Professional Documents
Culture Documents
PRACTITIONERS
GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL
OIL & GAS
ARBITRATION
Editor
James M. Gaitis
JURIS
~TABLE OF CONTENTS~
FOREWORD .............................................................. Tim Martin
ix
PREFACE ......................................................................................
xiii
xv
xvii
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................
Chapter 1
23
Chapter 2
25
Chapter 3
79
Chapter 4
iii
115
iv
Chapter 5
151
Chapter 6
217
263
Chapter 7
265
Chapter 8
345
Chapter 9
367
Chapter 10
425
TABLE OF CONTENTS
505
Chapter 11
507
Chapter 12
525
Chapter 13
559
Chapter 14
585
Chapter 15
605
Chapter 16
633
Chapter 17
667
vi
Chapter 18
693
751
Chapter 20
797
Chapter 21
813
Chapter 22
875
Chapter 23
901
Chapter 24
921
TABLE OF CONTENTS
MISCELLANEOUS .................................................................
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935
Chapter 25
937
Chapter 26
967
Index .................................................................................................
983
~FOREWORD~
The international oil & gas business has a lot of disputes, at least
compared to other businesses. The international energy sector, along
with its associated infrastructure projects, makes up the largest
portfolio of international commercial and investor-state arbitrations
in the world. As an example, oil & gas arbitrations regularly make up
about 10% of the ICC International Court of Arbitrations caseload
(with another 15% for construction cases, many of which are energy
infrastructure projects) and around 25% of the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes caseload arises from the
natural resources sector with oil & gas cases representing 40% of its
largest awards.
Why is this the case? It is not because oil & gas companies are
looking for a fight. They have enough problems on their plates
without seeking out disputes. It is primarily because they invest in
large, complex, capital-intensive projects that have long life spans.
Circumstances, economics, governments, and parties invariably
change in their investments and projects. There is a lot of money
involved, the stakes are high, the many players involved make
conflicting demands, misunderstandings arise, and disputes often
follow.
Disputes are therefore a significant risk in the international oil &
gas sector. As a result, this guide edited by James Gaitis is a welcome
addition for practitioners in both the dispute and energy worlds.
Mr. Gaitis and his contributing authors have focused mostly on
international arbitration, rather than litigation and alternative forms
of dispute resolution. That reflects the reality of disputes in the
international energy sector. Unlike domestic projects in countries
such as the United States, a big risk in international energy projects is
that a dispute will be submitted for resolution in a hostile forum
using an unfavorable law and process. Companies need assurance on
where and how their potential dispute will be resolved and who will
resolve it. That usually does not include the local courts in many
developing countries where oil and gas companies make many of
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FOREWORD
xi
chapters that address unique forms of oil & gas disputes such as price
reopeners and reviews, LNG, production sharing contracts, oilfield
service contracts, and joint operating agreements.
In addition, a variety of procedural issues, such as provisional
remedies, examining expert witnesses, and chairing arbitrations, that
directly relate to oil & gas disputes are included in the book. There
are also chapters that in-house counsel can rely upon to properly
manage their oil & gas disputes, including drafting dispute resolution
provisions, selecting arbitrators, and post-dispute agreements. Finally,
there is a useful compendium of resource materials and advice on
mediating international oil & gas disputes.
Given their prevalence and significance in the energy sector, it is
essential to plan well ahead for any dispute. They will arise. The
numbers tell us that. If they are not properly managed, disputes can
undermine the economic viability of a project. Parties therefore need
to begin addressing potential disputes from the drafting of their
agreements, to identifying the important issues, to the selection of
counsel and adjudicators, and to the running of an actual
international arbitration. Knowledge about these matters will mean
the difference between success and failure. Readers will find that The
Leading Practitioners Guide to International Oil & Gas Arbitration is a
most useful reference for achieving success in an international oil &
gas dispute.
Tim Martin
Past President
Association of International Petroleum Negotiators
Chairman
Executive Committee & Editorial Board
~PREFACE~
The late Professor Thomas Wldemy former colleague at
CEPMLP, University of Dundeelong argued that there was an
urgent need for a book on the subject of international oil and gas
arbitration or, more accurately, a book that focused both on
international investor-state arbitration and international commercial
arbitration through the prism of oil and gas industry disputes. On
more than one occasion, Thomas and I debated both the prospects
for such a book and the logistical and practical difficulties that might
be involved in bringing such a book to publication. And then our
lives moved in different directions and the book did not come to
fruition.
More recently, Mike Kitzen at JURIS invited me to serve as the
Editor for the very type of book Thomas Wlde and I had previously
considered. After some hesitation and a considerable amount of
assessment, I accepted Mike Kitzens offer, in part because I had
come to believe that Thomas Wldes vision was realistic and timely
and also because I knew from past experience that JURIS was the
perfect publisher for such a work.
Over the past half century, the field of international arbitration
encompassing both investor-state arbitration and commercial
arbitrationhas evolved from an alternative form of dispute
resolution into the primary means of final and binding dispute
resolution in use for disputes relating to the international oil and gas
industry. The path from the early arbitral decisions to the present has
not been without its hazards and setbacks. But it nonetheless has
been progressive and increasingly reliable, due in part to the
involvement of many different types of playersarbitral institutions
that focus on international arbitration, governments that have the
foresight to imbed arbitration processes in trade agreements and
treaties, a rapidly growing expert body of international lawyers and
arbitrators who specialize in various branches of the field, and a
wealth of academic and professionals who offer commentary and
analysis that together help to ensure that every relevant issue relating
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six provinces as well as the Federal Court of Canada and the Supreme
Court of Canada. As Regulator and Arbitrator he has written over
100 decisions in domestic and international energy disputes. Gordon
has served as a sole Arbitrator, Chairman and Party Nominee in
arbitrations on power purchase agreements, gas supply contracts,
project finance, the construction of transmission lines and the
interconnection of solar and wind generation. Gordon is a panel
member at the London Court of International Arbitration, Energy
Arbitration Chambers in Calgary, the Canadian Transportation
Agency in Ottawa, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, London
England, the JAMS Global Engineering and Construction panel in
Washington, DC and the Independent Electricity System Operator in
Ontario. He has served as an Adjunct Professor at Queens
University, the University of Toronto and the Osgoode Hall Law
School. He is a Board Member at the Energy Bar Association,
Washington, DC, Co-Chair of the Canadian Energy Law Forum and
a Managing Editor of the Energy Regulation Quarterly. He was
named Energy Lawyer of the Year by the Energy Law Forum in 2011
and was recognized as one of Canadas leading arbitrators and
mediators by Chambers Global 2014.
Sophie J. Lamb is a Partner at Debevoise & Plimpton and Co-Chair
of the firms global energy disputes group. A recognized leader in the
field of international arbitration and public international law, Ms.
Lamb has acted as adviser and/or advocate in more than one
hundred international arbitrations in proceedings involving
investment agreements, long term supply relationships, concession
agreements, stabilization clauses, tax disputes, price re-openers, gas
pipeline and consortium issues, take or pay obligations,
hardship/fairness clauses, M&A, JOA, JSBA, joint venture disputes,
shareholder agreements, pre-emption rights, share purchase
agreements, warranty/indemnity claims and technology licensing
rights, among many others. Her diverse international case load has
included arbitrations in Europe, Asia and the U.S., many of which
have concerned assets or claims valued in excess of $1 billion, subject
to a wide variety of applicable law and international treaties. She has
xxvii
Litigation and Arbitration from the University of Paris II PanthonAssas with honors in 2005. She is a native French speaker, is
proficient in Spanish and speaks basic Dutch.
Aimee-Jane Lee is an international Counsel at Debevoise &
Plimpton. Her practice focuses on investment treaty and complex
commercial arbitration and public international law and she is a
senior figure in Debevoises energy disputes group. Ms. Lee has
advised private clients and states across multiple jurisdictions (most
notably in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe) and a
number of industries, with particular expertise in energy. Inter alia,
she frequently advises on the international protection of investments
(notably under bilateral investment treaties, the Energy Charter
Treaty and investor-state contracts) and represents clients in
associated disputes, often involving multi-billion dollar claims. In
addition to her legal experience, Ms. Lee has passed all three levels of
the CFA (Chartered Financial Analyst) exams. She is therefore
particularly proficient in advising on disputes involving complex
financial analysis, business valuations, and financial instruments and
assisting clients with quantum-related aspects of their dispute.
James Lloyd Loftis heads Vinson & Elkins International Dispute
Resolution practice and focuses on the arbitration and litigation of
international commercial and investor-state disputes and matters
involving international law and treaties. His practice includes all
aspects of energy, infrastructure development and construction, and
disputes under investment laws and treaties, as well as boundary
disputes, cross-border technology disputes and sovereign debt. He is
a member of the ICC Commission on Arbitration, is listed in Global
Arbitration Review, is listed in Legal Media Groups (Euromoneys)
Expert Guide to Commercial Arbitration, and is ranked in international
arbitration in Chambers Global, Chambers UK, Chambers USA and Legal
500 UK. He is listed in The Best Lawyers in America for international
arbitration. Since 2009, James has been an adjunct professor at the
University of Texas School of Law where he teaches international
investment law and investor-state and international commercial
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This Chapter is from The Leading Practitioners' Guide to International Oil & Gas Arbitration.
(James M. Gaitis ed., JURIS). JurisNet, LLC 2015 www.arbitrationlaw.com
Chapter 9
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ECT
AND BITS IN LIGHT OF EVOLVING EU
POLICY
Graham Coop and Bernhard Maier*
I. INTRODUCTION
With the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, as amended by the Lisbon Treaty (the TFEU), in
2009, foreign direct investment became part of the exclusive
competence of the European Union (the EU). Five years later, the
EU has begun to exercise its newly allocated power. For example,
the European Commission has recently negotiated a 512-page
comprehensive trade and investment agreement with Canada,
threatened that it would pursue every appropriate legal avenue to
stall enforcement proceedings in an intra-EU bilateral investment
treaty (BIT) dispute and asserted that the Energy Charter Treaty
(the ECT) does not create obligations among EU Member States
inter se.
These actions have generated considerable controversy. This
flows in part from the different approaches taken by the international
and the European lawyer respectively as regards the natures of
international and European law. Whereas the European Court of
Justice (the Court of Justice, the Court or the ECJ) and the
European Commission maintain that European law constitutes a
* Graham Coop is a Partner at Volterra Fietta, and previously served as
General Counsel to the Energy Charter Secretariat. Bernhard Maier is an Associate
at Volterra Fietta. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance and insights
provided by Marie Germa and Maria Fogdestam-Agius, Associates at Volterra
Fietta.
367
369
371
10
373
375
377
379
381
383
trade by 23% (or 26 billion).55 While the text must still undergo a
legal review and translation, it is unlikely that the content of the
CETA will be modified before being presented to the European and
Canadian parliaments for ratification.56
These developments highlight an increasing tension between EU
Member States and EU institutions as to who ultimately bears
responsibility for negotiating investment agreements in the European
context. Meanwhile, the public debate remains focused on the
challenges posed by entrusting private arbitration tribunals with
decision-making power over measures adopted by sovereign States.
In an attempt to allay critics concerns, the European
Commission has since proposed a closed list of basic rights under
the fair and equitable treatment standard and a clarification that
legitimate public policy measures cannot qualify as an indirect
expropriation.57 Other suggestions tabled by the EU Commission
include more transparency as well as a permanent appellate
mechanism to ensure consistency in arbitral decisions.58
v. Allocation of financial responsibility and duty to cooperate
with the European Commission
On 28 August 2014, the European Parliament and Council
adopted a regulation establishing a framework for managing financial
responsibility linked to investor-State dispute settlement tribunals
established under BITs to which the EU and its Member States are
Official data of the EU-Canada trade relations European Commission, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/canada/.
56 The CanadaEU trade deal: signed, not sealed (28 September 2014) The
Economist, available at http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2014/09/
canada-eu-trade-deal.
57 Perry, EU commissioner defends investment protection (30 June 2014)
Global Arbitration Review, available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/
article/32767/eu-commissioner-defends-investment-protection/.
58 Perry, EU commissioner defends investment protection (30 June 2014)
Global Arbitration Review, available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/
news/article/32767/eu-commissioner-defends-investment-protection/.
55
385
387
389
391
74 Article 14 of the ECT provides that Each Contracting Party shall with
respect to Investments in its Area of Investors of any other Contracting Party
guarantee the freedom of transfer into and out of its Area . . . .
75 This follows from settled case law of the ECJ, see e.g. Case C-366/10, Air
Transport Association of America, 2011 ECR I-13755, para. 101, with further
references to other cases, as well as to Article 3(5) TFEU; see also Article 216(2)
TFEU, making explicit that the EU is bound by any international agreement to
which it becomes party; and see the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C366/10, Air Transport Association of America, 2011 ECR I-13755, para. 108,
emphasising that the EU is bound by international agreements applicable to it.
This is obviously consistent with the general principle of pacta sunt servanda that
applies to subjects of international law. As a matter of EU law, the obligation to
respect international law also requires that EU law must be interpreted and limited
in scope in light of relevant rules of international law; see on this Case C-402/05 P,
Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, 2008 ECR I06351, para. 291.
76 Case C-264/09, Commission v. Slovakia, 2011 ECR I-08065.
77 Article 20 of Directive 2003/54/EC of 26 June 2003.
78 Agreement between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the Swiss
Confederation on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments, entered
into force 7 August 1991.
Articles 351(1) and (2) TFEU (former Articles 307(1) and (2) of the EC
Treaty) provide that [t]he rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1
January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or more
Member States on the one hand, and one or more third countries on the other, shall
not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty. To the extent that such agreements are not
compatible with this Treaty, the Member State or States concerned shall take all
appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established. Member States shall, where
necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a
common attitude (emphasis added).
80 Opinion of Advocate General Jskinen, Case C-264/09, Commission v.
Slovakia, 2011 ECR I-08065.
79
393
395
para. 44. See further on this Klabbers, Treaty Conflict and the European Union (2009)
(Cambridge University Press), p. 118, with further reference to Koutrakos, EU
International Relations Law (2006) (Hart Publishing), p. 304 (both making the point
that the purpose of Article 351 TFEU is not so much to protect prior treaties as it
is to require Member States to find a way of accommodating their international
law obligations within the [EU] legal order).
92 This court is a constituent court of the Court of Justice, tasked with hearing
actions against the institutions of the European Union by individuals and Member
States. Prior to the entry into force of the TFEU it was known as the Court of
First Instance.
93 See Case T-179/09, Dunamenti Erm Zrt. v. Commission, Judgment of 30
April 2014, not yet published in the reports of cases and appealed to the ECJ, para.
102; and Case T-468/08, Tisza Ermkft v. Commission, Judgment of 30 April 2014
(unreported at time of writing), para. 323.
397
399
401
403
the investor at the merits stage, holding that the Czech Republic had
breached its obligation to afford Dutch investors fair and equitable
treatment.
ii. Eureko v. Slovakia
In the Eureko case, an arbitral tribunal formed pursuant to the
Netherlands-Slovak Republic BIT assumed jurisdiction over a claim
brought by a Dutch health insurer pertaining to legislative changes
made by Slovakia in relation to its private health insurance regulation.
Slovakia contested jurisdiction on the same basis as the Czech
Republic in the Eastern Sugar arbitration. According to Slovakia, the
EC Treaty governed the same subject matter as the BIT and
therefore the BIT should be considered terminated in accordance
with the VCLT. Slovakia claimed that the Court of Justice was
therefore vested with exclusive jurisdiction over Eurekos claims.118
The European Commission submitted an amicus curiae brief in
which it argued that EU Member States resorting to arbitration
pursuant to an intra-EU BIT are in breach of their obligation under
EU law to submit disputes to an EU court.119 Importantly for the
purposes of the present debate, the European Commission
recognised that there was no incompatibility between the Lisbon
Treaty and the BIT in its entirety120 but rather that there was an
incompatibility of certain provisions within the meaning of Article
30(3) of the [VCLT].121
In particular, the Commission took the view that the investorState arbitral mechanism of the BIT raised fundamental questions
regarding compatibility with EU law. According to the Commission,
infringements by the host state, adding: EU law does not provide such a guarantee
(emphasis added).
118 Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Interim Award
on Jurisdiction, 26 October 2010, para. 19.
119 Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Interim Award
on Jurisdiction, 26 October 2010, para. 178.
120 Within the meaning of Article 59(1)(b) of the VCLT.
121 Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2008-13, Interim Award
on Jurisdiction, 26 October 2010, para. 192.
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407
Romania liable for having breached the BITs fair and equitable
treatment standard by withdrawing economic incentives that had been
promised to Swedish investors prior to Romanias EU accession.128
According to the Micula tribunal, Romania had violated the claimants
legitimate expectations and had failed to act transparently in its
dealings with the Swedish investors.129
In its defence, Romania had claimed that it was mandated to
withdraw these incentives as a precondition of its accession to the
EU in 2007. It argued that the BIT should be interpreted in the light
of its obligations under EU law.130 In the arbitral proceedings, the
European Commission filed an amicus curiae brief in which it argued
that payment under an award in favour of the claimants would
amount to illegal State aid under EU law and that any such award
would therefore be unenforceable in the EU.131
In May 2014, the European Commissions Directorate-General
for Competition issued an injunction to prevent Romania from
honouring the US$250 million award. According to the European
Commissions spokesman for competition, the commission has
ordered Romania to refrain from paying the ICSID arbitration award
until the commission has taken a final decision on whether paying the
128 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v. Romania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/
20), paras. 687 and 872.
129 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v. Romania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/
20), paras. 864 and 869 to 872.
130 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v. Romania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/
20), para. 289.
131 Perry, EU blocks ICSID payout (8 August 2014) Global Arbitration Review,
available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32881/eu-blocks-icsidpayout/. As will be discussed below, in the amicus curiae brief filed by the
Commission in the US Steel v. Romania UNCITRAL arbitration, the Commission
threatened that it will pursue every appropriate legal avenue, including the
submission of amicus curiae observations to the national courts entrusted with the
task of recognising and enforcing the arbitral awards rendered in violation of the
Unions State aid control rules, Amicus curiae brief filed 15 May 2014 by the
European Commission in U.S. Steel Global Holdings I B.V. (The Netherlands) v. The
Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2013-6, para. 46.
132 Perry, EU blocks ICSID payout (8 August 2014) Global Arbitration Review,
available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32881/eu-blocks-icsidpayout/.
133 Antaris and other v. Czech Republic, Natland Investment Group and others v. Czech
Republic, I.C.W. Europe Investments Ltd v. Czech Republic, Voltaic Network GmbH v.
Czech Republic, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. Czech Republic and WA InvestmentsEuropa Nova Limited v. Czech Republic; see Peterson, Brussels latest intervention
casts shadow over investment treaty arbitrations brought by jilted solar energy
investors (8 September 2014) Investment Arbitration Reporter.
409
411
As the discussion of the cases above has shown, for the time
being intra-EU BITs continue in force until terminated by their
141
OJ [1994] L 380/1-2.
413
145 AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erm Kft v. The Republic of
Hungary, Award, 23 September 2010, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, para. 7.6.4.
146 AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erm Kft v. The Republic of
Hungary, Award, 23 September 2010, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, para 7.6.6.
147 AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erm Kft v. The Republic of
Hungary, Award, 23 September 2010, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, para 7.6.9.
148 Case C-126/97, EcoSwiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton International NV, 1999
ECR I-3055, paras. 35 to 41. The EUs competition rules are part of the public
order which national courts must take into account when they review the legality of
arbitral awards under the public policy exception recognized by the 1958 New York
Convention, in force in all EU Member States: Delgado Casteleiro, The
European Community and the Energy Charter Treatys Dispute Settlement
Mechanism, European University Institute, p. 20. See also Kleinheisterkamp,
Investment Protection and EU Law: The Intra- and Extra- EU Dimension of the
Energy Charter Treaty (2012) 15 Journal of International Economic Law 85, p. 92.
415
158 Electrabel S.A (Belgium) v. Republic of Hungary (2012) ICSID Case No. ARB/
07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, 30 November 2012,
para. 6.73; see also para. 4.169 and footnote 27. Article 4(3) TEU stipulates that:
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the
acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the
achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which could
jeopardise the attainment of the Unions objectives.
159 Electrabel S.A (Belgium) v. Republic of Hungary (2012) ICSID Case No. ARB/
07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, 30 November 2012,
para. 4.191; see also paras. 4.187 and 4.189.
160 Electrabel S.A (Belgium) v. Republic of Hungary (2012) ICSID Case No. ARB/
07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, 30 November 2012,
paras. 4.182, 4.183 and 4.191.
161 Article 216(2) TFEU.
417
162 Case C13/00, Commission v. Ireland, 2002 ECR I2943, paras. 14 to 17 and
19 to 21; Case C239/03, Commission v. France, 2004 ECR I9325, paras. 25 to 26;
and Case C459/03, Commission v. Ireland, 2006 ECR I-04635, paras. 14 to 15.
163 Peterson, Brussels latest intervention casts shadow over investment treaty
arbitrations brought by jilted solar energy investors (8 September 2014) Investment
Arbitration Reporter (emphasis omitted).
164 Ibid.
165 Electrabel S.A (Belgium) v. Republic of Hungary (2012) ICSID Case No. ARB/
07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, 30 November 2012,
para. 4.187.
419
421
VI. CONCLUSION
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, there is a
fundamental difference between the international and the European
lawyers perception of the respective natures and roles of
international and European law. For the European Court of Justice
and the European Commission, the EC Treaty has created its own
legal system173 which constitutes a new legal order of international
law.174 From a public international law viewpoint, on the other
hand, European law remains a subsystem of international law, albeit a
highly developed international legal order.175
There are a number of ongoing developments of which actors in
the oil and gas industry, in particular, should be aware. The EUs
newly acquired competence over foreign direct investment means in
practice that negotiations of extra-EU investment treaties (such as the
CETA and the TTIP) will now be conducted mainly by the EU
institutions, with limited scope for participation by the Member
States. Questions remain as to whether the European Parliament or
Member State parliaments will be responsible for the ratification of
such agreements and whether or not these future agreements will
include investor-State dispute resolution provisions.
The Grandfathering Regulation has clarified that, until the EU
concludes extra-EU BITs on behalf of its Member States, the
Member States may retain their pre-existing BITs with non-EU
Member States. They may also negotiate and sign new BITs insofar
as the relevant Member State complies with its notification
obligations and the proposed agreement does not undermine EU
treaty negotiations or violate EU law.
The 2014 Financial Responsibility Regulation also provides
much-anticipated guidance on how responsibility should be allocated
Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 ECR 585, p. 593.
Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie derBelastingen, 1963
ECR 2, p. 12.
175 See, for example, de Witte, The European Union as an International Legal
Experiment, in The Worlds of European Constitutionalism, eds. de Brca and Weiler
(2012) (Cambridge University Press), p. 19.
173
174
423