Ong vs Metropolitan Water District

104 Phil 397 Civil Law Torts and Damages Due Diligence as a
Defense Last Clear Chance; when not applied
On July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong (14 years old) and his two brothers went
to the swimming pool operated by Metropolitan Water District (MWD). After
paying the entrance fee, the three proceeded to the small pool.
The swimming pools of MWD are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing
line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the
pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on
display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations
governing the use of the pools. MWD employs six lifeguards who are all
trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued
certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by
their chief and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time on
duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a
sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there
are security guards who are available always in case of emergency.
Later, Dominador told his brothers that hell just be going to the locker room
to drink a bottle of Coke. No one saw him returned. Later, the elder Ong
noticed someone at the bottom of the big pool and notified the lifeguard in
attendant (Manuel Abao), who immediately dove into the water. The body
was later identified as Dominadors. He was attempted to be revived
multiple times but of no avail.
The parents of Ong sued MWD averring that MWD was negligent in
selecting its employees. During trial, the elder brother of Ong and one other
testified that Abao was reading a magazine and was chatting with a
security guard when the incident happened and that he was called a third
time before he responded. Plaintiff further alleged that even assuming that
there was no negligence on the part of MWD, it is still liable under the
doctrine of Last Clear Chance for having the last opportunity to save the
Dominador, its employees failed to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not MWD is liable for the death of Dominador Ong.

HELD: No. As established by the facts, MWD was not negligent in selecting
its employees as all of them were duly certified. MWD was not negligent in
managing the pools as there were proper safety measures and
precautions/regulations that were placed all over the pools. Hence, due
diligence is appreciated as a complete and proper defense in this case.
Further, the testimony in court by the elder Ong and the other witness was
belied by the statements they have given to the investigators when they
said that the lifeguard immediately dove into the water when he was called
about the boy at the bottom of the pool.
The doctrine of Last Clear Chance is of no application here. It was not
established as to how Dominador was able to go to the big pool. He went to
the locker and thereafter no one saw him returned not until his body was
retrieved from the bottom of the big pool. The last clear chance doctrine
can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously
(how can the lifeguard act instantaneously in dissuading Dominador from
going to the big pool if he did not see him go there), and if the injury cannot
be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or
should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous
negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the
injury.

Marikina Auto Line transport Corp. vs. People

MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORPORATION and FREDDIE L.
SUELTO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ERLINDA V.
VALDELLON
[G.R. No. 152040 March 31, 2006]
FACTS:
Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment
located at No. 31 Kamias Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line
Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-operator of a passenger bus
with Plate Number NCV-849. Suelto, its employee, was assigned as the
regular driver of the bus.

At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the

aforementioned passenger bus along Kamias Road, Kamuning, Quezon
City, going towards Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). The bus
suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial
apartment owned by Valdellon located along Kamuning Road. Valdellon
demanded payment of P148,440.00 to cover the cost of the damage to the
terrace. The bus company and Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement
which Valdellon refused.
Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property against Suelto. Valdellon also filed a separate civil
complaint against Suelto and the bus company for damages. Suelto
maintained that, in an emergency case, he was not, in law, negligent. Both
the trial court and the CA ruled in against herein petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sudden emergency rule applies in the case at bar.
HELD:
No.
It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Sueltos defense
that he acted on an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the
right to avoid colliding with a passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had
overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the lane of the bus. The
sudden emergency rule was enunciated by this Court in Gan v. Court of
Appeals,23 thus:
[O]ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to
act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid
the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
his own negligence.
Under Section 37 of Republic Act No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known
as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, motorists are mandated to
drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway:

SEC. 37. Driving on right side of highway. Unless a different course of

action is required in the interest of the safety and the security of life, person
or property, or because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in
compliance herewith, every person operating a motor vehicle or an animaldrawn vehicle on a highway shall pass to the right when meeting persons
or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when overtaking persons or
vehicles going the same direction, and when turning to the left in going
from one highway to another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the right
of the center of the intersection of the highway.
Section 35 of the law provides, thus:
Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed.(a) Any person driving a motor vehicle
on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not
greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the
traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there
existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at
such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor
at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within
the assured clear distance ahead.
In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that "unless
there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation." By his own admission, petitioner Suelto violated the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code when he suddenly swerved the bus to the
right, thereby causing damage to the property of private respondent.
However, the trial court correctly rejected petitioner Sueltos defense, in
light of his contradictory testimony vis--vis his Counter-Affidavit submitted
during the preliminary investigation:
It is clear from the photographs submitted by the prosecution (Exhs. C, D,
G, H & I) that the commercial apartment of Dr. Valdellon sustained heavy
damage caused by the bus being driven by Suelto. "It seems highly
improbable that the said damages were not caused by a strong impact.
And, it is quite reasonable to conclude that, at the time of the impact, the
bus was traveling at a high speed when Suelto tried to avoid the passenger
jeepney." Such a conclusion finds support in the decision of the Supreme
Court in People vs. Ison, 173 SCRA 118, where the Court stated that

"physical evidence is of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a

hundred witnesses." The pictures submitted do not lie, having been taken
immediately after the incident. The damages could not have been caused
except by a speeding bus. Had the accused not been speeding, he could
have easily reduced his speed and come to a full stop when he noticed the
jeep. Were he more prudent in driving, he could have avoided the incident
or even if he could not avoid the incident, the damages would have been
less severe.
In addition to this, the accused has made conflicting statements in his
counter-affidavit and his testimony in court. In the former, he stated that the
reason why he swerved to the right was because he wanted to avoid the
passenger jeepney in front of him that made a sudden stop. But, in his
testimony in court, he said that it was to avoid a passenger jeepney coming
from EDSA that was overtaking by occupying his lane. Such glaring
inconsistencies on material points render the testimony of the witness
doubtful and shatter his credibility. Furthermore, the variance between
testimony and prior statements renders the witness unreliable. Such
inconsistency results in the loss in the credibility of the witness and his
testimony as to his prudence and diligence.
As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages sustained
could not have resulted had the accused acted as a reasonable and
prudent man would. The accused was not diligent as he claims to be. What
is more probable is that the accused had to swerve to the right and hit the
commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he could not make a full stop
as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street.
Moreover, if the claim of petitioners were true, they should have filed a
third-party complaint against the driver of the offending passenger jeepney
and the owner/operator thereof.
Petitioner Sueltos reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape
conviction for the crime charged and his civil liabilities based thereon is,
thus, futile.

Africa vs Caltex
16 SCRA 448 Civil Law Torts and Damages Res Ipsa Loquitur
In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing gasoline
into the underground storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out from
the gasoline station and the fire spread and burned several houses
including the house of Spouses Bernabe and Soledad Africa. Allegedly,
someone (a passerby) threw a cigarette while gasoline was being
transferred which caused the fire. But there was no evidence presented to
prove this theory and no other explanation can be had as to the real reason
for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and the branch owner (Mateo Boquiren)
failed to install a concrete firewall to contain fire if in case one happens.
ISSUE: Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.
HELD: Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa
loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself) which states: where the thing
which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the
exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not occur if he having such control use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the
injury arose from defendants want of care. The gasoline station, with all its
appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of Caltex and
Boquiren. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started
were Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but they gave no explanation
thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res
ipsa loquitur is the exception because the burden of proof is shifted to the
party charged of negligence as the latter is the one who had exclusive
control of the thing that caused the injury complained of.

FGU Insurance Corporation vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation

and Lambert Eroles
G.R. No. 141910
FACTS:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on June
18, 1994, 30 units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard its Isuzu
truck driven by Lambert Eroles, to the Central Luzon Appliances in
Dagupan City. While traversing the North Diversion Road along McArthur
highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an
unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to
the cargoes.
FGU, an insurer of the shipment, paid the value of the covered cargoes
(P204,450.00) to Concepcion Industries, Inc.,. Being subrogee of CIIs
rights & interests, FGU, in turn, sought reimbursement from GPS. Since
GPS failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages & breach
of contract of carriage against GPS and Eroles with the RTC. In its answer,
respondents asserted that GPS was only the exclusive hauler of CII since
1988, and it was not so engaged in business as a common carrier.
Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was purely
accidental.
GPS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to
evidence on the ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a
common carrier.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss on April 30, 1996. It subsequently
dismissed the complaint holding that GPS was not a common carrier
defined under the law & existing jurisprudence. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration having been denied, FGU interposed an appeal to the CA.
The CA rejected the FGUs appeal & ruled in favor of GPS. It also denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. WON GPS may be considered a common carrier as defined under the
law & existing jurisprudence.

2. WON GPS, either as a common carrier or a private carrier, may be

presumed to have been negligent when the goods it undertook to transport
safely were subsequently damaged while in its protective custody &
possession.
3. Whether the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the instant
case.
HELD:
1. The SC finds the conclusion of the RTC and the CA to be amply justified.
GPS, being an exclusive contractor & hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc.,
rendering/offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be
considered a common carrier. Common carriers are persons, corporations,
firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or
compensation, offering their services to the public, whether to the public in
general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive
basis. The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of
passengers/goods, providing space for those who opt to avail themselves
of its transportation service for a fee. Given accepted standards, GPS
scarcely falls within the term common carrier.
2. GPS cannot escape from liability. In culpa contractual, the mere proof of
the existence of the contract & the failure of its compliance justify, prima
facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law will not permit a party to be
set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual
undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the
contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that
which may have been lost/suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the
interests of the promisee that may include his:
1. Expectation interest interest in having the benefit of his bargain by
being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract
been performed;
2. Reliance interest interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by
reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would
have been in had the contract not been made;

3. Restitution interest interest in having restored to him any benefit that

he has conferred on the other party.
Agreements can accomplish little unless they are made the basis for action.
The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, or to make
recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of another to
observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating
circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence (normally that of
the diligence of a good father of a family or, exceptionally by stipulation or
by law such as in the case of common carriers, that of extraordinary
diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his
ensuing liability.
A default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation gives rise to a
presumption of lack of care & corresponding liability on the part of the
contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. GPS
has failed to do so.
Eroles, on the other hand, may not be ordered to pay petitioner without
concrete proof of his negligence/fault. The driver, not being a party to the
contract of carriage between petitioners principal and defendant, may not
be held liable under the agreement. A contract can only bind the parties
who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed their
personality/juridical position. Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta
aliis neque nocet prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a
third person. Petitioners civil action against the driver can only be based on
culpa aquiliana, which would require the claimant for damages to prove the
defendants negligence/fault.
3. Res ipsa loquitur holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused
the injury complained of is shown to be under the latters management and
the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be
expected to happen if those who have its management/control use proper
care. In the absence of the defendants explanation, it affords reasonable
evidence that the accident arose from want of care. It is not a rule of
substantive law and does not create an independent ground of liability.
Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural
convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the plaintiff of,

the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. The maxim simply

places the burden of going forward with the proof on the defendant.
However, resort to the doctrine may only be allowed when:
(a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence;
(b) other responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence
(includes the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons); and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendants duty to
the plaintiff.
Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable
to one of several causes, for some of which the defendant could not be
responsible.
Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual
relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the inference
of negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the occurrence
and not from the nature of the relation of the parties. Nevertheless,for the
doctrine to apply, the requirement that responsible causes (other than
those due to defendants conduct) must first be eliminated should be
understood as being confined only to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort
since obviously the presumption of negligence in culpa contractual
immediately attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor.
On the other hand, while the truck driver, whose civil liability is predicated
on culpa acquiliana, can be said to have been in control & management of
the vehicle, it is not equally shown that the accident has been exclusively
due to his negligence. If it were so, the negligence could allow res ipsa
loquitur to properly work against him. However, clearly this is not the case

Perla Compania De Seguros, Inc., Et Al. V. Sps. Gaudencio And

Primitiva Sarangaya (2005)
G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005
Lessons Applicable: Res Ipsa Loquitur (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
1986: Spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and Primitiva Sarangaya erected
Super A Building, a semi-concrete, semi-narra, one-storey commercial
building fronting the provincial road of Santiago, Isabela
It has three doors which were leased out
The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second and
third doors of the building
On the left side of the commercial building stood the office of the
Matsushita Electric Philippine Corporation (Matsushita)
1988: Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. through its branch manager
Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door beside
the Matsushita office
It was converted into a two door so he had a garage where he parked a
company car 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina which he used to supervise
different towns
July 7, 1988: Pascual went to San Fernando, Pampanga leaving the car
3 days later: When he returned and warmed up the car, it made an odd
sound. On the second try, there was again an odd sound and a small
flames came out of its engine so he was startled, stopped the car, went out
and pushed it out of the garage
Soon, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and burned the whole
garage where he was trapped so he suffered burns in the face, legs and
arms
The spouses were busy atching TV when they heard 2 loud explosions,
smelt of gasoline and fire burned all their belongings
city fire marshall investigated and concluded that the fire was accidental

Spouses filed a complaint against Pascual for gross negligence and Perla
for lacking the required diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employee.
RTC: Pascual and Perla liable jointly and solidarily
Pascual was held liable under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
CA: affirmed but modified the amount of damages
ISSUE:
1. W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable - YES
2. W/N Perla lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision
of its employee. - NO
HELD: DENIED
1. YES.
Res ipsa loquitur
Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for
itself.
It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause
thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima facie case
The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption
facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they
furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is
lacking
based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the
accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff,
having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in general
terms
plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish
negligence
provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if
innocent, should be able to explain the care he exercised to prevent the
incident complained of

defendants responsibility to show that there was no negligence on his part

Requisites of Res Ipsa Loquitur
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent
Ordinary refers to the usual course of events
Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously
not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car
engine is revved.
Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he had
it periodically checked - negligence
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in
charge and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
When there is caso fortuito:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was
independent of the human will
human agency must be entirely excluded as the proximate cause or
contributory cause of the injury or loss -Not because car not maintained
(b) it was impossible to foresee the event which constituted the caso
fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid - NOT under
the control of pascual
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible to perform an
obligation in a normal manner - Spouses had no access nor obligation for
the maintenance
(d) the person tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated
in any course of conduct that aggravated the accident
2. YES.
Perla did not include any rule or regulation that Pascual should have
observed in performing his functions

There was no guidelines for the maintenance and upkeep of company

property like the vehicle that caught fire
Did not require periodic reports on or inventories of its properties
Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that employers shall be liable for the
damage caused by their employees. The liability is imposed on all those
who by their industry, profession or other enterprise have other persons in
their service or supervision
Nowhere does it state that the liability is limited to employers in the
transportation business.

Oscar del Carmen Jr. v Geronimo Bacoy

GR No. 17738770April 25, 2012
Facts: Spouses Monsalud and their daughter died from being run over by a
jeepney driven by a certain Allan Maglasang. The jeepney was owned by
Oscar del Carmen Jr. Allan was declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
a criminal case while the father of the late Mrs. Monsalud, Geronimo Bacou
filed an independent civil action against the former in behalf of the minor
children left by the Monsalud spouses. Del Carmen Jr. claimed he was a
victim as well as Allan stole the jeep and was not hired as a driver by the
former; he was a conductor (and had been released from employment
lately) and it was the brother of Allan, Rodrigo who was hired as a driver.
Del Carmen Jr. filed a carnapping case against Allan but was dismissed by
the court for insufficient evidence. RTC held del Carmen Jr. subsidiary
liable and held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The CA adjudged Oscar Jr.
liable to the heirs of the victims based on the principle that the registered
owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the injuries or
death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It
disbelieved Oscar Jr.s defense that the jeep was stolen not only
because the carnapping case filed against Allan and his
companions was dismissed but also because, given the circumstances,
Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the implied permission to use the
subject vehicle because the brothers were assigned to said jeep. After a
days work, the jeepney would be parked beside the brothers house and
not returned to del Carmens residence; the jeep could easily be started

even without the use of an ignition key; the said parking area was not
fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can
be started even without the ignition key.
Issue: W/N owner of vehicle is directly and primarily liable for injuries
caused by the operation of such
Held: Del Carmen Jr. was held to be primarily liable and not merely
subsidiary liable. Del Carmen Jr.s own evidence cast doubt that
Allan stole the jeepney. Given the dismissal of the carnapping case filed
by del Carmen Jr. against Allan, the former also admitted to such dismissal
in the SC. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where the thing that
caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of
the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of
things, would not happen if those who had management or control used
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient,
reasonable and logical explanation by defendant that the accident arose
from or was caused by the defendants want of care. All three are present
in the case at bar\

Ramos vs Pepsi Cola

L-22533, February 9, 1967
Facts:
On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co. of the P.I. and Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila
as a consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958, involving the car of
Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPSI-COLA. Said car
was at the time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son and coplaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by its driver
and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.
After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 15, 1961,
finding Bonifacio negligent and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not
sufficiently proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily,

were ordered to pay the plaintiffsP2,638.50 actual damages; P2,000.00

moral damages; P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and,
P1,000.00attorney's fees, with costs.
Issue:
WON Pepsi Cola had exercised due diligence in the selection of its drivers.
Held:
Pepsi Cola had exercised due diligence in the selection of its drivers.
The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of
defendant company, was to the effect that defendant driver was first hired
as a member of the bottle crop in the production department; that when he
was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his background,
asking him to submit clearances, previous experience, physical
examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual
driver's examination, consisting of: First, theoretical examination and
second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had undergone,
and that the defendant company was a member of the Safety Council.
In view hereof, we are of the sense that defendant company had exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of
defendant driver.
In the case of Campo vs. Camarote No. L-9147,1956), 53 O.G. 2794, cited
in appellee's brief, our Supreme Court had occasion to put it down as a rule
that "In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been satisfied
with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he should have
carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his
experiences and record of service. "Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides
inter alia:The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service
of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions. The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage; hence, Pepsi Cola shall be
relieved from liability.

Consolidated bank vs CA
L.C. Diaz and Company (LC Diaz), an accounting firm, has a savings
account with Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (now called
Solidbank Corporation).
On August 14, 1991, the firms messenger, a certain Ismael Calapre,
deposited an amount with the bank but due to a long line and the fact that
he still needs to deposit a certain amount in another bank, the messenger
left the firms passbook with a teller of Solidbank. But when the messenger
returned, the passbook is already missing. Apparently, the teller returned
the passbook to someone else.
On August 15, 1991, LC Diaz made a formal request ordering Solidbank
not to honor any transaction concerning their account with them until the
firm is able to acquire a new passbook. It appears however that in the
afternoon of August 14, 1991, the amount of P300,000.00 was already
withdrawn from the firms account.
LC Diaz demanded Solidbank to refund the said amount which the bank
refused. LC Diaz then sued Solidbank.
In its defense, Solidbank contends that under their banking rules, they are
authorized to honor withdrawals if presented with the passbook; that when
the P300k was withdrawn, the passbook was presented. Further, the
withdrawer presented a withdrawal slip which bore the signatures of the
representatives of LC Diaz.
The RTC ruled in favor of Solidbank. It found LC Diaz to be negligent in
handling its passbook. The loss of the P300k was not the result of
Solidbanks negligence.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA
used the rules on quasi-delict (Article 2176 of the Civil Code).
ISSUE: Whether or not the relations between Solidbank and LC Diaz, the
depositor, is governed by quasi-delict in determining the liability of
Solidbank.
HELD: No. Solidbank is liable for the loss of the P300k but its liability is
grounded on culpa contractual.

The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code on simple loan (Article 1980, Civil Code). There
is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The
bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends
the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The
savings deposit agreement between the bank and the depositor is the
contract that determines the rights and obligations of the parties.
Under their contract, it is the duty of LC Diaz to secure its passbook.
However, this duty is also applicable to Solidbank when it gains possession
of said passbook which it did when the messenger left it to the banks
possession through the banks teller. The act of the teller returning the
passbook to someone else other than Calapre, the firms authorized
messenger, is a clear breach of contract. Such negligence binds the bank
under the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility.
No contract of trust between bank and depositor
The Supreme Court emphasized that the contractual relation between the
bank and the depositor is that of a simple loan. This is despite the wording
of Section 2 of Republic Act 8791 (The General Banking Law of 2000)
which states that the State recognizes the fiduciary nature of banking that
requires high standards of integrity and performance. That the bank is
under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous
care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.
This fiduciary relationship means that the banks obligation to observe high
standards of integrity and performance is deemed written into every
deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature
of banking requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that
of a good father of a family.
However, the fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not
convert the contract between the bank and its depositors from a simple
loan to a trust agreement, whether express or implied. Failure by the bank
to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple loan, and not a breach of
trust.
In short, the General Banking Act simply imposes on the bank a higher
standard of integrity and performance in complying with its obligations

under the contract of simple loan, beyond those required of non-bank

debtors under a similar contract of simple loan. The General Banking Law
in no way modified Article 1980 of the Civil Code.

Tiu vs. Arriesgado

G.R. No. 138060, September 1, 2004
Facts: At about 10:00 p.m. of March 15, 1987, the cargo truck marked
"Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise" bearing plate number
GBP-675 was loaded with firewood in Bogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City.
Upon reaching Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck
passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio
Pedrano, then parked along the right side of the national highway and
removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop, about
700 meters away. Pedrano left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch
over the stalled vehicle, and instructed the latter to place a spare tire six
fathoms away behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming
vehicles. The trucks tail lights were also left on. It was about 12:00 a.m.,
March 16, 1987.
At about 4:45 a.m., D Rough Riders passenger bus with plate number
PBP-724 driven by Virgilio Te Laspias was cruising along the national
highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu. The passenger bus
was also bound for Cebu City, and had come from Maya, Daanbantayan,
Cebu. Among its passengers were the Spouses Pedro A. Arriesgado and
Felisa Pepito Arriesgado, who were seated at the right side of the bus,
about three (3) or four (4) places from the front seat.
As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspias saw the stalled truck,
which was then about 25 meters away. He applied the breaks and tried to
swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus
rammed into the trucks left rear. The impact damaged the right side of the
bus and left several passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado lost
consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right colles. His wife, Felisa,
was brought to the Danao City Hospital. She was later transferred to the
Southern Island Medical Center where she died shortly thereafter.

Respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for breach of

contract of carriage, damages and attorneys fees before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 20, against the petitioners, D Rough Riders bus
operator William Tiu and his driver, Virgilio Te Laspias on May 27, 1987.
The respondent alleged that the passenger bus in question was cruising at
a fast and high speed along the national road, and that petitioner Laspias
did not take precautionary measures to avoid the accident.
The petitioners, for their part, filed a Third-Party Complaint against the
following: respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc.
(PPSII), petitioner Tius insurer; respondent Benjamin Condor, the
registered owner of the cargo truck; and respondent Sergio Pedrano, the
driver of the truck. They alleged that petitioner Laspias was negotiating
the uphill climb along the national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion,
Compostela, in a moderate and normal speed. It was further alleged that
the truck was parked in a slanted manner, its rear portion almost in the
middle of the highway, and that no early warning device was displayed.
Petitioner Laspias promptly applied the brakes and swerved to the left to
avoid hitting the truck head-on, but despite his efforts to avoid damage to
property and physical injuries on the passengers, the right side portion of
the bus hit the cargo trucks left rear.
HELD: The rules which common carriers should observe as to the safety of
their passengers are set forth in the Civil Code, Articles 1733, 1755and
1756. It is undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not safely
transported to the destination agreed upon. In actions for breach of
contract, only the existence of such contract, and the fact that the obligor, in
this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination are the matters that need to be proved. This is because under
the said contract of carriage, the petitioners assumed the express
obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their destination
safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all
circumstances. Any injury suffered by the passengers in the course thereof
is immediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier. Upon the
happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arises,
and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed
extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. It must be stressed
that in requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common

carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law

compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. While evidence may
be submitted to overcome such presumption of negligence, it must be
shown that the carrier observed the required extraordinary diligence, which
means that the carrier must show the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons as far as human care and foresight can provide, or that the
accident was caused by fortuitous event. As correctly found by the trial
court, petitioner Tiu failed to conclusively rebut such presumption. The
negligence of petitioner Las pias as driver of the passenger bus is, thus,
binding against petitioner Tiu, as the owner of the passenger bus engaged
as a common carrier.

Exconde vs Capuno
101 Phil 843 Civil Law Torts and Damages Liability of Parents
Dante Capuno was a 15 year old boy who was a pupil of Balintawak
Elementary School. In March 1949, he attended a boy scout parade for Dr.
Jose Rizal. While they were inside a jeep, he took control of the wheels
which he later lost control of causing the jeep to go turtle thereby killing two
other students, Isidoro Caperina and one other. Isidoros mother, Sabina
Exconde, sued Dante Capuno for the death of her son. Pending the
criminal action, the mother reserved her right to file a separate civil action
which she subsequently filed against Dante and his dad, Delfin Capuno.
ISSUE: Whether or not Delfin Capuno, as the father of Dante is liable for
damages.
HELD: Yes. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is
necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them
which imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them, keeping
them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to
their means, while, on the other hand, gives them the right to correct and
punish them in moderation. The only way by which they can relieve
themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the

diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage which Delfin

failed to prove.
On the other hand, the school is not liable. It is true that under the law,
teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused
by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody, but this
provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any
academic educational institution.

Cuadra vs Monfort
35 SCRA 160 Civil Law Torts and Damages Liability of Parents
Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were both classmates in
Mabini Elementary School Bacolod City. In July 1962, their teacher
assigned the class to weed the school premises. While they were doing so,
MT Monfort found a headband and she jokingly shouted it as an earthworm
and thereafter tossed it at MT Cuadra who was hit in her eye. MT Cuadras
eye got infected. She was brought to the hospital; her eyes were attempted
to be surgically repaired but she nevertheless got blind in her right eye. MT
Cuadras parents sued Alfonso Monfort (MT Monforts dad) based on Article
2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court ruled that Monfort should pay for
actual damages (cost of hospitalization), moral damages and attorneys
fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monfort is liable under Article 2180.
HELD: No. Article 2180 provides that the father, in case of his incapacity or
death, the mother, is responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company. The basis of this vicarious, although
primary, liability is fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which
accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely
prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical
inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article 2180, which
states that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.

In the case at bar there is nothing from which it may be inferred that
Alfonso Monfort could have prevented the damage by the observance of
due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On
the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and
where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and
supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury
was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at
play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason
to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous
propensity, or indeed any trait in the childs character which would reflect
unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed
to her parents.

ELADIA MAGTIBAY, DONATO MAGTIBAY and JOSE MAGTIBAY,

plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ROWEL TIANGCO, defendant-appellant.
On December 17, 1937, defendant-appellant herein, Rowel Tiangco, who
was then a minor under eighteen years of age, pleaded guilty to an
information for homicide through reckless negligence, in that he had
recklessly driven an automobile and thereby cause the death of Mateo
Magtibay, of whom plaintiffs-appellees are the lawful heirs. The Court of
First Instance of Batangas found Rowel Tiangco guilty as charged, but as
he was under eighteen years of age, the sentence was suspended, and he
was committed to the care and custody of Attorney Gavino S. Abaya, until
Tiangco would reach his majority, subject to the supervision of the
Superintendent of Public Schools of the Province. A little over one year and
a half later, on July 27, 1939, Attorney Gavino S. Abaya in view of Rowel
Tiangco's good conduct, recommended the dismissal of the case. The
Court of First Instance dismissed the criminal case, but reserved such right
as the heirs of the deceased might have to recover damages in a civil
action against said Tiangco. Accordingly, the civil action in the instant case
was filed on September 2, 1941, against defendant-appellant herein, for
damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of Mateo Magtibay. The Court

of First Instance gave judgment for plaintiffs for P2,000 as damages. Hence
this appeal.
We believe the court a quo committed no error in rendering judgment for
plaintiffs. The suspension of the sentence under article 80 of the Revised
Penal Code, after appellant herein had pleaded guilty, did not wipe out his
guilt, but merely put off the imposition of the corresponding penalty, in order
to give the delinquent minor a chance to be reformed. When, therefore,
after he had observed good conduct, the criminal case was dismissed, this
did not mean that he was exonerated from the crime charged, but simply
that he would suffer no penalty. Nor did such dismissal of the criminal case
obliterate his civil liability for damages. The Court of First Instance of
Balagtas in dismissing the criminal case correctly reserved the right of
plaintiffs herein to bring a civil action for damages.
Counsel for defendant-appellant contends that a minor can view the
present civil action as one under the Penal Code or under the Civil Code,
defendant-appellant is liable in damages. If the theory of the civil action is
civil liability arising from the crime of homicide through reckless negligence,
defendant-appellant is bound to pay damages because article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that "Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable." Defendant herein was found guilty of the crime
of homicide through reckless negligence. The suspension of the sentence
did not exculpate him from the crime, as already stated.
If, on the other hand the theory of the civil action is culpa aquiliana or tort,
the minority of defendant-appellant does not free him from responsibility for
damages because article 32, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code provides that
"La menor edad, la demencia o imbecilidad, la sordomudez, la prodigalidad
y la interdiccion civil no son mas que restricciones de la personalidad
juridica. Los que se hallaren en alguno de esos estados son susceptibles
de derechos, y aun de obligaciones cuando estas nacen de los hechos o
de relaciones entre los bienes del incapacitado y un tercero."
Manresa says that said article 32 renders minors liable for culpa aquiliana
under article 1902, Civil Code. (See his comment on Article 32.) Moreover,
it is established that "Liability of an infant in a civil action for his torts is
imposed as a mode, not of punishment, but of compensation. If property
has been destroyed or other loss occasioned by a wrongful act, it is just

that the loss should fall upon the estate of the wrongdoer rather than on
that of a guiltless person, and that without reference to the question of
moral guilt. Consequently, for every tortious act of violence or other pure
tort, the infant tort-feasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in
the same manner and to the same extent as an adult." (27 A.J., p. 812.)
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So
ordered.

Safeguard Security Agency, Inc vs Tangco

G.R. No.165732
Facts:
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline)
went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time
deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen
card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit
to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard
Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm
from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot
Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly
causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children
(respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a
criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No.
0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right
to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon
City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated
January 19, 2000. On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed
with modification as to the penalty in a Decision dated July 31, 2000. Entry
of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273,
Marikina City, a complaint for damages against Pajarillo for negligently
shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by

its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint
and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death
was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in selfdefense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages
and attorney's fees.
Issues:
(a) Whether respondent can file civil liability ex delito under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code?
(b) Whether independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from
an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional
torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code?
(c) Whether the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent
and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to
the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both
causes?
Held:
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected
Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to
Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area
prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to
the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being
the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised
proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to
ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had
already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and
that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.

The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and

severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that
Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees,
particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that
it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the
supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only
the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of
persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees,
but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are
faithfully complied with.
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the
applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from
felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found
guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be
serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under
the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil
liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon
conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no
other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the
extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from
which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil
liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of
a family in the employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable
and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for
the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July
16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY
and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Castilex Industrial Corp. v. Vasquez

Facts: On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning,
Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente
Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of
traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was
also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other
hand, Benjamin Abad[was a manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial
Corporation, registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no.
GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car
out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmea rotunda he
made a short cut against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to
General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.In the process, the motorcycle of
Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe
injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to
the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital. On
September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. It was
there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party wherein
he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other
incidental charges Vasquez may incur. After the police authorities had
conducted the investigation of the accident, a Criminal Case was
filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to
prosecute. So, the present action for damages was commenced by
Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased
Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial
Corporation. Trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and
Luisa Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD) and
petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX) to
pay jointly and solidarily (1) Spouses Vasquez, the amounts of
P8,000.00 for burial expenses; P50,000.00 as moral damages;
P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and P778,752.00 for loss of earning
capacity; and (2) Cebu Doctors Hospital, the sum of P50,927.83 for
unpaid medical and hospital bills at 3% monthly interest from 27 July 1989
until fully paid, plus the costs of litigation.CASTILEX and ABAD separately
appealed the decision.The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial
court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the
latter is only vicarious and not solidary with the former. Spouses Vasquez

argue that their sons death was caused by the negligence of petitioners
employee who was driving a vehicle issued by petitioner and who was on
his way home from overtime work for petitioner; and that petitioner is thus
liable for the resulting injury and subsequent death of their son on the basis
of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the fourth paragraph of
Article 2180 were applied, petitioner cannot escape liability therefor.
Respondent Cebu Doctors Hospital maintains that petitioner CASTILEX is
indeed vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death of Romeo
Vasquez caused by ABAD, who was on his way home from taking snacks
after doing overtime work for petitioner. Although the incident occurred
when ABAD was not working anymore the inescapable fact remains that
said employee would not have been situated at such time and place had he
not been required by petitioner to do overtime work. Petitioner
CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not vicariously
liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by ABAD. Petitioner
contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should
only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or
industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth
paragraph should apply. It is undisputed that ABAD was a
Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the
tort occurrence. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his
assigned task is a question of fact, which the court a quo and the Court of
Appeals resolved in the affirmative.
Issue: Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death
resulting from the negligent operation by amanagerial employee of a
company-issued vehicle.
Held: No the facts and circumstances of the case show that the
employee, during the incident, was carrying out a personal purpose not in
line with his duties. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle
at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge
petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it
appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his
employment.

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the
petitioners office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City.
Thereafter, he went to Goldies Restaurant in Fuente Osmea, Cebu City,
which is about seven kilometers away from petitioners place of business.
A witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that
Fuente Osmea is a lively place even at dawn because Goldies
Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were
drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the
place. At the Goldies Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a
chat with friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the
incident in question occurred. That same witness for the private
respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD was
with a woman in his car, who then shouted: Daddy, Daddy! This
woman could not have been ABADs daughter, for ABAD was only 29 years
old at the time. To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of
his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at
the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m.
of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABADs working
day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His
being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a haven for
prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts, had no connection to
petitioners business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the
scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty
to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require
that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the
negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle
Others: Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals
It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in going
from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to work
from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in
the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer.
Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work Traveling to
and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of
the employee, and not apart of his services to his employer. Hence, in

the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere
performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the
employee is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he
uses his employers motor vehicle. The employer may, however, be liable
where he derives some special benefit from having the employee drive
home in the employers vehicle as when the employer benefits from having
the employee at work earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his
actual duties. Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a
general area with no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and from his
home to various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him
with a vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently applied what
has been called the special errand or roving commission rule, under
which it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his
employer until he actually reaches home. However, even if the employee
be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment in going to or
from work in his employers vehicle, the employer is not liable for his
negligence where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the
direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of
his own. Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working hours An
employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters
personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the
employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of
permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a regularly
assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well
as business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer.
Interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Art. 2180 Petitioners interpretation
of the fifth paragraph is not accurate.

The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be
interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged
in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee
who is acting within the scope of his assigned task. A distinction must be
made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both
provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and

managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to

employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry.
The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either
in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while
the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees
acting within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an
expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included.
Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a
business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the
scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service
of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly,
employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which
are beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still
within the call of duty. It is necessary to establish the employer-employee
relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the
employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope
of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It
is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee

Jayme vs. Apostol

Torts & Damages- Vicarious Liability of Employers
G.R. No. 163609

November 27, 2008

Facts:
Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pickup truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of
Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo
Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano
borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport
at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight.

The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then
crossing the National Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato.

The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some fifty (50) meters away from
the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high
speed at the time of the accident. The victim was brought to the hospital,
but despite medical intervention he did not survived.
Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents of
Marvin, filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against respondents
Apostol [registred owner of the vehicle], Simbulan [possessor of the car],
Lozano [driver], Miguel [passenger], Municipality of Koronadal [employer
Lozano].
The RTC rendered a decision absolving defendant Municipality of
Koronadal being an agency of the State performing governmental
functions. The same with defendant Simbulan, not being the owner of the
subject vehicle, he is absolved of any liability. However, defendants
Lozano, Apostol, and Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato, are
hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff.
The CA affirmed the decision, absolve Mayor Miguel of liability.
Issue:
Whether or not Mayor Miguel is solidarily liable with Lozano.
Held:
For the determination of the liability of Miguel, it must be established that
he is the employer of Lozano.
Per Article 2180 of the Civil Code -a person is not only liable for one's own
quasi-delictual acts, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible
for. This liability is popularly known as vicarious or imputed liability. To
sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the
following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was
chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the service
to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the
authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was
on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.
Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of
Article 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was
committed at the time the employee was performing his functions.

Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. It is

incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant
evidence. In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find out if
Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano and therefore liable for
the negligent acts of the latter. To determine the existence of an
employment relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This involves: (1) the
employer's power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other
remuneration; (3) the employer's right to control the method of doing the
work; and (4) the employer's right of suspension or dismissal.
Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was the
Municipality of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano at the
time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a
driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor
Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. This Court has, on
several occasions, held that an employer-employee relationship still exists
even if the employee was loaned by the employer to another person or
entity because control over the employee subsists. In the case under
review, the Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano's employer
notwithstanding Lozano's assignment to Mayor Miguel.
As to the contention that Miguel has the control over Lozano when the
accident happen- the same has no leg to stand on and must necessarily
fail. No negligence, said the Court, may be imputed against a fellow
employee [Miguel as mayor of Koronadal] although the person may have
the right to control the manner of the vehicle's operation. In the absence of
an employer-employee relationship establishing vicarious liability, the
driver's negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only
happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. Whatever right of control the
occupant may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an
application of the doctrine of vicarious liability.
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano's employer nor the
vehicle's registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between
him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for
Marvin's death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the
accident.

Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist the
driver, by providing him warnings or by serving as lookout does not make
the passenger liable for the latter's negligent acts. The driver's duty is not
one that may be delegated to others.

Phil. Bank of Commerce v. CA

G.R. No. 97626, March 14, 1997
The negligence must be the proximate cause of the loss
FACTS:
Rommels Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current
accounts with PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances.
The RMC General Manager Lipana entrusted to his secretary, Irene Yabut,
RMC funds amounting to P300,000+ for the purpose of depositing the
same to RMCs account with PBC. However, it turned out that Yabut
deposited the amounts in her husbands account instead of RMC. Lipana
never checked his monthly statement of accounts regularly furnished by
PBC so that Yabuts modus operandi went on for the span of more than
one year.
ISSUE:
What is the proximate cause of the loss Lipanas negligence in not
checking his monthly statements or the banks negligence through its teller
in validating the deposit slips?
HELD:
The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing
all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Yabut, despite the glaring
fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to
the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation
of deposit slips, original or duplicate.

The bank tellers negligence, as well as the negligence of the bank in the
selection and supervision of its bank teller, is the proximate cause of the

loss suffered by the private respondent, not the latters entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee. Xxx Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to
misappropriate the funds, she would not have been able to deposit those
funds in her husbands current account, and then make plaintiff believe that
it was in the latters accounts wherein she had deposited them, had it not
been for the bank tellers aforesaid gross and reckless negligence.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance where both parties are negligent, but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or
when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be
attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequences thereof. It means that the antecedent negligence of a
person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening
negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the
latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending
harm by exercise of due diligence. (Phil. Bank of Commerce v. CA, supra)

Meritt vs Government of the Philippine Island

34 Phil 311 Civil Law Torts and Damages Liability of the State for acts
of special agents
The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. E. Merritt was a constructor
who was excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding his motorcycle
along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance.
The driver of the ambulance was proven to have been negligent. Because
of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured
beyond rehabilitation so much so that he could never perform his job the
way he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used
to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government
which later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue of Act 2457
enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against
the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the AttorneyGeneral of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then

determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the
same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the
driver of the ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity
from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any
cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting
liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right
to interpose any lawful defense. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue
of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by
private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in
the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither
fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its
agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a
special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of
the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of
the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust
confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a
government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability
from the government. The Government does not undertake to guarantee
to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since
that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.

Republic vs Palacio

38 SCRA 899 Civil Law Torts and Damages Liability of the State for
acts of special agents
In April 1960, a certain Ildefenso Ortiz sued the Irrigation Service Unit (ISU)
which was under the Department of Public Works because ISU, without the
consent of Ortiz, encroached upon his land by allegedly inducing the
Handong Irrigation Assoc. to do so. The basis of the suit was that ISU,
though created by the government, is engaged in private business (selling
of irrigation pumps/construction materials in installment) and being such
has opened itself to suit thereby waiving immunity from suit. Judge Palacio
of CFI Camarines Sur ruled in favor of Ortiz so did the Court of Appeals.
The CA also ordered the issuance of the order of garnishment against the
deposit/trust funds in ISUs account in the PNB (such fund were generated
from the installment payments ISU received).
ISSUE: Whether or not such deposits may be garnished.
HELD: No. ISUs activity of selling irrigation pumps is not intended to earn
profit or financial gain. It is actually just to replenish the funds used in
purchasing said irrigation pumps (the original funds were from FTA from
US). The CA ruled that ISU, by selling irrigation pumps is engaged in
private business, hence it waived its immunity from suit and had also
ordered the garnishment of ISUs deposits in PNB. But then again, as
based in Merritt vs Insular Government, the waiver of said immunity does
not make the government liable. This would only lead to a disbursement of
fund without any proper appropriation as required by law. There is also no
showing that the ISUs alleged inducement of Handong is authorized by the
State hence the government cannot be liable under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.

SPOUSES FONTANILLA VS HON. MALIAMAN

FACTS: National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a government agency,
was held liable for damages resulting to the death of the son of herein
petitioner spouses caused by the fault and/or negligence of the driver of the
said agency. NIA maintains that it is not liable for the act of its driver
because the former does not perform primarily proprietorship functions but
governmental functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not NIA may be held liable for damages caused by its
driver.
HELD: Yes. NIA is a government agency with a corporate personality
separate and distinct from the government, because its community services
are only incidental functions to the principal aim which is irrigation of lands,
thus, making it an agency with proprietary functions governed by
Corporation Law and is liable for actions of their employees.

Quezon City vs. Dacarra

G.R. No. 150304

June 15, 2005

Facts: Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner
of Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan, while driving the said vehicle, rammed
into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City,
which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a
result, Dacarra, Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle
suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
Indemnification was sought from the city government, which however,
yielded negative results. Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara, for and in
behalf of his minor son, Jr., filed a Complaint for damages against the
Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, as defendants, before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
The RTC decided in favor of private respondents. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
Issue: whether or not the local government of Quezon City be held be
liable.
Held: Explained the court, what really caused the subject vehicle to turn
turtle is a factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon, absent any
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an
ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions. The
unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that
petitioners negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars us

from supplanting their findings and substituting these with our own. The
function of this Court is limited to the review of the appellate courts alleged
errors of law. It is not required to weigh all over again the factual evidence
already considered in the proceedings below. Petitioners have not shown
that they are entitled to an exception to this rule. They have not sufficiently
demonstrated any special circumstances to justify a factual review.
Petitioner's contention that the deceased was over speeding was not raised
on the proper time hence it cannot e appreciated. The said defense was
only raised on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's
decision. Moreover, it was established that there were no warning signs
installed in the area where the accident happened

THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA,

Petitioner,
- versus THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LAURA BIGLANG-AWA,
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM (MWSS),
and KWOK CHEUNG,
G.R. No. 121920
In this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, petitioner Municipality of San Juan urges us to annul
and set aside the decision dated 08 September 1995[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38906, affirming with modification an earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court at Pasig City in an action for damages
thereat commenced by private respondent Laura Biglang-awa against,
among others, the herein petitioner.
The material facts are not at all disputed:
Under a Contract For Water Service Connections[2] entered into by and
between the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and
Kwok Cheung as sole proprietor of K.C. Waterworks System Construction
(KC, for short), the former engaged the services of the latter to install water

service connections. Article 11 (Scope of Work), paragraph 2.01 of the

agreement provides:
2.01 The CONTRACTOR agrees to install water service connections,
transfer location of tapping to the nearest main, undertake separation of
service connection, change rusted connections, within the service area of
the MWSS specified in each job order covered by this Contract, from the
water main up to the installation of the verticals. Tapping of the service pipe
connection and mounting of water meter shall be undertaken exclusively or
solely by the MWSS;
On 20 May 1988, KC was given a Job Order by the South Sector Office of
MWSS to conduct and effect excavations at the corner of M. Paterno and
Santolan Road, San Juan, Metro Manila, a national road, for the laying of
water pipes and tapping of water to the respective houses of water
concessionaires.
That same day, KC dispatched five (5) of its workers under Project
Engineer Ernesto Battad, Jr. to conduct the digging operations in the
specified place. The workers installed four (4) barricades made up of twoinch thick GI pipes welded together, 1.3 meters wide and 1.2 meters high,
at the area where the digging is to take place. The digging operations
started at 9 oclock in the morning and ended at about 3 oclock in the
afternoon. The workers dug a hole one (1) meter wide and 1.5 meters
deep, after which they refilled the excavated portion of the road with the
same gravel and stone excavated from the area. At that time, only of the
job was finished in view of the fact that the workers were still required to reexcavate that particular portion for the tapping of pipes for the water
connections to the concessionaires.
Meanwhile, between 10 oclock and 11 oclock in the evening of 31 May
1988, Priscilla Chan was driving her Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK
991 at a speed of thirty (30) kilometers per hour on the right side of
Santolan Road towards the direction of Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro
Manila. With her on board the car and seated on the right front seat was
Assistant City Prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa. The road was flooded as it
was then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on a
manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a
result, the humerus on the right arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was

fractured. Thereupon, Priscilla Chan contacted Biglang-awas husband who

immediately arrived at the scene and brought his wife to the Cardinal
Santos Hospital.
Dispatched to the scene of the accident to conduct an investigation
thereof, Pfc. Felix Ramos of the Traffic Division of the San Juan Police
Station, upon arriving thereat, saw Priscilla Chans car already extracted
from the manhole and placed beside the excavated portion of the road.
According to this police officer, he did not see any barricades at the scene
when he arrived less than an hour later. A Traffic Accident Investigation
Report[3] was thereafter prepared and signed by Pfc. Ramos.
At the hospital, the attending physician, after having performed a close
reduction and application of abduction splint on Biglang-awa, placed a
plastic cast on her right arm. Barring complications, the injury she suffered
was expected to heal in four (4) to six (6) weeks, although she must revisit
her doctor from time to time for check-up and rehabilitation. After some
time, the plastic cast was removed. Biglang-awa sustained no deformity
and no tenderness of the area of the injury but she could not sleep on her
right side because she still felt pain in that portion of her body. A Medical
Certificate[4] on her injuries was issued by Dr. Antonio Rivera.
Consequent to the foregoing incident, Biglang-awa filed before the
Regional Trial Court at Pasig, Metro Manila a complaint for damages
against MWSS, the Municipality of San Juan and a number of San Juan
municipal officials.
Later, Biglang-awa amended her complaint twice. In her second amended
complaint, she included KC as one of the defendants.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Biglangawa adjudging MWSS and the Municipality of San Juan jointly and
severally liable to her. Dated 29 February 1992, the decision[5] dispositively
reads in full, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila and the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff
[Biglang-awa]. Both defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff the amounts of:
(a)

P18,389.55, for actual damages suffered by the plaintiff;

(b)

P15,000.00, for moral damages;

(c)

P10,000.00, for exemplary damages;

(d)

P5,000.00, for attorneys fees; and

(e)

to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
Unable to accept the judgment, both Biglang-awa and the Municipality of
San Juan went to the Court of Appeals via ordinary appeal under Rule 41
of the Rules of Court, which appeal was thereat docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 38906.
As stated at the outset hereof, the appellate court, in a decision dated 08
September 1995, affirmed with modification that of the trial court, to wit:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED but modified as follows:
1. The Appellees KC and MWSS and the Appellant San Juan are hereby
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to [Biglang-awa] the amounts of
P50,000.00 by way of moral damages, P50,000.00 by way of exemplary
damages and P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees, without prejudice to the
right of the Appellee MWSS for reimbursement from the Appellee KC under
the Contract, Exhibit 3-MWSS:
2. The counterclaims of the Appellees and Appellant San Juan and the
cross-claim of the latter are DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket supplied).
Therefrom, petitioner Municipality of San Juan came to this Court thru the
present recourse, on its submissions that:
I.
THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT HAS DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE NOT HEREFORE DECIDED BY THE SUPREME
COURT.
II.

THE RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT HAS DECIDED A QUESTION

PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
With no similar recourse having been taken by the other parties, the Court
shall limit itself to the liability or non-liability of petitioner municipality for the
injury sustained by Biglang-awa.
In denying liability for the subject accident, petitioner essentially anchored
its defense on two provisions of laws, namely: (1) Section 149, [1][z] of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1983; and (2) Section 8, Ordinance 82-01, of the Metropolitan
Manila Commission.
Petitioner maintains that under Section 149, [1][z] of the Local Government
Code,[6] it is obliged to provide for the construction, improvement, repair
and maintenance of only municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks,
bridges, parks and other public places. Ergo, since Santolan Road is
concededly a national and not a municipal road, it cannot be held liable for
the injuries suffered by Biglang-awa on account of the accident that
occurred on said road.
Additionally, petitioner contends that under Section 8, Ordinance No. 8201, of the Metropolitan Manila Commission, which reads:
In the event of death, injury and/or damages caused by the noncompletion of such works and/or failure of one undertaking the work to
adopt the required precautionary measures for the protection of the general
public or violation of any of the terms or conditions of the permit, the
permittee/excavator shall assume fully all liabilities for such death, injury or
damage arising therefrom. For this purpose, the excavator/permittee shall
purchase insurance coverage to answer for third party liability, only the
Project Engineer of KC and MWSS can be held liable for the same
accident.
The petition must have to be denied.
Jurisprudence[7] teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189[8] of
the Civil Code, ownership of the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings
and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it being sufficient that a
province, city or municipality has control or supervision thereof. This, we
made clear in City of Manila vs. Teotico, et al[9]:

At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the
liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets
belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is
exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality
have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. x x x
It is argued, however, that under Section 149, [1][z] of the Local
Government Code, petitioner has control or supervision only over municipal
and not national roads, like Santolan Road.
Sadly, petitioner failed to take note of the other provisions of Section 149
of the same Code, more particularly the following:
Section 149. Powers and Duties. (1) The sangguniang bayan shall:
(bb) Regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas,
water, sewer, and other pipes; the building and repair of tunnels, sewers,
drains and other similar structures; erecting of poles and the use of
crosswalks, curbs and gutters therein, and adopt measures to ensure
public safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar
hazards to life and property, and provide just compensation or relief for
persons suffering from them; (Underscoring supplied)
Clear it is from the above that the Municipality of San Juan can regulate the
drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and
other pipes within its territorial jurisdiction.
Doubtless, the term regulate found in the aforequoted provision of Section
149 can only mean that petitioner municipality exercises the power of
control, or, at the very least, supervision over all excavations for the laying
of gas, water, sewer and other pipes within its territory.
We must emphasize that under paragraph [1][bb] of Section 149, supra, of
the Local Government Code, the phrases regulate the drilling and
excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other
pipes, and adopt measures to ensure public safety against open canals,
manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life and property, are not
modified by the term municipal road. And neither can it be fairly inferred
from the same provision of Section 149 that petitioners power of regulation

vis--vis the activities therein mentioned applies only in cases where such
activities are to be performed in municipal roads. To our mind, the
municipalitys liability for injuries caused by its failure to regulate the drilling
and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other
pipes, attaches regardless of whether the drilling or excavation is made on
a national or municipal road, for as long as the same is within its territorial
jurisdiction.
We are thus in full accord with the following pronouncements of the
appellate court in the decision under review:
While it may be true that the Department of Public Works and Highways
may have issued the requisite permit to the Appellee KC and/or
concessionaires for the excavation on said road, the Appellant San Juan is
not thereby relieved of its liability to [Biglang-awa] for its own gross
negligence. Indeed, Evangeline Alfonso, the witness for the Appellant San
Juan unabashedly [sic] admitted, when she testified in the Court a quo, that
even if the Department of Public Works and Highways failed to effect the
requisite refilling, the Appellant San Juan was mandated to undertake the
necessary precautionary measures to avert accidents and insure the safety
of pedestrians and commuters:
The [petitioner] cannot validly shirk from its obligation to maintain and
insure the safe condition of the road merely because the permit for the
excavation may have been issued by a government entity or unit other than
the Appellant San Juan or that the excavation may have been done by a
contractor under contract with a public entity like the Appellee MWSS.
Neither is the [petitioner] relieved of liability based on its purported lack of
knowledge of the excavation and the condition of the road during the period
from May 20, 1988 up to May 30, 1988 when the accident occurred. It must
be borne in mind that the obligation of the [petitioner] to maintain the safe
condition of the road within its territory is a continuing one which is not
suspended while a street is being repaired (Corpus Juris Secundum,
Municipal Corporations, page 120). Knowledge of the condition of the road
and the defects and/or obstructions on the road may be actual or
constructive. It is enough that the authorities should have known of the
aforesaid circumstances in the exercise of ordinary care (City of Louiseville
versus Harris, 180 Southwestern Reporter. page 65). In the present

recourse, Santolan Road and the Greenhills area coming from Ortigas
Avenue going to Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila is a busy
thoroughfare. The gaping hole in the middle of the road of Santolan Road
could not have been missed by the authorities concerned. After all, the
[petitioner] San Juan is mandated to effect a constant and unabated
monitoring of the conditions of the roads to insure the safety of motorists.
Persuasive authority has it that:
It is the duty of the municipal authorities to exercise an active vigilance
over the streets; to see that they are kept in a reasonably safe condition for
public travel. They cannot fold their arms and shut their eyes and say they
have no notice. (Todd versus City of Troy, 61 New York 506). (Words in
bracket supplied).
Nor can petitioner seek shelter on Section 8 of Ordinance 82-01 of the
Metropolitan Manila Commission.
Concededly, Section 8 of the Ordinance makes the permittee/excavator
liable for death, injury and/or damages caused by the non-completion of
works and/or failure of the one undertaking the works to adopt the required
precautionary measures for the protection of the general public.
Significantly, however, nowhere can it be found in said Ordinance any
provision exempting municipalities in Metro Manila from liabilities caused
by their own negligent acts. Afortiori, nothing prevents this Court from
applying other relevant laws concerning petitioners liability for the injuries
sustained by Biglang-awa on that fateful rainy evening of 31 May 1988.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of
the appellate court AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner