CHAPTER FOUR

CHALLENGES FACING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NAIROBI

PROTOCOL IN KENYA
4.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the challenges that have confronted the efficient implementation
of the Nairobi Protocol and realization of its objectives as envisioned by the member
states. Specifically this chapter will cover challenges related to inability by the Kenyan
government to contain and prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of,
trafficking in, possession and use of small arms and light weapons in Kenya.
Additionally this chapter will establish the factors that hinder effective promotion and
facilitation of information sharing and cooperation between the governments in the subregion, as well as between governments, inter-governmental organizations and civil
society, in all matters relating to the illicit trafficking and proliferation of small arms and
light weapons. First, the study will review the security status of Kenya so as to
comprehend the real challenges hindering the successful implementation of Nairobi
Protocol.
The study will utilize both primary and secondary sources of data to derive the challenges
faced by law enforcement agencies in addressing issues related to small arms and light
weapons. The views and opinions of respondents who participated in this research
collaborated with institutional reports as well as governments monitoring and evaluation
reports will constitute the major sources informing this chapter. This is because in the
past few years Kenya has become increasingly insecure, partly, due to high prevalence of
SALW in the country. Internally, it has experienced rampant banditry, executed through
illegal SALWs and that continues to claim tens of lives. This research therefore seeks to

establish the real root causes of insecurity in Kenya so as figure out the challenges therein
3.2 Roots of Insecurity in Kenya
Kenya has increasingly become a dangerous place for its citizens and visitors. There are
two main sources of insecurity, one external and the other internal. The external threat is
in the form of terrorism that is often guised as an Islamic Jihad (holy war). At present the
main perpetrator of this kind of terrorism in Kenya is the Al-Shabaab terrorist
organization originating and operating from Somalia. Increasingly they are using a
strategy of sporadic guerrilla attacks that target non-Muslims for extermination while
sparing Muslims. The failure of their victims to recite passages of the Holy Quran
marked them for sure execution in both the Westgate siege of September 2013 and in the
Mandera executions of November 2014. Al- Shabaabs ostensible reason for its attacks in
Kenya are allegedly in retaliation to Kenyas presence in Somalia, now under the aegis of
the United Nations Amisom. However, this appears to be more of an excuse than a
reason; Kenya invaded Somalia in 2011 in an attempt to curtail the activities of AlShabaab that were already taking place on its soil.
The internal threats to security consist first, of rampant thefts and robbery that target
individuals and which many Kenyans now treat as a normal burden of citizenship. This
type of crime is occasionally with SALW available in the country. The second type of
internal insecurity is directed towards groups of people and goes by many labels such as
inter-ethnic clashes, livestock theft, boundary clashes, inter-clan rivalries, and even
insurgency. These violent episodes have recently acquired an ominous character in that
the combatants no longer brook the interference of the state security apparatus in their
activities. And in order to demonstrate this resolve they have repeatedly slaughtered the
police at will. Because the police are the custodians of internal state security, every time
they are slaughtered the message that is communicated is a very potent one: that these
parts no longer recognize the laws of the state that is Kenya. Whether it is in Kapedo or in

Baragoi these incidents are increasingly deadly not just for the public but for the police,
and by extension to the state, as well.
In this vast area, also sometimes loosely referred to as the north, there is little state
presence when it comes to security. This means that to a large extent security is a selfhelp undertaking and the people have taken this lesson to heart. You take care of yourself
and your own because the government (that is supposed to take care of your security) will
not or cannot. The gun is the law in this vast, poorly policed and poorly administered
region of Kenya. Livestock is wealth and livestock is also the bank. As already noted, the
main stock in trade apart from livestock is guns and bullets. The exchange of livestock
may occur peacefully for some reasons such as bride price but apart from that all other
exchanges are marked by violence and death from the barrel of a gun.
According to one source, G3 [rifle that is regular government issue to police officers] is
for women, AK 47 [automatic assault rifle] is for training boys and the MP5 [Heckler &
Koch machine pistol model 5] is for experienced morans [warriors in their prime]. It is
not a wonder that the police (armed with G3s) are therefore routinely slaughtered in
engagement with these armed bandits, who it is sometimes said, are but mere operatives
of rich and powerful businesspeople dealing in livestock (read skewed politicians).
Upon this background, this study examines the law and order maintenance in Kenya to
understand the effectiveness of security policies implementation in the country (read
Nairobi Protocol). The level of state authourity in the country is diminished by how it
maintains law and order. Revisiting recent events confirms this phenomenon. Since the
June 2014 terrorist attack in Mpeketoni, Lamu County in which at least 48 people were
killed only two people have been charged in court. In the aftermath of the Westgate Mall
siege Kenyans are yet to see any proof of a successful prosecution of any suspects and the
list goes on and on. Virtually no large scale corruption case or a case involving mass
slaughter has ever been successfully prosecuted in Kenyan courts. And usually, attending

this prosecutorial debate will be rumours of money changing hands to tamper with or get
rid of the evidence or some such underhand and corrupt dealings. The message is that
Kenyans forget quickly and move on with their lives.
Since the June 2014 terrorist attack in Mpeketoni, Lamu County in which at least 48
people were Killed only two people have been charged in court. In the aftermath of the
Westgate Mall siege Kenyans are yet to see any proof of a successful prosecution of any
suspects and the list goes on an on. Virtually no large scale corruption case or a case
involving mass slaughter has ever been successfully prosecuted in Kenyan courts. This
creates the real picture on what challenges, the state system is faced with particularly its
own state security.
4.2 Grand Corruption in the Governance System
The grand challenge confronting implementation of all government policies (Nairobi
Protocol included) in Kenya remains unchallenged; corruption. Grand Corruption
misallocates development resources and the citizens who are entitled to government
services do not get them. As a result, suspicion between the people and the state sets in
and as they stop trusting their government they stop interacting with it. Because they still
have to get things done, they create their own systems to do these things. Communities
create their own Small government with critical structure of security characterized by
secret acquisition of SALW stockpiles.
The police is not only the most corrupt state institution in the perception of the public but
may also be said to comprise a significant number of corrupt individuals whose main
qualification for joining the service was because they were able to bribe their way into it.
A substantial proportion of officers in the police service may therefore comprise of
people who are not necessarily committed to their job in the sense that they want to
pursue a career in law enforcement but are people who are out to recoup their
investment (the bribes that they paid out to get into the service). One would hardly

expect them not to practice on a fairly regular basis the very vice that gained them access
to the service. Such kind of police officers cannot be trusted to implement a protocol
aimed to implement government policies but keen and busy trading.
The Kenya Police Service is unable to fight corruption mainly because corruption itself is
a religion in which many of its officers are born into the service and it is the milk upon
which they are fed. And there seems to be no way of weaning this child from the milk
that is corruption. A survey conducted by Transparency International in Kenya in 2015
revealed that 90 per cent of Kenyans did not trust the police and considered the security
services either corrupt or extremely corrupt. Majority of Respondents (80 per cent)
interviewed in this research support this claim, citing it as the main reason why Nairobi
protocol has been hard to implement in Kenya.
The corrupt police officer, such as the one described above has only one cause that makes
sense: self-enrichment. But because of their deviant role within the police service they
suffer from role conflict and this generally affects their ability to perform to the required
standards, hence compromising efforts to implement the Protocol on SALW. By engaging
in corruption they render themselves ineffective against all forms of criminality including
banditry and terrorism. And by becoming the agents of corruption they also become the
first victim of criminals and terrorists. It is a truism that the first victim of ineffective
policing is the police. Evidenced by Baragoi and Kapedo Massacres.
4.3 A Weak State System
A weak state that for an instant ignores the fact of its weakness is doubly exposed. In the
last couple of years Kenya has been exposed not just to the terrorism from Al-Shabaab
but also internal security threats for instance livestock banditry where SALWs trade
thrive. In most areas of perennial insecurity the presence of the Kenya state is only
nominal. Most residents of these areas only half-jokingly refer to a sojourn out of these
areas into other parts of Kenya as going to Kenya; apart from their nominal citizenship

they really have no reason to feel that they are a part of Kenya. To move from this
nominal status to have an actual presence the state needs to adopt a more methodical
approach than it has taken so far. It certainly requires more than the knee-jerk reactions of
sending in tanks and helicopter gun-ships against naked bandits wielding AK 47s; it
requires more than sacking security chiefs and so on.
4.4 Inadequate Personnel Challenge and Gross Police Misconduct
Respondents who were interviewed confirmed that; the most recounted challenge
confronting implementation of Nairobi Protocol was the lack of personnel to provide
security. Majority of respondent (60 per cent) confirmed that the number of law
enforcement officers patrolling their regions are few and unable to comprehensively
cover wide area due to underdeveloped infrastructure which contributes to the failure to
combat rustling and banditry. For instance, the Suguta Valley lies in the areas between the
Samburu and Pokot, and it is inaccessible by road. The difficult mountainous terrain has
hindered security officers efforts to combat cattle rustling and small arms proliferation.
The area can be accessed on foot only, meaning that once rustlers drive livestock down
the valley security officers cannot reach them. This is also affected by the fact that some
law enforcers lives have in the recent past been lost in earlier security operations in
Suguta valley and in the region generally.
Law enforcement efforts to control the proliferation of small arms have also faced a mix
of challenges. This is mainly in the area of the inadequate physical presence of law
enforcement officers, poor infrastructure, corruption, the scarcity of resources, and
difficult terrain in the small arms and conflict hotspot areas blended with gross police
misconduct. Some police security initiatives have equally posed blowback challenges.
For instance, Bevan observes that the Kenya Police supplies almost 50 per cent of the
ammunition that circulates illegally in Turkana North in order to provide the Turkana
with some defence against rival groups in Sudan and Uganda. This police misconduct

fuels the demand for SALW in that region of Kenya.

4.5 Poor and Inadequate Equipment
The third weakness revolves around poor and inadequate equipment among security
agencies to track and manage the increased proliferation of SALW in the country. As
alluded to by Misiko, national security is the veritable cash cow for corruption networks
in Kenya. Corruption, more than any other single factor, has acted to deny Kenyas
security forces weapons to match those of their enemies. The Anglo-Leasing corruption
scandal that Githongo was instrumental in exposing, was mainly about the procurement
of security equipment. In March 2014 the Associated Press revealed that the anti-terror
police unit in Nairobi was operating on a budget of $735 per month while the country
was spending $15,000 per month to remunerate each Member of Parliament. Again there
are reports of lost, stolen, and diverted small arms and light weapons which are daily
reminders of the continued prevalence of weak export controls, poor stockpile security
practices, and inadequate or nonexistent border security.
4.6 Slow Pace of Policy Implementation
Those who participated in this research interview attributed the sluggishness on the part
of government as the main challenge in realizing the objectives of the Nairobi protocol.
Despite the existence of Legal Drafting Committees in almost all of the member states to
the Nairobi Protocol, measurable progress in amending or adopting new firearms
legislation to cover all aspects outlined in the protocol is yet to be effected. This can be
attributed to a number of reasons, including a lack of capacity, technical knowledge and
even a lack of political will. African states face a wide range of challenges and amending
firearms legislation may not be a high priority for a particular government, which makes
any advancement of the process difficult. Half of the Respondents (50 per cent) attributed
the government bureaucracy to the slow pace of enacting and operationalizing the tenets

of the protocol.
Amending and developing legislation is a major challenge, since many states have
outdated firearms laws. Lack of capacity, technical knowledge and political will have
prevented measurable progress in amending or adopting legislation. The provisions of the
protocol require states to develop legislation covering a broad range of issues. These
include: Legislation pertaining to the importing and exporting of firearms; Legislation
restricting the number and type of firearms civilians may possess; Legislation regulating
the brokering, dealing and manufacturing of firearms; Legislation on the marking, seizure
and confiscation of firearms; and Criminalizing all illicit firearms-related activities. In
Kenya, these legislation are yet to be enacted and this hampers the objectives and
principles enshrined in Nairobi Protocol. Majority of respondents (60 per cent) in this
research were not aware of any legislation that has been adopted by the government and
that has had an effect towards eradication of SALW in the country, hence the high
prevalence of them in the country.
4.7 Improper Coordination
This research sought to establish the effectiveness of the government security agencies in
containing the proliferation of SALW in the country and majority of the respondents (82
per cent) indicated that there exist poor coordination among government agencies when it
comes to disarmament exercises in the country. The ability of the government to carry out
a comprehensive disarmament operation in the country is faulted on several grounds.
One, a lot of political manipulation exists while undertaking disarmament processes
which exacerbates suspicion among traditional tribal rivalries mostly among pastoralist
communities. Another obstacle faced by various states in the region, Kenya among them
is that, in many instances, a single person is responsible for coordinating all the activities
of an NFP (National Focal Point). Furthermore, the designated person often has
additional policing duties alongside those of the NFP.

After the Westgate Mall attack in September 2013, the NIS (National Intelligence
Services) claimed that they had passed on to the police the relevant intelligence on the
attack. The police on their part replied that the information they got was so vague as not
to be actionable. In responding to the attack itself the paramilitary General Service Unit
declared that they had actually gotten the situation in hand before the army came in to
bungle up the whole situation. It is a litany of disjointed voices when it comes to interagency cooperation (coordination). This operational challenge is also evident during
disarmament operations to rid the country of illicit SALW.
4.8 Cultural and Traditional Setbacks
Considering that communities, particularly in arid and semi-arid areas, have a history of
inter-group rivalry, firearms are essential weapons for fighting off inter-group attacks. In
the said hotspots, respondents indicated that need to protect the community and fear of
future conflict as motivation for arms ownership. Another dimension is the generational
aspect of gun ownership there are cases where members of the younger generation inherit
firearms that belonged to their parents. Indeed, another 40 per cent of respondents
considered ownership as a valued family possession. This value that is ascribed to the gun
has a deeper meaning derived from the fact that with it one is able to protect ones family
and property in a context of minimal government presence. The gun therefore defines
groups identities, safety, and survival. In this way, it is a valuable family asset. This
cultural interpretation sets a serious setback to the implementation of Nairobi Protocol.
In some pastoralist communities, it is relatively common to consider that a moran
(warrior) must kill to be recognized as a brave warrior. Among the Turkana, morans have
their bodies tattooed for every killing committed. But this is not the only meaning to
tattooing: it is also used for cleansing it is believed that by spilling warriors blood
through the tattoos, curses that may follow them for deaths they have caused are broken.
The gun has in this way also influenced views on masculinity perceptions of bravery,

heroism, and even manhood are pegged on successful cattle raids and defence of ones
community among pastoralists. This creates a strong demand for the gun and an extra
challenge confronting the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol.
4.9 Absence of Political Goodwill
Arms control initiatives are very much dependent on political goodwill as they are on the
enforcement of appropriate legal and policy frameworks. However, Kenya is yet to
implement a national policy on small arms and light weapons. The country equally needs
to ensure a comprehensive review of small arms and light weapons-related policies and
laws with a view to fully aligning them to sub-regional arms control instruments. Political
interests in regions with high prevalence of SALW in Kenya are achieved through
manipulation of electorates ignorance. Political goods demanded by the electorates
include stocks of SALW. Politicians achieve their objectives by playing to the tune of
those demands. Disarmament operations are occasionally confronted by fierce opposition
originating from politicians in the affected regions.
The institution of the Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) is also seen to be highly politicized
and, as such, rules and procedures on its members recruitment are flouted. The KPRs are
meant to operate like any other regular police formation under an officer commanding
station and are supposed to be equipped, supervised, trained, and motivated to work for
the specific community, the process and procedures are largely ignored. For instance,
whereas the Samburu have the KPRs, their neighboring Pokot community does not. This
reinforces perceptions that KPRs are biased, ethnic, and highly politicized.
The absence of political goodwill is manifest in most of the disarmament drives by the
Kenyas security agencies. The political resistance emanates from the composition of
participants of the disarmament operations. Those involved in the disarmament exercise
are usually community leaders and some members of civil society who work closely with

the provincial administration in persuading and identifying those with arms. In all cases
the Kenya Police and the Administration Police are involved, except in areas where the
security dynamic is complex.
Where there are armed groups, such as Mt Elgons SLDF, the army intervenes. In many
cases, the Kenya Army is equally mobilized in some areas for the purposes of cordoning
target areas while the police and provincial administration move in. In most cases, the
bigger disarmament operation, the more the number of security agencies involved,
including the military. The militarys involvement is debatable given the nature of
military duties. Civil rights are totally violated when the military is deployed for
disarmament operations justifying the reason for such political opposition.
That aside, by involving the military in what are primarily policing duties, there are at
least three important issues that the state must be ready to answer to. First, the military is
not trained in homeland policing; their primary duty is to protect society from external
aggression. Involving them in policing duties therefore exposes them to duties for which
they have no training and usually no aptitude. The effect is to militarize society. Because
the military are not trained to deal with civilians they are not sensitive to the preservation
and protection of the civil liberties that are guaranteed by the Constitution. Hence,
military involvement in disarmament drives to reduce the proliferation of SALW in the
country has failed to be sanctioned by the political established.
Every time that the military has been brought in to restore civil order in Kenya it has
always been followed by complaints about the abuse of civil rights and violation of
citizen freedoms. In the most recent military involvement in Kapedo in November 2014,
many of the residents were actually forced to flee the area due to what they termed
harassment by the army. Residents talked of sleepless nights after soldiers allegedly
destroyed their property including their homes. This resulted in public protest by
Members of Parliament from the Pokot community asking the government to withdraw

the army from their area.

4.10 The Challenge of Unstable Neighbors
Kenya is located in a very insecure neighborhood in the East African region where illicit
SALW prevail. The country is neighbored by Somalia to the south-east and the republic
of South Sudan in Northwest which are war and conflict ravaged and where illicit SALW
command. According to majority of respondents (60 per cent) interviewed in this
research, opined that the challenge of unstable neighbors pose a great threat to
implementation of the Nairobi Protocol. Somalia conflict was particularly cited as the
major impediment to achievement of objectives of the Nairobi protocol.
The ability to achieve the objectives of the Nairobi Protocol have been hindered by the
spill-over effects of Somalia and south Sudan conflicts. The phenomenon of failed state
creates an environment conducive for gunrunning and emergency of militia outfits due to
absence state authority. On the Failed State Index Kenya is already ranked 17th and is
sandwiched between Nigeria and Niger. Number one on that list is its eastern neighbor
Somalia and number four is another neighbor to the north, the Republic of South Sudan.
As Wagner observes, Kenya is in a rotten neighborhood. This rotten neighborhood makes
Kenya unable to contain external pressures which increase proliferation of illicit SALW
dealing another blow to implementation of Nairobi Protocol.
To demonstrate the failure of Kenyan statehood is the fact that, atleast one-half of the
country is now only nominally under the control of the central government. This has been
demonstrated with increasing regularity in the last couple of years. Just to cite a few
cases, in November 2012, 46 people among them 42 police officers who had gone to
quell a violent clash between the Samburu and Turkana communities were massacred.
In 2012-2013, in ethnic clashes between the Orma and Pokomo communities of Tana
River County up to 30 people were believed to have lost their lives. These two areas fall

within what Kagwanja has dubbed Kenyas arc of insecurity. This arc straddles 12 out
of Kenyas 47 counties namely, West Pokot, Elgeyo-Marakwet, Baringo, Turkana,
Samburu, Isiolo, Marsabit, Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu and Tana River. Amongst
them these counties account for more than one-half of Kenyas total land surface area.
The conflicts in the neighboring states have emensely contributed to inability by the
government to contain proliferation of the Nairobi Protocol. Without stable neighbors
Nairobi Protocol is not implementable.
4.11 The Challenge of Porous Borders Conducive For Trafficking In SALW
Given the reality of the porous borders and ill-equipped security agencies, it is clear that
real success in dealing with the crisis of arms proliferation in Kenya is dependent on
concerted internal as well as external efforts. Without peace and stability in Kenya's
neighbors, it will be impossible to effectively deal with the scourge of small arms
proliferation. The Kenyan borders are extremely porous with limited patrols and
inadequate human resources.
Visibility of security personnel diminishes as one moves away from the capital Nairobi.
At the moment, the security and visibility of the state seems to be largely confined to the
major centers. As one moves further from the Capital Nairobi, for instance, there is less
and less visibility of state security structures, which is a reflection of states inability to
fully project the legitimate monopoly of violence within its borders and inability to stop
proliferation of SALW.
The security personnel mandated with border control have inadequate logistical assets.
Given the limited resources and porous borders, there is the need for the implementation
of strategies that urgently rally civilian support in the collection and passing on of vital
information to the relevant security agencies for the safety of all Kenyans in regard to
proliferation of SALW. There is the need for the sources and existing mechanisms of

arms acquisition and flows to be more closely and effectively monitored and addressed.
Most importantly, so should be the demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons
(SALW's).
Kenyas policy of openness to accommodate refugees and asylum seekers in her territory
has recently been abused by those accommodated. By allowing refugees from Somalia,
south Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi as well as other places has put Kenya in difficult
situation, where these asylum seekers exacerbate the problem of SALW in the country
through secret trafficking through camps. The fact that Kenya is obliged by the
international norms to uphold these norms renders the country victim to the vulgaries of
proliferation of SALW. Forcibly returning registered refugees to countries where they
faced threat of persecution or to a place where a person would be at real risk of torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is refoulement and is prohibited under
international law. This international obligation demands Kenya to condone neighbors
despite them increasing the prevalence of SALW. This challenges the effective
implementation of the Nairobi Protocol.
4.12 Political Environment Uncertainty Challenge
This research found out that most households feel the most insecure during electioneering
periods hence the need for arms and weapons. The disputable management of Kenyas
elections is therefore important for increasing the demand for small arms by communities
dealing a huge set back to objectives of the Nairobi Protocol. Respondents (40 per cent)
indicated that they needed guns and other weapons to protect themselves against
perceived political enemies during elections hence necessitating increase for SALW in
the country.
Political uncertainty coupled with mistrust in the electoral processes makes some feel
groups cheated, unsafe and helpless. Firstly, the government is viewed as having failed to

provide adequate security. Secondly, communities feel increasingly vulnerable to attacks

from neighbors, emergent criminal gangs, and armed youths. The resultant solutions is
heavy stockpiling of SALW by these communities, hence compromising the basic
principles of the Nairobi Protocol. Dialogical approaches, such as mediation by
government and local civil society actors, have failed to contain armed violence and,
eventually, the alleviation and erasure of small arms demand in various parts of the
country. The challenge has been amplified by the commercialization of illicit arms by the
security agents in Kenya. Political uncertainties have seen the Kenya Police supply
almost 50 per cent of the ammunition that circulates illegally in Turkana North in order to
provide the Turkana with some defense against rival groups in Sudan and Uganda. These
are real challenges which directly hamper the implementation of the Nairobi protocol.
4.13 Lack of legislative Framework
With the adoption of the Nairobi Protocol the member states were mandated to review
and harmonize legislation in line with the objectives of the Protocol. Specifically, the
protocol required states to establish effective import, export, and licensing systems; and
establishing systems for regulating dealers, brokers and brokering in SALW. While some
of these countries (Rwanda and Burundi) have already enacted new legislation that
contains provisions on brokering, others are still addressing the issue at the policy level
or are envisaging a comprehensive review of their national legislation. The absence of the
legislative framework compromises the achievement of the protocol on SALW in Kenya
and in the region generally.
The lack of appropriate legislative framework has rendered it impossible to implement
meaningful security-related initiatives, which are need for accurate data and relevant
programming to counter SALW threat in a bid to reduce armed violence and foster
development. Without legislative framework in place the availability and use of illicit
small arms and light weapons will continue to pose threat to peace in the country as it has

been the case. As one study observed there is general lack of accurate data and relevant
programming to counter SALW threat in a bid to reduce armed violence and foster
development. Not unless the member countries develop supporting legislation which can
guide the domestication of the Nairobi protocol it will just remain another protocol in
shelves without any mandate to accomplish.
There has been less progress in bringing about changes in management practices within
government or state bodies largely due to lack of legislation and motivation to get one. In
particular security force stockpile management and tracing mechanisms require further
work and reform. Manufacturing and transfer controls are considered, rightly or wrongly,
less of a priority in the East African region despite the fact that Kenya, Uganda and
Tanzania are ammunition producers and reporting of a relatively advanced state of
implementation reflects this assumption despite the fact that no specific measures in the
areas of manufacturing controls were taken in any of the EAC Partner States over the last
years.
4.14 Reliance on Donor Funding Challenge
The full implementation of the Nairobi Protocol has been hampered due to meagre
resources allocated in overseeing its operationalization. This has seen the institutions
mandated with its implementation seek alternative sources of financing, definitely from
donors and international development partners. The Kenya National Focal Point has
played a strategic role in pushing for tough global controls on arms trade by cosponsoring and lobbying for the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty, together with six
other like-minded states (Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, and the United
Kingdom). However, the challenge emanates from manner of funding by the donors since
they are not the primary beneficiaries of its implementation. According to Saferworld, the
KNFP is constrained by limited financial, institutional, and human resources. This is
considered a major reason for its inability to fully implement its National Action Plan

(designed to run from 2004 to 2009). Reliance on donor funding is circumstantial and
donors can withdraw any time dealing a huge blow to the implementation of the Nairobi
Protocol. A Case studies of project implementation which has been compromised due to
donor withdraw include the much celebrated work of the Wajir Women for Peace Group
that kick-started local initiatives to end local firearms-fuelled violence in Wajir.
This process catalyzed the formation of a more inclusive multi-clan Wajir Peace Group,
which brokered a local peace pact called the Al Fatah Declaration. The process later gave
birth to the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) a local peace structure
that became integrated as a sub-committee of the governments District and Development
Committee in 1995. This heralded the creation of local peace committees for violence
reduction and security management, initially in northern Kenya, but the whole project
came down when donors withdrew funding and the effectiveness of the initiative did not
achieve its full potential.
4.15 Chapter Summary
The Nairobi Protocol has been the leading instrument ever created in East and Central
Africa with a noble mandate of having a peaceful, secure and prosperous society free of
illicit small arms and light weapons for sustainable development, with a mission to
manage and coordinate all actions in addressing the proliferation of illicit small arms and
light weapons in all its aspects in Kenya. Despite its noble dictates and norms enshrined
therein, its implementation and achievement of its full potential has been hampered by a
number of challenges which stem from poor government practices down to negative
reception by the communities affected by the impact of proliferation of SALW in Kenya.
The challenges advanced in this research were drawn from primary data gathered from
respondents as well as institutional reports developed by government bodies and NGOs.
Among the chief findings of this research, the main challenges confronting the
implementation of the Nairobi Protocol include the very nature of security status in the

country as it is discussed in the root causes of insecurity in Kenya, which does not permit
for Nairobi Protocol to be domesticated and actualized. This research has revealed that
the major challenge facing implementation of the Nairobi Protocol is the grand corruption
in the governance system. The weakness of the Kenyan state has been singled as the
reason behind the ineffective implementation of the Nairobi Protocol. This is largely
coupled by the slow pace of policy implementation characterized by poor coordination
among the security agencies.
The challenge of unstable neighbors has been a major impediment to the full realization
of the Nairobi Protocol objectives. Polarity of Kenyan borders makes illicit SALW
penetration in the country easy while traditional beliefs and customs of arms possession
makes their fight redundant. From the political side the unwillingness of the political elite
to support full implementation of the Nairobi Protocol is evident in communities where
proliferation is high due to perceived threats some originating from the same nature of the
Kenyan politics. Absence of political will to curb illicit SALW in Kenya has resulted to
lack of proper legislation which guides and informs implementation of the Nairobi
Protocol. Inadequate equipment coupled with inadequate personnel who routinely are
engaged in gross misconduct renders the implementation of the protocol ineffective.
In-order to overcome all these challenges, there is need for development of pragmatic
efforts geared towards improvements on the challenges cited above. This research will
endeavor to consider some practical solutions in its recommendation so as to improve and
realize the objectives of the Nairobi Protocol on SALW in Kenya

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