This Project has been submitted by

Ms Eshika Maji
ID No: 212077
On: 13/02/2015
Public International Law & Human Rights
Law
During the Monsoon Semester 2013
Topic:
The Practice of States as Regards Nuclear
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
Treaties

Contents
I. Introduction.....................................................................................3
II. Current Assessment.......................................................................4
III. Treaties..........................................................................................5
A. Non-Proliferation Treaty............................................................5
B. Tlatelolco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America and the Caribbean..................................................6
C. Rarotonga Treaty on a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone.......7
D. Bangkok Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free
Zone...................................................................................................8
E. Pelindaba Treaty on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone8
F. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty..................................9
G. Semipalatinsk Treaty an a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in
Central Asia....................................................................................10
IV. Conclusion...................................................................................11

The Practice of States As Regards Nuclear Disarmament

and Non-Proliferation Treaties

Abstract
Today there is no wide-ranging and universal ban on the use of nuclear weapons in
either customary or conventional international law. The obligation on states to
eliminate nuclear weapons, their strategies to update their weapon systems, and
their views on the possible uses of nuclear weapons. There is an extensive history of
all of todays nuclear weapon states pledging in principle to nuclear disarmament.
Article VI of the 1970 nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) commits its five
nuclear-weapon-state parties: to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament. This paper endeavors to trace nation states international
political commitments to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, their practices
regarding nuclear disarmament treaties and advances policy arguments for better
implementation of nuclear disarmament treaties according to customary
international law.

I. Introduction
Today, the security in the world is threatened by the proliferation of nuclear weapons in both
state and Non-state actors. States like China and India among seven others, are believed to
possess nuclear weapons, while around an estimated thirty states like South Korea are
technologically enabled to quickly acquire them. 1 The access to dual-use of technologies
seems to be on the rise in this era of energy crisis, competition for nuclear energy and the
continued diffusion of scientific and technical knowledge.
There has been consensus in the last decade, both implied and explicit, that substantial arms
reduction is the need of the hour. This is evident through the 2009 landmark speech of the US
President in Prague, the passing of the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887 in
2009 regarding accelerated efforts toward total nuclear disarmament,2 and the increase in the
1 International Atomic Energy Agency,
https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull492/49204734548.html
(last visited Feb. 11, 2015).
2 Council on Foreign Relations, UN Security Council Resolution 1887, Nonproliferation, (Feb 10, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/international-organizations-and3

number of states ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to 157 in 2011, leading to the
inclusion of countries like United States, Israel, and Iran.
In spite of the apparent success of the current global nonproliferation or disarmament regime,
the existing multilateral institutions have failed in the case of preventing countries like India,
Pakistan, and North Korea from "going nuclear," and in dealing with the nuclear issue in Iran
as well as Non-state terrorist groups. This evidences the need for an updated framework of
regulation to effectively deal with the current issues, along with the fulfilment of the greater
objective of "peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons".3

II. Current Assessment

The International Instruments were successful till 1991, however the post-1991 period has
shown a downfall in their effectiveness. States like India, Israel, and Pakistan, acquired
nuclear weapons during the Cold War, while for five decades consequent to the development
of nuclear technology only nine states have developed the technology, but since 1945 no
country has made use of any nuclear weapon. 4 However, the same Institutions which were
successful until 1991, failed in deterring the proliferation in countries like Pakistan, Iraq,
Iran, North Korea, Libya, or Syria. Serious concerns were voiced by various countries, after
such Institutions failed in stopping the continued advancement of nuclear program in Iran,
through economic sanctions and global condemnation. 5 Additionally, the successful ventures
like Libya's abandoning its nuclear program in 2003 and the accession of all of the Soviet
successor states except Russia to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as nonnuclear

alliances/un-security-council-resolution-1887-non-proliferation/p20316.
3 Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech
Republic, WHITE HOUSE PRESS RELEASE, (Feb 10, 2015),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-BarackObama-In-Prague-As-Delivered .
4 The Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, (Feb 10, 2015), http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-anddisarmament/global-nuclear-nonproliferation-regime/p18984.
5 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, February 2012, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, (Feb 10, 2015),
http://www.cfr.org/iran/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamicrepublic-iran-february-2012/p27467.
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weapon states, were a product of government-to-government negotiations rather that action

by global bodies.
The operation of the International organization is complemented by ad hoc forums of
interested parties, such as the Six Party Talks on North Korea, the P5+1 grouping on Iran, and
the biannual global nuclear security summits. Even such forums have failed in addressing the
issues which were presented by countries like Iran and North Korea. 6 Such failures at
deterring the spread of nuclear weapons, have raised doubts regarding the sustainability of the
nonproliferation regime.
At the same time, it is seen that initiatives by the major nuclear powers have revived the
efforts. A New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), after the expiry of the earlier
one in December 2009,7 has been entered into on February 2011.8 A pledge by the Obama
administration for the Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
and reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense doctrine, has gone a long way in
ensuring the revival of the issue.9 Countries like Iran and North Korea still pose a threat to the
success of the effort, and to the international peace at large.

III. Treaties
A. Non-Proliferation Treaty
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most vital constituent of the world
nonproliferation regime. It creates a broad, legally obligatory structure based on three basic
doctrines: (1) states not possessing nuclear weapons, prior to a year the treaty opened for
signature, should not agree to obtain them; (2) As of 1967 the five states which have tested
nuclear weapons- the Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) - should not consent in assisting other
6 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, November 2011, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, (Feb 10, 2015),
http://www.cfr.org/iran/implementation-npt-safeguards-agreement-islamicrepublic-iran-november-2011/p26448.
7 http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/strategicarms-reduction-treaty-start-/p15097
8 http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/new-starttreaty/p21851
9 http://www.cfr.org/defense-strategy/sustaining-us-global-leadership-priorities21st-century-defense/p26976
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states in obtaining nuclear weapons. All states should endeavor to move towards complete
disarmament; (3) the Non-nuclear Weapons State (NNWS) should be allowed access to
energy development and civilian nuclear technology.10
NNWS are subject to protections to guarantee that technology and materials from civilian
actions are not utilized in weapons programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) is the executing body for the NPT, observing compliance with the treaty and helping
NNWS in harnessing civilian technology.11 Even though the scope and obligation of the NPT
and the IAEA are comparatively broad, there is a serious gap in application: 189 states are
members to the treaty, but three of the world's nine nuclear powersIsrael, India and
Pakistan did not sign the treaty, and a fourthNorth Koreawithdrew in 2003. Therefore,
even if implementation of the current regime were not in dispute, approximately half of the
world's nuclear-armed states have been left out from its provisions.
By scheme, the NPT does not talk about proliferation by non-state parties. After the attacks of
September 11, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1540, a legally obligatory mechanism
necessitating all UN member states to ratify and implement measures to prevent non-state
parties from obtaining Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Several states in the UN
General Assembly, nevertheless, have debated that the UNSC did not have the power to levy
a binding resolution in this zone. Partially as a consequence, some states have resisted
collaboration with the 1540 Committee instituted to supervise execution of the resolution.
An appraisal of the NPT in 2010 concluded with modest achievement. The concluding
outcome document recommits members to the codes of the treaty, offers some detailed action
plans for nonproliferation and disarmament, and appeals for the removal of nuclear weapons
from the Middle East through the formation of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the area.12

B. Tlatelolco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin

America and the Caribbean
10 http://www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-control-and-disarmament/globalnuclear-nonproliferation-regime/p18984
11 https://www.iaea.org/front
12 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?
symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20%28VOL.I%29
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The Tlatelolco Treaty which covers the Latin America Region and the Caribbean region,
came into full force after the ratification by Cuba in 2002, leading to all the 33 states of the
region ratifying the treaty. Since then, the treaty has been a model for all future Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) agreements
The Article 1of the Treaty lists out the obligations of the Member States as follows:
1. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the
nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and
prevent in their respective territories:
a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever
of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on
behalf of anyone else or in any other way; and
b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any
nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on
their behalf or in any other way.
2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or
authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use,
manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon.
The concerned area was declared as a Zone of Peace, at the Second Summit of the
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in Havana, on the basis of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco and international law. The member states at this Summit reaffirmed their
commitment to abide by the treatys nuclear disarmament policy.13

C. Rarotonga Treaty on a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty which was signed at Rarotonga in
1985 and which came into force in 1986, established the second nuclear-weapon-free zone.
The Treaty is restricted to member States of the South Pacific Forum, an international
13
http://www.2020visioncampaign.org/en/home/artikel/c7dd66360d64cfd88c8d05c
ca395e37c/latin-america-and-the-caribbean-cele.html
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organization aimed at promoting regional cooperation among countries of the Pacific

region.14
The Treaty mandates that the States Parties shall not manufacture or otherwise acquire,
possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive device anywhere inside or outside the
Treaty zone; and neither would they seek or receive any assistance in this or provide any
assistance in the same; that they shall not provide sources or special fissionable materials or
equipment to any NNWS, or NWS unless it is subject to safeguards agreements with the
IAEA. It is an obligation upon the States Parties to prevent any stationing of any nuclear
explosive device in the territory of States Parties, and to prevent the testing of any nuclear
explosive device. The Treaty also requires the State Party to dump radioactive wastes and
other radioactive matter at sea, anywhere within the SPNFZ, and at the same time prevent the
dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter by anyone in the territorial sea of
the States Parties.

D. Bangkok Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

As a result of the end of the Cold War and a decade after the Rarotonga Treaty, the treaty
forming a nuclear weapon free zone in South-East Asia, known as the Bangkok Treaty was
signed on December 15, 1995. Similar to its precedents, it has its origins in the Cold War and
reproduces the ASEAN States perception of facing economic, political, and security
challenges. The seven states of the ASEAN which are Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, together with Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar
became members of the Treaty creating NWFZs in Southeast Asia.15
States Parties are under an obligation not to produce, develop or otherwise acquire, own or
control nuclear weapons; place nuclear weapons; or use or test nuclear weapons anywhere
outside or inside the treaty area; not to pursue or obtain any assistance in this; not to take any
step to support or assist in the producing or acquisitioning of any nuclear device by any state;
not to offer any source or special explosive supplies or apparatus to any NNWS, or any NWS
without being subject to safeguards treaties with the IAEA; to avert in the territory of States
14 http://www.state.gov/t/isn/5189.htm
15 http://www.opanal.org/NWFZ/Bangkok/bangkok_en.htm
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Parties the positioning of any nuclear explosive device; to check the testing of any nuclear
explosive material; not to dump radioactive wastes and other radioactive material at sea
anywhere within the treaty area, and to check the dumping of radioactive trash and other
radioactive substances by anyone in the regional sea of the members.16

E. Pelindaba Treaty on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

For thirty-two years, efforts were being made to make Africa a Nuclear Weapon Free State.
This resulted in The Treaty of Pelindaba, also called The African Nuclear Weapon Free
Zone Treaty (ANWFZT). The Organization of African Unity (OAU) in its 1964 Summit
in Cairo officially declared its intention to denuclearize Africa via a treaty. The United
Nations passed a resolution with regard to this and in 1965 and this was supported by the
United States. The US played an important role in the development of the main text of the
treaty.
The treaty was fashioned to its final form through the efforts of the OAU and the United
Nations. It was thereafter adopted by the OAU at the same site where first nuclear device was
constructed by the South African government. This took place in 1995. A year later, in Cairo,
it was opened up to the fifty-three states of Africa. The treaty entered into force in 2009 as a
consequence of Burundi depositing its instrument of ratification. This was shortly followed
by Tunisia bringing the total number of parties to 29. The treaty enumerated certain tasks to
be performed by the OAU but the OAU was superseded by the African Union in 2002. 17
All parties to the treaty are prohibited from developing, acquiring, stockpiling, researching,
manufacturing controlling or even possessing nuclear weapons or devices and even assisting
or seeking assistance with regard to any of the above. Presence of nuclear weapons or devices
in the territories of these countries is prohibited altogether. Further dumping of radioactive
waste is also prohibited. All parties to the treaty promise to not conduct any nuclear tests or
the like and to avoid such tests or explosions in areas under their control. The countries are
however permitted to allow foreign vessels, aircrafts and the like to visit their ports and
airfields etc. Additionally, the Parties are supposed to declare any prior knowledge in the
manufacture, dismantling and destruction of any nuclear device by them before the coming
16 http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/southeast-asian-nuclear-weapon-freezone-seanwfz-treaty-bangkok-treaty/
17 http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4699.htm
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into force of this treaty. With the verification of the IAEA, they also have to dismantle and
destroy nuclear explosive devices that they already possess. The treaty permits that parties to
take part in nuclear activities that are peaceful. The parties have an obligation to have
safeguard agreements that have been verified by IAEA for such activities. The parties cannot
use nuclear forces for armed attack or the like in the zone of application of the treaty.18

F. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was tabled for being signed by
States in 1996. It is a worldwide ban on the testing of nuclear explosives that is legally
binding. It has thus been held to be the final phase of the vision that President Kennedy had
proposed fifty years ago. The United States of America has, unilaterally, from the year 1992,
ceased testing of nuclear explosives. The cessation can be explained on the fact that the US
does not require such tests in order to protect its national security and therefore we
discourage any sort of nuclear attack on the US. Further, it would completely fall in the
security interest of the US to reinforce the international rules prohibiting testing of nuclear
weapons.
If it came into force, the CTBT would make it nuclear explosive tests illegal for all members
that signed it. The treaty would do the following:
1) Deter countries that lack experience and expertise in nuclear weapons from improving the
same and at the same time would not affect the capacity of the US preserve the nuclear
deterrent force that it has. As for the States that would still have nuclear weapons
programs and the like, they would have to bear the risk of deploying the weapons without
knowledge of whether they would work as expected or not or they could suffer
international ridicule, disapproval and condemnation for violating the treaty and
conducting tests.
2) Prevent countries that do have expertise in nuclear weapons from verifying their nuclear
weapons and designs that they have not yet had a chance to successfully to do in the past.
3) Restraining nuclear arms race regionally for the next couple of decades. This would be
especially effecting in the Asian countries that are developing and building up better
nuclear forces.
4) Semipalatinsk Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia
18 http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/african-nuclear-weapon-free-zoneanwfz-treaty-pelindaba-treaty/
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G. Semipalatinsk Treaty an a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Central Asia

On 6th May 2014, the members of the United Nations Security Council, who are also the Five
Nuclear Powers of the World met in New York and signed a new protocol on the already
existing Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty. This protocol
aimed to create a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. This treaty binds these five countries
and requires that they do not acquire, posses, test or manufacture nuclear weapons.
All parties to the treaty are prohibited from developing, acquiring, stockpiling, researching,
manufacturing controlling or even possessing nuclear weapons or devices and even assisting
or seeking assistance with regard to any of the above. Presence of nuclear weapons or devices
in the territories of these countries is prohibited altogether. All parties to the treaty promise to
not conduct any nuclear tests or the like and to avoid such tests or explosions in areas under
their control.
The parties to the treaty will agree to finish with the IAEA and to bring a Safeguards
Agreement and an Additional Protocol to the treaty before 18 months lapse after it comes into
force. Export Controls also have to be initiated by the parties. They would not provide
fissionable or source materials to NNWS that have no finished an IAEA inclusive Safeguards
Agreement and an Additional Protocol. The States would also have the obligation to
physically protect nuclear materials and devices. It must however be remembered that this
treaty would not affect the rights and obligations that parties would have due to other treaties
that are members of, which they signed before signing the CANWFZ. This point is now
contentious between some NWS and the Central Asian States. Amendments can be made to
the treaty by general consensus.19

IV. Conclusion
Recent developments have brought the nuclear non-proliferation regime to the threshold of
serious crisis. The regime is under attack from both and non-state actors and rogue states, and
its basic bargain between the nuclear haves and have-nots is eroding. Boosting international
fetters on the world's most lethal weapons will need the State Parties to adopt substantial
19 http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/central-asia-nuclear-weapon-freezone-canwz/
11

steps to reinforce and close gaps in current treaty administrations, bodies, and partnerships.
Some recommendations to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime are:
1. The IAEA offers services on strengthening nuclear security so as to prevent atomic and
nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands. Therefore, increasing the IAEA
budget and improving the security, safeguards and personnel systems will go a long way
in strengthening the global non-proliferation regime.
2. Improving national and international efforts to bring the CTBT into the picture and its
implementation effective. The CTBT is specially related to the global non-proliferation
regime, and its implementation would strengthen the fight against proliferation of nuclear
weapons and make it more problematic for states to have belief that nuclear devices
would work without testing.

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