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ENGLISH
BREST_
3 4 3d
(MAY
COPY
INFANTRY DIVISION
I
18 SEP 44)
HISTORICAL DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES BRANCH
^t^^^^^^^^^yry^^^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Bee.C~
NS /
4~i~r43J ~e~iLA
B3-427
di~~A~1;T4c~"
. i
JL.Si4.LU
( May - 18 Sep 44 )
By
G. a, Do
B-427
[MO
A.
T0
T2E
TVH
lhVATSiU
1. QOecumation^ igienFr&L.
In the world, there was talk of a strong German
Atlantic Wall already at the time when same did not yet
exist.
It
is
Their chief
especially since
m # B-427
of the Atlantic Wall:
a.
many troops
B2427
-47
We
Aj/
B-427
landing.
# B-427
In spite
'%# 8..427
with the importance of the respective fortifications.
Until 1943, the three branches of the Wehrmacht were
operating independently, so that these requirements were
not sufficiently taken into consideration and it would
happen that in naval constructions, latrines were fortified
with concrete, while at the same time, defensive weapons
at the coast could not yet be constructed with concrete*
After the end of 1943, this state ofaffaires changed, when
the corps general staff was placed in supreme control of
the Wehrmacht branches.
The mine fields played an important role in the
fortifications.
interpreted this method erroneously and goodnaturedly without any thought of betrayal - temporarily allowed the
population to lead their cows to pasture there.
The dummy
i'
B vB"427
4--7-
oes -tacless.
3. A :mam nt_.
Already at the time when the field divis4ions
which, in comparison wiith the garrison divisions, were
better armed-
waf. obvious
These troops
it
entailed a great
due to the
In this manner,
0ibtained,
h1 # B"0427
and
antitank guns-
This resulted in a
CoMunicat ione.
It was of the utmost importance fQr thacommand
We did not
z W B-427
9-*
/
system;
inasmuch as many
lothing
wre allotted
dd waerr we
a
6. g44na nariPgi4ple
fbattle.
or the congw39t
Such
io
lves
invaion
i B(D427
-1.0-
Therefore,
in the Bast"*
Each unit which was committed at the coast for defense
operations, required its own reserves for counterattacks,
which - due to the enemy air superiority - had to be placed
in readiness as closely as possible to the front line; however,
not so near as to be caught, at the same time, by enemy deetrction fire.
Therefore,
4 J3B.*-427
had to entrench itself and prepare for all contingencies in
combat, in order to be able
bicycles
The alarm
7.
When?
invaBion exected?
lX a _haere?
were issued that ideas of this sort, which lulled our troops
into security, were to be attacked most vigorously.
the many incorrect reports, the 343
I.D.
Among
I&
-12-
B 427
io rmandy
b.
the Channel
c.
Brittany
d.
south of Brittany
the only
As regards the
were given:
' B-427
Hence,
-135
-14-
i / B-427
8,
Order of
atiand
Itt the
d.j Qt
The 343.
IT.D
combat
ffiienc
of ot
teroos.
_May 1944.
aauch
Oberst Baumann
Grenadier-Rgt.
The 952.
it
it
The 998.
fi
1f
Oberst Poerster
later -
Oberstlt. Jaeger
Oberstlt. Schwind
Major Snizarewski
Hauptmann Fink
I can't remember any
other names*
Festungastammabteilung
Brest
Oberst Sermersheim
IIauptmann v. Straub
Major Roehsler
Supply Services
Major Aich
Auxiliary Volunteers
3 A
B3-427
When the 343. I. D. was organized at the end of 1942,
troops were used which were not fully fit for combat
(g.v.H. - garnisonsverwendungsfaehig Heimat-
fit for
The physical
The first
This
East brought it about that the requirements for the Selection of officers were also lowered considerably; men who,
in 1942, had been rejected as officer's canditates, had to
be trained as officer's candidates in 1944.
The Division was made up of South Germans(including Austrians) and North"Germans - 1/3.
of the men was good.
AP
4618---427
The fortress cadre troops were older men or those
classified as less able;
defensive combat.
The fighting power of the Ostbataillone (battalions
composed of men from East-European countries) was doubtful;
and after their arrival at the end of 1943, they were rejecid
by German troops*
.,
B' 427
-1 7-
The morale
A B'*-4227
-13-
would
We all
knew that this too would neither help us obtain the concrete
which was lacking and for which we had been fighting hard
for months, nor be able to prevent the railroad sabotage
activities of the French resistance movement,
This belief
was justfied, for not the slightest change took place on the
basis of the visit of the commission.
9.
gonds
2nhboi__ng
SnUrior~
and
units-
At the time of
SB
lB-427
This seemed advisable because of the likelihood that an enemy
attack on Brest might be launched from the northern coast of
Brittany.
Since,further-
coast of Brittany,
Ys3
-20-
B- 427
ehould
was, therefore,
The
aoamander,
We
we could
MS /
S-427
e
formations
made it
increae
in forces.
2.
3.
all ti me.
portation difficulties.
Fhor thsee reasons we could ony decide on. a narrow
cordbn of forts.
this cznsctituted a
air begiunning.
can
i'e
The
1 '
The chief disadvanta:;cge of the narrow ring, the pc0s1bility of enemy artillery fire on objects of strategic
importance, Fwas not a decisive factorz
to th
te
AOX 7.
barely sufficim-t
to theFI
approval of the
"i&AIN
-ull-
rise
composed of civilians
M6
i3.B427
C,
-23-
4AR BY^SNS
uIIVACS.
bBA illuA
;b"
*0 iE
Tv
i.e.
"JUki' g0
HjB
5 AUS'US3
( see annex
e
EIUVASXMIi
'h2
DFii
1944.
2 )
they had to
The
resistance
platoons strong.
I.D.
Beeides,
Uk
MiS
B-427
and3435
- 4.
for tactical reasons-
I.U
At midnight on 5 June, heavy bombardement
was audible
Landerneau,
and it
g of the invasion.
waE assumed
Upon inquiries
was
ID
: Soon
the 343.
I.D. was
'2 )
uMS
-*25.'
,-427
were,
Moreover,
troops were detached for assistance, only those with offensive training and best equipement 'ere
chosen.
ivi.sion
shifts,
the
453.
ITD. became
i( B-00427~r
JABS
-26-
ot allowed
In this
US
-27-
#, B-427
realized that, in
However, at that
h48 O'427
-28.
-28-
might be encircled.
\
because otherwise,
The 543.
4
I.D. rejected this proposal,
'
ID.
about 4 August
it
was found out the next day that the enemy armored group
in which it
was completely
MS / B-427
This was the warning sign for the 343. I.D. that
This
On the basis
M3
I B--427
of numerous reportse
However, since
The
permanent weapons, fortifications and harbor installations the coast defense forces were set in motion, a message was
received from the AOK 7,
At the same
time, the AOK 7 reproached the 343. I.D.) for seeing ghosts
and asserted that in all of Britanny there were few enemy
forces.
They insisted on an
in view of the
MS /
B-427
-31-
tthe abandoned
who was willing to take the responsibility for the withdrawal - which had become urgently necessary-
of the
In this connect-
Therefore, it
MBS /
B-427
large-scale transportation.
When, on 5 August, the enemy armored troops had reached
Brest, a reinforcement of the Brest security occupation
became an urgent necessity.
Since this
captured on 6 August;
MS '
-33r
B 427
Fortress,
These combnands
In this connection, we
block the road for the troops rmarching from the coast to
the fortress, the march was ordered to take place on the
night of 5 August.
In this
MS l B-427
-34The order for this movement did not yet include any
M;S
Th.427
i. e.
iSi OAiL
2LiTUjiAIU
5F944.
(see annex
OF BiEAS-
18
1)
all
This situation
there was
in the area of Le Conquet and on the Orozon Peninsula in acdordance with annex #1 -belonged
to the fortified
The troops
mwS#
B-427
When the corps general ,taff of the XXV. Armeekorps
gave orders for the diabainlding of the coast defense forces,
they also issued instructions to keep open the nrarch route
of Quimperle -
The-refore,
on
This
Nevertheless,
it
because
Mj$
B.427
,357-
of personnel made it
impossible
in spite of their
Beginning 6 August,
This request
was
in
rejected;
necessary,
also
The evacuation
Because of these
Further
S3I B-4 27
enemy attacks in this area did not take place until the
second half tof August.
However, in spite of
1 - covering position,/1).
In addition,
US
if B-.427
finished in time.
In case of further enemy pressure on the Crozon
Peninsula, orders called for occupation of the line of
on 2 Septe.ber,
enemy bombers
Stab,
MSI/ S-427
September, it was impossible for any movements to take
place in this area during the day, because of the heavy
losses in men and materiel.
Fortress, there was-
no sign
covering
On the basis of
since weeks
had a
JS
4 B-427
responsible to provide for replacements in case of breakdowns.
This arrangement had the best results.
On
le stated that
time,
that the 343. I.D. was, attt tat
M8 44-80 427
commander oderered the withdrawal of the troops to the area
south thereof, already for the night of 16 September.
During the night of 17 September, the resistance pockets
in the new area were newly manned or reinforced, and the
troops were ordered to follow the principle of "holding
In this conntstion, no consideration
had
In this pocket
of resistance, there were two Belgian antitank guns which in spite of the'immediately imminent enemy armored attack
were still stationed on the beach and could not be fired
in landward direction.
MS /
B-427
:Ramke,
was
-theBrest
concerned,
it
is
Of course,
had
M8
B.-427
however, in
(signed) Dkfm,.
Rudolf Kogard
MS/
B-427
to Kogard Heport
map scale
1 ; 100 000
1 em = 1 km
,E3 M~
Plougaatel-
Obstlt.
ga:aul.au
Fuerst
t,. Mathieu
Orozon
Obst. Poernster
Brest-Sued Airdrome
cov3r position #1
Gen. Rauch
rgaE
Tal aj r
permanent fortifications
are.
Origial.ortified:
for the security garrison,
xtended :dfensive .area after the begiuming of
August 1944 -on the Crozon Peninsula also cover
lad 3.)
positions (cover positions ;1, 2,
in Brest (near the naval academy)
Submarine:: Pe
When the fortress became fully garrisoned, only the following
oint. were to remain ocupiad in the former
reinforced tron
of the 343. I.D.
sector
defensive coastal
Audierne, Quessant Island.
Benoit,
Aber Wrach, Aber
Ns
# B*427
to ard Report
to Kogard Report
1 s 250 000
1 cm = 2.5 km
map scale
nZeratern
Brittariu
Goulven
I D.
266. I.Do
Aber Wrach
Ma orlaix
Lannilis
Aber Benoit
Ploudalxe zeau
Brest
Le Conquet
Daoulas
Orozon
iHopital
le Faou 343. I*.D
(six infantry battalions
and four Ost-Btl. )
265.
I D.
Aber
Douarxienez
Quimper
265 I.D.
Conoarneau
Ainn2X s
MS J B.-427
to Kogard Report
map scale
1: 250 000
1 cm = 2.5 km
Occupation of the Brzest Fortrmess
1
2
a~nlof
b'dis
and
Aber ?'rach
266.
Aber Benoit
I.DS
Morlaix
lie d'Quess>.nt
3
Lancmd ~iv i iaU
2. lallrchjgr. Div
Landerneau
Le Conquet
i'lonts d Arree
Daoulas
Crozon
Black Mountains
'Doarneneez
St. P. Audierne
4
Q4uimpoex
9 Auloust
265. I.IJ,
Pont l'Abbe
1AM4
Xle d Quessant
4 - Audierne
Concarne au