Suntay vs. Suntay GR No.

132524 December 29, 1998

Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524

FACTS:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabels Petition for Letters of Administration over the
estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico
and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabels father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina.
The marriage of Isabels parents had previously been decalred by the CFI as null and void. Federico
anchors his oppostion on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to
succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federicos
Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the
dispositive portion of the the decision declaring the marriage of Isabels parents null and void be
upheld.

ISSUE:
In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispostive portion thereof, which should
prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabels parents a case of a void or voidable marriage?
Whether or not Isabel is an legitimate child?

HELD:
Petition dismissed
Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and
binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states
that the marriage be declared null and void, the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art.
85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a
marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the
decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental distinction between
void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The
effects of void marriages, with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under
Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal
fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89
irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the
other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside
by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the law
makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of Article 89
which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered
legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the
status of Isabel would be covered by the second paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which
provides that children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate.

Ninal vs Bayadog
Ninal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122

FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely
Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died
on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months
later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an
affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage
license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for
lack of marriage license.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos
marriage after his death?

HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be
exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years
because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma,
only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five
years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated
by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage.

Lolita Enrico vs Heirs of Spouses Eulogio Medinaceli and Trinidad Medinaceli, Represented by Vilma
Articulo
G.R. No. 173614 September 28, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli was married on June 14, 1962
children,

during their marriage they begot 7

herein respondents, Edward, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.
During his marriage with Trinidad, Eulogio lived, openly and publicly, together with one Lolita Enrico
(petitioner)
and their union begot 2 children .
On May 1, 2004 Trinidad died. Subsequently Eulogio married Lolita on August 4, 2004. Eulogio died on
February
10, 2005.
In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into
without the requisite
marriage license. Respondents posited further that petitioners marriage with their father does not fall
under emarriages
that are exempt of the license requirement. . To further their cause, respondents raised the additional
ground of lack of
marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.
As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the
contracting
parties while living who can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued granting the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action
based on
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in Section 2, par.(a). On Motion for Reconsideration of Respondent, RTC reversed
its decision and
reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Nial v.
Bayadog. Petitioner filed
for Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the RTC.
Petioner file a Petiton for Certiorari in the Supreme Court.

Issues:
Which rule in Assailing Nullity , Voiding and Annulment of Marriage applies in the case at bar?

Ruling:
We grant the Petition. In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the
RTC acted
with grave abuse of discretion.
We cannot apply the decision in the
therein was

case of Nial for the

solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.

applicable law to determine

reason

that the

impugned marriage

The Court in Nial recognized that the

the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extend
to those marriages
entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.
There is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial, because
they vary in
scope and application.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are
already without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, compulsory or intestate
heirs can still question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity, but upon the
death of a spouse in
a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 6, is
marriage of Lolita D.

ORDERED DISMISSED

without prejudice to challenging the validity of the

Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the latter. No costs

Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000

FACTS:
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March
1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were declared
null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the decree
nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their
church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued in August 1980. In January 1991,
Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be declared null and void. AC
ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of the Family
Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights
of the petitioner and of her children.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

HELD:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who sought
damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety,

besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact, that
petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is likewise suing to
maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages would result to a situation
where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the
application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages
between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting and
the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2 children
for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.

Terre vs. Terre

211 SCRA 6

FACTS:
Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first cousin. Atty. Jordan Terre
successfully convinced Dorothy that her marriage was void ab initio for the reason of public policy and
that they are free to contract marriage. They got married in 1977 where he wrote single under
Dorothys status. After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently
contracted another marriage to Helina Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre was charged with abandonment
of minor and bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terres marriage with Dorothy is null and void.

HELD:
Dorothys first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito is her first cousin thereby
against public policy. However, she did not file any declaration for the nullity of their marriage before
she contracted her marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is void. Article 40 states that

the absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

G.R. No. 204169

September 11, 2013

YASUO IWASAWA, PETITIONER, vs. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO,
AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY, RESPONDENTS.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the September 4, 2012 Decision2 and October 16, 2012 Order3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, of Manila in Civil Case No. 11-126203. The RTC denied the petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa with private respondent Felisa
Custodio Gangan due to insufficient evidence.
The antecedents follow:
Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his visits to the
Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as "single" and "has never married before." Since
then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines and
married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided
in Japan.4
In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might have
happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private respondent
confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband passed away.5
Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wifes confession and discovered that indeed, she was
married to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994.6

This prompted petitioner to file a petition7 for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as
null and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to
Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following pieces of documentary
evidence issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO):
(1)Certificate of Marriage8 between petitioner and private respondent marked as Exhibit "A" to prove
the fact of marriage between the parties on November 28, 2002;
(2)Certificate of Marriage9 between private respondent and Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as
Exhibit "B" to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on June 20, 1994;
(3)Certificate of Death10 of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibits "C" and "C-1" to prove
the fact of the latters death on July 14, 2009; and
(4)Certification11 from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of marriage recorded by the
office pertaining to private respondent marked as Exhibit "D" to prove that private respondent in fact
contracted two marriages, the first one was to a Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo on June 20, 1994, and
second, to petitioner on November 28, 2002.
The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) admitted the
authenticity and due execution of the above documentary exhibits during pre-trial.12
On September 4, 2012, the RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient
evidence to prove private respondents prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while
petitioner offered the certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner
who testified about said marriage. The RTC ruled that petitioners testimony is unreliable because he
has no personal knowledge of private respondents prior marriage nor of Arambulos death which
makes him a complete stranger to the marriage certificate between private respondent and Arambulo
and the latters death certificate. It further ruled that petitioners testimony about the NSO certification
is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in an Order dated
October 16, 2012.
Hence this petition raising the sole legal issue of whether the testimony of the NSO records custodian
certifying the authenticity and due execution of the public documents issued by said office was
necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary weight.

Petitioner argues that the documentary evidence he presented are public documents which are
considered self-authenticating and thus it was unnecessary to call the NSO Records Custodian as
witness. He cites Article 410 of the Civil Code which provides that books making up the civil register
and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. Moreover, the trial prosecutor himself also admitted the
authenticity of said documents.
The OSG, in its Comment,13 submits that the findings of the RTC are not in accord with law and
established jurisprudence. It contends that both Republic Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Law on
Registry of Civil Status, and the Civil Code elaborated on the character of documents arising from
records and entries made by the civil registrar and categorically declared them as public documents.
Being public documents, said documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their
due execution and genuineness and consequently, there was no need for the court to require
petitioner to present the records custodian or officer from the NSO to testify on them. The OSG further
contends that public documents have probative value since they are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein as provided in the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code. Thus, the OSG submits that
the public documents presented by petitioner, considered together, completely establish the facts in
issue.

In her letter14 dated March 19, 2013 to this Court, private respondent indicated that she is not against
her husbands petition to have their marriage declared null and void. She likewise admitted therein
that she contracted marriage with Arambulo on June 20, 1994 and contracted a second marriage with
petitioner on November 28, 2002. She further admitted that it was due to poverty and joblessness that
she married petitioner without telling the latter that she was previously married. Private respondent
also confirmed that it was when she found out that Arambulo passed away on July 14, 2009 that she
had the guts to confess to petitioner about her previous marriage. Thereafter, she and petitioner have
separated.
We grant the petition.
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public
documents.1wphi1 As provided in the Civil Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered
public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution
and genuineness.15 Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that
the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their
authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore
necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary
weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant
case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public
prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.
This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid
subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,16 which is
void from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is
what transpired in the instant case.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the
nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is
bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent married
Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a second
marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial
declaration of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she married
petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private
respondents marriage with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second
marriage of private respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the first marriage
was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The September 4, 2012 Decision and
October 16, 2012 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 11-126203
are hereby SET ASIDE. The marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa and private respondent Felisa
Custodio Gangan is declared NULL and VOID.
The Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City and the National Statistics Office are hereby ORDERED to make
proper entries into the records of the abovementioned parties in accordance with this Decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.
Fujiki v Marinay (Conflict of Laws)
2013
MINORU FUJIKI, Petitioner, -versus- MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,

FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents.
Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC: dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to
file the petition.

ISSUES & RULING:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave
v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file
a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning
under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
Yes. [t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Yes. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under
foreign law.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment
on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the family rights and duties, or
on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign
judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving
a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent
with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove
an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR

G.R. No. 189538; February 10, 2014

FACTS:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt
thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on
June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied
having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not
appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is
not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the
entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as
well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
The RTC granted Olaybars petition and directed the Local Civil Registrar to cancel all the entries in the
WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract. Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of
the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage
contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio. The motion for reconsideration was denied,
hence this Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the
marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.

HELD:
YES.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into
and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly
established that the only evidence of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While
we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify
the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest
the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had
already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth
as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the
marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

240 SCRA 20, January 4, 1995 (En Banc), J. Vitug

FACTS OF THE CASE:
Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May 18 1988, Julia
left for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not return to the country. In 1991, Leoul
filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding the marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC dismissed the complaint and the CA affirmed the dismissal.
ISSUE:
Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than
five years constitute psychological incapacity?
RULING:
No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for more than five
years does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Pyschological incapacity must be characterized by (a) GRAVITY (b) JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE (c)
INCURABILITY
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY to the
mot serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inablity to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every
individual problem
PETITION IS DENIED.

Chi Ming Tsoi vs CA

GR No. 119190, January 16, 1997

FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they
proceed to the house of defendants mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during
their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon
in a private place, they went to Baguio but Ginas relatives went with them. Again, there was no
sexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a
rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed
but no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for
medical examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical
examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine
prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his
residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their
marriage declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does
not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part
and is physically and psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still
overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the
result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.

ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes
psychological incapacity.

HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a
serious personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the meaning of Article
36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes
to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.

Republic vs CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina
to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985,
after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a
father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his
parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986,
the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her
work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her
and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.
What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities.
It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital
responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action at the time of the
marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological
incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along
with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but
only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:
burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of
marital obligations of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON, respondents.
The Case
The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision[1] as well as the 7 August 1997
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order[2]
dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-9524471. The Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss private respondents Petition for Annulment of
Marriage for failure to state a cause of action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for
Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23445 (first petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 87.[3] On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial
court granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner
Diana. This time, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24471 (second petition) before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (trial court).
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the second petition
fails to state a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94
(Circular No. 04-94) on forum shopping. Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner
Diana filed Additional Arguments in Support of the Motion.
The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an Order (first order)
deferring resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner
Diana filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the trial court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L.
Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an Order (second order) denying the motion. In denying the
motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison explained that when the ground for dismissal is the complaints
failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself.
Judge Pison held that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a perusal of the allegations in the petition
shows that petitioner Diana has violated respondent Tadeos right, thus giving rise to a cause of action.
Judge Pison also rejected petitioner Dianas claim that respondent Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in
filing the second petition. Judge Pison explained that when respondent Tadeo filed the second petition,
the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445) was no longer pending as it had been earlier dismissed
without prejudice.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals
assailing the trial courts first order deferring action on the Motion and the second order denying the
motion for reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and
denied the motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order erred in deferring
action on the Motion until after a hearing on whether the complaint states a cause of action.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial courts second order corrected the
situation since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court in effect denied the Motion.
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the allegations in the second petition state a cause
of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true.
The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To determine the
existence of forum shopping, the elements of litis pendentia must exist or a final judgment in one case
must amount to res judicata in the other. In this case, there is no litis pendentia because respondent
Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of the first petition before filing the second petition.
Neither is there res judicata because there is no final decision on the merits.
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:

I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE

SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94
IN FAILING TO STATE THE FILING OF A PREVIOUS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, ITS
TERMINATION AND STATUS.[4]
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Sufficiency of Cause of Action
Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of action is untenable. A
cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff.[5] A
complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to
respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.[6]
We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition sought the declaration of
nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.[7] The petition alleged that respondent
Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as
shown by the marriage contract attached to the petition. The couple established their residence in
Quezon City. The union begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on 28
October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7 March 1974; and
Cristina Maria born in February 1978. The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition
alleged the non-complied marital obligations in this manner:
xxx
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent,
coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She
would go to her sisters house or would play tennis the whole day.
6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a
child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.

7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the
pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their
conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she wanted to feel a little freedom from petitioners marital
authority and influences. The petitioner argued that he could occupy another room in their conjugal
dwelling to accommodate respondents desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could dissuade
her from demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner
was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium located in Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the respondent. The
petitioner waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondents favor through an extrajudicial
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. The separation in fact between the petitioner and the
respondent still subsists to the present time.
10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The extrajudicial
dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex C and taken as an integral part
hereof.
11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the
present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the psychological examination conducted on
the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent.
12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is
void ab initio and needs to be annulled. This petition is in accordance with Article 39 thereof.

xxx.[8]
The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in accordance with
Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.[9] Ultimate facts refer to the principal, determinative,
constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of action rests. The term does not refer to
details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which establish the material elements.[10]
Petitioner Diana relies mainly[11] on the rulings in Santos v. Court of Appeals[12] as well as in Republic
v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[13] Santos gave life to the phrase psychological incapacity, a novel
provision in the Family Code, by defining the term in this wise:
xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. xxx.
Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in cases for
annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity.[14]
Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in Santos and
Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective because it fails to allege the
root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The second petition also fails to state that the
alleged psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent
or incurable. Further, the second petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to
bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the
second petition did not even state the marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to
comply due to psychological incapacity.

Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new Rules).[15] Specifically, Section 2,
paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
x x x.
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete
facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
(Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[16] The obvious
effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that there is
also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of
neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological
incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the
psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of
the psychological incapacity.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to and control the
human body. Scientists still do not understand everything there is to know about the root causes of
psychological disorders. The root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science
even as their outward, physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the
petition to allege are the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Respondent
Tadeos second petition complies with this requirement.

The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo, the
correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the
legal right. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,[17] the Court held:
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it
must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the
existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the
case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient
basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the
defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion
to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist
rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v.
Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically
admits all the factual averments in the complaint.[18] Given the hypothetically admitted facts in the
second petition, the trial court could render judgment over the case.
Forum Shopping
Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second petitions certificate of non-forum
shopping which does not mention the filing of the first petition and its dismissal without prejudice
violates Circular No. 04-94.[19] Petitioner Diana refers to this portion of Circular No. 04-941. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition,
application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn

certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and
undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in the Supreme court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the
best of his knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or
may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that
a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated
herein have been filed.[20]
Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his certificate of non-forum
shopping that he had previously commenced a similar action based on the same grounds with the
same prayer for relief. The certificate of non-forum shopping should have stated the fact of termination
of the first petition or its status.
The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not attached to the petition or
one belatedly filed or one signed by counsel and not the party himself constitutes a violation of the
requirement. Such violation can result in the dismissal of the complaint or petition. However, the Court
has also previously held that the rule of substantial compliance applies to the contents of the
certification.[21]
In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether the omission of a
statement on the prior filing and dismissal of a case involving the same parties and issues merits
dismissal of the petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled:
xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res
judicata and litis pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification
of the entire proceedings considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are
not present. It is in this light that we ruled in Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission that a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping
would be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is to secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis pendentia. The first petitions
dismissal did not also amount to res judicata. Thus, there is no need to state in the certificate of nonforum shopping in the second petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-24471) about the prior filing and dismissal
of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445).

The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo to keep the
peace between him and his grown up children. The dismissal happened before service of answer or
any responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis pendentia since respondent Tadeo had already
withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition when he subsequently filed the second
petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but
a dismissal without prejudice.
Circular No. 04-94,[23] now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, must be interpreted
and applied to achieve its purpose. The Supreme Court promulgated the Circular to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice. The Circular should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of
procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.[24]
A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an inviolable social institution and
the foundation of the family that the state cherishes and protects.[25] In rendering this Decision, this
Court is not prejudging the main issue of whether the marriage is void based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. The trial court must resolve this issue after trial on the merits where each party can
present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. We are merely holding that,
based on the allegations in the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action and

does not violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the second petition is not subject to attack by a
motion to dismiss on these grounds.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 1997 as well as the Resolution
dated 7 August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson Marcos

G.R. No. 13649, Oct. 19, 2000
3rd Division
FACTS: Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson Marcos were married twice and had five
children. After the downfall of President Marcos, the respondent left the military service in 1987.
Consequently, due to the respondents failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often
quarrel and the respondent would hit and beat the petitioner. As a result, in 1992 they were already
living separately. Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of marriage assailing Art. 36 of the Family Code.
The court a quo found the respondent to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC because psychological
incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Wilson Marcos failure to find work to support his family and his
violent attitude towards Petitioner Brenda Marcos and their children constituted psychological
incapacity.
HELD: The court ruled the negative.
RATIONALE: The totality of the respondents acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his defects were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It
is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
POLICY: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of marriage, may be established
by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.

Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano

GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004

FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio
Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went
back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987.

In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio
sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several
times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but
did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved.
Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by
publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was
published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to
respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the
prosecutor for investigation.

ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.

HELD:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be
due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not
needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically
identified Toshios illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a
person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness.
Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.

David Dedel vs Court of Appeals & Sharon Corpuz-Dedel

Facts:
Art 46 compared with PI
In 1966, David and Sharon married each other. Theyve had four children since then. David then found
out that Sharon is irresponsible as a wife and as a mother because during the marriage Sharon had
extra-marital affairs with various other guys particularly with one Mustafa Ibrahim, a Jordanian, with
whom she had 2 children. She even married Ibrahim. David averred that Sharon is psychologically
incapacitated and David submitted the findings of Dr. Dayan which shows that Sharon is indeed

psychologically incapacitated. Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several
indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa
Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her
repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality
Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not PI has been proven.

HELD:
PI is not proven in court in this case. The evidence is not sufficient. PI is intended to the most serious
cases of personality disorders which make one be incapable of performing the essential marital
obligations. Sharons sexual infidelity does not constitute PI nor does it constitute the other forms of
psychoses which if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely
renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on
the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Sexual infidelity is not one
of those contemplated in law. Until further statutory or jurisprudential parameters are set or
established, SI cannot be appreciated in favor of the dissolution of marriage.

G.R. NO. 158896

October 27, 2004

JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01
July 2003, reversing the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31

January 2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent
herein Judge Manuel Siayngco ("respondent Manuel").
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel were married at civil
rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they
could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named
Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel
filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He
alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude
towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she
incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly
parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables,
chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard
at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would
yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that
she cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support
and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deepseated resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her
own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if
treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical
capacity of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage
to her for twenty-two (22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal
home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to
marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who was
remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors
despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family and had a happy childhood
contrary to what was stated in the complaint.
In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following:
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand and elaborated
on the allegations in his petition. He testified that his parents never approved of his marriage as they
still harbored hope that he would return to the seminary.4 The early years of their marriage were
difficult years as they had a hard time being accepted as husband and wife by his parents and it was at
this period that his wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable and temperamental5 to him and his
parents.6 She was also obsessive about cleanliness which became the common source of their
quarrels.7 He, however, characterized their union as happy during that period of time in 1979 when
they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new house.8 In 1981, when he
became busy with law school and with various community organizations, it was then that he felt that
he and his wife started to drift apart.9 He then narrated incidents during their marriage that were
greatly embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with an elderly
neighbor;10 when she would visit him in his office and remark that the curtains were already dirty or
when she kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a ballpen from his table;11 when she
caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened while he was away;12 when she confronted a female
tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of having an affair with him;13 and other incidents reported to
him which would show her jealous nature. Money matters continued to be a source of bitter
quarrels.14 Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was not able to celebrate his appointment as
judge in 1995 as his wife did not approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very generous
when it came to celebrations of their parish priest.15 Respondent Manuel then denied that he was a
womanizer16 or that he had a mistress.17 Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their conjugal
properties and obligations.18

Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuels Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner Juanita seldom went to
respondent Manuels office.19 But when she was there, she would call witness to complain about the
curtains and the cleanliness of the office.20 One time, witness remembered petitioner Juanita
rummaging through respondent Manuels drawer looking for his address book while the latter was in
Subic attending a conference.21 When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer she called
witness, telling the latter that she was looking for the telephone number of respondents hotel room in
Subic. A process server was requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper.
When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked drawer. On another
occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified that she heard petitioner Juanita remark to
respondent Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa labas?"22
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional
qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita.23 From her psychiatric
evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital
collapse. There is a partner relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond
with love, support and understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel
and Juanita had engaged themselves in a defective communication pattern which is characteristically
negative and deformed. This affected their competence to maintain the love and respect that they
should give to each other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who are expected to use healthy
strategies to solve their disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be derogatory, critical,
argumentative, depressive and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance and
suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego to cover up for his felt or
imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his
failure to prioritize the marriage. Both spouses, who display narcissistic psychological repertoire (along
with their other maladaptive traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive)
to each others needs and feelings. The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a
progressive marriage. Manuel and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity to
satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing of their patterns of
maladaptive traits, which warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise specified
(PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will bring about more emotional mishaps and
psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits which were in existence before the marriage will tend to be
pervasive and impervious to recovery.25
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuels allegations. She insisted that they were
a normal couple who had their own share of fights; that they were happily married until respondent
Manuel started having extra-marital affairs26 which he had admitted to her.27 Petitioner Juanita
professed that she would wish to preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her husband.28 She
stated further that she has continuously supported respondent Manuel, waiting up for him while he
was in law school to serve him food and drinks. Even when he already filed the present case, she
would still attend to his needs.29 She remembered that after the pre-trial, while they were in the
hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new family.30
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel,31
testified that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the results of which were
embodied in his report. Said report stated in part:
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests, respondent Juanita Victoria
Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature, conservative, religious and highly intelligent woman who
possess [sic] more than enough psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long term
heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is respectful of traditional institutions of society

like the institution of marriage. She was also found to be a loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman
who is capable of enduring severe environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is realityoriented and therefore capable of rendering fair and sound decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be psychologically capacitated to
comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.32
CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the Siayngcos as the ideal
couple, sweet to each other.33 The couple would religiously attend prayer meetings in the
community.34 Both were likewise leaders in their community.35 Witness then stated that she would
often go to the house of the couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent Manuel
there.36

On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuels petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to petitioner Juanita holding in part that:
The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not preponderantly supported in evidence.
The couple [was] happily married and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a son. Their life
together continued years thereafter in peace and prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and obsessive doubtless arose later
in the parties relationship sometime in the early 90s when the defendant-wife started receiving
letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk responses to slight stabs of the
Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed, due to her
jealousy, to the constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as our laws now
stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in such cases. In contrast to some countries,
our laws do not look at a marital partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she
sometimes may sound like a firetruck.37
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04 May 2001.38
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric
evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the case
of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.39 Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of plaintiff Manuel
and defendant Juanita. It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and defendant. That is a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each others feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults
who view the relationship with love "amore gignit amorem", sacrifice and a continuing commitment to
compromise conscious of its value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals,
266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped
in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less, but reverse and
set aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his marriage declared a
nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity, not only of defendant but also of himself.40
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED

II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE
TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING
OF THE PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF
REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON
GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The Courts Ruling
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we held that whether or not
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage
depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged according
to its own facts as there can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court of Appeals
did not heed.

The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its
factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite sharing the
same bed from the time of their wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation on 15 March
1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the
reason that an essential marital obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that "the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity."
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather, we have here a case
of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wifes outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds
his wifes obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by
her lack of support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book, however, these
inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not
amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article
36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer,
rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.43 In Republic v. Court of Appeals44 we expounded:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as
the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified, b)
alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must

be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage like the exercise
of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.45
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of whether or not the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against
petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of
the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution.46 With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals47
that the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel
herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuels
own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to
gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage:
She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool, intelligent but a liar,
masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of him whenever he is
sick. He is having extra marital affairs because he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest
problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his girl now. He started his
relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them together in the car. I think that it was the girl who
encouraged him to file the petition." She feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-ulit,"
but, that she still is willing to pursue it.

x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really psychologically
incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a new family."
She answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage
natin."48
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties
and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able
to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.50 It must be shown that
respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state51 and not merely due to
his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has
admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular
point."52
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for
him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially
with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological
maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there
any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent
Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and
essential obligations of marriage.54
The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other hand, does not help
his case any. Nothing in there supports the doctors conclusion that petitioner Juanita is psychologically
incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanitas
behavior is traceable not from the inception of their marriage as required by law but from her
experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter
the priesthood,55 her husbands philandering, admitted no less by him,56 and her inability to
conceive.57 Dr. Garcias report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew professionally during the
marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately
sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself
during his direct examination.58

Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into
the Siayngcoss life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a
way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.59 As we
stated in Marcos v. Marcos:60
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be experiencing in being
shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like
this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.61

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the Court
of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and effect. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

JAIME F. VILLALON, Petitioner, vs. MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON, Respondent.

On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition1 for the annulment of his marriage to
respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where it was docketed
as JDRC No. 3917 and raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his psychological
incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage.
According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal
to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; (b) his
immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband
to his wife; (c) his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his
false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium towards
respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void ab initio.
On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answer2 denying petitioners allegations. She asserted
that her 18-year marriage to petitioner has been "fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and
hopes for more growth in their relationship" and that their marital squabbles were normal based on

community standards. Petitioners success in his professional life aided him in performing his role as
husband, father, and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioners commitment to his paternal and
marital responsibilities was beyond reproach.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed the prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether
there was collusion between the parties.3 The report submitted to the trial court stated that there was
no such collusion.4
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) subsequently entered its appearance in behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines5 and submitted an opposition6 to the petition on September 23, 1997. Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued.
Petitioner testified that he met respondent sometime in the early seventies when he applied for a job
at Metrobank, where respondent was employed as a foreign exchange trader. They began dating in
1975 and had a romantic relationship soon thereafter.7 After going steady for about two years,
petitioner and respondent were married at the San Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila on April 22, 1978.
Petitioner claimed that he married respondent because he believed that it was the right time to raise a
family and that she would be a good mother to his children.8
In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided to separate from respondent. According to him, their
marriage reached a point where there was no longer any communication between them and their
relationship became devoid of love, affection, support and respect due to his constant urge to see
other women.9 Moreover, their relationship tended to be "one-sided" since respondent was
unresponsive and hardly ever showed her love, needs, wants and emotions.10
Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions before his marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same
time. He also saw other women even when he became engaged to and, later on, married
respondent.11 Respondent learned of his affairs but reacted in a subdued manner.12 Petitioner
surmised that it was respondents nature to be silent and withdrawn.13
In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode and moved into an apartment located five to
minutes away. Before he left, he and his wife spoke to their three children who, at that time, were
8, and 6 years old, respectively.14 Petitioner consulted a child psychologist before talking to
children.15 He considered himself as a good and loving father and described his relationship with
children as "great".16

ten
14,
his
the

Despite the separation, petitioner would regularly visit his children who stayed with him on alternate
weekends. He voluntarily gave monthly support to the children and paid for their tuition fees. He also
shouldered the childrens medical expenses as well as the maintenance and miscellaneous fees for the
conjugal abode.17
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged psychological
disorder of "Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder" with "Casanova Complex". Dr. Dayan described
the said disorder as "a pervasive maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and occupational
functioning" with main symptoms of "grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is
unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I personality." A person afflicted with this
disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and thus engages in
serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with "Casanova Complex" exhibits habitual adulterous behavior
and goes from one relationship to another.18

Dr. Dayan submitted a psychological report on both petitioner and respondent based on clinical
interviews and psychological tests.19
Respondent testified that she first learned of her husbands infidelity in 1980. She discovered that he
was having an affair with one of her friends who worked as a trader in her husbands company. The
affair was cut short when the woman left for the United States to work. Eventually, she and petitioner
were able to rebuild their relationship and overcome the crisis.20

When asked about the womanizing ways of her husband, respondent averred that she did not know
whether her husbands acts could be deemed "womanizing" since there were only two instances of
infidelity which occurred 13 years apart.21 She also theorized that petitioner wanted to have their
marriage annulled so he could marry her old friend.22 She stated that she has not closed her doors to
petitioner but the latter would have to give up his extra-marital relationship.23
To controvert the findings of petitioners expert witness, respondent presented a psychiatrist, Dr.
Cecilia Villegas, who testified that Dr. Dayans findings were incomplete because a "team approach"
was necessary in evaluating an individuals personality. An evaluation of ones psychological capacity
requires the expertise of a psychiatrist and social worker. 24
Upon order of the trial court, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.25 The OSG likewise
filed a certification26 pursuant to Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals.27 In due course, the trial court
rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
Ma. Corazon N. Villalon celebrated on April 22, 1978, as null and void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal assets and liabilities are hereby ordered to be liquidated and the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership of gains be effected in accordance with Article 129 of the Family Code.
As petitioner manifested that he wishes to maintain the custody arrangement now existing, the
custody of the three (3) children Miguel Alberto, Fernando Alfonso, and Ma. Joanna Victoria shall
remain with the respondent subject to visitation rights of petitioner as may be mutually agreed upon
by the parties.
In order to cancel the registration of the Marriage Contract between herein parties appearing in the
Book of Marriage of the city of Manila, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila as well as the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO), CRD Legal Department,
EDSA, Quezon City. SO ORDERED.28
Respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an appeal from the decision of the trial court, docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 74354. On March 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, the dispositive
part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 12, 2001 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment entered DISMISSING the petitioners petition for lack of merit.SO
ORDERED.29
Contrary to the trial courts findings, the appellate court held that petitioner failed to prove the juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of his alleged psychological incapacity. Although Dr. Dayan
testified that petitioners psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, she failed to give sufficient
basis for such a finding. Dr. Dayan also stated that parental marital instability was the root cause of
petitioners psychological incapacity but failed to elaborate thereon or link the two variables.
Moreover, petitioners sexual infidelity was made to appear as symptomatic of a grave psychological
disorder when, in reality, the same merely resulted from a general dissatisfaction with the marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision which was denied in an
order dated October 28, 2004.30 Thus, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The petition has no merit.
The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner
was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their separation, a loving
father to their children and a good provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at
least two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder

which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of
a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioners
personal history.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,31 the court held that psychological incapacity, as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage, must be characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability.32 It should
... [R]efer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the
time the marriage is celebrated....33
In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner suffered from Narcissistic Histrionic
Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex even before the marriage and thus had the tendency to
cheat on his wife, such conclusion was not sufficiently backed by concrete evidence showing that
petitioner indeed had several affairs and finds it difficult to be faithful. Except for petitioners general
claim that on certain occasions he had two girlfriends at the same time, no details or explanations
were given of such circumstances that would demonstrate petitioners inability to be faithful to
respondent either before or at the time of the celebration of their marriage.
Similarly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to establish the incurability and
gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan described the symptoms of one afflicted
with Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder as "self-centered", "characterized by grandiose
ideation" and "lack of empathy in relating to others", and one with Casanova Complex as a "serial
adulterer", the evidence on record betrays the presence of any of these symptoms.
Moreover, we are not convinced that petitioner is a "serial or habitual adulterer", as he wants the court
to believe. As stated by respondent herself, it cannot be said that two instances of infidelity which
occurred 13 years apart could be deemed "womanizing", especially considering that these instances
involved the same woman. In fact, at the time of respondents testimony, petitioners illicit relationship
has been going on for six years. This is not consistent with the symptoms of a person suffering from
"Casanova Complex" who, according to Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one relationship to another.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
marriage.34 The evidence on record fails to convince us that petitioners marital indiscretions are
symptomatic of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
evidence reveals that petitioner was a good husband most of the time when he was living with
respondent, a loving father to his children as well as a good provider.
In Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,35 we held that the cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Further
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.36
In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for respondent and has
consequently refused to stay married to her. As revealed by his own testimony, petitioner felt that he
was no longer part of respondents life and that the latter did not need or want him.37 Respondents
uncommunicative and withdrawn nature apparently led to petitioners discontentment with the marital
relationship.

However, as held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,38 refusal to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity within the meaning of the law. The policy of the
State is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage is the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.39
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 23, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 74354 and its October 28, 2004 Resolution, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006

Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris vs. Brix Ferraris
Facts: The couples relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union was not all bad.
During that relatively short period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the
company of Brix. Armida even admits that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems
began when Armida started doubting Brix fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the
calls from women that Brix began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his socalled marital obligations. Brix could not understand Armidas lack of trust in him and her constant
naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger, temper and
jealousy.
Petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity in the RTC. RTC denied the petition where they ruled that epilepsy does not amount to
psychological incapacity and s were not evidences were not sufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner filed
for motion for reconsideration which was denied having no evidence that respondent was mentally or
physically ill. Petitioner appealed to the CA, CA affirmed the RTCs decision. Petitioner gain filed for
motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Thus, she filed for a petition for review of
certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not there was psychological incapacity in the case.
Ruling: The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. It
is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are
binding on the SC save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the
appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the
case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case.
The root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained, which the petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
The respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they
quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and
lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. A "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance
of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity is not enough to prove that the parties
failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. It is essential that they must be
shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
The motion for reconsideration denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner
to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

Antonio vs. Reyes

GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006

FACTS:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year
after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at
Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about
herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or
things. She even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband
as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for
reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to
have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage
null and void.

HELD:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed
to a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is
abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, which amounts to
psychological incapacity. Respondents fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of
fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The
root causes of Reyes psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was
sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity was considered so
grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult
for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on
love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to
reconcile with her but her behavior remain unchanged.
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

G.R. No. 166579

February 18, 2010

JORDAN CHAN PAZ, Petitioner, vs. JEANICE PAVON PAZ, Respondent.

The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the 9 August 20042 and 26 November 20043 Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80473. In its 9 August 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed
petitioner Jordan Chan Pazs (Jordan) appeal of the 13 May 2003 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 69 (trial court), which granted respondent Jeanice Pavon Pazs (Jeanice) petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. In its 26 November 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
Jordans motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Jordan and Jeanice met sometime in November 1996. Jeanice was only 19 years old while Jordan was
27 years old. In January 1997, they became a couple and, on 10 May 1997, they were formally
engaged. They had their civil wedding on 3 July 1997, and their church wedding on 21 September
1997. They have one son, Evan Gaubert, who was born on 12 February 1998. After a big fight, Jeanice
left their conjugal home on 23 February 1999.
On 15 September 1999, Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Jordan.
Jeanice alleged that Jordan was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of
marriage. According to Jeanice, Jordans psychological incapacity was manifested by his uncontrollable
tendency to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his predisposition to become violent and
abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not satisfied.
Jeanice alleged that Jordan had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts and had the habit of hanging
out and spending a great deal of time with his friends. Since Jordan worked in their family business,
Jordan would allegedly just stay home, tinker with the Play Station, and ask Jeanice to lie to his
brothers about his whereabouts. Jeanice further alleged that Jordan was heavily dependent on and
attached to his mother. After giving birth to their son, Jeanice noticed that Jordan resented their son
and spent more time with his friends rather than help her take care of their son. Jordan also demanded
from his mother a steady supply of milk and diapers for their son.
At the early stage of their marriage, Jeanice said they had petty fights but that the quarrels turned for
the worse and Jordan became increasingly violent toward her. At one point, Jordan threatened to hurt
her with a pair of scissors. Jeanice also alleged that on 22 February 1999, Jordan subjected her to
verbal lashing and insults and threatened to hit her with a golf club. Jeanice added that Jordan has not
provided any financial support or visited their son since she left their conjugal home.

Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted with "Borderline Personality
Disorder as manifested in his impulsive behavior, delinquency and instability."5 Gates concluded that
Jordans psychological maladies antedate their marriage and are rooted in his family background.
Gates added that with no indication of reformation, Jordans personality disorder appears to be grave
and incorrigible.
Jordan denied Jeanices allegations. Jordan asserted that Jeanice exaggerated her statements against
him. Jordan said that Jeanice has her own personal insecurities and that her actions showed her lack of
maturity, childishness and emotional inability to cope with the struggles and challenges of maintaining
a married life.
Jordan also objected to the psychological report offered by Jeanice. Jordan pointed out that he was not
subjected to any interview or psychological tests by Gates. Jordan argued that Gates conclusions were
mere speculations, conjectures and suppositions from the information supplied by Jeanice. Jordan
alleged that it was patently one-sided and is not admissible in evidence as it was based on hearsay
statements of Jeanice which were obviously self-serving. Jordan said he wants Jeanice back and prayed
for the dismissal of the petition.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 13 May 2003, the trial court granted Jeanices petition. The trial court declared that Jordans
psychological incapacity, which was specifically identified as "Borderline Personality Disorder,"
deprived him of the capacity to fully understand his responsibilities under the marital bond. The trial
court found that Jordan was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage, particularly Articles 686 and 707 of the Family Code. The trial court also declared that
Jordans psychological incapacity, being rooted in his family background, antedates the marriage and
that without any sign of reformation, found the same to be grave and incurable.
The dispositve portion of the trial courts 13 May 2003 Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner
Jeanice Pavon Paz and respondent Jordan Chan Paz celebrated on July 3, 1997 and September 21, 1997
as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent pursuant
to Article 36 of the Family Code with all the effects provided by law. The couples absolute community
of properties [sic] shall be dissolved in the manner herein provided. And the custody over Evan shall
remain with the petitioner, without regard to visitation rights of the respondent as the father of the
child. Furthermore, the parties are jointly responsible for the support of their minor child Evan Guabert
Pavon Paz.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Quezon City and Pasig City
respectively as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO, CRP, Legal Department) EDSA, Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.8
On 6 June 2003, Jordan filed a Notice of Appeal.9 The trial court promptly approved Jordans appeal.
On 10 February 2004, Jeanice filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal with the Court of Appeals.10 In her
motion, Jeanice sought the immediate dismissal of Jordans appeal on the ground that Jordan failed to
comply with Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC11 which provides:
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(1) Pre-condition. No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the appellant has filed a motion
for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days from notice of judgment.
On 9 August 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed Jordans appeal. According to the Court of Appeals,
the rules state in mandatory and categorical terms that the filing of a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is a pre-condition before an appeal from the decision is allowed. The Court of Appeals added
that when the law is clear and unambiguous, it admits no room for interpretation but merely for
application.

Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 26 November 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the motion.
Hence, this petition.
In a minute Resolution dated 22 June 2005, we denied Jordans petition for failure to sufficiently show
that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the challenged resolutions as to warrant
the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.12
On 18 August 2005, Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration. While Jordan admits that he failed to file
a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts 13 May 2003 Decision, Jordan submits that Section 20
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC should not have been strictly applied against him because it took effect only
on 15 March 2003, or less than two months prior to the rendition of the trial courts 13 May 2003
Decision. Moreover, Jordan enjoins the Court to decide the case on the merits so as to preserve the
sanctity of marriage as enshrined in the Constitution.
Jeanice also filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration on 1 September 2005.13
In a minute Resolution dated 19 September 2005, we granted Jordans motion for reconsideration and
reinstated the petition.14
Jeanice filed a motion for reconsideration. In a minute Resolution dated 5 June 2006, we denied
Jeanices motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.15
On 7 August 2006, Jeanice filed a second motion for reconsideration.
In a minute Resolution dated 20 September 2006, we denied Jeanices second motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit and reminded Jeanice that a second motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading.16

The Issue
The only issue left to be resolved is whether Jordan is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Jeanice Failed to Prove Jordans Psychological Incapacity
Jeanices petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code
which provides:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) judicial antecedence; and (c) incurability. It must be confined "to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage."18
In Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court explained:
(a) Gravity It must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Judicial Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and

(c) Incurability It must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.20
In granting Jeanices petition, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of Gates to support its
conclusion that Jordan was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. Gates declared that Jordan was suffering from "Borderline Personality Disorder" as
manifested by his being a "mamas boy" and that such was "grave and incurable," "rooted in his family
background, [and] antedates the marriage."
Although there is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be
personally examined by a physician or a psychologist, there is nevertheless a need to prove the
psychological incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the person alleging said
disorder.21
Correspondingly, the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity.22
In this case, the Court notes that the report and testimony of Gates on Jordans psychological
incapacity were based exclusively on her interviews with Jeanice and the transcript of stenographic
notes of Jeanices testimony before the trial court.23 Gates only diagnosed Jordan from the statements
of Jeanice, whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. Gates did not actually hear, see and
evaluate Jordan. Gates testified:
Q- As a last question Madam witness. So all in all your conclusions here on page 1 to page 5 of your
Report are all based on the statement and perception of the petitioner (Jeanice) on the respondent
(Jordan)?
A- Yes Mam.24
Consequently, Gates report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no personal
knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on.25 Gates testimony should have thus been
dismissed for being unscientific and unreliable.26
Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Jordans alleged psychological incapacity was not
shown to be so grave and so permanent as to deprive him of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond. At best, Jeanices allegations showed that Jordan was
irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally immature. The incidents cited by Jeanice do not show that
Jordan suffered from grave psychological maladies that paralyzed Jordan from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage.
What the law requires to render a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity is downright
incapacity, not refusal or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.27 The mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" does not constitute psychological incapacity.28
In Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris,29 we said:
As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with
certain personality disorders, there is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
marriage.30
Furthermore, Gates did not particularly describe the "pattern of behavior" which showed that Jordan
indeed suffers from Borderline Personality Disorder. Gates also failed to explain how such a personality
disorder made Jordan psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband.
Likewise, Jeanice was not able to establish with certainty that Jordans alleged psychological incapacity
was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Gates testimony on the matter was vague and
inconclusive. Gates testified:

Q - Now is this disorder curable?

A - If its continuing to the present therefore its persevererative behavior. Then the possibility of
countering the same might be nil.31
Gates did not adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that Jordans condition was
incurable.
In sum, the totality of the evidence presented by Jeanice failed to show that Jordan was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations and that such incapacity was grave,
incurable, and existing at the time of the solemnization of their marriage.1avvphi1
In Republic v. Cabantug-Baguio,32 we said:
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected
by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies on the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.33
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 9 August 2004 and 26 November 2004
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. We REVERSE the 13 May 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Branch 69. The marriage of Jeanice Pavon Paz to Jordan Chan Paz subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.

SUAZO v. SUAZO
G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010

FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only. Without any
means to support themselves, they lived with Angelitos parents while Jocelyn took odd jobs and
Angelito refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to find work but this
often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito thereafter
found another woman with whom he has since lived. 10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged physical
beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony. Both her
psychological report and testimony concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated.
However, B was not personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage on the
ground that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as immaturity, i.e., lack of an
effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the
husband to support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and

habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks but
the CA reversed it and held that the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the
family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were
manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory
of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the
time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The
evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of
the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness
on the part of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the
Family Code.

HELD:
The Court find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting
aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyns evidence is insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological incapacity. The psychologist
evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived all her
conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be
doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could
not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective
opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be
conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for Angelitos. The
methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of
examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both
the psychologists report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelitos purported
anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave
and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or
the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be
evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself. As testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and
refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital
obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal
or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents personality structure
that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be
shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part
of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness;
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and
the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the
same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.