G.R. No.

76585
April 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.RODOLFO BAGUIO y Tampos @
"Bebot" [& JOHN DOE @ "Boying," PETER DOE @ "Arnel," RICHARD DOE @ "Badoy,"
etc.], accused-appellant
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Divina S. Cuejilo for accused-appellant.
NARVASA, J.:
Alfredo Paulino y Austria, 33 years old of age, was assaulted and stabbed by several
men in front of his house at Barangay Gulod, Quezon City, in the night of March 31,
1981. He died at about noon time of the following day. The autopsy disclosed
twenty-three (23) stab wounds on his person, eleven (11) of which had in all
probability been inflicted by a pointed instrument or instruments such as an ice
pick, and twelve (12), by partially pointed, single-bladed weapons.1 He was a
businessman, and was also the Barangay Tanod and Pook Leader of his Barangay.
He was survived by his widow, Lidovina Vallefas and five (5) children.
As she was later to testify in Court,2 the widow, Lidovina, and her husband were
conversing with a certain Benny in front of their house at about 10 o'clock in the
evening of March 31, 1981, when a group of about nine or ten people passed by.
Among the group she recognized Rodolfo Baguio y Tampos a.k.a. "Bebot," with
whom her husband, as Barangay Tanod, had earlier had some unpleasant dealings
because the latter suspected "Bebot" and another person known to her as Frankie
as responsible for some thievery in the neighborhood; and when a certain Dr.
Narciso lost his watch, it was found in the possession of "Bebot," who had then been
constrained to return it. As these persons were passing by, Lidovina went inside her
house to get some money to buy cigarettes. While inside, she heard her husband
cry out, "Aray ko po!" She rushed out and saw her husband sprawled on the ground
while "Bebot" and his companions were stabbing him with pointed weapons. She
saw "Bebot" himself thrust his weapon at her husband twice. Then the assailants
fled.
Lidovina went to her husband, Alfredo, and helped him to his feet. In a weak voice,
with blood soaking his clothing, he said, "Kung ako ay bibigyan pa ng Diyos ng
pangalawang buhay, hindi maaaring hindi mananagot si Bebot at Frankie." This
statement he made several times. Two neighbors, Ismael Milan and a Mr. Sinucuban
helped her bring Alfredo to the hospital. Alfredo died in the surgery room.
She gave a written statement to the police on April 1, 1981. In the middle of August,
1981, she was called to the police headquarters where, from among five persons
made to line up before her, she picked out Rodolfo Baguio.
An information charging Rodolfo Baguio y Tampos, and "John Doe @ "Boying", Peter
Doe @ "Arnel", Richard Doe @ "Badoy" and several John Does . . . whose true
names and whereabouts . . . (had) not yet been ascertained" as co-conspirators in
the crime of murder, "with treachery and abuse of superior strength," was
thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-17059. One of the identified assailants, "Frankie," whose real name is
Francisco Pinili, was indicted for the same crime in the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City, on account of his being a minor at the time, the
case being docketed as JDRC Case QF-81-106.

Only Baguio was arraigned and tried before the Regional Trial Court. His coconspirators, as far as the record shows, were never arrested.
Apart from the evidence given by the victim's wife and the medico-legal officer of
the NBI who performed the post-mortem examination,3 the Prosecution also
presented the testimony of the police officer who investigated the case, Pat.
Restituto de Leon. He declared that it was he who took down the written statements
of the widow and of Baguio, the latter's statement being marked as Exhibit "C," and
that prior to questioning the latter, he had advised him, in Tagalog, of his
constitutional rights to remain silent, to have the assistance of counsel, and that his
statement may be used for or against him.4
The defense of alibi was put forth by the accused, "Bebot" Baguio. His testimony is
to the effect that at the time of the killing, he was at work as a house painter at an
apartment at Mauban Street, Bonifacio, Balintawak, and that he worked overtime on
that day, until midnight in fact; that he was informed of the killing by his wife when
he reached home after work but he did not mind it much, although the victim was a
friend whom he saw quite often, because stabbings were an ordinary occurrence in
their neighborhood; that thereafter he continued reporting for work as usual. He
denied having had a hand in the slaying of Alfredo Paulino, or having signed the
statement, Exhibit C, presented to the Court by Pat. de Leon, supra, alleging that
while it was true that he had been interrogated by the police on August 9, 1981 and
had furnished the information appearing in said Exhibit C, the investigation was for
a case of "robbery-snatching," and not for the killing of Alfredo Paulino. He also
denied having any enemies in the locality.5
Baguio also offered the testimony of his helper, Rodolfo Pabica, in an attempt to
substantiate his alibi.1wphi1 The Trial Court rendered judgment on January 3, 1985
rejecting Baguio's alibi and declaring the evidence of the prosecution to have
established beyond reasonable doubt the commission by Baguio of the crime of
murder qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstances of
premeditation and abuse of superior strength. It sentenced the accused "to
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of Alfredo Paulino
in the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs.6
Baguio appealed and in this Court pleads for the reversal of the Trial court's verdict
because seriously flawed, according to him, by the following errors:
1)
it is based on ante-mortem statements of the victim, Alfredo Paulino, which
do not qualify as a dying declaration;
2)
the testimony of his witness, Rodolfo Pabica, was rejected merely because of
his delayed appearance as a witness;
3)
it used against him his written statement under police investigation, in
violation of his rights under the Constitution.
The first issue relates to the utterancens made by the victim, Alfredo Paulino,
shortly after having received his numerous wounds and while walking to the
hospital, with the assistance of his wife and friends, viz.: "Kung ako ay bibigyan pa
ng Diyos ng pangalawang buhay, hindi maaaring hindi mananagot si Bebot at
Frankie."

The appellant argues that the utterance could riot have been made much less
repeated, in view of the number and gravity of the decedent's wounds. The
argument is mere conjecture. It cannot be sustained in the face of the positive
evidence that despite the fatal character of his injuries, the deceased was still alive
during the time that he was being brought to the hospital, and that in truth he died
only at about 11 o'clock in the morning of the following day, and the equally
positive testimony that the statement was indeed made, not once, but several
times.
The appellant also expresses doubt as to whether Alfredo Paulino was "under the
consciousness of impending death" at the time he uttered the statement, "Kung ako
ay bibigyan pa ng Diyos ng pangalawang-buhay. . .," this being one of the requisites
in order that the statement may be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, as
a dying declaration.7 The statement itself would appear to be the best proof of this
fact. It opens with the hope that God might somehow give him a second life. But
surely, that wish for a second life expressed by the deceased cannot but indicate his
awareness that his first life was draining away with the blood flowing from his many
and grievous wounds.8 This being so, and it appearing that the other requisites of
the decedent's statement as a dying declaration are present, i.e., the statement
concerned the crime and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; the
declarant was otherwise competent as a witness; and the declaration was offered in
a criminal case the subject of which was the declarant's killing,9 the admission and
appreciation thereof by the Trial Court in the assessment of the appellant's guilt can
hardly be faulted.
In any case, even if the declaration in question be somehow still refused admission
as a dying declaration, there can be no question about its admissibility as part of
the res gestae,10 another equally well known exception to the hearsay rule, i.e., a
statement made while a startling occurrence is taking place, or immediately prior or
subsequent thereto, descriptive of the occurrence itself which is admissible in proof
of said occurrence.11 It is difficult to imagine an occurrence more startling than a
sudden attack by several armed men, and the infliction by them of numerous stab
wounds, on the declarant. This being the case, it is reasonable to assume that
statements made by the victim immediately after the unexpected attack and in
relation thereto must have been drawn from him almost involuntarily, under the
exciting influence of the shocking event, with neither time nor opportunity to
deliberate thereon.12 In such a situation, as has very often been said with no little
accuracy, it is the event speaking through the declarant, not the declarant speaking
of the event, his statements being "the reflex product of immediate sensual
impressions, unaided by retrospective mental action, . . . pure emanations of the
occurrence itself."13
Also untenable is the appellant's second argument, that the Trial court disregarded
the testimony of Rodolfo Pabica "on the basis of his delayed appearance as
witness." Actually, the Trial Court rejected Pabica's evidence not so much because
he was tardily presented, but chiefly because he did not impress the Court as a
credible witness. He deposed that he was a helper of Rodolfo Baguio and the latter's
father; that he started to work with them in March, 1981; that they left their place of
work at midnight of March 31, 1981 because they worked overtime; that
(contradicting Baguio's testimony that he had continued working as usual even after

March 31, 1981) Baguio had not reported for work any more since April 1, 1981
because, according to his father, he was a suspect in a criminal case.
It is exceedingly strange that after Baguio had been charged with the murder of
Alfredo Paulino and Pabica informed of it, Pabica never got in touch with Baguio to
offer to tell the authorities about their whereabouts at the time of the offense, nor
did Baguio ever seek Pabica out to substantiate his alibi. Certainly, it could not have
escaped Baguio that his co-workers, his own father and Pabica, were the best
witnesses to prove his absence from the scene of the crime at the time of its
perpetration. Yet, Baguio never presented his father to testify in support of his alibi.
And Pabica's becoming a witness, as he later declared, was pure and simple
happenstance three years or so after the murder, he chanced upon Baguio's mother
at a basketball court, and it was then, and only then, that he (Pabica) was asked to
testify in Baguio's behalf. This Court is satisfied that the Trial Court was correct in
refusing to accord credence to his testimony.
The Court is also satisfied that the appellant's defense of alibi was properly rejected.
Aside from the inherent weakness of that defense on account of the ease with which
it may be fabricated14 it has also been held to be unavailing where, as here, there
is affirmative evidence of the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission, if not indeed his positive identification as the actual
perpetrator of the crime by an eyewitness who has not been demonstrated to be
other than truthful or possessed of any ill motive against the appellant, as well as
by the ante mortem statements of the victim received in evidence either as a dying
declaration or as part of the res gestae.15
There is no need to discuss the third assigned error, which deals with the appellant's
admissions, Exhibit C. From all that has been said, it would seem obvious that even
without taking account of said Exhibit C, Baguio's conviction can stand upon the
other proofs on record, and must perforce be affirmed.
The Trial Court declared that it entertained no doubt and was "morally certain that
Rodolfo Baguio was one of those who killed Alfredo Paulino," "in conspiracy with his
co-accused who are still at large," and that the crime was "attended by the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, premeditation, (and) abuse of superior
strength . . ." This Court agrees. The facts demonstrate a deliberate, sudden and
unexpected attack on the victim, without any warning and without giving him an
opportunity to defend himself or repel the initial assault16 Abuse of superior
strength may not however be independently appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance since it is absorbed in treachery.17 Similarly, evident premeditation
may not be considered against the appellant and his co-accused; for although they
all took part in the slaying of Alfredo Paulino and cooperated with each other in such
a manner as to show a community of purpose and oneness of criminal intent, there
is no adequate evidence that they had planned the crime and had sufficient time
and opportunity to reflect thereon before actually carrying it into effect.18
The penalty prescribed for murder by the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal
maximum to death.19 There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
penalty should be imposed in its medium period, reclusion perpetua. This is in fact
the penalty meted out by the Trial Court.

As regards the indemnity payable to the heirs of Alfredo Paulino, the same should
be increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00, conformably with current doctrine.
One last point. The Trial Court's judgment sentenced Baguio "to reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, . . ." as if these penalties were one and the same, without any
substantial differences existing between them. This is incorrect. The crime of
murder is defined and published by the Revised Penal Code, and within the range of
the penalty prescribed therefor, i.e., reclusion temporal maximum to death, is the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Code does not prescribe the penalty of "life
imprisonment" for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty being invariably
imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special
laws. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after
which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, it also carries with it accessory
penalties, namely; perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as "life
imprisonment" which, for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty,
and for another, does not appear to have any definite extent or duration. The felony
committed by Baguio being one punished under the Revised Penal Code, the proper
penalty that should be imposed on him, therefore, is that prescribed by the same
Code, reclusion perpetua, not "life imprisonment."20
WHEREFORE, except as modified in its dispositive portion to specify the appellant
Baguio's penalty to be reclusion perpetua, removing the alternative reference
therein to "life imprisonment," and to increase the indemnity payable by him to the
heirs of his victim, Alfredo Paulino, from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00, as above
indicated, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court subject of the appeal is
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.

Enrile vs Salazar G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990

Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce
Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the
National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime

Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No.
9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a
panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State
Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil,
Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio
Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29
to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information
and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he
was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the
custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo
Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the
petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition
filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.
Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito compleio) arising
from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred
to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code?
Held:
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article 48 of the Penal
Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with
rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be
done), the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for
the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the
corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but
never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder,
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However,
under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the
absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist
in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that
rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion
thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the
context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a
crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the
Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the
logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be
considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before
conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas

corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or
vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the
normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending
trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said
respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing
a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the
weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the
trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even
then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also
available there.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez,
the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion
only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter
of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in
character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered remanded to the respondent
Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by
said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with
this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

People vs Sendaydiego, et. al.

People vs Sendaydiego, et. al.G.R. No. L-33254 and 33253 January 20, 1978Facts:
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is
that in1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in
conspiracy with JuanSamson y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store
in Dagupan City, and withAnastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an
accomplice, used six (6) forged provincialvouchers in order to embezzle from the
road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23. The provincial voucher in these
cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend"ARTICLE OR SERVICE" the
nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part issupposed to be signed by
two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by thegovernor's representative.
The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed
paragraphs.Paragraph 1 is a certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated
therein that the creditorvouches that the expenses "were actually and necessarily
incurred". In the instant casesparagraph 1 was not signed presumably because it is
not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works projects. Paragraph 2 is a
certification that the expenses arecorrect and have been lawfully incurred. It is
signed by the provincial engineer. Paragraph 3contains these words: "Approved for
pre-audit and payment, appropriations and funds beingavailable therefore." This is
signed by the provincial treasurer. Paragraph 4 is a certificationwhich, as filed up in
Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February 28, 1969, certifying thatthe voucher
has been pre-audited and signed by the auditor. Paragraph 5 is a certificationsigned
by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the provincial
engineer'scertification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is

chargeable asshown in the summary hereof. " It may be noted that the provincial
treasurer signs two partof the voucher.
Issue:
Whether or not appellants are liable for the crimes of falsicification of public
documents andsix crimes of malversation?
Held:
Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six
crimes of malversation. In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is
sentenced to thefollowing penalties: For each of the six falsification of the vouchers
(Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S),Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two
(2) years of prison correccionalminimum, as minimum, to four (4) years of prision
correccional medium, as maximum, andto pay a fine of three thousand pesos. For
the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal
medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of P16,727.52, and toindemnify
the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO. 23349, L33252). For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No.
11995 (Exh.O), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years of prision mayormaximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal medium, asmaximum; to pay a fine in the sum of P14,571.81, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No.
23351, L-33254). For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher
No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is sentenced to anindertiminate penalty of nine (9)
years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen(13) years of reclusion
temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P6,290.60, and toindemnify the
province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). For
the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh.R),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision
mayormedium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum,
as maximum;to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the same amount(Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). For the
malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, coveredby voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5)years of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum,as
maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan
in thesame amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).For the malversation of the
sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S),Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccionalmaximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay afine
of P4,501.38, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same
amount(Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). In the service of the twelve penalties
meted to Samson,the threefold limit provided for in article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code should be observed(People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that the
maximum penalty that he should serveis three times the indeterminate sentence of
twelve (12) years to seventeen (17) years, theseverest penalty imposed on him, or
thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51) years (see Peoplevs. Peas, 68 Phil. 533). The
maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty(40) years (Penultimate

par. of art. 70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs.Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68
Phil. 530 and 69 Phil. 58). The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the sum of P57,048.23. Samson and the
said estate are solitarily liable for thesaid indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code).
Samson should pay one-half of the costs. SOORDERED.

Yapdiangco v. Buencamino (122 SCRA 713)

FACTS: On February 1, 1965, the fiscal filed information for slight physical injuries
allegedly committed by the petitioner on December 2, 1964. Since the information
was filed after the prescribed 60-day period, petitioner moved to quash the criminal
prosecution on the ground of prescription. Respondent contended that it was filed
within the prescriptive period since the last day fell on a Sunday or legal Holiday,
therefore, should not be counted. ISSUE: Whether period of prescription is
interrupted by Sundays or Legal Holidays.
HELD: No. A Sunday or legal holiday does not interrupt nor stop the running of the
prescriptive period as a matter of statutory articulation. According to Article 91, the
only exception is the offenders physical absence and no other cause can be
sufficient to interrupt prescription.
The Court ruled that
Where the sixtieth and last day to file information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday,
the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the next working day. Prescription
has automatically set in.
The fiscal cannot file the information on the next following working day as it would
tantamount to extending the prescriptive period fixed by law. Therefore, the motion
to quash the criminal prosecution was granted on the valid ground of prescription.

G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008

Luis Panaguiton Jr., petitioner
vs DOJ, Ramon Tongson and Rodrigo Cawili, Respondents
Ponente: Tinga
Facts:

This is a petition for Review of CA resolutions dismissing Luis Panaguiton, Jr. petition
for certiorari and motion for reconsideration.
In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from petitioner and later issued checks as payment
both signed by Cawili and his business associate Tongson. But checks were
dishonored either for insufficiency of funds or closure of account.
Panaguiton then made a formal demands to Cawili and Tongson to pay but to no
avail.
So Panaguiton filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating BP Blg. 22
before QC Prosecutor's Office.
During PI, Tongson filed his counter-affidavit claiming that he had been unjustly
included as party-respondent since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in Cawili's
personal capacity. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate and
claimed that he himself has criminal cases against Cawili. Tongson also denied that
he had issued bounced checks and that his signatures on the checks had been
falsified.
As counter, Panaguiton presented documents showing Tongson's signature which
was the same as the signatures on the checks. Panaguiton presented also an
affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson claimed to be Cawili's business
associate.
December 1995, Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed
the charges against Tongson.
Panaguiton filed a partial appeal before DOJ even the case against Cawili was filed
before the proper court.
Later on July 1997, after finding that Tongson was possible to co-sign the bounced
checks and had altered his signature in pleadings submitte during PI, Chief State
Prosecutor directed the City Prosecutor of QC to conduct reinvestigation of the case
against Tongson and refer the signatures to NBI.
On March 1999, Asst. City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Tongson
without referring to the NBI, holding that the case had already prescribed pursuant
to Act. No. 3326, stating that in this case the 4 year period started on the date the
checks were dishonored and that the filing of complaint in QC prosecutor's office did
not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period as the law contemplates judicial
and not administrative proceedings. Four years had elapsed and no information was
filed against Tongson. And the order to refer the matter to NBI could no longer be
sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of rules of criminal procedure because the
initiative should come from the petitioner himself and not from the investigating
prosecutor.
Petitioner appealed to DOJ through undersecretary Teehankee but was dismissed.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration of DOJ and through undersecretary
Gutierrez ruled in his favor and declared that the prescription period was
interrupted by the filing of the complaint in the Prosecutor's office.
However, in August 2004, DOJ acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by
Tongson ruled the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered the
withdrawal of 3 informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against Tongson. DOJ
explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide
for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder.
Panguiton thus filed a petition for Certiorari before CA assailing the august
resolution of the DOJ, but was dismissed by CA in view of failure to attach a proper
verification and certification of non-forum shopping.

Panaguiton then filed for instant petition claiming that CA committed grave error on
dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it
was without merit and questions are too unsubstantial.
The DOJ stated that CA did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with
the rules of court.
Then Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment arguing that CA did not err in
dismissing the petition for certiorari, and they also claim that the offense of
violation of BP Blg. 22 has prescribed and the long delay, attributable to petitioner
and the State violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. The
petition is meritorious.
Issues: (1) Technical Issues, (2) Substantive Aspects
Ruling: (1) verification is merely formal requirement intended to secure an
assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct-the court may simply
order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict
compliance so that the ends of justice may be served. We find that by attaching
pertinent verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner has sufficiently
complied with the verification requirement.We also agree that CA erred in
dismissing the petition on the ground of failure to attach a certified copy or
duplicate original of the 3 resolution of DOJ.
(2) This court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for PI
suspends the running of the prescriptive period.The delay was beyond petitioner's
control but that of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and misapplications.
Petition is granted.

Francisco vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 108747

April 6, 1995
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and Regalado, JJ., concurr
Facts:
Petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, upon humiliating his employees, was accused of
multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five of
his employees, each Information charging him with gravely maligning them on four
different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati, Br. 61, found petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, guilty of grave oral defamation,
in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, and sentenced him to a prison term
of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional "in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the
information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each of the offended parties, Victoria
Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit. However,
he was acquitted in for persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to
appear and testify.
Issue:
(a) Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after appealing his
conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with regard to the duration of
the penalties imposed.
Held:
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for
probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher penalties pose
too great a risk to society, not just because of their demonstrated capability for
serious wrong doing but because of the gravity and serious consequences of the
offense they might further commit.

The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been convicted of
grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of the Revised Penal Code,
and not necessarily those who have been convicted of multiple offenses in a single
proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse.
Hence, the basis of the disqualification of the petitioner is principally on the gravity
of the offense committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. Those
sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not generally
considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of probation.
The Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt in each of the above entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the
mitigating circumstance which is analogous to passion or obfuscation, the Court
hereby sentences the said accused in each case to a straight penalty of eight
months imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law; and to pay
the costs.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC,
which necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final, for him to
file the application for probation with the trial court, is to stretch the law beyond
comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow probation after an appeal has been
perfected.
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and probation
as mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his conviction by the
MeTC although the imposed penalties were already probationable, and in his appeal,
he asserted only his innocence and did not even raise the issue of the propriety of
the penalties imposed on him, and finally, he filed an application for probation
outside the period for perfecting an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for
probation, the instant petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EULALIO BOHOS, ET AL., defendant-appellant.
PER CURIAM:

This is a review on appeal of the decision dated December 18, 1974, of the Court of
First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch IV, Iligan City, in Criminal Case No. 1440
convicting Eulalio Bohos of the complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape and
sentencing him to die for each of the thirteen (13) separate acts of rape committed
on the person of the complaint the dispositive portion of which reads.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Eulalio Bohos GUILTY as principal and
beyond reasonable doubt of the common crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape
under Articles 335 and 342 of the Revised Penal Code with the attending
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and taking advantage of superior strength
and number with no attending mitigating circumstance and hereby sentences the
said accused to suffer the supreme penalty of death for each of the thirteen (13)
separate acts of rape committed on the person of Myrna de la Vega.
Further, the accused is sentenced to indemnify Myrna de la Vega in the amount of
P500.00 for actual damages representing her expenses in coming to testify in this
case in Iligan City from San Carlos City, P12,000.00 for moral damages and
P6,000.00 for exemplary damages.
Finally he is sentenced to pay the costs of this proceedings.
On September 17, 1966, a Saturday, Myrna de la Vega, then 16 years old and a
student of the Immaculate Concepcion College in Ozamis City left the residential
home at Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to see a movie
in barrio Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, accompanied by a small child who
tagged along when Myrna went to the child's house in Maranding. At about 4:00
o'clock the child got thirsty so Myrna took her home but returned alone to view the
rest of the film.
It was already 8:00 o'clock in the evening when she by left the movie house to go
home. In going to Maranding Myrna walked a kilometer via the highway and she had
to take the same route in going home to Kapatagan. By that time the highway was
already deserted and although there were houses along the way the occupants had
already gone to bed. After walking for sometime she noticed several persons
approaching and as they came nearer they turned out to be four men. Then she
heard one of the men say, "Bay, Bay, mayron babae She tried to run away from
them but her efforts proved futile for she was no match to the four men who
immediately caught up with her. One man held her right arm, another held her left
arm and the other two covered her mouth. A passing cargo truck bound for Iligan
City was stopped and she was dragged along it. The four men rode with her at the
rear of the truck. Two men continued to hold her arms. A handkerchief was then
placed inside her mouth, her panty was removed and right there on the truck one of
the men abused her sexually. The cargo truck was made to stop at Magpatao,
another barrio of Lala where she was forced to alight and taken to a small house
along the highway, belonging to Teodoro Engio. That night, Myrna was ravished
thirteen times, once in the truck and twelve times in the house of Teodoro Engio
where the four men took turns in ravishing her three times each. Everytime she was
abused one man held her right hand, another held her left hand and another held
her legs wide apart. After that night's ordeal, Myrna's hands and feet were tied. The
following morning, September 18, 1966, her abductors untied Myrna and each one
again took turns in having carnal knowledge of her while the others held her hands

and her legs apart. After they were through they tied her up again. All in all Myrna
was violated seventeen times.
Myrna was rescued at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of September 18, 1966 by
then Kapatagan Mayor Bernardo Nietes together with some of his policemen led by
Desk Sergeant Apolonio Pangilinan in coordination with Philippine Army soldiers, in
response to a report of Florencio Morilla a neighbor of the De la Vegas. They found
Myrna in the house of Teodoro Engio fast asleep wearing only a "sando" while a
small towel was wrapped around her waist to cover her private parts. Beside her,
also sleeping was Agustin Nodado, one of the accused, who was in his underwear.
Both were interrogated right in the house and Agustin Nodado gave the names of
his companions as Teotimo Babanto, Felix Palcis and Eulalio Bohos. Myrna looked
weak and pale; she could not talk very well and was trembling during the
interrogation. However, she was able to tell Mayor Nietes and Sgt. Pangilinan that
she was kidnapped and abused by four men including Nodado. That same
afternoon, Teotimo Babanto, Felix Palcis and Eulalio Bohos were also arrested.
Eulalio Bohos was arrested right along the highway of Maranding where the raiding
team passed him on their way back to the Police Station of Kapatagan after the
rescue of Myrna while Teotimo Babanto and Felix Palcis were picked up in Baroy
where they were apprehended for pick-pocketing. Immediately after the arrest of
the three, Myrna Identified them as the companions of Nodado who kidnapped her
and took turns in raping her. Teodoro Engio was also apprehended for questioning
but he explained that he allowed the four who were his friends just to pass the night
at his house. At the time of the trial Teodoro had already died.
On November 25, 1967, Felix Palcis, Teotimo Babanto and Eulalio Bohos escaped
from the provincial jail while Agustin Nodado escaped on September 26, 1968, after
he had stabbed to death the guard on duty (Report of the Provincial Warden, Exhibit
"A" Only Eulalio Bohos had been rearrested as of arraignment date on March 18,
1974. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, was tried and convicted as
aforesaid. The three others are still at large.
The verified complaint filed by Myrna de la Vega with the Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Norte on January 18, 1968, against Agustin Nodado, Teotimo Babanto,
alias Toting alias Ernesto Ybanez, Felix Palcis and Eulalio Bohos alleges:
That on or about the 17 the day of September 1966 in the barrio of Maranding,
Municipality of Kapatagan, Province of Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Agustin Nodado, in company with
Teotimo Babanto, Felix Palcis and Eulalio Bohos, who have escaped from
confinement in the Provincial Jail last November 25, 1967, as detained prisoners in
Crim. Case No. 1311 together with Agustin Nodado, and who are still at large,
armed with a deadly weapon, and with the use thereof, conspiring together,
confederating and mutually helping with one another and with lewd designs, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away the
undersigned by force and violence or intimidation in a cargo truck which happened
to pass by bound for Iligan City and while in the said truck, the said accused abused
her and upon reaching the barrio of Magpatao, Lala, this province, the said accused
stopped the truck and forced her to alight thereon, dragged her to a certain house
at Magpatao where she was detained, the said accused alternately and successively

had sexual intercourse with her against her wilt to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party.
At the time of the trial in 1974, Myrna had transferred her residence to San Carlos
City (Pangasinan) which explains the award of P500.00 for her expenses in going to
Iligan City in order to testify. Mayor Nietes had abandoned politics and moved to
Quezon, Bukidnon, as a farmer. And Dr. Pablito P. Abragan Municipal Health Officer
of Kapatagan who performed the examination on Myrna was killed in 1971 during an
ambuscade so that his findings (Exh. "B") had to be interpreted by Dr. Ramon
Abragan, Jr., Provincial Health Officer who gave the opinion that force was used on
the person of Myrna when she was sexually used.
Appellant's counsel de oficio, Mary Concepcion-Bautista, who is a very capable
lawyer, states in her brief:
At the outset, we must confess to an inner conflict as to whether we should proceed
as counsel de oficio for the appellant after we found ourselves compelled to accept
that indeed the crane of forcible abduction with rape had been committed, and that
appellant had guilty participation in its commission.
As this Honorable Court had aptly observed in its previous decisions, no country lass
would allow herself to be so humiliated publicly unless she had really suffered and
been so victimized.
Furthermore, the half-nakedness of the victim at the time of her rescue was an
indication of what she had gone through and one can surmise that she fell asleep
out of sheer physical weakness and exhaustion. In addition, there was no reason to
question her Identification of the appellant when he was apprehended on
September 18, 1966 and in the courtroom. Neither could we ignore the
circumstance that appellant escaped, instead of insisting on an early trial which an
innocent man would have done.
Nonetheless, appellant's counsel has raised certained points in an effort to mitigate
his criminal liability. Thus she argues that there was no conspiracy among the four
accused hence the appellant should not be held liable for the acts of his co-accused.
It is true that there is no evidence in the record of a previous plan among the
accused to abduct Myrna in order to rape her. No witness testified to having seen or
heard the accused conspire or confabulate. The whole incident happened because
the four accused met a woman walking alone at a deserted place at night. But for
collective responsibility to be establish it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved
by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime. It is sufficient that at
the time of the commission of the offense all the accused acted in concert showing
that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution.
(People vs. Cutura, G.R. No. L-12702, March 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 663; People vs. Verzo,
G.R. No. L-22517, Dec. 26, 1967, 4 SCRA 1403; People vs. Estrada, G.R. No. L-26103,
Jan. 17, 1968, 22 SCRA 111; People vs. Crisostomo, 46 Phil. 775 [1923]; People vs.
Pajenado, G.R. No. L-26458, Jan. 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 172; People vs. Aleta, G.R. No.
L-40694, Aug. 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 542; People vs. Cabiling, G.R. No. L-38091, Dec.

17, 1976, 74 SCRA 285; People vs. Roncal, G.R. No. L-26857-58, Oct. 21, 1977, 79
SCRA 509; People vs. Cercano, G.R. No. L-37853, Nov. 21, 1978, 87 SCRA 1, citing
People vs. Clarit, G.R. No. L-14150, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 331, People vs. Castro,
G.R. No. L-17465, Aug. 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 699, People vs. Mandayag, 46 Phil. 838
[1923].) The degree of participation by each of them is immaterial (People vs. Verzo,
supra, citing People vs. Macul, 86 Phil. 423 [1950], People vs. Bautil, G.R No. L18997, Jan. 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 57, People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-18892, May 30,
1966, 17 SCRA 309, People vs. Akiran, G.R. No. Jr 18760, Sept. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA
239). The simultaneous acts of the four accused two of them holding Myrna's
hands and the other two covering her mouth as they accosted her on the highway;
the four of them dragging Myrna aboard the truck which they stopped and where
she was violated by one of them with the assistance and encouragement of the
three others; the four of them alternately and successively ravishing her inside the
house of Teodoro Engio three times each on the night of September 17, 1966, and
one each the following morning while one held complainant's right arm, another
held her left arm and another stretched her legs wide apart - together with other
circumstances, make evident a community to design, an indicia of a conspiracy to
abduct complainant forcibly for the satisfaction of their carnal desire against her will
.
We are satisfied that there was conspiracy among the four accused to abduct and
rape Myrna so that the act of any one was also the act of the others.
Appellant's other point is: "Even if we may assume purely for the sake of argument
that the complaining witness was forcibly abducted and then raped thirteen times,
we submit that there was only one forcible abduction, with rape and that was the
one allegedly committed on the truck or jeep. Any subsequent acts of intercourse in
the house against her wig would be only separate acts of rape and can no longer be
considered separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape.
This point is well taken. There was only one forcible abduction with rape which was
the one committed in the truck. Thus in People vs. Jose, et al., G.R. No. L-28232,
Feb. 6, 1971, 37 SCRA 450, where the four accused forcibly abducted Maggie de la
Riva and each of them raped her, this Court held "that even while the first act of
rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been
consummated, so that each of the three succeeding crimes of the same nature can
not legally be considered as still connected with the abduction in other words,
they should be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible
abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter."
(At p. 475.)
We have examined the record to ascertain if there was indeed forcible abduction
with rape and other rapes in order to set our minds at ease. And the evidence is
over-whelming so as to satisfy even the most skeptical reviewer that the crimes
were in fact committed.
We have Myrna's testimony that she was forcibly abducted and then raped
seventeen (17) times. Corroborating her were Bernards Nietes, former Municipal
Mayor of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, and Apolonio P former Desk Sergeant in the
Kapatagan Police Force, concerning their rescue of Myrna in the afternoon of

September 18, 1966, at Magpatao, Lala, Lanao del Sur, where she was brought by
her abductors, and their investigation of the case immediately after the rescue
which lead to the arrest of appellant Eulalio Bohos and his companions Agustin
Nodado, Teotimo Babanto and Felix Palcis. Both Nietes and Pan testified that in that
investigation, Agustin Nodado Identified his three companions as Teotimo Babanto,
Eulalio Bohos and Felix Palcis. Pangilinan further testified that Teodoro Engio who
was also apprehended on the same date for questioning Identified the four accused
as his friends who asked his permission to pass the night in his house. And then we
have the testimony of Dr. Ramon Abragan, Sr. to the effect that Myrna was abused
when she was sexually used according to Exhibit "B" which reads as follows:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
FIELD OPERATIONS
REGIONAL HEALTH OFFICE NO. 7
RURAL HEALTH UNIT
KAPATAGAN, LANAO DEL NORTE
September 19, 1966
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that I personally performed the examination of MYRNA DE LA VEGA,
16 years old, single of Kapatagan, Tanso del Norte.
Findings:
Ocular inspection of the vulva revealed
(1)
Fresh blood along the external os. (2) Peri-vulvar hyperomia moderate, more
prominent along both sides of he clitoris.
Internal examination revealed:
One finger can be admitted with slight pain, but can admit 2 fingers with difficulty
on the part of the examiner and severe pain on the part of the patient.
Tenderness upon lactation of the cervix.
Hymen incomplete with slight laceration at 8:30 o'clock.
Laceration of the cervix slight at 6:00 o'clock with slight bleeding from the
laceration.
(SGD) PABLITO P. ABRAGAN M.D.
Municipal Health Officer

The defense of the appellant is alibi. He claims that on September 17 and 18, 1966,
he was in the house of Vicente Pangilinan at Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. We reject
this defense. The defense of alibi, which can be easily concocted, cannot prevail
over the positive Identification of the accused by the prosecution witness as the
author of the crime (People v. Cortez G.R. No. L-31104, Nov. 15, 1974, 61 SCRA 73).
For alibi to prosper it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere when
the crime was committed but that he must likewise demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime during its
commission (People v. Cortez, G.R. No. L-31106, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 308).
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was correctly
appreciated by the trial court but it erred when it also added nocturnity for there is
no evidence to show that nighttime was purposely chosen to facilitate the
commission of the crime.
The aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle should also be appreciated.
The crimes thus proved to have been committed are forcible abduction with rape
and sixteen (16) separate rapes attended by the aggravating circumstances of
superiority and use of a motor vehicle without any mitigating circumstance.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in that Eulalio Bohos is
sentenced to suffer not thirteen (13) but seventeen (17) death penalties; it is
affirmed in all other respects. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur. I find it difficult to agree with the observation of Mr. Justice Aquino in his
dissent that "in strict legal theory, the offense committed in this case should be
characterized as the continuous complex crime of kidnapping or serious illegal
detention (detention of a female) with multiple rape." It is to me very evident that
the taking of Myrna by force by the four accused in the manner disclosed in the
record constitutes forcible abduction, the lewd design being obvious from the fact
that she was immediately raped the moment they succeeded in putting her on the
truck. Precisely, what distinguishes kidnapping or illegal detention from forcible
abduction is the presence of lewd design in the latter. As far as I am concerned, it is
not legally possible to complex kidnapping with multiple rape unless the evidence is
clear that at the time of the capture and taking of the victim, lewd design was
completely absent. In the case, at bar, the only inevitable conclusion I can gather
from the circumstance I have just po accused took and kept Myrna for no other
purpose than to have carnal knowledge of her.
I believe that the imposition of seventeen death penalties upon the appellant is
legally justified. The rape in the truck was itself punishable with death, constituting
as it did the complex offense of forcible abduction with rape by two or more
persons. (Arts. 48, 342 and 335 [3], Revised Penal Code, as amended The other
sixteen rapes were committed by each of the four accused with the help of each

other. It is revolting to the conscience that herein appellant should be punished only
for the rapes he himself enjoyed, without being responsible for the other rapes he
helped his companions commit. To view the situation in this case in the sense that
the other sixteen rapes after the one in the truck as already absorbed in the
charge of abduction with rape filed by the prosecutor is to be extremely over-liberal
in the application of our criminal law, considering that the information alleges on its
face that Myrna was raped several times. If any procedural flaw is to be noted in
this case, it is rather the failure of the defense to ask for a bill of particulars and to
object to the presentation of evidence proving more than one rape.
All in all, for so heinous a crime as that proven to have been committed in this case,
the heaviest conceivable penalty the laws and the Constitution permit, would, to my
mind, be well deserved by the herein accused, casting all technicalities aside,
specially since these are questionable or controversial.
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the judgment of conviction but dissent from the ruling that the accused
is guilty of sixteen rapes in addition to forcible abduction with rape, and that,
therefore, he should be sentenced to seventeen death penalties.
That ruling is based on the holding in People vs. Jose (the Maggie de la Riva case), L28232, February 6, 1971, 37 SCRA 450, that the rapes committed after the forcible
abduction with rape should be considered separate crimes and should be punished
separately from the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
Eulalio Bohos, together with his three companions, who escaped and were not rearrested, was charged with forcible abduction with rape in a complaint filed by the
sixteen-year-old complainant.
In that complaint the number of rapes was not specifically alleged. It was simply
alleged therein by the complainant that after the forcible abduction was committed,
the four accused "alternately and successively had sexual intercourse with her
against her will". In her supporting affidavit, the complainant did not state the
number of rapes committed. That point was testified to by her at the trial.
She testified that she was raped once inside the cargo truck. Then, in the house
where she was brought, each of the four accused raped her three times during the
night and then each raped her once in the morning. According to her version she
was raped seventeen times.
In strict legal theory, the offenses committed in this case should be characterized as
the continuous complex crime of kidnapping or serious illegal detention (detention
of a female) with multiple rape (Arts. 267[4] and 335, Revised Penal Code). The
kidnapping was resorted to as a means of committing the rape. The accused should
have been charged with that complex delito continuado. (See People vs. Ablaza, L27352, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 173, 178.)
Instead, they were charged with the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
The rape was committed by two or more persons. Hence, it is punishable with

reclusion perpetua to death. As the offense is complex, the capital penalty should
be imposed.
In my opinion, the accused should be convicted only of forcible abduction with rape
which is the offense charged in the information and which should be considered a
continuous crime, embracing or absorbing the other sixteen alleged rapes which
were not specifically alleged in the complaint. Therefore, only one death sentence
should be imposed.
In U.S. vs. Camiloy 36 Phil. 757, the four accused who through force and
intimidation took a young woman to an isolated house and there, again with force
and intimidation, successively throughout the night had carnal intercourse with her,
were convicted only of one crime of rape.
In People vs. Manguiat and Sanqui, 51 Phil. 406, the called Ana Refresca case, a
nineteen-year-old girl was forcibly abducted in Barrio Putol, Calamba, Laguna and
taken to the woods in Silang, Cavite and to other places, where she was brutally
raped several times by Macario Manguiat while her hands were held by Hilario
Sanqui.
Manguiat and Sanqui were charged with the complex crime of abduction with rape.
Manguiat escaped from jail and was killed by Constabulary soldiers. Sanqui was
convicted only of forcible abduction with rape.
In People vs. Pineda, 56 Phil. 688, Lourdes Pasig was forcibly abducted from her
house in Barrio Santiago, Aliaga Nueva Ecija and taken to Barrio San Carlos in the
same municipality where she was forcibly thrown to the ground by the three
accused who successively raped her despite her resistance.
Thereafter, the accused Fernando Pineda forcibly took Lourdes Pasig to a house in
Barrio Manaraog Rizal, Nueva Ecija. She was kept there by Pineda for fourteen days
during which time Pineda often had carnal knowledge of her through threats of
death and against her will.
Pineda and his two companions were convicted of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. (See People vs. Oso, 62 Phil. 271.)
The foregoing cases were decided on the unarticulated assumption that forcible
abduction with multiple rape is a continuous crime, a concept not expressly
provided by law but developed in criminal jurisprudence. (See People vs. Cu Unjieng
61 Phil. 236, 300-303, where only one indeterminate penalty was imposed for the
estafa through multiple falsification committed by the accused from November,
1930 to July 6, 1931.)
Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro
and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur in the result.
Fernando, C.J., took no part.

Ponce Enrile vs. Amin

September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 573
Facts:
An information was charged against Senator Juan Ponce Enrile for having committed
rebellion complexed with murder with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Another information was subsequently filed with the Regional Trial Court 9of Makati,
charging the former with a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 for willfully and
knowingly obstructing or delaying the apprehension of Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio Gringo
Honasan.
Allegedly, Senator Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Gringo Honasan by
giving him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house and not doing
anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. It was the prosecutions
contention that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law
while rebellion is based on Revised Penal Code; thus, the two crimes can be
separately punished.
Issue: Can a separate crime of a violation of PD 1829 be charged against the
petitioner?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court used the doctrine that if a person cannot be charged with
the complex crime of rebellion, he can neither be charged separately for two
different offenses, where one is a constitutive or component element or committed
in furtherance of rebellion.
It was also noted that petitioner was already facing charges of rebellion in
conspiracy with Honasan. Being in conspiracy thereof, the act of harboring or
concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an
act done in furtherance of rebellion. It cannot be made the basis of a separate
charge.
Also, the High Court reiterated that in cases of rebellion, all crimes committed in
furtherance thereof shall be absolved. Hence, the other charge of rebellion
complexed with murder cannot prosper. All crimes, whether punishable under a
special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance of rebellion, become absorbed and it cannot be charged
as separate crimes.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUFINO GENSOLA, FIDELINA

TAN and FELICISIMO TAN, Defendants-Appellants.
RESOLUTION*
PER CURIAM, J.:
Before the Court for consideration are the second motion for reconsideration and
new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence filed by accused-appellants
Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan (with leave duly granted), the States opposition
thereto, appellants reply, and said appellants memorandum and the States reply
thereto, in lieu of oral argument, filed pursuant to the hearing on said motion set by
the Court on June 17, 1970.
The affidavits of Ernesto Gargaritano, and more particularly, of Idelfonso Capinding
and Restituto Gersaneva (annexes A, B and C), whose testimonies on certain crucial
matters could not be presented at the trial due to no fault of the accusedappellants, raise grave and substantial doubt that the original judgment imposing
the near-extreme penalty of reclusion perpetua would have been so rendered, If the
material testimonies of these affiants were then introduced and admitted. The Court
took into account its findings on the evidence of record in its decision under
reconsideration that there was no evidence of conspiracy between the accused and
that "the command shouted by Fidelina, Rufino, strike him was not the moving
cause of the act of Rufino Gensola. The evidence shows that Rufino would have
committed the act of his own volition, even without said words of command."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The Court believes it imperative, therefore, in order to assure against any possible
miscarriage of justice, to grant a reopening of the trial at which the testimonies of
these affiants and such other evidence of both prosecution and defense as the trial
court may in the interest of justice allow to be introduced, may be duly presented.
The Courts judgment of September 30, 1969 is hereby reconsidered and set aside,
insofar as the accused-appellants Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan are concerned. The
trial courts original judgment of February 8, 1965 against the said accusedappellants Fidelina Tan and Felicisimo Tan is likewise set aside. The records of the
case are remained to the lower court for new trial pursuant to Rule 121, section 5(b)
and (c) of the Rules of Court, at which the evidence already taken shall stand and
the evidence of the three above-named affiants and such other evidence of both
prosecution and defense as the trial court may in the interest of justice allow to be
introduced, shall be taken and considered with the evidence already in the record,
and a new judgment thereafter rendered by the lower court.
Insofar as the accused, Rufino Gensola, is concerned, the appealed judgment
against him, as modified by the Courts judgment of September 30, 1969, reducing
his penalty from 3 months of arresto mayor as minimum to 3 years of prision
correccional as maximum, has become final and stands, since no motion for
reconsideration thereof was filed on his behalf. Let the corresponding judgment
against him be entered as of the date of its finality. So ordered.

JORGE TAER, vs. CA and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 85204 June 18,
1990
FACTS: Cirilo Saludes slept in the house of his compadre accused Jorge Taer,
whereat he was
benighted. At about 2:00 o'clock dawn, accused Emilio Namocatcat and Mario Cago
arrived at
Taer's house with two (2) male carabaos owned by and which Namocatcat wanted
Taer to tend.
The said carabaos were left at Taer's place. After searching in vain for the carabaos
at the
vicinity, Dalde and Palaca reported the matter to the police. Reyes informed Dalde
that he saw the
latter's lost carabao at Datag, Garcia-Hernandez. Forthwith Dalde and Palaca went
on that day toDatag and there they found their missing carabaos tied to a bamboo
thicket near the houseaccused Taer. Upon query by Dalde and Palaca why their
carabaos were found at his place,accused Taer, replied that the carabaos reached
his place tied together without any person in company. According to accused Taer,
what he told Dalde and Palaca was that the carabaos were brought to his place by
the accused Namocatcat who asked him to tell anybody looking for them that they
just strayed thereat. Taer was convicted for the crime of cattle rustling, later
affirmed by the CA in toto, finding the evidence of the prosecution that conspiracy
indeed existed between Emilio Namocatcat and Taer. Taer appealed arguing that the
extent of his participation did not go beyond the participation of the original
defendants Saludes and Cago. Therefore, he submits that the acquittal of these two
by the trial court should also lead to his acquittal and the only evidence proving the
alleged conspiracy between him and Namocatcat was the confession of
Namocatcat, however this should not be considered as admissible because the
same is hearsay under the rule of res inter alios acta .
Issues:
Whether or not there conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt to convict
the
accused as principal for the crime of cattle rustling as defined and punished by PD
533Held:No. Conspiracy must be established not by conjectures, but by positive and
conclusive evidence.

The same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a
finding of the
presence of criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus
mere
knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without cooperation or
agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy absent the
intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.
At most the facts establish Taer's knowledge of the crime. And yet without having
participated
either as principal or as an accomplice, for he did not participate in the taking of the
carabaos, he
took part subsequent to the commission of the act of taking by profiting himself by
its effects.
Taer is thus only an accessory after the fact. The most cogent proof that the
prosecution could
ever raise was the implication made by the accused Namocatcat (he did not appeal
his conviction
to the Court of Appeals) in his affidavit of confession. However, the settled rule is
that the rights
of a party can not be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. The
testimony,
being res inter alios acta , can not affect another except as provided in the Rules of
Court. This
rule on res inter alios acta specifically applies when the evidence consists of an
admission in an
extrajudicial confession or declaration of another because the defendant has no
opportunity to
cross-examine the co-conspirator testifying against him.WHEREFORE, the decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran and affirmed by therespondent
Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED in that the herein JORGE TAER is convicted as
an accessory of the crime of cattle-rustling as defined and penalized by PD No. 533
amending Arts. 308, 309, and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and he will serve the
minimum penalty within the range of arresto mayor medium, which we shall fix at 4
months imprisonment and the maximum penalty of prision correccional minimum
which we shall fix at 2 years.
Article 2
People v. Simon234 SCRA 555, 569 (1994)G.R. No. 93028
Facts:
Accused-appellant Martin Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a
NarcoticsCommand (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant Simon should be given a lighter punishment of
sixmonths to six years instead of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to the amendments
of Republic Act No. 7659 to Republic Act No. 6425

Held:
Yes, since Republic Act No. 7659 was effected on December 31, 1993.

People vs. Walpan Ladjaalam y Milapil (G.R. No. 136149-51. September 19, 2000)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
WALPAN LADJAALAM y MIHAJIL alias WARPAN, appellant.
Ponente: PANGANIBAN
FACTS:
The trial court found the appelant guilty of maintaining a drug den, an offense for
which was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Appelants guilt was established by the
testimony of Prosecution Witness , who himself had used the extension house of
appellant as a drug den on several occasions, including the time of the raid. The

formers testimony was corroborated by all the raiding police officers who testified
before the court. That appelant did not deny ownership of the house and its
extension lent credence to the prosecutions story.
The trial court also convicted appellant of direct assault with multiple counts of
attempted homicide. It found that [t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle
[at] the policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant x
x x constituted such complex crime. Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct
assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted him also of the
separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA
8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision
mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant can be convicted separately of illegal possession of
firearms after using said firearm in the commission of another crime.
HELD:
NO. The appealed Decision was affirmed with modifications. Appellant is found
guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with
the use of a weapon and (2) maintaining a drug den.
RATIO:
The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of
firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by the person arrested. If
the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and
murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily,
where the law does not distinguish, neither should [the courts].
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal
possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier
than that for direct assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the
second it is only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for
illegal possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter
offense, like alarm and scandal or slight physical injuries, both of which are
punishable by arresto menor. This consequence, however, necessarily arises from
the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts review. Any
perception that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to
Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning
detached from the manifest intendment and language of the legislature. [The
Courts] task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence
to the proven facts, and [this Court] have done so in this case.

Criminal Law; Special Penal Laws: CELINO v. CA, G.R. No. 170562 June 29, 2007
Brief Facts:
Two separate Information were filed against the petitioner, Angel Celino: one for
violation of the Comelec gun ban; the other, for Illegal Possession of Firearm under
R.A. 8294. After pleading not guilty to the former, he filed a Motion to Quash on the
latter contending that he cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms x

x x if he was also charged of having committed another crime of [sic] violating the
Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts x x x.

Issue:
Whether the mere filing of an information for gun ban violation against him
necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal possession of firearm because of the
provision of the law that "Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by
the person arrested."
Ruling:
Ruling against the petitioner, the High Court explained that he can be convicted
of illegal possession of firearms, provided no other crime was committed by the
person arrested. The word committed taken in its ordinary sense, and in light of
the Constitutional presumption of innocence, necessarily implies a prior
determination of guilt by final conviction resulting from successful prosecution or
voluntary admission.
Citing the case of People v. Valdez (1999), the Supreme Court ruled that all
pending cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be
prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294
are involved x x x.
In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A.
8294, any information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because
the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other
offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide,
or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup
detat. Conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated
under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of firearm should
continue to be prosecuted.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 108172-73

January 9, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CONRADO LUCAS Y BRIONES, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In the decision in this case, promulgated on 25 May 1994, the First Division touched
on the nature of the penalty of reclusion perpetua in the light of Section 21 of R.A.
No. 7659 1 which amended Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code by specifically
fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua at twenty (20) years and one (1) day to
forty (40) years. It opined that since no corresponding amendment to Article 76 of
the Revised Penal Code was made, the said laws has not made explicit an intention
to convert reclusion perpetua into a divisible penalty. Nevertheless, it applied Article
65 of the Revised Penal Code 2 and stated:
Accordingly, the time included in the penalty of reclusion perpetua (twenty [20]
years and one [1] day to forty [40] years) can be divided into three equal portions
with each composing a period. The periods of reclusion perpetua would then be as
follows:
minimum

20 years and 1 day to 26 years and 8 months

medium

26 years, 8 months and 1 day to 33 years and 4 months

maximum

34 years, 4 months and 1 day to 40 years

Taking into account the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship in

Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, the accused may finally be sentenced to thirty-four
(34) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion perpetua.

It then modified the challenged decision of the trial court by changing the penalty in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 from reclusion perpetua, as imposed by the trial
court, to "imprisonment of 34 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion perpetua."
In a motion for clarification seasonably filed by the appellee on 28 June 1994 which
was not opposed by the accused-appellant in his comment, the appellee asks the
Court to correct the duration of the maximum period of reclusion perpetua from
thirty-four (34) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty (40) years, as stated
in the decision, to thirty-three (33) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty
(40) years.
Since the issue of whether the amendment of Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code
by Section 21 of R.A. No. 7659 has made reclusion perpetua a divisible penalty is
one of first impression and of sufficient importance, the First Division referred the
motion for clarification to the Court en banc. The latter accepted the referral.
After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislative history of R.A. No.
7659, the Court concludes that although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the
duration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40)
years, there was no clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an
indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible penalty.
R.A. No. 7659 is a consolidation of Senate Bill (SB) No. 891 3 and House Bill (HB) No.
62. 4 SB No. 891 seeks to amend Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code by inserting
therein what are to be considered heinous crimes and to penalize these not with the
death penalty, but which reclusion perpetua only, with the qualification that "any
person sentenced to reclusion perpetua for . . . [such heinous] crimes under this
Code shall be required to serve thirty (30) years, without entitlement to good
conduct time allowance and shall be considered for executive clemency only after
service of said thirty (30) years." HB No. 62 defines and enumerates the heinous
crimes and seeks to penalize them with the death penalty.
An amendment by substitution to SB No. 891 was introduced by the Senate Special
Committee on Death Penalty. The amendment was entitled "An Act to Impose the
Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crime, Amending for that Purpose some Articles
of Act No. 3815, as Amended, and for other Purposes." The substitute amendment
sought to amend (a) Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code by providing in the scale
of penalties the following:
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
DEATH
Afflictive Penalties: LIFE IMPRISONMENT
Reclusion Perpetua
Reclusion Temporal
and (b) Article 27 of the same Code by inserting therein the penalty of life
imprisonment and providing a specific duration therefor as well as for reclusion
perpetua. The proposed amended Article 27 pertinently reads as follows:

Art. 27.
LIFE IMPRISONMENT. THE PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT SHALL BE
FROM THIRTY YEARS AND ONE DAY TO FORTY YEARS.
RECLUSION PERPETUA THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA SHALL BE FROM
TWENTY YEARS AND ONE DAY TO THIRTY YEARS.
Thus, life imprisonment, therefore a penalty imposed by special penal statutes, was
sought to be incorporated as penalty in the revised Penal Code with a specific
duration.
In his sponsorship of this substitute bill, Senator Arturo M. Tolentino explained the
incorporation of life imprisonment as follows:
But a very basic amendment was made, and that is, an amendment that will create
a new penalty, known in this bill as life imprisonment. The new penalty was created
in order to enable the committee to provide, in some crimes, a three-grade penalty
that would be composed of reclusion perpetua, as now provided by the Revised
Penal Code, as the lowest grade; on top of that, would be life imprisonment; and the
third highest grade would be death penalty. With this new grade of penalty, it
became possible for this bill now under consideration to impose a penalty ranging
from reclusion perpetua to death, composed of actually three periods or
grades. 5
However the Bicameral Conference Committee eliminated from the proposed
amendment of Article 27 the penalty of life imprisonment but extended the duration
of reclusion perpetua from twenty (2) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
Thus, in his sponsorship of the Conference Committee report on both the substitute
SB No. 891 and HB No. 62, Senator Tolentino stated:
By this, Mr. President, we have this new consolidated session that is before the
Members of this Chamber. There is one part or one portion of the Senate version
that we have agreed to be eliminated and that is the creation of the new penalty
known as "life imprisonment." Even in this Chamber, there were some doubts as to
the creation of this new penalty of life imprisonment because reclusion perpetua,
which is in the Revised Penal Code and retained in this bill, also means the same
thing. It is a perpetual imprisonment.
So in order to still accommodate the increase of imprisonment by means of life
imprisonment while we eliminated the new penalty of life imprisonment which
would last from 30 years and one day to forty years what we did was simply to
extend the period of reclusion perpetua by adding 30 to 40 years imprisonment to
the original 20 to 30 years, making the reclusion perpetua in this new bill range
from 20 years to one day to 40 years. This would be what we had called one day
before a "flexible or divisible penalty." 6
Although Senator Tolentino described reclusion perpetua as a "flexible or divisible"
penalty, yet in the portion of his sponsorship speech immediately succeeding the
foregoing description, he explicitly stated that the said penalty is one of the two
indivisible penalties in the Revised Penal Code. Thus:

Instead of having three penalties in the divisible [sic] penalty, we would have only
two indivisible penalties reclusion perpetua to death; and the principles on
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code will be
applicable to this penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. 7
At first glance, by stating that reclusion perpetua was "flexible and divisible" and
then later referring to it as one of two indivisible penalties, Senator Tolentino might
have fallen into an inconsistency. If we recall, however, what he stated in his
sponsorship speech to substitute bill where, as above adverted to, he mentioned
the proposed three-grade penalty ranging from reclusion perpetua to death, then
indeed he could also be correct in the sense that such three-grade concept would in
fact be a complex penalty which would be divisible, with each grade composing a
period and which could then be governed by Article 77 8 of the Revised Penal Code.
That Senator Tolentino had this three-grade penalty in mind when he spoke of
flexibility and divisibility and that he stood by his subsequent statement that
reclusion perpetua is one of two indivisible penalties is further borne out by his
explanations in relation to the rule in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code on the
application of mitigating circumstance. Thus:
Senator Tolentino.
In general, Mr. President, in all of these heinous crimes, the penalty reclusion
perpetua to death. Unless otherwise provided in the bill itself, this means that the
provisions on aggravating and mitigating circumstances will apply to them.
Therefore that means, if there is no mitigating and no aggravating circumstances,
the penalty of death will not be applied because under the provisions of the revised
Penal Code, when there are two indivisible penalt[ies] such as reclusion perpetua to
death, if there is no aggravating circumstance, then the penalty will be of lesser
degree, which means: life imprisonment. But even if there is an aggravating
circumstance, still death penalty will not be applied because it will still be the lesser
penalty. This is how it is going to operate.
But if there is an aggravating circumstance, without any mitigating circumstance,
the Revised Penal Code provisions for the application of the higher penalty or the
death penalty. That is how it is going to operate. . . .
...
Senator Taada.
Mr. President, permit me to clarify the matter further. The Gentleman is saying that
the principle of mitigating and aggravating circumstances is applicable in general to
all these crimes listed in this consolidated version. That means that, first, if there is
no aggravating circumstance and there is no there is no mitigating circumstance,
then the crime, although listed here in the measure, will not be punished by death
but by the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Senator Tolentino.
Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Taada.
Second, if there is an aggravating circumstance, but there is also a mitigating
circumstance, then generally speaking, that aggravating circumstance is offset by
the mitigating circumstance in which case the lesser penalty which is reclusion
perpetua will be the one imposed.
Senator Tolentino.
That is right, Mr. President. 9
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases in which the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of
the deed, and if the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
then the greater penalty shall be applied if there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, and the lesser penalty shall be applied when the commission of the
act was attended by some mitigating circumstance but without an aggravating
circumstance or when there was neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance,
and if both mitigating and aggravating circumstances were present, the court shall
reasonably allow them to offset one another taking into account their number and
importance and then to apply preceding rules according to the result of such
compensation.
Verily, if reclusion perpetua was reclassified as a divisible penalty, then Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code would lose its reason and basis for existence. To illustrate,
the first paragraph of Section 20 of the amended R.A. No. 6425 provides for the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death whenever the dangerous drugs involved are
of any of the quantities stated therein. If Article 63 of the Code were no longer
applicable because reclusion perpetua is supposed to be a divisible penalty, then
there would be no statutory rules for determining when either reclusion perpetua or
death should be the imposable penalty. In fine, there would be no occasion for
imposing reclusion perpetua as the penalty in drug cases, regardless of the
attendant modifying circumstances.
This problem revolving around the non-applicability of the rules in Article 63
assumes serious proportions since it does not involve only drug cases, as aforesaid.
Under the amendatory sections of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death is also imposed on treason by a Filipino (section 2), qualified piracy
(Section 3), parricide (Section 5), murder (Section 6), kidnapping and serious illegal
detention (Section 8), robbery with homicide (Section 9), destructive arson (Section
10), rape committed under certain circumstances (Section 11), and plunder (Section
12).
Now then, if Congress had intended to reclassify reclusion perpetua as a divisible
penalty, then it should have amended Article 63 and Article 76 of the Revised Penal
Code. The latter if the law on what are considered divisible penalties under the Code
and what should be the duration of the period thereof. There are, as well, other
provisions of the Revised Penal Code involving reclusion perpetua , such as Article

41 on the accessory penalties thereof and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 61, which
have not been touched by a corresponding amendment.
What then may be the reason for the amendment fixing the duration of reclusion
perpetua? The deliberations in the Bicameral Conference Committee and in both
Chambers of Congress do not enlighten us on this, except the cryptic statement of
Senior Tolentino adverted to above on the elimination of the "new penalty" of life
imprisonment by the Bicameral Conference Committee. It may, however, be pointed
out that although the Revised Penal Code did not specify the maximum of reclusion
perpetua , it is apparent that the maximum period for the service of this penalty
shall not exceed forty (40) years. In People vs.
Reyes, 10 this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, stated:
We hold that there is legal basis, both in law and logic, for Presidential Decree No.
818 to declare that any penalty exceeding twenty (20) years, or the maximum
duration of reclusion temporal, is within the range of reclusion perpetua.
It will be observed that Article 27 of the Code provides for the minimum and
maximum ranges of all the penalties in the Code (except bond to keep the peace
which shall be for such period of time as the court may determine) from arresto
menor to reclusion temporal, the latter being specifically from twelve years and one
day to twenty years. For reclusion perpetua, however, there is no specification as to
its minimum and maximum range, as the aforesaid article merely provides that
"(a)ny person sentenced to any of the perpetual penalties shall be pardoned after
undergoing the penalty for thirty years, unless such person by reason of his conduct
or some other serious cause shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy
of pardon."
The other applicable reference to reclusion perpetua is found in Article 70 of the
Code which, in laying down the rule on successive service of sentences where the
culprit has to serve more than three penalties, provides that "the maximum
duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of
time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him," and
"(i)n applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties ( pena
perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years."
The imputed duration of thirty (30) years for reclusion perpetua, therefore, is only to
serve as the basis for determining the convict's eligibility for pardon or for the
application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties. Since, however,
in all the graduated scales of penalties in the Code, as set out in Article 25, 70 and
71, reclusion perpetua is the penalty immediately next higher to reclusion temporal,
it follows by necessary implication that the minimum of reclusion perpetua is twenty
(20) years and one (1) day with duration thereafter to last for the rest of the
convict's natural life although, pursuant to Article 70, it appears that the maximum
period for the service of penalties shall not exceed forty (40) years. It would be
legally absurd and violative of the scales of penalties in the Code to reckon the
minimum of reclusion perpetua at thirty (30) years since there would thereby be a
resultant lacuna whenever the penalty exceeds the maximum twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal but is less than thirty (30) years. 11

At most then in fixing a specific duration for reclusion perpetua , Section 21 of R.A.
No. 7659 merely restated the existing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to MODIFY the decision of 25 May 1994 in this case
by DELETING therefrom the disquisitions on whether reclusion perpetua is a divisible
penalty and SETTING ASIDE its division into three periods and, finally, AMENDING
the dispositive portion thereof to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of 28 October 1992 of Branch 104 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 and Criminal
Case No. Q-91-18466 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject ot the modifications above
indicated. As modified:
(1)
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, in addition to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua imposed by the trial court, accused JOSE CONRADO LUCAS Y BRIONES is
further ordered to indemnify the offended party, Chanda Lucas y Austria, in the sum
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00); and
(2)
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466, accused JOSE CONRADO LUCAS Y BRIONES
is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of attempted
rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Four
(4) Years, Two (2) Months and One (1) Day of prision correccional as minimum to Ten
(10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor maximum, and to indemnify the
offended party, Chanda Lucas y Austria, in the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00).
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Pp. vs. Sanchez

Facts:
While Gladys, 9 -year old girl, was left alone in their apartment, the accused entered
in her room and rapedher. This was done by the accused three times. The accused
was later arrested and taken to the police station.It was found out in the medicolegal report that there was absence of any laceration in the hymen. Theaccused
raised the defense of alibi, contending that he was not there when the incident
occurred.
Issue:
W/N accused is guilty of the crime charged
Held:
Yes. Even if there had been no lacerations of the hymen, it does not necessarily
mean that there was norape. A broken hymen is not an essential element of rape.
The merest introduction of the male organ into the labiaof pudendum is sufficient.
The mere penetration of the penis by the entry thereof into the labis majora of
thefemale organ, even without rupture of the hymen, suffices to warrant a
conviction of rape.With regards to the degree of alibi of the accused, the court ruled
that alibi is inherently a weak defensebecause it is to fabricate and difficult to
disprove it. For alibi to be believed, credible and tangible proof of
physicalimpossibility for the accused to be at the scene of the crime is
indispensable.

People vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450

Facts:
- Magdalena Maggie de la Riva. 25, single, actress. Maggie was driving home with
her maid 4:30am in June 26, 1967 when the
appellants car bump her car. Accused were Jaime Jose y Gomez, Basilio Pineda, Jr.,
Eduardo Aquino y Payumo, and Rogelio Caal y
Sevilla, principals, with accomplices Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero
and Jessie Guion y Envoltario.
- Pineda went to her car, he tried to force her out, she screamed together with the
maid but the other 3 helped Pineda. They took her to
their car, left the maid and sped away. She was seated in the backseat between Jose
and Aquino. She pleaded for them to release her
but they replied with abusive language and threats (shoot her and throw acid at her
face). Jose and Aquino busied themselves by
kissing and touching her. They exchange knowing glances. When they were at
Makati she was blindfolded, told not to shoot otherwise
theyd kill her. They entered the Swanky Hotel (Pasay).
- When they were inside the room they removed her blindfold and she was told to
undress but she refused. They undressed her and
feasted their eyes. They left the room with her clothes. This time, Jose entered the
room, undressed himself, she defended herself but
he hit her and raped her. He left. Aquino ente
- When she got into a state of shock, they poured water and slapped her to revive
her. Pineda took his turn on her. She got into a state
of shock again but they revived her again so that she would know whats
happening. Canal was the last to rape her. While each of them
take their turns the others are outside the room just behind the door threatening
her and telling her to give in because she cant escape
anyway. When they were done they asked her to tidy herself up and that when she
gets home tell her mom that a she was mistaken as

a hostess but was released after knowing that she is an actress. They threatened
her not to tell anyone. She was so weak that they had
to carry her to the car. Jose held her head down to his lap for other people not to
see her. They stopped near channel 5 to make it
appear that she just came from a taping.
- Pineda told Jose to hail a taxi from a not well known company. Canal accompanied
her to the cab. In the cab she burst in tears. The
appellants didnt follow her. She came back home at about 630 am. There are police
and media in their house.
She told her mom what happened. Her mom told her to clean up and douche to
avoid infection and pregnancy. She was treated by the
family doctor but they didnt tell him about the sexual assault.
- On June 29, they finally decided to file the complaint. Jose was apprehended. He
said that they waited for her in abs cbn, followed and
abducted her. He named the other three but only Aquino and Pineda criminally
assaulted her. The other three were apprehended.
Canal and Pineda confirmed that they abducted her. But they said that Maggie
yielded her body on the condition that she will be
released. When they took the witness stand the three (except Pineda) said that they
just took Maggie for a striptease which she agreed
to for 1000 pesos. The court did not buy it for it was apparent from medical exams
that Maggie was physically and sexually assaulted
and she is earning a lot as an actress.
- Pineda pled guilty of the crime
RTC:
Forcible abduction with rape done in conspiracy; Death penalty
Issue:
1. WON PINEDA should get a lighter sentence because of his plea of guilty
2. Whether the aggravating circumstances should be appreciated

Use of a motor vehicle.

Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to make
its discovery difficult;

Abuse of superior strength;

That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added

ignominy
to the natural effects of the act; and

That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by
causing other wrong not necessary for the commission (cruelty)
Held:
1. No
2. YES except cruelty.
Ratio:

1. While a plea of guilty is mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission

of all the material facts alleged in the information,
including the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is
capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the
crime and its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime
- Since he pleaded guilty his presence in court for evidence is not required.
- The situation would be different if he asked to prove mitigating circumstances. He
was advised by his counsel of the effects of the plea
of guilty.
- The voluntary plea of guilty does not in the least affect the nature of the proper
penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there
would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants
should likewise be made to suffer the extreme penalty
of death in each of these three simple crimes of rape. (Art. 63, par. 2, Revised Penal
Code.)
2. a)nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate
the commission of these crimes; (b)
abuse ofsuperior strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants
in conspiracy with one another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman,et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113);
(c) ignominy, since the appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them
her complete nakedness forabout ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a
circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating;and
(d)use of a motor vehicle.
SC: Forcible abduction and 3 crimes of rape
3. Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be
executed simultaneously.The imposition of multiple
death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical importance. The
sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties
is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be
accurately projected by the imposition of only one death
sentence irrespective of the number of capital felonies for which he is liable.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ULDARICO HONRA, JR., accusedappellant.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated January 18, 1998, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, of Sorsogon, finding accused-appellant Uldarico Honra, Jr. guilty of
two counts of murder and three counts of rape with frustrated homicide and
sentencing him as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court finds Uldarico Honra, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 3333, 3338, 3341, 3342, and 3343
and hereby sentences him to two (2) counts of Reclusion Temporal in the maximum
period of twenty years for the murders of Pacita and Rustico Jerao and three (3)
counts of Reclusion Perpetua for the Rape with Frustrated Homicide of Jocelyn Jerao
and to indemnify in solidum the heirs of Pacita and Rustico Jerao in the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity for each case or total of P250,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay` the cost. In the service of his
imprisonment his detention at the Sorsogon Provincial Jail shall be fully credited.
SO ORDERED.
Two informations for murder were filed against accused-appellant Uldarico Honra, Jr.
along with three others, namely, Ronnie Gipaya, Cristobal Jintalan and Jose Jintalan
for the deaths of Pacita Jerao and Rustico Jerao in the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, where the cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 93-3333 and 933338. Except for the names of the victims, the informations uniformly alleged:
Criminal Case No. 93-3333 That on or about the 9th of May, 1993 at barangay Guinlajon, municipality of
Sorsogon, province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with guns and bolos, conspiring,

confederating and mutually helping each other, with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shot one Pacita Jerao,[2] thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound
which directly caused the death of said Pacita Jerao, to the damage and prejudice of
her legal heirs.
Contrary to law.[3]
The three informations for rape with frustrated homicide filed against the abovenamed accused before the same court were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 933341, 93-3342 and 93-3343. The informations uniformly alleged:
That on or about the 9th day of May, 1993, at sitio Lantik, barangay Guinlajon,
municipality of Sorsogon, province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with guns and
bolos, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and/or
intimidation have carnal knowledge of one Jocelyn Jerao, a fifteen year old girl
against her will and consent and immediately thereafter, with intent to kill, attack,
assault, and stab said Jocelyn Jerao, thereby inflicting upon her several serious
injuries which could have caused her death, thus, accused performed all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of Homicide, as a consequence but
which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will
of the accused, that is, because of the timely and able medical attendance rendered
to said Jocelyn Jerao which prevented her death, to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.[4]
Upon arraignment on July 19, 1993, the four (4) accused, with the assistance of a
counsel de oficio, entered pleas of not guilty in Criminal Case Nos. 93-3333[5] and
93-3343.[6] On July 21, 1993, with the assistance of a counsel de oficio, the four (4)
accused entered pleas of not guilty in Criminal Case Nos. 93-3338[7] and 93-3341.
[8] On August 25, 1993, accused-appellant Uldarico Honra, Jr., together with
accused Cristobal Jintalan and Jose Jintalan, each pleaded not guilty to Criminal
Case No.93-3342.[9] On September 7, 1993, the trial court entered a plea of not
guilty in favor of accused Ronnie Gipaya in Criminal Case No. 93-3342[10] on
account of the fact that after entering a plea of guilty, he refused to sign the
certificate of arraignment provided for the purpose. Joint trial of the cases thus
ensued.
However, on May 5, 1997, accused Ronnie Gipaya, with the assistance of Atty.
Manuel Fortes, Jr., withdrew his plea of not guilty and upon rearraignment pleaded
guilty to all the crimes charged against him.[11] On September 26, 1997, accused
Cristobal Jintalan, likewise withdrew his previous plea and entered pleas of guilty to
all charges.[12] The trial court then conducted a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of their pleas. Meantime,
all the charges against Jose Jintalan were dismissed after the trial court granted his
demurrer to evidence.[13] Eventually, on October 8, 1997, the trial court rendered
its judgment against accused Ronnie Gipaya and Cristobal Jintalan, finding them
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all the five (5) criminal cases.[14]

Trial proceeded as to herein accused-appellant Uldarico Honra, Jr.

Jocelyn Jerao, Dr. Marlon Gapayao and Dr. Liduvina Dorion testified for the
prosecution.
Jocelyn Jerao , a sixteen-year old third year high school student, testified that on
May 9, 1993, while she was asleep with her parents, Pacita and Rustico Jerao in their
house in the northern portion of Guinlajon, municipality of Sorsogon, somebody
called for them at around 2 a.m. asking for water to drink but they did not open the
door. Then she heard somebody fire a shot from a gun. Her parents opened the door
and her mother gave the person outside the door water to drink. The person told
her mother to drink first as he was afraid that the water was poisoned. So her
mother drank the water. The person outside the door introduced himself as Eric and
assured her mother that she will not be harmed then asked permission to leave. But
according to Jocelyn, he did not leave, but only went around the house because
they returned. Thereupon they knocked on the door and told them that somebody
wanted to see her father in the northern portion of their place. Her parents opened
the door and she saw three people whom she did not yet recognize as they were
wearing masks. She described their masks as t-shirts covering their faces. Her
mother, father and herself went out of the house and the three of them stood side
by side each other. The person who introduced himself as Eric told her father to go
to the northern portion of the place but the latter refused. She stated that only Eric
was wearing a mask while the two other companions were not. Then, Eric pointed
the barrel of his gun to her father and squeezed the trigger but the gun did not go
off. Eric then commented , Jesus Christ, its good that it did not go off, and then
laughed together with his two other companions. Eric took hold of the gun and
squeezed it a second time and this time it went off hitting her father in the
forehead. She shouted and tried to grab the gun from Eric but the latter boxed her
twice. She then covered her father with her body. She heard another gun shot and
saw her mother's body slumped on her fathers body. Before she heard the gunshot,
she saw Eric still holding the gun which was pointed towards her mother. She
testified further that the two companions helped Eric as when she started shouting
the two tried to cover her mouth with their hands and to lift her up. The person who
introduced himself as Eric removed his mask then raped her. She narrated that Eric
removed his pants and removed her clothes including her panty and performed
sexual intercourse on her. He lay on top of her then inserted his penis in her vagina
and moved his buttocks up and down. She felt pain and pretended to be
unconscious. The other two companions were standing guard by her side. After Eric
performed the sexual act on her, the other companion removed his clothes and did
the same thing to her. She identified the second person as the one who had a tattoo
on his forehead and goes by the name Cristobal Jintalan. He also placed himself on
top of her and performed the sexual act. After he finished, the third companion took
his turn. He also removed his pants and placed himself on top of her and did the
same thing that Honra and Jintalan did. After this third companion was through with
her, he took a very long machite, but Eric shouted that he use a luknit. Eric handed
the luknit or bladed weapon to the third companion whom she later identified as
Ronnie Gipaya. After Eric handed the latter the luknit, Ronnie Gipaya stabbed her on
the stomach once. She turned to her side and she was stabbed three more times at

her back. All this time, Eric and Cristobal Jinatalan did not leave. After Gipaya
delivered the third blow he said, Lets go she is already dead. Then they left.
Dr. Marlon Gapayao, a resident physician of the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital,
testified that he examined Jocelyn Jerao and her mother Pacita Jerao. Dr. Gapayao
confirmed the findings he made on the injuries of Jocelyn in a medical report. His
findings revealed the following:
- Stab wound peri umbilical area penetrating abdominal cavity with moderate intraabdominal bleeding;
- Stab wound right chest penetrating thoracic cavity with intra thoracic bleeding
moderate;
- Multiple stab wounds back.
- Alleged rape; positive for spermatozoa.
- Healing time barring complications - Three (3) weeks.[15]
Dr. Gapayao likewise confirmed the findings he made in his medical report on Pacita
Jerao. The medical report stated as follows:
- Gun shot wound right supra clavicular (point of entry) with bullet lodged at the
right thoracic cavity;
- Stab wound left lumbar area non penetrating;
- Stab wound supra umbilical area left penetrating abdominal cavity non perforating
with moderate intra abdominal hemorrhage.
Cause of death:
-Hypovolemic shock scc. To multiple stab wounds and gun shot wound.[16]
Dr. Liduvina Dorion conducted the post mortem examination on Rustico Jerao. She
testified that she found a single gunshot wound on the forehead of the victim.[17] In
the death certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, the cause of death
was stated as intracranial hemorrhage caused by a gunshot wound.[18]
On the other hand, herein accused-appellant and his brother Jose Honra testified for
the defense.
Accused-appellant Uldarico Honra, Jr., a twenty-eight year old security guard denied
participation in the crimes charged and offered an alibi as his defense. He testified
that on May 9, 1993, at about 2 a.m., he was in the house of the barangay captain
in barangay Casini, Irosin, Sorsogon. He testified that he was there to attend the
birthday celebration of the barangay captain. He was there at 8 p.m. and stayed
overnight in that place. He stated that this was on May 9, 1993 as this was the
birthday of the barangay captain. He slept at one oclock in the morning of May 9,

1993 on a bench because he was very drunk that night. The barangay captain was
in the house with his family and the visitors already left. He woke up at 7 a.m. of the
following day and returned home. He arrived home fifteen minutes later and ate his
breakfast and took a bath. His brothers, nephews and nieces were home when he
arrived. On May 10, 1993, at about 3 p.m., he heard on the radio that he was
involved in a case and he went to the municipal building of Sorsogon to verify the
matter. However, he found nothing there. The next day, on May 11, 1993 he went to
the police station and was dumbfounded by the news relayed to him by a certain
Major Uy that there was already a warrant for his arrest and a shoot to kill order
against him. He also narrated that he was present when Jocelyn Jerao testified
against him and that she did so only because she followed the statement of Gipaya.
According to him, Ronnie Gipaya killed his mother and the formers brother raped
her sister. He stated further that this Ronnie Gipaya is the same co-accused in the
criminal cases. According to him, Ronnie Gipaya implicated him in his statement as
a means of avenging his mothers death and his sisters rape. He does not remember
the date the statement was made but he was able to read the same which among
others implicated him in the commission of the crimes.
Jose Honra, 17 years old, brother of accused-appellant recalled that on May 9, 1993,
at about 2 a.m., his brother was sleeping in their home in Casini, Irosin, Sorsogon.
They were then together with their sisters Soledad, Rosalina and her husband and
the accused. According to him, no member of their family went out from the time
they went to sleep at 9 p.m. up to early morning. He said that his brother, herein
accused-appellant was still sleeping when he woke up at about 7 a.m. the following
day.
The trial court convicted accused-appellant of two counts of murder and three
counts of rape with frustrated homicide. In upholding complainants testimony and
rejecting accused-appellants alibi, the trial court ruled:
There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that Uldarico Honra Jr. did the crimes as
charged against him. The victim, Jocelyn Jerao, positively identified Eric whom she
later identified as Uldarico Honra Jr. as the one who pulled the trigger that killed her
parents, Pacita Jerao and Rustico Jerao. She was also able to recognize Ronnie
Gipaya and Cristobal Jintalan as among those present during the killing of her father
and mother. The victim recognized accused Uldarico Honra Jr. when the latter took
off his mask when the latter raped her. With respect to the two others, Gipaya and
Jintalan, the accused was able to recognize them thru their tattoo marks. The victim
cannot be mistaken as it was then a bright night. The Court likewise finds that all
the aforesaid accused, including Uldarico Honra Jr. thru force and without Jocelyn
Jeraos consent had carnal knowledge with her. The victim of these acts could not
have imagined it as no young Filipina woman of decent repute could publicly admit
that she had been criminally assaulted unless that it is the truth (People vs.
Sambangan 125 SCRA 726). Conspiracy of accused Honra Jr. with the other accused
in committing all the crimes charged against them was likewise shown in the
prosecutions witness testimony. Jocelyn Jerao testified that when Uldarico Honra Jr.
was shooting her parents the two companions of Honra Jr., Ronnie Gipaya and
Cristobal Jintalan covered her mouth to prevent her from shouting and likewise tried
to lift her. That later on when she was about to be stabbed by Gipaya, Uldarico
Honra Jr. advised Gipaya to use a luknit instead of a machete, who then stabbed her

once in the stomach and thrice at her back. These acts show that there was unity of
purpose and unity of the execution among the accused of their unlawful objectives
which are the murders of the parents of Jocelyn and the rape with frustrated
homicide of the latter.
Anent Uldarico Honra Jr.s defense of alibi, it cannot be sustained in the face of clear
and positive identification of the accused (People vs. Gonzaga 77 SCRA 140).
Likewise for alibi to be given merit the defense must prove it with probable
evidence which would reasonably satisfy the Court of the truth of such defense
(ibid). In the instant case, the Court finds the positive and clear identification by the
victim herself of the three accused including Honra Jr. to be credible. The Court
cannot believe the tale of accused that he was not present at the crime scene as his
brothers testimony that he (Honra Jr.) was sleeping at their sisters house in Casini,
Irosin, Sorsogon when the crimes occurred is materially inconsistent with the
testimony of the accused himself that he slept at the house of their barangay
captain in Casini, Irosin, Sorsogon after a drinking session celebrating the natal day
of the said barangay captain. He could have presented the barangay captain to
corroborate his testimony but was not able to.
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant ascribes the following sole error to the
trial court:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT ULDARICO HONRA, JR. FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[19]
The appeal is without merit.
Accused-appellants argument that prosecution witness Jocelyn Jerao could have
been mistaken as to the identity of her assailants and that she failed to establish his
identity is not well-taken. According to accused-appellant, Jocelyns testimony is
totally devoid of any narration as to when accused-appellant removed his mask
during the rape; that it was not possible for Jocelyn to recognize accused-appellant
as she testified that she pretended to be unconscious during the rape; and that the
crime took place at 2 a.m. in an isolated place where there is no electricity making
it impossible for her to recognize accused-appellant who was a total stranger to her.
To support this stance, accused-appellant quotes the following portions of Jocelyns
testimony as follows:
Q And when they returned, Madam Witness, what happened?
A They knocked at the door and informed us that somebody wanted to see my
father in the northern portion of our place.
Q Did your parents open the door when they knocked at your door?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said they, how many persons were you referring to who returned to your
house the second time around?

A Three (3).
Q And were you able to recognize these 3 persons who returned to your house for
the second time?
A I did not yet recognize them because they were wearing mask.
Q What kind of covering did they use as masks for covering their faces?
A: Their t-shirts.
(TSN, August 25, 1993, pp. 7-8; emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx.
Q A moment. When Eric fired the first shot hitting your father, did you notice what
(sic) were the two other companions?
A They were also helping because at that time when I was already shouting they
tried to cover my mouth with their hands.
Q When you said they, you were referring to the other two companions of Eric who
were trying to cover your mouth?
A They were trying to lift me up.
Q And one or both of them also tried to cover your mouth to prevent you from
shouting?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Were you able to identify who was that particular companion who tried to cover
your mouth to prevent you from shouting?
A I did not recognize.
Q What about the other companion of Eric who tried to lift you up or who helped in
lifting you up, were you able to recognize him also?
A I did not recognize his face.
(Ibid, pp. 12-13; emphasis supplied)
Prosecutor:
Q How did Eric rape you?
A Eric removed my clothes and after removing my clothes, Eric performed the act of
intercourse.

Q How did Eric perform the act of intercourse?

xxx xxx xxx
Q Please answer.
A He inserted his penis on my vagina and performed the act of sexual intercourse
by moving up and down his buttocks.
Court:
Q You testified that the accused Uldarico Honra, Jr. removed your clothes. What
about your panty, assuming that you have one, was it also removed by the said
accused?
A Yes, Your Honor. They also removed my panty and he also removed his pants.
(to the prosecutor)
Proceed.
Prosecutor:
Q After he removed his pants and your clothes as well as your panty, what else did
he do?
A He placed his body on top of me.
Q And when his body was on top of you, what was he doing?
A He was performing the act of sexual intercourse by moving his buttocks up and
down.
Q What else did you feel at that time when he was moving his buttocks up and
down?
A I felt pain.
Q Did you try to react. . .
Atty. Armes:
Leading.
Court:
Sustained.
Prosecutor:

Q What did you do when you felt the pain?

A I suffered the pain because they were thinking that I was unconscious.
Q You pretended to be unconscious?
Atty. Armes:
Leading.
Court:
May answer.
A Yes, sir.
Prosecutor:
Q During that time that Eric was having a sexual intercourse with you, what were
his two other companions doing?
A They were guarding me by my side.
Q By the way, why did you pretend to be unconscious during that time?
A I was acting unconscious during that time because I know that they already killed
my mother and father and if I tried to resist them, I am sure they kill me.
Q For how long did this Eric lay on top of you, in your estimate?
A About 30 minutes.
Q Then after Eric completed his sexual intercourse or act on you, what happened
next?
A He asked me this way; Do you know me? and I answered him back: No and he
said: Im Alberto Jasmin.
Q What was your condition during that time when you were answering him?
A I was feeling weak.
Q After that, Madam Witness, I mean after Eric performed his sexual act on you,
what happened next?
The other one who followed also removed his clothes and pants.
(Id., pp. 20-23; emphasis supplied).[20]

It is a legal truism that in criminal prosecutions, the State has the burden of proving
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has to prove the identity of the
accused as the malefactor, as well as the fact of the commission of the crime for
which he is alleged to be responsible.[21] However, we find that contrary to the
assertions of accused-appellant, the prosecution did not fail to establish the onus on
his identity.
First. It is not true that Jocelyns testimony is devoid of any narration as to when
accused-appellant took off his mask. On the witness stand, Jocelyn explained that
while she did not initially recognize accused-appellant as he was wearing a mask,
she recounted how she subsequently recognized accused-appellant when he
removed his mask while he was raping her. Accused-appellant overlooked the
following portions of Jocelyns testimony, to wit:
Prosecutor:
Q This Eric whom you said was the one responsible for shooting your father and
mother, if you happen to see him again, will you be able to recognize him?
A I know him.
Q Will you kindly look around and tell us if this Eric is now here inside the
courtroom?
A He is here.
Q Please point to him.
(The one at the center, witness pointed to the man who identified himself as
Uldarico Honra, Jr.)
xxx xxx xxx.
Court:
Q This person whom you pointed and who answered that his name is Uldarico, Jr.,
was he the same person whom you saw and heard introducing himself to your
mother when he asked water as Eric?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And the very same person whom you personally saw pointing a gun to your
mother and father and shooing each of them, (I am referring to Eric)?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q The same Uldarico Honra, Jr. whom you identified as the very Eric who introduced
himself that night?
A Yes, Your Honor.[22]

x x x xxx xxx.
Court:
A moment.
Q You testified a while ago that while Eric whom you identified in Court as Uldarico
Honra, Jr. was conversing with your mother and later pointing a gun at your mother
and father, he was wearing mask and associate him with the accused in this case
who answered to the name of Uldarico Honra, Jr.?
A I recognized him when he was already raping me because he removed his mask.
Q Are you in fact telling the Court that the killing of your mother and your being
subjected to rape by said Eric took place on that same occasion and same night?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Which took place first, the act of killing your parents or your being raped?
A The killing of my parents took place first.
Q And seconds after the killing of your parents, you saw Eric removing his mask
while raping you.
A Yes, Your Honor.
(to Prosecutor)
Proceed.
Prosecutor
Q Madam Witness,
Court
Q And you are very certain that the person who was raping you and removed his
mask and who identified himself before as Eric is the very person you pointed to in
court is Uldarico Honra, Jr.?
A Yes, Your Honor.[23]
Second. We likewise reject as purely speculative accused-appellants contention that
Jocelyn could not have recognized her assailant as she pretended to be unconscious
at the time. The truth of the matter of is, she only pretended to be unconscious out
of fear for her life having already witnessed the brutal killing of her parents, and
was in fact conscious and got a good look at the physical features of her assailant
during the rape. At that point, Jocelyn as the victim, was as close to the accused as

is physically possible, for a man and woman cannot be physically closer to each
other than during sexual act.[24] Thus, it cannot be doubted that she could easily
see and recognize the face of the man who was ravaging her. Moreover, the most
natural reaction of victims of violence is to strive to see the appearance of the
perpetrators of the crime and observe the manner in which the crime is being
committed.[25]
Third. While it may be true that the crime took place in a dark area, this does not
prevent the identification of accused-appellant. As testified to by Jocelyn, she could
not have been mistaken in the identification of accused-appellant as the night was
illuminated by a bright moonlight. This Court has ruled that the light of the moon is
sufficient for a person to identify another.[26]
All told, we see no reason to reject or doubt the identification made by Jocelyn of
accused-appellant.
Finally, the reliance being made by accused-appellant on the affidavit of Jocelyn in
order to discredit her is likewise futile. According to accused-appellant, Jocelyn did
not mention his name but only that of accused Ronnie Gipaya in her sworn
statement taken on May 11, 1993. The Court has consistently ruled that
discrepancies between the statement of an affiant in an affidavit and those made on
the witness stand do not necessarily downgrade testimonial evidence. Ex parte
affidavits are usually incomplete and frequently prepared by an administering
officer and cast in the latters language and understanding of what the affiant has
said. Quite frequently, the affiant would simply sign the affidavit after it has been
read to him or to her.[27]
After a thorough review of the records in the instant case, we see no reason to
reverse the trial courts factual finding and conclusion on the credibility of Jocelyn
Jeraos testimony; we are likewise unpersuaded by accused-appellants alibi. Wellsettled is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct
and attitude under grilling examination. Findings of the trial court on such matters
are binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted.[28]
The testimony of Jocelyn on how she saw her parents brutally murdered and how
she was defiled by three men one after the other was clear, direct and honest and
could only inspire belief. We have held that when the offended parties are young
and immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend
credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative
vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be
exposed by court trial if the matter about which they testified is not true.[29]
Jocelyns credibility is enhanced considering that she has no motive to testify against
accused-appellant and there is absolutely no evidence on record which can even
remotely suggest that she could have been actuated by any motive.[30]

On the contrary, we note that accused-appellants alibi is uncorroborated by the only

other defense witness, accused-appellants brother. It was not clearly established
where he actually was at the time of the commission of the crimes at 2 a.m. of May
9, 1993. He said he was at the barangay captains house sleeping, as he was drunk
the night before celebrating the barangay captains birthday. However, his bother
testified that accused-appellant was in their home sleeping on the night in question.
Alibi is inherently weak and certainly insufficient to outweigh Jocelyns positive and
categorical assertions on the commission of the crimes. The contradictory
statements of accused-appellant and his brother further add to the dubiety and
weakness of his defense. Moreover, whether he spent the night at the barangay
captains home or in their own home, accused-appellant has not shown the physical
impossibility of his presence at the place and time of the commission of the crime.
The proffered defense of alibi cannot be sustained where it is not only without
credible corroboration but it also does not on its face demonstrate the physical
impossibility of the accuseds presence at the place of the crime or in its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission.[31] In the instant case, accused-appellant
could not offer a corroborated and coherent alibi; and he has not shown that it was
not possible for him to go to Jocelyns house from the barangay captains house.
We now review the other aspects of accused-appellants conviction in keeping with
the Courts duty, as an appellate tribunal, to correct such errors as may be found in
the judgment appealed from, whether they are made the subject of assignment of
errors or not.[32]
In Criminal Case Nos. 93-33333 and 93-3338, accused-appellant was convicted of
the murders of Pacita Jerao and Rustico Jerao. The killings were properly classified
as murder upon the existence of treachery[33] as alleged in the information. There
is treachery where the attack upon the unarmed victim, who had not committed the
slightest provocation, and who were totally unaware of the murderous designs of
the accused, was swift and unexpected.[34] Pacita and Rustico were unarmed,
defenseless and helpless, and had absolutely no opportunity to defend themselves
from accused-appellants sudden and unexpected assault with the use of a gun.
Evident premeditation which was also alleged in the information cannot be
appreciated in the absence of direct evidence of the planning and preparation to kill
when the plan was conceived.[35] Under Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, when
the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, the penalty in its medium
period shall be imposed when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances present. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code[36], the penalty
for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, the medium period
of which is reclusion perpetua.[37] Hence, accused-appellant should suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of murder. We affirm the award of
P50,000.00 for each count as indemnity for death to the heirs of the two victims in
conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.[38] We cannot award actual damages
absent proof of actual losses suffered. However, the award of P50,000.00 as moral
damages is in order considering that Jocelyn Jerao testified on her own anguish
suffered as a result of the death of her parents.[39] Absent any aggravating
circumstance attending the murders committed, we cannot award exemplary
damages pursuant to Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.

In Criminal Case Nos. 93-3341, 93-3342 and 93-3343, the prosecution charged
accused-appellant with rape with frustrated homicide and the trial court convicted
him of three counts thereof. The case is wrongly denominated as there is no
complex crime of rape with frustrated homicide. Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code[40] requires the commission of at least two crimes, but the two or more grave
or less grave felonies must be the result of a single act, or an offense must be a
necessary means for committing the other.[41] Negatively put, when two or more
crimes are committed but (1) not by a single act or (2) one is not a necessary
means for committing the others, there is no complex crime. In the instant case,
accused-appellant committed separate crimes of rape and frustrated homicide.
They do not constitute a complex crime of rape with frustrated homicide. Neither
does this case fall under Article 335 of The Revised Penal Code which provides for a
special complex crime of rape with homicide. Pertinent portion of Article 335 reads:
xxx xxx xxx.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or
on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall likewise be death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
Clearly, the law does not contemplate consummated rape with frustrated homicide
as in the instant case.
Nevertheless, while the three informations were captioned rape with frustrated
homicide and alleged the elements of said crimes, it should be noted that the
defense did not object to the information despite its imperfection. The defect of
charging two offenses in one information, that is, rape and frustrated homicide, was
deemed waived by accused-appellants failure to raise it in a motion to quash before
he pleaded to the information.[42] Hence, conviction for three separate counts of
rape and three counts of frustrated homicide may lie.
Conviction for rape must be sustained considering that all the elements of rape
under Article 335(1) of the Revised Penal Code were established beyond reasonable
doubt. The accused had carnal knowledge of Jocelyn; and that coitus was done
through the use of force and intimidation.[43] Failure to shout or offer resistance did
not make voluntary Jocelyns submission to the criminal acts of the accused.[44]
Jocelyn pretended to be unconscious during the rape as she was subdued and
cowed to submit in fear, having just witnessed the killing of her parents in the hands
of her assailants. The use of deadly weapons (guns and bolos) as alleged in the
information could not be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance absent evidence
that the same were used to realize the crime of rape against Jocelyn. Conviction for
frustrated homicide must likewise be sustained considering that the accused
intended to kill the victim as shown by the weapon used and the parts of the victims
body at which the weapon was aimed, as shown by the wounds inflicted. In fact,
there is testimony to the effect that the accused left Jocelyn for dead. In fine, the
accused performed all the acts of execution which could have produced the felony
as a consequence, but did not on account of timely and adequate medical
intervention.

Accused-appellant is liable for three counts of rape and three counts of frustrated
homicide on account of a clear conspiracy among the three accused shown by their
obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after the other the crime of rape, and
then the crime of homicide. Conspiracy was properly appreciated by the trial court
because the individual acts of the accused when taken together as a whole showed
that they were acting in concert and cooperating to achieve the same unlawful
objective.[45] While accused-appellant was shooting Jocelyns parents, his coaccused were covering the latters mouth and lifting her up. While they took turns
defiling her, the others stood guard. It has been held that in multiple rape, each of
the defendants is responsible not only for the rape committed by him but also for
those committed by the others.[46] Accused-appellant, therefore, is responsible not
only for the rape committed personally by him but also for the rape committed by
the others as well.[47]
In the same vein, he is liable for three counts of frustrated homicide. In a
conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and
killed the victim.[48] Accused-appellant ordered which weapon to use and handed
the same to a co-accused who delivered the stab wounds on Jocelyn which could
have resulted in her death if not for immediate medical intervention. This is a clear
manifestation of a common purpose or design as well as concerted action on their
part to kill.
Finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape,
this Court imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
Latest jurisprudence awards the victim in a rape case the minimum amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages. Moral damages may be awarded to the victim
without need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.[49] Accused-appellant is also
ordered to pay Jocelyn the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count
of rape. Civil indemnity is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of rape.[50]
Finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of
frustrated homicide, this Court imposes upon him the indeterminate penalty of 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum up to 10 years of prision
mayor as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, accused-appellant Uldarico Honra, Jr. is
found guilty of two counts of murder in Criminal Case Nos. 93-3333 and 93-3338
and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count; in Criminal Case Nos. 93-3341, 93-3342 and 93-3343, accusedappellant is found guilty of three counts of rape and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count; accused-appellant is also found guilty
of three counts of frustrated homicide and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum up to 10 years
of prision mayor as maximum for each count.
In addition, accused-appellant Uldarico Honra, Jr. is ordered to PAY the following
sums:
(a) P100,000.00 to the heirs of Pacita and Rustico Jerao, as death indemnity;

(b) P100,000.00 to the heirs of Pacita and Rustico Jerao as moral damages;
(c) P150,000.00 to Jocelyn Jerao as civil indemnity;
(d) P150,000.00 to Jocelyn Jerao as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.