DE LUNA VS.

JUDGE ABRIGOOnerous Donation

Facts:
De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian University Foundation. The donation
was embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain terms and conditions. In
case of violation or non-compliance, the property would automatically revert to the donor. When the
Foundation failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna revived the said donation by executing a
Revival of Donation Intervivos with the following terms and conditions:
1) The Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense a Chapel, Nursery, and Kindergarten
School to be named after St. Veronica
2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least 70% completed three years from the
date of the Deed unless the Donor grants extensions
3) Automatic reversion in case of violation
The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered and annotated in the TCT. By a Deed of
Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for area the lot donated while the remaining area was
retained by the De Luna.
The children and only heirs of the late De Luna (died after the donation) filed a complaint with the
RTC for the cancellation of the donation on the ground that the terms were violated. The Foundation
defended itself by saying that it had partially and substantially complied with the conditions and that
the donor granted it an indefinite extension of time to complete construction.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription (for being filed after 4 years). The heirs
did not file an MR and went straight to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether the action prescribes in 4 years (based on art. 764 NCC-judicial decree of revocation of the
donation) or in 10 years (based on art. 1144 enforcement of a written contract)

RULING: 10 years
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause.
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not
by the law on donations but by the rules on contract. On the matter of prescription of actions for the
revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription apply. The same
rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which provides:
Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory
donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of
the burden imposed.
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation must
be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However,
said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733
providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. The rules on prescription
and not the rules on donation applies in the case at bar.

CENTRAL PHILIPPINE
UNIVERSITY VS. CAResolutory Condition
FACTS:
In 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez was a member of the board of trustees of Central Philippine
University when he executed a donation to the school, stating that the land must be for exclusive use
of a medical college. 50 years later, The heirs of Ramon Lopez filed an action to annul the donation,

stating the failure of the school to construct the medical college over the land. RTC ruled in favor of
respondents, which the CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether there is a resolutory condition

RULING:
The donation was an onerous one, where failure of the school to construct a medical college would
give the heirs the power to revoke the donation, reverting the property back to the heirs of the donor.
It is therefore a resolutory condition. Although, the period was not stated, and the courts should have
fixed a period, in this case, 50 years has lapsed since the donation was executed, thus fixing a
period would serve no purpose and the property must already be reverted back.

Dissenting Opinion:
Davide considered the donation as "modal" where the obligations are unconditional, and the
fulfillment, performance, existence or extinguishment is not dependent on any future and uncertain
event. It is more accurate to say that the condition stated is not a resolutory condition, rather a
obligation itself, being an onerous donation. Since this is an onerous donation, it has to comply with
the rules on Oblicon, and therefore the courts should have fixed a period.

[G.R. No. 168733. March 27, 2006]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF PETE ROXAS DE
JESUS,a.k.a. PETER ROXAS DE JESUS OR PEDRO DE JESUS, MARIA TERESA LAZATIN DE JESUS v.
SALVE BARICAN DE JESUS, FRANCIS GILBERT DE JESUS, MARIA JOVELYN DE JESUS AND JENIFER
DE JESUS
Third Division
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR. 27, 2006
G.R. No. 168733 (In the Matter of the Petition for the Probate of the Will of Pete Roxas de Jesus, a.k.a.
Peter Roxas de Jesus or Pedro De Jesus, Maria Teresa Lazatin de Jesus v. Salve Barican de Jesus, Francis
Gilbert de Jesus, Maria Jovelyn De Jesus and Jenifer de Jesus)

This treats of the Second Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner after this Court had denied both her
Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari and first Motion for Reconsideration [1] for raising factual issues and
for a lack of sufficient showing that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error.
cralaw

Aside from the fact the instant motion is dismissible for being a prohibited pleading, [2] through it, petitioner
merely reiterates arguments she had already set forth in prior pleadings filed with this Court, although she
has now condensed her issues to one factual and one legal question. Moreover, even on the merits, the
motion must be denied.
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This Court does not concern itself with factual issues unless the jurisprudentially established exceptions are
extant;[3] in this case, they are not. The legal issue, which we now take under consideration being a
significant question of law has to be addressed to end this controversy once and for all. However, such issue
is unmeritorious.
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The facts are straightforward. Pete Roxas de Jesus (Pete) married respondent Salve Barican on 4 September
1960.[4] Their union produced three children named Francis Gilbert, Maria Jocelyn, and Jennifer, all
surnamed de Jesus and all co-respondents in this case. Sometime in May 1977, Pete emigrated to the
United States of America.[5] In December of 1977, he obtained a divorce decree against Salve [6] and
married petitioner, Maria Teresa Lazatin de Jesus, in the state of Nevada. [7] Notably, however, he only
became a citizen of the United States in 1988.[8] He died in Daly City, California, on 4 December 1994.[9]
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On 3 March 1995, petitioner instituted with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, a petition for the
probate of the holographic will of the decedent, entitled "In the matter of the Petition for the Probate of the
Will of Pete Roxas de Jesus, a.k.a. Peter Roxas de Jesus or Pedro de Jesus; Maria Teresa Lazatin de Jesus v.
Salve Barican de Jesus, Francis Gilbert de Jesus, Maria Jocelyn de Jesus, and Jennifer de Jesus ." In his will,
the decedent instituted petitioner as his sole heir and disinherited the respondents. After trial, the probate
court rendered a Decision dated 26 October 2001 holding that even as the will is extrinsically valid, i.e., duly
executed in accordance with the requisites and solemnities prescribed by law, it is intrinsically void for
containing illegal dispositions and institution of an heir.[10]
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In its Decision[11] dated 31 January 2005, the Court of Appeals held that the decedent was not yet a citizen
of the United States at the time he obtained the divorce decree against Salve. Being a Filipino, petitioner
could not at the time validly obtain a divorce decree. Since the first marriage still subsisted at the time the
decedent married petitioner, the second marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void. Thus, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling of the court a quo dismissing the petition for probate on account of the illegal
dispositions and heir institution. In a Resolution dated 23 June 2005, the appellate court denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.
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On appeal to this Court, both the Petition for Review and Motion for Reconsideration were denied. Despite
the unseemly circumstance in which it is presented, as earlier intimated we deem the sole question of law in
this Second Motion for Reconsideration worthy of disquisition nonetheless unworthy of favorable action.
Petitioner's claim to the entire estate of the decedent having failed, she now argues that since the lower
courts upheld the intrinsic validity of the will, the testamentary provision therein in her favor should be given
effect even if only to the extent that it does not affect the legitime of the respondents. She argues that the
pronouncement of her marriage with the decedent as bigamous does not detract from the fact that the
testator had intended to leave something for her, entitling her to at least the free portion of the decedent's
estate.
The argument is untenable. Under Article 739[12] of the Civil Code, donations made between persons in a
state of adultery or concubinage are void. Article 1028 of the same code mandates that the same prohibition
be similarly applied to testamentary provisions. [13] Since the courts below have made the factual finding
that the marriage between petitioner and the decedent was bigamous, necessarily, petitioner and decedent
are considered as having been in a state of concubinage in the context of Article 739. Significantly, a
conviction for adultery or concubinage need not be had before the disabilities mentioned in paragraph (1) of
Article 739 may effectuate.[14] Thus, in a case for the probate of a will where the testator bequeathed to his
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bigamous wife the free portion of his estate, this Court ruled, inter alia, that the disposition is void under
Article 739 in relation to Article 1028 of the Civil Code. [15]
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WHEREFORE, the Second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY. Let Entry of Judgment be
made in due course.

DEL ROSARIO VS. FERRER

GR NO. 187056
SEPTEMBER 20, 2010
FACTS:
Spouses G executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" the terms of which are as
follows:

It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be
respected by the surviving spouse.
It is our will that J and E will continue to occupy the portions now occupied
by them.
It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not in any way
affect any other distribution of other properties belonging to any of us
donors whether testate or intestate and where ever situated.
It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves the right,
ownership, possession and administration of this property herein donated
and accepted and this Disposition and Donation shall be operative and
effective upon the death of the DONORS.
ISSUE:
Whether the disposition of the property is a donation mortis causa (effective
upon death), as in fact designated, or actually a donation inter
vivos(effective during the lifetime of the Donors)?
HELD:
IT IS A DONATION INTER VIVOS.

That the document in question in this case was captioned "Donation Mortis
Causa" is not controlling. This Court has held that, if a donation by its terms
is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it
mortis causa.
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "irrevocability" is a
quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa,
where "revocability" is precisely the essence of the act. A donation mortis
causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor
at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means
of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability" of the
donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a
donation inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that
this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the
surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable becomes
even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect the
irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality a
donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership, possession,
and administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon
their death. But this Court has consistently held that such reservation
(reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply means that
the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial
ownership of the donated property while they lived.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which
acceptance the deed required. This Court has held that an acceptance
clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a
requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being
in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor's
lifetime.

Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peaflorida, in case of doubt,

the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather than mortis
causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed.

ALDABA vs. CA- Donation

A letter showing an intention to donate is not sufficient to prove donation; and most certainly not the
form required by law in donations.

FACTS:
Two lots owned by Belen Aldaba are being disputed in this case. Petitoners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and
Jane Aldaba, father and daughter, lived with Belen Aldaba for 10 years and took care of her until her
death. Belen had presumptive heirs her surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her brother
Cesar Aldaba (represented as the respondents in this case.) After the death of Belen, the
respondents asked the petitioners to leave the premises and upon their refusal, the former instituted
an ejectment case. The petitioners argue that Belen really intended to donate the property to them
as evidence by the note written by Belen to them which reads, Huag kayong umalis diyan.
Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo. Alam nila na iyan ay sa inyo. They also argue that the property was
for compensation of their services which amounted to P53,000. The respondents contend that the
letter no way proves a donation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a disposition of property by Belen in favour of the petitioners?

RULING: NO

For the following reasons: (1) The note was insufficient conveyance, and hence could not be
considered as evidence of a donation with onerous caus. The note can be considered, at most, as
indicative of the intention to donate. (2) no notarial document was executed by Belen to the
petitioners during those 10 years. (3) P53,000 worth of services made by the petitioners no way
proves the alleged donation. If at all, the petitioners believed that the gratuitous use of the property
was not sufficient to compensate them for their services, they could have presented their claims in
the intestate proceedings, which they themselves could have initiated, if none was instituted.

The SC emphasized that there was no express agreement between the parties and that respondents
Jane did not even expect to be compensated.

The Case:
Ginno Grilli, an Italian national, met Rebecca in Bohol and courted her. To
build a residential house where he can stay during his visits in the
Philippines, Gino helped Rebecca buy for her parents a lot located in Dauis,
Bohol; the lot was eventually registered in her name under TCT No. 30626,
and a house was constructed thereon where Gino and Rebecca maintained
their common-law relationship. In 1998, Gino and Rebecca executed a
contract of lease, a memorandum of agreement, and a special power of
attorney to define their respective rights over the property. Under their
agreements, Gino as lessee, would rent the lot for a period of 50 years, to be
automatically renewed fro another 50 years upon its expiration, for the
amount of P10,000.00 for the whole term of the lease, and Rebecca as the
lessor is prohibited from selling, donating, or encumbering the lot without the
consent of Gino. The MOA on the other hand stated that Gino owned the
house and lot, and that should their common-law relationship be terminated,
Rebecca could only sell the lot to whomever Gino so desired. The SPA on the

other hand allowed Gino to administer, manage and transfer the lot in favour
of Rebecca.
At first, their relationship were harmonious; however, it soon turned sour,
both charging each other with infidelity. They could not agree on who should
manage the property. Gino thus sent Rebecca notice to vacate. Gino later filed
a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rebecca before the MCTC. In his
complaint, Gino alleged that their relationship turned sour when she gave
birth to a child which she alleged was Ginos child. Gino doubted it as the
childs features clearly did not resemble him. Rebecca later admitted that it
was not her child. Because of this, Gino allowed him to stay in one of the
rooms, but did not demand rent. After a year, Rebecca became more hostile;
allowing her relatives to stay in the house, necessitating repairs every time he
comes back to the Philippines; since he could not tolerate anymore Rebeccas
hostility, he decided to file the complaint. Rebecca on the other hand alleged
that their common-law relationship lasted for 18 years when Gino found a
younger woman. He then began to harass her and physically hurt her. When
she refused to leave their house, Gino again harassed, intimidated and
threatened to hurt her, forcing her to file a petition for issuance of temporary
restraining order and PPO under RA 9262 against him. The RTC granted her
petition and ordered Gino excluded from the property.
The MCTC ruled in favour of Rebecca, dismissing the case. Ginos appeal to
the RTC was granted. The RTC was of the view that Grilli had the exclusive
right to use and possess the house and lot by virtue of the contract of lease
executed by the parties. Since the period of lease had not yet expired, Fullido,
as lessor, had the obligation to respect the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of

the leased premises by Grilli as lessee. The RTC opined that absent a judicial
declaration of nullity of the contract of lease, its terms and conditions were
valid and binding. As to the TPO, the RTC held that the same had no bearing
in the present case which merely involved the possession of the leased
property.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling, emphasizing that in an ejectment case, the
only issue to be resolved would be the physical possession of the property.
The CA was also of the view that as Fullido executed both the MOA and the
contract of lease, which gave Grilli the possession and use of the house and
lot, the same constituted as a judicial admission that it was Grilli who had the
better right of physical possession. The CA stressed that, if Fullido would
insist that the said documents were voidable as her consent was vitiated, then
she must institute a separate action for annulment of contracts. Lastly, the CA
stated that the TPO issued by the RTC-Branch 3 under Section 21 of R.A. No.
9262 was without prejudice to any other action that might be filed by the
parties.
Rebecca elevated her case to the Supreme Court.

The Issue:
Whether Rebecca may be ejected from the property.

The Ruling:
The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one

who unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally
legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is the
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the parties.1
In this case, Fullido chiefly asserts that Grilli had no right to institute the
action for unlawful detainer because the lease contract and the MOA, which
allegedly gave him the right of possession over the lot, were null and void for
violating the Constitution. Contrary to the findings of the CA, Fullido was
not only asserting that the said contracts were merely
voidable, but she was consistently invoking that the same
were completely void.2 Grilli, on the other hand, contends that Fullido
could not question the validity of the said contracts in the present ejectment
suit unless she instituted a separate action for annulment of contracts. Thus,
the Court is confronted with the issue of whether a contract could be declared
void in a summary action of unlawful detainer.
Under the circumstances of the case, the Court answers in the affirmative.
A void contract cannot be
the source of any right; it
cannot be utilized in an

ejectment suit
A void or inexistent contract may be defined as one which lacks, absolutely
either in fact or in law, one or some of the elements which are essential for its
validity.3 It is one which has no force and effect from the very beginning, as if
it had never been entered into; it produces no effect whatsoever either against
or in favor of anyone.4 Quod nullum est nullum producit effectum.
Article 1409 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that void contracts also
cannot be ratified; neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be
waived.5 Accordingly, there is no need for an action to set aside a void or
inexistent contract6.
A review of the relevant jurisprudence reveals that the Court did not hesitate
to set aside a void contract even in an action for unlawful detainer.
In Spouses Alcantara v. Nido,7 which involves an action for unlawful
detainer, the petitioners therein raised a defense that the subject land was
already sold to them by the agent of the owner. The Court rejected their
defense and held that the contract of sale was void because the agent did not
have the written authority of the owner to sell the subject land.
Similarly, in Roberts v. Papio,8 a case of unlawful detainer, the Court
declared that the defense of ownership by the respondent therein was
untenable. The contract of sale invoked by the latter was void because the
agent did not have the written authority of the owner. A void contract
produces no effect either against or in favor of anyone.
In Ballesteros v. Abion,9 which also involves an action for unlawful
detainer, the Court disallowed the defense of ownership of the respondent

therein because the seller in their contract of sale was not the owner of the
subject property. For lacking an object, the said contract of sale was void ab
initio.
Clearly, contracts may be declared void even in a summary action for unlawful
detainer because, precisely, void contracts do not produce legal effect and
cannot be the source of any rights. To emphasize, void contracts may not be
invoked as a valid action or defense in any court proceeding, including an
ejectment suit. The next issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether
the assailed lease contract and MOA are null and void.
The lease contract and the MOA
circumvent the constitutional
restraint against foreign
ownership of lands.
Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, natural resources shall
not be alienated, except with respect to public agricultural lands and in such
cases, thealienation is limited to Filipino citizens. Concomitantly,
Section 5 thereof states that, save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines. The prohibition on the transfer of lands to aliens
was adopted in the present 1987 Constitution, under Sections 2, 3 and 7 of
Article XII thereof. Agricultural lands, whether public or private, include
residential, commercial and industrial lands. The purpose of prohibiting the

transfer of lands to foreigners is to uphold the conservation of our national

patrimony and ensure that agricultural resources remain in the hands of
Filipino citizens.10
The prohibition, however, is not limited to the sale of lands to foreigners. It
also covers leases of lands amounting to the transfer of all or substantially all
the rights of dominion. In the landmark case of Philippine Banking
Corporation v. Lui She,11 the Court struck down a lease contract of a parcel
of land in favor of a foreigner for a period of ninety-nine (99) years with an
option to buy the land for fifty (50) years. Where a scheme to circumvent the
Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of lands to aliens is readily
revealed as the purpose for the contracts, then the illicit purpose becomes the
illegal cause rendering the contracts void. Thus, if an alien is given not
only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land by
virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise
dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it
becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of
ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right
to enjoy the land but also of the right to dispose of it rights which constitute
ownership. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien
landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave peril. 12
In Llantino v. Co Liong Chong,13 however, the Court clarified that a lease
contract in favor of aliens for a reasonable period was valid as long as it did
not have any scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition, such as
depriving the lessors of their right to dispose of the land. The Court explained
that [a]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from use of

lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is

temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract
which is not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here
forever and share our fortune and misfortune, Filipino citizenship is not
impossible to acquire.14 The lessee-foreigner therein eventually acquired
Filipino citizenship.
Consequently, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 471 was enacted to regulate the
lease of lands to aliens. It provides that the maximum period allowable for the
duration of leases of private lands to aliens or alien-owned corporations,
associations, or entities not qualified to acquire private lands in the
Philippines shall be twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another period of
twenty-five (25) years upon mutual agreement of both lessor and lessee. 15 It
also provides that any contract or agreement made or executed
in violation thereof shall be null and void ab initio.16
Based on the above-cited constitutional, legal and jurisprudential limitations,
the Court finds that the lease contract and the MOA in the present case are
null and void for virtually transferring the reigns of the land to a foreigner.
As can be gleaned from the contract, the lease in favor of Grilli was for a
period of fifty (50) years, automatically extended for another fifty (50) years
upon the expiration of the original period. Moreover, it strictly prohibited
Fullido from selling, donating, or encumbering her land to anyone without
the written consent of Grilli. For a measly consideration of PI 0,000.00, Grilli
would be able to absolutely occupy the land of Fullido for 100 years, and she is
powerless to dispose the same. The terms of lease practically deprived Fullido
of her property rights and effectively transferred the same to Grilli.

Worse, the dominion of Grilli over the land had been firmly cemented by the
terms of the MOA as it reinforced Grillis property rights over the land
because, first, it brazenly dictated that ownership of the land and the
residential building resided with him.Second, Fullido was expressly
prohibited from transferring the same without Grillis
conformity. Third, Grilli would permanently reside in the residential
building. Fourth,Grilli may capriciously dispose Fullidos property once their
common-law relationship is terminated. This right was recently exercised
when the land was transferred to Guibone. Lastly, Fullido shall be compelled
to transfer the land to Grilli if a law would be passed allowing foreigners to
own real properties in the Philippines.
Evidently, the lease contract and the MOA operated hand-in-hand to strip
Fullido of any dignified right over her own property. The term of lease for 100
years was obviously in excess of the allowable periods under P.D. No. 471.
Even Grilli admitted that this is a case of an otherwise valid contract of lease
that went beyond the period of what is legally permissible. 17 Grilli had been
empowered to deprive Fullido of her lands possession, control, disposition
and even its ownership. The jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, jus
abutendi and, more importantly, the jus disponendi the sum of rights
which composes ownership of the property were effectively transferred to
Grilli who would safely enjoy the same for over a century. The title of Fullido
over the land became an empty and useless vessel, visible only in paper, and
was only meant as a dummy to fulfill a foreigners desire to own land within
our soils.

It is disturbing how these documents were methodically formulated to

circumvent the constitutional prohibition against land ownership by
foreigners. The said contracts attempted to guise themselves as a lease, but a
closer scrutiny of the same revealed that they were intended to transfer the
dominion of a land to a foreigner in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. Even if Fullido voluntary executed the same, no amount of
consent from the parties could legalize an unconstitutional agreement. The
lease contract and the MOA do not deserve an iota of validity and must be
rightfully struck down as null and void for being repugnant to the
fundamental law. These void documents cannot be the source of rights and
must be treated as mere scraps of paper.
Grilli does not have a
cause of action for unlawful
detainer
Ultimately, the complaint filed by Grilli was an action for unlawful detainer.
Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for filing
a complaint for unlawful detainer, to wit:
Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provision of the
next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheldafter
the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such

lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (l) year
after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action
in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and
costs.
[Emphasis Supplied]
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it
recites the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was
by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession
became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latters right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;
and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 18
The Court rules that Grilli has no cause of action for unlawful detainer against
Fullido. As can be gleaned from the discussion above, the complainant must
either be a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld. In other words, the
complainant in an unlawful detainer case must have some right of possession
over the property.
In the case at bench, the lease contract and the MOA, from which Grilli
purportedly drew his right of possession, were found to be null and void for
being unconstitutional. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law is

null and voidab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It
produces no legal effect at all.19 Hence, as void contracts could not be the
source of rights, Grilli had no possessory right over the subject land. A person
who does not have any right over a property from the beginning cannot eject
another person possessing the same. Consequently, Grillis complaint for
unlawful detainer must be dismissed for failure to prove his cause of action.
In Pari Delicto Doctrine
is not applicable
On a final note, the Court deems it proper to discuss the doctrine of in pari
delicto. Latin for in equal fault, in pari delicto connotes that two or more
people are at fault or are guilty of a crime. Neither courts of law nor equity
will interpose to grant relief to the parties, when an illegal agreement has been
made, and both parties stand in pari delicto.20
The application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid. An
accepted exception arises when its application contravenes well-established
public policy. In this jurisdiction, public policy has been defined as that
principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that
which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public
good.21 Thus, whenever public policy is advanced by either party, they may be
allowed to sue for relief against the transaction.22
In the present case, both Grilli and Fullido were undoubtedly parties to a void
contract. Fullido, however, was not barred from filing the present petition
before the Court because the matters at hand involved an issue of public
policy, specifically the Constitutional prohibition against land ownership by

aliens. As pronounced inPhilippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She, the

said constitutional provision would be defeated and its continued violation
sanctioned if the lands continue to remain in the hands of a foreigner. 23 Thus,
the doctrine of in pari delicto shall not be applicable in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 31, 2013 Decision of the
Court of Appeals and its September 24, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CEB-SP
No. 06946 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by
Gino Grilli before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Dauis-Panglao, Dauis,
Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 244, is DISMISSED for lack of cause of
action.
SO ORDERED.

Bishop of Calbayog v. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-23481 (June 29,

1972) Case Digest

Public

Dominion

Facts:
The Bishop of Calbayog, as a sole corporation, filed a petition for registration alleging open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession, since the Spanish regime, of three parcels of land.
The Municipality of Catarman opposed the petition contending that Nalazon St., traversing Lot I and
Lot 2, is a public thoroughfare and Lot 2, a public plaza, should therefore be excluded from the
application
for
registration
filed
by
the
Church.
Issue:
Whether

or

not

the

Lot

and

the

Nalazon

St.

can

be

subject

to

registration.

Held:
Neither the Church nor the municipality was able to present positive proof of ownership or exclusive
possession
for
an
appreciable
period
of
time.

The only undisputed fact was the free and continuous use of Lot 2 by the residents of Catarman,
coupled with the fact that the town had no public plaza other than the disputed parcel of land. Thus,
there was a strong presumption that the land was segregated as a public plaza upon the founding of
the
municipality
of
Catarman.
Nalazon St., traversing Lots 1 and 2, was originally merely a trail used by the parishioners in going to
and from the church. But since 1910, when it was opened and improved as a public thoroughfare by
the municipality, it had been continuously used as such by the townspeople of Catarman without
objection from the Church authorities. The street does not stop on Lot I but extends north toward the
sea, passing along the lot occupied by the Central Elementary School and the Northern Samar
General Hospital. Thus it is clear that Nalazon St. inside Lot 1 is used by the residents not only in
going to the church but to the public school and the general hospital north of Lot 1.
Therefore, Lot 2 and the Nalazon St., being public dominions cannot be subject to registration.

CASE DIGEST: Unisource Commercial and Development

Corporation v. Chung
FACTS

Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the registered owner of a parcel of which
contains a memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement carried over from the OCT of
Encarnacion S. Sandico declaring that Francisco Hidalgo has the right to open doors in the course of his
lot and to pass through the land of Encarnacion Sandico, until the bank of the estero that goes to the
Pasig River, and towards the right of a Callejon. The annotation does not expressly provide that it will be
binding to the heirs and assigns of the parties. Furthermore, the property of Hidalgo was already
subdivided.

The memorandum of encumbrance was consistently annotated at the back of every title covering
Sandicos property until it was acquired by the petitioner. Hidalgos property, on the other hand was
eventually transferred to respondents Joseph, Kia and Cleto all surnamed Chung.

Petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement of Right of Way on the
ground that the dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road which is Matienza Street which
was granted but the trial court but eventually reversed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES

WON the can be cancelled by the petitioners who owns the servient estate on the ground that
that the dominant estate has an adequate access to a public road

WON the easement is binding only between Hidalgo and Sandico since the annotation did not
expressly provides the intention to bind their heirs and assigns.

RULING

An easement is a real right on anothers property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the
latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property,
for the benefit of another person or tenement. These are established either by law (legal easement) or
by the will of the owner (voluntary easement).

(1) Petitioner itself admitted that the existing easement is voluntary. The opening of an adequate outlet to
a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case
at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not
detract from its permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of the necessity. This
easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by
renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. (Art. 631,NCC)

(2) A voluntary easement of right of way is like any other contract that is generally effective between the
parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract
are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 198774, April 04, 2016
TEOFILO ALOLINO, Petitioner, v. FORTUNATO FLORES AND ANASTACIA MARIE
FLORES,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed from the July 8, 2011 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 94524.1 The CA reversed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) decision2 in Civil Case No.
693203 and dismissed petitioner Teofilo Alolino's complaint against the respondents for the removal of their
illegally constructed structure.
Antecedents
Alolino is the registered owner of two (2) contiguous parcels of land situated at No. 47 Gen. Luna Street,
Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 784 and 976. TCT No. 784
was issued on August 30, 1976 covering an area of 26 square meters; while TCT No. 976 was issued on
August 29, 1977, with an area of 95 square meters.
Alolino initially constructed a bungalow-type house on the property. In 1980, he added a second floor to the
structure. He also extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his property. There are terraces on both
floors. There are also six (6) windows on the perimeter wall: three (3) on the ground floor and another three
(3) on the second floor.
In 1994, the respondent spouses Fortunato and Anastacia (Marie) Flores constructed their house/sari
sari store on the vacant municipal/barrio road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino's
house. Since they were constructing on a municipal road, the respondents could not secure a building
permit. The structure is only about two (2) to three (3) inches away from the back of Alolino's house,
covering five windows and the exit door. The respondents' construction deprived Alolino of the light and
ventilation he had previously enjoyed and prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through
the rear door of his house.
Alolino demanded that the respondent spouses remove their structure but the latter refused. Thus, he
complained about the illegal construction to the Building Official of the Municipality of Taguig. He also filed a
complaint with the Barangay of Tuktukan.
Acting on Alolino's complaint, the Building Official issued a Notice of Illegal Construction against the
respondents on February 15, 1995, directing them to immediately stop further construction. 4
Sometime in 2001 or 2002, the respondents began constructing a second floor to their structure, again
without securing a building permit. This floor was to serve as residence for their daughter, Maria Teresa
Sison. The construction prompted Alolino to file another complaint with the Building Official of Taguig.
The building official issued a second Notice of Illegal Construction against the respondents on May 6, 2002,
directing the respondents to desist from their illegal construction. 5
On May 17, 2002, the Office of the Barangay Council of Tuktukan issued a certification that no settlement
was reached between the parties relative to Alolino's 1994 complaint. 6
The respondents did not comply with the directive from the building official. This prompted Alolino to send
them a letter dated January 23, 2003, demanding the removal of their illegally constructed structure.
Despite receipt of the demand letter, the respondents refused to comply. Thus, on February 14, 2003,
Alolino filed a complaint against the respondents with the RTC praying for: (1) the removal of the
encroaching structure; (2) the enforcement of his right to easement of light and view; and (3) the payment
of damages. Alolino claimed that the respondents' encroaching structure deprived him of his light and view
and obstructed the air ventilation inside his house. The complaint was docketed asCivil Case No. 69320.
In their answer,7 the respondent spouses denied that Alolino had a cause of action against them. They
alleged that they had occupied their lot where they constructed their house in 1955, long before the plaintiff
purchased his lot in the 70s. They further alleged that plaintiff only has himself to blame because he
constructed his house up to the very boundary of his lot without observing the required setback. Finally,
they emphasized that the wall of their house facing Alolino's does not violate the latter's alleged easement of
light and view because it has no window.
The respondents also admitted to them that they did not secure a building permit because the property was
constructed on a municipal/barrio road. They claimed, however, that on March 1, 2004, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Taguig (the Sanggunian) reclassified the property as a residential lot from its prior classification as
a barrio/municipal road.8

During the trial, both parties moved for an ocular inspection of the premises. Consequently, on November
19, 2007, the RTC ordered the branch clerk of court, the deputy sheriff, and the stenographer to conduct the
inspection. The ocular inspection was conducted on December 6, 2007.
In their report dated January 30, 2008,9 the inspection team confirmed that the respondents' property
blocked the entry of light and air to Alolino's house.
On April 20, 2009, the RTC rendered a judgment ordering the respondents to remove their illegal structure
obstructing Alolino's right to light and view.
The RTC found that Alolino had already previously acquired an easement of light and view and that the
respondents subsequently blocked this easement with their construction. It held that the respondents' illegal
construction was a private nuisance with respect to Alolino because it prevented him from using the back
portion of his property and obstructed his free passage to thebarrio/municipal road. The court farther held
that the respondents' house was a public nuisance, having been illegally constructed on a barrio road - a
government property - without a building permit.
The respondents appealed the decision to the CA and was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 94524.
On July 8, 2011, the CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
The CA held (1) that Alolino had not acquired an easement of light and view because he never gave a formal
prohibition against the respondents pursuant to Article 668 10 of the Civil Code; (2) that Alolino was also at
fault, having built his fyouse up to the edge of the property line in violation of the National Building
Code;11 (3) that Alolino had not acquired an easement of right of way to the barrio Road; and (4) that the
respondents' house was not a public nuisance because it did not endanger the safety of its immediate
surroundings.
The CA concluded that the Government had already abandoned the barrio road pursuant to the 2004
Sanggunian resolution. It further held that the respondents' property could not be demolished, citing Section
28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act.12
Alolino moved for reconsideration on July 28, 2011.
On September 28, 2011, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration and maintained that Alolino had not
acquired an easement of light and view.
Thus, on November 15, 2011, Alolino filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
The Petition
Alolino insists (1) that he acquired an easement of light and view by virtue of a title because the
respondents constructed their house on a barrio road; (2) that the provision of Sec. 708 of the National
Building Code and Article 670 of the Civil Code prescribing the setbacks is inapplicable because the property
is adjacent to a barrio road; (3) that he has a right of way over the lot occupied by the respondents because
it is a barrio road; and (4) that the respondents' house/sari sari store is a nuisance per se.
In its comment, the respondent counters (1) that Alolino has not acquired an easement of light and view or
an easement of right of way, by either prescription or title; (2) that Alolino is at fault for constructing his
house up to the edge of his property line without observing the setbacks required in Article 670 of the Civil
Code and Section 702 of the National Building Code; and (3) that their house/sari sari store is not a
nuisance because it is not a serious threat to public safety and the Sanggunian has already reclassified the
lot as residential.
Our Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
There is no dispute that respondents built their house/sari sari store on government property. Properties of
Local Government Units (LGUs) are classified as either property for public use or patrimonial
property.13 Article 424 of the Civil Code distinguishes between the two classifications:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

Article 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws.14 (emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, the barrio road adjacent to Alolino's house is property of public dominion devoted to
public use.
We find no merit in the respondents' contention that the Local Government of Taguig had already withdrawn
the subject barrio road from public use and reclassified it as a residential lot. The Local Government
Code15 (LGC) authorizes an LGU to withdraw a local road from public use under the folio wing conditions:
Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

(a)

A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance,

permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley,
park, or square falling within its jurisdiction; Provided, however,
That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be
approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the
Sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the.
public facility that is subject to closure is provided.

(b)

No such way or place or any part thereof shall be permanently closed

without making provisions for the maintenance of public safety
therein. A property thus permanently withdrawn from public
use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other
real property belonging to the local government unit concerned
may be lawfully used or conveyed. x x x

To convert a barrio road into patrimonial property, the law requires the LGU to enact an ordinance, approved
by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Sanggunian members, permanently closing the road.
In this case, the Sanggunian did not enact an ordinance but merely passed a resolution. The difference
between an ordinance and a resolution is settled in jurisprudence: an ordinance is a law but a resolution is
only a declaration of sentiment or opinion of the legislative body.16
Properties of the local government that are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the
absolute control of Congress.17 Hence, LGUs cannot control or regulate the use of these properties unless
specifically authorized by Congress, as is the case with Section 21 of the LGC. 18 In exercising this authority,
the LGU must comply with the conditions and observe the limitations prescribed by Congress. The
Sanggunian's failure to comply with Section 21 renders ineffective its reclassification of the barrio road.
As a barrio road, the subject lot's purpose is to serve the benefit of the collective citizenry. It is outside the
commerce of man and as a consequence: (1) it is not alienable or disposable; 19 (2) it is not subject to
registration under Presidential Decree No. 1529 and cannot be the subject of a Torrens title; 20 (3) it is not
susceptible to prescription;21 (4) it cannot be leased, sold, or otherwise be the object of a contract; 22 (5)
it is not subject to attachment and execution;23 and (6) it cannot be burdened by any voluntary
easements.24
An easement is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the
encumbered estate does not belong.25Continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by virtue of
a title or by prescription of ten years. 26 Meanwhile, continuous but non-apparent easements and
discontinuous ones can only be acquired by virtue of a title.27 Used in this sense, title refers to a juridical

justification for the acquisition of a right. It may refer to a law, a will, a donation, or a contract.
We must distinguish between the respondents' house and the land it is built on. The land itself is public
property devoted to public use. It is not susceptible to prescription and cannot be burdened with voluntary
easements. On the other hand, the respondents' house is private property, albeit illegally constructed on
public property. It can be the object of prescription and can be burdened with voluntary easements.
Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the respondents have not voluntarily burdened their property with an
easement in favor of Alolino.
An easement of a right of way is discontinuous and cannot be acquired through prescription. 28 On the other
hand, an easement of light and view can be acquired through prescription counting from the time when the
owner of the dominant estate formally prohibits the adjoining lot owner from blocking the view of a window
located within the dominant estate.29
Notably, Alolino had not made (and could not have made) a formal prohibition upon the respondents prior to
their construction in 1994; Alolino could not have acquired an easement of light and view through
prescription. Thus, only easements created by law can burden the respondents' property.
The provisions on legal easements are found in Book II, Title VII, Chapter 2 of the Civil Code whose specific
coverage we list and recite below for clarity and convenience.
Section 3 (Articles 649-657) governs legal easements of right of way. Article 649 creates a legal easement
in favor of an owner or any person entitled to use any immovable, which is landlocked by other immovables
pertaining to other persons without an adequate access to a public highway.Article 652 creates a legal
easement in favor of an isolated piece of land acquired by sale, exchange, partition, or donation when it is
surrounded by other estates of the vendor, exchanger, co-owner, or donor. Article 653 grants the same
right of way. in favor of the vendor, exchanger, co-owner, or donor when his property is the one that
becomes isolated. Article 656 grants the owner of an estate, after payment of indemnity, a right of way to
carry materials through the estate of another when it.is indispensable for the construction or repair of a
building in his estate. Finally, Article 657 governs right of way easements for the passage of livestock.
None of these provisions are applicable to Alolino's property with respect to the barrio road where the
respondents' house stands on.
On the other hand, Section 5 of Book II, Title VII, Chapter 2 of the Civil Code (Articles 667-673)
governs legal easements of light and view. These seven provisions are:
SECTION 5
Easement of Light and View
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

Article 667. No part-owner may, without the consent of the others, open through the party wall any
window or aperture of any kind.
Article 668. The period of prescription for the acquisition of an easement of light and view shall be
counted: (1) From the time of the opening of the window, if it is through a party wall; or (2) From the time
of the formal prohibition ipon the proprietor of the adjoining land or tenement, if the window is through a
wall on the dominant estate.
Article 669. When the distances in article 670 are not observed, the owner of a wall which is not party wall,
adjoining a tenement or piece of land belonging to another, c^n make in it openings to admit light at the
height of the ceiling joints or immediately under the ceiling, and of the size of thirty centimeters square,
and, in every case, with an iron grating imbedded in|the wall and with a wire screen.
Nevertheless, the owner of the tenement or property adjoining the wall in which the openings are made can
close them should he acquire part-ownership thereof, if there be no stipulation to the contrary.
He can also obstruct them by constructing a building on his land or by raising a wall thereon contiguous to
that having such openings, unless an easement of light has been acquired.
Article 670. No windows, apertures, balconies, or other similar projections which afford a direct view upon
or towards an adjoining land or tenement can be made, without leaving a distance of two meters between
the wall in which they are made and such contiguous property.

Neither can side or oblique views upon or towards such conterminous property be had, unless there be a
distance of sixty centimeters.
The nonobservance of these distances does not give rise to prescription.
Article 671. The distance referred to in the preceding article shall be measured in cases of direct views
from the outer line of the wall when the openings do not project, from the outer line of the latter when they
do, and, in cases of oblique view, from the dividing line between the two properties.
Article 672. The provisions of article 670 are not applicable to buildings separated by a public way or alley,
which is not less than three meters wide, subject to special regulations and local ordinances.
Article 673. Whenever by any title a right has been acquired to have direct views, balconies or belvederes
overlooking an adjoining property, the owner of the servient estate cannot build thereon at less than a
distance of three meters to be measured in the manner provided in article 671. Any stipulation permitting
distances less than those prescribed in article 670 is void.
However, none of these provisions actually create a legal easement of light and view which can only be
acquired through prescription or a by virtue of a voluntary title.
From the foregoing, we agree with the respondents that Alolino does not have an easement of light and view
or an easement of right of way over the respondents' property or the barrio road it stands on. This does not
mean, however, that the respondents are entitled to continue occupying the barrioroad and blocking the rear
of Alolino's house. Every building is subject to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or possessor from
committing nuisance.30 Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, the respondents' house is evidently a nuisance:
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else
which:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property, (emphasis supplied)
A barrio road is designated for the use of the general public who are entitled to free and unobstructed
passage thereon. Permanent obstructions on these roads, such as the respondents' illegally constructed
house, are injurious to public welfare and convenience. The occupation and use of private individuals of
public places devoted to public use constitute public and private nuisances and nuisance per se.31
The CA clearly erred when it invoked Section 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act as a ground
to.deny the demolition of respondents' illegal structure. The invoked provision reads:
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. - Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or
demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations:
chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

(a)

When persons or entities occupy danger -areas such as esteros,

railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways,
and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds;
xxxx

(c)

When there is a court order for eviction and demolition. x x x

(emphasis supplied)

The invoked provision itself allows the demolition of illegal structures on public roads and sidewalks because
these nuisances are injurious to public welfare. Evidently, the respondents have no right to maintain their
occupation and permanent obstruction of the barrio road. The interests of the few do not outweigh the
greater interest of public health, public safety, good order, and general welfare.
chanroble slaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
94524 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 153
in Civil Case No. 69320 is REINSTATED.
The respondents, and all persons claiming rights under them, are ORDERED to remove and demolish their
illegal structure. The respondents are also ORDERED to pay the petitioner the sum of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as attorney's fees. Costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.

cr

Title: Pilar Devlopment Corp. v Dumadag, et al.GR No. 194336Date: March 11,
2013
Ponente: Peralta, J.Parties:
Petitioner: Pilar Development CorporationRespondents: Ramon Dumadag, Emma Bacabac, Ronaldo
Navarro, Jimmy Pagdalian, Pay delos Santos, Armando Trillos,Felicisimo Trillos, Arcangel Flores, Eddie
Martin, Presilla Layog, Conrado Caguyong, Gina Gonzales, Arlene Pedrosa, Jocelyn Abelino, Roque
Villaraza, Rolando Villaraza, Camilo Genove, Nilda Roayana, Susan Roayana, Juancho Panganiban,
Bong deGuzman, Arnold Enverso, Donna dela Raza, Emelyn Hagnaya, Freddie de Leon, Ronillo de
Leon, Mario Martinez, and Precy Lopez
Facts:
The petitioner owned Pillar Village Subdivision at Las Pias where the respondents allegedly built their
shanties without thepetitioners knowledge or consent. Thus, a Complaint for accion publiciana was filed
against the respondents. The respondents denied the material allegations of the Complaint asserting that
its the local government and not the petitioner, which has jurisdiction and authority over them. RTC
dismissed the complaint saying that the land in question is situated on the sloping area leading down a
creek and within the three-meter legal easement and thus, its considered as public property and part of
public dominion under Article 502 of the New Civil Code. With this, only the local government of Las Pinas
City could insititute an action for recovery of possession or ownership.CA dismissed the case but noted
that the proper party to seek recovery of the property is not the City of Las Pinas but the Republic of the
Philippines, through the OSG pursuant to Section 101 of the Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 otherwise
known as the Public Land Act.
Issues:
1. WON the land in question is part of public propertyYES.
2. Who is the property party entitled to institute the case-the OSG or the LGU
Ratio:
Petitioner used Article 630 of the Civil Code as it provides the general rule that the owner of the estate
retains the ownership of the portion of the easement established, Article 635 says that all matters
concerning easements established for public or communal use shall be governed by the special laws and
regulations relating thereto. The applicable special laws are DENR A.O. No. 99021dated June 11, 1999
which prescribed the guidelines for the implementation of P.D. Nos. 705 and 1067 which was issued for

biodiversity preservation, P.D. 1216 and P.D. 1067 or The Water Code of the Philippines all of which
states that such 3 meter allowance is reserved for public use. Therefore, it cannot be denied that the
subject land is public property. In relation to this, the Court held that respondents have no better right to
the property as the petitioners because it is public land.
With regard to the second issue, both the OSG and the local government of Las Pinas City, may file
an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The former shall be responsible in case of
action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may also bring an action to enforce the relevant
provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992).Under RA No. 7279,
all LGUs are mandated to evict and demolish persons or entities occupying dangerous areas including
riverbanks. It also obliges the LGUS to strictly observe resettlement procedures and prohibition against
new illegal structures in Sections 29 and 30 respectively. Else, there will be administrative and criminal
liability.
The Court suggests that petitioner should file an action for mandamus to compel the local government of
Las Pias City to enforce with reasonable dispatch the eviction of respondents under R.A.
7279.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.