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G.R. No.

L-67451 September 28, 1987


REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. and MACONDRAY
FARMS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Special Third Civil
Cases Division), HON. RIZALINA BONIFACIO VERA, as
Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII,
MORRIS G. CARPO, QUEZON CITY DEVELOPMENT AND
FINANCING CORPORATION, and COMMISSIONER OF
LAND REGISTRATION, respondents.

CORTES, J.:
The litigation over the ownership of the parcels of land which are
the subject of this petition started in 1927 when an application
for their registration under the Torrens System was first filed. In
the present petition for review Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.
(hereafter referred to as Realty) and Macondray Farms, Inc.
(hereafter referred to as Macondray) seek a reversal of the
Resolution of May 2, 1984 of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
and an affirmance of the Court of Appeals Decision of December
29, 1982.
Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las Pias,
Metro Manila, having an aggregate area of 373,868 sq. m.,
situated in the vicinity of the Ayala Alabang Project and BF
Homes Paraaque are covered by three (3) distinct sets of
Torrens titles to wit:
1) TCT No. 20408 issued on May 29, 1975 in the
name of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., which was
derived from OCT No. 1609, issued on May 21,

1958, pursuant to Decree No. N-63394 in LRC


Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO Record Nos. N29882, N-33721 and N-43516, respectively.
2) TCT No. 303961 issued on October 13, 1970 in
the name of Morris G. Carpo, which was derived
from OCT No. 8629, issued on October 13, 1970
pursuant to decree No. N-131349 in LRC Case No.
N-11-M (N-6217), GLRO Record No. N-32166.
3) TCTs Nos. 333982 and 333985, issued on July 27,
1971 in the name of Quezon City Development and
Financing Corporation, derived from OCT No. 8931
which was issued on July 27, 1971 pursuant to LRC
Case No. P-206 GLRO Record No. N-31777.
On December 29, 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIII, presided over by
Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera (hereafter referred to as Vera
Court), for "declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and
TCT No. 20408." Named defendants were Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc., Macondray Farms, Inc. and the Commissioner of
Land Registration. Subsequently, however, Carpo withdrew his
complaint as against the last named defendant, and the answer
filed on behalf of said government official was ordered stricken
off the record. The complaint alleged that TCT No. 20408 as well
as OCT No. 1609 from which it was derived, is a nullity as the
CFI of Rizal, Branch VI, then presided over by Judge Andres
Reyes (hereafter referred to as the Reyes Court) which issued
the order dated May 21, 1958 directing the issuance of a decree
of registration, was not sitting as a land registration court, but as
a court of ordinary jurisdiction. It was further alleged that the
original records of LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. 29882
which was the basis for the issuance of said order of May 21,
1958, were lost and/or destroyed during World War II and were

still pending reconstitution; hence, the Reyes Court had no


authority to order the issuance of a certificate of title.
Realty and Macondray alleged in their answer that the Reyes
Court was acting as a court of land registration and in issuing
the order of May 21, 1958, was actually performing a purely
ministerial duty for the registration court in Case No. 657, GLRO
Record No. 29882 (and the two other cases, Cases Nos. 758 and
976, with which said case had been jointly tried and decided)
which on August 19, 1935 had rendered a decision adjudicating
the two (2) lots in question to Estanislao Mayuga (father of
Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty and
Macondray), which decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals.
It was alleged that it is the title of Carpo which is null and void,
having been issued over a parcel of land previously registered
under the Torrens System in favor of another.
With leave of court, Realty and Macondray filed a third-party
complaint against the Quezon City Development and Financing
Corporation (hereafter referred to as QCDFC) and the
Commissioner of Land Registration alleging that TCTs Nos.
333982 and 333985 in the name of QCDFC also covered the
same parcels of land subject of the dispute between Carpo and
the two corporations, Realty and Macondray. They thus prayed
that Decree No. N-135938 issued on July 22, 1971, OCT No.
8931 issued on July 27, 1971, as well as TCTs Nos. 333982 and
333985 derived from OCT No. 8931 be declared null and void.
In its answer to the third-party complaint, QCDFC asserted the
validity of its own title alleging that it is the title in the name of
Realty which is null and void. QCDFC also filed a fourth-party
complaint against Carmelino Alvendia, Esperanza Alvendia,
Felicisimo Alvendia, Josefina Alvendia, Jacinto G. Miranda, Rosa
G. Miranda, Isabel G. Miranda, and Feliciano G. Miranda,
alleging that it bought said parcels of land from them. It prayed

that in the event of an unfavorable judgment against it, fourthparty defendants be ordered to reimburse the purchase price
which the corporation paid to them. However, QCDFC failed to
prosecute its case, and the fourth-party complaint was dismissed
for lack of interest.
After hearing, the Vera Court rendered judgment on January 20,
1981, sustaining the title of Morris G. Carpo to the two (2) lots in
question and declaring the titles of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc.
and QCDFC null and void.
On March 20, 1981, Realty filed a Petition for certiorari with this
Court docketed as G.R. No. L-56471 questioning the decision of
the lower court. It also asked that it be allowed to appear
directly to this Court as it was raising only questions of law. After
respondents filed their comments to said petition, this Court
passed a resolution dated October 19, 1981 referring the case to
the Court of Appeals "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction for
proper determination on the merits of the appeal."
In its decision dated December 29, 1982, the Court of Appeals,
through its Ninth Division, with Justice Patajo
asponente, concurred in by Justices Gopengco and Kapunan, set
aside the decision of the trial court and rendered a new one
upholding the validity of the title in the name of Realty Sales
Enterprise, Inc. and declaring null and void the titles in the name
of Carpo and QCDFC.
Carpo filed a motion for reconsideration with the appellate court.
In the meantime, by virtue and pursuant to Batas Pambansa
Bldg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Court
of Appeals was reorganized into the Intermediate Appellate
Court (IAC). As a consequence, there was a re-raffling of cases
and the case was assigned to the Second Special Cases Division
which, however, returned the records of the case for another re-

raffling to the Civil Cases Divisions as it deemed itself without


authority to act on a civil case in view of the allocation of cases
to the different divisions of the IAC under Section 8 of BP 129.
The case was then assigned to the Third Civil Cases Division,
composed of Justices de la Fuente, Coquia, Zosa and Bartolome.
Justices Coquia and Bartolome inhibited themselves, and Justices
Camilon and Bidin were assigned to the Third Civil Cases
Division.
On May 2, 1984, the IAC, through its Special Third Civil Cases
Division, with Justice Zosa as ponente; concurred in by Justices
Camilon and Bidin, promulgated its Resolution granting Carpo's
motion for reconsideration, reversing and setting aside the
decision of December 29, 1982, and affirming the decision of the
trial court. Hence, this petition docketed as G.R. No. 67451.
Petitioners assign the following errors:
I
The SPECIAL THIRD CIVIL CASES DIVISION of the
Intermediate Appellate Court (for brevity, referred
to herein as SPECIAL DIVISION) which
promulgated the disputed RESOLUTION of May 2,
1984 had no legal standing under the provisions of
Batas Pambansa Bldg. 129 and, as such, not vested
with jurisdiction and adjudicatory power to
pronounce any decision of final resolution for the
Court.
II
On the assumption that the SPECIAL DIVISION is
legally vested with jurisdiction and adjudicatory
powers under the provisions of BP 129, it decided

questions of substance contrary to law and the


applicable decisions of the Supreme Court because:
(a) The SPECIAL DIVISION'S
Resolution of May 2, 1984 amounted to
a denial to the Petitioners of their right
to appeal and judicial review over
fundamental issues of law duly raised
by them in their Petition for Review on
certiorari (G.R. No. 56471), as
authorized by the Constitution (Art. X,
sec. 5 (2) (e), the provisions of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 and Rule 42, Sec.
2 of the Rules of Court; and
(b) By its RESOLUTION of May 2,
1984, it ruled that the decision of the
Court of Appeals could not have gained
the nature of a proper and valid
judgment as the latter had no power to
pass upon the appealed judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal (the
Vera Court), as appeal and not
certiorari was the proper remedy;
Furthermore, the said SPECIAL DIVISION grossly
departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings by giving a perverted and
obviously unjustified and illogical interpretation of
the RESOLUTION of July 25, 1983, of the Ninth
Division of the Court of Appeals, holding and
declaring that "it has in effect erased or cancelled
the validity of (the DECISION of December 29,
1982), when the said RESOLUTION merely
"RESOLVED to return the records of the case ... for

re-raffling and reassignment ... in view of the


allocation of cases to the different Divisions of the
Intermediate Appellate Court under Section 8 of BP
129.
III
The SPECIAL DIVISION by confirming the appealed
judgment of the lower court in effect sanctioned the
contemptible disregard of law and jurisprudence
committed by Judge Vera, which call for an exercise
of the power of supervision;
IV
The SPECIAL DIVISION did state in its
RESOLUTION of May 2, 1984 a deliberate
falsehood, namely, that Morris G. Carpo is a
purchaser in good faith and for value when there is
absolutely no evidence, whether written or
testimonial, that was presented by Carpo, or by
anyone else that he was, in fact, a purchaser for
value and in good faith a material matter which
was neither alleged nor referred to in the complaint
and in all the pleadings, nor covered by any of the
exhibits presented by all of the parties herein and
solely on the bases of which the case at bar was
submitted by the parties for consideration and
decision.
1. To support their contention that the Special Third Civil Cases
Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court which promulgated
the Resolution of May 2, 1984 had no legal standing under the
provisions of BP 129 and, as such, not vested with jurisdiction

and adjudicatory power, petitioners cite Sections 4 and 8 of BP


129, to wit:
Sec. 4. Exercise of powers and functions.The
Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise its
powers, functions and duties, through ten (10)
divisions, each composed of five members. The
Court may sit en banc only for the purpose of
exercise administrative, ceremonial or other nonadjudicatory functions.
Sec. 8. Grouping of Divisions.Of the ten (10)
divisions, of the Court, four (4) divisions, to be
known as Civil case Divisions, shall take cognizance
of appeals in civil cases originating from the
Regional Trial Court; two (2) divisions, to be known
as Criminal Cases Divisions, of appeals in cases
originating from the Regional Trial Courts; and four
(4) divisions, to be known as Special Cases
Divisions, of original actions or petitions, petitions
for review, and appeals in all other cases, including
those from administrative agencies, except as
provided in Section 9 hereof.
Except with respect to the Presiding Appellate
Justice, the appointment of a member of the court
should specifically indicate whether it is for the Civil
Cases Divisions, the Criminal Cases Divisions, or the
Special Cases Divisions of the Court. No member of
the Court appointed to any of the three classes of
conclusions shall be assigned to any of the other
classes of division except when authorized by the
Supreme Court, upon recommendation of the
Intermediate Appellate Court en banc, if the

exigencies of the service so require. . . . (emphasis


supplied)
As officially constituted, the Third Civil Cases Division was
composed of Justice B.S. de la Fuente, as Chairman, Justices
Jorge Coquia, Mariano Zosa, and Flores Bartolome, as Members.
In view, however, of the voluntary inhibition of Justices Coquia
and Bartolome from taking part in the case, Justices Bidin and
Camilon were reassigned to the Third Civil Cases Division to
form the Special Third Civil Cases Division.

members thereof inhibited themselves from participating in said


case.
2. The second assigned error involves a determination of the
correctness of the ruling of the IAC that the CA Decision of
December 29, 1982 could not have gained the nature of a proper
and valid judgment (since appeal and not certiorari was the
proper remedy) and that the Resolution of July 25, 1983 had in
effect erased or cancelled the validity of said Decision.
The IAC said in its Resolution of May 2,1984:

Petitioners argue that the so-called Special Third Civil Cases


Division, not being one of the ten (10) Divisions of the Court duly
vested with jurisdiction, had no adjudicatory powers. It is also
alleged that the reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon is
violative of the injunction against appointment of an appellate
Justice to a class of divisions other than that to which he is
appointed. (Petition, pp. 21-26.)
This contention has no merit. A reading of the law will readily
show that what BP 129 prohibits is appointment from
one class of divisions to another class. For instance, a Justice
appointed to the Criminal Cases Divisions cannot be assigned to
the Civil Cases Divisions.
Justice Bidin was reassigned from the Fourth Civil Cases
Division, while Justice Camilon was reassigned from the
Second Civil Cases Division. The two therefore come from the
same class of divisions to which they were appointed.
Thus, the reassignment of Justices Bidin and Camilon to form the
Special Third Civil Cases Division in view of the voluntary
inhibition of two (2) "regular" members, is still within legal
bounds. Otherwise, a situation would have arisen where a
regular division could not decide a particular case because some

Said resolution of July 25, 1983, to Our view, was


effectively an acknowledgment by the Division that
promulgated it that the earlier Decision dated
December 29, 1983 rendered in a Special Civil
Action case for certiorari, CA-G.R. No. SP-13530,
was not appropriate and beyond the authority of the
Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals to
promulgate. The said Resolution was actually a
statement that the Ninth Division of the Court of
Appeals had over-stepped its bounds by reviewing
in certiorari proceedings a decision in a purely civil
case that should have passed through the processes
of an ordinary appeal. We are not aware of any legal
doctrine that permits an appellate court to treat a
petition for review on certiorari upon purely
questions of law, such as that filed by petitioners
herein, as an ordinary appeal. Neither can we find
any legal basis or justification for the election by the
appellate court of the essential requisites then
prescribed for the validity of an appeal, such as the
submission of a formal notice of appeal, an appeal
bond and approved record on appeal. Without any of
these mandatory requisites, the appeal could not

have been deemed perfected and ought to have


been dismissed outright.
The Court does not agree.
There are two modes by which cases decided by the then Courts
of First Instance in their original jurisdiction may be reviewed:
(1) an ordinary appeal either to the Supreme Court or to the
Court of Appeals, or (2) an appeal on certiorari to the Supreme
Court. To the latter category belong cases in which only errors or
questions of law are involved. Each of these modes have different
procedural requirements.
As stated earlier, Realty originally filed a Petition for certiorari
with this Court docketed as G.R. No. L-56471 questioning the
decision of the Vera Court, and asking that it be allowed to
appeal directly to this Court as it was raising only questions of
law. However, this Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction for proper
determination on the merits of the appeal."
It may thus be observed that even this Court treated the petition
first filed as an appeal, and not as a special civil action for
certiorari. After as, a petition for review by certiorari is also a
form of appeal. (People v. Resuello L-30165, August 22, 1969, 69
SCRA 35).
This mode of appeal under Rule 42 is in the form and procedure
outlined in Rule 45 which, unlike ordinary appeals, does not
require a notice of appeal, an appeal bond and a record on
appeal.
Thus it was error for the IAC to hold that the Decision of the Vera
Court "cannot be passed upon anymore in the Court of Appeals
decision because appeal and not certiorari was the proper

remedy." Precisely, petitioners brought the case to this Court on


appeal, albeit by way of certiorari.
Respondent Carpo cited authorities holding that certiorari is not
a substitute for appeal. Those cases are not in point. They refer
to the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, and not to
appeal by way of certiorari under Rule 45.
Similarly, the IAC Special Civil Cases Division erred in
interpreting the Resolution dated July 25, 1983 of the
Second Special Cases Division (to which the case was assigned
after the reorganization under BP 129) as having "erased or
cancellation" the validity of the Decision of the Ninth Division. A
perusal of said Resolution shows that it merely made clarification
about the nature of the case and why it should be reassigned to
the Civil Cases Division of the IAC. There was not the slightest
implication that it "erased or cancelled" the validity of the
Decision of the Ninth Division.
Even the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division impliedly
admitted the validity of the Decision of the Ninth Division when
it granted Carpo's motion for reconsideration. It would have
been incongruous to grant a motion to reconsider a decision,
reverse and set it aside, if in the first place it did not have any
validity. It would have been necessary only to decide its
invalidity.
3. In the third assigned error, Petitioners contend that the Vera
Court, and the IAC Special Third Civil Cases Division, erred in
upholding the validity of the title in the name of Carpo and
declaring null and void the titles in the names of Realty and of
QCDFC.
The basis of the complaint fired by Carpo, which was the same
basis for the of the Vera Court and the IAC Special Division, is

that the Reyes Court had no authority to issue the order of May
21, 1958 directing the issuance of a decree of registration in
favor of Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty, as it was not
sitting as a land registration court and also because the original
records of LRC Case No. 657, Record No. N-29882 were lost
and/or destroyed during World War II and were still pending
reconstitution.
Under Act No. 496, Land Registration Act, (1902) as amended by
Act No. 2347 (1914), jurisdiction over all applications for
registration of title to and was conferred upon the Courts of First
Instance of the respective provinces in which the land sought to
be registered is situated.
Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions,
is acquired upon the filing in court of the application for
registration, and is retained up to the end of the litigation. The
issuance of a decree of registration is but a step in the entire
land registration process; and as such, does not constitute a
separate proceeding.
In the case at bar, it appears that it was Estanislao Mayuga,
father of Dominador Mayuga, predecessor-in-interest of Realty,
who originally filed on June 24, 1927 a registration proceeding
docketed as LRC Case No. 657, GLRO Record No. N-29882 in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal to confirm his title over parcels of
land described as Lots 1, 2 and 3, Plan Psu-47035. (Lots 2 and 3
the subject of the instant litigation among Carpo, RRealty and
QCDFC.) Case No. 657 was jointly tried with two other cases,
LRC Case No. 976, GLRO Record No. 43516 filed by Eduardo
Guico and LRC Case No. 758, GLRO Record No. 33721 filed by
Florentino Baltazar, as the three cases involved Identical parcels
of land, and Identical applicants/oppositors.

On August 19, 1935 the CFI-Rizal acting as a land registration


court issued a consolidated decision on the three cases, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
En meritos de to do lo expuesto, se ordena el
registro de los lotes, 1, 2 y 3 del plans PSU-47035 a
nombre de Estanislao Mayuga, desist oposicion de
Florentino Baltazar y Eduardo Guico con respects a
dichos lotes....
On appeal, the above decision of the CFI was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its decision
dated November 17, 1939. the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Por todas last consideraciones expuestas
confirmamos la decision apelada en cuanto adjudica
a Estanislao Mayuga los lotes, 1, 2 y 3 de such piano
y que equivalent a lost lotes, 4, 5 y 6 del plano de
Baltazar y 4 y 5 del plans de Guico.
xxx xxx xxx
Guico filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court,
but the petition was dismissed and the Court of Appeals decision
was affirmed (See Guico v. San Pedro, 72 Phil. 415 [1941]).
Before he could secure a decree of registration in his name,
Estanislao died.
On May 13, 1958 Dominador Mayuga, son of Estanislao, filed a
petition with the Reyes Court docketed as Case No. 2689
alleging that he was the only heir of the deceased Estanislao
Mayuga and praying for the issuance of a decree of registration
over the property adjudicated in favor of Estanislao. At this
point, it cannot be overemphasized that the petition filed by

Dominador is NOT a distinct and separate proceeding from, but


a continuation of, the original land registration proceedings
initiated by Estanislao Mayuga, Florentino Baltazar and Eduardo
Guico. In the same vein, the Reyes Court, as Branch VI of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, was continuing in the exercise of
jurisdiction over the case, which jurisdiction was vested in the
CFI-Rizal upon filing of the original applications.
On May 21, 1958 the Reyes Court issued an order granting the
petition of Dominador Mayuga and directing the Commissioner
of Land Registration to issue a decree of registration over Lots 1,
2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035, substituting therein as registered
owner Dominador Mayuga in liue of Estanislao.
Respondent Carpo, however, contends, that since the records of
LRC Case No. 657 were not properly reconstituted, then there
was no pending land registration case. And since the Reyes
Court was acting without a pending case, it was acting without
jurisdiction. (Respondent Carpo's Memorandum, pp, 2-8.)
He cites the case of Villegas v. Fernando (L-27347, April 29,
1969, 27 SCRA 1119) where this Court said that upon failure to
reconstitute pursuant to law, "the parties are deemed to have
waived the effects of the decision rendered in their favor and
their only alternative is to file an action anew for the registration
in their names of the lots in question," citing the case of Ambat v.
Director of Lands, (92) Phil. 567 [1953]) and other cases. The
basis of said ruling is Section 29 of Act No. 3110, an Act to
provide an adequate procedure for the reconstitution of the
records of pending judicial proceedings and books, documents,
and files of the office of the register of deeds, destroyed by fire
or other public calamities, and for other purposes.
However, the Ambat case, in so far as it ruled on the effect of
failure to reconstitute records on the status of the case in its

entirety, was modified in the case of Nacua v. de Beltran, (93)


Phil. 595 [1953]). where this Court said:
(W)e are inclined to modify the ruling (in the Ambat
case) in the sense that Section 29 of Act No. 3110
should be applied only where the records in the
Court of First Instance as well as in the appellate
court were destroyed or lost and were not
reconstituted, but not where the records of the
Court of First Instance are intact and complete, and
only the records in the appellate court were lost or
destroyed, and were not reconstituted. One reason
for this view is that section 29 of Act 3110 is found
among the sections and provisions dealing with the
reconstitution of records in the Court of First
Instance in pending civil cases, special proceedings,
cadastral cases and criminal cases. A study of Act
(No.) 3110 ... who show that there are separate
procedures for the reconstitution of records in the
Justice of the Peace Courts, from Sec. 48 to Sec. 53;
for the reconstitution of records in the Supreme
Court, now including the Court of Appeals, from
Sec. 54 to Sec. 74; for the reconstitution of records
in the office of the Register of Deeds, from Sec. 75
to Sec. 90 and for the reconstitution of destroyed
records in the Courts of First Instance, from Sec. 1
to Sec. 47, under which sections, Sec. 29 is
obviously comprehended.
The whole theory of reconstitution is to reproduce
or replace records lost or destroyed so that said
records may be complete and court proceedings
may continue from the point or stage where said
proceedings stopped due to the loss of the records.

The law contemplates different stages for purposes


of reconstitution. . . .
. . . (S)ection 4 covers the stage were a
civil case was pending trial in the Court
of First Instance at the time the record
was destroyed or lost; section 6
evidently refers to the stage where the
case had been tried and decided but
was still pending in the Court of First
Instance at the time the record was
destroyed or lost; section 6 covers the
stage where the case was pending in
the Supreme Court (or Court of
Appeals) at the time the record was
destroyed or lost. *
If the records up to a certain point or stage are lost
and they are not reconstituted, the parties and the
court should go back to the next preceding age
where records are available, but not beyond that;
otherwise to ignore and go beyond the stage next
preceding would be voiding and unnecessarily
ignoring proceedings which are duly recorded and
documented, to the great prejudice not only of the
parties and their witnesses, but also of the court
which must again perforce admit pleadings, rule
upon them and then try the case and decide it
anew,-all of these, when the records up to said point
or stage are intact and complete, and
uncontroverted.
xxx xxx xxx

. . . (T)o require the parties to file their action anew


and incur the expenses and (suffer) the annoyance
and vexation incident to the filing of pleadings and
the conduct of hearings, aside from the possibility
that some of the witnesses may have died or left the
jurisdiction, and also to require the court to again
rule on the pleadings and hear the witnesses and
then decide the case, when an along and all the
time the record of the former pleadings of the trial
and evidence and decision are there and are not
disputed, all this would appear to be not exactly
logical or reasonable, or fair and just to the parties,
including the trial court which has not committed
any negligence or fault at all.
The ruling in Nacua is more in keeping with the spirit and
intention of the reconstitution law. As stated therein, "Act 3110
was not promulgated to penalize people for failure to observe or
invoke its provisions. It contains no penal sanction. It was
enacted rather to aid and benefit litigants, so that when court
records are destroyed at any stage of judicial proceedings,
instead of instituting a new case and starting all over again, they
may reconstitute the records lost and continue the case. If they
fail to ask for reconstitution, the worst that can happen to them
is that they lose the advantages provided by the reconstitution
law" (e.g. having the case at the stage when the records were
destroyed).
Applying the doctrine in the Nacua decision to LRC Case No.
657, the parties thereto did not have to commence a new action
but only had to go back to the preceding stage where records are
available. The land registration case itself re. mained pending
and the Court of First Instance of Rizal continued to have
jurisdiction over it.

The records were destroyed at that stage of the case when an


that remained to be done was the ministerial duty of the Land
Registration Office to issue a decree of registration (which would
be the basis for the issuance of an Original Certificate of Title) to
implement a judgment which had become final (See Government
v. Abural, 39 Phil. 996 [1919] at 1002; Sta. Ana v. Menla, 111
Phil. 947 [1961], 1 SCRA 1294; Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. De
Banuvar, 134 Phil. 257 [1968], 26 SCRA 316). There are however
authentic copies of the decisions of the CFI and the Court of
Appeals adjudicating Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 to
Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover, there is an official report of the
decision of this Court affirming both the CFI and the CA
decisions. A final order of adjudication forms the basis for the
issuance of a decree of registration.
Considering that the Reyes court was actually in the exercise of
its jurisdiction as a land registration court when it issued the
order directing the issuance of a decree of registration,
"substituting therein as registered owner Dominador Mayuga, in
hue of the original adjudicates, Estanislao Mayuga, based on the
affidavit of self-adjudication, subject to the provisions of Sec. 4,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court," which order is in consonance with
the ruling of this Court in the Guico decision, and the decisions
of the CFI-Rizal and the CA dated August 19, 1935 and
November 17, 1939, respectively, We uphold the validity of said
order and rule that Judge Vera was without jurisdiction to set it
aside.
4. In upholding the title of Carpo as against those of Realty and
QCDFC, the Special Division also relied on Carpo's being an
innocent purchaser for value.
Whether or not Carpo is an innocent purchaser for value was
never raised as an issue in the trial court. A perusal of the
records of the case reveals that no factual basis exists to support

such a conclusion. Even Carpo himself cites no factual proof of


his being an innocent purchaser for value. He merely relies on
the presumption of good faith under Article 527 of the Civil
Code.
It is settled that one is considered an innocent purchaser for
value only if, relying on the certificate of title, he bought the
property from the registered owner, "without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and
pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such
purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some
other persons in the property." (Cui v. Henson, 51 Phil. 606
[1928], Fule v. De Legare, 117 Phil. 367 [1963], 7 SCRA 351.) He
is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title
upon its face indicates. (Fule v. De Legare supra.)
Carpo bought the disputed property from the Baltazars, the
original registered owners, by virtue of a deed executed before
Iluminada Figueroa, Notary Public of Manila dated October 9,
1970. However, it was only later, onOctober 13, 1970, that the
decree of registration in favor of the Baltazars was transcribed in
the Registration Book for the Province of Rizal and that an
Original Certificate of Title was issued. It was on the same day,
October 13, 1970, that the deed evidencing the sale between the
Baltazars and Carpo was inscribed in the Registry of Property,
and the Original Certificate of Title was cancelled as Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 303961 in the name of Carpo was issued.
(Exhibit 12, Rollo pp. 270-273.)
Thus, at the time of sale there was as yet no Torrens title which
Carpo could have relied upon so that he may qualify as an
innocent purchaser for value. Not being a purchaser for value
and in good faith, he is in no better position than his
predecessors-in-interest.

The Baltazars, predecessors-in-interest of Carpo are heirs of


Florentino Baltazar, an oppositor in the original application filed
by Estanislao Mayuga in 1927. As stated earlier, the CFI-Rizal
confirmed the title of Estanislao to Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu47035 "desestimando oposicion de Florentino Baltazar . . . con
respeto a dichos lotes . . ." As such successors of Florentino, they
could not pretend ignorance of the land registration proceedings
over the disputed parcels of land earlier initiated by Eduardo
Guico, Florentino Baltazar and Estanislao Mayuga, as when as
the decisions rendered therein.
Moreover, it is not disputed that the title in the name of
Dominador Mayuga, from whom Realty derived its title, was
issued in 1958, or twelve years before the issuance of the title in
the name of the Baltazars in 1970.
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that "(t)he general rule is that in
the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails . . . . In successive
registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in
respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person
claiming under the prior certificate is entitled to the estate or
interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior
certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly
or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest
certificate issued in respect thereof . . . ." (Legarda and Prieto v.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 [1915] at 595-596; Garcia V. CA, Nos. L48971 and 49011, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380.)
TCT No. 20408 derived from OCT 1609, is therefore superior to
TCT No. 303961 derived from OCT 8629.
5. For its part, respondent Quezon City Development and
Financing Corporation (QCDFC) alleges that it has been
improperly impleaded as thirty-party defendant inasmuch as

Realty's alleged cause of action against it is neither for


contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief in
respect of Carpo's claim against Realty. It likewise alleges that
Realty had no cause of action against it since the third party
complaint did not allege that QCDFC violated any legal right of
Realty, QCDFC also assails the Vera Court decision in that it
declares QCDFC directly liable to Carpo and not to Realty.
In the first place, QCDFC did not appeal from the decision of the
Vera Court, nor from the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 29, 1982, nor from the resolution of the IAC Special
Third Civil Cases Division dated May 2, 1984 all of which
voided QCDFCs title to the disputed property. Hence, said
decisions/resolution have become final and executory as regards
QCDFC.
Moreover, even as this Court agrees with QCDFC that the thirdparty complaint filed against it by Realty was procedurally
defective in that the relief being sought by the latter from the
former is not in respect of Carpo's claim, policy considerations
and the factual circumstances of the case compel this Court now
to rule as well on QCDFC's claim to the disputed property. ** To
rule on QCDFC's claim now is to avoid multiplicity of suits and to
put to rest these conflicting claims over the property. After an,
QCDFC was afforded fun opportunity, and exercised its right, to
prove its claim over the land. It presented documentary as well
as testimonial evidence. It was even permitted to file a fourthparty complaint which, however, was dismissed since it failed to
prosecute its case.
QCDFC derived its title from Carmelino Alvendia et. al., the
original registered owners. Original Certificate of Title No. 8931
in the name of Spouses Carmelino Alvendia, et. al. was issued on
July 27, 1971, or thirteen (13) years after the issuance of
Mayuga's title in 1958.

Since Realty is claiming under TCT No. 1609 which was issued
earlier than OCT No. 8931 from which QCDFC's title was
derived, Realty's title must prevail over that of QCDFC.

Rizal Branch XXIII, are SET ASIDE and the Decision of


December 29, 1982 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

6. During the pendency of this case, Petitioners filed a


manifestation alleging that the case at bar is closely connected
with G.R. No. L-469953, Jose N. Mayuga et. al. v. The Court of
Appeals, Macondray Farms, Inc., Realty Sales Enterprise, inc.,
et. al. and moved for consolidation of the two cases involving as
they do the same property. By Resolution of August 29, 1984,
this Court denied the motion for consolidation.
In this connection, it must be emphasized that the action filed by
Carpo against Realty is in the nature of an action to remove
clouds from title to real property. By asserting its own title to the
property in question and asking that Carpo's title be declared
null and void instead, and by filing the third-party complaint
against QCDFC, Realty was similarly asking the court to remove
clouds from its own title. Actions of such nature are governed by
Articles 476 to 481, Quieting of Title, Civil Code (Republic Act
No. 386), and Rule 64, Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies,
Rules of Court.
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they,
strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the person in
respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi
in rem. (McDaniel v. McElvy, 108 So. 820 [1926].) The judgment
in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
(Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421 [1948]).
The ruling in this case is therefore without any prejudice to this
Court's final determination of G.R. No. L-46953.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of May 2,1984 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court and the Decision of January 20, 1981 of the CFI-

THIRD DIVISION
INOCENCIO Y. LUCASAN for himself and as the Judicial
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late JULIANITA
SORBITO LUCASAN,
Petitioner,
- versus PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC) as
receiver and liquidator of the defunct PACIFIC BANKING
CORPORATION,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 176929
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

On appeal is the March 23, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of


Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81518, affirming the July 24,
2003 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City,
Branch 43, granting respondents motion to dismiss, as well as its

subsequent Resolution[3] denying petitioners motion for


reconsideration.
The factual antecedents are as follows.
Petitioner Inocencio Y. Lucasan (Lucasan) and his wife Julianita
Sorbito (now deceased) were the owners of Lot Nos. 1500-A and
229-E situated in Bacolod City, respectively covered by TCT Nos.
T-68115 and T-13816.
On August 3, 1972, Pacific Banking Corporation (PBC) extended
a P5,000.00 loan to Lucasan, with Carlos Benares as his comaker. Lucasan and Benares failed to pay the loan when it
became due and demandable. Consequently, PBC filed a
collection case with the RTC of Bacolod City, docketed as Civil
Case No. 12188.
On April 30, 1979, the RTC rendered a decision ordering
Lucasan and Benares to jointly and severally pay PBC P7,199.99
with interest at 14% per annum computed from February 7,
1979, until the full payment of the obligation. Lucasan failed to
pay the monetary award; thus, to satisfy the judgment, the RTC
issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to effect a levy on
the properties owned by Lucasan and sell the same at public
auction.
In compliance with the writ, the City Sheriff of Bacolod issued a
Notice of Embargo on January 8, 1981, which was annotated on
Lucasans TCT Nos. T-68115 and T-13816 as Entry No. 110107.
Annotated as prior encumbrances on the same titles were the
mortgages in favor of Philippine National Bank (PNB) and
Republic Planters Bank (RPB) executed to secure Lucasans loans
with the banks.
On May 13, 1981, the lots were sold at public auction and were
awarded to PBC as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was
executed in its favor and was registered and annotated on TCT
Nos. T- 68115 and T-13816 as Entry No. 112552 on June 5, 1981.
Neither PNB nor RPB, the mortgagees, assailed the auction sale.

Lucasan, as well as the mortgagee banks, PNB and RPB, did not
redeem the properties within the redemption period.
Nevertheless, PBC did not file a petition for consolidation of
ownership.
In January 1997, Lucasan, through counsel, wrote a letter to the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC), PBCs receiver
and liquidator seeking the cancellation of the certificate of sale
and offering to pay PBCs claim against Lucasan.[4]
Not long thereafter, Lucasan paid his loans with the PNB and
RPB. Consequently, the mortgagee banks executed their
respective releases of mortgage, resulting in the cancellation of
the prior encumbrances in favor of PNB and RPB.
On August 13, 2001, PDIC denied Lucasans request for the
cancellation of the certificate of sale stating:
Please be informed that based on our records, TCT Nos. T-68115
and T-13816 have already become part of the acquired assets of
Pacific Banking Corporation by virtue of a Certificate of Sale
dated May 13, 1981 executed by the City Sheriff of Bacolod.
Subsequently, this document was registered on the titles on June
5, 1981 so that the last day of the redemption period was June 5,
1982.
With regard to your request, we regret to inform you that
reacquisition of the subject properties have to be through sale
following PDICs policy on disposal. Accordingly, these properties
can be disposed through public bidding using the latest
appraised value in the total amount of P2,900,300.00 as of
March 29, 2000 as a minimum bid. If you are still interested to
acquire the properties, please get in touch with our Asset
Management Group x x x.[5]
Lucasan then filed a petition denominated as declaratory relief
with the RTC of Bacolod City docketed as Civil Case No. 0211874.[6] He sought confirmation of his rights provided in the
second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court in

relation to Section 75 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.


Lucasan also pleaded for the lifting and/or cancellation of the
notice of embargo and the certificate of sale annotated on TCT
Nos. T-68115 and T-13816, and offered to pay P100,000.00 or
such amount as may be determined by the RTC, as consideration
for the cancellation.
PDIC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.
It averred that an action to quiet title under Section 1 of Rule 63
may only be brought when there is a cloud on, or to prevent a
cloud from being cast upon, the title to real property. It
asseverated that a cloud on the title is an outstanding instrument
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is actually
invalid or inoperative, but which may nevertheless impair or
affect injuriously the title to property. PDIC claimed that the
notice of embargo was issued pursuant to a writ of execution in
Civil Case No. 12188, while the certificate of sale was executed
as a result of a public bidding. Thus, their annotations on the
titles were valid, operative or effective. PDIC asserted that
Lucasans petition is nothing but a disguised attempt to compel
PDIC to resell the properties at a reduced price of P100,000.00.
Accordingly, it prayed for the dismissal of the petition.[7]
Lucasan opposed the motion.[8] He countered that the subject
properties were still in his possession, and neither PBC nor PDIC
instituted an action for consolidation of ownership. Since the
certificate of title was still in his name, he contended that he
could pursue all legal and equitable remedies, including those
provided for in Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court to
reacquire the properties. He also claimed that PDICs policy of
disposing the subject properties through public bidding at the
appraised value of P2,900,300.00 was unjust, capricious and
arbitrary, considering that the judgment debt amounted only to
P7,199.99 with interest at 14% per annum. Lucasan urged the
RTC to apply the liberal construction of the redemption laws
stressed in Cometa v. Court of Appeals.[9]
In its Order[10] dated July 24, 2003, the RTC granted PDICs
motion to dismiss, thus:

The clouds contemplated by the provision of law under Article


476 of the Civil Code is one where the instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding is apparently valid or effective on its
face that nothing appears to be wrong, but in reality, is null and
void. Hence, the petition filed by [Lucasan] pursuant to the said
article is equivalent to questioning the validity of the subsequent
annotation of Entry No. 110107 and Entry No. 112522 in TCT
Nos. T-13816 and T-68115.
Records disclose that Entry No. 110107 which is a Notice of
Embargo was issued by virtue of a valid judgment rendered in
Civil Case No. 12188 entitled Pacific Banking Corporation vs.
[Inocencio] Lucasan, et al., whereby the Court found [Lucasan]
liable in favor of [PBC] the sum of P7,199.99 with 14% interest
per annum to be computed from February 7, 1979 until fully
paid.
As mandated in Sec. 12, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,
such levy on execution create a lien in favor of [PBC] over the
right, title and interest of [Lucasan] over the two (2) subject
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-13816 and T-68115,
subject to liens and encumbrances then existing. The fact that
[Lucasan] has redeemed the mortgage properties from the first
mortgages (sic), PNB and PNB (sic) Republic Bank, does not vest
him any title free from the lien of [PBC].
While the law requires that the judgment debtor, [Lucasan] must
be served with a notice of levy and even if not served therewith,
the defect is cured by service on him of the notice of sale prior to
the sale, nowhere in the petition which alleges that [Lusasan]
refutes the validity of the execution sale. Thus, he is deemed to
have received and recognized the same.
As support for his thesis, [Lucasan] cites the case of Balanga vs.
Ca., et al. (supra). However this Court is unable to agree that it
is applicable to the present case. As correctly argued by [PDIC],
in that case the proceedings under execution suffered infirmity
from the very start as the levy and sale made by the sheriff of the
land of petitioner Balanga included the house erected on the
land [and] constituted as a family home which, under the law,

exempt from execution. In the case at bar, no objection was


interposed by [Lucasan] as a valid levy has been made pursuant
to Sec. 7, Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court, as a
consequence of which, the sale made pursuant to Sec. 11 of the
same rule is also valid and effective.[11]
The dispositive portion of the RTC Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the claim of any cloud over the titles of
[Lucasan] to be bereft of basis in fact and in law, the Motion to
Dismiss filed by [PDIC] is granted. Accordingly, this is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Lucasan filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it
on October 20, 2003.[13]
On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. It declared
that Lucasan already lost his right to redeem the properties
when he failed to exercise it within the prescribed period. The
effect of such failure was to vest in PBC absolute ownership over
the subject properties.[14]

Lucasan sought a reconsideration of the CA Decision, but the


same was denied on February 7, 2007.[16]
Before us, Lucasan impugns the CA Decision on the following
grounds:
1- THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL
OF THE PETITIONERS PETITION IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR PROVISION OF
SECTION 75 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529 AND PUT
TO NAUGHT THE APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN ZACARIAS
COMETA x x x AND THE CASES CITED THEREIN, INSPITE (sic)
OF THE CLEAR AND OUTSTANDING SIMILARITY OF FACTS
WITH THE CASE UNDER CONSIDERATION.
2- THE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
THAT THE NOTICE OF EMBARGO AND CERTIFICATE OF SALE
ISSUED BY THE CITY SHERIFF WERE ONLY LEVY ON THE
INTEREST OF THE PETITIONER ON THE TWO (2) SUBJECT
LOTS, AS DECREED IN QUEZON BEARING & PARTS
CORPORATION, x x x, WHICH IS LIKEWISE APPLICABLE TO
THE CASE AT BAR.[17]

The CA disposed, thus:


WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, the appeal
is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 43 dated 24 July
2003 dismissing [Lucasans] Petition for Declaratory Relief and
the subsequent Order of the same Court dated 20 October 2003
denying [Lucasans] motion for reconsideration from the Order of
Denial (sic) are hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.

Lucasan posits that he has sufficient cause of action against


PDIC; thus, he chides the RTC for dismissing his complaint, and
the CA for affirming the dismissal. In support of his thesis, he
cites Section 75 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529, or the
Property Registration Decree[18] and Cometa v. Court of
Appeals.[19]

SO ORDERED.[15]
As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, Lucasans action
was one for quieting of title under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.

Essentially, he sought the cancellation of the notice of embargo


and the certificate of sale annotated on TCT Nos. T-68115 and T13816 claiming that the said annotations beclouded the validity
and efficacy of his title. The RTC, however, dismissed his
complaint for lack of cause of action which was affirmed by the
CA in its assailed Decision. Thus, the key issue for our
consideration is whether the dismissal of Lucasans complaint
was proper.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal
of any cloud of doubt or uncertainty with respect to real
property. The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the
following language:

ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real


property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought
to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast
upon title to real property or any interest therein.

ART. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title


to, or interest in the real property which is the subjectmatter of the action. He need not be in possession of said
property.

To avail of the remedy of quieting of title, two (2)


indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to
or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to
be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.[20] Stated differently, the
plaintiff must show that he has a legal or at least an
equitable title over the real property in dispute, and that
some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.
Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case.
Admittedly, the subject parcels of land were levied upon by
virtue of a writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 12188. On
May 13, 1981, a public auction of the subject parcels of land was
held and the lots were awarded to PBC as the highest bidder. A
certificate of sale in favor of PBC was issued on the same day,
and was registered and annotated on TCT Nos. T-68115 and T13816 as Entry No. 112552 on June 5, 1981.
Under the 1964 Rules of Court, which were in effect at that time,
the judgment debtor or redemptioner had the right to redeem
the property from PBC within twelve (12) months from the
registration of the certificate of sale.[21] With the expiration of
the twelve-month period of redemption and no redemption
having been made, as in this case, the judgment debtor or the
redemptioner lost whatever right he had over the land in
question.[22]
Lucasan admitted that he failed to redeem the properties within
the redemption period, on account of his then limited financial
situation.[23] It was only in January 1997 or fifteen (15) years
later that he manifested his desire to reacquire the properties.

Clearly thus, he had lost whatever right he had over Lot Nos.
1500-A and 229-E.
The payment of loans made by Lucasan to PNB and RPB in 1997
cannot, in any way, operate to restore whatever rightspacerun:yes'> Sadly for him, that case is not on all fours with
his case, for it was not for quieting of title but a petition for
issuance of a writ of possession and cancellation of lis pendens.
Likewise, in Cometa the registered owner assailed the validity of
the levy and sale, which Lucasan failed to do.

Undoubtedly, Lucasans right to redeem the subject properties


had elapsed on June 5, 1982. His offer to redeem the same in
1997 or long after the expiration of the redemption period is not
really one for redemption but for repurchase. Thus, PBC and
PDIC, its receiver and liquidator, are no longer bound by the bid
price. It is entirely within their discretion to set a higher price.
As we explained in De Robles v. Court of Appeals:[25]
The right to redeem becomes functus officio on the date of its
expiry, and its exercise after the period is not really one of
redemption but a repurchase. Distinction must be made because
redemption is by force of law; the purchaser at public auction is
bound to accept redemption. Repurchase however of foreclosed
property, after redemption period, imposes no such obligation.
After expiry, the purchaser may or may not re-sell the property
but no law will compel him to do so. And, he is not bound by the
bid price; it is entirely within his discretion to set a higher price,
for after all, the property already belongs to him as owner.
Accordingly, the condition imposed by the PDIC for the reacquisition of the property cannot be considered unjust or
unreasonable.

Verily, in several cases,[26] this Court allowed redemption even


after the lapse of the redemption period. But in those cases a
valid tender was made by the original owners within the
redemption period. Even in Cometa, the redemption was allowed
beyond the redemption period because a valid tender of payment
was made within the redemption period. The same is not true in
the case before us.
In fine, we find that the RTC correctly dismissed Lucasans
complaint for quieting of title. Thus, the CA committed no
reversible error in sustaining the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and


Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81518, are
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Co- Ownership
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. and MARTA BAROLA,
namely: LEONOR, SIMPLICIO, PROTACIO, JR., ANTONIO,

BEVERLY ANN LORRAINNE, TITA, CONSOLACION, LEONORA


and ASUNCION, all surnamed GO, represented by
LEONORA B. GO,
Petitioners,
-versus ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 157537
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by
the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by
Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said
portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial
partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the
requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
Antecedents
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land
with a total area of 17,140 square meters situated in Southern
Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty three years
later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation and Waiver,[1] whereby he affirmed under oath
that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who
had purchased the two parcels of land (the property).
On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the wife
of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners.[2] On December
28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go (joined by Ritos
wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the property with an area of
5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio) for

5,686,768.00.[3] On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded


the return of the property,[4] but Servacio refused to heed their
demand. After barangay proceedings failed to resolve the
dispute,[5] they sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial
Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte (RTC) for the annulment of
the sale of the property.
The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation,
the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the
property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the
community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null
and void.[6]
Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively
owned the property because he had purchased it with his own
money.[7]
On October 3, 2002,[8] the RTC declared that the property was
the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the
exclusive property of Protacio, Sr., because there were three
vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and
Dina); that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had
been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta; that under
Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property
was acquired, all property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property
thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband or to the
wife; and that Protacio, Jr.s renunciation was grossly insufficient
to rebut the legal presumption.[9]
Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the
property, holding that: xxx As long as the portion sold, alienated
or encumbered will not be allotted to the other heirs in the final
partition of the property, or to state it plainly, as long as the
portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate (sic) of other
heirs, it is valid.[10] Quoting Tolentinos commentary on the
matter as authority,[11] the RTC opined:

In his comment on Article 175 of the New Civil Code regarding


the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, Senator Arturo
Tolentino, says [sic]
Alienation by the survivor. After the death of one of the spouses,
in case it is necessary to sell any portion of the community
property in order to pay outstanding obligation of the
partnership, such sale must be made in the manner and with the
formalities established by the Rules of Court for the sale of the
property of the deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation
or disposition of said property affected without said formalities
shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belongs
to the vendor as determined in the liquidation and partition.
Pending the liquidation, the disposition must be considered as
limited only to the contingent share or interest of the vendor in
the particular property involved, but not to the corpus of the
property.
This rule applies not only to sale but also to mortgages. The
alienation, mortgage or disposal of the conjugal property without
the required formality, is not however, null ab initio, for the law
recognizes their validity so long as they do not exceed the
portion which, after liquidation and partition, should pertain to
the surviving spouse who made the contract. [underlining
supplied]
It seems clear from these comments of Senator Arturo Tolentino
on the provisions of the New Civil Code and the Family Code on
the alienation by the surviving spouse of the community property
that jurisprudence remains the same - that the alienation made
by the surviving spouse of a portion of the community property is
not wholly void ab initio despite Article 103 of the Family Code,
and shall be valid to the extent of what will be allotted, in the
final partition, to the vendor. And rightly so, because why
invalidate the sale by the surviving spouse of a portion of the
community property that will eventually be his/her share in the
final partition? Practically there is no reason for that view and it
would be absurd.

Now here, in the instant case, the 5,560 square meter portion of
the 17,140 square-meter conjugal lot is certainly mush (sic) less
than what vendors Protacio Go and his son Rito B. Go will
eventually get as their share in the final partition of the property.
So the sale is still valid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complaint is hereby
DISMISSED without pronouncement as to cost and damages.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The RTCs denial of their motion for reconsideration[13]
prompted the petitioners to appeal directly to the Court on a
pure question of law.
Issue
The petitioners claim that Article 130 of the Family Code is the
applicable law; and that the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to
Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation.
In contrast, although they have filed separate comments,
Servacio and Rito both argue that Article 130 of the Family Code
was inapplicable; that the want of the liquidation prior to the
sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to
the extent of the portion that was finally allotted to the vendors
as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights of
the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale disposed
of was within the aliquot portion of the property that the vendors
were entitled to as heirs.[14]
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the
conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.

If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving


spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either
judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the
deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no
liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving
the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage
shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a
mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall
govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the
Family Code, viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage
settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall
govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions
in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses
before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n) [emphasis supplied]
It is clear that conjugal partnership of gains established before
and after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the
rules found in Chapter 4 (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) of Title
IV (Property Relations Between Husband And Wife) of the Family
Code. Hence, any disposition of the conjugal property after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after
the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is void.
Before applying such rules, however, the conjugal partnership of
gains must be subsisting at the time of the effectivity of the
Family Code. There being no dispute that Protacio, Sr. and Marta
were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on

August 3, 1988, their property relation was properly


characterized as one of conjugal partnership governed by the
Civil Code. Upon Martas death in 1987, the conjugal partnership
was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code,[15]
and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio,
Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the
assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation
following its liquidation.[16] The ensuing implied ordinary coownership was governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code,[17] to
wit:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the coownership. (399)
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in
respect of Martas share in the conjugal partnership, could not
yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share
without an actual partition of the property being first done either
by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had
was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share.[18] Nonetheless,
a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr.
had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest,
but not the interest of his co-owners.[19] Consequently, the sale
by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the
other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the
selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making
the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share.[20] This result
conforms to the well-established principle that the binding force
of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to
do so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere
potest).[21]

Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that


the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal
partnership is without prejudice to vested rights already
acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. This
provision gives another reason not to declare the sale as entirely
void. Indeed, such a declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio
who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in
the property subject of the sale.
In their separate comments,[22] the respondents aver that each
of the heirs had already received a certain allotted portion at the
time of the sale, and that Protacio, Sr. and Rito sold only the
portions adjudicated to and owned by them. However, they did
not present any public document on the allocation among her
heirs, including themselves, of specific shares in Martas estate.
Neither did they aver that the conjugal properties had already
been liquidated and partitioned. Accordingly, pending a partition
among the heirs of Marta, the efficacy of the sale, and whether
the extent of the property sold adversely affected the interests of
the petitioners might not yet be properly decided with finality.
The appropriate recourse to bring that about is to commence an
action for judicial partition, as instructed in Bailon-Casilao v.
Court of Appeals,[23] to wit:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is
entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property
by one

co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null


and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of
the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in
common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or
co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the
common property as if it continued to remain in the possession

of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v.


Bandoy, supra].
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of coowners in cases where their consent were not secured in a
sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the
undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for
PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
xxx[24]
In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of
the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might
not be validly sold to her. The following observations of Justice
Paras are explanatory of this result, viz:
xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged
really would pertain to the share of the surviving spouse, then
said transaction is valid. If it turns out that there really would be,
after liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole
transaction is null and void. But if it turns out that half of the
property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs to the husband as
his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the
estate of the wife, then that corresponding to the husband is
valid, and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these
can be determined only at the time the liquidation is over, it
follows logically that a disposal made by the surviving spouse is
not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of conjugal
properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse without the
legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the
deceased spouse (except of course as to that portion of the
husbands share inherited by her as the surviving spouse). The
buyers of the property that could not be validly sold become
trustees of said portion for the benefit of the husbands other
heirs, the cestui que trust ent. Said heirs shall not be barred by
prescription or by laches (See Cuison, et al. v. Fernandez, et
al.,L-11764, Jan.31, 1959.)[25]
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari;
and AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

The petitioners shall pay the costs of suit.


SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
REYNALDO BALOLOY and G.R. No. 157767
ADELINA BALOLOY-HIJE,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
ALFREDO HULAR,
Respondent. September 9, 2004
x-------------------------------------------------x

name. The respondent later discovered that in the cadastral


survey of lands in Juban, the property of his father, which
actually consisted of 1,405 square meters was made to form part
of Lot No. 3353, the property of Iluminado Baloloy. According to
the respondent, even if the residential land was made to form
part of Lot No. 3353 registered under the name of Iluminado
Baloloy, he had acquired ownership of the property by acquisitive
prescription, as he and his predecessors had been in continuous,
uninterrupted and open possession of the property in the
concept of owners for more than 60 years.

DECISION

The respondent prayed for alternative reliefs that, after due


hearing, judgment be rendered in his favor, thus:

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

a)
Declaring the plaintiff as the absolute owner of the land in
question;

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of


the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51081, which affirmed the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 51,
in Civil Case No. 93-5871.

b)
Ordering the defendants to perpetually refrain from
disturbing plaintiff in his peaceful possession in the land in
question;

The antecedents are as follows:


On May 11, 1993, respondent Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for
quieting of title of real property with damages against the
children and heirs of Iluminado Baloloy, namely, Anacorita,
Antonio, and petitioners Reynaldo and Adelina, all surnamed
Baloloy. The respondent alleged, inter alia, in his complaint that
his father, Astrologo Hular, was the owner of a parcel of
residential land located in Sitio Page, Biriran, Juban, Sorsogon,
with an area of 287 square meters, and that such lot was part of
Lot No. 3347 of the Juban Cadastre. The respondent alleged that
Iluminado Baloloy, the petitioners predecessor-in-interest, was
able to secure a Free Patent over the property through fraud on
March 1, 1968, on the basis of which the Register of Deeds
issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-16540 in his

c)
Ordering the defendants to remove their houses in the land
in question, and to declare OCT No. P-16540, and whatever
paper, form, document or proceeding the defendants may have,
as null and void and without any effect whatsoever as far as the
land in question is concerned as they cast cloud upon the title of
the plaintiff;
d)
In the alternative, defendants be ordered to reconvey the
title in favor of the plaintiff as far as the land in question is
concerned;
e)
Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the
plaintiff the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00
as attorneys fee plus P500.00 for every appearance or hearing of
his lawyer in court; P1,500.00 as consultation fee; P5,000.00 as
incidental litigation expenses; P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and to pay the costs.

Plaintiff further prays for such other relief [as are] just and
equitable in the premises.[3]
The Evidence of the Respondent
The respondent adduced evidence that the Spouses Lino and
Victoriana Estopin were the original owners of a parcel of land
located in Barangay Biriran, Juban, Sorsogon, designated as Lot
No. 3347 of the Juban Cadastre. A major portion of the property,
where a house of strong materials was constructed, was
agricultural, while the rest was residential. The respondent also
averred that the Spouses Estopin declared the property in their
names under Tax Declaration No. 4790. On the north of the
agricultural portion of the property was the road leading to
Biriran, while north of the residential portion was a creek (canal)
and the property of Iluminado.
When Lino Estopin died intestate, his widow, Victoriana Lagata,
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[4] on November 11, 1961 over
the agricultural portion of Lot No. 3347, which had an area of
15,906 square meters, more or less, in favor of Astrologo Hular,
married to Lorenza Hular. Shortly thereafter, on November 25,
1961, Lagata executed a Deed of Absolute Sale[5] over the
residential portion of the property with an area of 287 square
meters, including the house constructed thereon, in favor of
Hular. Hular and his family, including his son, the respondent,
then resided in the property. In 1961 or thereabouts, Iluminado
asked Hulars permission to construct a house on a portion of Lot
No. 3347 near the road, and the latter agreed. In l977, Lorenza
Hular, wife of Astrologo, declared the residential land in the
latters name under Tax Declaration No. 6841.[6]
Earlier, or on August 14, 1945, Irene Griarte had executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale over a coconut land located in Barangay
Biriran, Juban, with an area of 6,666 square meters in favor of
Martiniano Balbedina, with the following boundaries: North,
Alejandro Gruta; South, Lino Estopin; East, River Page; West,
Pedro Grepal and Esteban Grepal.[7] Subsequently, after a
cadastral survey was conducted on lands in Juban, the property

of Balbedina was designated as Lot No. 3353, with the following


boundaries: North: Lot No. 3353 (portion), Alejandro Gruta;
South: Lino Estopin; West: Lot No. 3349; East: creek. A trail was
then established between Lot No. 3353 and Lot No. 3347
resulting in the decrease of Lot No. 3353 owned by Balbedina to
4,651 square meters. He declared the property under his name
under Tax Declaration No. 191 with the following boundaries:
North: Lot No. 3353 (portion) Alejandro Gruta; South: trail; East:
creek; West: Lot No. 3349.[8]
On June 4, 1951, Balbedina executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
over Lot No. 3353 with an area of only 4,651 square meters in
favor of Iluminado.[9] The latter declared the property in his
name under Tax Declaration No. 5359.[10] Iluminado filed an
application with the Bureau of Lands for a free patent over the
entirety of Lot No. 3353 on January 5, 1960.[11] He indicated in
his application that the property was not occupied by any person
and was disposable or alienable public land. In support thereof,
he executed an affidavit wherein he declared that he purchased
about one-half portion of the property in 1951 based on a deed of
absolute sale attached to said affidavit; that in 1957, he
purchased the other one-half portion, but for economic reasons,
no deed of sale was executed by the parties. He also alleged that
the improvements on the land consisted of coconut trees.[12]
The Bureau of Lands processed the application in due course.
In the meantime, Iluminado constructed his house on a portion of
Lot No. 3353 near the trail (road) leading to Biriran. He and his
family, including his children, forthwith resided in said house.
On March 1, 1968, the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural
Resources approved Iluminados application and issued Free
Patent No. 384019 covering Lot No. 3353 with an area of 9,302
square meters, on the basis of which OCT No. P-16540 was
thereafter issued by the Register of Deeds on March 1, 1968.[13]
On August 2, 1975, Alejandro Gruta had executed a deed of
absolute sale over a portion of Lot No. 3353 with an area of
4,651 square meters in favor of Estelito Hije, the husband of
petitioner Adelina Baloloy, one of Iluminados children.[14]

Before he left for employment in Saudi Arabia in 1979,


respondent Hular had his house constructed near the trail (road)
on Lot No. 3347, which, however, occupied a big portion of Lot
No. 3353.[15]
Iluminado died intestate on November 29, 1985. His widow and
their children continued residing in the property, while petitioner
Reynaldo Baloloy, one of Iluminados children, later constructed
his house near that of his deceased father. When Astrologo died
intestate on December 25, 1989, he was survived by his children,
Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Elena, Leo, Teresita, and the respondent,
among others,[16] who continued to reside in their house.[17]
Sometime in l991, the respondents house helper was cleaning
the backyard, but was prevented from doing so by petitioner
Adelina Baloloy who claimed that their father Iluminado owned
the land where the respondents house was located. To determine
the veracity of the claim, the respondent had Lot No. 3353
surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Rodolfo Cunanan on February
16, 1993, in the presence of Balbedina, Antonio Baloloy and
petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy. Cunanan prepared a Special Sketch
Plan of Lot No. 3353[18] showing that the house of Iluminado
was constructed on Lot No. 3353[19] near the road behind the
houses owned by Astrologo and Alfredo.[20] The engineer
discovered that the residential area deeded by Lagata to Hular
had an area of 1,405 square meters, instead of 287 square
meters only.[21]
In their Answer to the complaint, the heirs of Iluminado Baloloy
averred that Iluminados house was built in 1962 on a portion of
Lot No. 3353, which the latter purchased from Balbedina, and
not on a portion of Lot No. 3347 which Hular purchased from
Lagata. They alleged that Hular constructed his house on a
portion of Lot No. 3353 after securing the permission of their
father Iluminado, and that the respondent had no cause of action
for the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and OCT No. P16540 because only the State, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, may file a direct action to annul the said patent and
title; and even if the respondent was the real party in interest to

file the action, such actions had long since prescribed. The heirs
of Baloloy prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable
Court to DISMISS this case pursuant to paragraph 15, et seq.,
hereof, and/or DECIDE it in favor of the defendants by
UPHOLDING the sanctity of OCT No. P-16540 and ordering
plaintiff to:
1.
RESPECT defendants proprietary rights and interests on
the property in question covered by OCT No. P-16540;
2.
VACATE it at his sole and exclusive expense, and never to
set foot on it ever again;
3.
PAY defendants:
a)
MORAL DAMAGES at P50,000.00 EACH;
b)
ACTUAL DAMAGES and UNREALIZED PROFITS at
P1,000.00/MONTH COMPUTED UP TO THE TIME OF PAYMENT
PLUS LEGAL RATE OF INTEREST;
c)
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of P50,000.00
d)
ATTYS FEES and LITIGATION EXPENSES of P100,000.00;
and
e)
THE COSTS OF THIS SUIT.
DEFENDANTS pray for all other reliefs and remedies consistent
with law and equity.[22]
The Evidence for the Petitioners
Sometime in 1982, Hular asked permission from Iluminado to
construct his house on Lot No. 3353 near the road leading to
Biriran. Iluminado agreed, in the presence of his daughter,
petitioner Adelina Baloloy. As per the plan of Lot No. 3353
certified by a Director of the Bureau of Lands on November 6,
1961, Lot No. 3353 had an area of 9,302 square meters.[23]
As gleaned from the Sketch Plan of Lot Nos. 3347 and 3353
prepared on February 7, 1991 by Geodetic Engineer Salvador
Balilo, the houses of the Baloloy siblings and those of Astrologo
and Alfredo were located in Lot No. 3353.[24] In the said sketch
plan, Lot No. 3353 had an area of 9,302 square meters, while Lot

No. 3347 had an area of 15,905 square meters. When apprised of


Hulars claim over the property, the petitioners and their co-heirs
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with the Municipal Trial
Court of Juban, docketed as Civil Case No. 331. The case was,
however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
On December 4, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in favor
of the respondent. The fallo of the decision reads:
a/ Declaring plaintiff the absolute owner of the land in question,
consisting of 1,405 square meters, more or less, and entitled to
the peaceful possession thereof;
b/ Ordering the defendants to reconvey the title to the plaintiff as
far as the land in question is concerned within fifteen (15) days
counted from the finality of the decision, failing in which, the
Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to execute the necessary
document of reconveyance of the title in favor of the plaintiff
after an approved survey plan is made;
c/ Ordering defendants to remove their houses from the land in
question at their own expense within fifteen (15) days after the
decision has become final;

Victoriana Lagata executed the deed of absolute sale on the


residential portion of Lot No. 3347, she did not know that it
formed part of Lot No. 3353. It further held that the action of the
plaintiff to nullify the title and patent was imprescriptible.
The petitioners filed on December 8, 1995 a motion to reopen
the case to admit Tax Declaration Nos. 6957 and 4790 covering
Lot No. 3347, under the names of Astrologo Hular and Victoriana
Lagata, respectively, in which it was declared that Lot No. 3347
was coconut land. The trial court ruled that the motion had been
mooted by its decision.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the
decision of the trial court, and thereafter denied the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The Present Petition
The petitioners, who are still residing on the subject property,
filed their petition for review on certiorari for the reversal of the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are:

d/ Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally plaintiff


the amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees. P5,000.00 as
incidental litigation expenses;
e/ To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[25]

The trial court ruled that the property subject of the complaint,
with an area of 1,405 square meters, was part of Lot No. 3347
which the Spouses Estopin owned, and which they later sold to
Astrologo Hular. The trial court
also held that Iluminado committed fraud in securing the free
patent and the title for the property in question, and that when

(1) whether all the indispensable parties had been impleaded by


the respondent in the trial court;
(2) whether the said respondent had a cause of action against
the petitioners for the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019
and OCT No. P-16540; for reconveyance and for possession of
the subject property; and for damages; and
(3) whether the respondent had acquired ownership over the
property through acquisitive prescription.
The first issue, while not raised by the parties in the trial court
and in the Court of Appeals, is so interwoven with the other
issues raised therein and is even decisive of the outcome of this
case; hence, such issue must be delved into and resolved by this
Court.[26]

We note that the action of the respondent in the trial court is for:
(a) reinvidicatoria, to declare the respondent the absolute owner
of the subject property and its reconveyance to him as a
consequence of the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and
OCT No. P-16540; (b) publiciana, to order the petitioners and the
other heirs of Iluminado Baloloy to vacate the property and
deliver possession thereof to him; and (c) damages and attorneys
fees.
It is the contention of the respondent that the subject property
was sold by Lagata to his father, Astrologo Hular, in 1961. He
adduced evidence that when his parents died intestate, they
were survived by their children, the respondent and his siblings
Elena, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Leo, and Teresita. Article 1078 of
the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs,
the whole estate of the decedent is, before partition, owned in
common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the
deceased. Until a division is made, the respective share of each
cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together
with his co-participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso
property, in addition to the use and enjoyment of the same.
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners
may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of
actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion
publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring
such an action without the necessity of joining all the other coowners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.[27] Any judgment of the court in
favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such judgment
is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the
unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to
the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he
impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming
sole ownership over the subject property and praying that he be
declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other
co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or

conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were


aware of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered
judgment declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the
property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the
latters siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is
erroneous.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent
was mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the
property, as parties. The respondent failed to comply with the
rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the
Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because
the respondent sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540
which was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the
State is impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the Court
would not be binding on it. It has been held that the absence of
an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the
proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including
the judgment.[28] The absence of the respondents siblings, as
parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing
thereof, including the judgment of the court, ineffective for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present.[29]
Even if we glossed over the procedural lapses of the respondent,
we rule that he failed to prove the material allegations of his
complaint against the petitioners; and that he is not entitled to
the reliefs prayed for.
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by the
requisite quantum of evidence. If he claims a right granted as
created by law or under a contract of sale, he must prove his
claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness or absence of the
evidence of that of his opponent.[30] He who claims a better
right to real estate property must prove not only his ownership
of the same but also the identity thereof.[31] In Huy v. Huy,[32]
we held that where a property subject of controversy is duly
registered under the Torrens system, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given weight and in the

absence of strong and compelling evidence to the contrary, the


holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property
until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action. A Torrens Certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to
property in favor of the person in whose name appears therein.
[33] Such holder is entitled to the possession of the property
until his title is nullified.
The petitioners aver that Lot No. 3347 owned by the Spouses
Estopin was coconut, and not residential, land. The petitioners
contend that, under the deed of absolute sale, Victoriana Lagata
executed on November 25, 1961 in favor of Astrologo Hular, she
sold the residential portion of Lot No. 3347; however, the latter
constructed his house on a portion of Lot No. 3353 which
Iluminado had purchased from Balbedina, now covered by OCT
No. P-16540. The petitioners assert that along with their mother
Anacorita and their brother Antonio Baloloy, they constructed
their houses on a part of Lot No. 3353, titled in the name of their
father Iluminado; hence, they could not be dispossessed of the
said property. The petitioners posit that, whether the house of
Hular was constructed on a portion of Lot No. 3353 of the
property of Balbedina or Gruta is irrelevant because both
properties are now covered
by OCT No. P-16540 under the name of Iluminado, their
predecessor-in-interest.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Victoriana Lagata owned the
subject property, which turned out to be 1,405 square meters,
and sold the same to Hular. In contrast, the RTC declared in its
decision that while under the deed of absolute sale executed by
Irene Griarte in favor of Balbedina, Lot No. 3353 had an area of
6,666 square meters, Griarte actually owned only 4,651 square
meters; a portion of the lot was actually owned by Lino Estopin.
Hence, Balbedina sold only 4,651 square meters to
Iluminado[34] because he was aware that he owned only 4,651
square meters of the land. It also held that, unknown to Lagata,
a portion of Lot No. 3347 was declared as part of Lot No. 3353
when the lands in Juban were surveyed. The trial court
concluded that Lagata erroneously declared, under the deed of

absolute sale executed on November 25, 1961 in favor of Hular,


that the property was part of Lot No. 3347.
The trial and appellate courts erred in their decisions.
The evidence on record shows that Irene Griarte owned a parcel
of land with an area of 6,666 square meters, more or less.[35]
When she sold the property to Martiniano Balbedina on August
14, 1945, it was bounded on the south by the property of Lino
Estopin. There was no trail yet between the property of Griarte
on the south and of Lino Estopin on the north. In the
meantime, however, a road (trail) leading to Biriran was
established between the property of Balbedina on the south and
that of Lino Estopin on the north. Thereafter, a cadastral survey
of the lands in Juban was conducted by the Bureau of Lands. The
property of Balbedina was designated as a portion of Lot No.
3353, while that of Estopin was designated as Lot No. 3347. The
other portion of Lot No. 3353, with an area of 4,561 square
meters, belonged to Alejandro Gruta. Because of the
construction of the road, the property of Balbedina, which was a
part of Lot No. 3353, was reduced to 4,651 square meters.
Balbedina declared, under Tax Declaration No. 391, that Lot No.
3353 had an area of 4,651 square meters and was coconut
land[36] and that his property was bounded on the south by a
trail (road). Lino Estopin declared Lot No. 3347 under his name
for taxation purposes, in which he stated that his property was
bounded on the north by the trail going to Biriran.[37] Clearly,
then, Lot No. 3353 and Lot No. 3347 had a common boundary
the trail (road) going to Biriran.
Balbedina sold his property, which was a portion of Lot No. 3353,
with an area of 4,651 square meters to Iluminado Baloloy on
June 4, 1951.[38] Under the deed of absolute sale, the property
was bounded on the south by the trail (road) owned by Lino
Estopin.[39] The English translation of the deed of sale attached
as page 85 to the RTC Records, which both the trial court and
the appellate court relied upon, is incorrect.
The original deed of absolute sale, which is in Spanish, states
that the boundary of the property on the south is con camino,
Lino Estopin, while the English version of the deed, indicates

that the property is bounded on the south by Lino Estopin. Being


an earlier document, the deed in Spanish signed by the parties
therefore should prevail. Conformably to such deed, Iluminado
Baloloy declared in Tax Declaration No. 5359 under his name
that the property is bounded on the south by a trail,[40] and not
by Lot No. 3347 owned by Lino Estopin.
The respondent failed to adduce any documentary evidence to
prove how the Spouses Estopin acquired the disputed property.
The respondents reliance on the testimonies of Melissa Estopin,
the daughter of the Spouses Estopin, and on Porfirio Guamos as
well as the May 8, 1993 Affidavit of Martiniano Balbedina, and
the deed of sale executed by Victoriana Lagata on November 27,
1961 in favor of Astrologo Hular to corroborate his claim over
the lot in question, is misplaced.
First. Per the testimony of Porfirio Guamos, the witness of the
respondent, Lino Estopin purchased the disputed property in
1941 from Irene Griarte and insisted that there was a deed of
sale evidencing the sale:
Atty. Dealca:
Q The area of the land in question is 1,405 sq. m., you claim that
way back in 1944 the owner of the land was Lino Estopin; 41 to
44?
A 1941.
Q And you said that Lino Estopin was able to acquire the land by
purchase?
A That was very long time when Lino Estopin sold the property.
Q My question is whether you know because you testified earlier
that Lino Estopin was able to acquire the land by purchase; do
you confirm that?
A Yes, Sir.

A I was not there.


Q So you do not know how much was it bought by Lino Estopin
from Irene Griarte?
A No, Sir.
Q You do not know whether a document to that effect was
actually drafted and executed?
A There was.
Q Have you seen the document?
A I did not see but there was a document.
Q You maintain there was a document but you did not see a
document, is that it?
A In my belief there was a document.
Q In your belief, how did you organize that belief when you did
not see a document?
A I insist there was a document.
Q That is why, why are you insisting when you did not see a
document?
A Well, during the sale that document was used.
Q How was it used when you did not see that document?
A When the deed of sale was executed I did not see the
document, but I insist there was a document.
Q Thats why, how were you able to say before the court that
there was a document when you contend that you did not see
any?
A There was basis in the sale the sale was based on a document.
You cannot sell a property without document? (sic)
Q Is that your belief?
A Yes, Sir.

Q From whom?
A From Irene Griarte.

Q But you did not see any document?

Q Were you present when that sale was consummated?

Atty. Diesta:

Already answered.
Witness:

respondents claim that the said lot was then residential, and that
the boundary of the property on the north was the road to
Biriran which, in turn, is consistent with the petitioners claim.
[44] Unfortunately, the trial court denied the said motion on the
ground that it was mooted by its decision.

A I did not see.


Atty. Dealca:
Q You said that that document was used when the property was
sold by Lino Estopin to Alfredo Hular. . .
A In 1961. Yes.[41]
However, the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the said
deed or even an authentic copy thereof. The respondent did not
offer any justification for his failure to adduce the same in
evidence. As against the respondents verbal claim that his father
acquired the property from Lagata, the Torrens title of Iluminado
Baloloy must prevail.[42]
Second. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence any
tax declarations over the disputed property under the name of
Irene Griarte and/or Lino Estopin, or realty tax payment receipts
in their names from 1941 to November 1961. The documents are
circumstantial evidence to prove that Irene Griarte claimed
ownership over the disputed property and that Lino Estopin
acquired the same from her. After all, such tax declarations and
tax receipts can be strong evidence of ownership of land when
accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for acquisitive
prescription.[43]
Third. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence Tax
Declaration No. 4790 covering the two parcels of land under the
name of Lino Estopin to prove his claim that Lot No. 3347
consisted of agricultural and residential lands. We note that the
petitioners appended a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No.
4790 under the name of Victoriana Lagata over Lot No. 3347 to
their Motion to Reopen the Case. In the said declaration, Lot No.
3347 was described as coconut land; this is contrary to the

Fourth. During the cadastral survey of lands in Juban, the lot of


Gruta and that of Balbedina, inclusive of the subject property,
were designated as Lot No. 3353 with a total area of 9,302
square meters under their names, while that of Lino Estopin was
designated as Lot No. 3347 with an area of 15,906 square
meters. Iluminado Baloloy applied for a free patent over Lot No.
3353, including the disputed property, under his name. The
respondent failed to adduce any evidence that the Spouses
Estopin and/or Astrologo Hular opposed Balbedina and/or
Iluminados claim of ownership of Lot No. 3353 during the survey
and after the filing of the application. A propos is our ruling in
Urquiaga v. Court of Appeals: [45]
As succinctly observed by respondent Court of Appeals in
assessing the totality of the evidence
We do not agree with defendants that they are also the
occupants and possessors of the subject lot just because it is
adjacent to their titled property. Precisely, the boundaries of
defendants titled property were determined, delineated and
surveyed during the cadastral survey of Dipolog and thereafter
indicated in their certificate of title in order that the extent of
their property will be known and fixed. Since the subject lot was
already found to be outside their titled property, defendants have
no basis in claiming it or other adjacent lots for that matter.
Otherwise, the very purpose of the cadastral survey as a process
of determining the exact boundaries of adjoining properties will
be defeated.
Defendants own title, O.C.T. No. 0-357 (in the names of Jose
Aguirre and Cristina Gonzales), in fact belies their claim of
occupation and possession over the adjacent subject lot.
Examining said title, we note that: (1) the cadastral survey of

Dipolog was conducted from January, 1923 to November 1925;


(2) defendants titled property was one of those lots surveyed and
this was designated as Lot No. 2623; (3) during the survey, it was
already determined and known that Lot No. 2623 is bounded on
the northeast, southeast, southwest and west by Lot No. 4443 (as
we have seen in our narration of facts, the subject lot is a
subdivision lot of Lot No. 6552 which was originally identified as
Lot No. 4443-B-1, Dipolog Cadastre 85 Ext.: hence, the subject
lot is a portion of Lot No. 4443); and (4) O.C.T. No. 0-357 was
issued on October 11, 1965 on the strength of the judgment
rendered on July 31 (sic), 1941 by the then Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Norte in Cadastral Case No. 6, LRC
Cadastral Record No. 756.
From the foregoing facts, we find that as early as January, 1923
when the cadastral survey was started, the boundaries of Lot
Nos. 2623 and 4443 were already determined and delineated.
Since the subject lot was surveyed to be part of Lot No. 4443, it
means that during that time defendants predecessors-in-interest
never claimed ownership or possession over the subject lot.
Otherwise, they would have complained so that the subject lot
could be excluded from Lot No. 4443 and included in Lot No.
2623, they being adjacent lots. It is obvious then that defendants
predecessors only claimed Lot No. 2623 and they pursued their
claim in Cadastral Case No. 6, LRC Cadastral Record No. 756
until O.C.T. No. 0-357 was issued to them. The contention of
defendants that they and their predecessors-in-interest occupied
and possessed the subject lot since time immemorial therefore is
not true.[46]
Fifth. Under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961,
Lagata sold to Astrologo Hular Lot No. 3347, and not Lot No.
3353. In Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,[47] we ruled that:
Petitioner VFP maintains that the deed of sale was valid and
enforceable and that it was perfected at the very moment that
the parties agreed upon the thing which was the object of the
sale and upon the price. The parties herein had agreed on the
parcel of land that petitioner would purchase from respondent

PNR, and the same was described therein; thus, petitioner VFP
cannot conveniently set aside the technical description in this
agreement and insist that it is the legal owner of the property
erroneously described in the certificate of title. Petitioner can
only claim right of ownership over the parcel of land that was the
object of the deed of sale and nothing else.[48]
Sixth. Under the said deed of sale dated November 11, 1961,
Victoriana Lagata sold Lot No. 3347 which had an area of 15,906
square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 4790. The
deed does not state that what was sold was only a portion of Lot
No. 3347, excluding therefrom the disputed property. This is
understandable, since the subject property is a portion of Lot No.
3353 owned by Alejandro Gruta and Iluminado Baloloy, and not
of Lino Estopin and/or Victoriana Lagata. Lagata could not have
sold a portion of Lot No. 3353 which she does not own. As the
Latin adage goes: NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET.
Seventh. The Balbedinas Affidavit dated May 8, 1993 offered by
the respondent to prove the contents thereof is inadmissible in
evidence against the petitioners. Balbedina did not testify; as
such, the petitioners were deprived of their right to crossexamine him. The said affidavit is thus hearsay and barren of
probative weight. The affidavit varies the contents of the deed of
absolute sale which he (Balbedina) executed in favor of
Iluminado more than forty years earlier. In the said affidavit, it
was made to appear that Balbedina sold to Iluminado on June 4,
1951 only a portion of Lot 3353 with an area of 3,333 square
meters, when under the said deed of absolute sale, the property
that was sold consisted of 4,651 square meters. The affidavit is
proscribed by Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
...
It bears stressing that the deed of absolute sale executed by
Balbedina in favor of Baloloy was notarized by the Justice of the

Peace who was an Ex-Officio Notary Public; hence, entitled to full


probative weight.
Eighth. The Special Sketch Plan of Lot No. 3353 prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Rodolfo P. Cunanan[49] cannot prevail over
OCT No. P-16540. In fact, the plan even buttressed the case for
the petitioners because it shows that the subject property is a
portion of Lot No. 3353, and not of Lot No. 3347, covered by
OCT No. P-16540 under the name of Iluminado Baloloy, the
deceased father of the petitioners.
Ninth. The conclusion of the RTC that Lagata in fact sold a
portion of Lot No. 3347 under the deed of absolute sale dated
November 25, 1961, unaware that the property was a part of Lot
No. 3353, is based on mere speculations and surmises.
Iluminado Baloloy included in his application for a free patent
the property of Alejandro Gruta, and was able to secure a free
patent over said property in addition to his own. As such, Gruta,
not the respondent, is the proper party to assail such free patent,
as well as OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based thereon.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of the
respondent is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
BETTY B. LACBAYAN,
Petitioner,
- versus G.R. No. 165427
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR.,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
March 21, 2011
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DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This settles the petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner Betty B. Lacbayan against respondent Bayani S.
Samoy, Jr. assailing the September 14, 2004 Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596. The CA had
affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 224, of Quezon City declaring respondent
as the sole owner of the properties involved in this suit and
awarding to him P100,000.00 as attorneys fees.
This suit stemmed from the following facts.

Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common


friend sometime in 1978. Despite respondent being already
married, their relationship developed until petitioner gave birth
to respondents son on October 12, 1979.[3]
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent,
together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a
manpower services company.[4] Five parcels of land were also
acquired during the said period and were registered in petitioner
and respondents names, ostensibly as husband and wife. The
lands are briefly described as follows:
1.
A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar
St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 303224 and registered in
the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty Lacbayan.[5]
2.
A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main
Ave., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 23301 and registered in
the name of Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan.[6]
3.
A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag
St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. RT-38264 and registered in
the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty Lacbayan
Samoy.[7]
4.
A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel
St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 335193 and registered in
the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty L. Samoy.[8]
5.
A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don
Enrique Heights, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 90232 and
registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. married to Betty L.
Samoy.[9]
Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V.
Luna, Quezon City. In 1983, petitioner left her parents and
decided to reside in the property located in Malvar St. in Project
4, Quezon City. Later, she and their son transferred to Zobel St.,
also in Project 4, and finally to the 400-square meter property in
Don Enrique Heights.[10]
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they
decided to part ways sometime in 1991. In 1998, both parties
agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business
partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.[11] Initially,
respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the properties in
Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter,
while the ownership over the three other properties will go to

respondent.[12] However, when petitioner wanted additional


demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent
refused.[13] Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for
judicial partition[14] of the said properties before the RTC in
Quezon City on May 31, 1999.
In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent
started to live together as husband and wife in 1979 without the
benefit of marriage and worked together as business partners,
acquiring real properties amounting to P15,500,000.00.[15]
Respondent, in his Answer,[16] however, denied petitioners claim
of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of
his own personal funds without any contribution from petitioner.
[17]
During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were
together for almost 24 hours a day in 1983 until 1991,
respondent would still go home to his wife usually in the wee
hours of the morning.[18] Petitioner likewise claimed that they
acquired the said real estate properties from the income of the
company which she and respondent established.[19]
Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were
purchased from his personal funds, salaries, dividends,
allowances and commissions.[20] He countered that the said
properties were registered in his name together with petitioner
to exclude the same from the property regime of respondent and
his legal wife, and to prevent the possible dissipation of the said
properties since his legal wife was then a heavy gambler.[21]
Respondent added that he also purchased the said properties as
investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the
purchase or construction of a new building.[22]
On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.[23] In resolving the
issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give considerable weight
to petitioners own admission that the properties were acquired
not from her own personal funds but from the income of the
manpower services company over which she owns a measly
3.33% share.[24]
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting
that she is the pro indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in
dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial courts decision subjected
the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral

attack contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also


contended that it is improper to thresh out the issue on
ownership in an action for partition.[25]
Unimpressed with petitioners arguments, the appellate court
denied the appeal, explaining in the following manner:
Appellants harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of
title covering the subject realties is, to say the least, misplaced.
Rather than the validity of said certificates which was nowhere
dealt with in the appealed decision, the record shows that what
the trial court determined therein was the ownership of the
subject realties itself an issue correlative to and a necessary
adjunct of the claim of co-ownership upon which appellant
anchored her cause of action for partition. It bears emphasizing,
moreover, that the rule on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title
applies only to original and not to subsequent registration as that
availed of by the parties in respect to the properties in litigation.
To our mind, the inapplicability of said principle to the case at
bench is even more underscored by the admitted falsity of the
registration of the selfsame realties in the parties name as
husband and wife.
The same dearth of merit permeates appellants imputation of
reversible error against the trial court for supposedly failing to
make the proper delineation between an action for partition and
an action involving ownership. Typically brought by a person
claiming to be co-owner of a specified property against a
defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be coowners, an action for partition may be seen to present
simultaneously two principal issues, i.e., first, the issue of
whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought
to be partitioned and, second assuming that the plaintiff
successfully hurdles the first the issue of how the property is to
be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s). Otherwise stated,
the court must initially settle the issue of ownership for the
simple reason that it cannot properly issue an order to divide the
property witary in the resolution of an action for partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up
with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact
exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally
proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the
parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a

declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either


because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment
that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the
premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that the parties
are unable to agree upon the partition directed by the court. In
that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties
have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an
award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of
their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in
question. x x x[29] (Emphasis supplied.)
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for
partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence
of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a
co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on
the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject
properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably,
therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely
and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of
the disputed properties.[30] More importantly, the complaint will
not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not
even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.[31]
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens
title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack? Most
definitely, it would not.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be
collaterally attacked,[32] but that rule is not material to the case
at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of
title and not the title itself.[33] The certificate referred to is that
document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In
contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is,
more often than not, represented by that document.[34]
Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title.
Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the

certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both


are interchangeably used.[35]
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can
no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a
certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof
of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot
always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.
[36] In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the
name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that
the real property may be under co-ownership with persons
not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may
only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired
interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of
the certificate of title.[37] Needless to say, registration
does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the
best evidence thereof.
Finally, as to whether respondents assent to the initial
partition agreement serves as an admission against
interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have
admitted the existence of co-ownership between him and
petitioner, we rule in the negative.
An admission is any statement of fact made by a party
against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for
which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged
by him.[38] Admission against interest is governed by
Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him.
To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of
fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be
knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the
admitters interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and
inadmissible.[39]
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition
Agreement indicates that the document involves matters

which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law,


basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties
have the right to freely divide among themselves the
subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners
argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit
against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as
well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over
the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to
waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the
disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be
waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law.[40]

may file against him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees


in respondents favor is DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not


assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to
amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does
not have any right to insist on the contents of an
agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe
to the trial courts view that respondent is entitled to attorneys
fees. Unlike the trial court, we do not commiserate with
respondents predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent
was forced to litigate and engaged the services of his counsel to
defend his interest as to entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as
attorneys fees. But we note that in the first place, it was
respondent himself who impressed upon petitioner that she has a
right over the involved properties. Secondly, respondents act of
representing himself and petitioner as husband and wife was a
deliberate attempt to skirt the law and escape his legal
obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one
but himself to blame the consequences of his deceitful act which
resulted in the filing of the complaint against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani S. Samoy,
Jr. is hereby declared the sole owner of the disputed properties,
without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or

SECOND DIVISION
LEONOR B. CRUZ,
Petitioner,
- versus TEOFILA M. CATAPANG,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 164110

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
February 12, 2008
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DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision[1]
dated September 16, 2003 and the Resolution[2] dated June 11,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69250. The Court
of Appeals reversed the Decision[3] dated October 22, 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, which
had earlier affirmed the Decision[4] dated September 20, 1999 of
the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Taal, Batangas
ordering respondent to vacate and deliver possession of a
portion of the lot co-owned by petitioner, Luz Cruz and Norma
Maligaya.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows.
Petitioner Leonor B. Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the
co-owners of a parcel of land covering an area of 1,435 square
meters located at Barangay Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas.
[5] With the consent of Norma Maligaya, one of the
aforementioned co-owners, respondent Teofila M. Catapang built
a house on a lot adjacent to the abovementioned parcel of land
sometime in 1992. The house intruded, however, on a portion of
the co-owned property.[6]
In the first week of September 1995, petitioner Leonor B. Cruz
visited the property and was surprised to see a part of
respondents house intruding unto a portion of the co-owned
property. She then made several demands upon respondent to
demolish the intruding structure and to vacate the portion

encroaching on their property. The respondent, however, refused


and disregarded her demands.[7]
On January 25, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint[8] for
forcible entry against respondent before the 7th MCTC of Taal,
Batangas. The MCTC decided in favor of petitioner, ruling that
consent of only one of the co-owners is not sufficient to justify
defendants construction of the house and possession of the
portion of the lot in question.[9] The dispositive portion of the
MCTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendant or any person acting in her behalf to vacate and
deliver the possession of the area illegally occupied to the
plaintiff; ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff reasonable
attorneys fees of P10,000.00, plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On appeal, the RTC, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas, affirmed the
MCTCs ruling in a Decision dated October 22, 2001, the
dispositive portion of which states:
Wherefore, premises considered, the decision [appealed] from is
hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC,
respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals,
which reversed the RTCs decision. The Court of Appeals held
that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this case
because respondents entry into the property, considering the
consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be
characterized as one made through strategy or stealth which
gives rise to a cause of action for forcible entry.[12] The Court of
Appeals decision further held that petitioners remedy is not an
action for ejectment but an entirely different recourse with the
appropriate forum. The Court of Appeals disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED. The challenged Decision dated 22 October
2001 as well as the Order dated 07 January 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court of Taal, Batangas, Branch 86, are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and, in lieu thereof, another is entered
DISMISSING the complaint for forcible entry docketed as Civil
Case No. 71-T.
SO ORDERED.[13]

After petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the


Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated June 11, 2004, she filed
the instant petition.
Raised before us for consideration are the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF COOWNER NORMA MALIGAYA IS A VALID LICENSE FOR THE
RESPONDENT TO ERECT THE BUNGALOW HOUSE ON THE
PREMISES OWNED PRO-INDIVISO SANS CONSENT FROM
THE PETITIONER AND OTHE[R] CO-OWNER[.]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT, BY HER ACTS, HAS
ACQUIRED EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OVER THE PORTION OF
THE LOT SUBJECT OF THE PREMISES PURSUANT TO THE
CONSENT GRANTED UNTO HER BY CO-OWNER NORMA
MALIGAYA TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE PETITIONER AND
THE OTHER CO-OWNER.[14]
III.
. . . WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IN FACT OBTAINED
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BY MEANS OF
SIMPLE STRATEGY.[15]
Petitioner prays in her petition that we effectively reverse the
Court of Appeals decision.
Simply put, the main issue before us is whether consent given by
a co-owner of a parcel of land to a person to construct a house
on the co-owned property warrants the dismissal of a forcible
entry case filed by another co-owner against that person.
In her memorandum,[16] petitioner contends that the consent
and knowledge of co-owner Norma Maligaya cannot defeat the
action for forcible entry since it is a basic principle in the law of
co-ownership that no individual co-owner can claim title to any
definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until
partition.
On the other hand, respondent in her memorandum[17] counters
that the complaint for forcible entry cannot prosper because her
entry into the property was not through strategy or stealth due
to the consent of one of the co-owners. She further argues that
since Norma Maligaya is residing in the house she built, the

issue is not just possession de facto but also one of possession de


jure since it involves rights of co-owners to enjoy the property.
As to the issue of whether or not the consent of one co-owner
will warrant the dismissal of a forcible entry case filed by
another co-owner against the person who was given the consent
to construct a house on the co-owned property, we have held that
a co-owner cannot devote common property to his or her
exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership.[18] In our
view, a co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to build a
house on the co-owned property, which is an act tantamount to
devoting the property to his or her exclusive use.
Furthermore, Articles 486 and 491 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common,
provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for which it
is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the
co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it
according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may
be changed by agreement, express or implied.
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the
others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even
though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the
withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is
clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford
adequate relief.
Article 486 states each co-owner may use the thing owned in
common provided he does so in accordance with the purpose for
which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the
interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from
using it according to their rights. Giving consent to a third
person to construct a house on the co-owned property will injure
the interest of the co-ownership and prevent other co-owners
from using the property in accordance with their rights.
Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the
consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in
common. It necessarily follows that none of the co-owners can,
without the consent of the other co-owners, validly consent to
the making of an alteration by another person, such as
respondent, in the thing owned in common. Alterations include
any act of strict dominion or ownership and any encumbrance or
disposition has been held implicitly to be an act of alteration.[19]

The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act


of dominion. Therefore, it is an alteration falling under Article
491 of the Civil Code. There being no consent from all coowners, respondent had no right to construct her house on the
co-owned property.
Consent of only one co-owner will not warrant the dismissal of
the complaint for forcible entry filed against the builder. The
consent given by Norma Maligaya in the absence of the consent
of petitioner and Luz Cruz did not vest upon respondent any
right to enter into the co-owned property. Her entry into the
property still falls under the classification through strategy or
stealth.
The Court of Appeals held that there is no forcible entry because
respondents entry into the property was not through strategy or
stealth due to the consent given to her by one of the co-owners.
We cannot give our imprimatur to this sweeping conclusion.
Respondents entry into the property without the permission of
petitioner could appear to be a secret and clandestine act done
in connivance with co-owner Norma Maligaya whom respondent
allowed to stay in her house. Entry into the land effected
clandestinely without the knowledge of the other co-owners
could be categorized as possession by stealth.[20] Moreover,
respondents act of getting only the consent of one co-owner, her
sister Norma Maligaya, and allowing the latter to stay in the
constructed house, can in fact be considered as a strategy which
she utilized in order to enter into the co-owned property. As
such, respondents acts constitute forcible entry.
Petitioners filing of a complaint for forcible entry, in our view,
was within the one-year period for filing the complaint. The oneyear period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is
generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land.
However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year
period is counted from the time the petitioner learned about it.
[21] Although respondent constructed her house in 1992, it was
only in September 1995 that petitioner learned of it when she
visited the property. Accordingly, she then made demands on
respondent to vacate the premises. Failing to get a favorable
response, petitioner filed the complaint on January 25, 1996,
which is within the one-year period from the time petitioner
learned of the construction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated


September 16, 2003 and the Resolution dated June 11, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69250 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 22, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Taal, Batangas is REINSTATED.
Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.

LILIA SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.


VICTORINO S. ALVARO as Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 120,
Caloocan City, and VIRGINIA TERIA, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8
January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182.
Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square
meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was registered
under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo
Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married to
Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez,
single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe
Sanchez.[1] On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under
TCT No. 289216 in the name of private respondent Virginia Teria
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been
executed on 23 June 1995[2] by all six (6) co-owners in her favor.
[3] Petitioner claimed that she did not affix her signature on the
document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus
prompting private respondent Virginia Teria to file an action for
recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City sometime in September
1995, subsequently raffled to Br. 49 of that court.
On 12 February 1998, the MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City ruled in
favor of private respondent declaring that the sale was valid only
to the extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the
property of petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of
Absolute Sale having been established as a forgery.
Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, subsequently assigned to Br. 120, which ordered
the parties to file their respective memoranda of appeal. Counsel
for petitioner did not comply with this order, nor even inform her

of the developments in her case. Petitioner not having filed any


pleading with the RTC of Caloocan City, the trial court affirmed
the 27 July 1998 decision of the MeTC.
On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance
of a writ of execution in favor of private respondent Virginia
Teria, buyer of the property. On 4 November 1999 or a year later,
a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff upon petitioner who
however refused to heed the Notice.
On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing
petitioners house without any special permit of demolition from
the court.
Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May
1999 petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of the premises
that used to serve as the houses toilet and laundry area.
On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from
Judgment with the RTC on the ground that she was not bound by
the inaction of her counsel who failed to submit petitioners
appeal memorandum. However the RTC denied the Petition and
the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari with
the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the court a quo.
On 23 May 2001 the appellate court dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. On 18 June 2001 petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in
its Resolution of 8 January 2002.
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
challenged case before it.
As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this Court to
issue the so-called extraordinary writs should generally be
exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of

Appeals or before constitutional or other tribunals or agencies


the acts of which for some reason or other are not controllable
by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of the extraordinary
writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the
Regional Trial Court, it is either of these courts that the specific
action for the procurement of the writ must be presented.
However, this Court must be convinced thoroughly that two (2)
grounds exist before it gives due course to a certiorari petition
under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of its or his jurisdiction; and (b) There is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are giving
due course to this petition as there are matters that require
immediate resolution on the merits to effect substantial justice.
The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to
promote their object of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action or proceeding.[4]
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed
to aid the courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive
determination of the cases before them. Liberal construction of
the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect
substantial justice.[5] Litigations should, as much as possible, be
decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities.[6]
Verily, the negligence of petitioners counsel cannot be deemed as
negligence of petitioner herself in the case at bar. A notice to a
lawyer who appears to have been unconscionably irresponsible
cannot be considered as notice to his client.[7] Under the
peculiar circumstances of this case, it appears from the records
that counsel was negligent in not adequately protecting his
clients interest, which necessarily calls for a liberal construction
of the Rules.
The rationale for this approach is explained in Ginete v. Court of
Appeals - [8]

This Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular


case from its operation where the appellate court failed to obtain
jurisdiction over the case owing to appellants failure to perfect
an appeal. Hence, with more reason would this Court suspend its
own rules in cases where the appellate court has already
obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case. This prerogative to
relax procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms
of compliance, such as the period to appeal has been invoked
and granted in a considerable number of cases x x x x
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of
Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter
even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final,
as we are now constrained to do in the instant case x x x x
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every
party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held
that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override
substantial justice.
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would
warrant the suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory
character and an examination and review by the appellate court
of the lower courts findings of fact, the other elements that
should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case,
(c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory,
and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.[9]
The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the
procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or

negligence of petitioner. Besides, substantial justice requires


that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the present
controversy that was brought about by the absence of any
partition agreement among the parties who were co-owners of
the subject lot in question. Hence, giving due course to the
instant petition shall put an end to the dispute on the property
held in common.
In Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Tiongco[10] we
held:
There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally
notice to counsel is notice to parties, and that such doctrine has
beneficent effects upon the prompt dispensation of justice. Its
application to a given case, however, should be looked into and
adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances; otherwise,
in the courts desire to make a short-cut of the proceedings, it
might foster, wittingly or unwittingly, dangerous collusions to the
detriment of justice. It would then be easy for one lawyer to sell
ones rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot
every process of the court affecting his clients, because he was
so busy. Under this circumstance, one should not insist that a
notice to such irresponsible lawyer is also a notice to his clients.
Thus, we now look into the merits of the petition.
This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law:
co-ownership. Throughout the proceedings from the MeTC to the
Court of Appeals, the notion of co-ownership[11] was not
sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to address this controversy in
the interest of substantial justice. Certiorari should therefore be
granted to cure this grave abuse of discretion.
Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as the right of common
dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a
thing, not materially or physically divided.[12] Manresa defines it
as the manifestation of the private right of ownership, which
instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner
over the things subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners

and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the
same.[13]
The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects,
who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which
means that there is a single object which is not materially
divided, and which is the element which binds the subjects, and,
(c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights
and obligations of the co-owners.[14]
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other
co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether
established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the
property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial
nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of
his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the
interest of his co-owners.[15]
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties
in co-ownership is to create an express trust among the heirs as
co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and
every co-owner is a trustee for the others.[16]
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no
individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion
thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire land or thing.[17]
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided
interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of it,
i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided
interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners.
[18] But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or
determinate part of the thing owned in common because his
right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion
without any physical adjudication.[19]
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property,
the metes and bounds of petitioners lot has not been designated.
As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily

entered into by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the


property must be respected. Partition needs to be effected to
protect her right to her definite share and determine the
boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done without
prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as
buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its Resolution
dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182 is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. A survey of the questioned lot with TCT No.
289216 (formerly TCT No. 263624) by a duly licensed geodetic
engineer and the PARTITION of the aforesaid lot are ORDERED.
Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49,
Caloocan City to effect the aforementioned survey and partition,
as well as segregate the 1/6 portion appertaining to petitioner
Lilia Sanchez.
The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to Virginia
Teria shall be RESPECTED insofar as the other undivided 5/6
portion of the property is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.

from which it was derived, is a nullity as the CFI of Rizal, Branch


VI, was not sitting as a land registration court, but as a court of
ordinary jurisdiction.
During the pendency of this case, Petitioners filed a
manifestation alleging that the case at bar is closely connected
with G.R. No. L-46953, Jose N. Mayuga et. al. v. The Court of
Appeals, Macondray Farms, Inc., Realty Sales Enterprise, inc.,
et. al. and moved for consolidation of the two cases involving as
they do the same property. By Resolution of August 29, 1984,
this Court denied the motion for consolidation.

ISSUE:WON the case at hand and G.R. No. L-46953 should be


consolidated?

RULING:
NO, they should not be consolidated.
Quieting of Title
Realty Sales Ent. Inc., v. IAC
GR L-67451, September 28, 1987
FACTS:
Two (2) adjacent parcels of land located in Almanza, Las
Pias, Metro Manila are covered by three (3) distinct sets of
Torrens titles, one of which is TCT No. 20408 issued in the name
of Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc., pursuant to Decree No. N-63394
in LRC Cases Nos. 657, 758 and 976, GLRO Record Nos. N29882, N-33721 and N-43516, respectively.
In 1977, Morris Carpo filed a complaint for "declaration of
nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No. 20408." The
complaint alleged that TCT No. 20408 as well as OCT No. 1609

The Supreme Court emphasized that the action filed by


Carpo against Realty is in the nature of an action to
remove clouds from title to real property. By asserting its
own title to the property in question and asking that Carpo's title
be declared null and void instead, and by filing the third-party
complaint against QCDFC, Realty was similarly asking the court
to remove clouds from its own title. Actions of such nature are
governed by Articles 476 to 481, Quieting of Title of the Civil
Code and Rule 64, Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies of
the Rules of Court.
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem,
are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against
person in respect of the res, these proceedings
characterized as quasi in rem. (McDaniel v. McElvy, 108

nor
the
are
So.

820 [1926].) The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only


between the parties. (Sandejas v. Robles, 81 Phil. 421
[1948]).The ruling in this case is therefore without any prejudice
to this Court's final determination of G.R. No. L-46953 a case
involving the validity of the compromise agreement between the
parties in this case.

Lucasan V PDIC.
To avail of the remedy of QUIETING OF TITLE, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject of action; and

Neither can Lucasan capitalize on PBC's failure to file a petition


for consolidation of ownership after the expiration of the
redemption period. with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year
redemption period forecloses the obligor's right to redeem ans
that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance thereafter
of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere
confirmation of the title that is already vested in the purchaser.
Certainly, Lucasan no longer possess any legal or equitable title
to or interest over the subject parcels of land; hence, he cannot
validly maintain an action for quieting of title.
_______________________________________________
Cownership

the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be


casting cloud on his title must be shown in fact invalid or
inoperative despite it prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.

HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. et. al. v. SERVACIO and GO


G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011
Persons And Family Relations

Stated simply, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal title or
at least an equitable title over the real property in dispute, and
that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy.

Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code,


any disposition of the conjugal property after the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation;
otherwise, the disposition is void.

Unfortunately, the foregoing requisites are wanting in this case.


Lucasan admitted that he failed to redeem the property during
the redemption period, on account of his ten limited financial
situation. It was only 15 years later that he manifested his desire
to reacquire the properties. Clearly thus, he had lost whatever
right ha had over the lots.
The payment of loans made by Lucasan cannot in any way
operate to restore whatever right he had over the subject
properties. Such payment only extinguished his loan obligations
to the mortgagee banks and the liens which Lucasan claimed
were subsisting at the time of the registration of the notice of
embargo and certification of sale.

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in


respect of Martas share in the conjugal partnership, could not
yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share
without an actual partition of the property being first done either
by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had
was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share. Nonetheless, a
co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had
the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but
not the interest of his co-owners.
Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners
without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily
void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby

effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner


of Martas share. Article 105 of the Family Code, supra,
expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on
dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws."
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of
the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in
common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or
co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the
common property as if it continued to remain in the possession
of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v.
Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for
the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any
portion that might not be validly sold to her.

In 1979, respondent Hular had his house constructed near the


trail (road) on Lot No. 3347, which, however, occupied a big
portion of Lot No. 3353.
Iluminado died intestate on November 29, 1985. His widow and
their children continued residing in the property, while petitioner
Reynaldo Baloloy, one of Iluminados children, later constructed
his house near that of his deceased father. When Astrologo died,
he was survived by his children, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Elena,
Leo, Teresita, and the respondent, among others, who continued
to reside in their house.
Sometime in l991 the respondent had Lot No. 3353 surveyed and
discovered that the residential area deeded by Lagata to
Astrologo Hular had an area of 1,405 square meters, instead of
287 square meters only.

______________________________________________________
CASE DIGEST: Baloloy v Hular
(Note: This case have several issues but only the issue about coownership was presented in this digest)
FACTS: Spouses Lino and Victoriana Estopin were the original
owners of a parcel of land located in Barangay Biriran, Juban,
Sorsogon ( Lot No. 3347 ) of the Juban Cadastre. A major
portion of the property was agricultural, while the rest was
residential. November 11 and 25, 1961: When Lino Estopin died
intestate, his widow, Victoriana Lagata, executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale on over the agricultural portion of Lot No. 3347,
( 15,906 sqm) and the residential portion of the property (287
sqm) to Astrologo Hular. In 1961 or thereabouts: Iluminado
asked Hulars permission to construct a house on a portion of Lot
No. 3347 near the road, and the latter agreed.
Iluminado Baloloy in 1945 acquired a coconut land (north of the
residential portion of Lot 3347 Lot No. 3353 (9302 sqm) and
registered the same. Iluminado constructed his house on a
portion of Lot No. 3353. He and his family, including his
children, forthwith resided in said house.

Respondent Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for quieting of title of


real property against the children and heirs of Iluminado Baloloy,
namely, Anacorita, Antonio, and petitioners Reynaldo and
Adelina, all surnamed Baloloy. He prayed among others that he
be declared the absolute owner of the property in question.
ISSUE: Whether all the indispensable parties had been
impleaded by the respondent in the trial court (NO)
RULING: Respondent adduced evidence that when his parents
died intestate, they were survived by their children, the
respondent and his siblings Elena, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Leo,
and Teresita.
Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two
or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before
partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
payment of the debts of the deceased. Under Article 487 of the
New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a
reinvidicatory action. If the action is for the benefit of the

plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to


the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he
impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming
sole ownership over the subject property and praying that he be
declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other
co- owners had waived their rights over the subject property or
conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were
aware of the case in the trial court.
______________________________________________________
Lacbayan vs. Samoy
Monday, June 16, 2014
Facts:
Betty Lacbayan (petitioner) and Bayani S. Samoy (respondent)
had an illicit relationship.
During their relationship, they, together with three more
incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services
company.
The company acquired five parcels of land were registered in
petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as husband and
wife.
When their relationship turned sour, they decided to divide the
said properties and terminate their business partnership by
executing a Partition Agreement.
Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners proposal that the
properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to
the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties
will go to respondent.
However, when Lacbayan wanted additional demands to be
included in the partition agreement, Samoy refused.
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial
partition of the said properties.
Petitioners contention: She claimed that they started to live
together as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of
marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring
real properties amounting to P15,500,000.00.
Respondents contention: He purchased the properties using his
own personal funds.

RTC and CA ruled in favor or respondent.


Issues:
1. WON an action for partition precludes a settlement on the
issue of ownership.
2. Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the
Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral
attack?
Held:
1. No.
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for
partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence
of co-ownership between the parties. Until and unless this issue
of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More
importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or
petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest
over the subject properties.
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition
Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which
necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is
a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely
divide among themselves the subject properties.
2. No.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be
collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at
bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title
and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that
document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In
contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is,
more often than not, represented by that document.
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no

longer be disputed. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the


name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the
real property may be under co-ownership with persons not
named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a
trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the
property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a
property, but may be the best evidence thereof.
Other topic:
Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership
over the subject realties.
YES. Petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the
Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to
include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist
on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to
sign.
Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to allow
respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of
his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled coownership over the said properties
______________________________________________________
LEONOR B. CRUZ, Petitioner, v. TEOFILA M. CATAPANG,
Respondent G.R. No. 164110, 2008 February 12,
Quisumbing, L.A.J.,
(Second Division) Co-owners cannot devote common property to
his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership.
Petitioners Leonor Cruz, Luz Cruz and Norma Maligaya are the
co-owners of a parcel of land covering an area of 1,435 square
meters located at Barangay Mahabang Ludlod, Taal, Batangas.
Sometime in 1992, Teofila Catapang, with the consent of Norma
Maligaya as one of the aforementioned co-owners, built a house
on a lot adjacent to the subject parcel of land. The house built
by Catapang intruded on a portion of the co-owned property.
In September 1995, Cruz learned about the intrusion and made

several demands for Catapang to demolish and vacate the part


of the structure encroaching upon their property. However,
Catapang refused and disregarded the demands of Cruz. Cruz
then filed a complaint for forcible entry against Catapang before
the MCTC of Taal, Batangas. The MCTC decided in favor of
Cruz, ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is not
sufficient to justify defendants construction of the house and
possession of the portion of the lot in question. On appeal,
the RTC affirmed the decision of the MCTC.
Catapang filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
RTCs decision and ruled in favor of her. The Court of Appeals
held that there is no cause of action for forcible entry in this
case because respondents entry into the property,
considering the consent given by co-owner Norma Maligaya,
cannot be characterized as one made through strategy or
stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for forcible
entry. Thus, the case went to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: 1.
Whether the consent given by one of the co-owners is sufficient
to warrant the dismissal of a complaint for forcible entry.
DECISION:
No, Co-owners cannot devote common property to
his or her exclusive use to the prejudice of the co-ownership. In
this case, the act of Norma Maligaya is tantamount to devoting
the property to her exclusive use. Under Article 491 of the Civil
Code, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of
the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common.
The Court ruled that it would necessarily follow that none of the
co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners,
validly give consent to the making of an alteration by another
person, such as Catapang in this case, in the thing owned in
common. In addition, Article 486 of the same Code states each
co-owner may use the thing owned in common provided he does
so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in
such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or
prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their
rights. The Court ruled that, to give consent to a third person to
construct a house on the co-owned property would be to injure
the interest of the co-ownership and would prevent other coowners from using the property in accordance with their rights.
In this case, the consent of only one co-owner will not warrant
the dismissal of the complaint for forcible entry filed against

the respondent Catapang. The consent given by Norma


Maligaya in the absence of the consent of her other co-owners
did not grant Catapang any right to enter and even build
upon the co-owned property. According to the Supreme
Court, the respondent Catapangs act of getting only the
consent of one co-owner, her sister Norma Maligaya, and
allowing the latter to stay in the constructed house, can in fact
be considered as a strategy which she utilized in order to enter
into the co-owned property. As such, respondents acts constitute
forcible entry. The petition was GRANTED
______________________________________________________
Sanchez vs CA
Facts:
Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square
meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was registered
under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo
Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married to
Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez,
single, Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe
Sanchez.[1] On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under
TCT No. 289216 in the name of private respondent Virginia Teria
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been
executed on 23 June 1995[2] by all six (6) co-owners in her
favor. Petitioner claimed that she did not affix her signature on
the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus
prompting private respondent Virginia Teria to file an action for
recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City sometime in September
1995, subsequently raffled to Br. 49 of that court.
Issue: WON the sale is valid given that one of the co owners did
not consent thereto
Held:
This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law:
co-ownership. Throughout the proceedings from the MeTC to
the Court of Appeals, the notion of co-ownership was not

sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to address this controversy in


the interest of substantial justice. Certiorari should therefore be
granted to cure this grave abuse of discretion.
Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as the right of common
dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a
thing, not materially or physically divided. Manresa defines it as
the manifestation of the private right of ownership, which
instead of being exercised by the owner in an exclusive manner
over the things subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners
and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the
same.
The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects,
who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which
means that there is a single object which is not materially
divided, and which is the element which binds the subjects, and,
(c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights
and obligations of the co-owners.
In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other
co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether
established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the
property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial
nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of
his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the
interest of his co-owners.
Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties
in co-ownership is to create an express trust among the heirs as
co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of trust and
every co-owner is a trustee for the others.
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no
individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion
thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided
interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of it,
i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided
interest to a third party independently of the other co-

owners. But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete,


specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common
because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or
ideal portion without any physical adjudication.
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property,
the metes and bounds of petitioners lot has not been
designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute
Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right to
1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be
effected to protect her right to her definite share and determine
the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done
without prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia
Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.

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