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The Forging of Modern Realism: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics
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The Forging of Modern Realtim: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics
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and renaissance natural philosophers including many who are not in any
technical sense Averroists. One of Averroes sixteenth century Italian admirers, Agostino Nifo (1473 - 1538). summarises Averroes argument as
follows:
Averroes argued logically against epicycles and eccentrics in the following way.
One should understand that a sound demonstration is one in which the cause is
necessary for the effect. Now it is granted that when eccentrics and epicycles are
posited the appearances follow and can be saved. But the converse is not true.
When the appearances are posited, epicycles and eccentrics do not have to be
[posited], except for the time being until another better cawa is discovered which is
necessary [for the appearances]. The proponents of epicycles and eccentrics are,
therefore, in error, because they argue from a proposition having several causas for
the truth of one of them. But these appearances can be saved both in this way and
in others which have not yet been discovered.13
one
But
unlike his contemporaries,
Giovanni Amici and Girolamo Fracastoro,
whose
Homocentrica
of 1538 Clavius attacks in the course of his defence of the
Ptolemaic system, Nifo offers no detailed account of the way in which such a
system can save the phenomena. By no means all of those who endorse Averroes logical argument against the Ptolemaic astronomy actually declare
that the celestial phenomena can be saved using only homocentrics. Aquinas,
for example, remains non-committal
as do several Italian renaissance
Aristotelians including Tommaso de Vio Gaetano (1469 - 1534) and Benedict
Pereira (1535 - 1610).
Duhems treatment of those who deny or doubt the truth of Ptolemaic
astronomy is puzzling. Nifo, Fracastoro and other declared homocentrists, he
assigns to the realist camp, but many of those who fail to declare themselves
homocentrists he describes as fictionalists or near-fictionalists.
Yet the
passages he cites all admit of a simple interpretation. Whatever they may have
believed about the prospects for a workable homocentric astronomy, all these
Aristotelians held that Ptolemaic astronomy is useful, being the best predictive
advice yet discovered, but that it is false; false because it describes a universe
inconsistent with the principles of Aristotelian physics. Clavius adversaries
are surely realists sceptical of the established astronomy.
aNifo, In Aristoteh
libros de coelo et mundo commentaria
(1517), Venice, 1553, 90v col. 2
(cited in Duhem, Phenomena, 48). Causa evidently has the weak sense of sufficient condition
here.
Aquinas, Summa, 1:32, I -2; Tommaso de Vio Gaetano (Cajetanus), Expositio in libro[s] de
coelo et mundo. Venice, 1502, f.39r; Pereira. De communibus
cipiis et affectionibus
(1562), Rome, 1576, 47D -48D. Pereira,
omnium
rerum naturaiium
prin-
146
the Sceptics
147
through the innate light of the mind we can apprehend with certainty truths
stored in our own memory; notably truths about numbers and figures, and the
fact of Gods existence. Finally, we can be sure of all instances of the rules of
logic. But though Augustine rejects extreme scepticism, his stance here (as in
the books of the Confessions and De Trinitafe in which he treats of human
knowledge) remains markedly sceptical. The misleading power of the senses is
largely conceded to the sceptic, and knowledge of nature is supposed to be
granted to men only insofar as such knowledge is needed to provide a basis for
apprehension of the existence and benevolence of a Creator. Further,
Augustines own style of argument is frequently that of the Ciceronian dialectician; for example, in the Contra Academicos, after presenting arguments on
both sides of the question, he concludes only that it is more probable than not
that we can answer some questions with certainty.
Philipp Melanchthons views on the attainability of knowledge combine
elements of Augustinian epistemology with the tenets of the humanist dialectic
of which he was so influential a protagonist. And Melanchthon is, for our purpose, a key figure. As Luthers right-hand man he was an instigator of
humanist curricula in over a dozen German universities and gymnasia. Promotion of the mathematical arts was a central part of the humanist programme,
and astronomy flourished as never before in the academies which fell under
Melanchthons aegis. Further, though subsequently violently at theological
odds with Melanchthon and Luther, Osiander was, up to the time he wrote the
notorious preface to Copernicus De revolutionibus, an intellectual ally of
Melanchthons and involved in the creation of a humanist curriculum at the
Ntirnberg Gymnasium.1g
Melanchthons views on the attainability of knowledge are set out in almost
identical terms in each of his major non-theological works: his dialectic textbook, his lectures on physics, and his De anima.ao Here he adopts the tradiIn 2~12, 27 Augustine argues that the academic position is incoherent since all judgements of
probability are relative to evidence which must be certain; and in 3: 10, 24 - 13, 29 he presents his
three sources of certainty. The best general account of Augustines epistemology that I have found
is J. Hessen,Augustins hfetuphysik der Erkenntnti, 2nd edn. (Leiden, 1960).
On humanist promotion of the mathematical arts see, H. &hilling, Die Geschichte der Axiomatischen Methode im 16. und beginnenden 17. Jahrhundert, (Hildesheim, 1969); R. Hooykaas,
Humantsme, Science et Reforme: Pierre de la Romee (1515 - 1572) (Leyden, 1958); P. L. Rose,
The Itahon Renaissance of Mathematics: Studies on Humanists and h4athematician.s from
Petrarch to Galileo (Geneva, 1975).
On Osianders relations with Melanchthon see, A. B. Wrightsman. Andreas Osiunder ond
Lutheran Contributions to the Copernicun Revolution, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
Wisconsin, 1970.
*nMelanchthon, Compendiario dialectices rutio (Leipzig, 1520) (revised versions include De
dialectico libri IV, Wittenberg, 1531, and Erotemata dialectices. Wittenberg, 1547); Initia doctrinae physicae, dictato in Academia Vitebergensi (Wittenberg, 1549); Liber de anima (Wittenberg, 1553). Subsequent references are-to C. G. Bretschneider (ed.) Phihppi Mehmchthoni
opera quaesupersunt omniu, Halle, 1834 - 1843 and Braunschweig, 1853 - 1860 (hereafter cited as
M.O. 7. Meianchthons De anima shows numerous close parallels with passages from Augustine
who is repeatedly cited. His account of the role of memory in cognition is thoroughly Augustinian,
148
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of Science
and many of the scriptural texts he uses to justify his theses had been used by Augustine to justify
similar theses. Melanchthons moral objections to academic scepticism are almost certainly derived from Conrru Acudenricox, as are the three criteria which he presents as sources of certainty.
I Scientiu is apprehension in which demonstration compels us to assent to a proposition; opinio
is apprehension in which we are moved by a probable reason to incline more to one side [of a question] than to the other, and assent or acceptance is suspended, De onimu, M.O., XIII, col. 166.
M.O., XIII, col. 137.
M.O., VII, col. 412.
This account is based on the sections of Melanchthons De unimu and Erotemutu diulectices
entitled Quue sum cuusue certitudinis doctrinutum. 7, together with the section of Initiu docfrinue
physicue entitled Dine certirudo uliquu doctrinu. (M.O.. XIII, col. 150; col. 647; cols
185-186).
M.O.,
XIII, col. 186.
The Forging of Modern Realism: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics
149
150
that the primary source of knowledge is reading of scripture, and his occasional remarks on medicine, alchemy and astrology emphasise the uncertainty
of all remedies and the dependence of cure on Gods wi1L3 Indeed, Osiander
may well have been less moderate in his scepticism than Melanchthon. In the
case of Ursus, appeal to his other works is inconclusive. The Geodaesia Rantzoviana, 1583, contains nothing relevant to the issue, and the Fundamentum
astronomicum, 1588, is ambiguous. It does indeed contain a Job-inspired outburst on the awfulness of mans lot and his moral and intellectual feebleness,
as well as specific sceptical remarks on our inability to answer certain questions about the form of the universe; but it contains also a number of
arguments from physical premises designed to vindicate Ursus own (or rather,
if the plagiarism charge is correct, Tychos) world-system.32 Perhaps Ursus is
confused (one possible source of his confusion being his repeated identification of astronomical hypotheses with systems of spheres, an identification
which may have led him to regard his own arguments against the existence of
solid spheres as demonstrating the unreality of astronomical hypotheses), or
perhaps we should regard the sceptical opening to the Tracfatus as a polemical
stance designed to facilitate his attack on Tychos claim to originality.
Fortunately, for our purposes, both the precise degree of scepticism adopted
by Osiander and Ursus and the sincerity of the adoption are immaterial. It suffices to note that Osianders and Ursus pronouncements are consistent with a
widely prevalent, indeed, in the protestant universities of Germany, orthodox,
moderate sceptical position.
Those forms of scepticism which cast doubt on the existence of an external
world are surely conducive to, even if they do not actually entail, an instrumentalist interpretation of the natural sciences. Berkeleyan phenomenalism is an obvious example. But it is perfectly clear that the scepticism of
Osiander and Ursus is not of this kind. However, short of such radical scepticism, there appear to be available in the sixteenth century few options for a
scepticism conducive to an instrumentalist interpretation of astronomical
hypotheses. Indeed, I can think of only two plausible candidates, both based
on dualistic ontologies. One, whilst acknowledging the existence of the objects
of the terrestial world, would place the celestial world altogether beyond our
On Osianders theological
and exegetical writings see E. Hirsch, Die Theologie des Andreas
Osiander und ihre geschichtlichen
Voraussetzungen
(Gottingen,
1919); A. B. Wrightsman,
Andress Osiander and Lutheran Contributions
to the Copernican Revolution,
unpublished
Ph.D.
thesis, University of Wisconsin,
1970, Ch.3.
The bulk of the Fundamentum astronomicurn is devoted to trigonometrical
methods of use in
practical astronomy.
Ursus new world-system
is illustrated by a large fold-out diagram interpolated between the dedicatory
letter and the first chapter, and is described in detail in the final
chapter, in which twenty physical theses are offered in support of it. These include a denial of the
existence of solid spheres and a denial of the triple motion of the earth on the Aristotelian
ground
that a simple body must have a single natural motion. Ursus also questions the finitude of the
universe and conjectures that the fixed stars may be at distances proportional
to their magnitudes.
But he raises a doubt about our ability to answer these questions conclusively.
Real&m:
the Sceptics
151
ken, denying that we can know even that it includes real celestial bodies performing real motions in space. The other, maintaining an unbridgeable gulf between things as they are and the world of appearances would deny that
knowledge of the true form of the universe, if attained, would enable us to explain the apparent positions and motions of the stars. Elements of both these
forms of scepticism are perhaps to be found in certain renaissance authors
with Platonist sympathies; for example, Giovanni Pontano (1426 - 1503) and
Lefevre dEtaples (Faber Stapulensis cu 1455 - 1536), to both of whom Duhem
ascribes a fictionalist position. But there is no evidence that Melanchthon,
Osiander or Ursus held such radical views. I conclude that instrumentalism, in
the technical philosophical sense, cannot be ascribed to them.
The term instrumentalist is, however, sometimes used in a much looser
sense, roughly equivalent to pragmatist. Consider a hydrodynamic theorist
interested in drag on irregular hulls due to turbulence, or a physical chemist interested in the kinetics of very complex chemical reactions. In principle the
problems they face are soluble from physical first principles by analytic means.
In practice no one in his right mind would attempt to solve them in this way.
Too many boundary conditions would have to be ascertained for the problems
to be posed in analytic terms, and even were they so posed the analysis itself
would far outrun the joint capacities of the human mind and the computer.
Here the scientist is bound to make use of ad hoc generalisations and models
whose truth or range of valid applicability is gravely in doubt. The messier the
problems he faces the more likely he is to assess such ad hoc devices simply in
terms of their predictive success, with scant regard for theoretical foundations.
And in tackling a given problem he will frequently employ several models
which are, interpreted realistically, inconsistent. Such a scientist is often said
to adopt an instrumentalist or pragmatic stance. His stance is premised on
scepticism about the feasibility of acquiring certain kinds of knowledge, but it
is perfectly consistent with realism.
It is, I suggest, such pragmatism, premised on moderate scepticism that lies
behind Melanchthons at first sight curious assessments of the Ptolemaic and
Copernican hypotheses: for example his dismissal of Averroes objections to
the Ptolemaic hypotheses on the grounds that though geometers do not suppose there really are epicycles and eccentrics, the hypotheses do show the
CUUS(IS
of the motions; and his concession that though Copernicus system is
false, his lunar model is altogether well constructed.3 The stance is the same
G. G. Pontano, De rebus coelestibus libri xiv (Naples, 1512) (quoted in Duhem, Phenomena,
54 - 56); Lefkvre dEtaples, Inrroductorium astronomicurn. . . ., (Paris, 1503) (quoted in Duhem.
Phenomena, 56 - 57).
M.O., XIII, cols 232 and 244 (here, as often elsewhere, Melanchthon uses the term cuusufor
sufjicient condition; cf., fn. 13). There is a large literature on Melanchthons attitude to Copernicus, and in particular on the significance
of his mitigation
in the
152
of Science
when Osiander claims that since astronomers cannot in any way attain to the
true causes, they must conceive and devise such hypotheses as, being assumed, enable the motions to be calculated correctly from the principles of
geometry, for the future as well as the past; and when Ursus maintains that it
is permitted and conceded to astronomers . . . to fabricate hypotheses,
whether true or false and feigned, of such a kind as may yield the phenomena
and appearances of the celestial motions and correctly produce a method for
calculating them.3s
Some of the passages (from Ptolemy, Simplicius, Proclus and Theon of
Smyrna) cited by Duhem in support of his general ascription of instrumentalism to Greek mathematical astronomers may be read as expressions of a
similarly pragmatic attitude to practical astronomy. And the same pragmatic
attitude may sometimes underlie the sharp distinction between physical and
mathematical astronomy that is commonly emphasised by both medieval and
renaissance natural philosophers. 36The evidence for the prevalence of this attitude amongst German professional astronomers in the latter part of the sixteenth century is, however, much firmer. Following the pioneering work of
Zinner there has been intensive study of the reception of the Copernican
hypotheses. In particular, it has been shown by Westman that from the 1550s
in the protestant German universities Copernicus planetary models were increasingly widely presented alongside Ptolemaic planetary models by those
who either rejected the theory as a true description of the universe, or, more
often, refrained from commenting on the issue.37 This approach to the Copernican system, the approach of Peucer, Reinhold and Praetorius, sceptical or
non-committal on the question of its truth, but committed on the question of
the practical usefulness of some of the Copernican planetary models, has been
called the Wittenberg interpretation. It represents precisely the sceptical,
second edition of his Initia docfrinaephysicae and of his own unpublished calculations on the motions of the sun. Useful recent assessments are K. Mtiller, Ph. Melanchthon und das kopernikanische Weltsystem, Cenfaunrs, 9 (1963 - 1964), 16-28, and the article by Maurer already
cited (fn.25). Maurer argues, as I do here, that, despite the discrepancies between their public pronouncements on the Copernican system, Melanchthon and Osiander share a common view of the
status of astronomical hypotheses.
Osiander, translation from E. Rosen, lot. cit. (fn.27); Ursus, Tracratus. f.Biv,v.
Frequently cited sources for this distinction are Aristotle, Physics, I:2, 193b 22-36, and a
quotation from Geminus in Simphcius commentary on that passage (In Aristoteles physjcorum
Libras QuaffuorPriores, ed. H. Diels (Berlin, 1882). 291.21-292.31; transl. T. L. Heath, Arisfarthus of Samos (Oxford, 1913). 275-276). Although in contrasting the physicist with the
astronomer Geminus says that astronomers do sometimes save the phenomena without regard to
the causes, the passage as a whole, far from claiming autonomy for mathematical astronomy,
emphasises the dependence of mathematical astronomy on physics. Cf. Lloyd, loccir. (fn.2).
E. Zinner, Entstehung und Ausbreitung der coppernicanischen Lehre (Erlangen. 1943); J.
Dobrzycki (ed.) The Reception of Copernicus Heliocentric Theory (Dordrecht, 1973); R. S.
Westman, The Melanchthon circle, Rheticus, and the Wittenberg interpretation of the Copernican theory, Isis, 66 (1975). 165 - 193; Three responses to Copernican theory: Johannes
Praetorius, Tycho Brahe, and Michael Maestlin, in The Copernican Achievement, R. S. Westman
(ed.), (Berkeley, 1975).
The Forging of Modern Realkm: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics
153
III
Clavius seeks to rebut a single sceptical argument: the fact that a set of
astronomical hypotheses saves the phenomena does not provide grounds for
accepting those hypotheses; for, as Aristotle notes in the Prior Analytics, a
true conclusion can follow from false premises. Before countering this,
Clavius obligingly fortifies the argument:
I can add some support to their position as follows. Nicolaus Copernicus, in his
work on the revolutions of the celestial orbs, saved all the phenomena in another
way. He posited that the firmament is at rest and immobile, and the sun at rest also
in the centre of the universe, and he attributed to the earth, which he placed in the
third heaven, a triple motion, etc. So eccentrics and epicycles are not necessary for
the saving of the planetary phenomena. And again, in the case of the sun, Ptolemy
used an epicycle to explain all the appearances that he saved using an eccentric. So
it cannot be inferred from our third argument that the sun is moved in an eccentric,
for perhaps it is moved in an epicycle.3
154
attainability
of knowledge of certain details of the disposition of the heavenly
bodies. But with the advent of the Copernican
and Tychonic systems the sceptics hand is greatly
world-systems,
strengthened.
a general
equivalence
suggests
Clavius
of knowledge
from
its
force.
His opening move is ingenious and economical.
Given that epicycles and eccentrics are inferred from, and successfully predict, the observed motions of
the celestial bodies, his adversaries should, he insists, either produce an alternative way of saving the phenomena
or concede
Otherwise they set a disastrous precedent:
the acceptability
of this one.
So if it is not right to infer from the appearances that eccentrics and epicycles are to
be found in the heavens, just because the true can be inferred from the false, the
whole of natural philosophy will tumble down. For, by the same token, whenever
from a known effect someone concludes that this or that is its cause, I can say: It is
not true, because from what is false one can derive what is true. And thus all the
principles of nature discovered by philosophers may be destroyed. Since this is absurd, it seems that the force and strength of our argument is not in fact undermined
by our adversaries.O
Given Clavius earlier claim that inference from observed effects is the only
route to knowledge of causes, and given a rejection of global scepticism, his
conclusion surely follows: there must be something wrong with his opponents
argument.
Clavius
choice
of premises
is dialectically
astute.
Many
Aristotelians
would have accepted his empiricist premise: There is nothing in
the intellect that was not first in the senses was, after all, a maxim of
scholastic philosophy.
And his opponents could scarcely refuse to concede his
denial of global scepticism in natural philosophy,
since their objection
to
epicycles and eccentrics was founded on absolute commitment
to the principles
of Aristotelian
physics.
Having established
by a neat transcendental
argument that there must be
something wrong with his opponents
the fallacy in it:
argument,
Clavius
proceeds
to diagnose
It should indeed be said that the rule of dialectic - What is true can follow from
what is false - is irrelevant. For what is true is not derived from what is false in the
same way as the phenomena
are saved by eccentrics and epicycles. In the former
case what is true is derived from what is false through the force of syllogistic form.
When we know the truth of any proposition,
false premises can be disposed in such
a way that through the force of the syllogism the true proposition
is necessarily
In Sphoeram, 435.
The Forging of Modern Realbm: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics
155
concluded. Thus, because I know that all animals are sensitive, I can contrive the
following syllogism: All plants are sensitive; All animals are plants; So, all animals
are sensitive. But if I doubt the conclusion in any way, I shall never acquire from
false premises any certainty about it, even though it is correctly concluded through
the force of the syllogism. By means of eccentric orbs and epicycles, however, one
not only saves the appearances already perceived at some time, but also predicts
future ones whose time [of occurrence] is altogether unknown. Suppose, for example, that I am in doubt whether there will be an eclipse of the moon at the full moon
of January 1582. [By inference] from the motions of the eccentric orbs and
epicycles I am made entirely certain that there will be, so that I am no longer in
doubt.
Clavius is successful in convicting his opponents of a false analogy. Contrivance of a syllogism with false premises and a true conclusion yields no new
knowledge; it has no predictive force. Postulation of a suitable arrangement of
epicycles and eccentrics, however, does have predictive force. Clavius concludes this phase of his argument as follows:
but it is not reasonable to suppose that we compel the heavens to obey the figments
of our minds, and that they move as we wish, or rather so as to conform to our
principles. Yet if eccentrics and epicycles are figments, as our adversaries would
156
Studies
planets are not carried at a constant distance from the earth. So, either there are eccentrics and epicycles in the heavens in the order in which Ptolemy placed them, or
there must at least be posited some equivalent cause of these effects using eccentrics
and epicycles. So if Copernicus postulate involved nothing false or absurd, there
would clearly be doubt whether one ought to adhere to Copernicus opinion or
Ptolemys on the question of how to save this kind of phenomena. But many absurd and erroneous things are contained in Copernicus postulate.
Clavius proceeds to detail the physical absurdities of Copernicus system. He
then counters the second example of observationally-equivalent
but inconsistent hypotheses:
Moreover, from the fact that Ptolemy saved the solar phenomena both by means of
an epicycle and by means of an eccentric, it follows only that it is not certain
whether the sun is carried by an epicycle or by an eccentric. But whichever is affirmed, it is clear that the sun has an inconstant distance from the earth, and is certainly not carried in a concentric orb, which is, as we have said, enough for our
purposes.41
Clavius is here successful in his primary aim, that of showing that the sceptics examples of inconsistent but observationally-equivalent
hypotheses fail to
cast doubt on the existence of epicycles and eccentrics. But such examples present a far more general challenge, casting doubt on the existence of adequate
criteria for deciding between inconsistent hypotheses. Clavius does not explicitly answer this challenge. However, he does make two points - that inconsistent hypotheses may have more in common than meets the eye; and that
predictive success does not provide the only criterion for choice between
hypotheses - which contain the germs of a general reply to the sceptic.
IV
At the beginning of the first chapter of his Mysterium cosmographicum
Kepler announces:
I have never been able to agree with those who, relying on the example of an accidental demonstration which with syllogistic necessity yields something true from
false premises . . . , used to maintain that it could be that the hypotheses which
Copernicus adopted are false but nevertheless the true phenomena follow from
them as if from genuine principles.
rIn Sphaeram, 436 - 437.
2In Sphaemm, 437.
Johannes Kepler: Gesammelte Werke, W. van Dyck,
(Munich, 1938). I, 15 (hereafter cited as K.G. W. ).
M. Caspar
and
F. Hammer
(eds.)
The Forging of Modern Realism: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics
157
As it stands, Keplers claim that false premises will always reveal their falsity
through evidently false consequences, like Clavius related claim that the warrant of truth in hypotheses is predictive power, is vulnerable to the sceptics
argument from observational equivalence. Kepler is aware of this, for he continues:
You might object as follows. It can be said with some truth to-day (and could have
been said with some truth in the past) that the ancient tables and hypotheses satisfy
the phenomena. Copernicus, nevertheless, rejects them as false. So, by the same
token, it could be said to Copernicus that although he accounts excellently for the
appearances, nevertheless he is in error in his hypotheses.
from observational
equivalence
has two
I reply, to start with, that the ancient hypotheses clearly fail to account for certain
important matters. For example, they do not comprehend the causes of the
numbers, extents and durations of the retrogradations, and of their agreeing so
well with the position and mean motion of the sun. Since in Copernicus their
regularity is made so beautifully apparent, there must be some inherent cause of all
these things.
We must be careful in interpreting this. Kepler is not denying the (near) observational equivalence of Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy: rather he
claims that though both world-systems save the phenomena only the Copernican system comprehends the causes of, that is, explains, certain regularities
in the phenomena.
The second part of Keplers reply is more substantial:
Further, Copernicus denied none of the things in the [ancient] hypotheses which
K.G. W. 1, 15. The first bracketed clause could mean more specifically when it is combined
with other related premises.
K.G.W.
I. 15.
K.G.W.
1, 15.
158
I take the central claim of this difficult passage to be that the Ptolemaic and
Copernican systems are nearly observationally equivalent precisely because
they are nearly kinematically equivalent. (Further Kepler is aware that for no
choice of finite parameters do they describe exactly the same relative motions,
hence the possibility of discrimination by a parallactic effect.) Though this
reading does succeed in providing Kepler with a coherent argument, it is liable
to the charge of textually-unwarranted and insensitive whiggish hindsight. The
reading requires us to interpret the genus to which both the Ptolemaic and
Copernican hypotheses belong, which is said to provide the basis from which
the appearances are demonstrated in both cases, as a hypothesis about
relative motions. The main internal evidence for this is Keplers claim that to
demonstrate the risings and settings of the stars it suffices to appeal to the
generic hypothesis that there is a certain motuum separatio between the earth
as separation,
and the heaven. Motuum separatio must be translated
divergence or antithesis of motions; but it can, I think, be glossed as differential or relative motion. The use of Aristotelian terminology in this
passage - proximate and commensurate middle term, in virtue of the genus
primarily, law of essential truth - diverges widely from that of its ultimate
KG. W. 1, I5 - 16. Though my translation of this hard passage departs from his on several
points, A. Koyrts free version in LP Rholution Astronomique (Paris, 1961). provided an invaluable start.
The Forging
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160
Studies in History
and Philosophy
of Science
Tychos claim to originality, Tycho does not appear as the defendant. Instead
it is hypotheses that are, metaphorically, in the dock (just as in Sir Philip
Sidneys Defence of Poesie, likewise a judicial oration composed on the
classical model, Poesie is the defendant).s0 Thus we are informed in the
preface that the aim is to obliterate the calumnies against the discoveries of
mathematicians [that is, hypotheses] impressed on the minds of patrons. And
in the first chapter the narration tells of Ursus defamation of hypotheses. So
where in the Mysterium Keplers brief is held for one particular set of
astronomical hypotheses, the Copernican, in the Apologia it is astronomical
hypotheses in general that are to be defended against misrepresentation.
The two main divisions of the first chapter, the confirmation and the refutation, are, as the rules of the game demand, very different in content and tone.
In the confirmation the tone is modest and the serious arguments in support of
Keplers own position are presented without much rhetorical embellishment.
In the refutation the tone is aggressive, witty and ironic. Ursus text is
dissected line by line and he and his witness Osiander are convicted of each of
the fallacies in the traditional list; equivocation, petitio principii, false induction, etc.5
It is the confirmation that is of primary interest to us. It opens with an
etymology and definition of the word hypothesis which need not detain us,
though two points about it deserve notice. This is a conventional opening gambit in a judicial oration in which the defendant is a thing, not a person. Further, appeal to the pristine usage of a word of the kind Kepler makes here, was
perfectly acceptable as a form of argument in the period. Kepler moves on,
again strictly in accordance with the rules, to consider next the species of
hypotheses, and then their proper nature (proprium).sz His argument under
this heading is evidently a response to the following passage in the Tractatus:
For it is the proper nature of hypotheses to inquire into, hunt for and elicit the
truth sought from feigned or false suppositions.
And so it is permitted and granted
to astronomers
as a thing conceded to astronomy
that they should fabricate
hypotheses,
whether true or false and feigned, of such a kind as may yield the
phenomena
and appearances
of the celestial motions and correctly produce a
method for calculating them, and thus achieve the intended purpose and goal of
this art.
%ze. K. 0. Myrick, Sir Philip Sidney us (I Lilerary Craftsman (Cambridge, Mass., 1935). I am
indebted to Dr. L. A. Jardine for this reference.
For Melanchthons account of the various fallacies of which one should seek to convict an op
nonent in the refututio of an oration. see 144.0.. XIII, cols 726-750. Such accounts derive
uhimately from Aristotles De sophbtiiis elenchh.
Melanchthon gives the following list of dialectical topics, headings under which any concep
tual issue should be discussed: 1. Definitio et definitum; 2. Genus; 3. Differentia,
Proprium; . . . : M.O., XIII, col. 663.
Tractatus, f.Biv,v.
The Forging of Modern Realkm: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics
161
162
Again as in the Mysterium, Keplers counter to the argument has two parts.
In the first part he seeks to convince us that there always exist adequate
grounds for choosing between observationally-equivalent
hypotheses:
Certainly one should not suppose that it is because what is true customarily follows
accidentally from what is false. For, as I said before, in the long and tortuous
course of demonstrations through diverse syllogisms, such as are wont to occur in
astronomy, it can scarcely ever happen, and no example occurs to me, that starting
out from a posited false hypothesis there should follow what is altogether sound
and fitting to the motions of the heavens, or such as one wants demonstrated. For
the same result is not in face always obtained from different hypotheses, even when
someone relatively inexperienced thinks it is. The results obtained from the Copernican hypotheses were duplicated, with respect to the numbers, by Maginus from
different hypotheses designed to be as far as possible in agreement with the
Ptolemaic hypotheses. Do Copernicus and Maginus really offer the same things?
Far from it! Copernicus wanted also to demonstrate the cause of and necessity for
the greater proximity of the superior planets to the earth when they are in opposition to the sun, as well as wanting to represent their ensuing motions by numbers. I
here forbear to mention many further matters. And though some disparate
astronomical hypotheses may yield exactly the same results in astronomy, as
Rothmann boasted in his letters to D. Tycho of his own mutation of the Copernican system, nevertheless a difference between the conclusions often arises
because of some physical consideration. Thus even were Tycho to have elicited exactly the same numbers from his hypotheses as did Copernicus (Copernicus
numbers are, however, in error), nevertheless there would be this difference in intention between Tychos demonstrations and the Copernican demonstrations: for,
as well as wanting to predict the future motions of the heavens, Tycho wants to
avoid postulating the immensity of the fixed stars and certain other things that
Copernicus admitted into his hypotheses.5
163
The Forging of Modern Realism: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics
different from [the conclusions of] all the others. Even though for two hypotheses
the conclusions in the geometrical realm coincide, each hypothesis will have its own
peculiar corollary in the physical realm.
The second
equivalence
part
of astronomical
of Keplers
hypotheses
he considers
of diurnal
reply
rotation
extends
the analysis
of observational
in the Mysterium.
is that of observational
equivalence
between
rotation
the
of the
Well then, isnt it necessary for one of the two hypotheses about the primary motion (to take an example) to be false, either the one that says that the earth moves
within the heavens, or the one which has it that the heavens gyrate about the earth?
Certainly if contradictories cannot both be true at once, these two will not both be
true at once, but one of them will be altogether false. But by both means the same
conclusion about the primary motion is demonstrated. The same emergences of the
signs [of the zodiac] follow, the same days, the same risings and settings of the
stars, the same features of the nights. So does what is true follow from what is false
just as it follows from what is true? Far from it! For the occurrences listed above,
and a thousand others, happen neither because of the motion of the heavens, nor
because of the motion of the earth, considered as a motion of the heaven or of the
earth. Rather they happen because there occurs a separation between the earth and
the heaven on a path which is regularly curved with respect to the path of the sun
(separatio super tractu quodam, qui legitime ad viam Solis sit inflemcs), regardless
of which of the two bodies is responsible for that separation. So the aforementioned things are demonstrated from two hypotheses insofar as they belong to a single
genus, not insofar as they differ. Since, therefore, they are one for the purpose of
the demonstration, they do not differ. And even though a physical contradiction
inheres in them, that is entirely irrelevant to the demonstration. So this example
does not prove that what is true can follow both from what is true and from what is
false.5B
In this passage
Kepler
claims,
more unambiguously
than
in the Mysterium,
that the two hypotheses are observationally equivalent because they describe
the same relative motion. Neither the contorted way in which he makes the
claim, nor his failure to justify it, should surprise us. For though many
astronomers of the period (including Rothmann, Tycho, Vi&e and Kepler
himself) show a clear grasp of special cases of the principle of kinematic
relativity, no precise terminology for talking about relative motions was forged until the mid-seventeenth century; an explicit statement of the principle of
kinematic relativity can hardly be expected of Kepler. The second example
Opera, 1, 240.
8Opera, I. 240.
**On the gulf between articulation of a general principle of kinematic relativity and sixteenth
century astronomers appreciation of what later came to be regarded as special cases of the principle, see R. Palter, Some episodes in the history of Copernicanism.
in A. Beer and K. Aa. Strand,
Copernicus: Yesterday and Today (Vistas in Astronomy,
Vol. 17) (Oxford, 19751, 47 - 59.
164
that Kepler tackles is that of the observational equivalence, for suitable choice
of parameters, of a planetary model which uses a concentric with epicycle and
one which uses an eccentric. Here again he claims, in what to us may appear
devious language, that the observational equivalence arises because the two
hypotheses describe the same relative motion.
Keplers analysis of this second example is, however, significantly different
from that of the first example. For here he does not admit that there is a
physical contradiction between the rival hypothesis. Instead he writes:
And we certainly do not ascribe eyes and human reasoning to the planets, so that
they can mark a point here or there with compasses, and authors introduce those
specific views I have mentioned as conceits of their own, rather than for the sake of
explaining nature. Therefore neither the former nor the latter supposition is worthy
of the title astronomical hypothesis, but rather what is common to both of
them.OO
This remark is far from clear. Yet it is, I think, crucial for the assessment of
Keplers argument. Fortunately, there is a passage later in the work in which
Kepler makes his point far more clearly. A letter from Osiander to Copernicus,
which Kepler quotes, contains the following declaration:
I have always been of the opinion that hypotheses are not articles of faith but bases
for calculation, so that even if they are false it does not matter provided they yield
the apparent motions exactly. For who could make us more sure that the unequal
motion of the sun comes about because of an epicycle rather than because of an eccentric, if we follow Ptolemys hypotheses, since it could come about in either way.
The Forging of Modern Realism: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics
165
one is to be taken seriously who does not acknowledge and grasp this diversity in
hypotheses.e
Thus, for Kepler, the second of the sceptics examples of inconsistent but
observationally-equivalent
hypotheses is a sham. A planetary model which
employs an eccentric and one which employs a concentric with epicycle are (for
suitable choice of parameters) merely different geometrical expressions of one
and the same underlying astronomical hypothesis.
Let us now turn from presentation to assessment of Keplers defence of
astronomy against the sceptic.
VI
Keplers rebuttal of the sceptical argument from observational equivalence
has two main components. The first, merely adumbrated in the Mysterium,
but more fully developed in the Apologia, may be called the argument from
sufficiency of evidence. We may put it as follows. The sceptics examples are
supposed to cast doubt on our capacity to make warranted choices between inconsistent hypotheses. But they seem convincing only because astonomers
customarily ignore certain sources of evidence. In the Apologia Kepler
repeatedly lumps together all these other sources of evidence as physical considerations (argumenta physica or ration= physicae). He gives a small
number of specific examples. Thus Ptolemys recourse to the equant provides
physical evidence against his system; and the capacity of the Copernican and
Tychonic systems to explain rather than merely predict the fact that the
superior planets are closest to the earth when in opposition to the sun is
physical evidence in their favour. a1 Further, Kepler alludes in passing both to
the physical arguments in support of the Copernican system that he had offered in the Mysterium and to certain further arguments for it he has since
derived from his reading of Gilberts De magnete (1600).6J From this, we are, I
think, entitled to infer that when Kepler talks of physical considerations he has
in mind not only criteria of simplicity and coherence but also arguments based
on substantive tenets of theology, metaphysics and speculative dynamics. But
the Apologia itself conveys little impression of the richness and diversity of the
types of evidence he had deployed in the Mysterium and was to deploy in his
later works. The second component, again sketched in the Mysterium and
more fully developed in the Apologia, may be called the argument from common ground. It proceeds by showing that each of the sceptics examples of inconsistent but observationally equivalent hypotheses has the following properOpera,I, 246.
See the passagequoted on p. 162 and Opera, 1. 243.
lopera. 1, 243.
166
ty. There is a third hypothesis, entailed by both, which yields the same observational conclusions.
Together, the argument from sufficiency of evidence and the argument from
common ground provide Kepler with a devastating rebuttal of the sceptics
specific examples. The sceptic thinks his examples show that in astronomy we
face choices between inconsistent hypotheses that cannot be settled on rational
grounds. Kepler demonstrates that he has shown no such thing. If our sole interest is in making predictions the choice can be evaded. For in each case we
can opt for a hypothesis which has the same predictive force and is entailed by
both the rival hypotheses. If, however, our interest is, as Kepler holds that it
ought to be, in portraying the true form of the universe, then in the cases in
which the hypotheses really are rivals, not merely different formulations of the
same hypothesis, evidential grounds other than predictive success are to be
found on which a choice can be based. But though Keplers two arguments
combine to crush the sceptics astronomical examples, they are of very different weights.
The argument from common ground is, quite obviously, not generally applicable in response to the argument from observational equivalence. For it is
not true that whenever inconsistent theories predict the same phenomena,
there exists a third theory entailed by both which predicts those phenomena.
Kepler was, I think, aware that this argument, whilst effective for the specific
purpose of refuting Osiander and Ursus, does nothing to answer the general
sceptical doubt about our capacity to choose correctly between inconsistent
hypotheses. For in the Apologia he ushers in the argument from common
ground as follows:
But authors are not always in the habit of taking account of that variety in physical
matters, and they themselves very often confine their own thinking within the
bounds of geometry or astronomy and consider the question of equipollence of
hypotheses within one particular science, ignoring the diverse outcomes which
weaken and destroy that vaunted equipollence when one takes account of related
sciences. Given that this is so, it is proper that we too should adapt our argument
and reply to their manner of speaking [my italics].6
Reabn:
the Sceptics
167
one of two kinds. Either: The hypotheses are not really inconsistent. They
have the same content, but employ different conventions to express it. Or: The
hypotheses are not really evidentially equivalent. With sufficient ingenuity
grounds for a rational choice can be found.
In the Apologia we have, of course, only a special case of the argument;
Kepler is concerned with astronomical hypotheses, not hypotheses in general.
Further his argument is seriously incomplete; no detailed categorisation of the
types of non-observational criteria he takes to be available for the resolution
of theoretical conflict is offered, nor is there any attempt to justify such
criteria as truth-linked. But limited in scope and incomplete though his argument is, it remains a remarkable performance, anticipating the response of
such twentieth-century
realists as Reichenbach to the most direct of all
arguments against scientific realism, the argument from observational
equivalence.
VII
168
And, because no more appropriate way has yet been found than that which saves all [the
phenomena] through epicycles and eccentrics, it is indeed credibile that the celestial spheres are
composed of orbs of this kind, In Sphaeram, 435. The unfamiliarity of Clavius stance is confirmed by the way in which it was misunderstood by the sceptic Francisco Sanchez. In a letter of cu
1589 Sanchez, who had clearly read the passages I have cited quite carefully, attributes to Clavius
both the view that certainty is not attainable in astronomy and the view that epicycles and eccentrics are figments of the mind. Evidently, despite Clavius claim to the contrary, he took it that to
concede that we cannot be certain of the existence of epicycles and eccentrics ir to concede their
fictional status. See. J. Iriarte-Ag, Francisco Sanchez, el Esceptico disfrazado de Carneades en
discusi6n epistohu con Crist6bal Clavio. Gregoriunum. 21(1940), 413 - 45 1. Clavius assessment
of Ptolemaic astronomy is close to Aristotles assessment of his own version of Cahppus
homocentric system: And thus it is reasonubfe ro suppose that there are just this number of immobile substances and principles - the statement of necessity may be left to more competent
thinkers [my italics], Metuphysics, X11:8, 1074a 23 - 24. Many points of phrasing in Clavius account suggest that he consciously emulates Aristotles cautious approach to celestial matters.
On the basis of Keplers anti-sceptical argument in the Mysterium. however, one might well
credit him with full adherence to the traditional distinction. For in answer to doubts about the
Copemican system he not only asserts that part, at least, of Copernicus account cannot be false,
but also claims that the entire system can be demonstrated upriori. The force and intent of these
remarks is open to question, for they are accompanied by other over-stated claims for the Copernican system which Kepler must have known to be misleading, for example,, the claim that it
relieves nature of the intolerable burden of so great a number of epicycles.
Iv0 Schneider, Wahrscheinlichkeit und Zufall bei Kepler, Philosophiu Nuturulk, 16 (1976).
40 -63, argues that in Keplers later works there is developed a quite sophisticated view of the
relative probabilities of hypotheses in the light of evidence.
Tractatus. f.Biv,v.
The Forging of Modern Realism: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics
169
Ptolemei
170
tially misleading because the few explicit examples of such criteria which
Kepler gives are readily assimilated to the modern categories of simplicity and
consilience of inductions, so that Kepler can all too easily be taken to be promoting an empiricist hypothetico-deductive
methodology. There is good
reason for Keplers reticence about the criteria for choice of theory. Keplers
views on the nature and justification of the physical criteria by which
theoretical disputes may be resolved were forged in the specific context of
defence and emendation of the Copernican system. But the Apologia is a
defence of Tycho, and Kepler, whilst he evidently felt himself free to declare
his adherence to a Copernican system, scrupulously refrains throughout the
work from actively promoting Copernicanism. It is a measure of his restraint
that, though he alludes to arguments he could give on behalf of Copernicus,
he spells out only arguments which support both the Tychonic and the Copernican systems against the Ptolemaic.
One possible way of relating the content of the Apologia to Keplers
epistemology as a whole is to ask - How can Kepler justify his repeated assertion that even when observational evidence fails physical evidence sufficient
to discern true from false hypotheses in astronomy can always be found?
Kepler, indeed, invites the request for justification, for twice in the Apologia
he draws attention to the fact that quite different physical considerations
seem compelling to different men.* And the Apologia even contains a hint of
the way in which he might answer the question. For at the beginning of the
first chapter he alludes to that illumination of our mind which most especially
thrives on geometrical figures, but also on other things, generally, and without
which there would be nothing of which the mind could have cognition.
Behind this remark we may, if we so choose, see elements of Keplers theology
and metaphysics. For Kepler it is because the Creator reproduced a part of His
essence both in the human mind and in the created world that the human
mind is possessed of an illumination through which knowledge of the hidden
form of the cosmos is attainable. It is because God created both the human
mind and the world as a geometer that the minds illumination most especially
thrives on geometrical figures, and hence can hope to resolve theoretical
disputes through apprehension of the geometrical harmony of the dispositions
and motions of the cosmos through which the Creator partially reveals His
essence. These commonplace aspects of Keplers metaphysics suffice to indicate how he would justify one of the types of physical consideration that he
took to be crucial for the resolution of theoretical disputes.7 But the divine
Opera, I, 243 and 261.
Opera, I, 238-239.
The remark occurs in the course of Keplers
hypothesis was originally coined to describe the self-evident principles of
Keplers theological
cosmology
and its historical context are explored
time in an important
recent work of J. Hitbner. Die Theologie Johannes
fhodoxie und Narurwissenschaft
(Tiibingen,
1975).
The Forging of Modern Realism: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics
171
G. Buchdahl, Methodological aspects of Keplers theory of refraction, Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci.
3 (1972). 265 - 298.
172
Studies in History
and Philosophy
TERMINOLOGY
of Science
The ultimate source of the Aristotelian terminology in this passage is the Posterior Analytics.
According to Aristotle the proximate cause of an effect (in a later Aristotelian terminology the
commensurate universal) is that which is, as a matter of necessity, present when and only when
the effect is present. Demonstration of the reason (4podeU tou diotr) for an effect is achieved by
a syllogism whose middle term specifies its proximate cause. Take, for example, the following
syllogism:
The Forging of Modern Real&m: Clavius and Kepler Against the Sceptics
173
44). The appeal to Keplers possible use of Ramus and Pro&s is, however, problematic. Kepler
never cites Ramus dialectical works, and his earliest reference to Proclus commentary is in a letter of September. 1599 to Herwart von Hohenberg (K.G. W., XIV, 63). Further, given Proclus
remarks on the role of the Platonic solids as an archetype, remarks which Kepler duly cites in the
Hurmonice, it seems unlikely that he would have failed to cite the work, had he read it, in the
Mysterium. A likely source both for Keplers conversancy with Ramus reinterpretation of Aristotles rule of truth kuthauto and for his conversancy with Pro&s views on the nature of
demonstration is Ramus controversial and influential Prooemium mathematicarum (Paris, 1567).
(For a detailed account of the impact of this work see J. J. Verdonk, Petrus Rumus en de
Wiskunde, (Assert, 1966.) A revised version of this forms Books I-III
of the Scholae
muthemuticue (EIasel, 1569), and Kepler refers to this edition in a letter to Mastlin of 1597
(K.G. W., 111, MO), and in several subsequent letters. In Book III, an attack on Euclids
unmethodical presentation of geometry, Ramus presents Prcclus views on the nature of
geometrical demonstration, and attributes to Proclus his own version of Aristotles rule of truth
kuthuuto: Then he [Proclus] declares that he [the geometer] will set out matters which are
cognate and of the same kind, nor will he teach anything foreign or superfluous . . . This is the
kuthuufo, per se, of Aristotle (op. cit., 80):