1

Ty vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 127406, 27 November 2000

FACTS:
Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married
with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March
1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church
wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were
declared null and void ab initio for lack of
marriage license and consent of the parties. Even
before the decree nullifying the marriage was
issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on
April 1979 and had their church wedding in
Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued
in August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with
RTC a complaint to have his marriage with
petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled
that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior
marriage with Anna must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly contracted.
However, SC found that the provisions of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case for doing so would prejudice the
vested rights of the petitioner and of her children.

absurd.
Moreover, Philippine laws do not
comprehend an action for damages between
husband and wife merely because of breach of a
marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted.
Marriage
between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and
subsisting and the award of the amount of
P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly
support to their 2 children for as long as they are
of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.

Arcaba vs Tabancura Vda De Batocael, GR No. 146683, 22

November 2001, 370 SCRA (old man-house help loverdonation)
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ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be

awarded to Ofelia Ty.
HELD:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no
damages should be awarded to the wife who
sought damages against the husband for filing a
baseless complaint causing her mental anguish,
anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation
and alienation from her parents. Aside from the
fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private
respondent held valid and subsisting. She is
likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate
wife. To grant her petition for damages would
result to a situation where the husband pays the
wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To
do so, would make the application of the law

Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow

started working for Francisco who was 75
year old widower. The latter did not pay him
any wages as househelper though her family
was provided with food and lodging.
Franciscos health deteriorated and became
bedridden.
Tabancura
testified
that
Franciscos only source of income was the
rentals from his lot near the public streets.

FACTS: Francisco Comille and his wife

Zosima Montallana became the registered
owners of Lot No. 437-A located at
Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog
City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956.
Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his
mother in law executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights,
where the latter waived her share consisting
of of the property in favor of Francisco.
Since Francisco do not have any children to
take care of him after his retirement, he
asked Leticia, his niece, Leticias cousin,
Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner,
who was then a widow and took care of
Franciscos house as well as the store inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila
were lovers since they slept in the same
room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura,
another niece of Francisco claimed that the
latter told her that Cirila was his mistress.
However, Cirila defensed herself that she
was a mere helper who could enter the
masters bedroom when Francisco asked her
to and that Francisco was too old for her.
She denied having sexual intercourse with
Francisco. When the nieces got married,

In January 1991, few months before

Francisco died, he executed a Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos where he ceded a
portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m.,
together with his house to Cirila who
accepted the same. The larger portion of
268 sq m. was left under his name. This was
made in consideration of the 10 year of
faithful services of the petitioner.
Atty
Lacaya notarized the deed and was later
registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993,
the lot received by Cirila had a market value
of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550.
The decedents nephews and nieces and his
heirs by intestate succession alleged that
Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation
inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcabas
favor was valid.
HELD:
The court in this case considered a sufficient
proof of common law relationship wherein
donation is not valid.
The conclusion was
based on the testimony of Tabancura and
certain documents bearing the signature of
Cirila Comille such as application for
business permit, sanitary permit and the
death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact

that Cirila did not demand her wages is an

indication that she was not simply a
caregiver employee.

AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July

1982.

Cohabitation means more than sexual

intercourse, especially when one of the
parties is already old and may no longer be
interested in sex at the very least,
cohabitation is a public assumption of men
and women holding themselves out to the
public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in
favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations

contracted by the husband alone is considered for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.

Ayala Investment vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 1183305, 12

February 1998 (surety agreement) FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00
loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of
PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980
and March 1981 making him jointly and severally
answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed
to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and
Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and
Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal
amount with interests.
Pending the appeal of the
judgment, RTC issued writ of execution.
Thereafter,
Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance
and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of
sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982.
Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners on
the ground that subject loan did not redound to the
benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP
enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way
for the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses
conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to

enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of

the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the
loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the
loan itself.

Go vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 114791, 29 May 1997

HELD:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement
and benefit of PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove
that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the
fact that they happened to be stockholders of said
corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt
and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only to the
extent of his corporate stockholdings.

Family Code Article 73 Exercise of Profession of Either

Spouse
In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with
Nancy Go for the latter to film their wedding. After the
wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding
video but Nancy Go said its not yet ready. She advised
them to return for the wedding video after their
honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to find out
that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding
video because the copy has been erased.

Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the

court, if the money or services are given to another
person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety
or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of obligations for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of
loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal
debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only
signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in
behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an
exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking
in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not
be made liable for the surety agreement which was
clearly for the benefit of PBM.

The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancys

husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled
in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded in their favor,
among others, P75k in moral damages. In her defense
on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they erased the video
tape because as per the terms of their agreement, the
spouses are supposed to claim their wedding tape within
30 days after the wedding, however, the spouses
neglected to get said wedding tape because they only
made their claim after two months; that her husband
should not be impleaded in this suit.

The court did not support the contention of the petitioner

that a benefit for the family may have resulted when the
guarantee was in favor of Chings employment (prolonged
tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige

HELD: Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown

that the spouses Ong made their claim after the
wedding but were advised to return after their
honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their

ISSUE: Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral

damages.

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honeymoon is to be done abroad and wont be able to
return for two months. It is contrary to human nature for
any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video
coverage of their wedding; the fact that the Ongs filed a
case against Nancy Go belies such assertion.
Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and the
fact that the event therein recorded a wedding which
in our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished
and remembered could no longer be reenacted and
was lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding
the Ongs moral damages in compensation for the
mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and
humiliation that the Ongs suffered and which under the
circumstances could be awarded as allowed under
Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code.
Anent the issue that Nancy Gos husband should not be
included in the suit, this argument is valid. Under Article
73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any
profession, occupation or engage in business without the
consent of the husband. In this case, it was shown that
it was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract with
the spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to pay
the damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.

Zulueta vs Pan American World Airways, Inc., GR No. 28589,

08 January 1973 FACTS:
Spouses Rafael Zulueta and Telly Albert Zulueta, with
their daughter boarded a PANAM plane from Honolulu to
Manila, the first leg of which was Wake Island. While on
stopover, Mr. Zulueta found the need to relieve himself
and after finding the terminals comfort rooms full, he
walked down the beach to do his business. Meanwhile,
the flight was called and Mr. Zuluetas absence was
noticed. Heading towards the ram, plaintiff remarked,
You people almost made me miss your flight. You have a
defective announcing system and I was not paged.
Instead of allowing plaintiff to board the plane, however,
the airport manager stopped plaintiff and asked him to
surrender his baggages for inspection. Refusing to comply
with the order, plaintiff was not allowed to board the

plane. His wife and daughter were able to proceed but

were instructed to leave their baggages behind.

With all the foregoing, it is clear that plaintiff is entitled to

damages from respondent company.

Plaintiff instituted present petition for recovery of

damages against respondents for breach of contract. The
defendants, however, maintain that plaintiffs reason for
going to the beach was not to relieve himself but because
he had a quarrel with his wife.

Wong vs. IAC, GR No. 70082, 19 August 1991 FACTS:

ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff is entitled to damages for breach
of contract.
HELD:
YES, plaintiff is entitled to damages. Firstly, plaintiffs
testimony about what he did upon reaching the beach is
uncontradicted. Furthermore, there is absolutely no direct
evidence about said alleged quarrel. If such was true,
surely, plaintiff would not have walked back from the
beach to the terminal before the plane had resumed its
flight to Manila, thereby exposing his presence to the full
view of those who were looking for him.
Anent the request of the common carrier to inspect the
bags of plaintiff, it appears that Captain Zentner received
information that one of the passengers expressed a fear
of a bomb on board the plane. As a result, he asked for
the plaintiffs bags to verify the bomb. Nevertheless, this
claim is unfounded. The Captain failed to explain why he
seemingly assumed that the alleged apprehension of his
information was justified. Plaintiff himself intimated to
them that he was well known to the US State Department
and that the Captain was not even aware of the
informants name or any circumstances which may
substantiate the latters fear of a certain bomb.
Defendants further argue that plaintiff was also guilty of
contributory negligence for failure to reboard the plane
within the 30 minutes announced before the passengers
debarked therefrom. This may have justified a reduction
of the damages had plaintiff been unwittingly left by the
plane, owing to the negligence of PANAM personnel, or
even, wittingly, if he could not be found before the
planes departure. It does not, and cannot have such
justification in the case at bar, plaintiff having shown up
before the plane had taken off and he having been offloaded intentionally and with malice.

Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They

had 3 children however, even during the early years of
their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time
living separately.
During the marriage or on about
January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in
Angeles from his father using the money borrowed from
an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered
an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned
the former pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95.
Katrina failed to return the same within the 20 day period
thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina
issued in September 1972, check of P55,000 which was
dishonored due to lack of funds. The spouses Anita Chan
and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of
money against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The
reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina.
Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a writ of
execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in
Angeles City all in the name of Romarico Henson married
to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public
auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo
Joson. A month before such redemption, Romarico filed
an action for annulment of the decision including the writ
and levy of execution.
ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of
the husband can be satisfied through the conjugal
property.
HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife
entered into the business deal with Anita. The husband
had nothing to do with the business transactions of

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Katrina nor authorized her to enter into such.
The
properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage
with unclear proof where the husband obtained the
money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong
in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that
they are exclusive property of the husband and even
though they had been living separately. A wife may bind
the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things
necessary for support of the family. The writ of execution
cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution of
judgments extends only over properties belonging to the
judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer
for Katrinas obligations as she exclusively incurred the
latter without the consent of her husband nor they did
redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no
evidence submitted that the administration of the
partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico
before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the
decision was void only in so far as Romarico and the
conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still
execute the debt against Katrina, personally and
exclusively.

Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property became conjugal

property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio
without the prior liquidation of the community property
between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void
pursuant to Article 130 of the Family Code. Servacio and
Rito countered that Article 130 of the Family Code was
inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the
sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was
valid to the extent of the portion that was finally allotted
to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also
prejudice any rights of the petitioners as heirs,
considering that what the sale disposed of was within the
aliquot portion of the property that the vendors were
entitled to as heirs.
The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal
property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive
property of Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the
validity of the sale of the property. Aggrieved, the
petitioners went all the way up to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.

Heirs of Protacio Go vs Servacio, GR No. 157537, 07

September 2011 (maasin city valid in their own share)
FACTS:

HELD:
The appeal lacks merit.

Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract ofsale of a

parcel of land. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath
that it was his father Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to Marta Go)
who purchased the said property. Subsequently, Protacio
Go together with his son Rito Go sold a portion of the
property to herein respondent Ester Servacio. On March 2,
2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the
property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand;
hence this case for the annulment of sale of the property.
The contention of the petitioner was that following

Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family

Code,any disposition of the conjugal property after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only
after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Upon Martas death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was
dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code,
and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among
Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to
her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership
pending a liquidation following its liquidation.

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his

children in respect of Martas share in the conjugal
partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any
specific portion of Martas share without an actual
partition of the property being first done either by
agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he
had was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share.
Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share;
hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose
of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his coowners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito
as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners
was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling coowners were thereby effectively transferred, making the
buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share. Article 105
of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the
applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal
partnership is without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the
nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession
of the thing owned in common from the third person who
substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated
their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as
if it continued to remain in the possession of the coowners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v.
Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a
trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in
respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to
her.

Carino vs Carino, GR No. 132529, 02 February 2001, 351

SCRA 127
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Cario married Susan Nicdao
Cario. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4
contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee
Cario. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is

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already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In
1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee.
Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of
SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00
while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In
1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money
against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee
admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized
during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and
Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is
null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage
license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also
claimed that she only found out about the previous
marriage on SPO4s funeral.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage
may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and
void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The
marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void
for the same has been solemnized without the judicial
declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao
and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage,
the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However,
for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime,
or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the
parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. In such
instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage
void.

The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned

by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to
bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc
owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by
each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148
of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by
SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This
is because the two were capacitated to marry each other
for there were no impediments but their marriage was
void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their
situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147
of the FC which provides that everything they earned
during their cohabitation is presumed to have been
equally contributed by each party this includes salaries
and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact
that the other may not have contributed at all.

Lilius vs Manila Railroad, GR No. L-39587, 24 March 1934

FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and
daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna.
It was his first time in the area and he was
entirely unacquainted with the conditions of
the road and had no knowledge of the
existence of a railroad crossing. Before
reaching the crossing in question, there was
nothing to indicate its existence and, it was
impossible to see an approaching train. At
about seven or eight meters from the crossing
the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the
left side of the road. Several people, who
seemed to have alighted from the said truck,
were walking on the opposite side. He slowed
down and sounded his horn for the people to
get out of the way. With his attention thus
occupied, he did not see the crossing but he
heard two short whistles. Immediately
afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling
itself upon him, which turned out to be
locomotive No. 713 of the MRCs train. The
locomotive struck the plaintiffs car right in
the center. The 3 victims were injured and
were hospitalized.
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Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI.

Answering the complaint, it denies each and
every allegation thereof and, by way of
special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with
the cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff,
negligently and recklessly drove his car, and
prays that it be absolved from the complaint.
The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2
parties
appealed
said
decision,
each
assigning errors on said judgement.
ISSUE:
WON Manila Railroad Company is liable for
damages
WON the sums of money fixed by the court a
quo as indemnities for damages proper

Injuries sutained by Lilius

for injuries sustained by wife and child
for loss of domestic service of wife to husband

1. YES

HELD: The judgment appealed from is

affirmed in toto, with the sole modification on
interest to be added on the indemnity in favor
of Lilius.

Upon examination of the oral as well as of the

documentary evidence, this court is of the
opinion that the accident was due to
negligence on the part of the defendantappellant company alone, for not having had
on that occasion any semaphore at the
crossing to serve as a warning to passers-by
of its existence in order that they might take
the necessary precautions before crossing the
railroad; and, on the part of its employees
the flagman and switchman, for not having

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remained at his post at the crossing in
question to
warn
passers-by of
the
approaching train
-

Although it is probable that the defendantappellant entity employed the diligence of a

good father of a family in selecting its
aforesaid employees, however, it did not
employ such diligence in supervising their
work and the discharge of their duties. The
diligence of a good father of a family, which
the law requires in order to avoid damage, is
not confined to the careful and prudent
selection of subordinates or employees but
includes inspection of their work and
supervision of the discharge of their duties.

received by her from the accident, disfigures

her face and that the fracture of her left leg
has caused a permanent deformity which
renders it very difficult for her to walk, and
taking into further consideration her social
standing, neither is the sum adjudicated to
her for patrimonial and moral damages,
excessive.
-

2.
a. With respect to the plaintiffs appeal, the
first question to be decided is that raised by
Lilius relative to the insufficiency of the sum
of P5,000 which the trial court adjudicated to
him by way of indemnity for damages
consisting in the loss of his income as
journalist and author as a result of his illness.
As to the amount of P10,000 claimed by Lilius
as damages for the loss of his wifes services
in his business, which services consisted in
going over his writings, translating them into
foreign languages and acting as his secretary,
in addition to the fact that such services
formed part of the work whereby he realized a
net monthly income of P1,500, there is no
sufficient evidence of the true value of said
services nor to the effect that he needed
them during her illness and had to employ a
translator to act in her stead.
b. Taking into consideration the fact that the
wife in the language of the court, which
saw her at the trial young and beautiful
and the big scar, which she has on her
forehead caused by the lacerated wound

As to the indemnity in favor of the child

neither is the same excessive, taking into
consideration the fact that the lacerations
received by her have left deep scars that
permanently disfigure her face and that the
fractures of both her legs permanently render
it difficult for her to walk freely, continuous
extreme care being necessary in order to
keep her balance in addition to the fact that
all of this unfavorably and to a great extent
affect her matrimonial future.
c. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of
P2,500 for the loss of what is called AngloSaxon common law consortium of his wife,
that is, her services, society and conjugal
companionship, as a result of personal
injuries which she had received from the
accident now under consideration.
Under the law and the doctrine of this court,
one of the husbands rights is to count on his
wifes assistance. This assistance comprises
the management of the home and the
performance of household duties. However,
nowadays when women, in their desire to be
more useful to society and to the nation, are
demanding greater civil rights and are
aspiring to become mans equal in all the
activities of life, marriage has ceased to
create the presumption that a woman
complies with the duties to her husband and
children, which the law imposes upon her,
and he who seeks to collect indemnity for

damages resulting from deprivation of her

domestic services must prove such services.
In the case under consideration, apart from
the services of his wife as translator and
secretary, the value of which has not been
proven, Lilius has not presented any evidence
showing the existence of domestic services
and their nature, rendered by her prior to the
accident, in order that it may serve as a basis
in estimating their value.
-

Furthermore, inasmuch as a wifes domestic

assistance and conjugal companionship are
purely personal and voluntary acts which
neither of the spouses may be compelled to
render, it is necessary for the party claiming
indemnity for the loss of such services to
prove that the person obliged to render them
had done so before he was injured and that
he would be willing to continue rendering
them had he not been prevented from so
doing
NOTES:
However, in order that a victim of an accident
may recover indemnity for damages from the
person liable therefor, it is not enough that
the latter has been guilty of negligence, but it
is also necessary that the said victim has not,
through his own negligence, , contributed to
the accident.
It appears that Lilius took all precautions
which his skill and the presence of his wife
and child, driving his car at a speed which
prudence demanded according to the
circumstances and conditions of the road,
slackening his speed in the face of an
obstacle and blowing his horn upon seeing
persons on the road. If he failed to stop, look
and listen before going over the crossing, in
spite of the fact that he was driving at 12
miles per hour after having been free from

7
obstacles, it was because, his attention
having been occupied in attempting to go
ahead, he did not see the crossing in
question,
nor
anything,
nor
anybody
indicating its existence, as he knew nothing
about it beforehand. The first and only
warning, which he received of the impending
danger, was two short blows from the whistle
of the locomotive immediately preceding the
collision and when the accident had already
become inevitable.
-

Go vs. Yamane, GR No. 160762, 3 May 2006 Petitioners:

Spouses JOSEPHINE MENDOZA GO & HENRY GO
Respondent:
LEONARDO YAMANE
FACTS:
Lot in Baguio City is registered in the name of Muriel
Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane. Atty. De Guzman
whohandled a case for wife and her sisters levied the said
property to satisfy the lien for attorneys fees.
The RTC of Baguio City held that the subject parcel of
land was the paraphernal property of Muriel Yamane and
not theconjugal property of the spouses. Leonardo
Yamane, husband filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied. Thecase was brought to the Court of
Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC.
The appellate court contends that, property acquired
duringmarriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless the
exclusive funds of one spouse are shown to have been
used for thepurpose.
Husbands name appeared on the Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) and the Deed of Absolute Sale. Both
documentsindicate that Muriel was married to Leonardo
Yamane.
ISSUE:

Whether the nature of the property is conjugal or

paraphernal
HELD:
Property purchased by spouses during the existence of
their marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature,
unless it beproved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. (Article 160)The nature of a
property, whether conjugal or paraphernal, is determined
by law and not by the will of one of the spouses.
The mere registration of a property in the name of one
spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. Conjugal
propertycannot be held liable for the personal obligation
contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage of
benefit is shown tohave accrued to the conjugal
partnership.
The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel
of land belonged to the conjugal partnership of Spouses
Murieland Leonardo Yamane. They acquired it from
Eugene Pucay on February 27, 1967, or specifically during
the marriage. Wethen follow the rule that proof of the
acquisition of the subject property during a marriage
suffices to render the statutorypresumption operative. It
is clear enough that the presently disputed piece of land
pertains to the conjugal partnership.
The contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman
and the Pucay sisters appears to have been incurred for
theexclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was acting
privately for her exclusive interest when she joined her
two sisters inhiring the services of Atty. De Guzman to
handle a case for them. Accordingly, whatever expenses
were incurred by Murielin the litigation for her and her
sisters' private and exclusive interests, are her exclusive
responsibility and certainly cannotbe charged against the
contested conjugal property. This piece of land may not
be used to pay for her indebtedness, becauseher
obligation has not been shown to be one of the charges
against the conjugal partnership.
The power of the court in executing judgments extends
only to properties unquestionably belonging to the

judgmentdebtor alone. In this case, therefore, the

property -- being conjugal in nature -- cannot be levied
upon. Petition is DENIED

Pana vs Heirs of Juanete, GR NO. 164201, 10 December

2012
FACTS: Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and
others were accused of murder. Efren was acquitted but
Melecia and another person was found guilty and was
sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay each of the
heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil
indemnity and damages.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased,
the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the
levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren
and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice
of sale on execution were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ
of execution, claiming that the levied properties were
conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and
Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the
satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case.
HELD: Art. 122. The payment of personal debts
contracted by the husband or the wife before or during
the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal
properties partnership except insofar as they redounded
to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed
upon them be charged to the partnership.
The payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon the
spouses may be enforced against the partnership assets
if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if it should be insufficient.
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that
Melecia has no exclusive property of her own, the above
applies. The civil indemnity that the decision in the
murder case imposed on her may be enforced against

8
their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated
in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

Carlos vs. Abelardo, GR No. 146504, 9 April 2002 FACTS:

Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo,
his son-in-law for recovery of the $25,000 loan used to
purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was
in October 1989 when the petitioner issued a check
worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their
married life independently. The seller of the property
acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July 1991,
the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the
amount loaned from him, the spouses pleaded that they
were not yet in position to make a definite settlement.
Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to
the extent of making various death threats against
petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand
but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation.
The spouses were separated in fact for more than a year
prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses filed
separate answers. Abelardo contended that the amount
was never intended as a loan but his share of income on
contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and
that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt
from his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor
of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside
trial courts decision for insufficiency of evidence.
Evidently, there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid
to the owner of the Paranaque property which became
the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed
an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did
not sign.
ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal
dwelling can be charged against the conjugal
partnership.
HELD:

Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family.

They did not deny that the same served as their
conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the
spouses are jointly and severally liable in the payment of
the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a loan
rather a profit share in the construction firm is untenable
since there was no proof that he was part of the
stockholders that will entitle him to the profits and
income of the company.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered
to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000 plus legal
interest including moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.

Guiang vs. CA, GR No. 125172, 26 June 1998

-

Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz are legally

married spouses. The spouses has 3 children.
The Corpuz couple, with plaintiff-wife Gilda
Corpuz as vendee, bought a lot located in
South Cotabato, and particularly from Manuel
Callejo who signed as vendor through a
conditional deed of sale.

Later, the Corpuz spouses sold one-half portion

of their Lot spouses Guiang. The latter have
since then occupied the one-half portion [and]
built their house thereon .They are thus
adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes.
Gilda left for Manila trying to look for work
abroad and her departure was with the consent
of her husband. She was not able to go abroad
though. She stayed for sometime in Manila.

After his wifes departure for Manila, defendant

Judie seldom went home to the conjugal
dwelling.
Sometime in 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that
her father intended to sell the remaining onehalf portion including their house, of their
homelot to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a
letter to her mother informing her. She [Gilda
Corpuz] replied that she was objecting to the
sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father
about this; but instead gave the letter to Mrs.
Luzviminda Guiang so that she [Guiang] would
advise her father
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda
defendant Judie pushed through the sale of the
remaining one-half portion. He sold to
defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a document
known as Deed of Transfer of Rights the
remaining one-half portion of their lot and the
house standing .Transferor Judie Corpuzs
children Junie and Harriet signed the document
as witness.
Four (4) days, obviously to cure whatever
defect in defendant Judie title over the lot
transferred, defendant Luzviminda Guiang as
vendee executed another agreement over the
lot , this time with Manuela Jimenez Callejo, a
widow of the original registered owner from
whom the Corpuz spouses originally bought the
lot , who signed as vendor . Judie signed as a
witness to the sale. The new sale described the
lot differently but it is obvious from the mass of
evidence that the correct lot is the very lot
earlier sold to the corpus spouses.
Plaintiff then returned home. She found her
children staying with other households. Only
Junie was staying in their house. Gilda gathered
her children together and stayed at their
house. Her husband was nowhere to be found.

9
She was informed by her children that their
father had a wife already.
-

For staying in their house sold by her husband,

plaintiff was complained against by defendant
Luzviminda Guiang and her husband before the
Barangay authorities for trespassing. The
parties thereat signed a document known as
amicable settlement. In full, the settlement
provides for, to wit:
That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her
three children, namely: Junie, Hariet and Judie
to leave voluntarily the house of Mr. and Mrs.
Antonio Guiang, where they are presently
boarding without any charge, on or before April
7, 1990

Transfer of Rights, as the amount they paid to

Mrs. Manuela Callejo, having assumed the
remaining obligation of the Corpuzes to Mrs.
Callejo and expenses particularly the taxes and
other expenses towards the transfer of the title
to the spouses Guiangs were incurred for the
whole lot.
-

Believing that she had received the shorter end

of the bargain, Gilda went to the Barangay
Captain to question her signature on the
amicable settlement. She was referred however
to the Office-In-Charge at the time, and the
latter in turn told her that he could not do
anything on the matter.
This particular point not rebutted. The
Barangay Captain who testified did not deny
that Mrs. Gilda Corpuz approached him for the
annulment of the settlement. We thus conclude
that Mrs. Corpuz really approached the
Barangay Captain for the annulment of the
settlement. Annulment not having been made,
plaintiff stayed put in her house and lot.
Defendant-spouses Guiang followed thru the
amicable settlement with a motion for the
execution of the amicable settlement, filing the
same with the MTC of
Koronadal. The
proceedings [are] still pending before the said
court, with the filing of the instant suit.
As a consequence of the sale, the spouses
Guiang spent for the preparation of the Deed of

Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an

Amended Complainant against her husband
Judie and Petitioner-Spouses Guiang. The said
Complaint sought the declaration of a certain
deed of sale, which involved the conjugal
property of private respondent and her
husband, null and void.
The trial court rendered a judgment is rendered
for Gilda and against the defendants therein,
declaring both the Deed of Transfer of Rights
amicable settlement as null void and of no
effect; Recognizing as lawful and valid the
ownership and possession of plaintiff Gilda over
the remaining one-half portion of subject lot 9;
and ordering plaintiff Gilda to reimburse
defendants Luzviminda Guiang the amount
corresponding to the payment made by
defendants Guiangs to Manuel Callejo for the
unpaid balance of the account of plaintiff in
favor of Manuel Callejo.
Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal
with the CA. Respondent Court affirmed the
decision of the trial court

Reconsideration was similarly denied by the

same court, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Petition denied; the challenged decision
affirmed
Whether the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights
was a void or a voidable contract

WON the execution of the amicable

settlement can validly rectify the defect in the
assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights
HELD:
1. VOID CONTRACT.
The Guiang spouses allege that absence of
Gildas consent merely rendered the Deed
voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable
or annullable, even though there may have
been no damage to the contracting parties
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence
or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are
annulled by a proper action in court. They are
susceptible of ratification.(n)
The error in petitioners contention is evident.
Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited
by vices of consent, i.e., contracts which were
entered into by a person whose consent was
obtained and vitiated through mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
In this instance, private respondents consent
to the contract of sale of their conjugal property
was totally inexistent or absent.
The said contract properly falls within the ambit
of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was
correctly applied by the the lower court:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of
the conjugal partnership properly shall belong
to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husbands decision shall
prevail, subject recourse to the court by the
wife for proper remedy, which must be availed

10
of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
-

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or

otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include
the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or
the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as
a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance
by
the
other
spouse
or
authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. (NOTES,
#2)
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud
and the intimidation referred to by petitioners
were perpetrated in the execution of the
document embodying the amicable settlement.
Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay
authorities made her sign said document
through misrepresentation and
coercion. 13 In any event, its execution does
not alter the void character of the deed of sale
between the husband and the petitionersspouses, as will be discussed later. The fact
remains that such contract was entered into
without the wifes consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is
premised on the absence
of private
respondents consent. To constitute a valid
contract, the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of the following elements: (1)
cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, 14 the last

element being indubitably absent in the case at

bar.
-

Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the

husband
cannot
generally
alienate
or
encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wifes consent. The
alienation or encumbrance if so made however
is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The
offended wife may bring an action to annul the
said alienation or encumbrance. Thus the
provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, to wit:

2. NO. Insisting that the contract of sale was

merely voidable, petitioners aver that it was
duly ratified by the contending parties through
the amicable settlement they executed.
The position is not well taken. The trial and the
appellate courts have resolved this issue in
favor of the private respondent. The trial court
correctly held:

By the specific provision of the law [Art. 1390,

Civil Code] therefore, the Deed to Transfer of
Rights cannot be ratified, even by an amicable
settlement. It cannot be denied that the
amicable settlement entered into by plaintiff
Gilda spouses Guiang is a contract. It is a direct
offshoot of the Deed of Transfer of Rights. By
express provision of law, such a contract is also
void:
Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct result
of a previous illegal contract, is also void and
inexistent. (Civil Code of the Philippines).

In summation therefore, both the Deed of

transfer of Rights and the amicable
settlement are null and void.
Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot
be ratified.
NOTES:
1. Comparing said law with its equivalent
provision in the Civil Code, the trial court
adroitly explained the amendatory effect of the
above provision in this wise: 12
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or
encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if
we compare the same with the equivalent
provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage

and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of
any contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such consent is
required, or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property.
Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or
her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage,
may demand the value of property fraudulently
alienated by the husband.(n)
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10)
years . . . during [the] marriage to annul the
alienation or encumbrance was not carried over
to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any
alienation or encumbrance made after August
3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by
the husband of the conjugal partnership
property without the consent of the wife is null
and void.
2. Neither can the amicable settlement be
considered a continuing offer that was
accepted and perfected by the parties,
following the last sentence of Article 124. The
order of the pertinent events is clear: after the
sale, petitioners filed a complaint for
trespassing against private respondent, after
which the barangay authorities secured an
amicable settlement and petitioners filed

11
before the MTC a motion for its execution. The
settlement, however, does not mention a
continuing offer to sell the property or an
acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor
was to the effect that private respondent would
vacate the property. By no stretch of the
imagination, can the Court interpret this
document as the acceptance mentioned in
Article 124.

Jader-Manalo vs. Camaisa, GR No. 147978, 28 January

2002
FACTS:
Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy
the properties of the respondents from the husband of
Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto
Camaisa. After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto
agreed upon the purchase price and terms of payment.
The agreement handwritten by the petitioner was signed
by Edilberto, with assurance from him that he would
secure his wifes consent. Petitioner was later on
surprised when she was informed that respondent
spouses were backing out of the agreement. Hence, she
filed a complaint for specific performance and damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a
conjugal property without the wife's written consent.
HELD:
Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that
one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to
participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers
of disposition or encumbrance which must have the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
The properties subject to the contract in this case were
conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective,
the consent of both husband and wife must be obtained.

Respondent Norma Camaisa did not give her written

consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent
Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of
the subject properties, which she denied, her written
consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. She
may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of
their conjugal properties, however that is not sufficient
to demonstrate consent.

Homeowners Savings vs. Dailo, GR No. 153802, 11 March

2005 FACTS: Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were
married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage the
spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo
City from a certain Dalida. The subject property was
declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of
Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the
exclusion of his wife.
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) in favor of one Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to
obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and
Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house
and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo
obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor,
Gesmundo executed on the same day a Real Estate
Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of
petitioner. The abovementioned transactions, including
the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took
place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.
[
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a
result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the
extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued
in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the
lapse of one year without the property being redeemed,
petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by

executing an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and

a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her
visits to the subject property, Miguela learned that
petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean
its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed
because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the
premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage
constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal
in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo
City a Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and
Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of
Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner.
In the latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that the property in question was the exclusive property
of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a
Decision declaring the said documents null and void and
further ordered the defendant is ordered to reconvey the
property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff, to pay
the plaintiff the sum representing the value of the car
which was burned, the attorneys fees, moral and
exemplary damages.
The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision,
but deleted the award for damages and attorneys fees
for lack of basis. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:

12
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE
MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS
CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED
SHARE.
2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE
PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE
MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED
TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.
HELD: the petition is denied.

1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:

ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. . . .
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court
declared that the absence of the consent of one renders
the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to the husband who
contracted the sale.
Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on
August 8, 1967. In the absence of a marriage
settlement, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains governed the property

relations between respondent and her late husband.

With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the
Family Code was made applicable to conjugal
partnership of gains already established before its
effectivity unless vested rights have already been
acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the
property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino
even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal
partnership of gains is a special type of partnership,
where the husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their
separate properties and those acquired by either or both
spouses through their efforts or by chance. Unlike the
absolute community of property wherein the rules on coownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal
partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements. Thus, the property relations of respondent
and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family
Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership
under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former
prevails because the Civil Code provisions on
partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on
the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime,
without the knowledge and consent of his wife,
Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their conjugal
partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the
Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or
written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.

The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect

to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or
encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on coownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does.
Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate
court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real
estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of
respondents consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he
conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . .
(1)
Debts and obligations contracted by either
spouse without the consent of the other to the extent
that the family may have been benefited; . . . .
Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a
liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to
defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new
Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity
and well-being of the family as a unit.[
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the
creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino
to finance the construction of housing units without a
doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without
adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held
liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
NOTES:

13
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals
that during the trial, petitioner vigorously asserted that
the subject property was the exclusive property of the
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with
the trial court was it alleged that the proceeds of the
loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on
appeal, petitioner never claimed that the family
benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party
adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be
permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit
him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party
but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair
play, justice and due process. A party may change his
legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases
thereof would not require presentation of any further
evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to
properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.

Sps. Lita De Leon & Felic Rio Tarrosa vs. Anita de Leon,
et al., G.R. No. 185063, 23 July
2009
FACTS: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then
single, and the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional
Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment
of a lot situated in Quezon City. On April 24,
1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon. They had
two children, Danilo and Vilma. On June 22,
1970, PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in
favor of Bonifacio upon full payment of the price
of the lot. TCT was issued on February 24, 1972
in the name of Bonifacio, single. On January
12, 1974, Bonifacio sold the lot to his sister, Lita,
and her husband, Felix Tarrosa. The Deed of Sale
did not bear the written consent and signature of
Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, Tarrosa spouses registered
the Deed of Sale. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a
reconveyance suit allegeing that Bonifacio was
still the owner of the lands. Tarrosa spouses
averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was

his exclusive property because he was still single

when he acquired it from PHHC. They further
alleged that they were not aware of the marriage
between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the
execution of the Deed of Sale.
The RTC ruled in favor of Anita De Leon et al
stating that the lot in question was the conjugal
property of Bonifacio and Anita. The CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the property that Bonifacio has
purchased on installment before the marriage
although some installments were paid during the
marriage would be considered conjugal property
HELD: Yes. The subject lot which was once
owned by PHHC and covered by the Conditional
Contract to Sell was only transferred during the
marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. The title to the
property was only passed to Bonifacio after he
had fully paid the purchase price on June 22,
1970. This full payment was made more than 2
years after his marriage to Anita on April 24,
1968.
In effect, the property was acquired
during the existence of the marriage. Hence,
ownership to the property is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership.
Dino vs Dino, GR No. 178044, 19 January 2011 FACTS:
Alain Dino and Ma. Caridad Dino were childhood friends
and sweethearts who started living together in 1984,
separated in 1994, and lived together again in 1996. On
January 14, 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel
Aguilar of Las Pinas City. On May 30, 2001, petitioner filed
for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
the respondents psychological incapacity. Petitioner
alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to
give love and support to him, abandoned her
responsibility to the family and that she was unfaithful.
Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for
divorce and was granted by the Superior Court of
California and that she married a certain Manuel
Alcantara. Doctor Tayag submitted a report establishing

that the respondent

Personality Disorder.

was

suffering

from

Narcissitic

ISSUE:
Did the trial court err when it ordered that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of parties
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code?
HELD:
Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages does not apply to Article 147 of the Family
Code. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that
Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which
are declared void ab initio under Articles 40 and 45 and
not under Article 36 which is the ground for the
nullification of the petitioner and respondents marriage.
Thus, the decision of the trial court is affirmed but with
modifications.

Valdez vs. RTC of Quezon City, GR No. 122749, 31 July

1996, 260 SCRA 221 FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in
1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in
1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was
granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground
of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and
Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother
while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they
prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the
decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in unions without marriage. During

14
the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be
based on co-ownership.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition
of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

Francisco vs. Master Iron Works, GR No. 151967, 16

February 16, 2005 FACTS:
Josefina Castillo was 24 years old when she and Eduardo
Francisco got married on January 1983. The latter was
then employed as Vice President in a Private
Corporation. Josefina acquired two parcels of land where
Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Josefina, married to Eduardo. An affidavit of waiver was
executed by Eduardo where he declared that prior to his
marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land
with her own savings and that he waived whatever
claims he had over the property.
When Josefina
mortgaged the property for a loan, Eduardo affixed his
marital conformity to the deed. In 1990, Eduardo who
was then a General Manager, bought bags of cement
from defendant but failed to pay the same. The latter
filed a complaint for recovery and trial court rendered
judgment against Eduardo. The court then issued a writ
of execution and the sheriif issued a notice of levy on
execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the
recovery of the balance of the amount due under the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party
claim over the 2 parcels of land in which she claimed as
her paraphernal property.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is the conjugal

property of Josefina and Eduardo.
HELD:
The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she
acquired the property with her personal funds before her
cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the sole
owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it
was issued after her marriage. Their case fall under
Article 148 and since they got married before the Family
Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied
retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights.
Petitioner likewise failed that she had any vested right.

Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal

impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art 148
should be applied. In the absence of proof that the
wife/husband has actually contributed money, property,
or industry to the properties acquired during such union
the presumption of co-ownership will not arise.
The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of
CA that the property was conjugal was affirmed.

Abrenica vs Abrenica, GR No. 180572, 18 June 2012

FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica
was a partner of respondents, Attys. Danilo N.
Tungol and Abelardo M. Tibayan, in the Law
irm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan ("the
Frm"). The respondents Fled with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
two cases against petitioner. The Frst was for
Accounting and Return and Transfer of
Partnership unds With Damages and
Application for Issuance of Preliminary
Attachment,
where
they
alleged
that
petitioner reused to return partnership
unds representing profts rom the sale o a
parcel o land in Lemery, Batangas. The
second was also for Accounting and Return
and Transfer of Partnership unds where
respondents
sought
to
recover
rom
petitioner retainer ees that he received
rom two clients o the frm and the balance

o the cash advance that he obtained in

1997. The SEC initially heard the cases but
they were later transferred to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City pursuant to
Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred
jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies
from the SEC to the courts.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court not only
erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction but
more importantly it acted without jurisdiction
or with lack of jurisdiction?
HELD: irst, it reasoned that the remedy of
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court is available only when the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no
fault of petitioners. Considering that the
dismissal of the appeal was directly
attributable to them, the remedy under Rule
47 was no longer available. Second, the CA
stated that the grounds alleged in the Petition
delved on the merits of the case and the
appreciation by the trial court of the evidence
presented to the latter. Under Rule 47, the
grounds for annulment are limited only to
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Lastly,
the CA held that the fact that the trial court
was not designated as a special commercial
court did not mean that the latter had no
jurisdiction over the case. The appellate court
stated that, in any event, petitioners could
have raised this matter on appeal or through
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but
they did not do so.

Quiao vs Quiao, GR No. 176556, 04 July 2012 (legal

separation net profits)
-

FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita

Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in
1977. They had no separate properties prior
to their marriage. During the course of said
marriage, they produced four children. In
2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido
for legal separation for cohabiting with

15
another woman. Subsequently, the RTC
rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the
legal separation of the parties pursuant to
Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal
age), the three minor children remains in the
custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.
-

The properties accrued by the spouses shall

be divided equally between them subject to
the respective legitimes of their children;
however, Brigidos share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership shall be
forfeited in favor of their children in
accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion
for execution, which was granted by the trial
court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards
to the earlier decision; the writ was partially
executed.
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a
motion for clarification asking the RTC to
define Nets Profits Earned. In answer, the
court held that the phrase denotes the
remainder of the properties of the parties
after deducting the separate properties of
each of the spouses and debts.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially
set aside its previous decision stating that
NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in
accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the
FC. However, it later reverted to its original
Order, setting aside the last ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains governs the couples
property relations.
HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on
January 6, 1977. Since at the time of
exchange of martial vows, the operative law
was the NCC and since they did not agree on
a marriage settlement, the property relations

between them is the system of relative

community or the conjugal partnership of
gains. Under this property relation, the
husband and wife place in a common fund the
fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work and industry. The
husband and wife also own in common all the
property of the conjugal partnership of gains.
Beumer vs Amores, GR No. 195670, 03 December 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner. a Dutch national, assails the decision of CA
which affirmed the decision of RTC Negros Oriental.
Petitioner and Filipina respondents marriage was nullified
by basis of the formers psychological incapacity.
Petitioner thus filed for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
praying for distribution of the properties acquired during
their marriage which include 4 lots of land acquired
through purchase and 2 lots by inheritance. RTC ruled
that all parcels of land be given to the respondent, tools
and equipment in favour of the petitioner and the two
houses on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner entitled to assail the decision of the RTC
and CA?
HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Firstly, foreigners may not own
lands in the Philippines. However, there are no restrictions
to the ownership of buildings or structures on lands of
foreigners. As such, the two houses on Lots 1 and 2142
are considered co-owned by the parties. Facts:
Beumer, a Dutch National, and Amores, a Filipina, was
married on March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC
of Negros
Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis
of the
formers
psychological
incapacity.
Consequently,
petitioner filed a
Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and prayed
for the
distribution of several properties claimed to have been
acquired
during the subsistence of their marriage.

Amores averred that, with the exception of their 2

residential
houses, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal
properties
during their marriage, and that she was able to acquire 4
other lots
out of her personal funds and 2 others by way of
inheritance.On the
other hand, Beumer testified that while the 4 other lots
were
registered in the name of respondent, these properties
were acquired
with the money he received from the Dutch government
as his
disability benefit.
32
Issue:WON Beumer has the right to claim reimbursement
from the purchase of
the real properties subject to the dissolution proceedings?
Held:
NO. In the case of Muller v. Muller, the Court held that one
cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition
against foreign
ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7,
Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well
aware of the
above-cited
constitutional
prohibition"
and
even
asseverated that, because of
such prohibition, he and respondent registered the
subject properties in the
latters name.
The time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity
must do equity,
and he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands. Conversely stated,
he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity.
Thus, a litigant may be
denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his
conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful.
The Court cannot grant reimbursement to petitioner given
that he

16
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties
by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase. Surely, a contract that violates
the Constitution
and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no
obligations and
produces no legal effect at all.
This case provides the exception to Art. 117, which
provides that, the following
are conjugal partnership properties:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage
at the expense of
the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for
only one of the spouses; XXX
Fuentes vs Roca, GR No. 178902, 21 April 2010
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES, Petitioners,
vs. CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE
MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and PILAR MALCAMPO, Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
Note: A forged affidavit of consent is void. Thus, anything
based on such instrument is likewise void.
The husband of a wife who no longer lives with him sold a
conjugal property without her consent as the affidavit of
consent was forged. After their death, their children
questioned the sale. It must be emphasized that their
marriage was contracted under the Civil Code, but the
sale was executed under the Family Code. Ruling that the
Family Code applies, the High Court held that the sale
could be made by the husband without the consent of the
wife. The SC ruled:
Note: Even if the marriage took place under the Civil, the
validity of sales of community or conjugal property is still
governed by the Family Code.
When the spouses got married, the Civil Code put in place
the system of conjugal partnership of gains on their

property relations. While its Article 165 made the

husband the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from selling
commonly owned real property without his wifes consent.
Still, if he sold the same without his wifes consent, the
sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave the
wife the right to have the sale annulled during the
marriage within ten years from the date of the sale.
Failing in that, she or her heirs may demand, after
dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property
that the husband fraudulently sold.
The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly
superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property
Relations Between Husband and Wife. The Family Code
provisions were also made to apply to already existing
conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights.
Thus:
Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also
apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this
Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as
provided in Article 256. (n)

Ravina vs Abrille, GR No. 160708, 16 October 2009

FACTS:
Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa
Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children,
who are also parties to the instant case and are
represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel
of land denominated as Lot 7, located in Davao City, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674
in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land

which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which

is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471.
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from
the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the
spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot. The house
was finished in the early 1980s but the spouses
continuously made improvements, including a poultry
house and an annex.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his
family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their
movables to support the family and the studies of her
children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and
the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo
Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of
her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and
the two lots without Mary Anns consent, as evidenced by
a Deed of Sale[5]. It appears on the said deed that Mary
Ann did not sign on top of her name.
On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house
and the four children were in school, Pedro together with
armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with
petitioners[6] began transferring all their belongings from
the house to an apartment.
When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came
home, they were stopped from entering it. They waited
outside the gate until evening under the rain. They
sought help from the Talomo Police Station, but police
authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a
family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused
stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so much so
that one flunked at school.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo
ravina are liable for damages, the same being contrary to
law and evidence.[10]
RULING:
The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by
which respondent and her children were removed from

17
the family home deserves our condemnation. While
respondent was out and her children were in school,
Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the
petitioners[21] surreptitiously transferred all their
personal belongings to another place. The respondents
then were not allowed to enter their rightful home or
family abode despite their impassioned pleas.
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.[22] When a right is exercised in a manner that
does not conform with such norms and results in
damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrong doer must be held responsible.
Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damages caused. [23] It is patent in this case that
petitioners alleged acts fall short of these established
civil law standards.

Borromeo vs Descaller, GR No. 159310, 24 February 2009

FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta
Opalla-Descallar. They fell in love and live together. They
bought a house and lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was
issued in their names. However, when the Deed of
Absolute Sale was presented for registration, it was
refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and
could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain.
Consequently, his name was erased but his signature
remained and the property was issued on the name of the
Respondent alone. However their relationship did not last
long and they found new love.
Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in
business. Jambrich indebted the petitioner for a sum of
money and to pay his debt, he sold some of his properties
to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment
was issued in his favor. However, when the Petitioner

sought to register the deed of assignment it found out

that said land was registered in the name of Respondent.
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for
recovery of real property.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties
in question and may not transfer and assign any rights
and interest in favor of the petitioner?
2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the
name of respondents make his the owner thereof.
RULINGS:
1. The evidence clearly shows that as between
respondent and Jambrich, it was Jambrich who possesses
the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute.
At the time of the acquisition of the properties, Jamrich
was the source of funds used to purchase the three
parcels of land, and to construct the house. Jambrich was
the owner of the properties in question, but his name was
deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal
constraints. Nevertheless, his signature remained in the
deed of sale where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich
has all authority to transfer all his rights, interest and
participation over the subject properties to petitioner by
virtue of Deed of Assignment. Furthermore, the fact that
the disputed properties were acquired during the couples
cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of coownership applies to a man and a woman living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to
marry each other does not apply. At the case at bar,
respondent was still legally married to another when she
and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous
relationship and no co-ownership exists between the
parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove
his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to able to lay claim to any portion of it.
2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the
existence with notice to the world at large. The mere
possession of a title does not make one the true owner of
the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the

titles of the disputed properties in her name does not

necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the
owner.

Villanueva vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 143286, 14 April

2004 (husband left legitimate family for mistress)
FACTS: On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a
complaint before the trial court against her husband
Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas son with
Pacita, Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia sought the
reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several
properties (subject properties), claiming that such are her
conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia, is the
legal wife of defendant Nicolas, having been married on
October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot
five (5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue City.
During their marriage, they acquired real properties and
all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and
Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of
land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his
parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the
purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8)
parcels of land in Mandaue City. Some of the properties
earn income from coconuts leased to corporations
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family
and cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein
Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas,
then, was the only person who received the income of the
properties. Pacita, from the time she started living in
concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no
properties of her own from which she could derive
income. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the
present, his illegitimate son is already the one who has
been receiving the income of his properties
Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial
court in favor of Eusebia Natuya. Petitioners appealed.

18
Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs. CA
upheld trial courts decision

presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that

all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties acquired

during the marriage between Eusebia and Procopio are
conjugal

Boado vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 145222, 24 April 2009

FACTS:
Mr. and Mrs. Buado filed a civil case against Erlinda
Nicol. On April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision
ordering Erlinda to pay damages to the petitioners. The
personal properties of Erlinda were insufficient to pay the
damages. The sheriff levied and auctioned the property
of Erlinda. An auction sale was held with the petitioners
as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in
favor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. After almost one year, the
husband of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for the
annulment of certificate of sale and damages with
preliminary injunction against petitioners and deputy
sheriff. He argued that there was no proper publication
and posting for the auction sale. He also claimed that the
judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol amounted to P40,000
only. The spouses Buado obtained the P500,000 worth of
property for only P51,685. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the petition of Romulo Nicol. The Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and held that
Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by
the respondent in this case. The petitioners filed a
petition where they said that the Court of Appeals
committed a grave abuse of discretion for reversing the
decision given by the RTC.

HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of

CA affirmed
RATIO: The Family Code provisions on conjugal
partnerships govern the property relations between
Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the
effectivity of Family Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that
the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships
established before the Family Code without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or
other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties
are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that
they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party
claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counterbalanced by the requirement that the properties must
first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage
before they are presumed conjugal.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926.
Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia
died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were
married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves
admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957.
The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.

Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were

acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol

arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the
conjugal partnership.
HELD: NO. Erlinda Nicols liability is not chargeable to the
conjugal partnership. Unlike in the system of absolute
community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by
reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the
absolute community of property, in the absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of
the

debtorspouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the

system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal
partnership of gains has no duty to make advance
payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Petitioners
argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her
criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
The Supreme Court does not agree to the contention of
Mr. and Mrs. Buado. In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court
held that the car which was claimed by the third party
complainant to be conjugal property was being levied
upon to enforce "a judgment for support" filed by a third
person, the third-party claim of the wife is proper since
the obligation which is personal to the husband is
chargeable not on the conjugal property but on his
separate property. Hence, the filing of a separate action
by Romulo Nicol was proper. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is affirmed.

Veloso vs Martinez, GR No. L-8715, 24 October 1914

ROBERTO and VENUS BUADO vs COURT OF APPEALS and
ROMULO NICOL
Mariano Veloso vs. Lucia Martinez,personally and as
administratrix of theestate of Domingo Franco
On the 1st day of July, 1911, the plaintiff commenced an
action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Cebu
to recover of the defendant, personally and as
administratrix of the estate of Domingo Franco, deceased,
the possession of a certain parcel of land particularly
described in the second paragraph of the complaint,
together with the sum of P125 per month, from the 1st day
of June, 1911.
The defendant presented a demurrer to said complaint,
which was overruled. No exception was taken to the ruling
of the court upon the demurrer. Later the defendant
answered, setting up a general denial and a special
defense. The special defense consisted

19

First. Of a counterclaim in the sum of P18,500, as attorney's

fees for services rendered by the deceased, Domingo
Franco, to the plaintiff; and, second, for the recovery of
certain jewelry, of the value of P6,000, particularly
described in the answer of the defendant, alleged to be in
the possession of the plaintiff.
The first special defense, relating to attorney's fees, was
later withdrawn by the defendant. The only questions left
for litigation were: .
First. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to the recovery of
the parcel of land in question; and, second, whether the
defendant was entitled to recover from the plaintiff the
jewelry described in her answer.
After hearing the evidence, the Honorable Adoph
Wislizenus, judge, in a carefully prepared opinion, found
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the possession of
the land in question, together with the sum of P100 for each
month from the month of June, 1911, until the possession of
the land was returned to him.
The lower court further found that the defendant was
entitled to the possession of said jewelry, and ordered the
plaintiff to return the same to her and in case of the
plaintiff's failure to return said jewelry to the defendant,
then and in that case, he shall pay to the defendant, for
such failure, the sum of P6,000.
From the judgment of the lower court, each of the parties,
plaintiff and defendant, appealed to this court. Later the
defendant withdrew her appeal, thereby allowing that part
of the judgment relating to the plaintiff's right to the
possession of the land in question, together with damages,
to become final. The only question remaining, therefore, for
this court to decide is as to the ownership and right of
possession of said jewels. It is admitted that the jewels in

question, before the possession of the same was given to

the plaintiff, belonged to the defendant personally and that
she had inherited the same from her mother. The
defendant, Lucia Martinez, is the widow of Domingo Franco,
and after the death of her husband she was appointed
administratrix of his estate. The record further shows
(Exhibit C) that a short time before the death of Domingo
Franco he borrowed from the plaintiff the sum of P4,500
and gave as security for the payment of said sum the
jewelry described in the complaint. The money was
borrowed on the 7th day of April, 1911, under promise to
repay the same, with 12 per cent interest, on the 7th day of
May, 1911. It is not clear whether or not the jewelry, at the
time of the execution of said document (Exhibit C), was in
fact delivered to the plaintiff. Said exhibit states that the
jewelry was contained "dentro de una caja que queda
cerrada despues de demonstradas las alhajas a D. Mariano
Veloso" (in a box which remains closed after the jewels
were shown to Mariano Veloso). The document further
admits the "la llava quedara en poder de D. Domingo
Franco" (the key shall remain in possession of Domingo
Franco). After the death of Domingo Franco it appears that
said jewelry was found in the same "caja" and that the key
was in the possession of the defendant. It is very doubtful,
indeed, under the facts, whether the plaintiff ever obtained
the actual possession of the jewelry. His possession,
however, seems to be admitted by the defendant in the
present action. So far as the record shows the jewelry was
in the same box where it was found at the time of the
execution and delivery of said Exhibit C and that the
defendant still has the key to said box.
During the trial of the cause the plaintiff attempted to show
that the jewels in question were pawned to him by Domingo
Franco, with the full knowledge and consent of the
defendant. And not only that, the plaintiff further attempts
to show that after the death of Domingo Franco, the
defendant promised to pay the amount for which the said
jewels were pawned. The defendant positively denies that

she knew that her husband had pawned her jewels or that
she promised to redeem the same by paying the amount
due. No explanation is contained in the record why the
jewels were placed in said box (presumably a money safe).
In view of the fact, however, that the record shows that the
jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife,
acquired from her mother, and in the absence of further
proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her
paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she
exercised dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil
Code.) She had the exclusive control and management of
the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her
husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the
husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil
Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever
delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for
any purpose. That being true, she could not be deprived of
the same by any act of her husband, without her consent,
and without compliance with the provisions of the Civil
Code above cited.1awphil.net
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the defendant is
entitled to the possession of said jewels, or to their value,
amounting to P6,000.
The judgment of the lower court is therefore affirmed, with
costs.
G-Tractors Inc. vs Court of Appeals, GR No. L-57402, 28
February 1985 (logging business contract w/ G Tractors
suable to the conjugal property)
This was the ruling in the case of G Tractors
Inc. vs CA and spouses Nicasio. The husband
was engaged in the logging business. He
obtained a logging concession from the
government. In pursuit of this business, he
alone entered into a contract with G Tractors
for the purpose of the logging business. Due
to the non-payment of the stipulated rentals
for the heavy equipment, the owner of the
equipment goes to court for the collection of

20

the unpaid rentals. G Tractors won and now

seeks to enforce the money judgment, but G
tractors levy on execution a property
belonging to the community property. WON
this obligation enforce against a common
property when Mr. Nicasio was the only one
who incurred this obligation and there was no
showing that it benefit of the family because
in fact the business went down the
drain.maybe
The Supreme Court said Mr. Nicasio ventured
into this business which is intended for the
family. It is not required if the nature of the

construction itself that it would normally

redound to the benefit of the family, it is not
required that actual benefit is incurred to the
family, it is enough that it is presumed to
have been intended for the benefit of the
family. So when the business went down the
drain any liability incurred thereof maybe
enforce against the common/community
property. The incurring spouse should not be
left alone.