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    Twelve years ago, the idea of writing a book about human agency did not strike me as a defensive project. After all, the ‘problem of structure and agency’ was widely acknowledged to lie at the heart of social theorising. This could only be the case if there were a difficulty about how to link two sets of properties and powers; those belonging to the parts of society and those belonging to the people. Certainly, as I examined this linkage, first for culture (Culture and Agency, Cambridge University Press, 1988), and then for the structure (Realist Social Theory: the Morphogenetic Approach, 1995), it was very clear that some short cuts were being taken. These I called forms of ‘conflation’. They were strong tendencies, rooted in classical sociology, either to let the ‘parts’ dominate the ‘people’ (downwards conflation), or alternatively, to allow the ‘people’ to orchestrate the ‘parts’ (upwards conflation). However, in terms of the philosophy of social science, these two fallacies were embedded in the old debate between Methodological Holism and Methodological Individualism, which thankfully seemed to be largely defunct. Indeed, it appeared to have been superseded by a new debate between Structuration Theorists and Social Realists. Despite their undoubted antinomy, the central task of both was to advance a framework which linked ‘structure and agency’. There were hugely important differences between the ‘duality of structure’, advanced by structurationists, and the ‘analytical dualism’, advocated by critical realists, and these will continue to divide practical analysts of society. Nevertheless, they address the same problem of how to link the ‘parts’ and the ‘people’

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    Twelve years ago, the idea of writing a book about human agency did not strike me as a defensive project. After all, the ‘problem of structure and agency’ was widely acknowledged to lie at the heart of social theorising. This could only be the case if there were a difficulty about how to link two sets of properties and powers; those belonging to the parts of society and those belonging to the people. Certainly, as I examined this linkage, first for culture (Culture and Agency, Cambridge University Press, 1988), and then for the structure (Realist Social Theory: the Morphogenetic Approach, 1995), it was very clear that some short cuts were being taken. These I called forms of ‘conflation’. They were strong tendencies, rooted in classical sociology, either to let the ‘parts’ dominate the ‘people’ (downwards conflation), or alternatively, to allow the ‘people’ to orchestrate the ‘parts’ (upwards conflation). However, in terms of the philosophy of social science, these two fallacies were embedded in the old debate between Methodological Holism and Methodological Individualism, which thankfully seemed to be largely defunct. Indeed, it appeared to have been superseded by a new debate between Structuration Theorists and Social Realists. Despite their undoubted antinomy, the central task of both was to advance a framework which linked ‘structure and agency’. There were hugely important differences between the ‘duality of structure’, advanced by structurationists, and the ‘analytical dualism’, advocated by critical realists, and these will continue to divide practical analysts of society. Nevertheless, they address the same problem of how to link the ‘parts’ and the ‘people’

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    8 views21 pages

    Being Human, The Problem of Agency

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    πάνταρει
    Twelve years ago, the idea of writing a book about human agency did not strike me as a defensive project. After all, the ‘problem of structure and agency’ was widely acknowledged to lie at the heart of social theorising. This could only be the case if there were a difficulty about how to link two sets of properties and powers; those belonging to the parts of society and those belonging to the people. Certainly, as I examined this linkage, first for culture (Culture and Agency, Cambridge University Press, 1988), and then for the structure (Realist Social Theory: the Morphogenetic Approach, 1995), it was very clear that some short cuts were being taken. These I called forms of ‘conflation’. They were strong tendencies, rooted in classical sociology, either to let the ‘parts’ dominate the ‘people’ (downwards conflation), or alternatively, to allow the ‘people’ to orchestrate the ‘parts’ (upwards conflation). However, in terms of the philosophy of social science, these two fallacies were embedded in the old debate between Methodological Holism and Methodological Individualism, which thankfully seemed to be largely defunct. Indeed, it appeared to have been superseded by a new debate between Structuration Theorists and Social Realists. Despite their undoubted antinomy, the central task of both was to advance a framework which linked ‘structure and agency’. There were hugely important differences between the ‘duality of structure’, advanced by structurationists, and the ‘analytical dualism’, advocated by critical realists, and these will continue to divide practical analysts of society. Nevertheless, they address the same problem of how to link the ‘parts’ and the ‘people’

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    BEING HUMAN at ee a Dn eee ee Se of Warwick. Her previous books include Culture and Agency eer erred Ce een eet te en eee ee ene nee eee aes ee te ee eee es ne eee ere CAMBRIDGE bain ans il 95642 ‘Being Human: the Problem of Agency ‘umaniy and the very noon ofthe human abet are under threat ‘fom postmodernist dunking which has ecard nor only he ‘Det ok God but bo the ‘Desh of Man’ Thi bookies teindcton of ‘he concep of mani, rejecting contemporary sci theory that ‘ects to diminish human propersen and powers Archer anges that ‘eng human depends onan itereeson wih the real word in which Dractice takes primacy over langage the emergence of haan se fcccioume, thought, ematoaly und personal endcy all of ‘which re prior ty ond more bac than, our acguon of wociliden- = "Ths original and provocative new Book fom leading alto “Marguet Acker son the theme explored in er peo books Calne and Any (1988) und Rel Sec Try (1995) ew be ‘equred reading for academics and siden of sail theory, cla ‘theory, poll theory, phlowphy and bale Being Human: the Problem of Agency Margaret S. Archer ef mck CAMBRIDGE ‘Teter bastng emp Soe Combe Une Rigas SSS Serer oe {0 Stanford Ren Oude Meteor 3166 Aurela ‘ure puco 3 dfs Sp Maps Aer 2000 “Tipton nin cprieh Suton eon Bhomepgngnetrsrncaueprictaer ene, ‘Breen stant on ie SNR Ce tn en nl ne Unt ign Use Cate cer Panin 1012 Sum Caehhe™ ie) ‘Aeterna fom rt Ly ISBNO521 95648 pepeck Contents Lis of figures Ackredgements Inwoduction Part The impoverishment ofhumasity 1 Resisting the dissolution of humanity 2. Moderniq’sman 39> Society's being: humanity asthe gift ofsocety Part ll The emergence ofselfconsclousness 4 Theprimacy of practice 5) The practical order as pivotal PartIll The emergence of personal identity (6 Humanity and realty: emotions as commentaries on ‘human concerns 17 Peron dent: the inner conversation nd emotional ‘abortion PartIV Theemergence of social identity 8 Agen: eciveand passive 9° Actors and commitment (Concusion: the re-emergence ofhumanity Inde 7 51 86 1a 154 193 aa 253 283 306 320 Figures 311 Hare’ ontologies of science and society age 89 3.2 The development of Society's Being 3.3 The orthodox Vygotskyan square Harr) 3.4 The social realist square (Archet) 5.1 Tree orders of reality and their respective forms of nouledge 5.2 Relations between embodied, praca and discursive knowledge 6.1 The emergence of (first-order) emotions {6.2 Emotional emergence inthe natural order {63 motional morphogenesis inthe natural order 7A Else's cogaitive wansmutation of emotion 8.1 Realism’ account ofthe development ofthe ternifed human 8.2 The morphogenesis of corporate agency 8.3 Structural and cultural configurations reproducing smorphostasis in society and agency {84 Structural and cultural configurations generating morphogenesis in society and agency 8.5 The double morphogenesis of gency 9.1 The acquisition of roial identity 9.2 The emergence of persona and veil identity 107 ns 5 162 19 19 a 29 295 296 Ie SelReC ECONOMIC 6 Humanity and reality: emotions as ‘commentaries on human concerns (One ofthe major concerns ofthis bookis with those properties of people which are interwined with their social, yet are irreducible voit. Taese Properties make for personal dent and their emergence isthe subject ofthis chapter andthe next. Invospectvely, we are alleanstanly sare of ‘hemain property upon which this emergent proces depends. As uman beings we know dhat we live arch ier ie: that we are in continuous ‘communion with ourselves and that we engage ia a continsal running ‘commentary with the events going on around us. Weare aware of ow ur inner lives monitor our responses to exteralitetions in which we find ‘urselves and indeed modify some ofthe circumstances to which we will ingly expose ourselves, be these natural, practical or soca, For example, itis doubrfl if there is @ (normal) human being who is untware of a Incernal dialogue which sently voices sentiments ike, ‘Isn'the ever going ‘to stop talking, ‘Careful that ruck’s paling out, o, cant face that agsin” Moreover, we all also know that thete are not jast ide com "They are more than somo voce asides as daly life ges by, passed by some unengaged spectator. Rather, the commentary is interwoven with jour responses themselves they are part ofthe action. Certainly we may ‘wish that is interminable speech was over, but we alto monitor oracles to conceal our irritation and even to simulate a politely attentive ‘demeanour. Life is lvays a predicament and never a specace, because ‘we cannot shed our statu as participants, aa god reearch method! ‘confront lif direcaly without the accompaniment of this nicl, praden- tial, censorious, apprehensive, asertive, smarting and frbearing inner ‘commentato, who is all ofthese thing. Yet even when we come closest to doing so, when we are filly absorbed in action, the commentary only ‘becomes discontinuous but does not disappear: the mountainer inter ‘ogates and instructs herself on hand-holds, the lover internally beg hat 194 The emergence of persona identity hy oop a ing lee ken Retreats rs ata eet edn cinoma seit yon on aa ence ts sentence pening ene TThuelitasae eoeony ne segeny onetberoe se eo pel pry pee en nn Erne an oy dupe cs te bouraneel as ein ped pena ay ee Sern Sede it Seong eee ear beepen Trompe nea ewe SEE pe pe ay oles m Tes Satellite dhe een Seiten Sat cnet sali ce ampere cn nog ae ances oe Tey ee oe enc ny ey sues" eo een ‘tipo en See ty atte we ot Teron Sie ante tre cabo natn cn sym te cong me Sica Wii nen aie ‘sou eo feel cer ee poate oe aha ada ie mpeae Pacem Tmuchndngrecestenmnnedesccrertace Ti eh ak taney pr Me si ila a ec rs Sale Soran dic nye ue serene at Sica Winns pr an oO era re ml oem On Se eb skeet Se Na dine! Spe tite note setae wea aaron vegan a a met wn eeepc ean ine es Seamer Beh reemcemerenemycomrmeenae Sabres meas SS cee Sa Bae rn yn ce bosses Bootiont commentaries on hums concerns 195 tonal, sist gift of ociery. Again the obec isthe reverse: namely to show how ireducble properties of our human selves interact with cur sos and ht here siicant of hme ale However there isa oof ground to trace between the fist emergence of| ‘our emodons andthe full elaboration ofthe internal conversation, ‘Thus the discussion i divided into these cwo parts, spanning the two chapters. ‘This ismore than a maner of convenience, because eam that we are dealing with fst and second-order phenomena respectively, Where (fist ‘ordet) emotional emergence is concerned, there is a mative Iterature outside rocology that requires sifting for its sociological significance. However, emotionality’ (second-order) contibution tthe internal maa agement of our concerns is preciely where sociology could be of sgniicance. The following ia broad overview, using everyday language, ‘ofthe argument thar wil e put forward in this chapter and the net © diferent clusters of emosons represent commentaries upon our ‘concerns and are emergent om our human relationships withthe ritual, precal and discursive ondere of realty respectively. ‘Masten donot finish here. (G_ because of our reflexivity, we review these emotional commentaries, articulate them, monitor them and tansnute them thas elaborat- ‘ng further upon our emotionality itself. (Gi) this oceurs through the inner conversation which i «cesses di- cession about the satisfaction of our ultimate concerns and a moni toring of the self and its commitments in elation to the commentaries received ‘The definition of emotions as ‘commentties upon our concerns cll for its own commentary. It is, of course, a sraightforwardly reali efinition which presumes that emotions are about something in the world (they are intentional or, a8 some would prefer, intensional in tare). Thus as Charles Teylor put it, we speak of emotions a eseen- Lally involving a sense of our situation. They are affective modes of swarenes of situation." They ae thus relational to something, which x ‘wat gives them their emergent character, and tha something our own ‘Concerns which make situation a mater ofnon-indifleence toa person. ‘Tylor hime cals thes ‘impor and ight maintains that in identi Ing the import ofa given situation we ae picking out what in the situation fives the grounds or basis of our flings. THE are mort tating tha we perience a certain feng tis vitarion™ (my ial). This 9 the She tr, ana Ac nt Lae, Cae Deny Pe 859.8 196 ‘The emergence ofpersonaieaty efintion apart from subjectvim and emotivism which reduce the judgemental element involved ta series of grants and groans. Equally it ‘Sesit apart fom emotional rational beenute we are note to make ‘what we ul of state of afar indepeodenty of how things are. (Indeed ‘some of he inner dialogue is precisely about the relationship between our epistemology and our ontology and to miss histo condemn our emo- ‘Sonali to living-out of the epistemic falacy) ‘Simulkancously, the present approach is equally far removed from ‘motional cogntiviam which reduces the emotions to mere expresions ‘ofa flblown comminnent system and dhs denis the acive role that commentary plays towards @ concern. This property includes the ‘modification of concerns themacves— within the framework of the inter ‘al conversation which any cognitive theory rules out by definition in favour of expressive monologue? Thus those cogaiivists who mainain that our emotions derive from our cognitive interpretations, imposed ‘upon reality rather than ftom reality fel, have the problems, (a) of ‘explaining where any commitment (uch as become a concert pianist) tomes from ifemnotons provide no ahoving-power,” (0) how the can be Taintained without (a this case) postive feedback fom practical reality ‘lgnalling (some) performative achievement, and, (chow, since negative feedback in the form of incompetence would lead to modified career tprations we can disregard encounters with reality and view ll of tem fvsieved through some pe-exrtent anid utterly resent cognitive focus. Tasted emovions are like any emergent property in that one of thei ‘mers gua emergent to modify those ofits constituents ~in this ase ‘he cognitive goal tule desited carer. Here the commentary does so {part ofthe conversion, which its insisted does nt function lke the ‘poring commentator’ voice-over’ but rathe lays an active part inthe second-order inner deliberations ~ perhaps in the reduetion of career ‘epirrtion from concert panist co music teacher. inal, in defining emotions as relational, hati as emerging from situations o signal their import for our concerns there is less preoccup ge Oe Ge: Gi ft CPC ed suche Gates sores ome crete Sere oh enemas iene wremeencete eee meee Fe ee Sle cee et Secret ‘Sirs eras com nos honor and ooouaby” whch caret be ir Shriae ‘Emotions a commentaries on human concer 1s tion here than usual with the occurrence ofan’ emotion, ts nomencla- ture of dassfcation. Beease of their situational and relational charscter 25 import, our emoconality is regarded as a continuous running com ‘mentary (thats romeching we are never without) and therefore it only {nsudden or urgent context that we ae aware ofa specfc emotion. Tas tallies extremely well with Fda’ conclusion: "Emotion in this parnig mati seas, however, are but crysuallsatons ins sueam of emodonal response, of readines and tendency, that faithfully follows the continu (ous bed of concern-elevant events end that overflows that bed i inten ‘onal activities and passions; but which sueam of relevance appraisals, toes on incessantly, mostly ony elt by the person herelf or himself" ‘Thus, there is no need to compile complex ists of named emotions and, sccommodate them on this account fo, as Greenwood? argues, there ‘Bo necessary correlation between the richnes of emotional experience tnd the existence of an equivalent subdety of available linguist labels in any given culeare Instead, in dealing withthe emergence and progressive elaboration of (frs-order) emotions, the tsk will be to delineate clusters of emotions ‘whore emergence is rooted in the diferent orders of realy -the natural, practical and discursive. In other word, distinct wacts of our emational- fry are internally linked to equally distinet kinds of real word objects, whose alee diferent Kinds of imports register themselves a2 com” ‘mentaries on three correspondingly different Kinds of concerns. Protoypieal examples can and will be given of each clase, but its not ‘art ofthe aim here to accommodate the four hundred orto emotions iscriminatd i the English language othe three casters, because ofthe ‘ive nominaliem which would be entaled, Since synonyms can prolife rate and the naresism of smal diferenees may flourish, we should be daly eautious in assuming that each appellation connotes diferent ‘experience, just as we should beware of thinking that the absence of & ‘name in certain cultures implies «corresponding sbrence ofa feling ‘The emergence of three different emotional clusters Persons necessarily interact with three diferent orders of reality ~ the ‘natural, the pracical nd the dicursive, which were defined and die ‘cussed in the last chapter. Exactly the same willbe argued here for ‘the emergence of our human emodionality(storder. In other words, ‘the natural order, the practical order and the discursive order are the 1 No Fee, The sons Camb aie Pe 195,94. "ats Green asta Eee Ses nde, 198 162 198 ‘The emesgence of penal etsy Inteasional objects to which three diferent clusters of emovons are related. Beeaure emotions have been defined a ‘commentaries upon our concerns’ a disint type of concern has plausibly o be identified with, tach of these three orders. This ean be established for enchy and it Seems preferable as 4 procedure tothe search for some portmanteau concept which covers the eliciting conditions forthe fll gamut of emo- tions. The problems with these portmantenux, such as ‘appraisal’, ‘arouse’, ‘approach, ‘avoidance’ is basicaly that ther very generaliy verges on vacuity: they can indeed be made to cover ll emotions precisely because, with very lite ingenuity, there is very litle human behaviour ‘har they cannot embrace. Thus they tellus correspondingly tne about ‘emotionality as opposed to other forms of behaviour which are emotion- Sly neutral catching a bus entails sme form of appraisal” of timing and

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