Japan's Foreign Policy

Japan's Foreign Policy
Author(s): Roger W. Bowen

Source: PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 57-73
Published by: American Political Science Association
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allocation through a controlled bank
system to implement industrial policy.
Background for instructor.
Further Sources of Basic Information
Japan Economic Institute. JEI Report.

Washington: Japan Economic Institute.
This ten-page plus newsletter offers updates
on Japan-U.S. relations, and current events
and economic and political developments in
Japan, as well as periodic background
reports and analyses of political economy
subjects. Despite the basically favorable
approach to Japan of the institute, the
analysts do a credible job of providing
good information and a point of view on
Japan. A basic source both for those who
do not read Japanese or get a daily newspaper about Japan, and for those who do.
At $20 per year academic subscription rate,

this is the best bargain around for anyone
interested in Japan. For further information, contact Japan Economic Institute,
1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; tel: (202) 296-5633.
Keizai Koho Center. 1991. Japan, 1991: An
International Comparison. Tokyo: Keizai
Koho Center. P. A handy compendium of
statistics, many comparative, concerning
Japan's economy, society, and government.
English. Annual. Useful for background
for class lecture. To receive the publication
write to Keizai Koho Center (Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs) 6-1,
Otemachi, 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo
100, Japan.
Also handy is a booklet put out by the
same organization: Japan Information
Resources in the United States, 1990.
About the Author

Ellis S. Krauss
Ellis S. Krauss is
Professor of Political
Science at the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh. He
has conducted re-
search in Japan at
Tokyo, Kyoto, and
Keio universities.
Professor Krauss has
published Japanese
Radicals Revisited (University of California
Press, 1974) as well as three co-edited books
on Japan, Political Opposition and Local
Politics in Japan (Princeton University Press,
1980; with Kurt Steiner and Scott Flanagan),
Conflict in Japan (University of Hawaii
Press, 1984; with Thomas Rohlen and
Patricia Steinhoff), and Democracy in Japan

(University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989; with
Takeshi Ishida).

Roger Bowen, Colby College
Central Points
Japan serves as an excellent case
of the anomaly of the economic
giant-political pygmy whose ability to
always been successful in separating

economic relations from political and
strategic considerations in its rela-
tions with the United States and with
Asian neighbors.
desire to play a larger role. Japan's

attempts to achieve political standing
commensurate with its economic
clout internationally have enjoyed

only minimal success.
Historical factors, especially its
defeat in World War II and the
Occupation of Japan by the United

States, continue to influence Japan's
postwar foreign policy. So too does
the so-called "peace clause" of the
U.S.-imposed Constitution and the
pacifist public consensus that has
grown around it.
Since the war Japan's defense alli-
ance with the United States has had
an enormous impact on foreign

policy, both inhibiting and aiding
Japan's relations with other states.
Japanese dependence on American

defense guarantees sometimes conflicts with Japan's attempts to strike
a more independent foreign policy.
Much of Japan's foreign policy

can be properly termed "economic
diplomacy," yet Japan has not
If Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., is cor-
rect and foreign policy is "the face a

nation wears to the world" (1983, 1),
then the image being projected by
Kaifu's declaration is of a nation
influence international events is
severely limited despite a manifest
June 1990).
self-confident, willing to assist
Introduction
others, bold and ready to take deci-
On June 25, 1990, just two days
sive action when the need arises.
after Japan renewed its thirty-year
Indeed, the world should not be

surprised by such heady rhetoric; the
world well knows by now that
Japanese dependence on
American defense
guarantees sometimes
conflicts with Japan's
Japan's enormous wealth makes it

eminently capable of playing a lead-
attempts to strike a more

independent foreign
policy.
ing political role in the international
arena. Japan produces 15% of the

world's GNP, second only to the
United States; Japan leads the entire
world in providing other nations with
development assistance; and Japan is
the world's largest creditor and
exporter of capital. Militarily Japan

ranks behind only the United States
and the Soviet Union in defense
spending; its military-related tech-
Toshiki Kaifu told a Japanese symposium in Tokyo, "From now on

Japan will go out into the world and
nology is reputed to be among the

most sophisticated in the world. In
brief, Japan seems to possess all the
ingredients of a world-class power.
Yet Japan does not behave like one.
if there is a need, if there is a request

from another party, we should not
Minister Kaifu issued his bold
old treaty of Mutual Security with

the United States, Prime Minister
hesitate in meeting it" (FBIS, 25
March
Only six weeks after Prime
declaration, Iraq invaded Kuwait.
1992
57
Introducing Japan to Comparative Politics
Such international political powers as

the United States, Great Britain, and
other E.C. member-states reacted
quickly by imposing an embargo on

Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil and by freezing
the assets of both Middle Eastern
nations. Japan, on the other hand,

which depends on these two nations
for 12% of its oil imports, waited
three days before following suit.
Compared with past reactions to
international crises, Japan acted

quickly in this instance, at least
initially. But then in the weeks that
followed Iraq's invasion, Japan

dragged its feet while the West, led
by the United States, mobilized military forces in the Gulf. Not until the
end of August did Japan settle on a

policy "package" designed to con-
tribute to the multinational effort to
The Prime Minister also initiated discussions within the government about
legislation that would create a
"United Nations Peace Cooperation
Corps," a noncombat operations
group of some 2,000 members who
would play a support and relief role
for U.N. forces. A special session of
Japan's Diet debated the proposal in
October. Predictably the ruling Liberal Democratic Party met with stiff
resistance from the opposition parties, and outside parliament from
peace groups as well as from spokespersons of Asian nations which in
WWII had fallen victim to Japanese
imperialism. Lacking majority control in the upper house, plagued by
factional divisions within the LDP,
and facing public opinion polls
punish Iraqi aggression.

But the world was not impressed
with Japan's "package," amounting
. . . Japan seems to
to $1 billion of non-military aid to

the multinational force and economic
assistance to Middle Eastern nations
adversely affected by the sanctions
possess all the ingredients

of a world-class power.
Yet Japan does not
said The Economist, referring to
behave like one.
against Iraq. "The Scrooge of Asia,"
Japan's package (September 1, 1990).

Japan's principal ally since World
War II, the United States, likewise
portrayed Japan's policy as one
befitting a miserly wealthy weakling.
"A mere bagatelle," one U.S.

senator called the package; anonymous "high-ranking" American officials scornfully dismissed Japan's
"checkbook diplomacy" and warned
that Washington's "global partnership" with Tokyo was in danger.
"Japan Should Do More," read the
title of a New York Times editorial
(September 1, 1990).
Japan's Foreign Ministry reacted
to American derision in kind, insist-
ing that "one billion dollars is not
peanuts," but nevertheless reevaluated its package in light of American

criticisms. After two weeks of infighting between leaders of the different ministries-Foreign, Inter-
national Trade and Industry (MITI),

the Defense Agency, the Finance
Ministry (MOF), and the Transportation Ministry-Tokyo announced an
upgraded package worth $4 billion to
showing strong opposition to the
proposed law, Kaifu conceded defeat.

When war began in mid January
1991, Japan responded with new
pledges of financial assistance in
hopes of preempting the sort of criticism leveled at its policy the previous
fall. Following a week of internal

LDP squabbling, the Prime Minister
finally pledged $9 billion in additional funds, and further announced

that Japanese military transport
planes would be sent to the Gulf to

ferry refugees away from the conflict. Kaifu warned that failure to
contribute more to the Allied effort
could result in "international isolation." Nevertheless, opposition

forces inside and outside the Party
grumbled about the proposed increase in taxes that would be needed
national U.N.-sponsored military
to pay for the added contribution

and further warned that the use of
military craft abroad would violate
the Constitution. Kaifu came under
intense criticism, moreover, once
reports circulated in Tokyo that the
amount of the additional contribu-
economically damaged by sanctions.
tion had been dictated by Washington which also insisted that Tokyo
be divided equally between the multiforces and the frontline Arab states
58
PS:
Political
refrain from insisting that the funds

be used for nonmilitary purposes.
Washington eventually relented on
the latter issue, and two days after
the war ended in the Gulf, the Clean

Government Party and the Democratic Socialist Party in the Upper
House voted with the LDP in passing
legislation for financing the $9 billion
contribution. Debate continued

around the issue of sending a peacekeeping contingent to the Gulf, how-
ever. In March 1991, the United

States pressed Japan to follow the
example of Germany, another nation
whose Constitution restricts overseas
deployment of its military, and send
minesweepers to the Gulf. One
month later the Japanese government

finally announced that it would contribute to the minesweeping effort.
Surprisingly, just six weeks after the
April 26 dispatch of the minesweep-
ers, one opinion poll revealed that

65% of the public supported this
first post-war overseas venture. But

in December 1991, 50 years after the
attack on Pearl Harbor, an apprehensive public and an oppositioncontrolled Upper House combined to
force the new LDP government of
Kiichi Miyazawa to abandon a
renewed attempt to legalize the participation of Japanese troops in
United Nations peacekeeping operations abroad.
Japan's reaction to the Gulf Crisis

serves as an object lesson to the
problems, limits, and perils of
Japan's foreign policy. The "Schlesingerian" face of Japan's Gulf Crisis
policy reveals what Kent Calder has
described as "the reactive state
(1988)," one which is more likely to
change policy because of outside
pressure than due to strategic con-
cerns. More grossly put, Japan's

behavior in the Gulf Crisis shows the
face of a wealthy weakling, uncertain, timid, slow-responding, conflicted, and vulnerable to outside
pressure, especially American. Obvi-
ously, this is not the "face" projected by Prime Minister Kaifu in the
quotation opening this chapter.

Kaifu is not the first prime minister who has tried to project the
image of a Japan whose international
political role should be commensurate with its economic strength.

Nor is the present Gulf Crisis the
only instance when Japan's foreign
Science
&
Politics
policy has seemed hesitant, contradictory, inconsistent, or, as specialist
Donald Hellman puts it, "schizophrenic" (1988, 369). For antece-
dents and, more importantly, explanations, it is necessary to review
the whole of Japan's postwar foreign

policy. The review will reveal that
international and domestic con-
straints have had, and continue to

have, an enduring braking effect on
the development of an independent,
principled, and active foreign policy,
selves to rapid economic, political,

and military development. "Enriching the nation, strengthening the
military" (fukoku kyohei) and

"civilization and enlightenment"
(bummei kaika) were the two most
important of several slogans adopted
by Meiji oligarchs to symbolize their

policy of catching up with the West
and regaining sovereignty by negoti-
ating an end to the unequal treaties.

Military victories over China in the
1890s and over imperial Russia in
and, hence, on the making of a "Pax

Nipponica" whereby Japan can
become a preeminent political actor
England in 1902, the annexation of

Korea in 1910, and entry into World
together represented Japan's entry

into the international society of
in the international arena.
1905, a military alliance with
War I on the side of the Allies
in the Pre-War Period
Every nation can point to certain

moments in its past that constitute
genuine "turning points," events that
result in fundamental structural and
"civilized," i.e., imperialist, nations.

The unequal treaties were gradually
removed and by 1911 Japan had
regained sovereign control over its
external relations. This did not prevent Western nations, however, from
policy changes that forever alter the
disallowing a racial equality clause to
nation's character. Two such turning
be included into the treaty ending

World War I, nor did it deter the
United States from passing the
points in Japan's modern history
happened because of the United

States; both had lasting impact on
Japan's foreign policy.
The first happened in 1853, when
Commodore Matthew C. Perry's
fleet of warships steamed into Tokyo

Bay for the purpose of forcing Japan
to abandon its almost 250-year-old

policy of sakoku, or "closed
nation," and open its borders to
Oriental Exclusion laws in 1924.
Japan had gained its legal equality

with the West by the end of Meiji,
only to suffer the pains of discrim-
ination during the Taisho Era

(1912-25).
When Depression struck Japan
western trade. Perry's demand,
and the rest of the capitalist world

in the late twenties, western forms
of protectionism were aimed in many
backed by a war-making capability
instances at Japanese exports. Seek-
unimaginable to the Japanese, effectively burst open the bubble of island
consciousness that had long nurtured

provincial feelings of national greatness. Perry's arrival also had the
effect of engendering factionalism
amongst the ruling samurai who split
into coalitions around the issue of
opening Japan to the foreign bar-
barians. Civil war ensued with vic-
tory going to the so-called "realists"

who understood that Japan had to
defer to western military superiority.
The civil war, waged coincidentally

at roughly the same time as Americans fought theirs, concluded with
the "restoration" of the emperor and

the beginning of the Meiji Era (18681912). Humbled and humiliated by
"unequal treaties" imposed by the
stronger Western governments,
Japan's new leaders dedicated them-
ing to secure safe overseas markets

for its exports, lebensraum for its
quickly expanding population, and

security for its investments in China,
the Japanese government condoned

aggression by its military in Man-
churia, leading to its annexation

in 1932. Censure by the League of
Nations led to Japan's decision to
quit the League and adopt a policy
of international outlawry. By 1937
Philippines, all of French Indochina,

British Malaya, and Indonesia
(Dutch East Indies). Prosperous it
was not, great it was, indeed, one of
the largest (geographically) but
shortest-lived empires in world
history.
But native resistance and the
American military proved too powerful. By early 1945 the Americans

began bombing Japanese cities, utterly devastating Tokyo with fire
bombs, and, of course, destroying
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early
August with atomic bombs. By war's
end, the Japanese reckoned that
some three million citizens had lost
their lives during the war. The econ-
omy was in shambles, unemployment

was high, food production was
dangerously low, factory production
had been crippled, the wartime government and its expansionist policies
had been discredited, and aggressive

nationalism had been exposed as a
failed doctrine. The Japanese people
who had sacrificed so much for
national greatness now stood at the

edge wondering exactly who they
were and fearing equally what the
future would bring.
Conditions were perfect for a
second "turning point." Lacking a
government they could trust and a
national raison d'etre they could

believe in, the people of Japan, their
spirit utterly broken, were ready and
willing to obey their conquerors.
Thus begins Japan's American Interlude, 1945-52, fashioned by Supeme
Commander for the Allied Powers
(SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur. During those seven years
SCAP policy laid the basis for

Japan's foreign policy up until
the present day. In a few words,
America's foreign policy became
Japan's; the Occupation made Japan
into a "junior partner" in an
American-led alliance.
Throughout the nearly forty years
Japan was at war with China, had

allied itself with Nazi Germany and
Fascist Italy in 1940, and with the
bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941,
public at large, have split over the
set for itself an irrevocable policy of

war and conquest under the rhetoric
foreign policy should be to the
Prosperity Sphere." At its height, the
tion Socialists and the revisionist
of creating a "Greater East Asia CoJapanese sphere of conquest encompassed much of the eastern half of
China, all of Korea, Taiwan, the
March
that have passed since the Occupation, Japanese foreign policy elites,
the opposition parties, as well as the
issue of how subordinate Japan's

United States. Generally the opposi-
conservatives, such as prime min-
isters Kishi Nobusuke and Nakasone
Yasuhiro, have sought, but for dif-
1992
59
ferent reasons and with different
aims, to make Japan's foreign policy

more independent of America's.
Most specialists agree that both
groups have failed, yet it is equally
evident that as Japan's economy had
progressed from dependency to interdependency with the United States,
in at least some areas, notably

defense, economic diplomacy, and
policies toward the Middle East,
Southeast Asia, and South Africa,
Japan has devised foreign policies
independent of and even occasionally
at odds with American policy
stances. Perhaps the most important
question confronting foreign policy
makers as Japan approaches the
twenty-first century is whither goeth
the U.S.-Japan alliance.
The two metaphors are not incompatible: Okita's "under America's

... wing" and Scalapino's and
Frost's "marriage" analogy bespeak
a crucial truth about this relation-
ship, and hence about Japan's

foreign policy. During most of the
Relations
The cornerstone of Japan's postwar foreign policy has been its

bilateral relationship with the United
States. The relationship was

grounded in Japan's defeat in World
War II, its terms largely defined
during the American Occupation of

Japan (1945-52), and cemented in the
1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty,
amended somewhat in 1960 and just
recently renewed in June of 1990.
The importance of the U.S.-Japan
tie was recently underscored by Okita
Saburo, former Foreign Minister of

Japan (1979-81), "Japan's relations
democratization. Demilitarization
was accomplished rather quickly and

easily with the destruction of Japan's
armaments industry, the purging of
wartime leaders, and the prosecution
post-WWII period, Japan has pretty

much behaved as a submissive "sig-
of war criminals. In order to ensure

that demilitarization would last
bandly dictates, and indeed, even

today betrays old habits of obedience, even loyalty, to United States
Article 9 was inserted into the

American-drafted constitution.
nificant other" to American hus-
foreign policy wishes, requests, and
demands.
In the aftermath of the war Mac-
Arthur's rule was paternalistic, permitting little or no domestic opposition from the Japanese. In the 1950s,
America encouraged Japan to do
more, especially for its self-defense,
Changing U.S.-Japan
The two general goals of the Occupation were demilitarization and
but as Ito Kan puts it, "One of the

fundamental aspects of postwar U.S.
policy toward Japan was to keep
Japan weak and underarmed" (1990,
148). Keep the little woman at home,
and make certain she remembers to
lock the doors. In the 1960s, Japan

became self-absorbed with making
money, which America encouraged,
yet by the time America returned
from its failed war in Vietnam, a war
supported by Japan, it discovered

that the trade relationship with Japan
had gone bad. In the early seventies
America punished Japan in response.
Then when both marriage partners
fell victim to oil extortionists, Japan
went its own way and cut its own
deal. Its purse quickly refattened
beyond the Occupation, the famous
Article 9, commonly known as the

"peace clause," obliges Japan to
"forever renounce war ... and the

threat or use of force as a means of
settling international disputes" and

commits it not to maintain military
forces. This unusual feature,

especially because of foreign authorship, has resulted in frequent calls by
LDP conservatives to revise the Con-
stitution, even as it has helped make

pacifism the ideology of most
Japanese.
The other crucial effect of Article
9 has been to shift the sovereign

responsibility for defense to Japan's
military protector, the United States.
Demilitarized Japan had to depend
on militarized America for defense.
Over the years the arrangement has
nurtured a deep sense of dependency,

even to the extent of legitimizing
"freeridership" under the American

hegemonic umbrella. For the first
twenty years of the U.S.-Japan alliance, during which America enjoyed

a healthy balance of trade surplus
with a Japan still rebuilding, "free-
with the entire world have been
while America's wallet thinned. In
ridership" was not a contentious
shaped by being under America's

economic, social, and political wing
the eighties Japan made much more

money than America, much of it at
America's expense, but also due to
American profligacy. And now as
the nineties begin, talk of divorce,
however "unthinkable," is in the
air. An economically emasculated
America wants more concessions; an
economically empowered Japan is
less inclined to give them.
The facts of this changing relationship give meaning to both metaphors. In the American military
occupation of Japan, SCAP sought
nothing less than to remake Japan's
political and economic systems in
the American image, and, with the
beginning of the Cold War, to use
Japan as the critical link in
issue for either party. Only in the

1970s when Japan turned the trading
relationship to its advantage did the
for more than forty years" (1989,
131).
Another metaphor, especially
favored by Americans for reasons
that should be obvious, used to
describe the U.S.-Japan relationship

is "marriage." Robert Scalapino, for
example, recently wrote, "The
Japanese stake in the economic
health of the United States is steadily

gaining. Thus, a divorce is unthinkable even if the marriage remains
troubled" (1990, 105). Ellen Frost,
whose recent book is titled For
Richer, For Poorer in order to
emphasize the intimacy of the U.S.Japan relationship, bluntly states,
". .. the two countries are so closely
intertwined that 'divorce' is virtually
impossible" (1987, ix).

60
PS:
America's are of containment around
the Soviet Union and the People's

Republic of China (PRC).
Political
United States begin faulting Japan

for taking a free ride on defense.
Nevertheless, Article 9, and the
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, formed
the basis of Japan's foreign policy
in the immediate postwar period.
Japan's security needs were met by
the United States, which built over
one hundred military bases in Japan
accommodating yet today some
50,000 American servicemen. At
American urging, which became
quite strong once the Korean War
(1950) began, Japan did create a Self
Defense Force (SDF) but only slowly
built it from a 120,000-man military
into today's 240,000-man army, navy
and airforce. Government reluctance
to comply with U.S. demands to
Science
&
Politics
rearm can be explained partly by the

clause in Article 9 which forbade
"land, sea, and air forces, as well

as other war potential" from being
maintained. Too, Japanese leaders
also realized that a military buildup
would only antagonize its former
wartime victim nations, the very
countries whose resources Japan
needed for reconstruction.
But the main reason why Japan

decided against large-scale remilitarization was economic. Japanese leaders, supported by a public disillusioned with militarism, recognized
the enormous expense of rearming
Japan into a peace-loving state.

Obviously, as well, as architects of
Japan's postwar constitutional order,
American occupiers were disinclined
to create a political system that
would differ substantially from their
own, if for no other reason than
nations tend to strike alliances with
similarly constituted political systems.

And like the American system, so far
as foreign policy making is concerned, the Japanese system has all
the earmarks of an elitist democracy.
Concretely, this means that foreign
policy is generally made with as little
them and the nation profitably for so

many years.
Japan's foreign policy fits the elitist democracy model since only in the
most indirect way has public opinion,

or the media to the extent it reflects
public opinion, influenced Japan's

foreign policy. Through the electoral
process the public's unbroken en-
dorsement of the LDP in election
after election (the 1989 House of

Councillors election is the sole exception) strongly suggests solid public
support for the conservatives'
policies, probably more so in the case
would drain valuable resources from
regard for public opinion as politically feasible. This does not mean that
of their domestic than their foreign
a war-ravaged economy that could ill
the public is quiescent on controver-
the public does challenge the govern-
afford such an unproductive venture,

especially at a time when the Americans, for their own strategic reasons
elites always ignore public sentiment
in the Cold War, were only too willing to bear the burden of Japan's
security. Instead of wasting scarce
resources on the military, therefore,
Japan's leaders, principally Prime
Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1946-47,
1948-54), made the decision to
muster the nation's energies into
producing economic growth.
The political decision to foster economic growth, to forego a military
build-up, and to rely on U.S. security
guarantees constitutes the basic three
dimensions of the so-called "Yoshida
Doctrine." This doctrine essentially

remains today as the pillar of
Japanese foreign policy. Pragmatic

dependency on the U.S. alliance has
meant comparatively minimal investments in defense and maximum
investments in economic growth.
This formula is another way of

describing Japan's postwar foreign
policy as "overwhelmingly economic" (Hellman 1988, 373) and
also helps to explain why some critics
say it is "in lock-step synchronization with U.S. strategic planning"
(Shindo 1989, 278).
Central to Japan's alliance with
sial issues, nor does it mean that
when making policy. However plur-
. . . the main reason why
Japan decided against

large-scale remilitarization
was economic.
alistic Japan's political system is
becoming, foreign policy since the
war, but most especially in the 1950s,
democratization was as important as
7, 1990, when the Kaifu Government
was slowly and cautiously developing

a policy toward the Crisis, one
opinion poll showed an overwhelming 70%o approval rating for Kaifu's
foreign policy and a 580% overall

approval rating for his government.
But in October, as Kaifu's cabinet
roles, public opinion quickly shifted

to a two-to-one margin against
and high-ranking bureaucrats of the

most powerful ministries, especially
breaking with the pacifist consensus

as represented by Article 9 and the
International Trade and Industry

(MITI) and Finance (MOF). The
Foreign Ministry, and even farther
removed from decision making

power, the Defense Agency, denied
as it is ministerial status, influence

foreign policy only secondarily. By
the 1980s, policy-oriented rank and
file LDP politicians, aligned in socalled zoku (tribes), as well as
conspicuous, roles in the policy process. Interest groups such as big
demilitarization in transforming
One such instance happened during the Gulf Crisis. As late as August
ing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
few factional leaders within the rul-
second of the Occupation's two

goals, democratization. Its relevance
not to be aggressors in international

politics, and therefore believed that
innovation.
endorsed the sending of members of

the SDF to the Gulf in non-combat
bureaucrats from other ministries,

began playing more important, if less
policy should not be overlooked.

Occupation leaders operated on the
assumption that democracies tend
ment's policy, it happens usually

because the LDP appears to be
modifying the Yoshida Doctrine. On
those occasions, public opinion can
act as a constraint on policy
1960s, and 1970s, has been made by

the Prime Minister, his cabinet, a
the United States has been the
for understanding Japan's foreign
policies. In the rare instances when
business and farmers have exercised
influence in particular instances

where foreign economic policy
affects their interests directly, but
generally they defer to the governing
elites whose record in promoting economic nationalism, as embodied in
the Yoshida Doctrine, have served
March
Yoshida Doctrine. With such clear
public opposition, politically manifested in a bare victory for the LDP

candidate in an October by-election,
Kaifu backed away from the United
Nations Peace Cooperation Corps
legislation. Kaifu had to yield to
popular sentiment, perhaps best sum-
marized by an unnamed woman cited
in an interview with a New York
Times correspondent: "If Japan is

criticized, that's that. It might sound
selfish to you (American reporter),
but I'm very afraid of becoming

involved in another war" (International Herald Tribune, November
5, 1990).
Again, however, this exception
helps prove the rule that foreign
policy is made with as little regard
for public opinion as possible. A

commonly cited example of public
1992
61
powerlessness to influence foreign

policy is the 1960 Security Treaty
Crisis. Then the LDP government

acted to uphold the Yoshida Doctrine, despite massive popular
opposition.
The 1960 Crisis concerned ratifica-
tion of a modestly revised version of
the original 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. For Japan important revisions included the removal of a
clause permitting American troops in

Japan to serve as police in emergency
situations; a clause calling for the
reduction of American troop levels in

Japan while getting a more explicit
promise to defend Japan from exter-
nal aggression; and a "prior consultation" clause that, if nothing

else, symbolized greater equality in
the alliance. Then Prime Minister
Kishi Nobusuke, a conservative revisionist who sought greater autonomy

from U.S. control, saw the revisions
as important steps toward restoration
of full sovereignty for Japan.
The Treaty itself, quite apart from
any revisions, was opposed by both
the right and left wings. The right
wing objected to the treaty as
foreign-imposed, the left objected to
any military relationship with the
leading protagonist of the Cold War,
feeling that it would result in Japan
being targeted in some future nuclear
war. Kishi, however, was determined
to see the treaty ratified by parliament before President Eisenhower
visited Japan, scheduled for June.
Kishi's resignation, but replaced him

with another strongman, Ikeda
Hayato (1960-64), who was just as
supportive of the Treaty but more in
the Yoshida mold of emphasizing
economic growth over contentious
foreign policy issues.
Preserving the pillar of Japan's
postwar foreign policy, the alliance
with the United States, was deemed
more important than following parliamentary procedure or heeding
public opinion. Prime Minister Sato's
government (1964-72) acted according to the same assumption in unobtrusively supporting the American
war in Vietnam, despite strong and
Japan 's foreign policy fits
the elitist democracy
model since only in the

most indirect way has
public opinion, or the

media to the extent it
reflects public opinion,

influenced Japan 's foreign
policy.
unceasing public protest. For the
public the pacifist provision of the
Constitution took precedence over

the security ties with the United
Debate in parliament got out of hand
States; for Sato the opposite held
when members of the Socialist Party
true.
took the Speaker of the House captive; police were called to remove the
Socialists physically. The JSP thereafter boycotted Diet sessions. Outside
the Diet building, hundreds of thousands of students, workers, and
peace advocates demonstrated. Petitions opposing the Treaty garnered
13 million signatures; and most every
major newspaper scolded the Government for using authoritarian tactics in parliament. Ignoring them all,
Kishi used his LDP majority in the
Diet to ramrod ratification of the
Treaty when the Socialists were
absent. Eisenhower's visit was can-
celled-his personal security could

not be guaranteed so angry had the
demonstrators become-and Kishi
travelled to Washington instead.

Shortly thereafter LDP leaders got
62
PS.
Yet another example of elite control over foreign policy is Japan's
China policy. Despite left-wing and

strong business support for establish-
ing diplomatic relations with China

ever since the 1950s, Japan did not
open up relations until after the
United States first approached the
People's Republic of China in 1971.
One Japanese critic recently characterized Japan's dependence on the
U.S. lead in formulating a China
policy as "like an obedient dog led
by its master" (Shindo 1989, 278). In
the Houston Summit meeting in July
1990, Kaifu seemed to deflate such
criticism by boldly announcing that
Japan was determined to release an
810 billion Yen loan package to
China, regardless of the views of
Western nations still punishing China
Political
for the Tiananmen Square massacre,
but later when it was learned that
President Bush had quietly given his

approval to the Japanese loan,
Kaifu's boldness appeared as mere
bluster.
There is no shortage of examples

of elites setting Japan's foreign
policy agenda according to American

preferences, indeed, says one student
of Japan's policy, "the general principle of Japanese foreign policy is

cooperation with Washington"
(Shimizu 1988, 385). One concrete
measurement of this principle is that
for the first twenty-five years of the
postwar U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan
voted with the United States over

90% of the time in the United
Nations.
Japan has been willing to play the

role of "junior partner" to the
United States because followership
has been in its national self-interest.
In exchange for serving as a forward

deployment base for the American
military in the Pacific, Japan has
received a cheap ride on defense and
a lucrative trade and commercial
relationship from its number one

trading partner.
Japan's defense expenditures have

always been small as a proportion of
its Gross National Product (GNP).
The most expensive years were the
1950s when first building the Self-
Defense Force; but even then, Japan

never spent even as much as 3 % of
its GNP on defense in any year during that decade. After 1967, and for
the next twenty years, Japan kept
defense expenditures below 1% of
GNP, while the United States was
spending around 6 to 70% and most
NATO nations around 4%. In 1976

Prime Minister Miki's cabinet made
official the 1 o limit on military
spending in the Government's

National Defense Program Outline;
the limit was honored by his successors until Prime Minister Nakasone
barely exceeded the limit in 1987. But

that measure hardly proved to be the
psychological breakthrough that
Nakasone expected. Opinion polls
show that the Japanese public
remains wedded to the notion of a
1% o limit (the defense budget for FY

1990 is barely under 1% o of GNP), as
well as to the other now commonly

accepted features of Japan's defense
profile. These are: (1) a ban on the
Science
&
Politics
export of arms and military technology, a commitment first made by
billion in 1990). As a general rule,
Prime Minister Sato in 1968 and
the higher the American trade deficit

with Japan, the louder and more fre-
modified only in 1983 by Nakasone
quent are American calls for Japan
The most recent round of Japanese

commercial concessions, the so-called
to make technology transfers to the
to beef up its defense.
United States the sole exception; (2)

the "three nonnuclear principles,"
also announced by Sato during the
Vietnam War when the Japanese
public became nervous about supporting America. The principles say
that Japan will not possess, produce,
or introduce nuclear weapons into
Japan; and (3) the periodic re-
Japan has to acknowledge such

calls even if it does not always sub-
Structural Impediments Initiative
affirmations by a succession of
Prime Ministers to abide by Article 9
of the Constitution. Even the so-
called "hawk" on defense, Nakasone

(1982-87), reaffirmed Japan's commitment to a small military and an
"exclusively defensive defense" while

promising that Japan would never
become a great military power.
mit to them. The United States has
throughout the postwar period been

Japan's number one trade partner;
their two-way trade ranks second in
the world, after only U.S.-Canada
trade. Over the past several years
some 35% of all Japanese exports
have gone to the United States while
well over 200%7 of all Japanese imports came from the United States.
Such trade figures clearly reveal the
American pressure on
Japan to assume greater
Not coincidentally, Nakasone

made that promise while calling on
the Prime Minister of Papua New
responsibility for its
Guinea in the early eighties. But
coincided with a
every Japanese leader has issued

similar promises, including Kaifu in
May 1990, when visiting Southeast
Asian nations, or, for that matter,
East Asian nations with which Japan

has significant commercial ties. This
aspect of Japanese foreign policy
constitutes a second reason for keeping defense expenditures low: the
need to reassure former victims of
Japanese military aggression that

history will not repeat itself.
Meanwhile, the constant American
refrain has been for Japan to beef up
its military, to share the burden for
its defense and the defense of Asia.
American pressure on Japan to

assume greater responsibility for its
defense has usually coincided with

a comparative weakening of the
American economy vis-A-vis Japan's.
The pattern first showed itself when
America's "imperial overstretch" in
the Vietnam War coincided with
Japan's economic recovery and trade

surpluses with the United States.
Since then the problem has only got-
ten worse. By 1972 Japan was running a $4 billion trade surplus with
the United States, by 1977 an $8

billion surplus, and by 1981, a $15
billion surplus; the figure peaked at
over $52 billion in 1987 and has since
hovered around $45 to $50 billion
(although the estimate is "only" $40
defense has usually

comparative weakening of
the American economy
vis-a-vis Japan 's.
interdependency of the two giant
economies.
America really wants (and needs)

redress.
(SII) of 1990, discussed below, is
remarkably similar in substance to
Japan's 1972 "Seven Point Program" designed to address American

complaints about Japan's mounting
trade surplus with the United States.
Then, as in 1990, Japan agreed to

spend more on public works and
capital outlays, to expand its imports
of American goods, to make fairer
its marketing and retailing system, to
export more capital, and to forge a
"self-reliant" defense in tune with

the so-called "Nixon Doctrine." In
exchange President Nixon promised

to support Japan's quest for a seat
as a permanent representative on the
United Nations Security Council, a
status symbol still not attained and

still used as a lure by the Americans,
most recently in September 1990 in a
failed attempt to induce Japan to
send troops to Saudi Arabia.

Although Japan increased its
defense budget modestly in 1972-73,

it still remained less than 1% of
GNP. Concessions in the other areas
were likewise modestly implemented.
The point, however, is that Japan
makes concessions in the economic
ings to increase defense spending is
sphere in order to deflect American

criticism away from the existing
defense arrangement. The further
and relations with former victims of
point is that in the U.S.-Japan

defense relationship, political and
Japan's response to American urgpatterned; Japan's peace constitution

Japanese imperialism are genuine
constraints making compliance diffi-
cult. Nonetheless Japan increases its

defense budget annually by as much
as 5 to 6%, points to the absolute
dollar amount (nearly $30 billion in
1990, up from $10 billion in 1982),
buys more American arms and military technolgy thus reducing the
American trade deficit, assumes
greater responsibility for development assistance to strategic U.S.
allies (such as Pakistan and Turkey),
and even periodically increases its
financial support of American bases
in Japan, but Japan does not aban-
don the essence of the Yoshida Doctrine. Instead of altering the basic
defense arrangement, Japan offers
concessions in commercial relations,
which is, after all, exactly the area of
the U.S.-Japan relationship where
March
economic issues had gotten intertwined, which remains the situation
today. The penultimate point is that
all the U.S. talk about "burden shar-
ing" and "equal partnership" actual-
ly reflects American economic decline
and Japanese ascension as an economic power. And the final point is

that America can usually squeeze
concessions, such as they are, from
Japan because Japanese leaders then
as now perceive the Security Treaty
and U.S.-Japan commercial relations

as central to Japan's survival.
Periodically the United States acts

to remind Japan of its dependence.
A year before Japan conceded the
"Seven Points Program," the United
States "shocked" the Japanese consciousness with an awesome display
of American leverage over Japan's
commercial and foreign policy. With
1992
63
no prior consultation, Nixon announced in July 1971 that he would

be visiting China in February, leaving
Japan, the last major power withholding diplomatic recognition from
China, out to dry. Nixon also issued
Japan an ultimatum to restrict textile

imports to the United States, to
which Japan yielded in part because

delivery on the 1969 American prom-
ise to return U.S.-occupied Okinawa

to Japanese control rested on
Japanese compliance on textiles. The
textiles conflict, accompanied by a
10% surcharge on Japanese imports
to the United States, was followed in
August 1972 by Nixon's so-called
"dollar shock." By floating the
dollar and thereby inflating the value
of the yen, U.S. policy caused slower
economic growth, reduced exports,
and set off a record number of bank-
ruptcies in Japan. If that was not
enough, in 1973 Nixon imposed a
short-term embargo on soybean

exports to Japan, conclusively proving Japanese vulnerability to the
exercise of American power.
The two "oil shocks" of the 1970s
only exacerbated Japan's sense of
end the OPEC oil embargo against

Japan. In so doing, however, Japan
broke ranks with the United States
and western European nations which

refused to give into blackmail. Oil
dependency on the Middle East, then
supplying 85% of Japan's oil needs,
forced Japan to deviate, in the words
of one observer, "from its traditional
'follow America' diplomatic line"
(Shimizu 1988, 384). By distancing
itself from Israel and adopting a line
toward the Palestinian issue that was
acceptable to petroleum exporting

countries, Japan convinced OPEC to
reopen the spigots by December
1973.
The Nixon shocks and the oil
shocks were countered by Japan with
economic or "resource diplomacy,"

also more broadly known as "multilateral diplomacy," "omnidirectional
diplomacy," and "comprehensive
security," all terms used by Japanese
foreign policy analysts to refer to the
pragmatic and necessary steps (1) to

diversify various Japanese dependen-
cies and trading relationships, (2) to

develop overseas' resources, (3) to
stockpile crucial commodities at
toric sense of "victim conscious-
home, and (4) to curry favor with

primary producers by providing
ness," succinctly described by Karl

Van Wolferen, "Japanese popular
in the form of grants and loans.
vulnerability and heightened its his-
generous "development assistance"
imagery has long viewed the nation
Concrete examples include the purchase of more oil from Mexico,

Southeast Asia, and China so that
victim of uncontrollable external
today 710% of its oil, rather than
as surrounded by an unreliable and

capricious world, and as the potential
forces" (1990, 47). Such thinking is

understandable for an import-dependent nation like Japan which must
buy 9907o of all its oil, 90% of its
wheat, soybeans, corn and feed
grains, as well as most of its iron

ore, nonferrous metals, lumber,
uranium, coal, and natural gas. Most

tellingly, Japan relies on imports to
meet a full 70% of its food needs.
Such resource dependency, quite

naturally, tends to result in "resource
diplomacy" and a reactive foreign

policy that is constantly conjuring ad
hoc solutions to externally induced
shortfalls of necessary goods.
Fresh on the heels of the Nixon
shocks, the first oil shock of 1973

threw Japan's economy into a tailspin; high inflation, panic and hoarding, and negative growth combined
to send Japanese leaders rushing to
the oil-producing nations to strike
whatever deal they could in order to
64
PS:
85% as in 1973 or 80% at the time
of the second "oil shock" in 1979,

comes from the Middle East. Also,
during the Iran-Iraq war of the
1980s, Japan cultivated friendly relations with both warring nations,
despite American displeasure, with
the effect that during the 1990 Gulf

Crisis, increased oil imports from
Iran nearly compensated for the loss
of Kuwaiti and Iraqi oil.

Since the Nixon shocks, and
relationship involves fundamental

philosophical differences with
another nation's political system,
Japan's typical response has been to

"separate politics from economics"
(seikei bunri). In its trading relations
with, say, Khomeini's Iran or racist
South Africa, Japan has clearly
stated that the economic tie should
not be regarded as an endorsement

of either nation's repressive politics.
Generally the official American reaction has been neither to condone nor
condemn this practice, recognizing
that resource dependency makes it
difficult for Japan to adhere consistently to a democratically principled
foreign policy. Nevertheless, in Con-
gress and amongst the American

public, Japan's practice of giving
primacy to economic relations over
political principles has slowly generated such epithets as "Japan,
Inc.," "economic animal," and
"predatory" commercial and foreign
aid practices.
Not surprisingly, criticism of
Japan's economic practices worsens
in the United States during periods
when the American economy is weak
and the Japanese economy is strong,
and especially when the bilateral
trading relationship accentuates
Japan's strength and America's
weakness. During these periods1968-72, 1976-78, and 1981 to the
present-the American predominantly military notion of security and the
Japanese predominantly economic
notion of security have come into
conflict. But because the Japanese
tend to believe that their economic
security rests on American defense

security guarantees and the larger
economic benefits gained from the
bilateral trading relationship, the
Americans invariably enjoy strong
leverage in negotiations over trade
and other disputes.

In the late seventies, for instance,
as America's trade deficit with Japan
because of recurring trade disputes

with the United States-textiles in the
mounted to $8 billion and a be-
1960s, TV and steel in the 1970s, and
leaguered post-Vietnam War America
automobiles and semiconductors in
the 1980s-Japanese policy makers

have adopted a more comprehensive
notion of national security that
makes friendly relations with virtually every resource-rich nation and
not just those favored by the United
States, central to Japanese foreign
policy. In instances where a trading
Political
struggled to restore its economy and

national self-esteem, complaints
about Japan's "free ride" on defense

grew in Congress. President Carter
sought to reduce defense expenditures in East Asia in part by paring
back American troop levels stationed
in Korea. Carter also came under
pressure from the American steel
Science
&
Politics
industry to levy fines on Japan for
"dumping" steel products in the
American market and from American television manufacturers to
Such concessions, however modest,

developed gradually enough so that
when Prime Minister Suzuki in 1981
referred publicly to the U.S.-Japan

relationship as an "alliance," despite
a public outcry, most commentators
acknowledged the remark as an
impose export restraints on Japan.

Already apprehensive about the reliability of the American defense commitment to Japan in the wake of the
obvious truth.
increasing financial support for
nationalist on record as favoring constitutional revision, former head of
U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, and

regarding South Korea's security as
central to its own, Japan's leaders
reacted to Carter's new policies by
American troops stationed in Japan,

by purchasing more U.S. manufactured military items, by accepting
"voluntary" export restraints, and
by promising another "package" of
trade concessions that would result in
Certainly one LDP leader who did

was Nakasone Yasuhiro, chosen
Prime Minister in 1982. Longtime
the Defense Agency, and well known
"hawk" on defense issues, Nakasone's ascension to power seemed to
signal a fundamental shift in Japanese foreign policy away from the
the purchase of more value-added
passive Yoshida Doctrine and dependence on U.S. security promises but
manufactured goods from the United
in ways that would nonetheless har-
States. At the time only 41% of U.S.

goods sold to Japan were manufac-
monize with President Reagan's
hardline anticommunist views. Naka-
tured items (in FY 1990 the figure is
sone, many believed, would be the
closer to 50%). But Japan hedged its
leader whose foreign policy reflected

Japan's emergent status as a great
bets by also signing a big trade deal
with Peking, as well as a Peace and
power. Nakasone tried hard not to
Friendship Treaty partly in order to

reduce the possibility of Chinese
disappoint them.
Early in his administration Nakasone engineered a partial reversal of
Japan's long-standing policy prohibiting the export of military technology by making the United States
meddling in the Korean peninsula.

By cultivating such alternative
markets, Japan clearly signalled the
U.S. that interdependence would not

be permitted to degenerate into
dependence.
Because the second oil shock in
1979 slowed Japanese economic

expansion, Japan devoted greater
attention to economic problems, at
the insistence of the Ministry of
Finance, and less to renewed American pressure to spend more on
defense. Japan palliated U.S. pressure, however, by supporting punitive actions taken by the Americans
against the Soviets in the wake of the
invasion of Afghanistan, and by suspending economic relations with
Vietnam after it invaded Cambodia.
Japanese leaders further yielded to

American pressure by enlarging the
official definition of self-defense
to include protection of sea lanes

extending as far as 1,000 miles from
the Japanese islands. Joint military
exercises with American forces and
additional financial support for U.S.

troops stationed in Japan, by 1981
amounting to $1 billion, both signalled a growing willingness in the
early eighties to share a greater
responsibility for its own defense.
the exception to the rule. He also

broached the issue of revising the
constitution in discussions with
TABLE 1.
Japan's Direct Overseas Investment

by Region and Country
(as of March 31, 1990) (US$ million)
FY 1989 FY 1951-89
Amount Total
United States 32,540 104,400

Canada 1,362 4,593
North America, Total 33,902 108,993
United Kingdom 5,239 15,793

Luxembourg 654 5,383
Netherlands 4,547 10,072

Germany, F.R. 1,083 3,448
France 1,136 2,899
Switzerland 397 1,829
Spain 501 1,546
Europe, Total 14,808 44,972
Indonesia 631 10,435
Hong Kong 1,898 8,066
Singapore 1,902 5,715
Korea, Republic of 606 3,854
China 438 2,474

Malaysia 673 2,507
Taiwan
494
2,285
Thailand 1,276 2,088

Philippines 202 1,322
Asia, Total 8,238 40,465
Australia 4,256 12,394
Oceania, Total 4,618 13,933
Saudi Arabia/Kuwait 32 1,415
Middle East, Total 66 3,404
Panama 2,044 14,902
Brazil 349 5,946
Cayman 1,658 6,743
South America, Total 5,238 36,855
Liberia 643 4,301
Africa, Total 671 5,275
Total 67,540 253,896
Reagan; he went beyond Suzuki's
Source: Keizai Koho Center, Japan 1991: An

International Comparison (Tokyo, 1991).
United States by referring to Japan
Note: Figures are the accumulated value of

approvals and notification. Source: Ministry
of Finance, Japan.
declaration of an "alliance" with the
as "a big aircraft carrier" in the
Pacific. In 1985 he broke with tradi-
tion again, this time by visiting the
Yasukuni Shrine where Japan's
World War II militarists are buried.
The next year he agreed to cooperate

with Reagan's "Star Wars" (Strategic Defense Initiative) program;
and in 1987 his defense budget
exceeded, but only barely, the sacrosanct 1% o limit for the first time in
twenty years. Nakasone's list of

accomplishments is lengthy, yet as
Kenneth Pyle correctly asserts, his
attempts to establish "a more activist
foreign policy were limited and often
symbolic." Nakasone "modified the

Yoshida Doctrine by making changes
around the edges" (Pyle, 1987, 268,
269).
Yet that Nakasone went as far as
he did bespeaks as much as anything

else the perceived need for Japan to
March
placate the Americans in the area of

defense precisely when the U.S.Japan economic relationship was
deteriorating at quicksilver speed.
Japan's economy boomed during
the eighties while America's floundered in budget deficits, trade deficits, and unprecedented borrowing.
Further, as Japan's economy truly
internationalized, especially after
1985, its overseas investments, nearly
half of which went to the United
States, made its rising wealth in relation to America's growing indebted-
ness all the more conspicuous to an
American public straining to believe
Reagan's "feel good about America"

rhetoric. Between 1987 and 1989,
Japan's overseas investments were
1992
65
larger than all its investments made

abroad between 1951 and 1986. In
FY 1989 (through March 31, 1990)

alone, Japan sent $67.5 billion
abroad, half of that to the United
States, and spent another $14 billion
in 174 mergers and acquisitions of
American companies (see Table 1).
To read the financial pages of any
major American newspaper in the
late 1980s was to learn that Japan
seemed to be buying up America.
Well publicized purchases of American landmarks, like Columbia Pic-
the American reforms. Millions of
small retailers and large industrial
groupings (keiretsu), however, whose

support the LDP relies on, oppose
aspects of SII-related legislation
retained a competitive edge with
which may mean that implementation of the reforms will prove prob-
mercial advantage.
lematic. Furthermore, since SII also
resulted in American agreement to

strengthen its economy by, among
other things, reducing the deficit and
increasing the savings rate, it's quite
possible that American failure to fulfill its part of the bargain will serve
tures and Rockefeller Center, made

the American pain all the worse.
as a convenient excuse for Japan to

renege as well.
world's number one debtor nation,
its SII promises, American insistence
and Japan the number one creditor

nation; that Japan had taken first
place from the United States in dis-
on a greater Japanese commitment to

security arrangements is unlikely to
Then to learn that America was the
bursing "foreign aid" (Overseas

Development Assistance) was like
pouring the proverbial salt in the
gaping wound of American pride,

Reagan rhetoric notwithstanding.
The result: Business Week's well-
known August 1989 poll: Americans
are less fearful of the Soviet's mili-
tary power than of Japan's economic

(August 7, 1989, 51).
Washington's response today to
Japanese advances echoes that of
space was one of the few remaining
industries where the United States
However fully Japan implements
cease. Before the Gulf Crisis broke
out, Secretary of State Baker told the

Asia Society, "The time has arrived
for Japan to translate its domestic
and regional successes more fully
into a broader international role with
Japan, Americans were uncomforta-
ble with the prospect of losing comAt roughly this juncture in the
squabbling, it was revealed that the

Toshiba Corporation illegally transferred American military technology
to the Soviets, thereby causing
serious damage to U.S. security.
Relying on trade legislation, the
United States slapped sanctions on

imports from Toshiba. At the same
time, the Reagan administration took
retaliatory measures against Japanese
microchip producers by imposing
100% tariffs on electronic imports.
To defuse the trade conflict and
derail American protectionism, the
Japanese government agreed to codevelopment of the fighter plane.
At this stage, 1988, the FSX symbolized a genuine partnership, with
both nations sharing technologies
increased responsibilities" (New York

Times, June 27, 1989). Recent
Japanese leaders, including Kaifu,
with the other, hence its importance
have been receptive to this message,
mutual trust. But during the next

year pressure was applied by American congessmen and trade specialists,
although they've been quick to add
that increased burden-sharing should
went well beyond mere defense coop-
eration to reflect renewed attitudes of
be accompanied by increased power-
who feared that American aircraft
unfair, which is what the Structural
sharing in return. America, some

Japanese critics observe, seems disinclined to trust Japan with greater
Impediments Initiative (SII) does,

insist on change, and intone once
power. Some observers point to the

recent FSX (fighter plane) flap as
used in the same way that computer

memory chips, videocassette record-
earlier administrations: attack
Japan's commercial practices as
more that Japan must assume greater
responsibilities for its and Asia's

security.
SII essentially tells Japan to restructure its economy and reorder its
economic priorities in ways that
should theoretically benefit the
United States's position in the bilateral relationship. The aim of SII is

to reorient the Japanese economy
away from export reliance and hidden trade and investment barriers,
and toward greater market liberalization and consumer spending; it calls
for the diversion of some $3 trillion
in governmental funds to public
works spending over the next ten
years. Japanese consumers, who on
average pay some 42% more for the
same goods as Americans, stand to
gain from lower prices and improved
road, sewerage and park systems, as
they themselves are well aware.
Opinion polls show a majority favor
66
PS:
evidence.
The FSX was initially conceived in

the mid-eighties as an exclusively
Japanese project to develop a next

generation support fighter for the Air
Self Defense Force. By 1987, how-
ever, American military contractors,
congressmen and U.S. officials worried that an independent Japanese

defense industry would cut into U.S.
exports of aircraft to Japan in the
future. They combined to press
Japan either to purchase existing
American-made fighters or to enter
in with American manufacturers in
technology would wind up being

ers, and television sets had been used
by Japan in the past, i.e., Japan
would improve on these American
inventions and take the industrial
lead. As such worries mounted, the
Bush administration effected a revision of the earlier memorandum of
understanding with Japan in order to
ensure that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, the prime contractor and sym-
bol of Japan's economic prowess,

would not gain advantage in the
aerospace industry by getting F-16C
technology. The Japanese government responded with a plea to sep-
arate trade from defense issues, but
Bush gave into domestic pressure and
co-development of the experimental

aircraft. Japan's defense establishment, and the principal contractor
insisted on revision of the original
for the project, Mitsubishi Heavy
States was about to take retaliatory

action once again, this time against
Industries, preferred that Japan go it
alone, not only because it would be
more cost effective, but also to
reduce Japan's dependency on U.S.

aerospace technology. But as aero-
Political
agreement. Japan conceded just
when it appeared that the United
Japan for failing to liberalize its telecommunications market. The issue of

free trade, the sine qua non of
Japan's economic survival, had to
Science
&
Politics
take precedence over defense. And

for the United States, Washington's
reneging on the original agreement
symbolized, as the New York Times

put it, a "new concern over the
economic dimension of national
security" (April 29, 1989).

The meaning of the FSX affair for
Japan was that Washington did not

trust Tokyo enough to share power,
military technology in this case, and
further denigrated Japanese sovereignty by imposing what one critic
called an "unequal treaty" on Japan

(Ishihara 1989, 65). Making matters
worse, less than a year later, in
March 1990, the U.S. Marine com-
mander in Japan stated that Ameri-
can troops needed to stay in Japan

as "a cap in the bottle," that is, to
prevent Japan from becoming a military power once again. This at a time
when Japan is paying for 40% of the
expense of maintaining U.S. troops
in Japan (to be increased to 50%o by
1995). The Japanese must wonder
about the contradictions in Washington's mixed messages: Spend more
on defense but don't build your own
fighter planes, and pay for the
American troops who guard you
against yourselves.
The contradictions may be catching up with Washington. In September 1990, the House of Representatives passed a resolution, 370-53, that
proposes withdrawing U.S. troops
from Japan unless Japan agrees to
pay the full cost of maintaining
them. The resolution was answered
by the Director-General of the

Defense Agency with the remark:
"Japan has never asked for the stationing of troops. Let them (the
Americans) go home" (FBIS, October 1, 1990). Yet just months before,

in July 1990, Prime Minister Kaifu
wrote, "Japan considers it important
to contribute to regional stability--
and, by extension, to the peace and

stability of the world-by cooperat-
ing with the United States under the

security arrangements provided for
by the mutual security treaty" (1990,
32). It seems as if the Americans do

not have a monopoly on contra-
dictions.
ing the war, but winning the peace."

Military aggression proved ultimately
ineffectual for securing Japan access
to Asia's markets, raw materials,

cheap labor, and investment opportunities, but Japan's aggessive economic policies since the war have
proven stunningly effective. Today
Japan is the number one trading
partner with, leading investor in, and
major donor of aid to most nations
in Asia.
many Asians. Nevertheless Japan

perseveres to prove that not only
does it not have hegemonic intentions
in Asia, but also that it wishes to
lead the nations of Asia into an era
of unprecedented economic growth,
cooperation, and mutual respect.

A rough road to hoe. As recently
as the fall of 1990, when Japan pro-
posed the creation of a small, noncombat United Nations Peace Coop-
eration Corps, former victims of
Yet the "face" that Japan's foreign policy projects to many Asian
Japanese aggression denounced this

proposal as evidence of a revival of
nations is of an untrustworthy,
Japanese militarism. Aware of this

prospect, the Japanese foreign
ministry attempted to allay such suspicions by consulting broadly with its
rapacious, aggrandizing economic
machine that systematically exploits

the human and material resources of
Asia for its own profit while enjoying American protection, but forever
threatening to make itself into a
dominant military power in Asia.
Such harsh imagery bears the heavy
imprint of historical aggression and
presentday strategic alliances that the
passing of forty-five years and
repeated signs of greater Japanese
independence from the United States
seem unable to erase in the minds of
Asian neighbors. China and South

Korea especially, however, demurred.
At first glance, their demurral is
difficult to explain in rational terms
(see Table 2). South Korea is Japan's

second leading single country trading
partner, has had diplomatic relations
with Japan since 1965, is the recipient of billions of dollars of Japanese
aid and investment, and has received
a formal apology from Japan for
TABLE 2.
Japan's Leading Trading Partners (1987-1989)a

Japan's Exports to-
1987 1988 1989 1987 1988 1989
(US$ millions) (percentages)
United States 83,580 89,634 93,188 36.5 33.8 33.9

ECb 37,693 46,873 47,908 16.4 17.7 17.4
Korea, Republic of 13,229 15,441 16,561 5.8 5.8 6.0
Germany, F.R. 12,833 15,793 15,920 5.6 6.0 5.8
Taiwan 11,346 14,354 15,421 4.9 5.4 5.6
China 8,250 9,476 8,516 3.6 3.6 3.1
Australia 5,146 6,680 7,805 2.2 2.5 2.8
Canada 5,611 6,424 6,807 2.4 2.4 2.5
United Kingdom 8,400 10,632 10,741 3.7 4.0 3.9
Indonesia 2,990 3,054 3,301 1.3 1.2 1.2
Saudi Arabia 3,239 3,142 2,763 1.4 1.2 1.0
Hong Kong 8,872 11,706 11,526 3.9 4.4 4.2
Singapore 6,008 8,311 9,239 2.6 3.1 3.4
Malaysia 2,168 3,060 4,124 0.9 1.2 1.5
France 4,014 4,987 5,298 1.8 1.9 1.9
United Arab Emirates 1,118 1,286 1,296 0.5 0.5 0.5
Switzerland 2,266 2,775 2,664 1.0 1.0 1.0
U.S.S.R. 2,563 3,130 3,082 1.1 1.2 1.1
Netherlands 4,071 5,054 5,112 1.8 1.9 1.9
Thailand 2,953 5,162 6,838 1.3 1.9 2.5
Italy 2,103 2,787 2,783 0.9 1.1 1.0

South Africa 1,863 2,047 1,717 0.8 0.8 0.6
Belgium 2,697 3,390 3,455 1.2 1.3 1.3
India 1,957 2,082 2,018 0.9 0.8 0.7
Mexico 1,389 1,772 1,908 0.6 0.7 0.7
Brazil 879 998 1,310 0.4 0.4 0.5
East Asian Co-prosperity

Sphere?
Philippines 1,415 1,740 2,381 0.6 0.7 0.9
Japan's relations with Asia today

give meaning to the expression, "los-
World, Total 229,221 264,917 275,175 100.0 100.0 100.0
Kuwait 857 730 671 0.4 0.3 0.2

Sweden 1,931 2,319 2,174 0.8 0.9 0.8
March
1992
67
ly of the United States. Japan's con-
TABLE 2 (continued).
Japan's Imports from-1987 1988 1989 1987 1988 1989
(US$ millions) (percentages)
United States 31,490 42,037 48,246 21.1 22.4 22.9
ECb 17,670 24,071 28,146 11.8 12.8 13.3
Korea, Republic of 8,075 11,811 12,994 5.4 6.3 6.2

Germany, F.R. 6,150 8,101 8,995 4.1 4.3 4.3
Taiwan 7,128 8,743 8,979 4.8 4.7 4.3
China 7,401 9,859 11,146 5.0 5.3 5.3
Australia 7,869 10,285 11,605 5.3 5.5 5.5
Canada 6,073 8,308 8,645 4.1 4.4 4.1
United Kingdom 3,057 4,193 4,466 2.0 2.2 2.1
Indonesia 8,427 9,497 11,021 5.6 5.1 5.2
Saudi Arabia 7,311 6,348 7,048 4.9 3.4 3.3
Hong Kong 1,561 2,109 2,219 1.0 1.1 1.1
Singapore 2,048 2,339 2,952 1.4 1.2 1.4
Malaysia 4,772 4,710 5,107 3.2 2.5 2.4
France 2,871 4,315 5,546 1.9 2.3 2.6
United Arab Emirates 5,408 5,324 6,051 3.6 2.8 2.9
Switzerland 3,101 3,565 3,863 2.1 1.9 1.8
U.S.S.R. 2,352 2,766 3,005 1.6 1.5 1.4
Netherlands 757 996 1,122 0.5 0.5 0.5
Thailand 1,796 2,751 3,583 1.2 1.5 1.7
Italy 2,135 2,895 3,806 1.4 1.5 1.8
South Africa 2,259 1,933 2,035 1.5 1.0 1.0
Belgium 859 1,125 1,430 0.6 0.6 0.7
India 1,530 1,804 1,978 1.0 1.0 0.9
Mexico 1,625 1,591 1,730 1.1 0.8 0.8
Brazil 2,032 2,950 2,999 1.4 1.6 1.4
Philippines 1,353 2,044 2,059 0.9 1.1 1.0
Kuwait 1,796 1,590 2,339 1.2 0.8 1.1
Sweden 682 977 1,086 0.5 0.5 0.5
World, Total 149,515 187,354 210,847 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Keizai Koho Center, Japan 1991: An International Comparison (Tokyo, 1991).
tinued support of an anti-Peking line

until the United States pulled the rug
out from under Japan in 1971, and
Japan's domestically unpopular position of lending economic support to

South Vietnam during the Vietnam
War are both examples showing how

the U.S. security relationship can
damage Japan's credibility as an
independent and impartial actor with
other Asian nations. In short, the
Security Treaty cuts both ways.
Nonetheless, the LDP ruling establishment has decided, as Kuriyama's
remark attests, that the gains from
the dependency relationship with the
United States outweigh its liabilities.
The clearest evidence that the U.S.
tie produces greater good than
damage is Japan's thriving economic

relationship with most Asian nations,
which underscores the fact that
Japan's foreign policy in Asia is pre-
dominantly economic. This observation applies to northeast Asia-the

two Koreas, China, the USSR, Tai-
wan, and Hong Kong-and southeast
Asia-the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN: Singapore,

Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Philippines and Brunei), Indochina
(Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos), and
aln order of total value of exports plus imports in 1987.
New Zealand and Australia. With
b1985 ten countries, 1986-87 twelve countries. See p. 5. Source: Japan Tariff Association, The
Summary Report: Trade of Japan.
the exceptions of Soviet Asia, New

Zealand, and Australia, Japan's
WWII empire included all these
past aggression. In the case of China,

Japan was one of the few industrial
democracies to go easy on China in
the wake of the Tiananmen massacre
and the first to resume normal eco-
nomic relations, including the releasing of low interest loans of some $6

billion for development projects.
At second glance, however, it
and foremost of these policies is the
U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Vice

Foreign Minister Kuriyama Takakazu
helped make this very point in an
article published in June of 1990.
Arguing broadly about the importance of the Treaty, Kuriyama made
the special point that it "renders
international credibility to Japan's
nations.
In most cases, twenty or more
years had to lapse before Japan

could normalize diplomatic relations
with these nations, by which time
Japan passed the United States to

become the leading trading nation in
Asia. Prior to the mid-sixties,
Japan's Asia policy generally fol-
becomes clear that China, South
stance that it will not become a
lowed American wishes which in-
Korea and other Asian nations are
major military power, thus facilitating the acceptance of a larger polit-
cluded negotiations to settle the

terms of reparation payments for
harm inflicted by Japan during its
military occupation of these nations.
ously, Japan's foreign policy makers

feel that its acceptance by other
Asian nations rests on maintaining its
military-dependent relationship with
the United States.
strategically important to American

Cold War strategy after the communist victory in China in 1949, did
Japan sign an early peace treaty, and
only then because of American pres-
But if Japan's trustworthiness in

the eyes of Asian nations rests on the
sure. More typical examples include

South Korea with whom Japan nor-
not quite so obsessed with past

Japanese wrongs as they are about a
potential future Greater East Asia
Co-prosperity sphere, extending from
Seoul to Sydney. They understand

that Japan's economic might and its
technological and military prowess
could very easily permit Japan to
become the hegemon of Asia.

Knowing this, Japan has designed
policies toward its Asian neighbors
largely in ways that will reassure
them that it is content to remain
"merely" an economic giant. First

68
PS:
ical and economic role for Japan by

its neighbors" (Far Eastern Economic Review, July 5, 1990). Curi-
American alliance, the U.S.-Japan

treaty also harms Japan's credibility
as a nation that can act independent-
Political
Only with Taiwan, which became
malized relations in 1965, with China

in 1972, and with the Philippines in
1974. Diplomatic relations with the
Science
&
Politics

Soviet Union were reestablished in
1956, but Soviet refusal to return the

four small islands north of Hok-
bered by Koreans and still strains the

relationship with Tokyo. As recently
as 1974 Koreans mounted attacks on
If Japan and North Korea do

establish formal relations, it will in
large part be due to the ending of the
Japan's embassy in Seoul, and today
Cold War in northeast Asia, perhaps
Japan's arguably racist treatment of
best typified by the Soviet Union's
kaido, seized at the tailend of the

war, to Japanese control resulted in
Japan's refusal to sign a peace
treaty; this issue remains unresolved
in 1991. Despite growing commercial
ties, Japan has yet to establish diplo-
some 680,000 Koreans living in

Japan continues to be a sore point.
decision in September 1990 to nor-
malize relations with Seoul. But for
Not until 1984 did a South Korean
Tokyo the real test of whether the
matic relations with communist
head of state visit Tokyo, and only

in May 1990 did the Korean presi-
was the visit to Japan by President
North Korea; relations with North
dent get a formal apology from
Vietnam came only in 1973, following the Paris Peace Accords between
the United States and North Viet-
nam, but economic relations were

suspended after reunified Vietnam's
invasion of Cambodia in 1979. These
examples generally show that Japan's

political relations with most Asian
nations closely adhered to U.S.

policy during the Cold War.
Normalization of economic rela-
tions, however, was another matter
altogether. Well before diplomatic

relations were restored, Japan prac-
. . . the "face" that

Japan's foreign policy
projects to many Asian
nations is of an untrust-
worthy, rapacious,
aggrandizing economic
machine that
ticed a policy of separating eco-
systematically exploits the

human and material
and the bad communist PRC, on

strictly political grounds, yet ex-
panded trade with the PRC so that

by 1964 trade with Peking surpassed
trade with Taiwan. Today, ironically,
although Japan no longer has formal
diplomatic relations with Taiwan,
resources of Asia for its

own profit while enjoying
American protection, but

forever threatening to
make itself into a
dominant military power
in Asia.
Japan for its repressive behavior dur-
even though Japanese direct foreign

investment in China is some $200
ing the colonial period. For the last

decade Seoul has complained about
million more than that in Taiwan.
Japan's persistent trade surplus, just
Japan's most important trading
partner in northeast Asia is, and has

been, South Korea. Historically regarded as critical to Japan's security,
Japan has a strong vested interest in
helping ensure political and economic
stability on the Korean peninsula.
Between 1951 and 1988, direct
Japanese investment in South Korea
reached $3.25 billion, and since 1965
Japan has poured in about 650
billion yen in loans to the government in Seoul; in 1988 their two-way
trade amounted to over $25 billion.
Thirty-five years (1910-45) of
especially brutal colonial occupation
by Japan continues to be remem-
as Japan has complained about
Korean trade barriers and protection-
ism against Japanese exports. A

possible future strain on the relation-
ship is Japanese movement toward

normalizing relations with communist
North Korea, accompanied by an

unofficial promise of sizeable reparation payments which could possibly
undermine the South's attempt to use
its economic leverage to push the
North toward unification. Nonethe-
less, Japan will be careful to avoid

damaging its relations with Seoul for
a trading relationship with the North
that in 1989-90 was worth only one-
sixtieth of that with the South.
March
Territories," the four small islands
off the coast of Hokkaido
(Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri,

Etorofu), which Japan has claimed
since WWII but have been occupied
by the Soviets. Japan's leadership
insisted that the islands be returned
to Japanese sovereignty as a condition to the signing of a peace teaty

with the Soviets and thus as a prelude to greater Japanese trade,
investment, and aid. The Soviet
refusal to exchange territory for
improved economic relations means

that future Japanese-Soviet relations
will likely continue at the modest
level of the past. Two-way trade in
1990 amounted to only about $6
billion.
Japan has long subscribed, and

played a role in, the American "con-
tainment" of the former Soviet
Union, and its defense policy has traditionally assumed the Soviets to be
the principal enemy of Japan. Despite Soviet invitations for Japan to
invest, especially in exploiting
their two-way trade in 1987 and 1988
exceeded Tokyo's trade with Peking,
Gorbachev in April 1991. Then

Tokyo pressed once more for the
return of the so-called "Northern
nomics from politics, that is, keeping

commercial relations unfettered by
political or ideological differences. In

the best-known case of Sino-Japanese
relations, Japan adhered to
America's Cold War policy of "two
Chinas," the good capitalist Taiwan
post Cold War era indeed arrived
Siberia's natural resources, between

1968 and 1976 Japan separated economics from politics only to the extent of investing $1.5 billion in seven
different development projects. Since
that time, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the shooting down of a
Korean airliner near Japanese air
space, and the Soviet military buildup in Asia soured the climate for
greater Japanese economic involvement in the USSR. Only about a
dozen Japanese-financed development projects were agreed upon since
1976, these dealing primarily with oil
and gas exploration. Since the late
eighties, however, the Soviets were
no longer described officially as a
"threat" to the peace and stability of
East Asia, yet because of its economic difficulties, exemplified by
$518 million in unpaid debts to
1992
69
Japanese trading companies, Japan's

foreign minister reacted to a 1991
West European proposal for economic aid to Moscow by saying it
would be "no more than money
down the drain." In more polite

terms, the same views were expressed
jointly by the United States and
Japan at the Houston Summit in

July 1990.
Japan's foreign policy toward

northeast Asia has generally adhered
to American Cold War strategy,
albeit the economic component of its
policy, as opposed to the strategic
(just the opposite of American priori-
ties), has played a much larger role.

But in the case of Japan's policy
toward Southeast Asia, and most
especially ASEAN, it is arguable that
Japan's "yen diplomacy" reflects
both a greater sensitivity to the
strategic angle and a greater awareness of the impossibility of separating strategic concerns from econom-
ics. Or otherwise put, Japan's southeast Asian policy demonstrates,
especially after and in light of

America's defeat in Vietnam, that
the wisest "strategic angle" is

economic diplomacy.
The attraction of southeast Asia is
obvious: low labor costs, underdeveloped pollution control laws,

relatively open markets, easy access
to raw materials, and, for all these
reasons, attractive investment opportunities. Until the early seventies
Japan practiced fairly opportunistic
neo-mercantilist policies of maximizing the export of its manufactured
goods and minimizing the import of
nonessential goods from Southeast
Asia. Japan bought low-cost raw
materials and sold high-cost consumer goods. Small and mediumsized Japanese firms, squeezed out
by larger companies in the domestic
Japanese market, or made unprofitable by stricter pollution control laws
passed in the early seventies, flocked
to Southeast Asia. The low wages
these Japanese companies paid, their
poor record on worker safety, the
pollution their factories caused, and
the profits they exported back to
Japan combined to cause a high level
of anti-Japanese sentiment, expressed
Japan's direct overseas investment,
withdrawal of American military

forces from Vietnam in 1973, and
and received nearly 50% of Japan's
Vietnam's reunification in 1975,
total foreign aid.
making Vietnam the most powerful

military power and primary threat to
the stability of Southeast Asia,
forced Japan to reconstruct its policy
toward the region. Spurred on by

American pressure to assume a
stronger stabilizing role, Japanese
Prime Minister Fukuda issued a
"doctrine" in 1977, with implementation the following year, that was
intended to enhance the chances for
Thereafter Japan-ASEAN links

expanded and tightened as regular
consultations, tariff reduction nego-
tiations, and development projects
became standard fare. ASEAN has
since become the main beneficiary of

Japanese Overseas Development
Assistance (ODA), development
loans, and private investment (see
Figure 1). In the 1970s ASEAN
received 45% of Japan's total ODA
and in the 1980s between 30% and
peaceful development in the region.
The "Fukuda Doctrine" emphasized
that Japan rejected a military role in
Southeast Asia, that it sought relations based on mutual trust, and further offered to play an overtly political mediator role of repairing rela-
350%. Despite the high level of economic support from Japan, some
ASEAN nations have complained
about tied aid, i.e., grants and loans
to be used for the purchase of
Japanese exports. Japan's ODA to
tions between Vietnam and ASEAN.
the Philippines, for instance, between
The latter represented a genuine

departure from Japan's typical reactive foreign policy, but alas, it came
1968 and 1989, amounted to nearly

one trillion yen, but since 80% of
that amount was in yen-dominated
loans, a full 70% of ODA was spent
on orders for goods and services
from Japanese corporations. ASEAN
"beggars" can seldom afford to be
to naught, in part because of

ASEAN disinterest, especially following Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia
and border skirmishes with Thai
troops, and partly because ASEAN
choosers, but tied aid of this sort
nations brashly argued for material

rather than political aid from Japan.
Thus Fukuda's offer of $200 million
nonetheless results in nationalistic
in development aid to each of the

five ASEAN states (Brunei did not
join ASEAN until 1984) was warmly
welcomed. It was aid wisely invested;
at the time ASEAN nations bought
10% of Japan's exports, got 20% of
hackles being raised.

Japanese ties to Thailand represent
a different sort of relationship.
Direct Japanese investment in Thai-
land is second only to Japan's investment in the United States and represents 53% of all foreign investment
in Thailand. Until 1987 Thailand was
FIGURE 1.
Japan's Overseas Development Aid in Asia 1985-89

US$ billion
3.5
12.7 Asia Total = US$ 14.9 billion
3 11.8 World Total = US$ 24.9 billion
Figures at top of bar = percent share of total ODA
2.5
8.0
6.8
5.7
3.4
3.9
3.3
2.4
1.6
0.5
most forcefully in protest riots dur-
ing Prime Minister Tanaka's 1974
visit to the five ASEAN nations.
A combination of the riots, the

70
PS:
Indonesia China Philippines Thailand Bangladesh India Pakistan Burma Sri Lanka Malaysia
Source: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 June 1991).
Political
Science
&
Politics
the second largest recipient of
Japanese aid and is now ranked

fourth. For Bangkok, Japanese ODA
amounts to nearly 70% of all bilateral development assistance. Japan
is also Thailand's biggest trading
partner; two-way trade in 1988
amounted to almost $10 billion, with

Japan enjoying a $3 billion trade sur-
plus. Unfortunately for the Thais,
such trade imbalances favoring Japan

have been a persistent problem since
the 1950s. And the problem is getting
worse; in 1989 the Thais suffered a
$4 billion trade deficit, the worst
ever. Aggravating the deficit is the
content of trade; less than 50% of
what Japan buys from Thailand consists of manufactured goods, and
much of that figure represents goods
manufactured by Thai-based Japanese companies. Despite attempts by
the Thai government to negotiate
away the inequities and trade deficits, the Thais feel stuck in what they
acknowledge is a dependent relationship. The hundreds of thousands of
jobs that Japanese companies have
created and the estimated two percent boost to GDP growth resulting
from Japanese investment, aid, and
trade forces Thai officials to suffer,
however gladly, the unequal relationship.
The alternative seems less pleasant,
as represented by Indonesia and
Malaysia. Both those nations enjoy
sizeable balance of trade surpluses
with Japan, but unlike Thailand
which is fast becoming an industrialized nation due to Japanese investment, Indonesia and Malaysia re-
main stuck in a classic North-South
dependency relationship with Japan.
Indonesia's trade surplus with Japan

is due largely to oil exports,
pledge of 3.2 billion yen made to

Indonesia in August 1990 for use in
domestic production of vaccines and
forestation projects.
Japan has been moving toward

dispensing more humanitarian and
less commercially tied aid, but it
remains true that Japanese aid tends
to follow trade. Thus Japan is the

largest single donor to Indonesia
where bilateral trade (1988)
amounted to some $12 billion, but
was less generous with Malaysia
where two-way trade amounted to
about $7.5 billion. Moreover in 1989
60% of all Japanese aid to Indonesia

went to servicing its debt to Japan;
Malaysia, in order to limit its indebt-
Japan has been moving

toward dispensing more
investment such resource rich nations
shown, for example, by a Japanese
bodia, Japan is rewarding Vietnam.

In the first five months of 1990,
Japanese trade and investment in
Vietnam has doubled, and its exports

are 85% higher than a year earlier.
Yet so long as civil war rages in
Cambodia between the Vietnameseinstalled government and rebel

forces, the restoration of stability to
the larger region remains in jeopardy.
To help end the conflict Japan took
the initiative by hosting its first peace

talks in an international dispute in
June 1990. The two-day talks failed
ring factions, the Khmer Rouge,
it remains true that
Japanese aid tends to

follow trade.
edness to Japan, had to refuse all
Japanese loan offers in 1989.
As a predominantly trading nation
dependent on Southeast Asian
resources, Japan's bilateral relations
came to Tokyo but boycotted the

sessions. Nevertheless, by demon-
strating its willingness to play a

larger role in the peace process,
Japan was rewarded with observer

status at the ongoing Paris peace
talks conducted by the five perma-
nent members of the United Nations
Security Council. In addition, Japan

has been using its strong ties with
China, the chief supporter of the
Khmer Rouge, to encourage quiet,
with each of the ASEAN nations
behind-the-scenes resolution of the
tends to be primarily economic, yet
conflict.
as a wise trader and investor, Japan
Japan's ventures into more traditional diplomacy of this sort have

not succeeded. Despite its economic
leverage in Southeast Asia, neither
also realizes that the key to sustaining lucrative commercial relations

depends on political stability in the
region. Generally Japanese involve-
ment has worked on the liberal
serve free trade. Yet Japan has also
attract tends to be devoted to building an infrastructure that facilitates

greater raw material extraction.
Japan is not insensitive to complaints
stemming from this situation, as
and promised to provide economic
assistance to all of Indochina once

war ended. Now that Vietnam has
withdrawn its troops from Cam-
commercially tied aid, but
political stability and, of course, pre-
depleted. Similarly, what Japanese
assistance to refugees in the region,
because the most militant of the war-
of raw materials, a similar percentage
course, eventually the volume of

exports will decline as resources are
Cambodia by cutting commercial

relations. In 1984, however, Japan
offered to assist peacekeepers in
Indochina, to extend humanitarian
humanitarian and less
Malaysia's because of oil and forestry products. A full 80% of

Indonesia's exports to Japan consists
in the case of Malaysia; such exports

do not create many new jobs and, of
to punish Vietnam for its invasion of
assumption that economic progress in

Southeast Asia will help produce
undertaken initiatives more strictly
ASEAN nor the Indochinese states
yet regard Japan as a credible leader

in the region. In some respects Japan
appears to them as a kind of "Asian
Uncle Tom," Asian to be sure, but
in truth aligned with the Western
camp of advanced industrialized
political. The most recent instance is

Japan's attempt to play the role of
nations. After all, 65%7o of all

Japanese aid may be going to Asian
Japan's economic relationship with

Cambodia is miniscule, but its economic ties with Cambodia's neighbor
to the west, Thailand, are gargan-
but more than 68%7o of its direct

investment, the lion's share of the
tuan. Its ties to Cambodia's eastern
tinues to gravitate toward the ad-
neighbor, Vietnam, the regional
vanced nations of North America
hegemon, have been slowly develop-
and Western Europe. Finally, while

there is no question that Japanese
mediator in the Cambodian civil war.
ing. In the late seventies Japan tried
March
nations, lending credence to Japan's

claim to be an "aid great power,"
wealth Japan exports abroad, con-
1992
71
economic involvement in Southeast

Asia has enriched the nations of the
region, it is just as obvious that the
terms of trade, investment, and aid
continue to favor Japan. The poor

get richer, to be sure, but the rich get
even richer.
Political and economic cooperation

with its senior partner, the United
States, remains sacrosanct. And
shut down American bases in Japan

unless Tokyo pays the full bill, the
contribution to the American mili-

A "truth by definition": in the
absence of what was earlier called a

"turning point," present trends will
continue into the future. This really
means that predictive powers are
bound by the adequacy of our
description of the present. In this

short chapter much about the intrica-
cies of Japan's foreign policy has

been omitted or just barely touched
upon, meaning that predictions about
the future direction of Japan's

foreign policy will be equally sketchy.
But in the few pages remaining, it is
possible to fill in a few blanks and
offer guarded guesses about the
future.
In November 1990 the Charter of
Paris officially signaled the end of
the Cold War in Europe, thereby

putting onto paper what many
observers have been saying for
tary. Japan is, after all, a "great aid

power." In short, the Cold War may
be over in Europe, but Japan's
actions in the Gulf Crisis, in SII, and
its renewal of the Security Treaty this
The fact is, Japan has

prospered for 45 years by
respecting the status quo,
the most important
elements of which are
U.S. security guarantees
and a relatively nonprotectionist capitalist
world committed to free
trade. And "if it works,
why fix it? "
several years. The immediate issue
for our purposes is to ask whether
year all suggest that "it's back to the
the Cold War has also ended in Asia,
future."
and, if so, whether this might con-
to continuing the Security Treaty, the

linchpin of Japan's postwar foreign
Yet it is imaginable that Japan

would bid fond farewell to American
troops stationed in Japan if its relations with the newly formed Commonwealth improve to the point
where Moscow returns the Northern
Territories; if diplomatic relations
War, the Security Treaty is the core
with North Korea are established; if

South Korea and North Korea follow
stitute a "turning point" in Japanese
foreign policy.
Of first importance is noting the
American and Japanese commitment
policy. Itself a product of the Cold
of the so-called "Yoshida Doctrine,"

which, as we have seen, has been
reaffirmed by every postwar Japanese Prime Minister, including Mr.

Kaifu. Japan's inability or unwillingness, Kaifu's efforts notwithstanding,
to play a more active role in the Gulf
Crisis stands as a reminder that the
pacifist provision of the Yoshida

Doctrine has withstood yet another
test. Further evidence of the inviolability of the Doctrine is the apparent
Japanese capitulation to American
demands to restructure its economy
as dictated by the SII agreement.

72
PS:
Yoshida Doctrine going the way of
the kimono.
The fact is, Japan has prospered
despite rumblings by the Congress to
past has shown that Japan has

repeatedly responded to charges of a
"free ride" on defense by upping its
Future Directions of
cism about the likelihood of the
the example of Germany and reunite
as a nonnuclear nation; if the recent

detente between Moscow and Beijing
results in a further demilitarization
of northeast Asia; if a peaceful and
permanent accommodation can be
reached between China and Taiwan;

and if all these powers, plus Japan's
for 45 years by respecting the status
quo, the most important elements of

which are U.S. security guarantees
and a relatively nonprotectionist
capitalist world committed to free
trade. And "if it works, why fix it?"
But what if those two sine qua
nons of Japanese success no longer
work? What if a declining hegemon
like the United States closes up its
military bases in Japan, South
Korea, and the Philippines and goes
home, as it were, retreating into
isolationism? Or what if Europe after
1992 places even greater restrictions
on Japanese trade and investment?
What if the U.S.-Canada free trade
agreement extends to Mexico, thus
creating a new, larger, and more selfsufficient trading bloc that likewise
places restrictions on Japanese trade?
To the first substantive questionthe end of the security relationship
with the United States-future
Japanese foreign policy makers may
very well conclude that the military
alliance is an anachronism of the
Cold War that has outlived its usefulness in the post Cold War world,
that the American "nuclear umbrella" only invites "rain," and that
U.S. bases in Japan only waste
scarce land better used for golf
courses, and that the defense relationship is no longer necessary once
all the major powers of northeast
Asia reach genuine accommodation.
To the second issue, protectionism,
Japan's foreign policy makers should
conclude that economic interdependency between Japan and Western
trading blocs is an immutable fact
that is unlikely to be altered anytime
in the future. Japanese manufacturers are now investing at an accelerated rate in specific West European
nations, establishing something more
than a foothold, in anticipation of
the 1992 economic union of Europe;
in FY 1990 Japanese direct investment in Europe increased a whop-
ping 20%7 to $15 billion. And the
many worldwide suppliers of resources, agree to trust a neutral
walls of "fortress America" were
Japan, independent of the U.S. alli-
financiers, investors and manufacturers, evoking a predictable jingoism

among America-firsters, but also a
reasoned assessment by cooler heads
ance, that goes no farther toward

remilitarization than it already has.
A great many "ifs" that when added

can only prompt profound skepti-
Political
long ago breached by Japanese
that the American economy needs,
Science
&
Politics
indeed, depends on a Japanese presence. Cooler heads also remind us
that Japan owns much less of

America than does Great Britain,
prompting thinking Americans to
wonder whether it isn't racism at the
bottom of U.S. hostility toward

Japanese investment in America.
But even if, for Japan, the worst
case scenario were to happen and the
American and European trading
blocs were to repair the breach and
say "no more," Japan has repeatedly
demonstrated that its powers of
"resource-omnidirectional diplomacy" have made it the ultimate survivor. While most Western nations
slapped economic sanctions on South
Africa in the 1980s, for instance,
Japan increased its trade with the
pariah state, becoming its top trading
partner in 1987, falling to second
place (after West Germany) in 1988
while still increasing its exports to
South Africa by 10%. Japan has
shown itself equally adept in meeting
its energy needs by kowtowing to
Middle Eastern oil-producing states
when necessary, by adopting the
industrial world's most fuel-efficient
production methods, by conserving
energy, by developing alternative
energy sources, especially nuclear,
and by widely diversifying its oil
dependencies. Finally, Japan's commercial relations with Southeast Asia
and the lesser developed countries
(LDCs) in general have settled into
fairly secure trading and investment
patterns not easily altered by the
LDCs.
To take special notice of Japan's

survival skills is really to reaffirm
what the Japanese themselves have
long recognized as a "given": the

world is a dangerous place, unpredictable, whimsical, and fraught with
uncertainty. The best Japan can do is

plan ahead whenever possible, react
whenever necessary, cultivate friendly
commercial relations at all times, but
accept its limitations in shaping the
world "order." Leave that ungodly
burden to the superpower(s?) and the
United Nations; meanwhile, ally
itself with the leading hegemon,
hope, and contribute whenever possible to making the world safe for
business.
Suggested Discussion Topics

Compare the relative importance
of military and political power in the
foreign policies of Japan, Germany,
the United States, and the former
Soviet Union. Explain why the

United States seems to be the only
"superpower" in the Post Cold War

period; and why Japan is not a
superpower.
If you were an influential policy
maker in the LDP, what would your
position be regarding the benefits

and liabilities of the alliance with the
United States?
Gaullism refers to the French
policy in the postwar period of
adopting a foreign and defense policy
that is independent of the Atlantic
Alliance of Western nations. Discuss
the merits of Japanese Gaullism.
Additional Readings
Frost, Ellen J. 1987. For Richer, For Poorer:
The New U.S.-Japan Relationship. New
York: The Council on Foreign Relations.
A well-written overview of the problems
and promises of the U.S.-Japan rela-
tionship.
Inoguchi Takashi and Daniel I. Okimoto.

1988. The Political Economy of Japan,
Vol. 2: The Changing International Context. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
A useful collection of essays dealing with
Japan's place in the international system
and aspects of foreign policy making.
Two essays especially are pertinent:
Japan's foreign policy.
Okita Saburo. 1989. "Japan's Quiet
Strength." Foreign Policy (Summer):

128-45. An intelligent overview of Japan's
foreign policy by a former foreign

minister.
Prestowitz, Clyde. 1988. Trading Places:

How We Allowed Japan to Take the
Lead. New York: Basic Books. An argu-
mentative but thoughtful lament about the

reversal in fortunes of the two nations by
a Japanese specialist, formerly with the
Commerce Department.
Pyle, Kenneth B. 1987. "In Pursuit of a
Grand Design: Nakasone Betwixt the Past
and the Future." Journal of Japanese
Studies 13:2: 243-70. An in-depth study of
former Prime Minister Nakasone's marginally successful attempt to overcome
Japan's typically reactive foreign policy.
Other Readings Cited

Calder, Kent. 1988. "Japanese Foreign
Economic Policy: Explaining the Reactive
State." World Politics 40(4): 517-41.
Ito Kan. 1990. "Trans-Pacific Anger."
Foreign Policy 78: 131-52.
Scalapino, Robert A. 1990. "Asia and the
United States: The Challenges Ahead."
Foreign Affairs 69(1): 89-115.
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. 1983. "Foreign
Policy and the American Character."
Foreign Affairs 62(1): 1-16.
Shimizu Manabu. 1988. "Japan's Middle
East Policy." Japan Quarterly 35(4):
383-89.
Shindo Eiichi. 1989. "Frozen in the Cold

War: Another Look at Japan-U.S. Friction." Japan Quarterly 36(1): 275-81.
Von Wolferen, Karl. 1990. "The Japan
Problem Revisited." Foreign Affairs
69(4): 42-55.
Periodicals/Newspapers cited: Business
Week, The Economist, Far Eastern Economic Review, Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS): East Asia,
International Herald Tribune, New York
Times.
Donald C. Hellmann, "Japanese Politics
and Foreign Policy: Elitist Democracy

Within the American Greenhouse"; and
Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan, the World, and
the Twenty-first Century."
Ishihara Shintaro. 1989. "From Bad to

Worse in the FSX Project." Japan Echo
XVI(3): 59-65. An angry critique about
U.S. interference in Japan's attempt to
build its own experimental fighter aircraft,
written by LDP conservative and co-
author (with Sony Corp. head Akio

Morita) of the controversial The Japan
That Can Say No.
Kaifu Toshiki. 1990. "Japan's Vision."
Foreign Policy 80: 28-39. The current

prime minister's platitudinous survey of
About the Author

Roger Bowen
Roger Bowen
teaches in the Department of Government,
Colby College. He is
the author of Rebel-
lion and Democracy

in Meiji Japan (California, 1980) and
Innocence Is Not
Enough: The Life
and Death of Herbert Norman (M.E. Sharpe, 1988). He is cur-
rently writing on Japan's land use policies.
March
1992
73

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Japan's Foreign Policy

Author(s): Roger W. Bowen