MARY GRACE POE - Llamanzares vs COMELEC et.

al
G.R. No. 2221697 221698-700
J.Perez
FACTS:
Grace Poe (Poe) was found abandoned in a church in Jaro Iloilo sometime 1968.
Parental care was passed to the relatives of Edgardo Militar, the person who found
the child. The relative then reported and registered the child as a founding with the
Civil Registrar of Iloilo. The child was then named Mary Grace Militar. The child was
subsequently adopted by Fernando Poe, Jr and Susan Roces sometime in 1974.
Necessary annotations were placed in the child's foundling certificate but it was
only in 2005 that Susan Roces discovered that their lawyer failed to secure a new
Certificate of Live Birth indicating Poe's new name as well as the name of the
adoptive parents. Roces then submitted an affidavit and in 2006, a Certificate of
Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Poe was released by the Civil Registry of Iloilo.
At the age of 18, Poe was registered as a voter of San Juan. In 1988, she was issued
a Philippine passport. In 1991, Poe married Teodoro Llamanzares and flew to the US
right after the wedding. She then gave birth to her eldest child in the US. In 2001,
Poe became a naturalized American Citizen and
she obtained a US Passport that same year.
In April 2004, Poe came back to the Philippines in order to support her father's
candidacy. It was at this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter. She
then returned to the US in July 2004 with her two daughters. Poe returned in
December 2004 after learning of her father's deteriorating condition. The latter
died and Poe stayed until February 2005 to take care of the funeral arrangements.
Poe stated that she wanted to be with grieving mother hence, she and her husband
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime first quarter of
2005. They prepared for resettlement including notification of their children's
schools, coordination with property movers and inquiry with Philippine authorities as
to how they can bring their pet dog. According to Poe, as early as 2004, she already
quit her job in the US.
Poe came home on May 24, 2005 and immediately secured a TIN while her husband
stayed in the US. She and her family stayed with her mother until she and husband
was able to purchase a condominium in San Juan sometime February 2006. On
February 14, 2006, Poe returned to the US to dispose the other family belongings.
She travelled back in March 2006. In early 2006, Poe and husband acquired a
property in Corinthian Hills in Quezon City where they built their family home.
On July 7, 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to R.A. 9225.
On July 10, 2006, she filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship
together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children. The
Bureau of Immigration acted in favor of the petition on July 18, 2006. She and her
children were then considered dual citizens. Poe then registered as voter in August
2006 and secured a Philippine passport thereafter.

On October 6, 2010, she was appointed as Chairperson of the MTRCB. Before

assuming her post, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the US
before a notary public in Pasig City on October 20, 2010. The following day, she
submitted the Affidavit to the Bureau of Immigration and took her oath as MTRCB
Chairperson. According to Poe, she stopped using her American passport from then
on.
On July 12, 2011, Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of
the US before the Vice Consul of the US Embassy in Manila. On December 9, 2011,
the US Vice Consul issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the US effective
October 21, 2010.
On October 2, 2012, Poe filed with COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy for
Senator stating that she was a resident of the Philippines for a period of 6 years
and 6 months before May 13, 2013. She was then proclaimed a Senator on May 16,
2013.
On October 15, 2015, Poe filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
elections. She declared that she is a natural born and her residence in the
Philippine up to the day before election would be 10 years and 11 months counted
from May 24, 2005.
Several petitions were filed against Poe alleging that (1) she committed material
misrepresentation in her COC when she stated that she is a resident of the
Philippines for at least 10 years 11 months up to the day before May 9, 2016
Elections, (2) she is not natural born considering that Poe is a foundling. It was
argued that international law does not confer natural born status and Filipino
citizenship to foundlings hence, she is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship under R.A. 9225 as she is not a natural citizen to begin with.
Assuming that Poe was a natural born citizen, she lost it when she became a US
Citizen.
In addition, one of the petitioners, Francisco Tatad, theorized that:
1.
Philippines adhere to the principle of jus sanguinis and hence persons
of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, are not natural born
Filipino citizens.
2.
Using statutory construction, considering that foundlings were not
expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 1935
Constitution, the framers are said to have the intention to exclude
them
3.
International conventions are not self-executory hence, local
legislations are necessary to give effect to obligations assumed by the
Philippines.
4.
There is no standard practice that automatically confers natural born
status to foundlings.
Petitioner Valdez alleged that Poe's repatriation under R.A. 9225 did not bestow
upon her the status of a natural born citizen as those who repatriates

only acquires Philippine citizenship and not their original status as natural born
citizens.
Poe countered these petitions by alleging that:
1.
The grounds invoked by the petitioners were not proper grounds for a
disqualification case as enumerated under Section 12 and 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
2.
What the petitioners filed focus on establishing her ineligibility, hence,
they fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, not
the COMELEC.
3.
The July 18, 2006 Order of the Bureau of Immigration declaring her as
natural born, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of
adoption reinforced her position as a natural born citizen
4.
As early as first quarter of 2005, she started to reestablish her domicile
in the Philippines and that she can reestablish her domicile of
choice even before
she renounced her American citizenship.
5.
The period of residency as stated in her COC for senator was a mistake
in good faith.
COMELEC ruled against the petitioner resolving that she is not a natural born citizen
and that she failed to complete the 10 year residency requirement.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES AND RATIO:
1)
Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction to disqualify POE.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the Resolutions of the
COMELEC emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
jurisdiction.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether the COC should be denied due
course on the exclusive ground' that she made in the certificate a false material
misrepresentation. COMELEC should restrain itself from going into the issue of
qualifications of the candidate. It cannot, in the same cancellation case decide the
qualification or lack thereof of candidate. Not one of the enumarated powers of the
COMELEC as stated in
Article IX C, Sec. 2 of the Constitution grants the commission the power to
determine the qualifications of a candidate. Such powers are
granted to the
Electoral Tribunal as stated in Article VI Section 17 and the Supreme Court under
Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution.
Lacking this prior determination, the certificate of candidacy cannot be
cancelled or denied due course on ground of false representations regarding a
candidate's qualifications except if there exists self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. In this light the COMELEC cannot
cancel Poe's certificate of candidacy lacking prior determination of her qualifications
by a competent body.
2)

Whether it can be concluded that Poe's parents are Filipinos.

Presumption regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unacceptable in

Philippine Law. There is more than sufficient evidence that Poe has Filipino
parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Hence, the burden of proof was on
private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen.
Private respondents should show that Poe's parents were aliens. Her
admission that she is foundling did not shift the burden to their because such status
did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos. In fact, there is a high
probability that her parents are Filipinos.
The Solicitor General offered official Statistics from the Philippine Statistics
Office that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners
born in the
Philippines was 15,985. While the Filipinos born in the country were more that 10
Million. On this basis, there is a 99% chance that the child born in the Philippines
would be a filipino which in turn, would indicate more that ample probability that
Poe's parents are Filipinos.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poe's parents are the fact
that:
1.
2.

She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo

She has typical Filipino features

There are disputable presumptions that things have happened according to

the ordinary course of nature. On this basis, it is safer to assume that Poe's
parents are Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd.
3)
Whether as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Citizen
Foundling are as a class, natural born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language that
would exclude
them either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration, there is a need
to examine the intent of the framers.
The amendment to the Constitution proposed by constitutionalist Rafols to
include foundlings as natural born citizens was not carried out, not
because
there was any objection to the notion that persons of unknown parentage are not
citizens, but only because their number was not enough to merit specific mention.
There was no intent or language that would permit discrimination against
foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to
equal protection of the laws. Likewise, domestic laws on adoption support the
principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption
confers citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the adoptee must be Filipino
in the
first place to be adopted. Recent legislation all expressly refer to "Filipino children"
and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
The argument that the process to determine that the child is a foundling
leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate are acts to acquire
or perfect
Philippine citizenship is without merit. Hence, the argument that as a foundling, Poe
underwent a process in order to acquire or
perfect her Philippine citizenship, is
untenable.

"Having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by
the citizen. In this case, the determination of foundling status was
done by
authorities, not by Poe. Second, the object of the process is to determine the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the
child and lastly, the
process is not analogous to naturalization proceedings.
Under international law, foundlings are citizens. Generally accepted principles
of international law which include international customs form
part of the laws of
the land. The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention of the Rights of the child and the International Convent on Civil and
Political Rights obligates the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and to ensure
that no child is
stateless. The principles stated in the:
1.
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the Conflict
of Nationality laws (that a foundling is presumed to have the nationality of the
country of birth)
2.
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling is
presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found) bind the Philippines
although we are not signatory to these conventions.
Although we are not a signatory to the Hague Convention, we are a signatory
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which affirms
Article 14 of
the Hague Convention. Likewise, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
affirms Article 15 of the UDHR. By analogy, although the Philippines has not
signed the International Convention for the Protection of Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, we (the Supreme
Court) ruled that the proscription against
enforced disappearance was nonetheless binding as a generally accepted principle
of international law.
Poe's evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South
America and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizens.
166 out of 189 countries accept that foundlings are recognized as citizens. Hence,
there is a generally accepted principle of
International law to presume
foundlings as having been born and a national of the country in which it is found.
Hence, as a foundling, Poe is a natural born Filipino citizen.
4)
Whether Poe's repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural born
citizenship.
The COMELEC arrogantly disregarded jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation which states that repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. A natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine nationality will be
restored to his former status as natural born Filipino after repatriation (Benson v.
HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc). In passing R.A. 9225, Congress saw it fit
to decree that
natural born citizenship may be reacquired even if it has been
lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with Congress' determination.
Neither is repatriation an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In the
case of Bengson, the Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens
under the 1987 constitution: natural born and naturalized. There is no third

category for repatriated citizens. The COMELEC

cannot reverse a judicial
precedent. Hence, COMELEC's decision is wrapped with grave abuse of discretion.
5)
Whether Poe is a resident of the Philippine for 10 years
Poe alleged that her residency should be counted from May 24, 2005 when
she returned for good from the US. There are three requisites to acquire
a new
domicile 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality 2. Intention to remain
(animus manendi) and 3. Intention to abandon the old
domicile (animus nonrevertendi). The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an
indefinite period of time, the change of
residence must be voluntary and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family
abandoned their US domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These
evidence include former US passport showing her arrival on May 24, 2005 and her
return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad, email correspondences
with freight company to arrange for the shipment of household items as well as with
the pet Bureau; school records of her children
showing enrolment in the
Philippine to the Philippine schools starting on June 2005 etc.
COMELEC refused to consider the petitioner's domicile has been timely
changed as of May 24, 2005 and maintained that although there is physical
presence and animus manendi, there is no animus revertendi. Respondents
contend that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she
obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquired Philippine citizenship since she is
still an American until July 7, 2006 on the basis of previous cases ruled upon by
the Supreme Court.
SC held that the other cases previously decided by the court wherein
residence was counted only from the acquisition of permanent residence were
decided as such because there is sparse evidence on establishment of residence.
These cases cannot be applied in the present case. In the case at bar, there is
overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other conclusion that Poe decided to
permanently abandon her US residence and reside in the Philippines as early as
May 24, 2005.
These evidence, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship is clear that when she returned in May 2005, it was for good.
The stamp in her passport as a balikbayan does not make Poe an ordinary
transient.
Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2012 COC was only a mistake
in good faith. Such a mistake could be given in evidence against her but it was by
no means conclusive considering the overwhelming evidence submitted by Poe.
Considering that the COMELEC failed to take into
consideration these
overwhelming evidence, its decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The
decision of the COMELEC is hereby annulled and set aside. Poe is thus declared
qualified to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Election on May 9,
2016.

Mary Grace Poe - Llamanzares vs COMELEC et al

G.R. NO. 221697 221698-700
J.Carpio - Dissenting Opinion
PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS:
. A presidential candidate who is deemed a natural born citizen by less that a
majority and deemed not a natural-born Filipino citizen by five Justices and with no
opinion from three Justices is now allowed to run for President of the Philippines. J.
Carpio dissents.
. He notes that the ruling of the majority will lead to absurd results by allowing a
presidential resolve with uncertain citizenship status to be potentially elected. The
majority wants to resolve the citizenship status only after the election, and if the
petitioner wins.
. Poe failed to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino Citizen and a resident of the
Philippines for the last ten years hence, she is not eligible to run as President of
the Republic of the Philippines.
ON COMELEC JURISDICTION:
section 2(1), Article IX-C vest in the COMELEC the power among others, to "enforce
and administer all laws...relative to the conduct of the election." Screening initially
the qualifications of the candidates lies within this specific power. Pursuant to this
constitutional mandate, the COMELEC can initially disqualify those lacking any of
the qualifications before the conduct of the election.
The Supreme Court in the case of Timbol upheld the COMELEC's power to disqualify
a nuisance candidate. It cannot be disputed that a person not a natural-born
Filipino citizen and therefore, ineligible, who files a certificate of candidacy for
President, "puts the election process in mockery". Such person is therefore a
nuisance candidate. Under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC
is empowered, motu propio, to cancel a COC if it has been filed "to put the election
process in mockery". The electorate is needlessly misled to cast their votes if an
ineligible candidate is allowed to run. COMELEC cannot be a party to such a
mockery; otherwise, it will be committing a grave abuse of discretion.
ON CITIZENSHIP:
The 1935 Constitution, which is applicable in Poe's case, allows only two methods of
acquiring Philippine citizenship:
1. By blood relation to the father or mother who must be a Filipino citizen
2. By naturalization according to law
The Philippines adheres to the jus sanguinis principle or the "law of the blood" to
determine citizenship at birth. An individual acquires Filipino Citizenship at birth
solely by virtue of biological descent from a Filipino mother or father. This view is
made evident by the suppression from the Constitution of the jus soli principle.

Poe contends that as a foundling, she is deemed included in par. 3 and 4 of Article
IV of the 1935 constitution (Par 3 - Those whose father are citizens of the Philippines
and Par 4 - those whose mother are citizens of the Philippines, and upon reaching
the age of majority, elects Philippine citizenship).
Poe is gravely mistaken as the framers of the 1935 Constitution voted to
categorically reject the proposal to include foundlings as Citizens of the Philippines.
The delegates actually voted to reject Rafol's amendment to consider children of
unknown parentage as Filipino citizens. Three delegates even voiced out their
objections to this amendment and stated that the Congress should instead provide
an enabling law for foundlings to be considered as Filipino citizens.
Poe argues that the reason why the provision on foundlings was not included in the
1935 Constitution was because there is already a clear principle existing in
domestic and international law on foundlings. Carpio comments that there is no
such domestic law as well as international law existing during the proceedings of
the 1935 Constitutional Convention explicitly governing citizenship of foundlings
and thus there could not have been any redundancy to speak of. The Spanish Civil
Code which has a provision on foundlings ceased to have any effect in our land
upon the cession by Spain of the Philippines to the US.
Likewise, only the 1930 Hague Convention relating to the Conflict of Nationality law,
which articulated the presumption on the place of birth of foundlings, was in
existence during the deliberations of the 1935 constitution. This Convention does
not guarantee a nationality to a foundling at birth and there is no prevailing
customary international law at the time, as there is still none today, conferring
automatically a nationality to foundlings at birth.
While the framers of the 1935 Constitution discussed the matter of foundlings, they
not only rejected the proposal to include a provision relating to them (foundlings)
but also clearly manifested that foundlings could not be citizens of the Philippines at
birth like children of Filipino fathers. The framers intended to exclude foundling
from the definition of natural born Filipino citizens by expressly rejecting Rafol's
proposal.
Clearly, it was the intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution to refer to naturalborn citizens as only those who were Filipino citizens by the mere fact of being born
to fathers who were Filipino citizens - nothing more nothing less. As a matter of
course, those whose parents are neither Filipino
citizens or are both unknown, as the case of foundlings, cannot be considered
natural born Filipino citizens.
FOUNDLINGS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
It is a fundamental principle that every independent state has the right and
prerogative to determine who its citizens are. This principle is applied in the
Philippines as early as 1912 in the case of Roa. The 1930 Hague Convention
explicitly recognizes this principle. Hence, it is the municipal law, both
constitutional and statutory, which determines and regulates the conditions on
acquiring citizenship.

There is no customary international law presuming a foundling as a citizen of the

country where the foundling is found. Poe anchors her claims on the Convention of
the Rights of the Child, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1930 Hague
Convention, and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (CRS).
1. Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) was ratified by the Philippines
only on August 21, 1990. This convention binds the Philippines only
on the day
of ratification. Since Poe was born in 1968. her citizenship at birth cannot be
affected in any way by the Convention. Moreover, the CRC does not guarantee a
child a nationality at birth much less a natural citizenship at birth as understood
under the Philippine constitution, but merely the right to acquire a nationality in
accordance with a domestic law.
2. ICCPR - the ICCPR entered into force on 23 March 1976. The ICCPR does
not obligate states to automatically grant a nationality to children at birth. The
covenant does not guarantee a foundling a nationality at birth.
3. UDHR - The UDHR (Art. 15 on the right to a nationality) is merely a
declaration. It does not obligate states to automatically confer nationality at birth.
4. 1930 Hague Convention - the Philippines is not a signatory to this
convention, hence, Philippines is not bound by it. Poe claims that this
convention
is evidence of "generally accepted principles of international law." Note that Article
14 of this convention states that foundlings shall have the nationality of the
country OF birth". It does not say that a foundling shall have the nationality AT
birth. There is nothing in this article that guarantees the nationality of a foundling
at birth, much less natural born citizenship at birth as understood under the
Philippine constitution. Moreover, Article 15 of the convention acknowledges the
fact that acquisition of nationality by reason of birth in a state's territory is not
automatic. It actually states that municipal law determines the conditions
governing the acquisition of nationality.
5. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness - the Philippines is not a
signatory to this convention. The convention does not bind the Philippines.
Likewise, Art. 2 of the CRS which states that "foundling found in the territory of a
contracting state, shall in the absence of proof to the contrary, to have been born
within that territory of parents possessing the nationality of that state" binds only
contracting states, of which, the Philippines is not.
In sum there is no international treaty to which the Philippines is a
contracting party, which provides expressly or impliedly that a foundling is deemed
a natural born citizen of the country in which the foundling is found.
On the issue of customary international law, one of its elements (widespread
and consistent practice of states) was not duly proven by Poe. She failed to show
that Article 2 of the CRS is an established, widespread and consistent practice of a
majority of sovereign states. On the other
hand, international law writers
generally accept that the CRS does not constitute customary international law
precisely because of the small number of states that have ratified the convention.
Since the first element of customary international law is missing, the second
element (opinion juris) is lacking as well. There is no general international law,
whether customary international law or generally accepted principle
of
international law, obligating the Philippines, or any state, to automatically confer
citizenship to foundlings at birth.

There are only two general principles of international law applicable to

foundlings;
1. First, that a foundling is deemed domiciled in the country where the
foundling is found (they have a domicile at birth, not a nationality at birth)
2. A foundling is deemed born in the country where the foundling is
found.
These two general principles have nothing to do with conferment of
nationality.
Assuming that there was in the 1935 and thereafter, a customary
international law conferring nationality to foundlings at birth, still foundlings could
not be considered as natural born Filipino citizens as such would conflict with the
concept of jus sanguisinis under the 1935 Constitution.
In case of conflict between customary international law and the Constitution,
the constitution prevails.
Moreover, there is a difference between citizenship at birth because of jus soli
and citizenship at birth because of jus sanguisinis. The former may be granted to
foundlings under the constitution but the citizenship granted is not of a natural-born
citizenship but that of naturalized citizenship. Only those citizens at birth because
of jus sanguisinis, which required blood relation to a parent are natural citizens
under 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitution.
ON STATISTICS
The statistics shown speak of foreign and Filipino births in the Philippines with
known parents, either Filipino or foreigner. It does not show
the number of
foundlings born in the Philippines. This data also do not show the number of
foundlings who were later determined to have Filipino
parentage. If there is
99% probability that a child born in the Philippines is a natural born citizen, it does
not automatically follow that
there is 99% that a foundling born in the Philippines
is a natural-born Filipino citizen. The data on foundlings, if any, may show a
different
statistical data. For the solicitor General to assert that a foundling with
a blond hair, blue eyes and milky white Caucasian skin is a natural
born citizen is the height of absurdity.
Philippine laws and jurisprudence on adoption is not determinative of natural
born citizenship
The terms "natural born Filipino citizen" does not appear in the
domestic or inter-country adoption act. In fact, while the terms "Filipino mentioned,
it is only in the title of these laws. The text of the adoption laws do not contain the
term "Filipino." There is no specific provision in these adoption laws requiring that
adoptees must be Filipinos, much less natural born Filipinos. These adoption laws
do not distinguish between a Filipino child and an alien child found in the
Philippines. Hence they apply to both Filipino and alien child found in the
Philippines over which the government exercises jurisdiction. The case of Ellis and
Duncan does not apply in the case at bar because: 1) the case do not involve
foundlings 2) the issues raised therein do not involve citizenship.
ON BURDEN OF PROOF

Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of
proving his or her Philippine citizenship. A person who claims to be
qualified to
run for the position of President, because he or she, is a natural born citizen, has the
burden of proving that he/she is indeed a
natural born citizen. Any doubt should
be resolved against him/her. In this case, there is no dispute that petitioner is a
foundling with unknown biological parents. Hence, her certificate of live birth does
not show on tis face that she is a natural born Filipino citizen. This shifted the
burden of evidence to the petitioner that she is eligible to run and she could have
used evidence such as DNA.
SUMMARY: PETITIONER IS NOT A NATURAL BORN CITIZEN BECAUSE:
1. No Philippine law automatically confers Philippine citizenship to a
foundling at birth
2. The 1935 constitution clearly excluded foundlings from being considered
natural born citizens
3. There is no legal presumption in favor of Philippine citizenship, whether
natural or naturalized.
4. There is no treaty, customary international law or general principle of
international law granting automatically Philippine citizenship to a foundling at
birth.
5. Assuming that there is a customary law presuming that foundling is a
citizen of the country where it is found, such presumption cannot prevail over the
Philippine constitution which adopts the jus sanguisinis principle
6. Petitioner failed to discharge her burden to prove that she is a natural
born Filipino citizen
7. Foundling has to perform an act, that is, prove his/her status as a
foundling to acquire a Philippine citizenship. This being so, a foundling can only be
deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because he/she has to perform an act to
acquire Philippine citizenship.
Not being a natural born citizen, petitioner is a nuisance candidate whose
certificate of candidacy for President can motu propio be cancelled by the
COMELEC. There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.