Greco-Italian War

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Greco-Italian War
Part of the Balkans Campaign of World War II

Greek newspaper announcing the war

Date
Location
Result

28 October 1940 23 April 1941

(5 months, 3 weeks and 5 days)
Southern Balkan Peninsula
See Aftermath section

Belligerents
Italy

Greece
Albania

British
Empire air support

Commanders and leaders

Benito Mussolini(Prime
Minister of Italy)

Ioannis Metaxas (Prime

Minister of Greece)

Sebastiano Visconti

Alexander

Prasca (Commander in Chiefto Papagos(commander-in-chief

9 November)

of the Hellenic Army)

Ubaldo Soddu (C-in-C to

mid-December)

John
D'Albiac(commander of RAF

Ugo Cavallero (C-in-C

in Greece)

from mid-December)

Strength
87,000 rising to 565,000 men

Fewer than 260,000 men

463 aircraft

79 aircraft

163 light tanks

Casualties and losses

13,325 killed

13,755 killed

42,485 wounded

50,874 wounded

1,237 missing

3,914 missing

1,531 POW

21,153 POW
Total combat losses: 89,696

Total combat losses: 58,578

? sick

52,108 sick

c.25,000 frostbite cases

12,368 frostbite cases

52 aircraft

64 aircraft (another 24

1 submarine

claimed)

General total: 90,000+

1 submarine
30,000 long tons of shipping
General total: 154,172

[show]

Balkan Campaign

[show]

Greco-Italian War
The Greco-Italian War (Italo-Greek War, Italian Campaign in Greece; in Greece: War of
'40 and Epic of '40), took place between the Kingdoms of Italy and Greece from 28 October
1940 to 23 April 1941. This local war began the Balkans Campaign of World War II between
the Axis powers and the Allies. It turned into the Battle of
Greecewhen British and German ground forces intervened early in 1941.
In the mid-1930s, the Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini began an aggressive foreign
policy and annexed Albania in the spring of 1939. World War II began on 3 September 1939
and on 10 June 1940, Italy declared war on the Allies, invaded France, British
Somaliland and Egypt by September and prepared to occupy Greece. In the late 1930s the
Greeks had begun the Metaxas Line opposite Bulgaria and from 1939 had accelerated
defensive preparations against an Italian attack from Albania. In 1940, there was a hostile
press campaign in Italy and other provocations culminating in the sinking of the Greek light
cruiser Elli by the Italians on 15 August, (the ChristianDormition of the Mother of
God festival). On 28 October, Mussolini issued an ultimatum to Greece demanding the
cession of Greek territory, which the Prime Minister of Greece, Ioannis Metaxas, rejected.
The Italian army invaded Greece on 28 October before the Italian ultimatum expired. The
invasion began disastrously, the 140,000 troops of the Italian Army in Albania being poorly
led and equipped, and having to cope with the mountainous terrain on the AlbanianGreek
border and tenacious resistance by the Greek Army. By mid-November the Greek army had
stopped the Italian invasion just inside Greek territory, and counter-attacked, pushing the
Italians back into Albania, culminating with the Capture of Klisura Pass in January 1941. The
Italian defeat and the Greek counter-offensive of 1940 have been called the first "first Axis
setback of the entire war" by Mark Mazower, the Greeks "surprising everyone with the
tenacity of their resistance". After reinforcing the Albanian front to 28 divisions, the Italians
conducted a spring offensive in 1941, which also failed and by February there was a
stalemate.
In the spring of 1941, the failure of the Italian counter-offensive and the arrival of British
ground forces in Greece led the Germans to invade on 6 April. During the Battle of Greece,
Greek and British forces in northern Greece were overwhelmed and the Germans advanced
rapidly into Greece. In Albania, the Greek army made a belated withdrawal to avoid being cut
off by the Germans, was followed up slowly by the Italians and surrendered to German
troops on 20 April 1941 (then to Italy for propaganda reasons several days later). Greece
was occupied by Bulgarian, German and Italian troops. The Italian army suffered 154,172
casualties from all causes and the Greek army about 90,000 losses. The economic and
military failings of the Italian Fascist regime were exposed by the Greek dbcle and defeats
against the British in Africa, which reduced the Italian fascist regime to dependence on
Germany.
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1Background
1.1Italian imperialism
1.2GreekItalian relations in the interwar period
1.3Prelude to war, 193940
2Opposing plans
2.1Italy
2.2Greece
3Orders of battle
3.1Italy
3.2Greece
3.3Britain
4Campaign
4.1Italian offensive (28 October 13 November 1940)
4.2Greek counter-offensive (14 November 1940 6 January 1941)
4.3End of the Greek offensive (6 January 6 April 1941)
4.4Italian Spring Offensive
4.5German invasion
5Sea and air campaign
5.1Naval operations
5.2Air operations
6Home front
6.1Greece
6.2Italy
6.3Albania
7Aftermath
7.1Analysis
7.2Casualties
7.3Occupation
8Notes
9Footnotes
10References
11Further reading
12See also
13External links

Background
Italian imperialism
Main article: Imperial Italy (fascist)

Imperial ambitions of Fascist Italy in Europe in 1936 (click to enlarge)

In the late 1920s, the Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini said that Fascist
Italy needed Spazio vitale, an outlet for its surplus population and that it would be in the best
interests of other countries to aid in this expansion.[1] The regime wanted hegemony in
the MediterraneanDanubianBalkan region and Mussolini imagined the conquest "of an
empire stretching from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Strait of Hormuz".[2] There were designs
for a protectorate over Albania and for the annexation of Dalmatia and economic and military
control of Yugoslavia and Greece. The fascist regime also sought to establish protectorates
over Austria,Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, which lay on the periphery of an Italian
European sphere of influence.[3]
In 1935, Italy began the Second Italo-Ethiopian War to expand the empire; a more
aggressive Italian foreign policy which "exposed [the] vulnerabilities" of
the British and French and created an opportunity for the Fascist regime needed to realize its
imperial goals.[4][5] In 1936, the Spanish Civil War began and Italy made a military contribution
so vast that it played a decisive role in the victory of the rebel forces of Francisco Franco.
[6]
"A full-scale external war" was fought for Spanish subservience to the Italian Empire, to
place Italy on a war footing, and to create "a warrior culture". [7]
In September 1938, the Italian army had made plans to invade Albania, which began on 7
April 1939 and in three days had occupied most of the country. Albania was a territory that
Italy could acquire for "living space to ease its overpopulation" as well as a foothold for
expansion in the Balkans.[8] During 1940, Italy invaded France and Egypt.[9] A plan to invade
Yugoslavia was drawn up, but postponed due to opposition fromNazi Germany and a lack of
Italian army transport.[10]

GreekItalian relations in the interwar period

Eleftherios Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece (various terms 19101933)

Italy had captured the predominantly Greek-inhabited Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean
Sea from the Ottoman Empire in the Italo-Turkish War of 1912. It had occupied them since,
after reneging on the 1919 VenizelosTittoni agreement to cede them to Greece.[11] When the
Italians found that Greece had been promised land in Anatolia at the Paris Peace
Conference, 1919, for aid in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War,
the Italian delegation withdrew from the conference for several months. Italy occupied parts

of Anatoliawhich threatened the Greek occupation zone and the city of Smyrna. Greek troops
were landed and the Greco-Turkish War (191922) began with Greek troops advanced into
Anatolia. Turkish forces eventually defeated the Greeks and with Italian aid, recovered the
lost territory, including Smyrna.[12] In 1923, Mussolini used the murder of an Italian general on
the Greco-Albanian border as a pretext to bombard and temporarily occupy Corfu, the most
important of the Ionian Islands.[13]
The Greek defeat in Anatolia and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) ended the
expansionist Megali Idea. Henceforth Greek foreign policy was largely aimed at preserving
the status quo. Territorial claims to Northern Epirus (southern Albania), the Italian-ruled
Dodecanese, and British-ruled Cyprus remained open but inactive in view of the country's
weakness and isolation. The main threat Greece faced was from Bulgaria, which claimed
Greece's northern territories. The years after 1923 were marked by almost complete
diplomatic isolation and unresolved disputes with practically every neighbouring country.
[14]
The dictatorship of Theodoros Pangalos in 192526 sought to revise the Treaty of
Lausanne by a war with Turkey. To this end, Pangalos sought Italian diplomatic support, as
Italy still had ambitions in Anatolia, but in the event, nothing came of his overtures to
Mussolini.[15] After the fall of Pangalos and the restoration of relative political stability in 1926,
efforts were undertaken to normalize relations with Turkey, Yugoslavia, Albania and
Romania, without much success at first. The same period saw Greece draw closer to Britain
and away from France, exacerbated by a dispute over the two sides' financial claims from
World War I.[16]
The Greek government put renewed emphasis on improving relations with Italy and in
November 1926, a trade agreement was signed between the two states. Initiated and
energetically pursued by Andreas Michalakopoulos, the ItalianGreek rapprochement had a
positive impact on Greek relations with Romania and Turkey and after 1928 was continued
by the new government of Eleftherios Venizelos.[17] This policy culminated with the signing of
a treaty of friendship on 23 September 1928. [18][19] Mussolini exploited this treaty, as it aided in
his efforts to diplomatically isolate Yugoslavia from potential Balkan allies. An offer of alliance
between the two countries was rebuffed by Venizelos but during the talks Mussolini
personally offered "to guarantee Greek sovereignty" on Macedonia and assured Venizelos
that in case of an external attack onThessaloniki by Yugoslavia, Italy would join Greece.[19][20][21]
During the late 1920s and early 1930s, Mussolini sought diplomatically to create "an Italiandominated Balkan bloc that would link Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, and Hungary". Venizelos
countered the policy with diplomatic agreements among Greek neighbours and established
an "annual Balkan conference ... to study questions of common interest, particularly of an
economic nature, with the ultimate aim of establishing some kind of regional union". This
increased diplomatic relations and by 1934 was resistant to "all forms of territorial
revisionism".[22] Venizelos adroitly maintained a principle of "open diplomacy" and was careful
not to alienate traditional Greek patrons in Britain and France. [23] The Greco-Italian friendship
agreement ended Greek diplomatic isolation and led to a series of bilateral agreements,
most notably the Greco-Turkish Friendship Convention in 1930. This process culminated in
the signature of the Balkan Pact between Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Romania, which
was a counter to Bulgarian revisionism. [24]
The Second Italo-Ethiopian War marked a renewal of Italian expansionism, and began a
period where Greece increasingly sought a firm British commitment for its security. Although
Britain offered guarantees to Greece (as well as Turkey and Yugoslavia) for the duration of
the Ethiopian crisis, it was unwilling to commit itself further so as to avoid limiting its freedom
of manoeuvre vis--vis Italy.[25] Furthermore, with the (British-backed) restoration of the Greek
monarchy in 1935 in the person of the anglophile KingGeorge II, Britain had secured its

dominant influence in the country. This did not change after the establishment of the
dictatorial 4th of August Regime of Ioannis Metaxas in 1936. Although imitating the Fascist
regime in Italy in its ideology and outward appearance, the regime lacked a mass popular
base, and its main pillar was the King, who commanded the allegiance of the army.[26] Greek
foreign policy thus remained aligned with that of Britain, despite the parallel ever-growing
economic penetration of the country by Nazi Germany. Metaxas himself, although an
ardent Germanophile in World War I, followed this line, and after the Munich Conference in
October 1938 suggested a BritishGreek alliance to the British ambassador, arguing that
Greece "should prepare for the eventuality of a war between Great Britain and Italy, which
sooner or later Greece would find itself drawn into". Loath to be embroiled in a possible
GreekBulgarian war, dismissive of Greece's military ability, and disliking the regime, the
British rebuffed the offer.[27]

Prelude to war, 193940

Benito Mussolini, Prime Minister of Italy

On 4 February 1939, Mussolini addressed the Fascist Grand Council on foreign policy. The
speech outlined Mussolini's belief that Italy was being imprisoned by France and the United
Kingdom and what territory would be needed to break free. During this speech, Mussolini
declared Greece to be a "vital [enemy] of Italy and its expansion." [28] On 18 March, as signs
for an imminent Italian invasion of Albania as well as a possible attack on Corfu mounted,
Metaxas wrote in his diary of his determination to resist any Italian attack. [29]
Following the Italian annexation of Albania in April, relations between Italy and Greece
deteriorated rapidly. The Greeks began making defensive preparations for an Italian attack,
while the Italians began improving infrastructure in Albania to facilitate troop movements.
[30]
Tensions mounted as a result of a continued anti-Greek campaign in the Italian press,
combined with provocative Italian actions. Thus during Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano's
visit to Albania, posters supporting Albanian irredentism in Chameria were publicly displayed;
the governor of the Italian Dodecanese, Cesare Maria De Vecchi, closed the remaining
Greek communal schools in the province, and Italian troops were heard singing "Andremo
nell'Egeo, prenderemo pure il Pireo. E, se tutto va bene, prenderemo anche Atne." (We go
to the Aegean, and will take even Piraeus. And if all goes well, we will take Athens too.").
Four of the five Italian divisions in Albania moved towards the Greek border, and on 16
August the Italian Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, received orders to

begin planning for an attack on Greece. On 4 August, Metaxas had ordered Greek forces to
a state of readiness and a partial mobilization.[31][32]
Although both Britain and France publicly guaranteed the independence of Greece and
Romania on 13 April 1939, the British still refused to be drawn into concrete undertakings
towards Greece, as they hoped to entice Mussolini to remain neutral in the coming conflict
with Germany, and saw in a potential Greek alliance only a drain on their own resources.
[33]
With British encouragement, Metaxas made diplomatic overtures to Italy in August, and on
12 September, Mussolini wrote to Metaxas, assuring him that if he entered the war, Italy
would respect Greek neutrality, and that Italian troops based in Albania would be pulled back
about 20 miles (32 km) from the Greek border. The Italian dictator even instructed the
ambassador to Greece, Emanuele Grazzi, to express his trust towards Metaxas and offer to
sell Greece aircraft.[34][35] On 20 September, the Italians offered to formalize relations by
renewing the 1928 treaty. Metaxas rejected this, as the British Foreign Office was opposed to
a formal commitment by Greece to Italy, and made only a public declaration of friendship and
good-will. GreekItalian relations entered a friendly phase that lasted until spring 1940. [36][37]
In May, as Italian entry into the war became imminent, the Italian press began an antiGreek propaganda campaign, accusing the country of being a foreign puppet and tolerating
British warships in its waters.[38] Following the defeat of France, GreekItalian relations
deteriorated further. From 18 June, De Vecchi sent a series of protests to Rome, reporting on
the presence of British warships in Crete and other Greek islands and claimed that a British
base had been established at Milos.[39] The allegations were overblown but not entirely
unjustified: in January 1940, bowing to British pressure, Greece concluded a trade
agreement with Britain, limiting its exports to Germany and allowing Britain to use the large
Greek merchant fleet for its war effort, marking Greece a tacit member of the anti-Axis camp,
despite its official neutrality.[40] British warships did sail deep into the Aegean, leading the
British ambassador in Athens to recommend, on 17 August, that the government put a stop
to them.[41]
Italian military forces harassed Greek forces with air attacks on Greek naval vessels at sea.
[42]
On 12 July, while attacking a British petrol carrier off Crete, Italian aircraft based in the
Dodecanese went on to bombard Greek warships in harbour at Kissamos. On 31 July Italian
bombers attacked two Greek destroyers in the Gulf of Corinth and two submarines
in Nafpaktos; two days later a coastguard vessel was attacked at Aegina, off Athens.[43][44] On
11 August, orchestrated by Ciano and the Italian viceroy in Albania,Francesco Jacomoni, the
Italian and Albanian press began a campaign against Greece, on the pretext of the murder of
the bandit Daut Hodja in June. Hodja was presented as a patriot fighting for the liberty of
Chameria and his murder the work of Greek agents. Although Greek "expansionism" was
denounced and claims for the surrender of Chameria made, Ciano and well-informed
German sources regarded the press campaign as a means to intimidate Greece, rather than
a prelude to war.[45][46]
On 15 August 1940 (the Dormition of the Theotokos, a Greek national religious holiday), the
Greek light cruiser Elli was sunk by the Italian submarine Delfino in Tinosharbour. The
sinking was a result of orders by Mussolini and Navy chief Domenico Cavagnari allowing
submarine attacks on neutral shipping. This was taken up by De Vecchi, who ordered
the Delfino's commander to "sink everything in sight in the vicinity of Tinos and Syros", giving
the impression that war was imminent. On the same day, another Greek steamship was
bombarded by Italian planes in Crete.[47][48] Despite evidence of Italian responsibility, the Greek
government announced that the attack had been carried out by a submarine of unknown
nationality. No-one was fooled and the sinking of Elli outraged the Greek people.
Ambassador Grazzi wrote in his memoirs that the attack united a people "deeply riven by

unbridgeable political differences and old and deep-running political hatreds" and imbued
them with a firm resolve to resist.[49] German intervention, urging Italy to avoid Balkan
complications and concentrate on Britain, led to the postponement of Italian ambitions in
Greece and Yugoslavia.[50] On 7 October, German troops entered Romania, to guard
the Ploieti oil fields and prepare for Operation Barbarossa. Mussolini, who had not been
informed in advance, regarded it as an encroachment on Italy's sphere of influence, and
advanced plans for an invasion of Greece.[51][52]

Opposing plans
Italy
The Italian war aim was to establish a Greek puppet state, which would permit the Italian
annexation of the Ionian Islands and the Sporades and the Cyclades islands in theAegean
sea, to be administered as a part of the Italian Aegean Islands.[53] The islands were claimed
on the basis that they had once belonged to the Venetian Republic and the Venetian client
state of Naxos.[54] The Epirus and Acarnania regions were to be separated from the rest of
the Greek territory and the Italian-controlled Kingdom of Albania was to annex territory
between the Greek north-western frontier and a line
from Florina to Pindus, Arta and Preveza.[55] The Italians intended to partly compensate
Greece for its extensive territorial losses by allowing it to annex the British Crown
Colony of Cyprus after the war.[56]

Marshal Pietro Badoglio,Chief of Staff of the Italian military since 1925

On 13 October, Mussolini finalized the decision for war when he informed Marshal Badoglio
to start preparing an attack for 26 October. Badoglio then issued the order for the Italian
military to begin preparations for executing the existing war plan, "Contingency G[reece]",
which envisioned the capture of Epirus as far as Arta but left the further pursuit of the
campaign open.[57] On the next day, Badoglio and acting Army Chief of Staff Mario Roatta met
with Mussolini, who announced that his objective was the capture of the entire country and
that he would contact Bulgaria for a joint operation. Roatta advised that an extension of the
invasion beyond Epirus would require an additional ten divisions, which would take three
months to arrive and suggested limiting the extent of the Italian demobilization. Both

generals urged Mussolini to replace the local commander, Lieutenant-General Sebastiano

Visconti Prasca, with someone of greater seniority and experience. Mussolini seemingly
agreed but also insisted on the attack going ahead at the determined date, provisionally
under Prasca's command.[58]Badoglio and Roatta seemed unconvinced that the operation
would take place, as with similar projects against Greece and Yugoslavia. [59]
The following day Mussolini called another conference, with Badoglio, Roatta, Visconti
Prasca, Ciano, and Jacomoni. He reiterated his objectives and his determination that the
attack take place on 26 October and asked for the opinion of the assembled. Jacomoni
agreed that the Albanians were enthusiastic but that the Greeks would fight, likely with British
help, while Ciano suggested that the Greek people were apathetic and would not support the
"plutocratic" ruling class.[60] Prasca offered assurances that the operation was as perfectly
planned as "humanly possible", and promised to finish off the Greek forces in Epirus (which
he estimated at 30,000 men) and capture the port of Preveza in ten to fifteen days. [61]
[62]
Prasca regarded the campaign as an opportunity to win fame and achieve the coveted
rank of Marshal of Italy by conquering Athens. He was relatively junior in his rank and knew
that if he demanded more troops for the Albanian front, it was likely that a more senior officer
would be sent to command the operation, earning the accolades and promotions instead. [63]
During the discussion only Badoglio voiced objections, pointing out that stopping after
seizing Epiruswhich he conceded would present little difficultywould be an error, and that
a force of at least twenty divisions would be necessary to conquer the whole country,
including Crete. Roatta suggested that the schedule of moving troops to Albania would have
to be accelerated and called for two divisions to be sent against Thessaloniki as a diversion.
Prasca pointed out the inadequacy of Albanian harbours for the rapid transfer of Italian
divisions, the mountainous terrain, and the poor state of the Greek transport network, but
remained confident that Athens could be captured after the fall of Epirus, with "five or six
divisions".[64] The meeting ended with an outline plan, summed up by Mussolini as "offensive
in Epirus; observation and pressure on Salonika, and, in a second phase, march on Athens".
[65]
The staging of incidents at the border to provide a suitable pretext (analogous to
the Gleiwitz incident) was agreed for 24 October. Mussolini suggested that the expected
advance of the 10th Army (Marshal Rodolfo Graziani) on Mersa Matruh, in Egypt, be brought
forward to prevent the British from aiding Greece. [61] Over the next couple of days Badoglio
failed to elicit objections to the attack from the other service chiefs or to achieve its
cancellation on technical grounds. Mussolini, enraged by the Marshal's obstructionism,
threatened to accept his resignation if offered. Badoglio backed down, managing only to
secure a postponement of the attack until 28 October.[66]

Pindus mountains outlined

The front was roughly 150 kilometres (93 mi) wide in mountain terrain with very few roads.
The Pindus mountains divided it into two theatres of operations, Epirus and western
Macedonia.[67][verification needed] The Italian forces in Albania were organised accordingly:
the XXV Ciamuria Corps (Lieutenant-General Carlo Rossi (it)) in the west was charged with
the conquest of Epirus, while the XXVI Corizza Corps (Lieutenant-General Gabriele Nasci) in
the east, around Kor, would initially remain passive in the direction of western Macedonia.
[68]

On 18 October Mussolini sent a letter to Tsar Boris III of Bulgaria inviting him to take part in
the coming action against Greece, but Boris refused, citing his country's unreadiness and its
encirclement by hostile neighbours.[69] This was not regarded as a major setback, as the
Italian leadership considered that the threat of Bulgarian intervention alone would compel the
Greek High Command to commit most of its army in eastern Macedonia and Thrace. It was
not until 24 October that Badoglio realized that not only were the Greeks already mobilizing,
but that they were prepared to divert most of their forces to Epirus, leaving only six divisions
against Bulgaria.[69] Prasca would still have numerical superiority at the start of the campaign
(some 150,000 men against 120,000) but concerns grew over the vulnerability of the left
flank. The 29th Division Piemonte was diverted from the attack in Epirus to bolster XXVI
Corps in the Kor area, while the 19th Infantry Division Venezia was ordered south from its
position along the Yugoslav border.[70]
In 1936 General Alberto Pariani had been appointed Chief of Staff of the army, and had
begun a reorganisation of divisions to fight wars of rapid decision, according to thinking that
speed, mobility and new technology could revolutionise military operations. In 1937, threeregiment (triangular) divisions began to change to two-regiment (binary divisions), as part of
a ten years plan to reorganise the standing army into 24 binary, 24 triangular, twelve
mountain, three motorised and three armoured divisions. [71]The effect of the change was to
increase the administrative overhead of the army, with no corresponding increase in
effectiveness, as the new technology of tanks, motor vehicles, and wireless communications
was slow to arrive and was inferior to that of potential enemies. The dilution of the officer
class by the need for extra unit staffs was made worse by the politicisation of the army and
the addition of Blackshirt Militia.[72] The reforms also promoted frontal assaults to the
exclusion of other theories, dropping the previous emphasis on fast mobile warfare backed
by artillery.[73]
Prior to the invasion Mussolini let 300,000 troops and 600,000 reservists go home for the
harvest.[34] There were supposed to be 1,750 lorries used in the invasion but only 107 arrived.
The possibility that Greek officials situated in the front area could be corrupted or would not
react to an invasion proved to be mostly wishful thinking, used by Italian generals and
personalities in favor of a military intervention; the same was true for an alleged revolt of the
Albanian minority living in Chameria, located in the Greek territory immediately behind the
boundary, which would break out after the beginning of the attack. [34]
On the eve of 28 October 1940, Italy's ambassador in Athens, Emanuele Grazzi, handed an
ultimatum from Mussolini to Metaxas. It demanded free passage for his troops to occupy
unspecified strategic points inside Greek territory. Greece had been friendly towards Nazi
Germany, profiting from mutual trade relations, but now Germany's ally, Italy, intended to
invade Greece. Metaxas rejected the ultimatum with the words "Alors, c'est la
guerre" (French for "then it is war."). In this, he echoed the will of the Greek people to resist,
a will that was popularly expressed in one word: "ochi" () (Greek for "no"). Within hours,
Italy attacked Greece from Albania. The outbreak of hostilities was first announced by Athens

Radio early in the morning of 28 October, with the two-sentence dispatch of the general staff,
[citation needed]

Since 05:30 this morning, the enemy is attacking our vanguard on the Greek-Albanian
border. Our forces are defending the fatherland.
Greek General Staff, 28 October 1940

Greece

Alexandros Papagos, commander of the Greek Army

In 1936, the 4th of August Regime came to power in Greece, under the leadership of Ioannis
Metaxas. Plans were laid down for the reorganization of the Greek armed forces, including
building the "Metaxas Line'", a defensive fortification along the Greco-Bulgarian frontier.
Large sums of money were spent to re-equip the army but due to the increasing threat of
and the eventual outbreak of war, the most significant foreign purchases from 19381939,
were only partly delivered or not at all. A massive contingency plan was developed and great
amounts of food and equipment were stockpiled in many parts of the country as a precaution
in the event of war. After the Italian occupation of Albania in spring 1939, the Greek General
Staff prepared the "IB" (Italy-Bulgaria) plan, anticipating a combined offensive by Italy and
Bulgaria. Given the overwhelming superiority of such an alliance in manpower and matriel,
the plan prescribed a purely defensive strategy, including the gradual retreat of the Greek
forces in Epirus to the Arachthos RiverMetsovoAliakmon RiverMt. Vermion line, to gain
time for the completion of mobilization. [74]
With the completion of partial mobilization of the frontier formations, the plan was revised
with variants "IBa" (1 September 1939) and "IBb" (20 April 1940). These modified the role of
the main Greek force in the region, the 8th Infantry Division (Major-General Charalambos
Katsimitros). Plan "IB" foresaw it covering the left flank of the bulk of the Greek forces in
western Macedonia, securing the Metsovon pass and blocking entry into Aetolia-Acarnania,
"IBa" ordered the covering of Ioannina and the defence of the Kalamas river line. Katsimitros
had discretion to choose the defensive line and chose the Kalpaki line, which lay astride the
main invasion axis from Albania and allowed him to use the Kalamas swamps to neutralize
the Italian tank threat.[75] The Greek General Staff remained focused on Bulgaria as its main
potential enemy: of the 851 million drachmas spent on fortification between April 1939 and
October 1940, only 82 million went to the Albanian frontier and the rest on the Metaxas Line
and other works in the north-east.[76]

Orders of battle

Italy
In the Epirus sector, the XXV Ciamuria Corps consisted of the 23rd Infantry
Division Ferrara (12,785 men, 60 guns and 3,500 Albanian auxiliary troops), the 51st Infantry
Division Siena (9,200 men and 50 guns) and the 131st Armoured Division Centauro (4,037
men, 24 guns and 163 light tanks, of which only 90 operational). In addition, it was reinforced
by cavalry units in a brigade-level command operating on the extreme Italian right along the
coast (4,823 men and 32 guns). The XXV Corps comprised 22 infantrybattalions, three
cavalry regiments, 61 artillery batteries (18 heavy) and 90 tanks. Along
with Blackshirt battalions and auxiliary troops, it numbered c.42,000 men.
[77]
XXVICorizza Corps in the Kor area comprised the 29th Infantry
Division Piemonte (9,300 men and 32 guns), and the 49th Infantry Division Parma (12,000
men and 60 guns). In addition, the Corps comprised the Venezia Division (10,000
men and 40 guns), moving south from its deployment along the Yugoslav frontier
between Lake Prespa andElbasan, and was later reinforced with the 53rd Infantry
Division Arezzo (12,000 men and 32 guns) around Shkodr. XXVI Corps totalled 32
infantry battalions, about ten tanks and two cavalry companies, 68 batteries (7 heavy) for a
total of c.44,000 men.[78] The elite 3rd Alpine Division Julia with (10,800 men and 29
guns), was placed between the corps to cover the advance of XXV Corps along the Pindus
mountains.[79] The Regia Aeronautica had 380 aircraft available for operations against
Greece.[80]

Greece

A Greek woman sees her son depart for the Albanian front.

On 28 October, the Greek army had 14 infantry divisions, one cavalry division and three
infantry brigades, all at least partly mobilized since August; four infantry divisions and two
brigades were on the border with Albania; five infantry divisions faced Bulgaria and five more
with the cavalry division were in general reserve. [81] Greek army divisions were triangular and
held up to50 per cent more infantry than the Italian binary divisions, with slightly more
medium artillery and machine-guns but no tanks.[82]Most Greek equipment was still of First
World War issue, from countries like Belgium, Austria, Poland and France, all of which were
under Axis occupation, cutting off the supply of spare parts and ammunition. Many senior
Greek officers were veterans of a decade of almost continuous warfare, including the Balkan
Wars of 191213, the First World War, and the Greco-Turkish War of 191922.[citation needed]
In Epirus, the 8th Infantry Division was already mobilized and reinforced with a regiment and
the staff of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, fielding 15 infantry battalions and 16 artillery batteries. At
the time of the Italian attack, the 2/39 Evzone Regiment was moving north
from Missolonghi to reinforce the division.[77] The western Macedonia sector was held by
the Western Macedonia Army Section (TSDM), based at Kozani (Lieutenant-General Ioannis
Pitsikas), with the II Army Corps (Lieutenant-General Dimitrios Papadopoulos) and III Army
Corps (Lieutenant-General Georgios Tsolakoglou), each of two infantry divisions and an
infantry brigade. The total forces available to TSDM on the outbreak of war consisted of 22
infantry battalions and 22 artillery batteries (seven heavy). The Pindus sector was covered
by the "Pindus Detachment" ( ) (Colonel Konstantinos Davakis) with two
battalions, a cavalry company and 1.5 artillery batteries.[79]
The Royal Hellenic Air Force (Ellinik Vasilik Aeropora, RHAF) had to face the numerically
and technologically superior Regia Aeronautica. It comprised 45 fighters,24 light bombers,

nine reconnaissance aircraft, about 65 auxiliary aeroplanes and 28 naval cooperation

aircraft. It consisted of the 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 24th pursuit squadrons, the 31st, 32nd, 33rd
bomber squadrons, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th military cooperation squadrons, the 2828
Independent Military Cooperation Flight and the 11th, 12th and 13th naval cooperation
squadrons. At the outbreak of the war the operational combat fleet of the Greek Air Force
counted 24 PZL P.24 and nine Bloch MB.151 fighters, as well as eleven Bristol Blenheim Mk
IV, ten Fairey Battle B.1 and eight Potez 633 B2 bombers.[83] Serviceable ground attack and
naval support aircraft included about nine Breguet 19two-seater biplane bombers,
15 Henschel Hs 126 reconnaissance and observation aircraft, 17 Potez 25A observation
aircraft, nine Fairey III amphibious reconnaissance aircraft, 12 Dornier Do 22G torpedo
bombers, and 9 Avro Anson maritime reconnaissance aircraft.[84] The main air bases were
located in Sedes, Larissa, Dekeleia, Faleron,Eleusis, Nea Anchialos and Maleme.[83]
The Royal Hellenic Navy had the elderly cruiser Georgios Averof, two modern destroyers,
four slightly older Italian destroyers and four obsolete Wild Beast-class destroyers. There
were six old submarines, fifteen obsolete torpedo boats and about thirty other auxiliary
vessels.[81]

Britain

Bristol Blenheim bomber of No. 211 Squadron RAF at Menidi, Greece

On 22 October 1940, six days before the Italian invasion of Greece, despite the Italian
invasion of Egypt, the RAF Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Middle East in Cairo was
ordered to prepare squadrons for Greece, based on Ultra decodes and other sources that an
Italian invasion of Greece was imminent. [85] The RAF first sent 30 Squadron, consisting of one
flight of Blenheim IF night fighters and one flight of Blenheim I light bombers, that were
based at Athens-Eleusis airfield. [86] Soon afterwards, six Vickers Wellington medium bombers
were detached from 70 Squadron and a flight of Blenheim Is from 84 Squadron arrived. All
RAF assets were placed under the command of Air vice-marshal John D'Albiac.[87] The RAF
aircraft participated in the Greek counter-offensive that began on 14 November, with No. 84
Squadron operating forward from Menidi.[88] A few days later, the Gloster Gladiator fighters
of 80 Squadron moved forward to Trikala, causing significant losses to the Regia
Aeronautica.[89] 211 Squadronwith Blenheim Is, followed before the end of November, joining
84 Squadron at Menidi and 80 Squadron moved to Yannina, about 64 kilometres (40 mi)
from the Albanian border. In the first week of December, 14 Gladiators were transferred from
the RAF to the RHAF.[90]

Campaign
The Greek official history of the Greco-Italian War divides it into three periods: [91][92]

the Italian offensive and its defeat from 28 October to 13 November 1940
the Greek counter-offensive, from 14 November to 6 January 1941, the initial Greek
counter-offensive in 1423 November, with the restoration of the pre-war border in
Epirus and the capture of Kor, followed by the Greek advance into Albania until 6
January 1941
the gradual stabilization of the front from 6 January 1941 until the onset of the
German attack on 6 April; the final Greek advances, until 8 March, followed by the Italian
spring offensive and the stalemate until April.

The Greek commander-in-chief, Alexandros Papagos, in his memoirs regarded the second
phase as ending on 28 December 1940; as the historian Ioannis Koliopoulos comments, this
seems more appropriate, as December marked a watershed in the course of the war, with
the Greek counter-offensive gradually grinding to a halt, the German threat becoming clear,
and the beginning of British attempts to guide and shape Greek strategy. According to
Koliopoulos, the final three months of the war were militarily of little significance as they did
not alter the situation of the two combatants, but were mostly dominated by the diplomatic
and political developments leading up to the German invasion. [81]

Italian offensive (28 October 13 November 1940)

Italian invasion of Greece

Italian forces invaded Greece in several columns. On the extreme Italian right, the coastal
group moved south in the direction ofKonispol with the final aim of
capturing Igoumenitsa and thence driving onto Preveza. In the central sector,
the Siena Division moved in two columns onto the area of Filiates, while the Ferrara Division
moved in four columns against the main Greek resistance line at Kalpaki with the aim of
capturing Ioannina. On the Pindus sector, the Julia Division launched five columns aiming to
capture Metsovo and cut off the Greek forces in the Epirus sector from the east. [91] With the
onset of the Italian offensive, Papagos, until then the Chief of the Hellenic Army General
Staff, was appointed commander-in-chief of the newly established General Headquarters.
The Army General Staff, which functioned as the main field staff throughout the war, was
handed over to Lieutenant-General Konstantinos Pallis, recalled from retirement.[93] With
Bulgarian neutrality assuredfollowing the terms of theBalkan Pact of 1935, the Turks
threatened to intervene on Greece's side if the Bulgarians attacked Greecethe Greek high
command was free to throw the bulk of its army against Italian forces in Albania. [94] Almost
half the forces assigned to the Bulgarian front (13th and 17th Divisions, 16th Infantry
Brigade) and the entirety of the general reserve (I Army Corps with 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Infantry
Divisions, as well as the Cretan 5th Infantry Division and the Cavalry Division) were directed
to the Albanian front.[95]

Epirus and coastal sectors

See also: Battle of ElaiaKalamas
On the Epirus sector, Katsimitros had left five battalions along the border to delay the Italian
advance, and installed his main resistance line in a convex front with the Kalpaki pass in the
centre, manned by nine battalions. Further two battalions under Major-General Nikolaos
Lioumbas took over the coastal sector in Thesprotia. The swamps of the Kalamas river,
especially before Kalpaki, formed a major obstacle not only to armoured formations, but
even to the movement of infantry. A further battalion and some artillery were detached to the
Preveza area in the event of an Italian landing, but as this did not materialize, they were
swiftly moved to reinforce the coastal sector.[96] By the night of 29/30 October, the Greek
covering units had withdrawn to the Kalpaki line, and by 1 November, Italian units made
contact with the Greek line. During these three days, the Italians prepared their assault,
bombarding the Greek positions with aircraft and artillery. In the meantime, the developing
Italian threat in the Pindus sector forced Papagos to cable Katsimitros that his main mission
was to cover the Pindus passes and the flanks of the Greek forces in western Macedonia,
and to avoid offering resistance if it left his forces depleted. Katsimitros had already decided
to defend his line, however, and disregarded these instructions, but detached some forces to
cover its right along the Aos River.[97] On 1 November, the Italians managed to
capture Konitsa and the Comando Supremo gave the Albanian front priority over Africa.[98]
The scheduled Italian amphibious assault on Corfu did not materialize due to bad weather.
The Italian navy commander, Admiral Domenico Cavagnari, postponed the landing to 2
November, but by that time Visconti Prasca was urgently demanding reinforcements, and
Mussolini ordered that the 47th Infantry Division Bari, earmarked for the operation, be sent to
Albania instead.[99] Mussolini proposed a landing at Preveza on 3 November to break the
emerging impasse, but the proposal met with immediate and categorical refusal by the
service chiefs.[100]
The main Italian attack on the Kalpaki front began on 2 November. An Albanian battalion,
under the cover of a snowstorm, managed to capture the Grabala heights, but were thrown
back by a counterattack on the next day. On the same day, an attack spearheaded by 5060
tanks against the main Kalpaki sector was also repulsed. The Greek units east of the
Kalamas were withdrawn during the night. On 57 November, repeated assaults were
launched against the Grabala and other heights; on the night of the 7th, Grabala briefly fell
once more, but was swiftly recaptured. On 8 November, the Italians began withdrawing and
assuming defensive positions until the arrival of reinforcements. [101] On the coastal sector, the
Italians made better progress. The Greek covering units were forced south of the Kalamas
already on the first day, but the bad state of the roads delayed the Italian advance. On the
night of 4/5 November, the Italians crossed the river and broke through the defences of the
local Greek battalion, forcing Lioumbas to order his forces to withdraw south of the Acheron
River. Igoumenitsa was captured on 6 November, and on the next day, the Italians
reached Margariti. This marked their deepest advance, as the Thesprotia Sector began
receiving reinforcements from Katsimitros, and as on the other sectors the situation had
already turned to the Greeks' favour.[102]
As evidence of the Italian offensive's failure mounted, on 8 November, Visconti Prasca was
relieved of overall command in Albania and relegated to command the Italian forces in the
Epirus front, while General Ubaldo Soddu, State Undersecretary of War, assumed his place.
Soddu's report from Albania underlined Greek resistance in Epirus and the mounting threat
of the Greek concentration in western Macedonia, and recommended taking up defensive
positions "while awaiting the reinforcements that would permit us to resume action as soon
as possible". Mussolini consented. [103] With the Italians on the defensive, 8th Division began

launching local counterattacks to regain the lost ground. By 13 November, the Greek forces
once again stood at the Kalamas river along its entire length. On 12 November, I Army Corps
under Lieutenant-General Panagiotis Demestichas took over the Epirus sector. 8th Division
was subordinated to it, while the coastal sector was placed under the independent Lioumbas
Detachment.[95][104]
Pindus sector
See also: Battle of Pindus

Greek military uniforms from 1941 on display in Athens War Museum

A greater threat to the Greek positions was posed by the advance of the Julia Alpine
Division, under Mario Girotti, over the Pindus Mountains towards Metsovo, which threatened
to separate the Greek forces in Epirus from those in Macedonia. The opposing Greek force,
the Pindus Detachment, numbered 2,000 men, was formed of reservists of the 51st
Regiment, mobilized on 29 August, while one of its three battalions (III/51) was formed as
late as 15 October and was still on its way to the front. Colonel Davakis and his men had to
cover a front some 37 km in width, and moreover over extremely broken terrain. [105] The
Italian attack began under torrential rainfall and made rapid progress, forcing the Greeks to
abandon their forward posts, especially in the Detachment's central sector. Davakis was
forced to deploy the companies of the III/51 Battalion piecemeal as soon as they arrived,
leaving himself with no reserves.[106]
The situation worried the TSDM, which began sending whatever reinforcements it could
muster, and assigned the Pindus sector to the 1st Infantry Division. Despite the onset of
snowfall on the 29th, the Julia Division continued pressing its attack on the Greek centre and
left during 2930 October, forcing the Greeks to withdraw towards Samarina.[107] From 30
October, however, the Greeks managed to stabilize the situation. Command in the Pindus
sector passed to 1st Division and Major-General Vasileios Vrachnos, while additional forces
the Cavalry Division, 5th Brigade, and he newly formed Cavalry Brigadewere deployed
on the flanks of the Italian salient and in the rear to secure the vital passes. [108]
After covering 25 miles (40 km) of mountain terrain in icy rain, the Julia Division captured the
village of Vovousa, on 2 November, but failed to reach its primary objective; Metsovo, 19
miles (30 km) south. That same day, Davakis was gravely wounded during a reconnaissance
mission near Fourka.[109] However, it had become clear to the Italians that they lacked the
manpower and the supplies to continue in the face of the arriving Greek reserves. [110][110] On
November 3, the Italian spearhead was surrounded from all sides. The commander of
the Julia Division requested from the Italian headquarters relief attacks and Italian reserves
were thrown into the battle. Thus, Visconti Prasca sent forward the Bari Division to its aid,
but it was unable to reach the cut-off Italian forces. In the meantime, the assistance of the
local civilians, including men, women, and children, to the Greek forces proved invaluable.

As a result of the Greek pressure the Julia Division was virtually wiped out,[112] while the
villages previously taken by the Italians were recaptured on November 3 and 4. [113] Within less
than a week, the remaining Italian troops in this sector were in roughly the same positions
they occupied before the declaration of the war.[112] By 13 November the Greek forces had
completed the re-occupation of the Grammos and Smolikas mountain ranges.[114] On the
same day, Visconti Prasca was relieved and recalled to Italy.[115]
[111]

Greek counter-offensive (14 November 1940 6 January 1941)

Greek counter-offensive (13 November 1940 7 April 1941)

By 14 November, the Italian forces in Albania had been reorganized in two field armies:
the Ninth Army, formed out of the XXVI Corps in the Kor sector, comprising five infantry
and two Alpini divisions as well as a number of independent regiments, including Blackshirt
and Albanian battalions; and the Eleventh Army (former XXV Corps) on the Epirus sector,
with three infantry, an armoured, and a cavalry division, as well as a number of independent
units.[116] The Italian situation was very difficult, as the troops on the front had been fighting
non-stop for three weeks and were exhausted. The supply situation was abysmal, with the
army lacking lorries, horses, and mules; the limited capacity of Albania's two main
ports, Valona and Durrs, created a bottleneck for supplies and reinforcements, while the
airlift initiated between Italy and Tiranawhich consumed all of the Italian Air Force's
transport capacity to the detriment of Africacould transport troops, but not heavy
equipment.[117] The Greek order of battle on 14 November consisted of Lieutenant-General
Demestichas' I Corps on the coastal sector (2nd, 8th, and the Cavalry Divisions, and the
Lioumbas Detachment), Lieutenant-General Papadopoulos' II Corps in the Pindus sector (1st
Infantry Division, 5th Brigade and the Cavalry Brigade), and Lieutenant-General
Tsolakoglou's III Corps in western Macedonia (9th, 10th, 15th Infantry Divisions, with 11th
Division assembling in its rear). The latter two corps were under the command of TSDM, led
by Lieutenant-General Pitsikas. The 3rd, 4th, and 5th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 16th
Brigade, were kept in reserve.[116][118] By 12 November, Papagos had over 100
infantry battalions on familiar terrain against fewer than fifty Italian battalions. [110]
Fall of Kor (1423 November)
See also: Battle of MoravaIvan
From the first days of November, III Corps had undertaken limited advances into Albanian
territory, and already on 6 November, it submitted plans for a general offensive. Judged too
ambitious for the moment, Papagos postponed the offensive for 14 November.[119] III Corps'
main objective was the capture of the Kor plateau, which controlled access to the interior
of Albania along the valley of the Devoll river. The plateau lay behind the Morava and Ivan
mountains on the Greco-Albanian frontier, which were held by the 29th Piemonte, the

19th Venezia, and the 49th Parma divisions. The Italians were later reinforced by the 2nd
Alpine Division Tridentina, the 53rd Arezzo Division, and 3050 tanks of
the Centauro Division.[119] Leaving five battalions to secure its rear, III Corps attacked with
twenty battalions and 37 artillery batteries. Due to the lack of tanks or anti-tank weapons to
counter Italian armour, the Greeks decided to limit their movement along the mountain
ridges, never descending to the valleys. The offensive was launched on the morning of 14
November, with the corps' three divisions moving on converging lines of attack towards
Kor. To achieve surprise, the attack was not preceded by an artillery barrage. [119]
The Italian forces were indeed taken by surprise, allowing the Greeks to force several
breaches in the Italian positions on 1416 November.[120] On 17 November, III Corps was
reinforced with 13th Division, and on the next day, with 11th Division, which along with the
10th Division formed a new command, the "K" Group of Divisions or OMK (LieutenantGeneral Georgios Kosmas).[121] The most critical moment for the Greeks came on 18
November, when elements of the 13th Division panicked during an ill-coordinated attack and
the division almost retreated; its commander was sacked on the spot and the new
commander, Major-General Sotirios Moutousis, forbade any further retreat, restoring the
front.[122] On 1921 November, the Greeks captured the summit of Morava. Fearing that they
would be surrounded and cut off, the Italians retreated towards the Devoll valley during the
night, and on 22 November the city of Kor was captured by 9th Division. [123][122] By 27
November, TSDM had captured the entire Kor plateau, suffering 624 dead and 2,348
wounded.[122] Further south and west, I and II Corps had moved to evict the Italians from
Greek territory, which they achieved by 23 November. II Corps further moved across the
border line, capturing Ersek on 21 November and Leskovik on the next day.[119][124] On 23
November, bowing to pressure from Badoglio and Roatta, Mussolini finally reversed his early
October order for demobilization. [125]
Greek offensive towards Valona (23 November December 1940)
Following the capture of Kor and the eviction of the Italian forces from Greek soil, the
Greek GHQ faced two options: continue the offensive in the Kor sector in the direction of
Elbasan or shift focus on the left flank and drive towards the port of Valona. [122] The latter was
chosen, as the capture of Valona would be of great strategic significance, leaving the Italians
with only Durrs as an entrept.[126][127] TSDM, comprising III Corps and OMK, would defend
their positions on the Greek right and apply pressure, while I Corps would move north along
the GjirokastrTepelenValona axis. II Corps would form the pivot of the movement,
securing the connection between I Corps and TSDM, advancing in step with its western
neighbour in the direction of Berat. I Corps was reinforced with 3rd Division (21 November)
and II Corps with 11th Division (27 November) and the Cavalry Division (28 November). [122]
"I said that we would break the Negus' back. Now, with the same, absolute certainty, I repeat, absolute, I tell
you that we will break Greece's back."
Mussolini's speech in Palazzo Venezia, 18 November 1940[128][129]

Between 24 and 30 November, I Corps moved north into Albania along the Drinos river, while
II Corps moved in the direction of Frashr, which it captured in early December.[130] TSDM
continued to apply pressure against the Italians and the 10th Division
captured Moscopole on 24 November. Pogradec was captured unopposed by the 13th
Division on 30 November.[131] The continued Greek advance caused another crisis in the
Italian hierarchy. The news of the fall of Pogradec and the pessimistic reports of the Italian
commanders in Albania reportedly caused Mussolini to consider asking for a truce through
the Germans but in the end he recovered his nerve and ordered Soddu to hold fast. The
Greeks would be worn out, since they had "...no war industry and can only count on supplies

from Great Britain".[132] Mussolini, encouraged by the hardline Fascist Party secretary Roberto
Farinacci, sacked Badoglio on 4 December and replaced him with Ugo Cavallero as Chief of
the General Staff. The resignation of the governor of the Italian Dodecanese, Cesare Maria
De Vecchi and Admiral Cavagnari, followed within a few days. [133]
I Corps captured Delvin on 5 December and Gjirokastr on 8 December; the Lioumbas
Detachment captured Sarand renamed Porto Edda after Edda Mussolinion 6
December. Further east, the 2nd Division captured the Suh Pass after a fierce struggle from
14 December, while 8th Division launched repeated attacks on the heights around
the Kakavia Pass, orcing the Italians to withdraw on the night of 4/5 December. The division
had suffered considerable losses but took over 1,500 prisoners, several artillery pieces and
thirty tanks.[134] In the TSDM sector, Lieutenant-General Kosmas (in command of the K Group,
essentially the 10th Division) captured the Ostravic Mountain on 12 December, while III
Corpssince 1 December reinforced with 17th Division, which replaced 13th Division
completed its occupation of the Kamia massif and secured Pogradec. [134]
On 2 December, Papagos, and Crown Prince Paul, visited the front. Pitsikas and Tsolakoglou
urged him to order an immediate attack on the strategic Klisura Pass, without waiting for I
and II Corps to level with TSDM. Papagos refused and ordered the plan to continue, with III
Corps relegated to a passive role. (This decision was later criticized, coupled with the onset
of winter, it immobilised the Greek right wing.[124] Despite the atrocious weather and the heavy
snowfall, the Greek offensive continued on the left throughout December. I Corps, now
comprising 2nd, 3rd and 4th Divisions (8th Division and the Lioumbas Detachment were
moved back into reserve) captured Himar on 22 December. II Corps, moving between the
Aos and the Apsos rivers, reached the vicinity of Klisura, but failed to capture the pass. To
its right, the V Army Corps (the former K Group but still comprising only the 10th Division)
managed to advance up to Mount Tomorr and secure the connection between II and III
Corps, which remained in its positions.[135]

End of the Greek offensive (6 January 6 April 1941)

On 28 December 1940, the Greek GHQ took the decision to halt large-scale offensive
operations in view of the stiffening Italian resistance, the worsening supply situation and the
bad weather, which inter alia led to a large number of frostbite casualties. This decision took
effect on 6 January, whereby only local offensive operations would take place to improve
Greek lines until the weather improved. [136] The Italians had eleven infantry divisions, (11th
Infantry Division Brennero, 29th Infantry Division Piemonte, 19th Infantry
Division Venezia, 23rd Infantry Division Ferrara, 33rd Mountain Division Acqui, 37th
Mountain Division Modena, 48th Infantry Division Taro, 49th Infantry DivisionParma,
51st Siena, 53rd Arezzo and 56th Casale) and four Alpini divisions (2nd Tridentina,
3rd Julia, 4th Cuneense, and 5th Alpine Division Pusteria) and the CentauroArmoured
Division, with the 6th Infantry Division Cuneo and the 7th Infantry Division Lupi di
Toscana moving to the front. There were also two independent Bersaglieriregiments, a
grenadier regiment, two cavalry regiments, Blackshirt and Albanian battalions and other
units. According to official Italian documents, on 1 January 1941, Italy had 10,616 officers,
261,850 men, 7,563 vehicles, and 32,871 animals in Albania. [137] This strengthening of the
Italian position prompted Cavallero, who after Soddu's recall on 29 December combined his
post as Chief of the General Staff with the overall command in Albania, to pronounce that the
"period of crisis [was] almost overcome" and to begin planning for an attack aiming to
recapture Kor in early February.[138]
Struggle for Klisura Pass and Tepelen
Main article: Capture of Klisura Pass

The main operation envisaged by the Greek GHQ was the capture of the Klisura Pass by II
Corps, coupled with minor offensives by I Corps and TSDM to improve their positions. II
Corps attacked on 8 January, with 1st Division on the left and 15th Division, followed by the
11th Division, on the right flank. The 15th Division faced the JuliaDivision, and after a hard
struggle managed to capture its positions in a costly success. The 11th Division followed up
on 9 January next day captured the pass. The offensive forced Cavallero to deploy the
reserves he had husbanded for the Kor offensive, which never took place. [137] The newly
arrived Lupi di Toscana division was routed.[a] The division went into action on 9 January to
support the Julia Division, after a 24-hour forced march in horrendous weather, without
having time to reconnoitre the front, without maps and without coordinating fire support with
the Julia Division. The commander and the chief of staff failed to coordinate its two
regiments, which became entangled on the same mule track. Despite attacking downhill and
facing a numerically inferior enemy, the division lost a battalion to encirclement and were
driven back to their starting positions after two days. By 16 January, the division had
disintegrated and "ceased to exist as an organized force", with only 160 officers and men
immediately available and over 4,000 casualties.[139] On 26 January, the Italians counterattacked to recover the pass but II Corps, reinforced with 5th Division, managed to repel
them and then counter-attacked. In the Battle of Trebeshina, a series of engagements from
212 February, the Trebeshin massif was captured.[137] The capture of the strategic Klisura
pass by the Greek army was considered a major success by the Allied forces, with the
Commander of the British forces in the Middle East, Archibald Wavell, sending a
congratulatory message to Alexander Papagos.[140]
As the threat of a German invasion from Bulgaria increased, the need to transfer Greek
divisions to the Bulgarian frontier forced Papagos to launch a final effort to capture Valona as
quickly as possible. The RAF agreed to challenge the air superiority of the Regia
Aeronautica, which had recovered with the loss of much of the RHAF in ground-attack
operations, rather than continue ineffective attempts at interdiction. With reinforcements from
Egypt and the drying of a landing-ground at Paramythia, the RAF managed200 close support
sorties by the end of February. Launched in mid-February, the attack saw I Corps gain
ground towards Tepelen; Italian resistance and a deterioration in the weather forced a
suspension of operations before Tepelen, let alone Valona or Berat, were reached. The
Italian defensive success was costly, and signs of an imminent Italian offensive in the central
sector of the front forced a return to the defensive. [141][142][143]
On 14 February, in view of GHQ's increasing concern with developments on the Bulgarian
frontier, a new higher command, the Epirus Army Section (TSI), under LieutenantGeneral Markos Drakos, was formed, comprising I and II Corps.[137] Despite Greek success in
Albania, dissension within the Greek leadership emerged over strategy towards the expected
German attack and the need for a withdrawal in Albania. The front commanders in Albania
represented their views to GHQ in Athens and in early March, Papagos moved to replace
virtually the entire leadership in the Albanian front: Drakos, Kosmas and Papadopoulos, the
commanders of TSI, I and II Corps respectively, were replaced by the TSDM commander
Lieutenant-General Pitsikas, Lieutenant-General Demestichas and Major-General Georgios
Bakos, TSDM being taken over by Tsolakoglou.[144]

Italian Spring Offensive

See also: Italian Spring Offensive

Greek troops during the spring offensive

On 4 March, the British sent the first convoy of Operation Lustre with W Force (LieutenantGeneral Sir Henry Maitland Wilson) and supplies for Greece.[145][b] The Italian leadership
desired to achieve a success against the Greek army before the impending German
intervention and reinforced the Albaniuan front to 28 divisions with an average of 26
serviceable bombers, 150 fighters, along with 134 bombers and 54 fighters of the
4 Squadra in Italy.[146] Cavellero planned an attack on a 32 km (20 mi) of the centre of the
front, to recapture Klisura and advance towards Leskovik and Ioannina. [147] The attack would
be carried out by theVIII Army Corps (59th Cagliari, 38th Puglie and 24th Pinerolo divisions),
XXV Corps' Sforzesca Division, the 47th Bari, 51stSiena, and 7th Lupi di Toscana divisions
as a second echelon, and the Centauro and Piemonte divisions as general reserves.[148]The
Greek units opposite them were II Corps (17th, 5th, 1st, 15th, and 11th Divisions), with three
regiments as TSI's general reserve, and 4th Division providing reinforcement. II Corps
continued limited offensive action as late as 8 March to improve its positions. [148]
The Italian attack, watched by Mussolini, began on 9 March, with a heavy artillery barrage
and air bombardment; on the main sector, held by the Greek 1st Division, over 100,000
shells were dropped on a 6 km (3.7 mi) front. Despite repeated assaults and heavy shelling,
the positions of 1st Division held during 910 March. A flanking manoeuvre on 11 March
ended in Italian defeat. The exhausted Puglie Division was withdrawn and replaced with
the Bari Division during the subsequent night, but all attacks until 15 March failed. [148] The
Italian offensive halted on 1618 March, allowing the Greeks to bring reserves forward and
begin a gradual reshuffle their line, relieving the 1st Division with the 17th. The Italian
offensive resumed on 19 March with another attack on Height 731 (the 18th thus far).
Attacks, preceded by heavy artillery bombardments, followed daily until 24 March, the last
day of the Italian offensive, without achieving any result. [149] Mussolini admitted that the result
of the Italian offensive was zero.[150][151][152][153] Italian casualties amounted to over 11,800 dead
and wounded, while the Greeks suffered 1,243 dead, 4,016 wounded and 42 missing in
action.[149]

German invasion
Main article: Battle of Greece

German forces arrive in Athens, May 1941

With most of the Greek army on the Albanian border, Operation Marita began through
Bulgaria on 6 April, which created a second front. Greece had received a small
reinforcement from British forces based in Egypt in anticipation of the German attack, but no
more help was sent after the invasion. The Greek army was outnumbered; the Bulgarian
defensive line did not receive adequate troop reinforcements and was quickly overrun. The
Germans outflanked the Greek forces on the Albanian border, forcing their surrender, and
British Empire forces began a retreat. For several days Allied troops contained the German
advance on the Thermopylae position, allowing ships to be prepared to evacuate the British
force. The Germans reached Athens on 27 April and the southern shore on 30 April,
capturing 7,000 British troops. The conquest of Greece was completed with the capture of
Crete a month later and Greece was occupied by the military forces of Germany, Italy, and
Bulgaria until late 1944.[154]
On 6 April, Papagos ordered TSDM to launch an attack towards Elbasan, in conjunction with
Yugolav forces. The attack began on 7 April and the 13th Division made some progress, but
the Yugoslav army, attacked by the Germans, rapidly collapsed and the operation was
cancelled.[155] On 12 April, GHQ in Athens ordered the Greek forces on the Albanian front to
retreat but the decision was too late.[156] The Greek commanders knew that Italian pressure,
the lack of motor transport and pack animals, the physical exhaustion of the Greek army, and
the poor transport network of Epirus meant that any retreat was likely to end in disintegration.
Advice to retreat before the start of the German attack had been rejected and they petitioned
Pitsikas to surrender. Pitsikas forbade such talk, but notified Papagos and urged a solution
that would secure "the salvation and honour of our victorious Army". [157][158] The order to
retreat, the disheartening news of the Yugoslav collapse, and the rapid German advance
in Macedonia led to a breakdown of morale in the Greek troops, many of whom had been
fighting without rest for five months and were forced to abandon hard-won ground. By 15
April, the divisions of II Army Corps, beginning with the 5th Division, began to disintegrate,
with men and even entire units abandoning their positions. [157][159][160]
On 16 April, Pitsikas reported to Papagos that signs of disintegration had also begun to
appear among the divisions of I Corps and begged him to "save the army from the Italians"
by allowing it to capitulate to the Germans, before the military situation collapsed
completely). On the following day TSDM was renamed III Army Corps and placed under
Pitsikas' command. The three corps commanders, along with the metropolitan bishop of
Ioannina, Spyridon, pressured Pitsikas to unilaterally negotiate with the Germans. [159][161]
[162]
When he refused, the others decided to bypass him and selected Tsolakoglou, as the
senior of the three generals, to carry out the task. Tsolakoglou delayed for a few days,
sending his chief of staff to Athens to secure permission from Papagos. The chief of staff
reported the chaos in Athens and urged his commander to take the initiative in a message

that implied permission by Papagos, although this was not in fact the case. On 20 April,
Tsolakoglou contacted Obergruppenfhrer Sepp Dietrich, the commander of the nearest
German unit, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) brigade, to offer surrender. The
protocol of surrender was signed by Tsolakoglou and Dietrich at 18:00 on the same day.
Presented with the fait accompli an hour later, Pitsikas resigned his command.[163][164][165]

Sea and air campaign

Naval operations
Further information: Adriatic Campaign of World War II
Thoroughly outclassed by the far larger and more modern Italian Regia Marina, the Royal
Hellenic Navy (RHN) was unable to attempt a direct naval confrontation. Its role was rather
limited to patrol and convoy escort duties, a particularly important task given the general
inadequacy of the Greek transport network on land; apart from large quantities of
matriel, c.80,000 mobilized men and over 100,000 animals were moved by sea during the
war.[166] The RHN carried out limited operations against Italian shipping in theStrait of
Otranto with submarines (losing one vessel), sinking at least 23,000 long tons (23,000 t) of
transport and merchant shipping and also a submarine but lack of maintenance facilities
made it impossible to continue the effort.[167] Destroyers carried out bold but fruitless night
raids on 14 November 1940, 15 December and 4 January 1941. The British fought the Battle
of the Strait of Otranto on 12 November acting as a decoy force and the Regia Marina had
half of its capital ships put out of action by the British Royal Navy (RN) during the Battle of
Taranto (1112 November) but Italian cruisers and destroyers continued to escort convoys
between Italy and Albania. On 28 November, an Italian squadron bombarded Corfu and on
18 December and 4 March, Italian task forces shelled Greek coastal positions in Albania.
From January 1941, the main task of the RHN was to escort the convoys of Operation
Excess to and from Alexandria, in co-operation with the RN. As the convoys transporting
Lustre Force began in early March, the Italian Fleet sortied against them and the British were
forewarned by Ultra decrypts. The Mediterranean Fleet intercepted the Italians at the Battle
of Cape Matapan on 28 March and sank three cruisers and two destroyers, the greatest
Italian naval defeat at sea of the war.[168]

Air operations
Royal Hellenic Air Force

Greek PZL P.24 F/G 1940, with the 120 marking of Marinos Mitralexis

On 2 November, a squadron of 15 Italian CANT Z.1007 bombers, with Fiat CR.42 fighter
escorts headed towards Thessaloniki and was intercepted by Greek PZL P.24 fighters of the
22nd Squadron. Second Lieutenant Marinos Mitralexis shot down one bomber and being out
of ammunition, aimed the nose of his PZL P. 24 at the tail of a bomber, smashed the rudder
and sent the bomber out of control.[169] The news of Mitralexis' feat quickly spread throughout
Greece and boosted morale.[170] On 2 December, the 21st Pursuit Squadron re-equipped with
14 ex-RAF Gladiators.[171]

RAF

Gladiator at the Shuttleworth Airshow

Ultra decrypts of orders to the Regia Aeronautica and nightly reports from 4 Zona Aerea
Territoriale in Italy to Comando Aeronautico Albania della Regia Aeronautica in Tirana,
disclosed bombing targets for the next day and were sent to RAF HQ in Greece, to assist in
fighter interception.[172] From mid-November to the end of December, the Blenheim and
Wellington bombers from Egypt flew 235 sorties but almost 13 failed, due to a lack of allweather airfields and the season, when flying was possible for about 15 days per month.[173]
[174]
The bombing effort was concentrated on Durazzo and Valona but some close support
operations were carried out and the fighters near Athens helped to reduce the number of
Italian raids. By the end of 1940, the Gladiator pilots had claimed 42 aircraft shot down for
the loss of six, which established a measure of air superiority over the Pindus mountains. In
January 1941, 11 Squadron and 112 Squadron were sent to Greece despite being at half
strength. 33 Squadron, 113 Squadron(Blenheims) and 208 Squadron (Lysanders and
Hurricanes) moved in March.[175]
The British fighters were able to prevent most Italian air operations after mid-February, when
the Greek army made a maximum effort to capture Valona. The RAF managed fifty sorties
on 13 and 14 February; Gladiators and Hurricanes intercepted a raid by fifty Italian aircraft
on 28 February, the RAF claiming 27 aircraft for the loss of one. When the Greek advance
was slowed by more bad weather and Italian reinforcements, the RAF returned to attacks on
airfields and ports. On the eve of the German invasion in April, the RAF had claimed 93
Italian aircraft confirmed and 26 probables, for a loss of four pilots and ten aircraft. [174] RAF
Greece had been increased to nine squadrons and two Wellington detachments of about 200
aircraft, of which only 80 were serviceable, in support of about 100 Greek and Yugoslav
aircraft.[176] RAF losses in the Greek campaign were 163 men killed, missing or prisoner (150
aircrew) and 209 aircraft, 72 in the air, 55 on the ground and82 destroyed or abandoned
during the evacuation.[177]

Home front
Greece
Italy
The announcement of the Italian attack was greeted with favour but not much enthusiasm,
by the Italian public. The situation changed as the Italian attack devolved into a stalemate in
early November, especially after the British Taranto raid and the start of the Greek counteroffensive.[178] In private conversations, Italians soon took to calling the war in Albania "a
second and worse Caporetto".[179] The regime's popularity slumped further with the
introduction of strict rationing in food, oil and fats in early December. Despite imposing a

price freeze in July, prices rose and the state distribution network of staple foods and heating
oil broke down. Coupled with the dismissal of Badoglio and the British advance in North
Africa in Operation Compass, it produced "the regime's most serious crisis since the murder
of Giacomo Matteotti in 1924" (MacGregor Knox).[180] In a move designed to bolster the
Fascist Party's flagging standing, in mid-January 1941 Mussolini ordered the all
senior gerarchi and officials under 45 years, to go to the Albanian front (much to their
displeasure). According to Dino Grandi at least, this move caused much resentment against
Mussolini among the Party leadership that simmered underground and resulted in his
dismissal in July 1943.[181]

Albania
In an effort to win Albanian support for Italian rule, Ciano and the Fascist regime encouraged
Albanian irredentism in the directions of Kosovo and Chameria. [182] Despite Jacomoni's
assurances of Albanian support in view of the promised "liberation" of Chameria, Albanian
enthusiasm for the war was distinctly lacking.[183] The few Albanian units raised to fight
alongside the Italian Army mostly "either deserted or fled in droves". Albanian agents
recruited before the war, are reported to have operated behind Greek lines and engaged in
acts of sabotage but these were few in number.[184] Support for the Greeks, although of limited
nature, came primarily from the local Greek populationswho warmly welcomed the arrival of
the Greek forces.[184] Despite official Greek proclamations that they were fighting for the
liberation of Albania, Greek claims on Northern Epirus were well-known. Albanian suspicions
were reinforced, when a new municipal council of eleven Greeks and four Albanians was
appointed at Kor, and when the military governor of Gjirokastr prohibited the celebration
of the Albanian independence day on 28 November (his counterpart in Kor allowed it to go
ahead and was reprimanded). The Greek authorities even ignored offers of Albanian
expatriates to enlist as volunteers against Italy. The Greek occupation regime followed the
regulations of international law and the Albanian civil administration was left intact and
continued to operate, including law courts. No atrocities were committed and the safes of the
state bank were discovered unopened after the Greeks withdrew.[185]

Aftermath

Map of occupation zones, Italian in blue

Analysis
In 2008, Paoletti wrote that the Italian army fought in difficult terrain, was short of clothing
and equipment and units were split up as they arrived and used piecemeal. The German
invasion "went smoothly, because the Greek army was concentrated against the Italians".

In 2009, Mazower wrote that the Italian invasion of Greece was a disaster and the "first
Axis setback" of the war. Mussolini had sent 140,000 poorly-equipped troops to attack
Greece, over some of the worst mountain country in Europe, at the beginning of winter. The
Greeks repulsed the invasion, to the surprise of enemies and Allies alike, an event made
worse for the Fascist regime because of the attack on Taranto and the disasters in Libya,
Eritrea and Ethiopia.[197]
[196]

Sadkovich wrote in 1993 that the effect of the Italo-Greek war had been exaggerated by
other authors, because Axis victories in the spring of 1941 cancelled the Italian defeats of the
previous winter. During the war against Greece, the quantity of soldiers, merchant ships,
escort vessels and weapons allocated to the Greek front was much greater than those for
the invasion of Egypt.[198] In 1995, Gann and Duignan wrote that the fighting in France,
Yugoslavia and Greece reduced Italy to the status of a [German] satellite.[199]According to
Kershaw in 2007, Italian aspirations to great power status were ended by the Greek failure,
the Battle of Taranto (1112 November 1940) and the loss of Cyrenaica (9 December 1940
9 February 1941).[200]

Casualties
The Italian invasion began with a force of about 87,000 men and was increased to
about 565,000 troops, supported by 463 aircraft and 163 light tanks.[201][202][203] Italian forces
suffered casualties of 13,755 killed, 50,874 wounded and 25,067 missing (of whom 21,153
were taken prisoner), for a total of 89,696 losses in action and 52,108 sick,12,368
frostbite cases and 64 aircraft losses (another 24 claimed by the Greeks) with 229
aircrew killed, for a grand total of 154,172 casualties. Eighteen ships of the Regia
Marina were sunk.[204][205][206][207][206][203] Greek military forces amounted to fewer than 260,000
men and 77 aircraft[203] with casualties of 13,325 killed, 42,485 wounded,1,237
missing and 1,531 prisoners, for a total of 58,578 losses and c.25,000 frostbite cases, a
grand total of about 90,000 casualties and 52 RHAF aircraft.[208][203] (In Operation Marita, the
Germans took 244,000 Yugoslav, 218,000 Greek and 9,000 British prisoners.)[209]

Occupation
Main article: Axis occupation of Greece
On 13 April, Hitler issued Directive 27, including his occupation policy for Greece and
jurisdiction in the Balkans with Directive No. 31 (9 June). Italy occupied the bulk of the
mainland, German forces occupied Athens, Thessaloniki, Central Macedonia and several
Aegean islands, including most of Crete and Florina, subject of disputed claims by Italy and
Bulgaria.[210] Bulgaria, which had not participated in the invasion, occupied most of Thrace on
the same day that Tsolakoglou surrendered taking the territory between the Struma river and
a line through Alexandroupoli and Svilengrad west of the Evros River.[211] Italian troops took
over their zone of occupation from 28 April to 12 June. [212]

Notes
1.

2.

Jump up^ Knox called the experience of the Lupi di Toscana Division an example of
the failings of the Italian Army in Albania: "[r]ecently reconstituted after partial demobilization,
it arrived without mules or motor transport, organic artillery, a full complement of headquarters
and service troops, and communications equipment. Many of the troops were practically
untrained".[139]
Jump up^ W Force consisted of the 1st Armoured Brigade and part of the 2nd
Support Group of the 2nd Armoured Division, the 6th Australian Division, 7th Australian

Division, New Zealand Division and the Independent Polish Brigade Group (the Polish
brigade was not dispatched).[145]

Footnotes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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24.
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28.
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34.
35.
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37.
38.
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40.
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42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Jump up^ Mack Smith 1982, p. 170.

Jump up^ Martel 1999, pp. 184, 198.
Jump up^ Bideleux & Jeffries 1998, p. 467.
Jump up^ Bell 1997, pp. 7071.
Jump up^ Martel 1999, p. 198.
Jump up^ Preston & MacKenzie 1996, pp. 2122.
Jump up^ Preston & MacKenzie 1996, pp. 22, 5051.
Jump up^ Zabecki 1999, p. 1,353.
Jump up^ Knox 2000a, pp. 181182.
Jump up^ Knox 2000a, pp. 7879.
Jump up^ Verzijl 1970, p. 396.
Jump up^ Plowman 2013, pp. 910.
Jump up^ Bell 1997, p. 68.
Jump up^ Svolopoulos 1978, pp. 342343.
Jump up^ Klapsis 2014, pp. 240259.
Jump up^ Svolopoulos 1978, pp. 343345.
Jump up^ Svolopoulos 1978, pp. 345347.
Jump up^ Svolopoulos 1978, p. 348.
^ Jump up to:a b Kitromilides 2008, p. 217.
Jump up^ Svolopoulos 1978, p. 349.
Jump up^ Steiner 2005, p. 499.
Jump up^ Steiner 2005, pp. 499500.
Jump up^ Svolopoulos 1978, pp. 349350.
Jump up^ Svolopoulos 1978, pp. 352358.
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 380381.
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 381391.
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 397402.
Jump up^ Gooch 2007, p. 451.
Jump up^ Petraki 2014, pp. 1819.
Jump up^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 2122.
Jump up^ Cervi 1972, pp. 79.
Jump up^ Petraki 2014, pp. 2122, 24, 293 (note 16).
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 402403, 406.
^ Jump up to:a b c Cervi 1972, pp. 710.
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 403404.
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 404405.
Jump up^ Petraki 2014, pp. 2829.
Jump up^ Petraki 2014, p. 30.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, p. 139.
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 406408.
Jump up^ Petraki 2014, p. 299 (note 69).
Jump up^ Tucker 2012, p. 323.
Jump up^ Petraki 2014, pp. 3334.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, pp. 167168.
Jump up^ Petraki 2014, pp. 3435.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, pp. 170173.
Jump up^ Petraki 2014, pp. 3537.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, pp. 173174.
Jump up^ Petraki 2014, pp. 3738.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, pp. 174177.

51.
52.
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93.
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95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Jump up^ Sadkovich 1993, pp. 439445.

Jump up^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, p. 37.
Jump up^ Rodogno 2006, pp. 103104.
Jump up^ Rodogno 2006, pp. 8485.
Jump up^ Rodogno 2006, p. 104.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, p. 138.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, p. 209.
Jump up^ Kershaw 2007, p. 170.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, pp. 209211.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, pp. 211212.
^ Jump up to:a b Knox 1986, p. 212.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, p. 8.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 8, 1011.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, pp. 213214.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, p. 214.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, pp. 214216.
Jump up^ Bauer 2000, p. 99.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 810.
^ Jump up to:a b Knox 1986, p. 218.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, pp. 218219.
Jump up^ Maiolo 2010, p. 197.
Jump up^ Macksey 1971, p. 24.
Jump up^ Jowett 2000, pp. 45.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, p. 6.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, p. 7.
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, p. 412.
^ Jump up to:a b Gedeon 2001, p. 9.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 910.
^ Jump up to:a b Gedeon 2001, p. 10.
Jump up^ Argyle 1980, p. 49.
^ Jump up to:a b c Koliopoulos 1978, p. 416.
Jump up^ Buell 2002, p. 37.
^ Jump up to:a b Kaisarou-Pantazopoulou, Beldekos & Karytinos 2000, pp. 8290.
Jump up^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, p. 27.
Jump up^ Hinsley 1994, pp. 6263.
Jump up^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, pp. 3031.
Jump up^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, pp. 3233, 3031.
Jump up^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, pp. 3438, 33.
Jump up^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, p. 39.
Jump up^ Shores, Cull & Malizia 1987, pp. 41, 43, 48.
^ Jump up to:a b Gedeon 2001, p. 11.
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, p. 414.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 1112.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, p. 233.
^ Jump up to:a b Koliopoulos 1978, p. 417.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 1314.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 1415.
Jump up^ Knox 2000, p. 80.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, p. 232.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, p. 234.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, p. 15.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 1718.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, p. 235.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, p. 18.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 1819.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, p. 19.

107.
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159.
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161.
162.

Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, p. 20.

Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 2021.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, p. 64.
^ Jump up to:a b c Bauer 2000, p. 105.
Jump up^ Mackenzie 1943, pp. 75, 391.
^ Jump up to:a b Schreiber 1995, p. 437.
Jump up^ Nikolaidou 1997, p. 391.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, p. 21.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, p. 237.
^ Jump up to:a b Gedeon 2001, p. 22.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, p. 238.
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, p. 420.
^ Jump up to:a b c d Gedeon 2001, p. 23.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 2324.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 2223, 24.
^ Jump up to:a b c d e Gedeon 2001, p. 24.
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 420421.
^ Jump up to:a b Koliopoulos 1978, p. 421.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, p. 249.
Jump up^ Playfair et al. 1954, p. 333.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, p. 257.
Jump up^ CM 2009.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, p. 261.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 24, 26.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 2425.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, pp. 250251.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, pp. 243249.
^ Jump up to:a b Gedeon 2001, p. 26.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, p. 27.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 2728.
^ Jump up to:a b c d Gedeon 2001, p. 28.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, pp. 257258.
^ Jump up to:a b Knox 1986, p. 258.
Jump up^ Hadjipateras & Phaphaliou 1995, p. 97.
Jump up^ Playfair et al. 1954, pp. 336337.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, p. 29.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, p. 259.
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, p. 442.
^ Jump up to:a b Raugh 1993, p. 143.
Jump up^ Playfair 2004, p. 75.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 2930.
^ Jump up to:a b c Gedeon 2001, p. 30.
^ Jump up to:a b Gedeon 2001, p. 31.
Jump up^ Carr 2013, p. 157.
Jump up^ Electris & Lindsay 2008, p. 187.
Jump up^ Zapantis 1987, p. 54.
Jump up^ Carruthers 2013, p. 9.
Jump up^ Dear & Foot 1995, pp. 102106.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, p. 32.
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, p. 444.
^ Jump up to:a b Koliopoulos 1978, p. 446.
Jump up^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 225227, 282.
^ Jump up to:a b Gedeon 2001, p. 33.
Jump up^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, p. 258.
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 448.
Jump up^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 282283, 382.

163.
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, pp. 448450.
164.
Jump up^ Gedeon 2001, pp. 3334.
165.
Jump up^ Stockings & Hancock 2013, pp. 383384, 396398, 401402.
166.
Jump up^ Koliopoulos 1978, p. 422.
167.
Jump up^ Playfair et al. 1954, p. 335.
168.
Jump up^ O'Hara 2009, p. 98.
169.
Jump up^ Piekalkiewicz & Heurck 1985, p. 110.
170.
Jump up^ Carr 2007.
171.
Jump up^ Thomas 2002, p. 62.
172.
Jump up^ Hinsley 1994, pp. 64.
173.
Jump up^ Richards 1974, pp. 255258.
174.
^ Jump up to:a b Terraine 1997, p. 331.
175.
Jump up^ Richards 1974, pp. 258, 274, 284.
176.
Jump up^ Richards 1974, pp. 286, 294.
177.
Jump up^ Terraine 1997, p. 334.
178.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, p. 260.
179.
Jump up^ Lepre 1989, p. 119.
180.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, pp. 261262.
181.
Jump up^ Knox 1986, pp. 269270.
182.
Jump up^ Fischer 1999, pp. 7073.
183.
Jump up^ Fischer 1999, p. 75.
184.
^ Jump up to:a b Fischer 1999, pp. 7879.
185.
Jump up^ Fischer 1999, pp. 7981.
186.
Jump up^ Tsirpanlis, 1992, p. 112: "Undoubtedly a solid anti-Italian sentimental
substratum had developed among public opinion, despite the conventional propriety that the
dictatorship of Metaxas was trying to maintain. Following the torpedoing of lli, on 15th
August 1940 at Tinos, on the nameday of the Virgin Mary, the sentimental charging, in
combination with the injustice and the insult to the Orthodox religious tradition, reached its
peak. "
187.
Jump up^ Tsirpanlis, 1992, p. 112: Besides, official propaganda, as well as the
spontaneous reaction of the people created the optimism which was necessary for the first
difficult moments.
188.
Jump up^ Carr, 2013, p. 39: "At 6.00 am air raid sirens woke the Athenians who
quickly filled the streets and squares in a paroxism of patriotic fervor. Newspapers rushed out
special Monday morning editions with screaming headlines and ecstatic editorials whipping
up public enthusiasm- if it really needed whipping up- for a stern lesson to be delivered to the
'macaroni-boys' (makaronades)..."
189.
Jump up^ Tsirpanlis, 1992, p. 121: The optimism of the Greek rank and file
reinforced by his ignorance which did not cause any hesitation; the familiar smile of the
soldier; his satisfactory training; the adequately organized mobilization; the strong feeling of
justice which had been deceitfully and crudely offended by a coarse Italian propaganda; the
capable NCOs and officers, from the rank of platoon leader to that of regiment or division
commander who reacted adroitly and very quickly carried out successful decisions, whether
they concerned artillery firing or mortar shots or the capture of strategic points; the biological
superiority of mountain or rural population (especially people from Epirus, Roumeli,
Macedonia, Thessaly), which made up the biggest mass of the infantry forces; the complete
devotion of the non-combatant people (women, old people and children) living on the border
line (of Epirus and Western Macedonia); the extremely unfavorable weather conditions, which
hindered both sides equally, but which were more adverse for the attacker. These are, I
believe, the most important factors which made a joint contribution to a profound
psychological transformation, which changed the defender into a ruthless attacker, regardless
of any sacrifice, at any cost.
190.
Jump up^ Tsirpanlis, 1992, p. 113: "Still, inexorable questions are put forth to the
historian: what is the content, finally, of the miracle or of those glorious days of war in
Albania if the Greek victors defeated an easy enemy, whose superiority in numbers and arms
seemed to play a completely unimportant role. Strong proof of that optimistic over-

simplification of probably the most serious factor, which has to do with the justification or nonjustification of a military conflict, has survived up to date among the Greek public opinion: that
is, that the Italian macaronis took to their heels and the Greeks nearly threw them into the
sea."
191.
Jump up^ Tsirpanlis, 1992, p. p. 122: The unpublished and unknown up to now
documents (memoranda, letters, plans) of Ubaldo Soddu (who did not write down his
memoirs), Commander of the Italian forces in Albania from 10.11. to 30.12.1940, a critical
period for the Italians, reveal the desperate efforts for control, the strict measures for
unjustified retreats and abandonment of positions, the tragic appeal even for German help
(on 24.11. and 17.12.1940).
192.
Jump up^ Tsirpanlis, 1992, p.123: In his reports, Soddu analyzes the Greek tactics
for attack; he acknowledges the bravery and the moral strength of the enemy; he points out,
however, that during this period (end of NovemberDecember) the Greeks neither apply any
new method of military tactics, nor do they quickly take advantage of the land left back by the
Italian retreat. Mussolini, after the capture of Himara by the Greeks, does not doubt the
contribution of high morale to the victory of the enemy (24.12.40).
193.
Jump up^ Clogg, edited by Richard (2008). Bearing gifts to Greeks : humanitarian
aid to Greece in the 1940s. Basingstoke [England]: Palmgrave Macmillan.
p. 4.ISBN 9780230500358. Greece's military successes on the Albanian front moved
Winston Churchill famously to declare 'today we say that Greeks fight like heroes, from now
on we will say that heroes fight like Greeks'.
194.
Jump up^ Fisher, Bernd Jrgen (2007). Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and
Authoritarian Rulers of South Eastern Europe. Purdue University Press.
p. 194.ISBN 9781557534552. A the only active ally of Britain fighting in Europe, Greece,
overcoming its comparative disadvantage, provided the first victory against the Axis forces...
Greek advances stalled in early January 1941, falling victim to the harsh winter and to Italian
reinforcements. Nonetheless, the strong positioning of Greek forces in southern Albania
provided not only humiliation for Mussolini but also an unexpected gain for Greece, which
now occupied an area inhabited by many Greeks that had been relegated to Albanian rule
after the First World War.
195.
Jump up^ Jowett 2000, p. 7.
196.
Jump up^ Paoletti 2008, p. 174.
197.
Jump up^ Mazower 2009, pp. 132133.
198.
Jump up^ Sadkovich 1993, pp. 439464.
199.
Jump up^ Duignan & Gann 1995, p. 14.
200.
Jump up^ Kershaw 2007, pp. 180183.
201.
Jump up^ Richter 1998, pp. 119, 144.
202.
Jump up^ Cervi 1972, p. 129.
203.
^ Jump up to:a b c d HAF 2005.
204.
Jump up^ Cervi 1971, p. 308.
205.
Jump up^ Montanari 1980, p. 805.
206.
^ Jump up to:a b Rochat 2005, p. 279.
207.
Jump up^ Cervi 1972, p. 267.
208.
Jump up^ Rodogno 2006, p. 446.
209.
Jump up^ Cervi 1971, p. 306.
210.
Jump up^ Richter 1998, pp. 602, 615616.
211.
Jump up^ Miller 1975, p. 51.
212.
Jump up^ Richter 1998, pp. 615617.

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Further reading

Anamali, Sknder; Prifti, Kristaq (2002). Shqiptart gjat lufts s dyt botrore dhe pas saj:
19391990 [Albanians During World War II and its Aftermath: 19391990]. Historia e popullit
shqiptar n katr vllime (in Albanian). IV. Tirana: Toena. ISBN 99927-1-622-3.
Badoglio, Pietro (1948). Italy in the Second World War; Memories and Documents.
London/New York/Toronto: Oxford University Press. OCLC 1369527.
Beevor, Antony (1992). Crete: The Battle and the Resistance. London: Penguin
Books. ISBN 0-14-016787-0.
Ceva, Lucio (1975). La condotta italiana della guerra: Cavallero e il Comando supremo 1941
1942 [The Conduct of War: Cavallero and the Supreme Command 19411942]. I Fatti e le idee.
Milano: Feltrinelli. OCLC 1955885.
Churchill, Winston S. (1948). The Second World War: The Gathering Storm. I. London:
Cassell. OCLC 219846129.
Churchill, Winston S. (1949). The Second World War: Their Finest Hour. II. London:
Cassell. OCLC 264739165.
Creveld, Martin van (1973). Hitlers Strategy 19401941: The Balkan Clue. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521201438.
Felice, Renzo de (1990). Italia in guerra 19401943 [Italy at War 19401943]. Mussolini
l'alleato, 19401945 (in Italian). I. Torino: Einaudi. OCLC 901699257.
Fowler, Will (2003). The Balkans and North Africa 1941. Blitzkrieg. London: Ian Allan. ISBN 071102-946-6.
Fhrer Conferences on Naval Affairs 19391945. London: Greenhill Books. 1990. ISBN 185367-060-X.
An Abridged History of the Greek-Italian and Greek-German War, 19401941 (Land
Operations). Athens: Army History Directorate Editions. 1997. OCLC 45409635.
Higham, Robin (2015) [1986]. Diary of a Disaster: British Aid to Greece 194041. Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 9780813192918.
Hillgruber, Andreas (1993). Hitlers Strategie. Politik und Kriegfhrung 19401941 [Hitler's
Strategy: Politics and Warfare 19401941] (in German) (3rd ed.). Bonn: Bernard & Graefe D.
L.ISBN 3-76375-923-9.
Hitler, Adolf; Bormann, Martin (1961). Genoud, Franois, ed. The Testament of Adolf Hitler:
The HitlerBormann Documents, FebruaryApril 1945. London: Cassell. OCLC 185760846.
Keegan, John (2005). The Second World War. Penguin. ISBN 0-14-303573-8.
Kershaw, Ian (2000). Hitler, 19361945: Nemesis. London: Allen Lane. ISBN 0-71399-229-8.
Kirchubel, Robert; Gerrard, Robert (2005). Opposing Plans, Operation Barbarossa 1941:
Army Group North. Campaign. II. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 1-84176-857-X.

Knox, MacGregor (1984). "Fascist Italy Assesses its Enemies, 19351940". In May, Ernest
R. Knowing Ones Enemies. Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-69104-717-0.
Lamb, Richard (1998). Mussolini as Diplomat. London: John Murray. ISBN 0-88064-244-0.
Mack Smith, Denis (1974). Mussolini as a Military Leader. Stenton Lecture. Reading:
University of Reading. ISBN 0-70490-204-4.
Mack Smith, Denis (1976). Mussolinis Roman Empire. London/New York, 1976:
Longman. ISBN 0-58250-266-7.
Mack Smith, Denis (1983). Mussolini. London: Grenada. OCLC 655460413.
Muggeridge, Malcolm, ed. (1948). Ciano's Diplomatic Papers. London:
Odhams. OCLC 753172847.
Muggeridge, Malcolm, ed. (1947). Ciano's Diary 19391943. London:
Heinemann. OCLC 6941231.
Papagos, Alexandros (1949). The Battle of Greece 19401941 ("Alpha" ed.). Athens: J. M.
Scazikis. OCLC 3718371.
Payne, Stanley G. (1995). A History of Fascism 191445. London: UCL Press. ISBN 0-29914874-2.
Prasca, Sebastiano Visconti (1946). Io Ho Aggredito La Grecia [I Attacked Greece]. Seconda
guerra mondiale; colezione di memorie, diari e studi (in Italian). V. Milano:
Rizzoli.OCLC 23489678.
Francesco, Pricolo (1946). Ignavia contro eroismo; l'avventura italo-greca, ottobre 1940
aprile 1941 [Apathy Against Heroism: The Italo-Greek Adventure: October 1940 April 1941].
Roma: Ruffolo. ISBN 88-428-1604-3.
Rintelen, Enno von (1951). Mussolini als Bundesgenosse. Erinnerungen des deutschen
Militrattachs in Rom 19361943 [Mussolini as Ally: Memoirs of the German Military Attach in
Rome, 19361943] (in German). Tbingen/Stuttgart: Rainer Wuderlich Verlag Hermann
Leins. OCLC 887128808.
Sullivan, Brian R. (2002). "Where One Man, and Only One Man, Led. Italy's Path from NonAlignment to Non-Belligerency to War, 19371940". In Wylie, Neville. European Neutrals and
Non-Belligerents during the Second World War. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 052164-358-9.
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Engineering. 1948. OCLC 680001502.
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Africa. Ramsbury: The Crowood Press. ISBN 1-86126-646-4.
Weinberg, Gerhard L. (1994). A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-44317-2.
Willingham, Matthew (2005). Perilous Commitments: the Battle for Greece and Crete: 1940
1941. Staplehurst UK: Spellmount. ISBN 978-1-86227-236-1.
Wint, Guy; Pritchard, John (1999). Calvocoressi, Peter, ed. The Penguin History of the
Second World War. Penguin Books. ISBN 978-0-14-195988-7.
Wylie, Neville, ed. (2002). European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents during the Second World
War. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-52164-358-9.
Zabecki, David T., ed. (1999). World War II in Europe: An Encyclopaedia.
Routledge. ISBN 978-0-824-07029-8.

Journals

Carrier, Richard C. (October 2003). "Hitler's Table Talk: Troubling Finds". German Studies
Review. 26 (3): 561576. doi:10.2307/1432747. ISSN 2164-8646. JSTOR 1432747.

Ceva, Lucio (1979). "La campagna di Russia nel quadro strategico della guerra fascista" [The
Campaign of Russia in the Strategic Framework of the Fascist War]. Politico. Saggi di Enzo
Collotti et al. OCLC 848260125.
Creveld, Martin van (1971). "25 October 1940: A Historical Puzzle". Journal of Contemporary
History. Sage. 6: 8796. doi:10.1177/002200947100600306. ISSN 0022-0094.
Creveld, Martin van (1974). "Prelude to Disaster: The British Decision to Aid Greece, 1940
41". Journal of Contemporary History. Sage. 9: 65
92. doi:10.1177/002200947400900303.ISSN 0022-0094.
Sadkovich, James J. (1989). "Understanding Defeat. Reappraising Italy's Role in World War
II". Journal of Contemporary History. London: Sage. 24: 27
61.doi:10.1177/002200948902400102. ISSN 0022-0094.

See also

World War II portal

Military history of Greece during World War II

Military history of Italy during World War II

External links
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media related to GrecoItalian War.

Mediterranean and the Middle East Volume I Chapter XVIII (The Albanian front in the
winter of 1940/1)
Hellenic Air Force history
Kyrou: The First Victory: Greece in the Second World War
Greek orders of battle