Choose a Key Foreign Policy Decision by any State.

Examine how the Decision was Actually

Made, by whom, and Compare that with a Rational Model of the Decision

The policy of Appeasement, a foreign policy decision followed by Britain throughout the
1930s, struggles when measured against a rational model of the decision as there are many
issues on which it deviates completely from this model. However, as will be discussed
subsequently, virtually no foreign policy decision will be rational if looked at in enough
depth due to the limits of the rational model theory. Taking an agent-centred approach, rather
than structure-centred, the 'rational actor theory bases itself on the fact that there will be one
central decision-maker (the actor) acting on behalf of a larger entity, e.g. the state 1. These
actors will have a foreign policy goal(s) they wish to achieve (e.g. keeping relations with
another state peaceful) and in order to achieve this goal they will try to rationally deduce the
best method to do this by weighing up the relative cost vs. benefits of a solution. In short,
actors will try to maximise utility as fully as possible, and the option which allows them to do
so will be their rational choice.
One of the core assumptions of this theory is that in making a rational decision, an actor
may have to settle for an outcome less desirable than their original goal due to constraints
forced upon them. This is where the idea of preference ordering comes into play. This is the
idea that there is a set of outcomes ranked A, B and C (with A being the outcome most
preferred by the actor and C being the least preferred). In a rational model, if A can no longer

Bueno de Mequista, B., Foreign Policy Analysis and Rational Choice

Models, New York University & Stanford University,
http://www.isacompss.com/info/samples/foreignpolicyanalysisandrationalc
hoicemodels_sample.pdf

be achieved then the actor would turn all of their efforts to achieving B, as logic deems that
this is the next best option. However, this is often quite difficult to apply to real-life decisions
as occasionally, even when a decision maker has acted rationally throughout the decisionmaking process, the least preferred option is reached due to external influences outside of
their control (as was the case with Appeasement). According to the rational model, decision
makers will have to deal with the fact that they will often not have complete freedom of
action (due to elements such as bureaucracy and groupthink) and will have to adjust their
behaviour accordingly.2 However, this is easier said than done with external influences and
factors such as motivations, emotions, beliefs, national conceptions, etc.3. Therefore, these
laws which are set out as being a rational model are often hard to find in reality.
A good foreign policy decision to use as an example of the complexity of the rational
model is that of Appeasement. Appeasement is the now infamous policy followed by Britain
throughout the 1930s in order to maintain peace in the international system through as the
name suggests appeasing potential threats to Britains security, in particular the threat of
Hitler and Nazi Germany. The origins of Appeasement lie with the League of Nations and the
attempt at collective security, which date back to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. In short,
the League was meant to bring peace to the international system by abandoning old
diplomacy (building up arms capabilities, use of force, etc.) which had taken Europe and,
consequently, other states from around the world, to war in 1914. The aim was to replace it

2
Ibid

3
Hudson, V., 'Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground
of International Relations', Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 1 (2005), p.2

with new diplomacy'4, which would see states negotiate with each other through talks rather
than turning to force as they had done previously. With the United States of America leaving
the League, Britain knew that the obligation to maintain order 5 now rested on her shoulders.
Appeasement starts to make an appearance for the first time in around 1931, with the crisis of
the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.
This was exactly the sort of situation the League had been established to prevent yet it
only managed to condemn the action, the first of many circumstances when it would fail in its
peacekeeping role6. According to some, this was the point at which the escalation into another
global conflict became inevitable7. The same response was repeated in 1936 with Italys
invasion of Abyssinia, and also with many of Hitlers audacious decisions, such as
rearmament (announced publicly in 1935), the occupation of the Rhineland (1936) and the
Anschluss (1938).
The main driving force of Appeasement (and the main character associated with the policy
today) was Neville Chamberlain. From his appointment as Prime Minister in 1937 he saw
himself as the only person capable of dealing with the tyranny of Facism and this was
reflected in the leading role he took in diplomatic matters concerning Hitler, often ignoring
4
Goldstein, E., Lukes, I. (eds.), The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II,
(London, Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1999), p.237

5
Ibid

6
Ibid

7
Ibid

his own Foreign Secretery Lord Halifax (who from September 1938 onwards condemned the
policy of Appeasement).However, Chamberlains views were shaped by others around him
and he was in no way alone in carrying out his foreign policy decisions8, being subject to
bureaucracy. 9
When compared to a rational model of the decision, there are many things which could be
said about the way in which Appeasement was actually carried out and how it deviates
greatly from how it should have been if every decision made had been rational. To start with,
applying the preference ordering model to Appeasement, it is probable that the most desired
outcome of any foreign policy choice of Britain at this time would be to uphold peace whilst
maintaining the current status-quo, and the least desired outcome would be the involvement
of Britain in another conflict comparable in scale to that of the First World War.
The status-quo which Britain wished to maintain at this point was mainly that of control
over her empire (within which there had been the stirrings of trouble throughout the 1920s
and 1930s) and this would have been the main driving force of her desire to keep peace (as
becoming embroiled in any serious conflict would take time and money away from the
empire). Until war broke out in 1939 the biggest challenge facing Britain was that of the
empire and what to do about its increasingly uncertain future.10
8
Goldstein, E., Lukes, I. (eds.), The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II,
(London, Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1999), p.282

9
Hudson, V., 'Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground
of International Relations', Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 1 (2005), p.2

10
Overy, R., with Wheatcroft, A., The Road to War, (London, Macmillan
London, 1989) , p.73

In essence, the empire took priority over everything else and any foreign policy decisions
made would be with its protection at the heart of it, which is why it was hoped that any
potential conflicts could be dealt with using diplomacy and negotiations rather than force.
According to Paul M Kennedy, her stretched global position was an enormously powerful
reason for compromise with other states.11 Conversely, whilst the empirical issue was a huge
influence to the policy of Appeasement in the first place, it also helped to ensure that the
policy would not fulfil its aims of maintaining peace. Britains aim to keep the empire strong
fall under the category of loss aversion, a psychological theory which gives evidence that
humans find losses more painful to deal with than they find comparable gains pleasant.12 This
theory can be seen clearly in the fact that Appeasement lacked any real decisiveness or clear
direction (in the words of Richard Overy, British foreign policy had an incoherent character,
the appearance of drift and reaction rather than initiative13) as British priorities lay elsewhere.
It also meant that when dealing with potential enemies Britain was less flexible in the
adjustments she was willing to make to the post-war settlement,14 resulting in even more
limitations on potential negotiations and the use of new diplomacy. In a rational model,
Britain would have been more flexible over empirical issues as this would have meant a
11
Kennedy, P., 'The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy',
British Journal of International Studies, Volume 2, Issue 3 (1976), p.197
12
Berejikian, J.D. And Early, B.R., 'Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve', Political Psychology, Volume 34, Issue 5 (2013)

13
Overy, R., with Wheatcroft, A., The Road to War, (London, Macmillan
London, 1989), p.74
14
Ibid

better chance at maintaining peace and would have been more beneficial for the empire in the
long-term.
Another way in which Appeasement deviates from the rational model is the simplified way
in which Britain saw her potential enemies, especially Nazi Germany. In foreign policy,
decision makers will often simplify situations, stripping away context and many other
complexities, in order to rationalise situations enough to be able to able to try and make
decisions about them.15 Appeasement was guilty of this in the way in which it viewed Hitlers
foreign policy aims. The simplified view that the British had of Nazi Germany seemed to be
that Hitler was first and foremost seeking to reverse the terms of the Treaty of Versailles,
primarily by reuniting all German speakers. Whilst this was one of his aims, it is a much
simpler narrative than the vast complexities of the true aims of the German state, and it
presents Hitler as a politician with whom negotiations can be made. In the words of Richard
Overy, If he [Chamberlain] had a fault it was to place for too long confidence in the
possibility that all leaders were susceptible to reason and good intentions, even Hitler.16
Even with the British realising Germanys potential to disturb future peace (a realisation
which gradually grew throughout the 1930s due to Hitlers increasingly audacious demands)
which caused them to start a programme of rearmament in 193417, foreign policy decisions
15
Dunne, T., Hadfield, A., Smith, S. (eds.), Janice Gross Stein, Foreign Policy:
Theories, Actors, Cases, 2nd edition (Oxford, Univeristy of Oxford Press, 2008), p.133

16
Overy, R., with Wheatcroft, A., The Road to War, (London, Macmillan
London, 1989), p.96
17
Ibid, p.75

did not change direction and Appeasement stayed firmly in place. This discounting of
information is consistent with the theory that as well as simplifying situations, humans also
like consistency and will blatantly ignore evidence which threatens their beliefs.18 This would
also help to explain why the British appear to be so bad at making predictions in the run up to
the Second World War, whereas wit hindsight it is easy to see how an increasingly ambitious
Hitler could easily lead to an escalation towards conflict.
Despite the many reasons discussed above as to why Appeasement did not follow a
rational model, there are some elements which do appear to be rational, most obviously the
realisation by Chamberlain of the restrictions placed on him by external factors. In a rational
model, the actor will realise the constraints imposed upon them and will adjust their choices
accordingly.19 When looking at Appeasement, this does appear to be what Chamberlain does.
With the withdrawal of the United States, Germany and Italy and the exclusion of the USSR,
most British policy makers saw the League of Nations as completely ineffective and therefore
adjusted to rapprochement with potential enemies without the League, as this was no longer a
possibility. Chamberlain also acknowledged the publics lack of desire for a conflict, with this
being one of the major reasons why diplomacy was the way in which problems would be
dealt with.
What comparing a real foreign policy decision -in this case Appeasement- with the rational
model does, is actually to show how unlikely any foreign policy made will be completely
rational. Some of the key factors highlighted above, in particular the human desire for
18
Dunne, T., Hadfield, A., Smith, S. (eds.), Janice Gross Stein, Foreign Policy:
Theories, Actors, Cases, 2nd edition (Oxford, Univeristy of Oxford Press, 2008), p.133

19
Hudson, V., 'Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground
of International Relations', Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 1 (2005), p.2

simplicity and continuity, apply to all foreign policy choices, regardless of context. Seeing as
these are traits inherent to human decision makers, it raises the question of whether or not
humans can ever be rational at all. Therefore, in conclusion, when compared to a rational
model of the decision, Appeasement appears to be very flawed despite having some rational
aspects. However, when taking into account how flawed the rational actor model itself is, it is
unlikely that any other foreign policy decision could be seen as completely rational either.

Bibliography

Berejikian, J.D. And Early, B.R., 'Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve',
Political Psychology, Volume 34, Issue 5 (2013), p. 649-671

Bueno de Mequista, B., Foreign Policy Analysis and Rational Choice Models, New
York University & Stanford University,
http://www.isacompss.com/info/samples/foreignpolicyanalysisandrationalchoicemode
ls_sample.pdf

Goldstein, E., Lukes, I. (eds.), The Munich Crisis, 1938: Prelude to World War II,
(London, Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1999)

Dunne, T., Hadfield, A., Smith, S., Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases, 2nd
edition (Oxford, Univeristy of Oxford Press, 2008)

Hudson, V., 'Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of
International Relations', Foreign Policy Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 1 (2005), p. 1-30

Kennedy, P., 'The Tradition of Appeasement in British Foreign Policy', British

Journal of International Studies, Volume 2, Issue 3 (1976), p. 195-215

Lee, R., Munich, (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1988)

Mazower, M., Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century, (London, Penguin, 1999)

McDonough, F. (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War: An International

Perspective, (London, Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011)

Overy, R., with Wheatcroft, A., The Road to War, (London, Macmillan London, 1989)