SECTION 1 RULE 114 REVISED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Section 1. Bail defined. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to
guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of
corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.

EXTRADITION:

Government of USA vs Purganan

G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002

Facts:This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion where the court held that
Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC
on 18 May 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter
alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on
15 April 1999.

Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that
Jimenezs application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. In its 23 May 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and
set the case for hearing on 5 June 2001. In that hearing, Jimenez manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial
court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an
alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.

The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on 15 June 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its 3 July 2001 Order,
directing the issuance of warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1 million in cash. After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated 4 July 2001.
Hence, this petition.

Issues: 1.Whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued
2. Whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending
Held:
1. No.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or
affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the
issuance of warrants of arrest.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and their witnesses. In the
present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early
stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present
evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire
plethora of defenses at this stage if he so desires in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert
the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case
superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
***Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible,
a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and
Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may
personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the
arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary
hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the
petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will
best serve the ends of justice in extradition cases.***
 2. No.
Extradition cases are different from ordinary criminal proceedings. The constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.

Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Parettiin arguing that, constitutionally, [n]o one shall be deprived of x x x liberty x x x
without due process of law.
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right
to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time,
point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances such as those present
in an extradition case call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be given full
opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his
right to due process and fundamental fairness.

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 (2007)

Facts Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree
the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the
private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the
respondent was a high flight risk. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge
subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues
raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for
judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court
even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time
and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal,
be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the
government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

Ruling A potential extraditee is entitled to bail.

Ratio Decidendi Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has
a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding
Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the
constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal proceedings. The
Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on
the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human
rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

Go vs. LUIS T. RAMOS

Facts: These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit[9] for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable
alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other records
indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmys citizenship as FChinese. Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth
certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of
Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout,
Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents
and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit,verring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a
harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings.

Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy
alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance
with Commonwealth Act 625.

In resolution dated Feb. 14 2001, Associate Comm. Linda L. Malinab Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy.

On March 8 2001, The Board of Commissioner reversed the decision. Their contention is that Carlos election of citizenship was made
out of time.

The board issued a decision dated April 17 2002 for apprehension and deportation of Jimmy Go to China.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in RTC but was denied by the said court.

They questioned the said decision and filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of appeals. The petition was granted.

Their motion for reconsideration was denied at Bureu of immigration.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.

RULING: A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be
issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of
habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances
mentioned in Section 4[98] of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.[99]

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas
corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term court in this context
includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the persons confinement, like the Deportation Board of the
Bureau of Immigration.[100] Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is
detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial
Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.[101]

Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by
this Courts pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition
for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other arguments advanced
by respondents regarding the same subject.

BOND VS. RECOGNIZANCE

BAIL IS A MATTER OF RIGHT

Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or
released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

BAIL IS DISCRETIONARY

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision
of the trial court conviction the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only
be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

RECLUSION PERPETUA VS. LIFE IMPRISONMENT

RP LI
REVISED PENAL CODE SPECIAL PENAL LAW
20 TO 40 YEARS DURATION IS INDEFINITE
COMES WITH ACCESORY PENALTIES NO ACCESORY PENALTIES
CONVICTS BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR PARDON AFTER NO DETAILS OF PARDON SPECIFIED
30 YEARS

N. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED DURING TRIAL

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were
made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on
December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption
against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeeded
in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire
prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a
snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run
in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his
post. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later
left Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed
for judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of people power of freedom of
speech and freedom of assemblyto
exercise of the people power of petition the government for redress of
revolution which overthrew the whole grievances which only affected the office of
government. the President.
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of intra constitutional and the resignation of
the new government that resulted from it the sitting President that it caused and the
cannot be the subject of judicial review succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review.
presented a political question; involves legal questions.
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain
provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art
VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the
right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left
the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing material relevant issuesPresident Estrada is
deemed to have resigned constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacaan Palace. In the
press release containing his final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he
was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past
opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President.
Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both
houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is
no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional
fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the
de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the
imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a
non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with
post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the
jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court
also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to
render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary
investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more
concerned with justice and less with prosecution.

Corpuz v People 194 SCRA 73 (1991)

Facts: Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower courts decision finding him guilty for malversation of public funds. The accused was the
acting supervising cashier at the Provincial Treasurers office. He denied having misused the whole amount of P72,823.08 which was
discovered to be a shortage from the government funds contending that the P50,000.00 was the unliquidated withdrawal made by their
paymaster Pineda thru the 4 checks he issued while the petitioner was on leave and that he was forced by their Provincial Treasurer
Aluning to post said amount in his cash book despite not actually receiving the amount.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of innocence of the accused of the charge against him

Held: It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused should yield to the positive findings that he malversed the government
funds considering all the evidences presented that point out to his guilt on the charge imputed against him. Records shows that the
checks issued for the paymaster were duly liquidated to the accused and there were inconsistent entries on his cash books and that he
was not really on leave on the day the said checks were disbursed by the paymaster.

IV. The Equipoise Rule: where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, the case will be resolved against the plaintiff, thus in
criminal cases the accused must be acquitted and in civil cases, the complaint must be dismissed.

Right to be Heard by Himself and Counsel (Sec. 14 (2), Art. III)

Even if the guilt of the accused is very apparent, a hearing is still indispensable. He cannot be punished upon doubtful assumption.
Lack of hearing or notice of hearing violates procedural due process.

Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in person, or he has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel
de officio to defend him.

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED

(a)Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his rights to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel;
(c)The right to be informed o his rights the right guaranteed here is more than what is shown in television shows where the police
routinely reads out the rights from a note card; he must also explain their effects in practical terms (People vs. Rojas, 147 SCRA 169).
Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot then truly be said that the person has been informed of his rights (People vs.
Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289).

RIGHT TO SPEEDY, PUBLIC AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL

HOW SHOULD THE TRIAL BE CONDUCTED?

> The trial should be speedy, public and impartial

WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL?

> The right means that the trial should be conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations and
it should be free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays

WHEN SHOULD THE ARRAIGNMENT AND PRE-TRIAL BE HELD?

> According to the Speedy Trial Act of 1988, and Circular 38-98, if the accused pleads not guilty, arraignment and pre-trial should be
held within 30 days from the time the court acquires jurisdiction
over the accused

WITHIN HOW MANY DAYS SHOULD THE TRIAL BE COMPLETED?

> In no case shall the entire period exceed 180 days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Court
Administrator

WHAT FACTORS MAY BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING WHETHER

THE ACCUSED HAS BEEN DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL AND SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS
CASE? (ACCORDING TO CORPUZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN)
1. Length of delay
2. Reason for the delay
3. The defendants assertion of his right
4. Prejudice to the defendant

WHAT ARE THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THE ACCUSED WHOSE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL HAS BEEN VIOLATED?
1. Motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of right to speedy trial
must be filed before trial. This has the same effect as an acquittal for purposes of double jeopardy.
2. File for mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information
3. If he is restrained of his liberty, file for habeas corpus
4. Ask for the trial of the case and move to dismiss

WHAT IS THE LIMITATION ON THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL?

> The limitation is that the State shouldn't be deprived of its day in court
> The right of the State and the prosecution to due process should be respected
THE PROSECUTION AND THE COMPLAINANT FAIL TO ATTEND THE
FIRST HEARING. THE COURT POSTPONES THE HEARING TO ANOTHER DATE. IS THERE A VIOLATION TO THE RIGHT
TO SPEEDY TRIAL?
> No, the right to speedy trial is violated when there are unjustified postponements of the trial and a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the case being tried for no unjustifiable reason

NOTA BENE: Corollary to the right to speedy trial is the right to speedy disposition of cases.

WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL?

> It means that anyone interested in observing the manner that a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so

WHY SHOULD A TRIAL BE CONDUCTED IN PUBLIC?

> The trial should be public in order to prevent abuses that may be committed by the court to the prejudice of the defendant
> Moreover the accused is entitled to the moral support of his friends and relatives

IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO THE REQUIREMENT OF PUBLICITY?

> Yes, the court may bar the public in certain cases, such as when the evidence to be presented may be offensive to decency or
public morals, or in rape cases, where the purpose of some
persons in attending is merely to ogle at the parties

IS IT ALRIGHT TO HOLD THE TRIAL IN THE CHAMBERS OF THE JUDGE?

> Yes, there is no violation of the right to a public trial since the public isnt excluded from attending the trial

IN SO-CALLED TRIALS BY PUBLICITY, WHEN CAN THE PUBLICITY BE CONSIDERED PREJUDICIAL TO THE ACCUSED?
> To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegations and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be by the barrage of
publicity

I. SPEEDY DISPOSATION OF CASES

Section 16, Art. III. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

Speedy Trial vs. Speedy Disposition of Cases

Speedy trial

Speedy disposition of cases

Refers to trial phase only

Refers to disposition of cases (All phases)

Criminal cases only

Judicial, quasi-judicial or admin. Proceedings

Periods for decision for courts (Sec. 15, Art. VIII)

SC: 24 months from submission

All lower collegiate courts: 12 months unless reduced by SC

All other lower courts: 3 months

Periods for decision for Constitutional Commissions (Sec 7, Art. IX-A)

60 days from date of submission for decision or resolution

Factors considered in determining whether the right is violated

1. Length of delay

2. Reason of delay

3. Assertion of the right or failure to assert it

4. Prejudice caused by delay

Remedy in case there has been unreasonable delay in resolution of a case:

Dismissal through mandamus

Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [GRs 74989-90, 6 November 1989]

First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 21 November 1981, Joel Caes was charged in two separate informations with illegal possession of firearms and illegal
possession of marijuana before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The cases were consolidated on 10 December 1981. Arraignment
was originally scheduled on 11 January 1982, but was for some reason postponed. On 31 August 1982, Caes was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. Trial was scheduled for 13 October 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the parties.

On 15 November 1982, the trial was again postponed for reasons that do not appear in the record. On 20 December 1982, the trial was
again postponed because the prosecution witnesses were absent. On 19 January 1983, the third resetting of the case was also
canceled, no reason appearing in the record. On 21 February 1983, 21 March 1983, and 19 April 1983, no trial could be held as the
prosecution witnesses were absent. On 3 June 1983, a sheriffs return informed the trial court that the prosecution witnesses, namely,
Capt. Carlos Dacanay and Sgt. Bonifacio Lustado, had been personally served with subpoena to appear and testify at the hearing
scheduled on 6 June 1983. On said day, the trial was again postponed, this time because there was no trial fiscal. On 12 July 1983,
trial was reset for lack of material time. On 6 September 1983, the trial was once ore reset by agreement of the parties. On 19 October
1983, the trial was reset to 14 November 1983. On 14 November 1983, the prosecution moved for the provisional dismissal of the case
because its witnesses had not appeared. On the same date, Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio issued the order provisionally dismissing the
case.

On 9 January 1984, a motion to revive the cases was filed by Maj. Dacanay (he had been promoted in the meantime) and Sgt.
Lustado, who alleged that they could not attend the hearing scheduled on 14 November 1983, for lack of notice. Copy of the motion
was furnished the City Fiscal of Caloocan City but not Caes. On 18 May 1984, the judge issued the order granting the "Motion for the
Revival of the Case." A motion for reconsideration filed by Caes dated 7 June 1984, was denied on 9 October 1984, and the revived
cases were set for hearing on 19 November 1984. Caes filed the petition for certiorari with th Supreme Court, which was referred to the
appellate court. The petition there was dismissed for lack of merit on 20 May 1986, and reconsideration was denied on 17 June 1986.
Caes filed the present petition.

Issue: Whether the revival of the cases would place Caes in double jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights.

Held: Fittingly described as "res judicata in prison grey," the right against double jeopardy prohibits the

prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been previously acquitted or convicted. The purpose is to set the effects of the first
prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge
against him for the same offense. It has been held in a long line of cases that to constitute double jeopardy, there must be: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) filed before a competent court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which he had been
previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his expressconsent. There is no question
that the first three requisites are present in the present case. It is settled that a case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on
motion of the accused himself or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused. Such a dismissal is correctly
denominated provisional.

But a dismissal is not provisional even if so designated if it is shown that it was made without the express consent of the accused. This
consent cannot be presumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure to object As held in a number of
cases, such consent must be express, so as to leave no doubt as to the defendant's conformity. Otherwise, the dismissal will be
regarded as final, i.e., with prejudice to the refiling of the case. There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be held to be final
and to dispose of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself. The first is where the
dismissal is based on a demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested. Such dismissal has the effect of
a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal. The other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the
accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This is in effect a failure to prosecute. The circumstance that the dismissal
of the cases against Caes was described by the trial judge as "provisional" did not change the nature of that dismissal. As it was based
on the "lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the consequent delay in the trial of the cases, it was final and operated as an acquittal of
the accused on the merits. No less importantly, there is no proof that Caes expressly concurred in the provisional dismissal. Implied
consent is not enough; neither may it be lightly inferred from the presumption of regularity, for we are dealing here with the alleged
waiver of a constitutional right. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the accused.

RIGHT TO MEET THE WITNESSES FACE TO FACE

WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION?

> It means that the accused can only be tried using those witnesses that meet him face to face at the trial who give testimony in
his presence, and who may be subject to cross-examination

WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR THE RIGHT?

> The right to confrontation is afforded the accused to allow the court to observe the demeanor of the witness while testifying
and to give the accused the opportunity to cross-examine the witness in order to test their recollection and credibility

CAN THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION BE WAIVED?

> Yes, it can be waived either expressly or impliedly
> It is waived impliedly when an accused waives his right to be present at trial
> It is waived also by conducting amounting to a renunciation of the right to cross-examine
> When the party was given an opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for
reasons attributable to the party alone, he is deemed to have
waived his right
WHAT HAPPENS TO THE TESTIMONY OF A WITNESS WHO DIES OR BECOMES UNAVAILABLE?
> If the other party had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness before he died or became unavailable, the testimony may
be used as evidence
> However, if the other party did not have the opportunity to cross-examine before the subsequent death or unavailability of the
witness, the testimony will have no probative value.
> What suffices to be able to use the testimony of a witness as evidence is the opportunity to cross-examine and there need
not be an actual cross-examination

RULE ON EXAMINATION OF A CHILD WITNESS

Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. Unless otherwise provided, this Rule shall govern the examination of child witnesses who are
victims of crime, accused of a crime, and witnesses to crime. It shall apply in all criminal proceedings and non-criminal proceedings
involving child witnesses.chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 2. Objectives.- The objectives of this Rule are to create and maintain an environment that will allow children to give reliable and
complete evidence, minimize trauma to children, encourage children to testify in legal proceedings, and facilitate the ascertainment of
truth.chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 3. Construction of the Rule. This Rule shall be liberally construed to uphold the best interests of the child and to promote
maximum accommodation of child witnesses without prejudice to the constitutional rights of the accused.chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 4. Definitions.

(a) A child witness is any person who at the time of giving testimony is below the age of eighteen (18) years. In child abuse cases, a
child includes one over eighteen (18) years but is found by the court as unable to fully take care of himself or protect himself from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition.chanrobles virtual law
library

(b) Child abuse means physical, psychological or sexual abuse and criminal neglect as defined in Republic Act No. 7610 and other
related laws.chanrobles virtual law library

(c) Facilitator means a person appointed by the court to pose questions to a child.chanrobles virtual law library

(d) Record regarding a child or record means any photograph, videotape, audiotape, film, handwriting, typewriting, printing,
electronic recording, computer data or printout, or other memorialization, including any court document, pleading, or any copy or
reproduction of any of the foregoing, that contains the name, description, address, school or any other personal identifying information
about a child or his family and that is produced or maintained by a public agency, private agency or individual.chanrobles virtual law
library

(e) A guardian ad litem is a person appointed by the court where the case is pending for a child who is a victim of, accused of, or a
witness to a crime to protect the best interests of the said child.chanrobles virtual law library

(f) A support person is a person chosen by the child to accompany him to testify at or attend a judicial proceeding or deposition to
provide emotional support for him.chanrobles virtual law library

(g) Best interests of the child means the totality of the circumstances and conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection,
and feelings of security of the child and most encouraging to his physical, psychological, and emotional development. It also means
the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the growth and development of the child.chanrobles virtual law library

(h) Developmental level refers to the specific growth phase in which most individuals are expected to behave and function in relation
to the advancement of their physical, socio-emotional, cognitive, and moral abilities.chanrobles virtual law library
(i) In-depth investigative interview or disclosure interview is an inquiry or proceeding conducted by duly trained members of a multi-
disciplinary team or representatives of law enforcement or child protective services for the purpose of determining whether child abuse
has been committed.chanrobles virtual law library

Sec. 5. Guardian ad litem.

(a) The court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a child who is a victim of, accused of, or a witness to a crime to promote the best
interests of the child. In making the appointment, the court shall consider the background of the guardian ad litem and his familiarity
with the judicial process, social service programs, and child development, giving preference to the parents of the child, if qualified. The
guardian ad litem may be a member of the Philippine Bar. A person who is a witness in any proceeding involving the child cannot be
appointed as a guardian ad litem.

(b) The guardian ad litem:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) shall attend all interviews, depositions, hearings, and trial proceedings in which a child participates;

(2) shall make recommendations to the court concerning the welfare of the child;

(3) shall have access to all reports, evaluations, and records necessary to effectively advocate for the child, except privileged
communications;

(4) shall marshal and coordinate the delivery of resources and special services to the child;

(5) shall explain, in language understandable to the child, all legal proceedings, including police investigations, in which the child is
involved;

(6) shall assist the child and his family in coping with the emotional effects of crime and subsequent criminal or non-criminal
proceedings in which the child is involved;

(7) may remain with the child while the child waits to testify;

(8) may interview witnesses; and

(9) may request additional examinations by medical or mental health professionals if there is a compelling need therefor.

(c) The guardian ad litem shall be notified of all proceedings but shall not participate in the trial. However, he may file motions pursuant
to Sections 9, 10, 25, 26, 27 and 31(c). If the guardian ad litem is a lawyer, he may object during trial that questions asked of the child
are not appropriate to his developmental level.

(d) The guardian ad litem may communicate concerns regarding the child to the court through an officer of the court designated for that
purpose.

(e) The guardian ad litem shall not testify in any proceeding concerning any information, statement, or opinion received from the child in
the course of serving as a guardian ad litem, unless the court finds it necessary to promote the best interests of the child.

(f) The guardian ad litem shall be presumed to have acted in good faith in compliance with his duties described in Sub-section (b).

Sec. 6. Competency. Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. However, the court shall conduct a competency
examination of a child, motu proprio or on motion of a party, when it finds that substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child
to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court.

(a) Proof of necessity. A party seeking a competency examination must present proof of necessity of competency examination. The
age of the child by itself is not a sufficient basis for a competency examination.
(b) Burden of proof. To rebut the presumption of competence enjoyed by a child, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging his
competence.

(c) Persons allowed at competency examination. Only the following are allowed to attend a competency
examination:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) The judge and necessary court personnel;

(2) The counsel for the parties;

(3) The guardian ad litem;

(4) One or more support persons for the child; and

(5) The defendant, unless the court determines that competence can be fully evaluated in his absence.

(d) Conduct of examination. Examination of a child as to his competence shall be conducted only by the judge. Counsel for the
parties, however, can submit questions to the judge that he may, in his discretion, ask the child.

(e) Developmentally appropriate questions. The questions asked at the competency examination shall be appropriate to the age and
developmental level of the child; shall not be related to the issues at trial; and shall focus on the ability of the child to remember,
communicate, distinguish between truth and falsehood, and appreciate the duty to testify truthfully.

(f) Continuing duty to assess competence. The court has the duty of continuously assessing the competence of the child throughout
his testimony.

Sec. 7. Oath or affirmation. Before testifying, a child shall take an oath or affirmation to tell the truth.

Sec. 8. Examination of a child witness. The examination of a child witness presented in a hearing or any proceeding shall be done in
open court. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally.

The party who presents a child witness or the guardian ad litem of such child witness may, however, move the court to allow him to
testify in the manner provided in this Rule.

Sec. 9. Interpreter for child.

(a) When a child does not understand the English or Filipino language or is unable to communicate in said languages due to his
developmental level, fear, shyness, disability, or other similar reason, an interpreter whom the child can understand and who
understands the child may be appointed by the court, motu proprio or upon motion, to interpret for the child.

(b) If a witness or member of the family of the child is the only person who can serve as an interpreter for the child, he shall not be
disqualified and may serve as the interpreter of the child. The interpreter, however, who is also a witness, shall testify ahead of the
child.

(c) An interpreter shall take an oath or affirmation to make a true and accurate interpretation.

Sec. 10. Facilitator to pose questions to child.

(a) The court may, motu proprio or upon motion, appoint a facilitator if it determines that the child is unable to understand or respond to
questions asked. The facilitator may be a child psychologist, psychiatrist, social worker, guidance counselor, teacher, religious leader,
parent, or relative.
(b) If the court appoints a facilitator, the respective counsels for the parties shall pose questions to the child only through the facilitator.
The questions shall either be in the words used by counsel or, if the child is not likely to understand the same, in words that are
comprehensible to the child and which convey the meaning intended by counsel.

(c) The facilitator shall take an oath or affirmation to pose questions to the child according to the meaning intended by counsel.

Sec. 11. Support persons.

(a) A child testifying at a judicial proceeding or making a deposition shall have the right to be accompanied by one or two persons of his
own choosing to provide him emotional support.

(1) Both support persons shall remain within the view of the child during his testimony.

(2) One of the support persons may accompany the child to the witness stand, provided the support person does not completely
obscure the child from the view of the opposing party, judge, or hearing officer.

(3) The court may allow the support person to hold the hand of the child or take other appropriate steps to provide emotional support to
the child in the course of the proceedings.

(4) The court shall instruct the support persons not to prompt, sway, or influence the child during his testimony.

(b) If the support person chosen by the child is also a witness, the court may disapprove the choice if it is sufficiently established that
the attendance of the support person during the testimony of the child would pose a substantial risk of influencing or affecting the
content of the testimony of the child.

(c) If the support person who is also a witness is allowed by the court, his testimony shall be presented ahead of the testimony of the
child.

Sec . 12. Waiting area for child witnesses. The courts are encouraged to provide a waiting area for children that is separate from
waiting areas used by other persons. The waiting area for children should be furnished so as to make a child comfortable.

Sec. 13. Courtroom environment. To create a more comfortable environment for the child, the court may, in its discretion, direct and
supervise the location, movement and deportment of all persons in the courtroom including the parties, their counsel, child, witnesses,
support persons, guardian ad litem, facilitator, and court personnel. The child may be allowed to testify from a place other than the
witness chair. The witness chair or other place from which the child testifies may be turned to facilitate his testimony but the opposing
party and his counsel must have a frontal or profile view of the child during the testimony of the child. The witness chair or other place
from which the child testifies may also be rearranged to allow the child to see the opposing party and his counsel, if he chooses to look
at them, without turning his body or leaving the witness stand. The judge need not wear his judicial robe.

Nothing in this section or any other provision of law, except official in-court identification provisions, shall be construed to require a child
to look at the accused.

Accommodations for the child under this section need not be supported by a finding of trauma to the child.

Sec. 14. Testimony during appropriate hours. The court may order that the testimony of the child should be taken during a time of
day when the child is well-rested.

Sec. 15. Recess during testimony.

The child may be allowed reasonable periods of relief while undergoing direct, cross, re-direct, and re-cross examinations as often as
necessary depending on his developmental level.

Sec . 16. Testimonial aids. The court shall permit a child to use dolls, anatomically-correct dolls, puppets, drawings, mannequins, or
any other appropriate demonstrative device to assist him in his testimony.
Sec . 17. Emotional security item. While testifying, a child shall be allowed to have an item of his own choosing such as a blanket,
toy, or doll.

Sec . 18. Approaching the witness. The court may prohibit a counsel from approaching a child if it appears that the child is fearful of
or intimidated by the counsel.

Sec. 19. Mode of questioning. The court shall exercise control over the questioning of children so as to (1) facilitate the
ascertainment of the truth; (2) ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child; (3) protect
children from harassment or undue embarrassment; and (4) avoid waste of time.

The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.

Sec. 20. Leading questions. The court may allow leading questions in all stages of examination of a child if the same will further the
interests of justice.

Sec . 21. Objections to questions. Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten, or
intimidate the child.

Sec . 22. Corroboration. Corroboration shall not be required of a testimony of a child. His testimony, if credible by itself, shall be
sufficient to support a finding of fact, conclusion, or judgment subject to the standard of proof required in criminal and non-criminal
cases.

Sec. 23. Excluding the public. When a child testifies, the court may order the exclusion from the courtroom of all persons, including
members of the press, who do not have a direct interest in the case. Such an order may be made to protect the right to privacy of the
child or if the court determines on the record that requiring the child to testify in open court would cause psychological harm to him,
hinder the ascertainment of truth, or result in his inability to effectively communicate due to embarrassment, fear, or timidity. In making
its order, the court shall consider the developmental level of the child, the nature of the crime, the nature of his testimony regarding the
crime, his relationship to the accused and to persons attending the trial, his desires, and the interests of his parents or legal guardian.
The court may, motu proprio, exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced during trial is of such character as
to be offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, on motion of the accused, exclude the public from trial, except court
personnel and the counsel of the parties.

Sec . 24. Persons prohibited from entering and leaving courtroom. The court may order that persons attending the trial shall not enter
or leave the courtroom during the testimony of the child.

Sec. 25. Live-link television testimony in criminal cases where the child is a victim or a witness.

(a) The prosecutor, counsel or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order that the testimony of the child be taken in a room outside
the courtroom and be televised to the courtroom by live-link television.

Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this section, he shall consult the prosecutor or counsel and shall defer to the
judgment of the prosecutor or counsel regarding the necessity of applying for an order. In case the guardian ad litem is convinced that
the decision of the prosecutor or counsel not to apply will cause the child serious emotional trauma, he himself may apply for the order.

The person seeking such an order shall apply at least five (5) days before the trial date, unless the court finds on the record that the
need for such an order was not reasonably foreseeable.

(b) The court may motu proprio hear and determine, with notice to the parties, the need for taking the testimony of the child through
live-link television.

(c) The judge may question the child in chambers, or in some comfortable place other than the courtroom, in the presence of the
support person, guardian ad litem, prosecutor, and counsel for the parties. The questions of the judge shall not be related to the issues
at trial but to the feelings of the child about testifying in the courtroom.

(d) The judge may exclude any person, including the accused, whose presence or conduct causes fear to the child.
(e) The court shall issue an order granting or denying the use of live-link television and stating the reasons therefor. It shall consider
the following factors:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) The age and level of development of the child;

(2) His physical and mental health, including any mental or physical disability;

(3) Any physical, emotional, or psychological injury experienced by him;

(4) The nature of the alleged abuse;

(5) Any threats against the child;

(6) His relationship with the accused or adverse party;

(7) His reaction to any prior encounters with the accused in court or elsewhere;

(8) His reaction prior to trial when the topic of testifying was discussed with him by parents or professionals;

(9) Specific symptoms of stress exhibited by the child in the days prior to testifying;

(10) Testimony of expert or lay witnesses;

(11) The custodial situation of the child and the attitude of the members of his family regarding the events about which he will testify;
and

(12) Other relevant factors, such as court atmosphere and formalities of court procedure.

(f) The court may order that the testimony of the child be taken by live-link television if there is a substantial likelihood that the child
would suffer trauma from testifying in the presence of the accused, his counsel or the prosecutor as the case may be. The trauma
must be of a kind which would impair the completeness or truthfulness of the testimony of the child.

(g) If the court orders the taking of testimony by live-link television:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) The child shall testify in a room separate from the courtroom in the presence of the guardian ad litem; one or both of his support
persons; the facilitator and interpreter, if any; a court officer appointed by the court; persons necessary to operate the closed-circuit
television equipment; and other persons whose presence are determined by the court to be necessary to the welfare and well-being of
the child;

(2) The judge, prosecutor, accused, and counsel for the parties shall be in the courtroom. The testimony of the child shall be
transmitted by live-link television into the courtroom for viewing and hearing by the judge, prosecutor, counsel for the parties, accused,
victim, and the public unless excluded.

(3) If it is necessary for the child to identify the accused at trial, the court may allow the child to enter the courtroom for the limited
purpose of identifying the accused, or the court may allow the child to identify the accused by observing the image of the latter on a
television monitor.

(4) The court may set other conditions and limitations on the taking of the testimony that it finds just and appropriate, taking into
consideration the best interests of the child.

(h) The testimony of the child shall be preserved on videotape, digital disc, or other similar devices which shall be made part of the
court record and shall be subject to a protective order as provided in Section 31(b).

Sec . 26. Screens, one-way mirrors, and other devices to shield child from accused.
(a) The prosecutor or the guardian ad litem may apply for an order that the chair of the child or that a screen or other device be placed
in the courtroom in such a manner that the child cannot see the accused while testifying. Before the guardian ad litem applies for an
order under this Section, he shall consult with the prosecutor or counsel subject to the second and third paragraphs of Section 25(a) of
this Rule. The court shall issue an order stating the reasons and describing the approved courtroom arrangement.

(b) If the court grants an application to shield the child from the accused while testifying in the courtroom, the courtroom shall be
arranged to enable the accused to view the child.

Sec . 27. Videotaped deposition.

(a) The prosecutor, counsel, or guardian ad litem may apply for an order that a deposition be taken of the testimony of the child and
that it be recorded and preserved on videotape. Before the guardian ad litem applies for an order under this Section, he shall consult
with the prosecutor or counsel subject to the second and third paragraphs of Section 25(a).

(b) If the court finds that the child will not be able to testify in open court at trial, it shall issue an order that the deposition of the child be
taken and preserved by videotape.

(c) The judge shall preside at the videotaped deposition of a child. Objections to deposition testimony or evidence, or parts thereof,
and the grounds for the objection shall be stated and shall be ruled upon at the time of the taking of the deposition. The other persons
who may be permitted to be present at the proceeding are:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) The prosecutor;

(2) The defense counsel;

(3) The guardian ad litem;

(4) The accused, subject to sub-section (e);

(5) Other persons whose presence is determined by the court to be necessary to the welfare and well-being of the child;

(6) One or both of his support persons, the facilitator and interpreter, if any;

(7) The court stenographer; and

(8) Persons necessary to operate the videotape equipment.

(d) The rights of the accused during trial, especially the right to counsel and to confront and cross-examine the child, shall not be
violated during the deposition.

(e) If the order of the court is based on evidence that the child is unable to testify in the physical presence of the accused, the court
may direct the latter to be excluded from the room in which the deposition is conducted. In case of exclusion of the accused, the court
shall order that the testimony of the child be taken by live-link television in accordance with Section 25 of this Rule. If the accused is
excluded from the deposition, it is not necessary that the child be able to view an image of the accused.

(f) The videotaped deposition shall be preserved and stenographically recorded. The videotape and the stenographic notes shall be
transmitted to the clerk of the court where the case is pending for safekeeping and shall be made a part of the record.

(g) The court may set other conditions on the taking of the deposition that it finds just and appropriate, taking into consideration the
best interests of the child, the constitutional rights of the accused, and other relevant factors.

(h) The videotaped deposition and stenographic notes shall be subject to a protective order as provided in Section 31(b).
(i) If, at the time of trial, the court finds that the child is unable to testify for a reason stated in Section 25(f) of this Rule, or is unavailable
for any reason described in Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may admit into evidence the
videotaped deposition of the child in lieu of his testimony at the trial. The court shall issue an order stating the reasons therefor.

(j) After the original videotaping but before or during trial, any party may file any motion for additional videotaping on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The court may order an additional videotaped deposition to receive the newly discovered evidence.

Sec . 28. Hearsay exception in child abuse cases. A statement made by a child describing any act or attempted act of child abuse,
not otherwise admissible under the hearsay rule, may be admitted in evidence in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding subject to the
following rules:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) Before such hearsay statement may be admitted, its proponent shall make known to the adverse party the intention to offer such
statement and its particulars to provide him a fair opportunity to object. If the child is available, the court shall, upon motion of the
adverse party, require the child to be present at the presentation of the hearsay statement for cross-examination by the adverse party.
When the child is unavailable, the fact of such circumstance must be proved by the proponent.

(b) In ruling on the admissibility of such hearsay statement, the court shall consider the time, content and circumstances thereof which
provide sufficient indicia of reliability. It shall consider the following factors:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) Whether there is a motive to lie;

(2) The general character of the declarant child;

(3) Whether more than one person heard the statement;

(4) Whether the statement was spontaneous;

(5) The timing of the statement and the relationship between the declarant child and witness;

(6) Cross-examination could not show the lack of knowledge of the declarant child;

(7) The possibility of faulty recollection of the declarant child is remote; and

(8) The circumstances surrounding the statement are such that there is no reason to suppose the declarant child misrepresented the
involvement of the accused.

(c) The child witness shall be considered unavailable under the following situations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) Is deceased, suffers from physical infirmity, lack of memory, mental illness, or will be exposed to severe psychological injury; or

(2) Is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance by process or other
reasonable means.

(d) When the child witness is unavailable, his hearsay testimony shall be admitted only if corroborated by other admissible evidence.

Sec . 29. Admissibility of videotaped and audiotaped in-depth investigative or disclosure interviews in child abuse cases. The court
may admit videotape and audiotape in-depth investigative or disclosure interviews as evidence, under the following
conditions:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) The child witness is unable to testify in court on grounds and under conditions established under Section 28 (c).

(b) The interview of the child was conducted by duly trained members of a multidisciplinary team or representatives of law enforcement
or child protective services in situations where child abuse is suspected so as to determine whether child abuse occurred.
(c) The party offering the videotape or audiotape must prove that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) the videotape or audiotape discloses the identity of all individuals present and at all times includes their images and voices;

(2) the statement was not made in response to questioning calculated to lead the child to make a particular statement or is clearly
shown to be the statement of the child and not the product of improper suggestion;

(3) the videotape and audiotape machine or device was capable of recording testimony;

(4) the person operating the device was competent to operate it;

(5) the videotape or audiotape is authentic and correct; and

(6) it has been duly preserved.

The individual conducting the interview of the child shall be available at trial for examination by any party. Before the videotape or
audiotape is offered in evidence, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity to view or listen to it and shall be furnished a copy of a
written transcript of the proceedings.

The fact that an investigative interview is not videotaped or audiotaped as required by this Section shall not by itself constitute a basis
to exclude from evidence out-of-court statements or testimony of the child. It may, however, be considered in determining the reliability
of the statements of the child describing abuse.

Sec . 30. Sexual abuse shield rule.

(a) Inadmissible evidence. The following evidence is not admissible in any criminal proceeding involving alleged child sexual
abuse:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) Evidence offered to prove that the alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior; and

(2) Evidence offered to prove the sexual predisposition of the alleged victim.

(b) Exception. Evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim to prove that a person other than the accused
was the source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence shall be admissible

A party intending to offer such evidence must:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) File a written motion at least fifteen (15) days before trial, specifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is
offered, unless the court, for good cause, requires a different time for filing or permits filing during trial; and

(2) Serve the motion on all parties and the guardian ad litem at least three (3) days before the hearing of the motion.

Before admitting such evidence, the court must conduct a hearing in chambers and afford the child, his guardian ad litem, the parties,
and their counsel a right to attend and be heard. The motion and the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal and
protected by a protective order set forth in Section 31(b). The child shall not be required to testify at the hearing in chambers except
with his consent.

Sec . 31. Protection of privacy and safety.

(a) Confidentiality of records. Any record regarding a child shall be confidential and kept under seal. Except upon written request and
order of the court, a record shall only be released to the following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) Members of the court staff for administrative use;

(2) The prosecuting attorney;

(3) Defense counsel;

(4) The guardian ad litem;

(5) Agents of investigating law enforcement agencies; and

(6) Other persons as determined by the court.

(b) Protective order. Any videotape or audiotape of a child that is part of the court record shall be under a protective order that
provides as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) Tapes may be viewed only by parties, their counsel, their expert witness, and the guardian ad litem.

(2) No tape, or any portion thereof, shall be divulged by any person mentioned in Sub-section (a) to any other person, except as
necessary for the trial.

(3) No person shall be granted access to the tape, its transcription or any part thereof unless he signs a written affirmation that he has
received and read a copy of the protective order; that he submits to the jurisdiction of the court with respect to the protective order; and
that in case of violation thereof, he will be subject to the contempt power of the court.

(4) Each of the tape cassettes and transcripts thereof made available to the parties, their counsel, and respective agents shall bear the
following cautionary notice:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This object or document and the contents thereof are subject to a protective order issued by the court in (case title), (case number).
They shall not be examined, inspected, read, viewed, or copied by any person, or disclosed to any person, except as provided in the
protective order. No additional copies of the tape or any of its portion shall be made, given, sold, or shown to any person without prior
court order. Any person violating such protective order is subject to the contempt power of the court and other penalties prescribed by
law.

(5) No tape shall be given, loaned, sold, or shown to any person except as ordered by the court.

(6) Within thirty (30) days from receipt, all copies of the tape and any transcripts thereof shall be returned to the clerk of court for
safekeeping unless the period is extended by the court on motion of a party.

(7) This protective order shall remain in full force and effect until further order of the court.

(c) Additional protective orders. The court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, the child, his parents, legal guardian, or the
guardian ad litem, issue additional orders to protect the privacy of the child.

(d) Publication of identity contemptuous. Whoever publishes or causes to be published in any format the name, address, telephone
number, school, or other identifying information of a child who is or is alleged to be a victim or accused of a crime or a witness thereof,
or an immediate family of the child shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.

(e) Physical safety of child; exclusion of evidence. A child has a right at any court proceeding not to testify regarding personal
identifying information, including his name, address, telephone number, school, and other information that could endanger his physical
safety or his family. The court may, however, require the child to testify regarding personal identifying information in the interest of
justice.

(f) Destruction of videotapes and audiotapes. Any videotape or audiotape of a child produced under the provisions of this Rule or
otherwise made part of the court record shall be destroyed after five (5) years have elapsed from the date of entry of judgment.
(g) Records of youthful offender. Where a youthful offender has been charged before any city or provincial prosecutor or before any
municipal judge and the charges have been ordered dropped, all the records of the case shall be considered as privileged and may not
be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone for any purpose whatsoever.

Where a youthful offender has been charged and the court acquits him, or dismisses the case or commits him to an institution and
subsequently releases him pursuant to Chapter 3 of P. D. No. 603, all the records of his case shall also be considered as privileged
and may not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone except to determine if a defendant may have his sentence suspended under
Article 192 of P. D. No. 603 or if he may be granted probation under the provisions of P. D. No. 968 or to enforce his civil liability, if said
liability has been imposed in the criminal action. The youthful offender concerned shall not be held under any provision of law to be
guilty of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related
thereto in response to any inquiry made to him for any purpose.

Records within the meaning of this Sub-section shall include those which may be in the files of the National Bureau of Investigation
and with any police department or government agency which may have been involved in the case. (Art. 200, P. D. No. 603)

Sec . 32. Applicability of ordinary rules. The provisions of the Rules of Court on deposition, conditional examination of witnesses, and
evidence shall be applied in a suppletory character.

Sec. 33. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on December 15, 2000 following its publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.

RIGHT TO BE PRESENT IN TRIAL

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES OF A VALID TRIAL IN ABSENTIA?

1. The accused has been already arraigned
2. He has been duly notified of the trial
3. He fails to appear at the trial but his non-appearance at the trial is unjustifiable

CAN THE RIGHT TO BE PRESENT BE WAIVED?

> Yes, except in the following situations where the presence of the accused at the trial is required
1. During arraignment
2. During promulgation of judgment, except if it is for a light offense
3. When the presence of the accused at the trial is required for purposes of identification, unless he admits beforehand that he is
the same person charged

WHAT IS HABEAS CORPUS?

Habeas corpus means having it brought plus body
To inquire into the legality of the detention of a person
A writ or order requiring that a prisoner be brought before a judge or into court to decide whether he is being held lawfully.

WHY IS HABEAS CORPUS CONSIDERED AN EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION?

Because it is a prerogative writ and therefore must be decided upon immediately by the court
The habeas corpus proceeding must take precedence over all other cases because it involves the liberty of the person
WITHIN HOW MANY HOURS SHOULD A JUDGE RESOLVE A HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING?
Within 48 hours or 2 days

WHAT ARE THE DUTIES OF THE PUBLIC ATTORNEY IF THE ACCUSED ASSIGNED TO HIM IS IMPRISONED?
1. He shall promptly undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner
for trial, or cause a notice to be served on the person having custody of the prisoner, requiring such person to advise the
prisoner of his right to demand trial
2. Upon receipt of that notice, the person having custody of the prisoner shall promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and
his right to demand trial. If at anytime thereafter, the prisoner
informs the custodian that he demands such trial, the latter shall cause notice to that effect to be sent promptly to the public
attorney
3. Upon receipt of such notice, the public attorney shall promptly seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial
4. When the person having custody of the prisoner receives from the public attorney a properly supported request for the availability
of the prisoner for purposes of trial, the prisoner shall be made
available accordingly.

I. Go v. Ramos, G.R. No(s). 167569, 167570, 171946

Petitioner(s): Carlos T. Go Sr.
Jimmy T. Go
Hon. Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr., in his capacity as the Commissioner of the
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION;
Atty. Faisal Hussin and Ansari M. Macaayan, in their capacity as
Intelligence Officers of the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION,
Respondent(s): Luis T. Ramos
Jimmy T. Go
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J. [Second Division]

II. FACTS
These three cases are petitions for review on certiorari. G.R. Nos.167569 and 167570 are regarding the preparation and filing
of deportation charges against Jimmy T. Go. On the other hand G.R. No. seeks to set aside the decision and resolution of the
Appellate Court . Considering that all cases arose from the same factual milieu, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 167570
and 167569 with G.R. No. 171946 per Resolution dated February 26, 2007.

It all started when Luis Ramos initiated a petition against petitioner Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien
and not a Filipino citizen. Ramos alleged that Go represents himself as a Filipino citizen when in fact Gos personal circumstances and
other records indicate that he is Chinese.

Go denies the allegation and insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son
of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 4 of the 1935
Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625.

The the complaint for deportation against Jimmy was dismissed however the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said
dismissal, holding that Carlos election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmys claim to Philippine citizenship in serious
doubt by reason of his fathers questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation
charges against Jimmy.

Petitioners father and son filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for injunctive reliefs before the RTC
seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, the Charge Sheet, and the proceedings had therein.
They challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings.
 Go filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC and reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs. The
trial court issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining the Bureau from enforcing the
Decision. However, RTC dissolved the writ and dismissed the decision.
Following the dismissal of the petition the Board issued a warrant of deportation which led to his apprehension and Jimmys
detention at the Bureau of immigration. Go commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but was dismissed by reason of his provisional
release on bail. A petition for certiorari before the CA was filed imputing grave abuse of discretion by the RTC for passing upon
their citizenship, claiming that what they asked for in their petition was merely the nullification of the Resolution and the charge sheet.
The CA dismissed the petition.

III. ISSUES
1) Whether or not the cause of action of the Bureau against petitioner had prescribed;
2) Whether or not the deportation proceedings are null and void for failure to implead Carlos as an
indispensable party therein;
3) Whether or not the evidence adduced by the petitioners to prove their claim of Philippine citizenship
is substantial and sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the deportation proceedings in
order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage;
4) Whether or not due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the Board; and
5) Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.

IV. RULINGS:
1) Deportation may be effected any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any other clause unless the
arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause of deportation arises. The court a quo is correct
when it ruled that the 5-year period should be counted only from the time when Luis filed his complaint for deportation. It is the
legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the computation of the period of prescription. A
prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The counting
could not logically start when his passport was issued because the government was unaware that he was not a Filipino citizen,
otherwise his application would have been denied.
2) To be indispensable, a person must first be a real party in interest, that is, one who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In this case, Carlos clearly is not an
indispensable party as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. What is sought is the
deportation of Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien.
3) No. Citizenship proceedings are a class of its own. Unlike other cases, res judicata does not obtain as a
matter of course. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to suchcitizenship is generally not considered
as res judicata. Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship only if the following concur: a) a person'scitizenship must
be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; b) the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and c) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by the Court.
The doctrine of jus soli only benefited those who were individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by
a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus soli. The 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be
extended as when the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. In this case, there was no sufficiency to show merit
the extension of the 3-year period. The exercise of Carlos right of suffrage were done after he elected Philippine citizenship.
His registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter
his real citizenship which is determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges granted only to
Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the
rights and privileges of citizens of this country. It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine
citizenship and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.
4) No. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted
strictly in accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.
5) No. A writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or
lawful. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the
writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, be no
longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
 question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of
Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no
power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it. The petition for
habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.

Petitions Denied.

Scope of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which any person is deprived of his liberty, or
in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential object and purpose is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas
corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical liberty. (Sangca v. The City Prosecutor of Cebu, et al., G.R. No. 175864,
June 28, 2007; citing In Re: Arguelles, Jr. v. Balajadia, Jr., G.R. No. 167211, March 14, 2006, 484 SCRA 653, 657).

Writ of AMPARO

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

FR. REYES V. GONZALES (2009)

G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009

FACTS: Fr. Reyes was among of those who were arrested during the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege, 30th of November, 2007 and they
were temporarily held at Camp Crame. A Hold Departure Order (HDO) for the petitioner and to the other accused was issued by the
DOJ upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government. Probable cause was found during investigation and
petitioner was charged with rebellion. The RTC however dismissed the charge against him but the HDO was still in effect. Petitioner
requested that HDO should be lifted in view of the dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner argued that a writ of amparo should be
issued against the respondents, violating the whole breadth of rights enshrined in the Constitution, specifically, his right to travel.

ISSUE: Whether the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

RULING: No. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall
cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

The restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not
unlawful. Petitioner has failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a
serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.

A persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice.
In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts
sound discretion.

Razon v. Tagitis
G.R. No. 182498
03 December 2009

PONENTE: Brion, J.

PARTIES:

PETITIONERS: GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief Superintendent RAUL
CASTANEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief,
Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP
RESPONDENT: MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact

NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

Court of Appeals: Petition for the Writ of Amparo

FACTS:

Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis), a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development
Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, arrived in Jolo by boat in the early
morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked
Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis
was no longer around. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latters Manila-based secretary, who advised
Kunnong to simply wait for Tagitis return.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow student
counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. More than a month later, or on December 28, 2007,
the respondent, May Jean Tagitis, through her attorney-in-fact, filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) directed against Lt. Gen.
Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo
M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force
Comet (collectively referred to as petitioners), with the Court of Appeals (CA). On the same day, the CA immediately issued the Writ
of Amparo and set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008.

On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an enforced disappearance under the
United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA ruled that when military
intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an
enforced disappearance. Hence, the CA extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the petitioners to exert
extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their
actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander
Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.

On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution dated April 9,
2008. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

PERTINENT ISSUES:

Whether or not the requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts, i.e. complete in every detail in stating the threatened or
actual violation of a victims rights, is indispensable in an amparo petition.

Whether or not the presentation of substantial evidence by the petitioner to prove her allegations is sufficient for the court to grant the
privilege of the writ.

Whether or not the writ of amparo determines guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the alleged enforced disappearance of the
subject of the petition for the writ.

ANSWERS:

No. However, it must contain details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a
violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action.

Yes.

No.

SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

1. REQUIREMENTS IN AN AMPARO PETITION

The requirement that the pleader must state the ultimate facts must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which
addresses a situation of uncertainty The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in
stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the
ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must
be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able
to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the
victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this
type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule
is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read the
Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to
determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action
showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be
read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements namely, of the
disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are present.

2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AN AMPARO PETITION

Burden of proof of Amparo petitioner [T]he Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form
requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable
case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The
rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the
victims constitutional rights to life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond.

Substantial evidence required in amparo proceedings The [characteristics of amparo proceedings] namely, of being summary and
the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond
reasonable doubt in court proceedings) reveal the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an
administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence required the duty of
public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence point, too, to the extraordinary measures expected in the protection
of constitutional rights and in the consequent handling and investigation of extra- judicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of
Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case, of course,
must show that an enforced disappearance took place under circumstances showing a violation of the victims constitutional rights to
life, liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to appropriately respond. The landmark case of Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a
valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay: Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The statute provides that the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling. The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent
in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.

Minor inconsistencies in the testimony should not affect the credibility of the witness As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these
indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various
witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were
integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story.

3. ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES in relation to THE WRIT OF AMPARO

The writ of amparo does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance, rather, it determines responsibility,
or at least accountability , for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance [The writ of amparo is] a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty
and security. It embodies, as a remedy, the courts directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the
disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing
the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties
in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined
above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those
who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all
these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the
victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.

The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and
jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate [T]he unique situations that call for the issuance of
the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all be the same as the standard
measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)
issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to
evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.

The concept of enforced disappearances is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction The Amparo Rule expressly provides
that the writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. We note that although the writ specifically
covers enforced disappearances, this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court
Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental
definition of the concept of enforced disappearance: x x x In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House
of Representatives and in the Senate on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear
textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its power
to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative
efforts. As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized
separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now
penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the
determination of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive
law that only the Legislature has the power to enact under the countrys constitutional scheme and power structure. Source of the
power of the Supreme Court to act on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances Even without the benefit of directly
applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act
under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute
State or private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Courts power is strictly
procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be
very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its
procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened
violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference even if only procedurally in a
situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of
constitutional rights.

DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following terms:

Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an enforced disappearance covered by the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo;

Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility, declaring the government (through the PNP and the PNP-
CIDG) and Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable for the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;

Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;

Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its Chief, directly responsible for the disclosure of material facts
known to the government and to their offices regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper
investigations using extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this Court;

Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding him accountable with the obligation to disclose
information known to him and to his assets in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG
investigations, actions and the validation of their results; the PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the Court of Appeals a
plan of action for further investigation, periodically reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and action;

Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with its recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP
and PNP-CIDG Chiefs as petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality
of this Decision;

The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigations; the Court of Appeals shall submit its full
report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;

The abovementioned directives and those of the Court of Appeals made pursuant to this Decision were given to, and were directly
enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National Police and its Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group, under pain of contempt from the Supreme Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation
constitute less than the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand.

Given the unique nature of Amparo cases and their varying attendant circumstances, the aforementioned directives particularly, the
referral back to and monitoring by the CA are specific to this case and are not standard remedies that can be applied to every
Amparo situation.

The Supreme Court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding
General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City.

Writ of Kalikasan
Writ means Legal action
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A Writ of Kalikasan is a legal remedy under Philippine law which provides for the protection ones right to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature, as provided for in Section 16, Article II of the Philippine Constitution. It is
compared with the writ of amparo but protects ones right for a healthy environment rather than constitutional rights.
Provision for the Writ of Kaliksaan was made in 2010 by the Supreme Court of the Philippines under Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases as a Special Civil Action. The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Reynato Puno took the initiative and issued
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Case because Section 16, Article II of the Philippines 1986 Constitution was not a self-executing
provision.
The writ of Kailkasan may be sought to deal with environmental damage of such magnitude that it threatens life, health, or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

Writ of Amparo
Recurso de amparo
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The writ of amparo (also called recurso de amparo or juicio de amparo) is a remedy for the protection of constitutional rights, found
in certain jurisdictions. In some legal systems, predominantly those of the Spanish-speaking world, the amparo remedy or action is an
effective and inexpensive instrument for the protection of individual rights.
Amparo, generally granted by a supreme or constitutional court, serves a dual protective purpose: it protects the citizen and his basic
guarantees, and protects the constitution itself by ensuring that its principles are not violated by statutes or actions of the state that
undermine the basic rights enshrined therein.
It resembles, in some respects, constitutional remedies such as the writ of security available in Brazil and the constitutional complaint
(Verfassungsbeschwerde) procedure found in Germany.
In many countries, an amparo action is intended to protect all rights other than physical liberty, which may be protected instead
by habeas corpus remedies. Thus, in the same way that habeas corpusguarantees physical freedom, amparo protects other basic
rights. It may therefore be invoked by any person who believes that any of his rights, implicitly or explicitly protected by the constitution
(or by applicable international treaties), is being violated.
Habeas corpus
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Habeas corpus ; Latin: you must present the person in court) is a writ (legal action) which requires a person under arrest to be
brought before a judge or into court. This ensures that a prisoner can be released from unlawful detention, in other words, detention
lacking sufficient cause or evidence. The remedy can be sought by the prisoner or by another person coming to the prisoners aid. The
legal right to apply for a habeas corpus is also called by the same name. This right originated in the English legal system to assist
wealthy landowners, but it is now available in many nations. It has historically been an important legal instrument safeguarding
individual freedom of certain individuals against arbitrary state action.
A writ of habeas corpus, also known as the Great Writ, is a summons with the force of a court order; it is addressed to the custodian (a
prison official for example) and demands that a prisoner be taken before the court, and that the custodian present proof of authority,
allowing the court to determine whether the custodian has lawful authority to detain the person. If the custodian does not have authority
to detain the prisoner, then they must be released from custody. The prisoner, or another person acting on his or her behalf, may
petition the court, or a judge, for a writ of habeas corpus. One reason for the writ to be sought by a person other than the prisoner is
that the detainee might be held incommunicado.
Most civil law jurisdictions provide a similar remedy for those unlawfully detained, but this is not always called habeas corpus. For
example, in some Spanish-speaking nations, the equivalent remedy for unlawful imprisonment is the amparo de libertad (protection of
freedom).
Habeas corpus has certain limitations. It is technically only a procedural remedy; it is a guarantee against any detention that is
forbidden by law, but it does not necessarily protect other rights, such as the entitlement to a fair trial. So if an imposition such as
internment without trial is permitted by the law then habeas corpus may not be a useful remedy. Furthermore, in many countries, the
process may be suspended due to a national emergency.
The right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus has nonetheless long been celebrated as the most efficient safeguard of the liberty of
the subject. The jurist Albert Venn Dicey wrote that the British Habeas Corpus Acts declare no principle and define no rights, but they
are for practical purposes worth a hundred constitutional articles guaranteeing individual liberty.
The writ of habeas corpus is one of what are called the extraordinary, common law, or prerogative writs, which were historically
issued by the English courts in the name of the monarch to control inferior courts and public authorities within the kingdom. The most
common of the other such prerogative writs are quo warranto, prohibito, mandamus, procedendo, and certiorari.
The due process for such petitions is not simply civil or criminal, because they incorporate the presumption of non-authority. The official
who is the respondent has the burden to prove his authority to do or not do something. Failing this, the court must decide for the
petitioner, who may be any person, not just an interested party. This differs from a motion in a civil process in which the movant must
have standing, and bears the burden of proof.