to show a case ripe
for adjudication.
13. Atlas Fertilizer vs. Secretary of DAR
Facts:
Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation Philippine Federation of Fishfarm Producers, Inc. and petitioner-in-intervention
Archies Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acuna are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn
farms. They assail Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as well as the implementing guidelines and
procedures contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform as unconstitutional.

Petitioners claim that the questioned provisions of CARL violate the Constitution in the following manner; it extends
agrarian reform to aquaculture lands even as Section 4, Article XIII of the constitution limits agrarian reform only to
agriculture lands; similarly treat of aquaculture lands and agriculture lands when they are differently situated and and
differently treat aquaculture lands and other industrial lands, when they are similarly situated in violation of the
constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.
Issue: Whether or not RA 6657 is unconstitutional?
Ruling:
While the Court will not hesitate to declare a law or an act void when confronted squarely with constitutional issues,
neither will it preempt the Legislative and the Executive branches of the government in correcting or clarifying, by means
of amendment, said law or act. On February 20, 1995, Republic Act No. 7881 was approved by Congress.
R.A. No. 7881 expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. In view of the
foregoing, the question concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot and academic with
the passage of R.A. No. 7881.
One of the requisites of judicial review is that there must be an actual case or controversy, the issues raised in the case
must not be moot and academic. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events.
With the passage of an amendatory law excluding fishponds and prawns from the coverage of CARL, the issue of
constitutionality is now moot and academic, and therefore not ripe for judicial review.
14. SALONGA vs PAO
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause,
alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him.
Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress,
and persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August,
September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga
as one of those responsible.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a Notice of Preliminary Investigation in People
v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that the preliminary investigation of the
above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 oclock p.m. on December 12, 1980 and that petitioner was given ten (10) days
from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner
states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not
received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.
The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12
March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP
31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for
failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano
(Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January

1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act,
as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4
January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case
has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his
further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines
today.

Issue: Whether or not the court is precluded from deciding a case that is already considered as moot and academic?
Ruling: As a rule the court need not decide a case that is already moot and academic since it no longer presents a
justiciable controversy. However the rule admits some exceptions.. i.e to formulate principles to serve as guide for the
bench and the bar.
The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court's judgment had been arrived at, and a
draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent
Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the
petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek
the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has
been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It
has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and,
therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition became moot
because of his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision and stated:
The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in
language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.
15. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES,
vs.
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS,
Facts:
The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act
No. 180 be declared unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and
parents of liberty and property without due process of law; B. They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear
their children for civic efficiency; and C. Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and
discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
The Government's legal representative submitted a mimeographed memorandum contending that, (1) the matter
constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional questions; (2)
petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts; and (3) the Acts are constitutionally valid.
Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of Education. Such
requirement was not originally included in Act No. 2706.

Petitioners also contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any
law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to
censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorent to our system of law and government.
Issue: Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that would warrant the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of
the act?

Ruling:
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by
its operation.
The Solicitor General points out that none of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have
permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits.1 And they do not assert that the respondent
Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of law
and, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain.
Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies.
Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does
not constitute a justiciable controversy.
Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid
the problem may be. This is specially true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into
play regard for the court's duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion."
Where the petitioning private schools are actually operating by virtue of the permits issued by the secretary of education
under act no 2706, who have not shown to have threatened to revoke their permits, there is no justiciable question that
would authorize the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of the act.

16. Dumlao vs. Comelec

Petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said
position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified
voter and a member of the Bar. Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel,
Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory
and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to
which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term
of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes
from running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after
preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
Issue: Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy that would warrant judicial review by this court?
Ruling:
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted
earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent
COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that
provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that

constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the
abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be rendered without the
benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring
Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as
provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution.
A request for advisory opinion is not an actual case or controversy.

17. PEREZ VS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA ECIJA

NO ACTUAL CONTROVERSY: ISSUE RAISED WAS MOOT AND ACADEMIC
FACTS:
Pres. Ferdinand Marcos nominated petitioner Honorato Perez for appointment to the position of Provincial Fiscal of
Nueva Ecija.
When confirmation of petitioners nomination as Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija was by-passed by the Commission on
Appointments upon adjournment sine die of Congress on May 18, 1972, the President designated him as acting
provincial fiscal.
Respondent Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 228, ordering respondent Provincial Treasurer to stop payment of
petitioners salaries as acting provincial fiscal
Consequently, the treasurer disapproved petitioners requisition for various office supplies while the Governor
disapproved his salary vouchers.
Hence, the instant petition, an original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul Resolution No. 228 of the
respondent Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,
and to compel respondents to recognize petitioner Honorato Perez as acting provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija.
The petitioner raised the following legal questions:
"1) Whether or not respondent Provincial Board has the power to pass and enact a resolution not recognizing herein
petitioner as acting provincial fiscal despite the fact that the latter has assumed such office pursuant to a designation
lawfully extended to him by the President of the Philippines.
2) Whether or not respondent Provincial Board has the power to defy and/or pass judgment on the validity of the said
designation and assumption."cralaw virtua1aw library
Pending resolution of which the petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor of Cabanatuan City.
ISSUE: WON THE COURT CAN PASS UPON THE PETITION
HELD: NO, the petition having become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition holding that a petition instituted to establish ones right to an appointive office
is rendered moot and academic where his right to said office has been forfeited by his filing of a certificate of candidacy
to an elective office.
We deem it unnecessary to pass upon the issues raised, We take cognizance of the fact that petitioner Perez filed his
certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor of Cabanatuan City in the local elections of January 30, 1980. The mere
filing of a certificate of candidacy constitutes forfeiture of his right to the controverted office under Section 29 of the

Election Code of 1978.

18. TANADA VS ANGARA
GR. NO. 118295; MAY 2, 1997
CASE SHOWING ACTUAL CASE AND CONTROVERSY
FACTS:
The Philippines joined WTO as founding member.
Then Secretary Navarro of Department of Trade and Industry, on behalf of the RP signed the Final Act containing the
WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and
(2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
The Senate concurred the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization
The present petition was filed. It assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
"develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to
qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."
The Court resolved to give due course to the petition especifically to the "political question" issue being very
fundamental and vital, and being a matter that probes into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case
was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue;

ISSUE:
DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY?
HELD: YES.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
"The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of
the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is
raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide."
((The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution, as
follows: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality, of the government." The foregoing
text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality, of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. As explained by
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously, as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature." As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk,
digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the
government.))
19. MARIANO VS COMELEC
GR. NO. 118577
CASE HELD NOT RIPE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION
FACTS:

Petitioners as taxpayers assails the constitutionality of RA 7854 entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati."
Mariano, Jr. is the only resident of Makati. The other petitioners are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
The petitioners assail, among others, the constitutionality of Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 as it attempts to alter or restart
the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of
the Constitution.
Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue
as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election
is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will
acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues
exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of
Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854
restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them.
In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has
already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually
win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year
consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term asmunicipal mayor would not be counted. Thus,
petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent
Mayor Binay.

ISSUE: WON THE PETITION IS RIPE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION

HELD: NO.
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. 5
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many
contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in
said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the` same position in the 1998 elections.
Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet
to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over
which this Court has no jurisdiction.

20. OPLE VS TORRES

GR NO. 127685
CASE SHOWING THE EXISTENCE OF AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY
FACTS:
AO No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System"
Sen. Blas F. Ople filed a petition assailing the constitutionality of AO No. 308.
Petitioner Ople prays to invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 on two important constitutional grounds, viz:

one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and

two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights
sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.

Respondents counter argue that the the instant petition is not a justiciable case as would warrant a judicial review.
ISSUE: WON THE PETITION WARRANT JUDICIAL REVIEW?

HELD: YES.
The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308
have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face.

His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents
themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules.

All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the
formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality.

As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No.
308 is a usurpation of legislative power.

As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of
the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.

21. PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995
FACTS: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of
not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be
allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications,
their stand on public issues and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the
Commission for dissemination of vital election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the
Supreme Court in their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order, to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition
imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible
exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media
enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to
donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private personal property without payment of the just compensation
required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by
respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private
property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution
No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing
of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.

22. JOYA VS. PCGG

G.R No. 96541, August 24 1993
FACTS:
Special Civil Action for Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injuction and/or Restraining Order seek to
enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale scheduled on January 11, 1991 by Christies of New York of 82
Old Masters Paintings and 18 th-19th century silverware contained in 71 cartons. The items were seized from Malacanang
and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and were placed in the custody of the Central Bank. It was alleged to be part of
the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies.
On August 9, 1990, Mateo Caparas, the Chairman of PCGG wrote then President Aquino requesting her for authority to
sign the proposed Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and Christie, Manson and Woods
International Inc (Christies of New York) concerning the sale. President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, Jr. authorized PCGG to sign the agreement. The PCGG signed the Consignment Agreement with
Christies of New York
On October 26, 1990 the COA submitted to President Aquino the audit findings and observations on the Consignment
Agreement to the effect that:
The authority of PCGG Chairman Caparas was of doubtful legality; that the contract was highly disadvantageous to the
government; that he PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the US; and that the assets subject of
auction were historical relics and had cultural significance hence their disposal was prohibited by law
The PCGG, through its new Chairman David Castro, wrote to President Aquino defending the Consignment Agreement
and refuting the allegations of COA Chairman Domingo; Director of National Museum Gabriel Casal issued a certification
that the items subject on the Consignment Agreement did not fall within the classification of protected cultural properties
and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage.
As Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists, petitioners Dean Jose Joya et al contended that they have legal personality to
restrain respondent from acting contrary to preserving artistic creations pursuant to Sec 14-18 Article XIV of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for this Court to exercise its power of judicial
review over this case
HELD: Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court shall exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has legal standing
to raise the constitutional or legal question.
Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The paintings legally belongs to the foundation
or the members of thereof and the silverware are gifts to the Marcos couple. When the Marcos administration was
toppled and the said objects were confiscated it did not mean that ownership has passed to the government without
complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these were already
acquired, any defect in the acquisition must be raised by the true owners. Petitioners failed to show that they are the
legal owners of the said objects that have become publicly owned.
The Court shall exercise its power of judicial review only if there is an actual case or controversy
Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale,
which is long past, the issues raised have become moot and academic
They submit that the resolution by the Court of the issues in this case will establish future guiding principles and
doctrines on the preservation of the nation's priceless artistic and cultural possessions for the benefit of the public as a
whole.

23. TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COMELEC,

G.R. No. 132922. April 21, 1998
FACTS: Petitioners Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. and GMA Network, Inc.
challenge the validity of Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 which prohibits the sale or donation of print space or air
time for political ads, except to the Commission on Elections under Section 90 of Batas Pambansa No.881 (Omnibus
Election Code), with respect to print media, and Section 92 with respect to broadcast media.
Section 90 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) provides that a COMELEC space be allocated, free of charge,
equally and impartially among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper is circulated while Section 92
provides that the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or
television time (COMELEC time), free of charge, to all candidates during the campaign period.
These are the contentions of the petitioners:
A. The requirement that radio and television time be given free takes property without due process of law and violates the
eminent domain clause of the Constitution, which provides for the payment of just compensation;
B. That it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws;
C. It is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication
or information during election period.
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an organization of lawyers of radio and
television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. On the other hand,
GMA Network, Inc. operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a franchise
granted by Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) and
GMA Network, Inc. have locus standi to challenge the operation of Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 providing free COMELEC
airtime; HELD: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. held to be without standing; while
GMA Network, Inc. has locus standi to bring the constitutional challenge. Members of TELEBAP assert their interest as
lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies and as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. But their
substantive claim is without merit because:
A. In view of the transcendental importance, a citizen is allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show
that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; injury is traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. But
Members of TELEBAP have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the operation of Section 92, B.P. Blg.
881.
B. The case at bar does not concern a citizens right to suffrage, thus, members of petitioner TELEBAP do not have the
interest as registered voters.
C. They do not also have an interest as taxpayers since the case at bar does not involve the exercise of Congress of its
taxing or spending power. A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money and that he will sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
questioned statute.
D. Members of TELEBAP do not also have a legal standing by reason of their corporate entity because standing jus tertii
will be recognized only if it can be shown that the party suing has some substantial relation to the third party, or that the
third party cannot assert his constitutional right, or that the right of the third party will be diluted unless the party in court
is allowed to espouse the third partys constitutional claim. None of these requirements is present.
E. The mere fact that TELEBAP is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not authorize them to bring this
suit in their name as representatives of the affected companies.
On the other hand, GMA Network, Inc. has locus standi to challenge the constitutional question as it operates radio and
television broadcast stations throughout the Philippines. Petitioner has showed that it is affected by the enforcement of

Section 92, B.P. Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide free air time to the COMELEC for
the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes.

24. FRANCISCO S. TATAD vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
G.R. No. 124360 and 127867. November 5, 1997
FACTS:
In December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy was created (through the enactment of R.A. No. 7638) to control
energy-related government activities. In March 1996, R.A. No. 8180 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996)
was enacted in pursuance to the deregulation of the power and energy thrust under R.A. 7638. Under the R.A. No. 8180,
any person or entity was allowed to import and market crude oil and petroleum products, and to lease or own and
operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities.
Petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the constitutionality of Section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 since the imposition of tarrif
violates the equal protection clause and bars the entry of others in the oil industry business. Also, the inclusion of tarrif
violates Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which shall be
expressed in its title.
Respondents, on the other hand, declares the petitions not justiciable (cannot be settled by the court) and that the
petitioners have nolocus standi since they did not sustain direct injury as a result of the implementation of R.A. No. 8180.
ISSUE:

Whether

or

not

the

petitioners

have

the

standing

to

assail

the

validity

of

the

law

HELD: The effort of respondents to question the locus standi of petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In language
too lucid to be misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner's locus standi where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, we stressed:
xxx xxx xxx
Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are, however, in the main
procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's
duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given
to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions.
There is not a dot of disagreement between the petitioners and the respondents on the far reaching importance of the
validity of RA No. 8180 deregulating our downstream oil industry. Thus, there is no good sense in being hypertechnical
on the standing of petitioners for they pose issues which are significant to our people and which deserve our forthright
resolution.

25. G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995

KILOSBAYAN,et. al., petitioners,
vs.
MANUEL L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the
PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, respondents

FACTS:

In this present case, the petitioners are seeking to declare the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) entered into
by the PCSO and PGMC invalid based on the previous ruling of the court in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona
nullifying the Contract of Lease between the same parties, contending that the nullified Contract of Lease is the
same as the ELA.

PCSO and PGMC on the other hand questions the petioner,s standing to bring the present case. They argue
that Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract.

In trying to establish their standing to sue in the case at bar, petitioners invoked their constitutional right to
independent people's organizations which allows them to an "effective and reasonable participation at all levels
of social, political and economic decision-making.

Also, the petitioners invoked the following policies and principles of the Constitution:

Art. II, 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

12. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster
patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to file the present case.
HELD:

The court held that petioners have NO legal standing to question the contract, since neither the Kilosbayan's
status as a people's organization give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract in this
case. These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or those with
standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases
involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, 5. This
requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision-making in the courts
from decision-making in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any
party.

It is also insisted that the Court has in the past accorded standing to taxpayers and concerned citizens in
cases involving "paramount public interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators have indeed
been allowed to sue but then only (1) in cases involving constitutional issues and (2) under certain conditions.
Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing.

The court further held that even petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained nor as concerned
citizens can they bring this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners,
who are members of Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not
complain of any infringement of their rights as legislators.

The court concluded that petitioners' opposition is not really to the validity of the ELA but to lotteries which they
regard to be immoral. This is not, however, a legal issue, but a policy matter for Congress to decide and
Congress has permitted lotteries for charity.

26. G.R. No. 114222 April 6, 1995

FRANCISCO
S.
TATAD,
JOHN
H.
OSMENA
and
RODOLFO
G.
BIAZON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, and EDSA LRT CORPORATION, LTD., respondents
FACTS:

In the present case at bar petitioners Francisco S. Tatad, John H. Osmena and Rodolfo G. Biazon as Senators
and as taxpayers questions the implementing and enforcing of the "Revised and Restated Agreement to Build,
Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA" and the "Supplemental Agreement to the 22 April
1992 Revised and Restated Agreement To Build, Lease and Transfer a Light Rail Transit System for EDSA"

Respondent Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. on the other hand is the incumbent Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), while private respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd. is a
private corporation organized under the laws of Hongkong.

Secretary Garcia and private respondent claimed among other things that Petitioners are not the real partiesin-interest and therefore have no legal standing to institute the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners as taxpayers have legal capacity to question the contracts entered into by the
national government.

HELD:

The court held that the prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits allow taxpayers to question contracts entered
into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of
the law (Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 [1994]) and to disallow the same when only municipal
contracts are involved (Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron, 176 SCRA. 240 [1989]).
For as long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, the court have no choice but to follow it
and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action.

27. G.R. No. L-45685

November 16, 1937

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
and
HONGKONG
&
SHANGHAI
BANKING
CORPORATION,petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents
FACTS:

The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation filed by the herein respondent Mariano
Cu Unjieng, before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature.

The Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the respondent. The private
prosecution also filed an opposition alleging, among other things, that Act No. 4221, is nevertheless violative of
section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason
that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the

provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their
respective provinces.

The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on
Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1,
Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect
to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act No. 4221.

counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No. 4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of
the petitioners, it does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal
protection clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive

counsel for the respondents reiterate the view that section 11 of Act No. 4221 is free from constitutional
objections and contends that

the private prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less question the validity of
Act No. 4221;

that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are estopped from questioning the validity of the Act

ISSUE:
Whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these proceedings

HELD:
The court held that the question of the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised.

It is a well-settled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts
unless that question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a determination
of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton and
Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.)

The court also held that the question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is frequently raised in
ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the
remedies in the ordinary course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate.
o

Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone([1922]), 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the question of the
constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in mandamus proceedings (

in Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in Springer vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845]), this court declared an
act of the legislature unconstitutional in an action of quo warranto brought in the name of the
Government of the Philippines.

It has also been held that the constitutionality of a statute may be questioned in habeas
corpus proceedings (12 C. J., p. 783; Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117), although there are
authorities to the contrary; on an application for injunction to restrain action under the challenged statute
(mandatory, see Cruz vs. Youngberg [1931], 56 Phil., 234)

and even on an application for preliminary injunction where the determination of the constitutional
question is necessary to a decision of the case. (12 C. J., p. 783.) The same may be said as
regards prohibition and certiorari.

Although, as a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute
involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction
is void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the
constitutionality will be considered on its being brought to the attention of the court by persons interested in the
effect to be given the statute.(12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.)

It is true that, as a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so
that if not raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it
will not considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.

The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the
Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of
grater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted
upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state
can challenge the validity of its own laws.

28. G.R. No. 117577 December 1, 1995

ALEJANDRO
B.
TY
AND
MVR
PICTURE
TUBE,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. AURELIO C. TRAMPE, in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, THE
HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF PASIG AND THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF
PASIG, respondents.
FACTS:

Respondent Assessor sent a notice of assessment respecting certain real properties of petitioners In a letter,
petitioners through counsel requested the Municipal Assessor to reconsider the subject assessments.

Thereafter, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for
Prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to declare null and void the
new tax assessments and to enjoin the collection of real estate taxes based on said assessments. However,
respondent Judge denied the petition for lack of merit.

Ty and Company contends that 1)the Court gravely erred in holding that Presidential decree No. 921,including
its implementing rules and regulations, were expressly repealed by R.A 7160 the Court erred in not declaring
the confiscatory and oppressive nature of the assessments as illegal ab initio and unconstitutional constituting
a deprivation of property without due process of law and the Court erred in declaring that Ty and company
failed to exhaust administrative remedies provided the law by not paying tax although under protest instead
(Sec. 252, LGC)

Petitioner raised the following issues in the present petiton:

- Whether Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, repealed the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 921; Whether petitioners are required to exhaust administrative remedies
prior to seeking judicial relief; and Whether the new tax assessments are oppressive and confiscatory, and
therefore unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is necessity upon the court to determine the constitutionality of P.D. 921 and R.A. 7160
after harmonizing the same.
HELD:

The court held that it is axiomatic that the constitutionality of a law, regulation, ordinance or act will not be
resolved by courts if the controversy can be, as in this case it has been, settled on other grounds.
o

In the recent case of Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority this Court declared:
It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will
not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate
cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota presented. To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of
legal rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a
proper party, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity, and (d) the
resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case.

The aforequoted decision in Macasiano merely reiterated the ruling in Laurel vs. Garcia where this Court
held:
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions are properly
raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the determination of the case (People v.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the
case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law (Siler
v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 [1941]).

29. REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR 54 SCRA 83

Facts:

The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan and International
Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.

Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. And for the strength of
this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment.

The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment
of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations of
AFP.

Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are null
and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.

Ruling:
No
Ratio:
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental
postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state and its government is immune
from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends.
30. LASCO VS. UNRFNRE
FACTS:

Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund
for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United
Nations.
The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration
work in Dinagat Island.
Petitioners are the complainants for illegal dismissal and damages.
Private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed
diplomatic immunity.

ISSUE:
Whether special agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity.
RULING:
The diplomatic immunity of private respondent was sufficiently established by the letter of the Department of Foreign
Affairs, recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations where the Philippine Government was a party. Our courts can only assume jurisdiction
over private respondent if it expressly waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at bench.
31. SEAFDEC VS. NLRC
G.R. Nos. 97468-70, September 2 1993, 241 SCRA 580
FACTS
T wo l a b o r c a s e s w e r e f i l e d b y t h e h e r e i n p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t s a g a i n s t t h e p e t i t i o n e r,
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City.
In these cases, the private respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their employment by the
petitioner.
The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government organization composed of various Southeast
Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged the jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking
cognizance of the above cases.
The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is not immune from suit
and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not
expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.
RULING
The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international
agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. It has already been held in Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992).
Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international

agency
beyond
the
jurisdiction
of
public respondent
NLRC.
Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD),enjoys
functional
independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. One of the basic
immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the
legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection o f s u c h a n o r g a n i z a t i o n t o t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e l o c a l c o u r t s w o u l d a f f o r d a c o n v e n i e n t
medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and
decisions
of
the
organization;
besides,
such
objection
to
local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilitiesiimpartially on behalf of its
member-states.
32. Republic vs. Feliciano (Ate Febs version)
Facts:

Respondent Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance against the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land.

The trial court rendered a decision declaring Lot No. 1 to be the private property of Feliciano and the rest of the
property reverted to the public domain.

The trial court reopened the case due to the filing of a motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of the
trial court by 86 settlers, alleging that they had been in possession of the land for more than 20 years under claim of
ownership.

The trial court ordered the settlers to present their evidence but they did not appear at the day of presentation of
evidence. Feliciano, on the other hand, presented additional evidence. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision
and the trial court ruled in favor of Feliciano.

The settlers immediately filed a motion for reconsideration and then the case was reopened to allow them to
present their evidence.

Feliciano filed a petition for certiorari with the Appellate Court but it was denied.
The settlers filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without
its consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by Feliciano.
Issue:

Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land.
Held:

No
Ratio:

A suit against the state is not permitted, except upon a showing that the state has consented to be sued, either
expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted.

The complaint involves land not owned by the state but private land belonging to Feliciano, hence the
government is not being divested of any of its properties.

32. Republic vs Feliciano 148 SCRA 424 (1987) (Marvins version)

Facts:
-Feliciano sued the Republic through Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land in
Camarines Sur in CFI Camarines Sur.
-He alleged that he bought the land from heirs of Abrazado as evidenced from informacion posesoria (Spanish title).
However, the Land Authority, then NARRA, reserved the land for resettlement purposes and subdivided it to settlers.
-Republic moved to dismiss the case on ground of non-suitability of the State. CFI dismissed said motion hence this
appeal by Republic

Issue: Could the State be impeaded as defendant in the present action?

Ruling: NO. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled
jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by
implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the
instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent.

The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried before the court a
quo, as alleged by private respondent, is not fatal. It is now settled that such defense "may be invoked by the courts sua
sponte at any stage of the proceedings."

CFI dismissed the case against the Republic.

33. Sanders vs Veridiano 162 SCRA 88 (1988)
Facts:
-PETITIONERS Sanders and Moreau were officers in US Naval Base. They downgraded employment status of
RESPONDENT Veridiano from full-time to part-time.
-Before the start of grievance hearing to hear their case, an allegedly libelous letter were sent to Chief of Naval
Personnel Subic explaining reason for downgrading of their status.
-This led RESPONDENT to file case for damages.They made it clear that the petitioners were being sued in their
private or personal capacity.
-PETITIONERS moved to dismiss case as acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of their
official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity.
Issue: Are the PETITIONERS sued in their private or personal capacity?
Ruling: NO.It is clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of
NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their
employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters.
Complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be
sued. There are however some well-recognized exceptions:
1) public officer may be sued as such to compel him to do an act required by law

2) restrain a Cabinet member, for example, from enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional
3) compel the national treasurer to pay damages from an already appropriated assurance fund
4) to secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by himself without the
State having to do a positive act to assist him;
5) where the government itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may directly implead the government
even without first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit as normally required, as the doctrine of state
immunity "cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice."
34. Veteran Manpower (VMPSI) vs CA 214 SCRA 286
Facts:-Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly
contract rate per guard (VMPSI will contend it is waiver of immunity).
-PADPAO (association of security agencies) cancelled VMPSI license for cutthroat competition (lower rates). It was
affirmed by PC Chief which lead to VMPSI's license being cancelled.
-VMPSI sued PADPAO and PC Chief in RTC to restraint the latter from cancelling its license but PC Chief filed motion to
dismiss as case is a suit against the State without its consent.
Issue: Is VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent?
Ruling: YES. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). Invoking
this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a
primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security
guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Governments consent,
especially in this case because VMPSIs complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain
way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages from said public respondents. Even if its
action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not consent to
appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose.

Waiver of the States immunity from suit, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be lightly inferred, but must be
construed strictissimi juris. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority, hence, from a
legislative act, not from a mere memorandum like in this case. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the public respondents.

35. Municipality of San Fernando vs Firme 195 SCRA 692

Facts: -A private passenger jeepney and dump truck owned by Municipality of San Fernando, La Union collided which
kiled some passengers. The dump truck is carrying gravel and sand to build roads.
-Respondents who were victims and their heirs filed complaint for damages before RTC. Despite invocation of nonsuitability of the State, the Municipality was still held liable for damages.

Issue: Does municipal corporations enjoy sovereign immunity from suits?

Ruling: YES. Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are
engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are
subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be
sued.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel
for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." The said act is a purely government functions. We arrive at the
conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.

36. NIA vs CA 214 SCRA 35 (1992)

Facts: Private citizens sued NIA for damages alleging that the latters negligence in regulating the canal lead to the
inundiation of their farmlands ang causing damages to their crops. NIA averred that it is immumed from suits.
Doctrine: NIA "is not immune from suit, by virtue of the express provision of P.D. No. 552." A reading of Section 2,
sub-paragraph (f) of P.D. No. 552, amending Republic Act No. 3601 shows the granting to NIA the power "to exercise all
the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act." Paragraph 4 of said law also provide that petitioner NIA may sue and be sued in court for all kind of action s,
whether contractual or quasi-contractual, in the recovery of compensation and damages as in the instant case
considering that private respondents action is based on damages caused by the negligence of petitioners.
Supreme Court reiterated that NIAis a corporate body performing proprietary functions, whose charter, P.D. 552, provides
that it may sue and be sued.
37. Bureau of Printing vs Bureau of Printing Employees 1 SCRA 340 (1961)
Facts: Bureau of Printing is sued by its labor union for unfair labor practice before Court of Industrial Relations. Motion
to dismiss by the Bureau invokig immunity from suit. The Court denied it on ground that functions of the Bureau of
Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature.
Issue: Could the Bureau be sued without its consent?
Ruling: NO.
As an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued
without its consent, much less over its objection (It has no charter).
The Bureau of Printing is primarily a service bureau and is not engaged in business or occupation for pecuniary benefit.
Although it receives outside jobs and many of its employees are paid for overtime work on regular working days and on
holidays, these facts do not justify the conclusion that its functions are "exclusively proprietary in nature." Hence, the
Court of Industrial Relations is without jurisdiction to hear and determine complaints for unfair labor practice filed against
the Bureau of Printing. It is immumed from suit.

38. Farolan vs CTA 217 SCRA 298 (1993)

Facts: RESPONDENT Bagong Buhay imported bales of screen net and paid duties to Bureau of Customs. After a
reexamination, the value of the goods and duties paid are misdeclared so the goods were subject to forfeiture in favor of
the government.
-Upon appeal to CTA, the decision of Customs was reversed stating that the misdeclaration of the value of goods was an
honest mistake with no fraud on the part of RESPONDENT.
-CTA released the goods but upon discovery, some of the screen nets were in bad condition. RESPONDENT wants to
held Bureau of Customs for damages.
Issue: Coud the Bureau of Customs be held for damages as a result of the acts of its agents?
Ruling: NO. The Bureau of Customs cannot be held liable for actual damages that the private respondent sustained with
regard to its goods. Otherwise, to permit private respondents claim to prosper would violate the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Since it demands that the Commissioner of Customs be ordered to pay for actual damages it sustained, for
which ultimately liability will fall on the government, it is obvious that this case has been converted technically into a suit
against the state.
As an unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own, the Bureau of Customs
enjoys immunity from suit. Along with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, it is invested with an inherent power of
sovereignty, namely, taxation. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs the governmental function of collecting
revenues which is definitely not a proprietary function.

HANGGANG DITO LANG PO TALAGA ANG NASEND. OR BAKA SAKIN LANG.

HEHE.