Laurel v Desierto digest

Laurel v. Desierto
GR No. 145368, April 12, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National Centennial Commission, a body constituted for the
preparation of the National Centennial celebration in 1998. He was subsequently appointed as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was
one of the nine (9) incorporators. A controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts to some entities and the
petitioner was implicated. By virtue of an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner was indicted for
alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, which was denied. He further filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied,
hence this petition for certiorari.
The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a public officer since ExpoCorp is a private
corporation.
Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public officer
Yes, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public officer. The NCC is an office performing
executive functions since one of its mandate is to implement national policies. Moreover, the said office was established by virtue of an
executive order. It is clear that the NCC performs sovereign functions, hence it is a public office. Since petitioner is chair of the NCC, he
is therefore a public officer. The fact that the NCC was characterized by EO 128 as an 'ad-hoc body' make it less of a public office.
Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of no consequence since such is merely an
incidence and forms no part of the office.
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring
at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer (Mechem).

RENATO M. LAPINID VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY AND JUANITO JUNSAY
G.R. No. 96298, May 14, 1991
CRUZ, J.

FACTS
On October 1, 1988, Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the
Manila International Container Terminal. Lapinids appointment was protested by private respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his
earlier representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a review of the decision of the Placement Committee
dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his
preferential right thereto. On June 26, 1989, Junsay went to the Civil Service Commission and challenged Lapinid's appointment on the
same grounds he had earlier raised before the PPA complaining that the PPA had not acted on his protest.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Commission finds the appeal meritorious. It is thus obvious that Protestants
Junsay (79.5) and Villegas (79) have an edge over that of protestees Lapinid (75) and Dulfo (78).

Lapinid, who claimed he had not been informed of the appeal and had not been heard thereon, filed a motion for reconsideration on
March 19, 1990. This was denied on May 25, 1990. The Philippine Ports Authority also filed its own motion for reconsideration on June
19, 1990, which was denied on August 17, 1990. A second motion for reconsideration filed on September 14, 1990, based on the reappreciation of Lapinid's rating from 75% to 84%, was also denied on October 19, 1990.

On the premises considered, it is directed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as Terminal Supervisor
(SG 18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo respectively who may be considered for appointment to any position
commensurate and suitable to their qualifications, and that the Commission be notified within ten (10) days of the implementation
hereof.

ISSUE:
Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better
qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?

RULING:
In Luego v. Civil Service Commission the Court declared:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights,
the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

Only recently, in Gaspar v. Court of Appeals, the Court said:

The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases of this nature, according to Luego, is to review the appointment in the light
of the requirements of the Civil Service Law, and when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal requirements have been
otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the appointment. Luego finally points out that the recognition by the Commission
that both the appointee and the protestant are qualified for the position in controversy renders it functus officio in the case and prevents
it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the former's appointment; it has no authority to revoke the appointment
simply because it considers another employee to be better qualified for that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested
in the appointing authority.

Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in proper cases be the
subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the appointee - taking into account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract
qualities that define his personality - is the prerogative of the appointing authority. This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of
the appointing authority. It is a political question that the Civil Service Commission has no power to review under the Constitution and
the applicable laws.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the respondent dated February 14, 1990, May 25, 1990, August 17, 1990,
and October 19, 1990, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order dated December 13, 1990, is made
PERMANENT. No costs.

Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

G.R. No.119976
September 18, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the
COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. Private respondent contended that
petitioner lacked the Constitution's one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution
Ratio Decidendi:

Yes. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her
own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a
minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioners domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought
the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and
positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically
gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner
married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d)
even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband
died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice.

AKBAYAN-Youth vs Commission on Election

On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of the registration of voters for the
May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21
be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued
COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4 million youth
who were not able to register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no
registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of
Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts
including voters registration if the original period is not observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of the voters registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that
no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated
by measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power,
may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and
peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly
constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the
day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189s provision is explicit as to the
prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will
substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the additional voters from the special two day registration will
have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized
voters list; and then they will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update and distribute it by that time, the May 14,
2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special registration. In short, it will cost more
inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYANYouths pleading was attached any actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that
the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are asking an

extension because they failed to register on time for some reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not
those who slumber on their rights.

FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC (1996)

G.R. No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his citizenship. He then petitioned for
repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was able to take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based on his previous attempts to run as governor and
acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee, who got the second highest number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldos repatriation was valid.
HELD:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative nature of Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation
retroacted to the date of the filing of his application to run for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by repatriation
under Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if
the application is approved. It is only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not
have explicitly provided otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.