Tanada vs Cuenco, 103 Phil.

1051
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly
occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Taada
who belonged to the Citizens Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a
senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is
provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3
justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from
the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET
members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Taada assailed
this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the
SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party
will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members
of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it
is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET
is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Taada and Macapagal was not to raise
the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD:
No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question.
The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being
asked by Taada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by
Taada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid

which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from
the Senate which does not perform legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the
minority members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of
the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats
(even though those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the
majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the
Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such
rules comply with the Constitution.
SANIDAD VS COMELEC
73 SCRA 333; October 12, 1976
Ponente: Martin, J
FACTS:
On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October
16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners
contend that the president has no power to propose amendments to the new constitution, as such, the
referendum plebiscite has no legal basis.
ISSUE:
1. Is the case at bar justiciable?
2. Does the president have authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
sufficient and proper submission?
HELD:
The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a justiciable
question since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the president to perform such act
is in question. The president has the authority to propose amendments as the governmental powers
are generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis. The time for deliberation of the
referendum-plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too short especially since the questions are issues of
the day and the people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law
Daza vs Singson
FACTS:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally
apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in accordance with Article VI,
Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a

representative of the Liberal Party.

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political
realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis of this development, the House of
Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the
seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new
set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein
respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP.

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission
on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on
Appointments

HELD:

At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of

the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the
House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not
vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted
to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on
Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary

alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.

The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on
Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution.

TANADA v. ANGARA
October 26, 2012 Leave a comment

272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as
Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides
new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as
viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair
Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the
Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are
considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements
must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally
binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute
because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined
the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of
sovereignty as autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine
whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and
review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows
withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be
viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for
multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its
alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed,
through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

AYTONA VS CASTILLO
Posted by kaye lee on 11:22 PM
4 SCRA 1 G.R. No. L-19313 January 19 1962 [Midnight Appointment]
FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner
Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the
corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal
assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President
Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the
former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as
ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto) against
Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to
Castillo by the new President, should be considered void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.
RULING:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President
Garcia administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound
to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not
do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his
successor. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the
political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve
partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced
to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for
the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But
the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of
them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason,
be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being
apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and
other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make
the corresponding appointments.
OSMENA VS. PENDATUN

In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr. delivered a speech entitled A Message
to Garcia. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his
administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house
in order to investigate the charges made by Osmea during his speech and that if his
allegations were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary
actions by the lower house.
Osmea then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court.
Osmea avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches
delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he
averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has
the power to discipline its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary
immunity upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the
courts or any other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him
from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are

considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeas petition

is dismissed.

Case Digest: Vera vs Avelino

Facts of the Case:
The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress a
report regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason of certain
specified acts of terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely Pampanga, Nueva
Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the accurate feedback of
the local electorate.
During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to the
report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had been
included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes and as
proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members
of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against their election.
Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted the
resolution, praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to exercise
their senatorial duties. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.
Issues of the Case:
Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not
votes cast in the said provinces are valid.
Whether or Not the administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno
and Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged
against their elections.
Held:
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding
that the case was not a contest, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the legislature to
determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers assigned by the
Constitution, the question raised was political in nature and therefore not under the juridical
review of the courts
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION VS. COMELEC
140 SCRA 455
FACTS:
A number of petitions assailing the validity of B.P Blg. 883 calling for a special election for a President
and Vice-president on February 7, 1986. Marcos gave a conditional resignation where he shall vacate
the position only when a winner has been proclaimed and qualified by taking his oath 10 days after
the proclamation. Petitioners question the validity of Marcos resignation as it did not create the

vacancy needed for a special election to be held and pray for prohibition to acts in relation to B.P. Blg.
883
ISSUE:
Is the B.P Blg. 883 unconstitutional?
HELD:
The Court failed to have 10 votes to declare B.P. Blg. 883. Unconstitutional. Whereas the original
issue on B.P Blg. 883s constitutionality, the issue has now transformed into a political question where
only the sovereign people can decide in a fair, clean and honest election. As such, the Court
dismissed the petitions and denied their prayers of prohibition.

Romulo v. Yniguez Digest

Romulo v Yniguez
G.R. No. 71908 February 4, 1986
Patajo, J.:

Facts:
1.

Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the Batasan in

1985, filed with the Batasan Resolution No. 644 and complaint calling for the
impeachment of President Marcos. Said resolution and complaint were referred
by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government. The Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and
substance to warrant its further consideration and disapproved and dismissed all
the charges contained in the complaint attached. It then submitted its report
which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the archives.

2.

On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying
for the recall from the archives of Resolution No. 644 and the verified complaint
attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan.

3.

Hence, this petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from enforcing

Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings and mandamus to compel the Batasan Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the archives and report out
the resolution together with the verified complaint for the impeachment of the
President of the Philippines.Petitioner contend that said provisions are
unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of Article XI I of the 1973
Constitution, without complying with the mandatory amendatory process

provided for under Article XVI of the Constitution, by empowering a smaller body
to supplant and overrule the complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisite 1/5
of all the members of the Batasan Pambansa and that said questioned provisions
derail the impeachment proceedings at various stages by vesting the Committee
on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative
belongs solely to Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body.

4.

Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the Rules is unconstitutional

because it imposes an unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order
that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial before the Batasan. By
requiring a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for the approval of
the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose a
condition not required by the Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII
requires is the endorsement of at least one-fifth of all The members of the
Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings or for the impeachment
trial to proceed.

5.

Respondents Speaker and the Members of the Committee on Justice of the

Batasan Pambansa contend that that the petition should be dismissed because
(1) it is a suit against the Batasan itself over which this Court has no jurisdiction;
(2) it raises questions which are political in nature; (3) the Impeachment Rules
are strictly in consonance with the Constitution and even supposing without
admitting that the Rules are invalid, their invalidity would not nullify the
dismissal of the complaint for impeachment for the Batasan as a body sovereign
within its own sphere has the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint even
without the benefit of said Rules; and (4) the Court cannot by mandamus compel
the Batasan to give due course to the impeachment complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court can interfere with the

Batasans power of impeachment

NO.
1.

The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the

impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of
powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of
this Court to review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the
impeachment trial prayed for by petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as
a body of the resolution and complaint for impeachment makes irrelevant under
what authority the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government
had acted.

2. Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the Archives said
resolution and complaint for impeachment without revoking or rescinding the
action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for recall (which of course it had
no authority to do and, therefore, said Committee is in no position to comply with
any order from the Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the
Committee would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself.

3.

The Court held that if it has no authority to control the Philippine Senate, then it
does not have the authority to control the actions of subordinate employees
acting under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and
disbursing officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act
independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested, there
will be the spectacle presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeantat-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing, and
the Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing.

4.

The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the
person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it.
AVELINO VS. CUENCO

On February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate
floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested
to do so on the next session (Feb. 21, 1949). On the next session day however, Avelino
delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by
Taada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to
open session. He however, together with his allies initiated all dilatory and delaying
tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al
were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad,
among others, as being out of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session
due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested the said
adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left
his chair and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Tomas Cabili then
stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President
Pro-tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the
session in order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Taada was subsequently
recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68)
that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and
was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took

his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC
to declare him as the rightful Senate President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: No. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the
case. This is in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy
and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which
power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should
abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or
reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of
the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall
not in the Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation
of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by
leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al) twelve senators from passing a
resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different
had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen.
Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session
(presided by Avelino)? Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum
constituting such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the
minutes entered into the journal. There were 23 senators considered to be in session
that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a
majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean all the
members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the House. There is a
difference between a majority of all the members of the House and a majority of the
House, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority
(12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of
the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not
constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent
members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and

Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be
eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case
and that they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right
or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was
elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being
confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does
it change the majority which if mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of
24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected
unanimously there was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in
the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees
with the result of the majoritys pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that,
under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that
regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new
session with a quorum would result in Cuencos election as Senate President, and that
the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy
such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group,
but to no avail, because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues to
constitutional processes. For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has
done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majoritys ruling
is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest.
Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is
dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that the majority of all the
members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the fact that
said provision was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of
each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, shows the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or
provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this
must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their
duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the
house or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned
impossible, even through coercive process which each house is empowered to
issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a

quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a
mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words of all the members as
unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution
which required concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly to
expel a member was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so
as to require the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House.
Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the
jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February
21, 1949, were twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

MERALCO vs. PASAY TRANS

ENDENCIA VS DAVID
Posted by kaye lee on 10:03 PM
93 Phil 696 August 31 1953 [Salaries of Judges Tax Exemption]
FACTS:
Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and
Jugos salaries. A case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the
constitution, it shows that judicial officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries
and thus considered that the deduction of salaries from the said judges as a violation
from the compensation received by judicial officers.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.
RULING:
No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in judicial
officers is considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the
Constitution. The compensation shall not be diminished during their continuance of their
service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary received by any public officer of the
republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is in
contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided